

U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
REGION I
DIVISION OF COMPLIANCE

Report of Inspection

CO Report No. 247/70-10

Licensee: CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY
Indian Point No. 2 (IP-2)
License No. CPPR-21
Category B

Dates of Inspections: October 7, 8, 13 and 14, 1970

Dates of Previous Inspections: September 8, 23 and 25, 1970

Inspected by: G. L. Madsen 11/23/70
G. L. Madsen, Reactor Inspector Date

Reviewed by: N. C. Moseley 11/23/70
N. C. Moseley, Senior Reactor Inspector Date

Proprietary Information: None

SCOPE

Announced inspections were made to the Indian Point No. 2 (IP-2) construction site on October 13 and 14, 1970 and to the Con Ed Engineering Offices on October 7 and 8, 1970. Major items covered included preoperational testing, mechanical cleanup, electrical review, closure of containment, compliance to Table A and evaluation of the pressurizer question. Mr. Spessard accompanied the inspector on October 13 and 14, 1970. Messrs. Moseley, Collins, and Brown attended the October 7, 1970 pressurizer meeting.

SUMMARY

Fifty-five percent of the Phase II system functional test procedures have been approved for use by Con Ed and Wedco. A review of the control rod drop test revealed that the proposed coverage does not meet the present compliance criteria. (Section II.A.)

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Mechanical systems cleanup is continuing. A field review of portions of systems reported to be 100 percent completed revealed the presence of some arc strikes and fitup weldments. As a result Wedco has proposed to establish inspection and cleanup teams that will work on systems just prior to attachment of insulation. Wedco and Con Ed are discussing control mechanisms for this approach. (Section B.)

Wedco and Con Ed have completed their investigation and testing relating to the welding quality on the pipe penetration bellows assemblies. Specific welder documentation is not available and assurance of welder qualification is based on past practices and subsequent NDT of welds. Wedco has completed an examination of existing documentation and field testing of the pipe penetration bellows materials and reports that existing records and field testing show acceptable results. Con Ed is presently making a final evaluation of this subject. (Section II C.1)

Concrete placement at the three containment building construction access opening is in progress. A check of records indicates acceptable control. Some rebar, protruding from previously placed concrete at the equipment hatch area, was noted to be close to the exterior surface. (Section II.C.2.)

UE&C and Wedco have established criteria for installation of protective stainless bands, between carbon steel supports and stainless pipe. (Section II.D.1.)

Wedco, Quality Control has expanded their audit program to include pipe hangers as well as seismic restraints. (Section II.D.2.)

Con Ed arranged a meeting for the purpose of discussing the evaluations relating to the pressurizer base plate question and to permit Compliance to review weldment radiographs. Subsequent to the meeting Con Ed submitted a report to DRL on this subject. (Section II.E.)

Review of documentation relating to NDT compliance to Table A for the reactor coolant boundary components has been completed. Available documentation indicates that the IP-2 plant is consistent with Table A except that the discs of seven valves have not been radiographed. (Section II.F.1.)

Con Ed expanded their electrical design review to include safeguard and protection instrument cabling. Based on the combined design review of Con Ed and Westinghouse the previous question relating to adequacy of design review is considered resolved. (Section II.G.1.)

Placement and termination of electrical cabling is about 95 percent complete. Wedco has completed their proposed electrical installation surveillance program. Con Ed is compiling data relating to the installation review performed by Westinghouse and Con Ed. (Section II.G.2.)

The plant operating and abnormal conditions procedures are nearing completion. Control mechanisms relating to field modifications and programs for checking out operating procedures were discussed. (Section II.H.)

The main steam flow nozzles have been replaced. Checkout of weld records revealed no deficiencies. The subject area is scheduled to receive a hydrostatic test. This item is considered to be satisfactorily resolved. (Section II.I.)

The Nuclear Facility Safety Committee is functioning at IP-1 as outlined in the IP-2 FSAR and will assume a similar role at IP-2 when the operating permit is issued. An Ad Hoc subcommittee has been organized to perform similar functions in the areas of preoperational testing, core loading, operating procedures, and construction quality assurance. (Section II.J.)

A final records review of the service water system revealed that certain weld documentation was not available. On the basis of existing information Wedco and Con Ed contend that reasonable evidence does exist for the welding workmanship. (Section II.K.)

A listing of items requiring resolution and for followup is included in this report. (Section II.M.)

DETAILS

I. Persons Contacted

Con Ed

Mr. F. McElwee, Resident Construction Manager
Mr. A. Corcoran, Construction Project Superintendent
Mr. J. Grob, Chief Mechanical Engineer
Mr. G. Wasilenko, Assistant Division Engineer
Mr. A. Nesterok, Associate Engineer
Mr. E. Dadson, Quality Assurance Supervisor
Mr. A. Kohler, Nuclear Engineer, Construction Department
Mr. R. Cosgrove, Mechanical Engineer, Startup
Mr. R. Schuster, Quality Control Inspector
Mr. T. Houlihan, Quality Control Inspector

Wedco

Mr. M. Snow, Manager, Reliability
Mr. W. Dibeler, Manager, Site Quality Control
Mr. M. Griffin, Manager, Electrical Construction
Mr. J. Dombrowski, Assistant Manager
Mr. D. Boreheus, Electrical Engineer

Westinghouse

Mr. H. Skow, Electrical Power Systems
Mr. O. Hauge, Manager, Project Engineering

Attendance for October 7, 1970 Meeting

Con Ed

Mr. J. Grob
Mr. A. Flynn
Mr. G. Waselinko
Mr. J. Coulch
Mr. A. Zeuther
Mr. E. Dadson
Mr. H. Luck
Mr. A. Nesterok
Mr. G. Case

Westinghouse, Atomic Power Division

Mr. O. Hauge
Mr. B. Nelson

Westinghouse, Tampa Division

Mr. F. Brown
Mr. R. Anderson

Southwest Research

Mr. E. Norris
Mr. S. Wenx

U. S. Testing

Mr. C. McDonnell

Royal Globe Insurance Company

Mr. F. Forti
Mr. P. Kandel
Mr. L. Crowell

Compliance

Mr. N. Moseley
Mr. J. Collins
Mr. R. Brown
Mr. G. Madsen

II. Results of Inspection

A. Preoperational Testing

1. Status of Procedure Preparation

Fifty-five percent of the Phase II system preoperational test procedures have been approved for use by Con Ed and Wedco. An additional 25 percent have been issued by Wedco for review by Con Ed.

2. Review of System Functional Test Procedures

The control rod drop test procedure No. 4.10.2 was reviewed. The procedure calls for the following drop test measurements:

- a. All (53) control rods in the ambient and no flow condition.
- b. Ten rods in the ambient and flow condition.
- c. Ten rods in the hot and no flow condition.
- d. All (53) control rods in the hot and flow condition.

The inspector informed Con Ed that the proposed drop testing appears to be lacking and fails to meet the present compliance criteria. Upon request, the inspector indicated that recent testing at Westinghouse plants indicates that a minimum program should be equivalent to drop testing all control rod in the cold-no-flow, cold-flow, hot-no-flow, and hot-flow conditions and in addition drop testing the slowest and fast rods a total of 20 times in the hot-flow condition. Mr. Kohler indicated that this subject would be given consideration.

B. Mechanical Systems Cleanup

Wedco indicated that mechanical cleanup was completed for portions of systems defined by the following hydrostatic test procedure boundaries.

<u>Test No.</u>	<u>Boundary</u>
3.1.2	Thermal Barrier Hydro
3.5	RCS Hydro
3.6 and 3.8	Pressurizer Relief tank and lines to the pressurizer safety and relief valves
3.7	Reactor Vessel leakoff
3.9	SIS Accumulators to motor operated accumulator valves and from the accumulators to the nitrogen supply
3.13	Main steam - between the steam generators and the isolation valves

A field review of the systems included in portions covered in Test Procedures 3.5, 3.6, 3.8 and 3.13 provided satisfactory findings; however, the system covered by test procedure 3.9 contained identified arc strikes and fitup attachment welds which had not been cleaned up. The inspector informed Con Ed of these findings. Con Ed agreed that the above noted conditions should not exist and this was an indication of a failing in the cleanup program. As a result of these findings, Wedco has proposed to establish inspection and cleanup teams that will work on systems just prior to attachment of insulation thereby eliminating the potential for arc strikes and weld splattering of the system that has received a final cleanup. Wedco and Con Ed are presently discussing control mechanisms for this approach.

C. Containment

1. Pipe Penetrations

As previously reported, questions have been raised with regard to weldment quality and material compatibility at the pipe penetration expansion bellows for the containment building*. Con Ed informed the inspector that specific welder documentation is not available; however, during the time that the welds were made it was UE&C policy to qualify welders as soon as they arrived at the site; therefore, Wedco and Con Ed maintain that in compliance with Paragraph 5.1.4.5 of the FSAR, only welders qualified to Section IX of the ASME Code were utilized. Even though not specifically required by specifications, Wedco ground and magnetic particle tested 59 of these welds and visually examined 8 others which were not accessible for MT. All inspected welds were reported to be of acceptable quality. Wedco and Con Ed agree that no further testing of subject welds is required.

With regard to lack of complete material documentation, Wedco performed an examination of existing records and conducted field acid testing to determine the identification of the bellows material. A summary of the record requirements versus actual existing records for the 24 expansion joints follows:

<u>Requirements</u>	<u>Existing Records</u>
Welder qualifications (long seam on S.S. bellows)	None
Radiography reports (long seam on S. S. bellows)	Acceptance reports on 22 bellows
Liquid penetrant test	Reports on 24 joints (3 unsigned)

Requirements

Existing Records

Hydrostatic test

Reports on 24 joints

Hardware material certifications

Reports on 38 pieces

Bellows material certifications -
supplier

None (except S. S. ident.
on R.T. reports)

Bellows material certification -
Field Acid tests

Reports on 24
All positive - S.S.

Wedco reports that all existing material records and test reports show acceptable results for the items listed. The R.T. reports from an independent laboratory, identified the bellows material as stainless steel.

UE&C design engineering and Wedco have completed their review of existing reports and documentation and have concluded that, although incomplete, there is sufficient evidence to assure that the materials and testing meet the essential requirements of the specification for this application. Con Ed engineering is presently making a final evaluation of this subject. The inspector will await Con Ed's position on this item.

2. Containment Closure

Concrete placement is in progress at the three construction access openings for the containment building. A check of Wedco Quality Control records indicated to the inspector that;

- a. Approvals to place concrete gave consideration to cleanliness and adequacy of spacing between the forms and rebar.
- b. Approved concrete design mixes are being utilized.
- c. Cylinder break strengths for 3000 psi design concrete was averaging about 3700 psi for seven days.

The inspectors noted rebar, that was protruding from previously placed concrete in the equipment hatch area, to be close to the exterior surface. Con Ed was informed of this observation and agreed to give this condition special consideration during future concrete form placement at this location.

D. Pipe Supports

1. Protective Bands

As previously reported, UE&C recommended that carbon supports should be anchored to stainless pipe or a 20 gauge stainless protective band should be provided*. Westinghouse was of the opinion that the installation of protective bands should be limited to systems where normal temperatures exceed 300° F. As a result, UE&C reviewed their original recommendation and concluded that certain minor modifications could be made; however, they did not concur with the Westinghouse recommendation. The inspector was provided with a listing which indicates modifications required for hangers and supports in the nuclear plant. Westinghouse and Con Ed agree with the latest position presented by UE&C and installation modifications are presently in progress.

2. Wedco Quality Control

As previously reported, Wedco Quality Control plans to perform a 100 percent audit of seismic restraints; however, no additional review was planned for some 4100 hangers**. The inspector was informed that audits of the hangers would be performed and that the present program includes a 100 percent review of the safety injection, service water and feedwater systems. The inspector indicated that the revised program appears to be responsive and the previous concerns on this item is considered to be resolved.

E. Pressurizer

As previously reported, preservice UT inspection of the pressurizer welds identified questionable conditions relating to the base plate material***. Subsequent UT of the area in question was performed and pertinent information relating to this subject was reported****. Con Ed arranged a meeting for the purpose of discussing the evaluations of the pressurizer base plate question and to permit Compliance's review of radiographs of the pressurizer weldments. Additional pertinent information presented, for the pressurizer plate material, included the following:

*CO Report No. 247/70-8, Paragraph II.I.

**CO Report No. 247/70-9, Paragraph D.2.e.

***CO Report No. 247/70-8, Paragraph II.J.

****CO Report No. 247/70-9, Paragraph II.E. and Inquiry Memorandum No. 247/70-A.

1. Base plate material records are available for correlating base material to the specific pressurizer. Records indicate that UT of the plates did not identify conditions that do not meet the requirements of ASME Section III.
2. Vendor records indicate that MT and PT of the plate edges was performed after forming of the plate and after the weld preparation was completed; and no weld repairs were required.
3. A Compliance review of weldment radiographs, prior to and after cladding, revealed that the radiographs were of good quality and no questionable conditions were identified.
4. Removable insulation is being installed in the area in question to permit easy accessibility for future inspections.
5. The applicant and his consultants believe that lamination of the base plate does not exist; however, a series of metallic or nonmetallic inclusions are present. In addition the applicant is of the opinion that the vessel was constructed to and meets the fabrication requirements of ASME Section III.

Questions raised by Compliance included:

1. Could the presence of inclusions cause dilution of the welds and what is the future probability of cracking from this condition?
2. Can the Inservice Inspection requirements of ASME Section XI be applied to the area in question?

Subsequent to the meeting Con Ed submitted a report to DRL on the pressurizer subject. CO:HQ and DRL are presently evaluating the pressurizer question and investigative findings.

F. Reactor Pressure Boundary

Con Ed and Westinghouse have completed their review of documentation relating to code compliance and/or the Table A NDT for reactor pressure boundary components. The inspector was presented with documentation* addressed to the Con Ed Vice President of Engineering which indicated

*Memo to Mr. Cahill, V.P., from J. Grob, Chief Mechanical Engineer, dated 10/6/70.

that the IP-2 plant is consistent with the Table A requirements except for seven valve discs which were not radiographed. The scope of the valve review program and the lack of radiography of the seven valves discs was previously reported*. Con Ed's position is that in all cases the above valves are separated from the reactor coolant system by at least two other isolation valves and therefore, in the event that the discs failed, no loss of coolant would occur. Furthermore, Con Ed points out that the integrity of the valve discs in question have been proven by hydrostatic testing. Con Ed's present position with regard to Table A is that their investigative efforts are complete and no further action is contemplated. The inspector indicated that the findings relative to Table A will be transmitted to Compliance Headquarters for review with DRL as previously discussed**. Con Ed will be informed by the Region I Compliance Office if further actions are required.

G. Electrical

1. Electrical Design Review

As previously reported, Con Ed performed design reviews relative to separation of redundant safeguards power and control cabling; however, only a small sample of associated instrument cables had received a similar evaluation***. As a result of field findings on the containment pressure instrumentation****, Con Ed expanded their design review of the safeguard and protection instrument cabling. This design review included routing from control room cabinet terminals, sensors, transmitter racks, terminal boxes and entrance to the proper channel cable tray. The review revealed two additional areas which required evaluation. The two areas involved the following:

- a. The turbine first stage for permissive circuit. Two cables came together in a common tray. Cables are scheduled to be placed in separate trays.
- b. Channel 3 and 4 on steam line differential pressure to safeguards was scheduled to have cables running through a common conduit. Investigation of this item revealed that the cable was installed to the conduit schedule and UE&C was aware of the error in design and had processed a correction to the cable schedule which will place the cables in separate conduits.

*CO Report No. 247/70-8, Paragraph II.D.2.

**CO Report No. 247/70-2, Paragraph II.C.2.

***CO Report No. 247/70-6, Paragraph II.B.1.

****CO Report No. 247/70-7, Paragraph II.B.1.

Con Ed indicated that most of the protective and safeguards instrument cabling was included in this review. A review by the inspector indicated a coverage in excess of 90 percent.

Discussions with Westinghouse revealed that they have also performed independent design reviews on some 340 safeguard and protection cables. This number included power, control, and instrument cabling. Westinghouse reports that no significant deficiencies were identified; therefore, no additional routing and separation design review was performed.

Based on the combined design review of Westinghouse and Con Ed the inspector considers the previous question* relating to adequacy of design review to be resolved.

2. Electrical Cable Installation

Placement and termination of electrical cabling is about 95 percent complete. Wedco has completed their previously proposed surveillance program relating to conformance of cable installation to the cable pulling schedule**. Wedco reports that the review revealed that the cables for the two boric acid pumps were in a common conduit. Investigation by Wedco revealed that the cables were installed to the original cable schedule. Westinghouse personnel indicate that initially the cables for the boric acid transfer pumps were not separated during design; however, later considerations resulted in a change in design and the cables were scheduled to be separated prior to the finding in the field. Other conditions noted during the field review included:

- a. Parts of trays omitted. Generally found to exist at the ends of a cable tray. These trays are being extended.
- b. Some labeling of cable trays was missing.

Con Ed is presently in the process of compiling data on installation review coverage completed by Westinghouse and their staff. On completion of this activity Con Ed indicated that they would take a position relative to the acceptability of electrical cable installation.

*CO Report No. 247/-1, Appendix A.

**CO Report No. 247/70-5, Paragraph II.B.2.

H. Operating Procedures

Con Ed personnel indicated that the operating and abnormal conditions procedures are nearing completion. The present completion target date is October 31, 1970.

As previously reported, the proposed abnormal conditions procedure outline did not include the loss of instrument air or containment integrity*. No indication was presented which implied that the present procedures cover these two conditions. These items will receive additional evaluation during future reviews by Compliance.

The inspector inquired as to the availability of completed procedures for Compliance's review under the following terms:

1. The procedures so borrowed do not consequently become part of the docket.
2. Future changes in the procedure by the licensee must not be restricted because of the loan.
3. Compliance's review is for the purpose of understanding the scope and depth of the procedures and does not constitute or imply a step-by-step review or approval of the procedure.
4. The procedures will be returned at the approximate time specified by the licensee.

Mr. McCormack stated that under these terms, a copy of the procedures would be available for usage by Compliance.

The inspector asked if Con Ed had an outlined program for checking out operating procedures during hot functional testing and power ascension which would also include involvement by all operators. Mr. McCormack indicated that such a written program does not exist; however, it is their intent to do considerable checkouts of the procedures during these periods.

The inspector inquired as to mechanism for control of field modification of a system during the later phases of construction and means by which operation procedures and training programs are altered to reflect modification. Mr. McCormack stated that throughout the period of preoperational testing and after acceptance of a system that modifications require issuance of a work authorization by Con Ed.

This is the primary control mechanism. Secondly Con Ed receives updated drawings which are funneled to the people who have the principal responsibility for training and operating procedures for the modified system. Periodically the operating procedures will require updating to assure that the context reflects the latest system status.

I. Main Steam System.

The four main steam flow nozzles were previously rejected during site receipt inspection and pipe spool pieces were installed to permit hydrostatic testing of this system*. The replacement flow nozzles have been received and installed. The inspector witnessed Con Ed's checkout of weld records for this area and no deficiencies were identified. The subject area is scheduled to receive a hydrostatic test. This subject is considered to be satisfactorily resolved.

J. Nuclear Facility Safety Committee PI 3800/1 Attachment No.8

The FSAR** outlines plans relative to the organizational makeup, functions and responsibilities of the Nuclear Facility Safety Committee. Mr. McCormack indicated that the committee is presently functioning at IP-1 as described in the IP-2 FSAR and will assume similar functions when the IP-2 operating license is issued. The inspector inquired as to similar committee coverage which applies to IP-2 until the operating license is issued. Mr. McCormack stated that an Ad Hoc Subcommittee had been organized and is performing similar functions in the areas of preoperational testing, core loading, operating procedure preoperation, and construction Quality Assurance. Mr. McCormack indicated that many of the Nuclear Safety Committee members are also on this Ad Hoc Subcommittee and that one meeting had been held to date and the second meeting was scheduled for October 15, 1970. The inspector asked if meeting minutes were being prepared. Mr. McCormack answered in the affirmative and stated the minutes would be available to the inspector.

K. Service Water System

During the final records review of welding documentation of the service water system, Con Ed became aware that certain welding documentation was not available. As a result, Wedco performed a detail review of available records and requirements for this system. Wedco contends that the welders for this work were qualified to ASME Section IX as required by Power Piping Code ASA-B.31-1-1955. This was verified verbally by some people still at the site who were present during the installation of the system, and

*CO Report No. 247/70-4, Paragraph II.1.

**Volume IV, Section 12.5 and Volume V, Question 12.3.

in addition, although not specifically required, the welder identification numbers can be traced back to specific field welds in approximately 70 percent of the cases. In addition, Wedco contends that the welds were magnetic particle tested, which can also be verified verbally by people still at the site and 70 percent documentation exists. On the above basis, Wedco contends that reasonable evidence does exist, relating to welding workmanship, for the service water system. Con Ed has also evaluated the situation and agrees with the Wedco conclusion. The above condition indicates that documentation does not meet the requirements of today's Quality Assurance Criteria; however, reasonable evidence appears to be available for the acceptance of the system.

L. Resolution of Previously Identified Items (CO Report reference in parenthesis)

1. Replacement of Main steam flow nozzles (247/70-4 Section II.I). The resolution is included in Section II.I of this report.
2. Need for an independent electrical cable design review (247/70-1, Appendix A). Resolution included in Section II.G 1. of this report.
3. Removal of 80 foot of IP-1 stack. May be deferred until a convenient time in the next few years but prior to commencement of operation of IP-3.*
4. Containment pipe penetration bellows weld quality, 247/70-6, (Section II F). Resolution contained in (Section II C.1) of this report.

M. Items Requiring Followup

Resolution is required for the following items (CO Report reference in parenthesis):

1. SIS Valves-CF8 vs. CF8M (247/69-11, Section II. B. 3.)
2. Reactor Pressure Boundary - Table A (247/69-11, Section II.C.)
3. Fuel Storage Building - completion of preops - FSAR discrepancies (247/69-9, Section II. G.)
4. Pipe Supports - Stainless Shims (247/69-9, Section II. J.)

*ACRS letter to Chairman Seaborg dated September 23, 1970.

5. Code "N" Stamp on Section III, Class "C" Vessels (247/69-7, Section II. N.)
6. Lateness of Preoperational Procedure Preparation (247/70-2, Section II. B.)
7. Pressurizer - Base Plate Question (247/70-8, Section II. K.)
8. Containment Penetration Bellows (247/70-6, Section II. F.)
9. Electrical Barriers Installed (247/70-5, Section II. B.)
10. Cable Tray Loading Audit (247/70-5, Section II. B.)
11. Pipe Support Installation and Clearance Review (247/70-6, Section II. C.)
12. Circulating Water Pump Bearing Sleeve Modification (247/70-8, Section II. F.)
13. In-depth Quality Control Followup Items (247/70-1, Appendix A):
 - a. Pressurizer surge nozzles not UT.
 - b. SIS - evidence of lack of first line quality control.
 - c. 480 switchgear - air lines and air compressor.
 - d. Lack of control on electrical cable installation.
 - e. Emergency diesel control cables lack separation.
 - f. SIS boron tank valve modification.
 - g. Single electrical penetration.
14. DRL Report to ACRS, dated July 2, 1970
 - a. Tunnel fire protection installed.
 - b. Installation of strong motion seismograph.
 - c. Diesel auto start from 480 volt buses.
 - d. Internals vibrational preoperational test coverage.
 - e. Demonstration of hydrogen recombiner throttle back - pre-operational test.
 - f. Alarm arrangement on protection channels.

- g. Installation of hydrogen recombiner.
 - h. Installation of redundant electrical tunnel fans.
15. DRL Requests:
- a. Possibility of defeating manual trip with reset buttons.
 - b. Trip breaker annunciation and bypass interlocks.
16. FSAR, Volume V
- a. Remote control and instrumentation outside of control room.
 - b. Installation of modern fuel failure detection instrumentation.
17. DRL Report to ACRS, dated September 4, 1970
- a. Seismic reinforcement of buildings.
 - b. Additional turbine overspeed protection.
 - c. X-y stability test - power ascension.
 - d. Motor operated accumulator valves open with SIS signal - Preoperational test.
 - e. Charcoal filters installed for refueling building.
 - f. Iodine filters installed - recirculation fans - proceeded by HEPA filters.

III. Management Interview

A management interview was conducted with Messrs. Corcoran and Dadson at the completion of the site inspection. Items discussed included:

A. Preoperational Testing

The inspector indicated that the rod drop testing, as presented in procedure No. 4.10.2, appears to be lacking. Mr. Corcoran stated that this procedure would be re-evaluated.

B. Mechanical System Cleanup

The findings related to the field review of mechanical systems was discussed. Mr. Dadson agreed that the presence of arc strikes and attachment weldments was an indicator of failings in the existing cleanup program and henceforth a final inspection will be performed just prior to application of insulation.

C. Containment

The status of Con Ed's evaluation of the weld quality and bellows material documentation for the containment pipe penetrations was reviewed. Mr. Dadson indicated that Con Ed engineering is presently evaluating this subject.

The inspector indicated acceptable finding relative to concrete placement at the construction access openings. The existence of rebar, near the surface, at the equipment hatch area was discussed. Mr. Corcoran stated that this item would receive special considerations during placement of concrete at this location.

D. Pipe Supports

The inspector indicated that the established criteria for installation of stainless bands at pipe supports is considered acceptable. In addition, the inspector indicated that the revised Wedco Quality Control program for supports is considered to be responsive. Mr. Corcoran indicated that additional surveillance of pipe supports and restraints would be made by Con Ed personnel.

F. Reactor Pressure Boundary

The status and findings relating to conformance of reactor pressure boundary piping was reviewed. The inspector indicated that the information would be forwarded to CO:HQ for review and Con Ed will be informed if further actions are required.

G. Electrical

The inspector indicated satisfactory coverage and finding relative to the design review of safeguard and protection cabling. The inspector asked when a Con Ed position relative to cable installation surveillance would be available. Mr. Corcoran indicated that the findings are being compiled and evaluated, to determine if sufficient surveillance has been performed. The inspector stated that a timely position on this subject would seem appropriate.