

DOCK NUMBER *Key comma*
PROD. & UTIL. *EAR* 30-247

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
ONE CHASE MANHATTAN PLAZA
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10005

February 5, 1974

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202-672-8668

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Anthony Z. Roisman, Esq.
Berlin, Roisman & Kessler
Fourth Floor
1712 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036



Re: Indian Point 2

Dear Mr. Roisman:

Enclosed is a letter from Mr. Cobean to
Mr. O'Reilly dated January 28, 1974 and a letter from
Mr. Cobean to Mr. O'Leary dated February 1, 1974.

Very truly yours,

LEBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MACRAE
Attorneys for Consolidated
Edison Company of New York,
Inc.

By *Edward L. Cohen*
Edward L. Cohen

BY HAND

Enclosures

cc w/encs: William C. Parler, Esq.
Dr. John A. Buck
Dr. Lawrence R. Quarles
Samuel W. Jensch, Esq.
Mr. R. B. Briggs
Dr. John C. Geyer
Myron Karman, Esq.
Angus Macbeth, Esq.
J. Bruce MacDonald, Esq.
Hon. Louis J. Lefkowitz
Secretary, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission


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DOCKET NUMBER
PROD. & UTIL. REG. 50-247

Rel. Lines

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
4 Irving Place, New York, NY 10003



January 28, 1974

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
AEC Docket No. 50-247
Operating License DPR-26
A.O.-4-2-5

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Regulatory Operations, Region I
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. O'Reilly,

In accordance with the requirements of Section 6.12.2a of the Technical Specifications of Facility Operating License No. DPR-26, the following report is submitted.

On January 23, 1974 at approximately 1538 hours a slight reactor coolant system pressure transient above the Technical Specifications limit was experienced in the course of placing a reactor coolant pump in service. At the time of the occurrence, the reactor was shutdown with all full length control rods fully inserted and a reactor coolant system temperature of about 190°F.

In order to heat the reactor coolant system to 547°F preparatory to returning the plant to service following completion of repairs associated with the November 13, 1973 feedwater line break incident, the first reactor coolant pump was placed in service following prescribed procedures. These procedures entailed the establishment of a nitrogen blanket in the pressurizer to act as a surge volume for the start of the first pump. Upon starting the pump, the reactor coolant system pressure increased to 525 psig. and 510 psig. as indicated on two installed drag pressure gages. The pressure was immediately brought down to the desired 425 psig. by operator action. Technical Specification 3.1.B.1.a states that for indicated temperatures at or below 220°F the maximum indicated pressure shall not exceed 500 psig.

There was no damage incurred to any system or component as a result of a pressure transient of this magnitude nor was there any reason to expect any. The transient experienced was much less

Mr. James P. O'Reilly

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
January 28, 1974

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
AEC Docket No. 50-247
Operating License DPR-26
A.O.-4-2-5

than those previously reported and demonstrates the effectiveness of a gas blanket in eliminating or minimizing pressure surges when starting the first pump. We believe this particular transient was due to an insufficient volume of nitrogen in the pressurizer and we plan to modify our procedure to insure the proper amount.

Mr. Anthony Fasano of your office was informed of this occurrence by Mr. John Makepeace on January 24, 1974.

Very truly yours,




Warren R. Cobean, Jr., Manager
Nuclear Power Generation

cc: Mr. John F. O'Leary

DOCKET NUMBER

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Key Lines
50-247




Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
4 Irving Place, New York, N Y 10003

February 1, 1974

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
Facility Operating License
DPR-26
A.O.-4-2-3

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Office of Regulations
Washington, D. C. 20545



Dear Mr. O'Leary,

The following report is provided pursuant to the requirements of Section 6.12.2(a) of the Technical Specifications to Facility Operating License No. DPR-26.

Following the completion of repairs associated with the November 13, 1973 feedwater line break incident, an inspection of all Bergen-Paterson hydraulic shock and sway arrestors (snubbers) located in the vapor containment was performed. This inspection was completed on January 18, 1974 and of the approximately 350 snubbers located in the containment, two (2) did not meet the established criterion for operability; that is, the accumulator oil level plunger was more than one inch below the "EXT" mark.

One of the above two snubbers (SR-1040) is located on the component cooling water return line (Line No. 14) from upper bearing cooler of No. 23 reactor coolant pump and the other (SR-48-SR3) is located on the secondary blowdown line (Line No. 48) from No. 24 steam generator.

The two defective snubbers which have been replaced with spares are being disassembled for inspection in an effort to determine the cause of the problem. Presently, we plan to periodically inspect all of the snubbers inside of the containment building. We further intend to replace all the existing millable gum

Mr. John F. O'Leary

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February 1, 1974

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
Facility Operating License
DPR-26
A.O.-4-2-3

polyurethane seals on these snubbers with seals recommended by the manufacturer based on the temperature environment that the seals will experience. The replacement will be conducted on a progressive schedule that is presently being discussed with the A.E.C. Regulatory Staff.

We believe our program for inspections of the snubbers and replacement of their seals together with a further investigation into the two instances of low oil level will significantly reduce or eliminate such maintenance actions required for the snubbers and remove any resultant concern that such problems with snubbers might affect the performance of their required safety function.

Very truly yours,



Warren R. Cobean, Jr., Manager
Nuclear Power Generation

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly