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May 24, 1976

Indian Point Station
Docket Nos. 50-247
50-286

Mr. Eldon J. Brunner, Chief
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Brunner

This refers to an inspection conducted by your Mr. J. Streeter and Mr. A. Davis on March 23-26, 1976 of activities authorized by NRC License Nos. DPR-26 and DPR-64 at our Indian Point Station. Your April 29, 1976 letter stated that it appeared that certain of our activities were not conducted in full compliance with NRC requirements. Our response to these items of apparent non-compliance is as follows (items identified the same as in Appendix A to your April 29, 1976 letter):

Infraction

The information and instructions contained in the memorandum issued by the Operations Engineer on November 17, 1975 have been incorporated in a formal procedure which is presently being reviewed. The memorandum was subsequently reviewed by the SNSC and approved and is presently being followed until the completed procedure is reviewed and approved. In the future, all operations memoranda will be reviewed by the operations staff to determine if they contain procedural steps in order to assure that pre-implementation review by SNSC is accomplished if required. The new procedure will be completed and implemented by May 28, 1976.

Deficiency A

It was the inspector's conclusion that reporting was required under Paragraph (item) C.2.a.(9) of Regulatory Guide 1.16 Revision 4. Subsequent to a second review, we still believe that reporting is not required for this item. We base this on the following reasons.

1) In Section C.2.a, nine types of events are listed which should be reported. Each of these types relate to different situations or areas of interest. The words, Component Failure or Malfunction, are not used or referenced in any way under item C.2.a.(9). It is item C.2.a(5) which addresses component failure or malfunction. However, reporting under this item is not required.

2) The "Note" following item C.2.a(6) states, "For items 2.a(5) and 2.a(6) reduced redundancy that does not result in loss of system function need not be reported under this section but may be reportable under items 2.b.(2) and 2.b(3) below". Item 2.a(5) deals with component failure or malfunction. However, a review of the reporting requirements of items 2.b.(2) and 2.b(3) does not result in a report being required for this occurrence. Again reporting of this malfunction is not required.

3) Item C.2.a(9) requires reporting of "Performance of structures, systems or components that requires remedial action or corrective measures to prevent operation in a manner less conservative than that assumed in the accident analyses in the safety analysis report or technical specification basis";

   The Technical Specification Basis (TS 4.7) for the main steam isolation valves specifies that the valves ability to close upon signal be verified at each scheduled refueling shutdown and that a closure time of five seconds is consistent with expected response time for instrumentation as detailed in the steam line break incident analysis (FSAR-Section 14.2.5). These valves are tested for closure within five seconds at each refueling outage.

   The assumption in the FSAR analyses (Section 14.2.5) is that one main steam line (stop) isolation valve does not close at all during the steam line break incident. Even under this condition, adequate protection against resultant reactor coolant system cooldown rate and reactivity insertion is provided. Performance of the system or components was therefore not less conservative than that assumed in the accident analyses or Technical Specification Basis.

The five seconds closure specified is a design operating requirement of the component (main steam isolation valve). If the component fails to perform in accordance with design requirements due to defective materials, inadequate design analyses, improper application, inaccurate specification of the environment or components otherwise unable to meet the specified functional requirements, then there is truly a failure of the component to perform as specified and required. If any changes were made to the component or system as a result of identifying any one of the conditions noted above then corrective measures to prevent operation in a manner less conservative than assumed would have been made and would be reportable. As an example, the occurrences relating to the Bergen Patterson restraints fit into this category. The above however, was not applicable to the occurrence involving the main steam isolation valve.

The failure in valve operability was a one time event and involved only one component. As such it is not viewed at this time to be a generic problem. Corrective maintenance of equipment is expected to occur in power plants. Because of this, periodic testing and preventive maintenance programs are established to identify these conditions which result or could result in component inoperability. Component failures as such, are not always generic in nature in that they are new and never considered before. A review of the examples given in Regulatory Guide 1.16 item C.2.a(9) we believe substantiates this.

Based on the above, it is still our conclusion that the occurrence involving the main steam isolation valve is not required to be reported under any of the presently identified type of events outlined as a Reportable Occurrence in the Regulatory Guide. If it is the intent of the Commission to have all component failures, regardless of cause, reported as a Reportable Occurrence, it is our belief that the existing wording must be revised or additional requirements added. This failure, in any event, would have been reported to the Commission in the next Annual Operating Report so that the Commission would have been eventually notified.

Deficiency B

The review to determine why valve 898 was open when called to be closed by the check off list was completed. However, the reason for its being opened could not be ascertained. Although the valve is called to be closed on the checkoff list there is no reason why it can not be opened by watch personnel during normal operation.

Upon completion of the present refueling outage (scheduled to be June 15, 1976) the operations staff will initiate a program whereby all accessible locked safeguards valves will be checked approximately once per quarter for correct valve alignment and locked status to assure that all such valves are as required.

Very truly yours

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