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DOCKET NUMBER *Rel Cases*
PROD. & UTIL. *50-247*

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February 11, 1974

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
Re: Indian Point 2

Dear Mr. Roisman:

Enclosed is a copy of a letter from Mr. Cobean to Mr. O'Reilly dated February 6, 1974 and a letter from Mr. Cobean to Mr. O'Leary dated February 8, 1974.

Very truly yours,

LEBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MACRAE
Attorneys for Consolidated Edison
Company of New York, Inc.



By

Edward L. Cohen
Edward L. Cohen

BY HAND

Enclosures

cc w/encs: William C. Parler, Esq.
Dr. John A. Buck
Dr. Lawrence R. Quarles
Samuel W. Jensch, Esq.
Mr. R. B. Briggs
Dr. John C. Geyer
Myron Karman, Esq.
Angus Macbeth, Esq.
J. Bruce MacDonald, Esq.
Hon. Louis J. Lefkowitz
Secretary, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission ✓


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PDR ADOCK 05000247
PDR



Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
4 Irving Place, New York, NY 10003

6 February 1974

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
Facility Operating License
DPR-26
A.O.-4-2-7



Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Regulatory Operations, Region I
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. O'Reilly,

On February 1, 1974 at approximately 3:50 PM both doors of the 80 foot elevation personnel air lock to the containment building were inadvertently opened at the same time for a period of about thirty seconds. At the time of this occurrence, the reactor was shutdown with all full length control rods fully inserted in the core. The reactor coolant system pressure and temperature were 2235 psig and 540⁰F respectively, and the reactor coolant boric acid concentration was approximately 1190 ppm boron. With this concentration of boron and all control rods fully inserted, the reactor was subcritical by more than 7 percent $\Delta k/k$.

Investigation into the cause of the occurrence revealed the following pertinent information:

Whenever the plant is not in the cold shutdown condition and containment entry is to be made by other than operating personnel, a man who has been properly instructed on the operation of the air lock doors and the requirements for containment integrity is stationed in the airlock to operate its controls. In addition, signs are posted at the outside of each door to inform plant personnel when system conditions are such that containment integrity is required.

At about 3:50 PM on February 1, 1974, an offsite Company employee in attempting to enter containment from outside the air lock mistakenly operated the wrong hand wheel opening the inner air lock door. Both the operator stationed inside the air lock and the person outside realized what happened

Mr. James P. O'Reilly

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and both started to close the inner door. Upon closing, the inner door bounced off its seating frame and the door latch rotated into position with the inner door still open. When the individual outside the airlock noted the erroneous indication that the inner door was closed, he immediately started opening the outer door. Before the operator inside the airlock could stop its movement, and reclose the door, containment integrity had been breached for about thirty seconds.

We are continuing our investigation into this matter and will advise you of our findings and corrective action taken to prevent recurrence. Mr. Anthony Fasano of your office was notified of this occurrence on February 2, 1974 by Mr. John Makepeace.

Very truly yours,

Warren R. Cobean, Jr.

Warren R. Cobean, Jr.
Manager, Nuclear Power
Generation

cc: Mr. John F. O'Leary




Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
4 Irving Place, New York, NY 10003

February 8, 1974

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
AEC Docket No. 50-247
Facility Operating License
DPR-26
A.O.-4-2-6

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing
Office of Regulation
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545



Dear Mr. O'Leary,

The following report is provided pursuant to the requirements of Section 6.12.2(a) of the Technical Specifications to Facility Operating License No. DPR-26.

On January 25, 1974, the Indian Point Unit No. 2 reactor was brought critical in preparation for placing the plant back in service following completion of repairs associated with No. 22 steam generator feedwater line. Criticality was achieved with the "C" bank of control rods 45 steps withdrawn from the core, "B" bank 175 steps withdrawn and "D" bank fully inserted. The position of the control rods was approximately 27 steps below the insertion limit for criticality shown on Figure 3.10-1 of the Technical Specifications. At the time of the occurrence, the reactor coolant system pressure and temperature were 2235 psig and 540°F respectively. All four reactor coolant pumps were in service, and the boron concentration was 1125 ppm. Immediately upon noting that the positions of the control rods was not in conformance with Technical Specifications requirements, boron was added to the Reactor Coolant System and the rods were further withdrawn until their positions satisfied the requirements of Figure 3.10-1.

The 27-step differential represents approximately .26% reactivity. Minimum boron concentration required to maintain the stipulated shutdown margin (Figure 3.10-3 of the Technical Specifications)

Mr. John F. O'Leary

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
Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
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is calculated to be 770 ppm. Therefore, the shutdown margin existing at the time of the occurrence was three times more than that required by Figure 3.10-3.

To insure against recurrence of this incident, the importance of following operating procedures precisely has been reemphasized to all licensed Reactor Operators.

Because the operational limitations set forth in Figure 3.10-1 are derived conservatively, safe operation of Indian Point Unit No. 2 was not adversely affected by this occurrence. With the assumption that one rod is stuck in its fully withdrawn position, the boron concentration in the Reactor Coolant System was still more than sufficient to shut the reactor down. The safety implications to the occurrence are therefore considered slight.

Very truly yours,



Warren R. Cobean, Jr., Manager
Nuclear Power Generation

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly