

LAW OFFICES OF  
LEBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MACRAE  
1821 JEFFERSON PLACE, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036

ARVIN E. UPTON  
EUGENE B. THOMAS, JR.  
LEONARD M. TROSTEN  
HARRY H. VOIGT  
LEX K. LARSON  
WASHINGTON PARTNERS

August 24, 1973

ONE CHASE MANHATTAN PLAZA  
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10005

WASHINGTON TELEPHONE  
202 FEDERAL 8-0111


CABLE ADDRESS  
LALALU, WASHINGTON D.C.

Anthony Z. Roisman, Esq.  
Berlin, Roisman & Kessler  
Fourth Floor  
1712 N Street, N.W.  
Washington, D. C. 20036

Re: Consolidated Edison Company  
of New York, Inc.  
Indian Point Unit No. 2  
AEC Docket No. 50-247

Dear Mr. Roisman:

Enclosed is a copy of the text of a telegram from Mr. Zarakas to Mr. O'Reilly transmitted on August 3, 1973 and a letter from Mr. Zarakas to Mr. O'Leary dated August 16, 1973.



Very truly yours,

LEBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MACRAE  
Attorneys for Applicant

By Edward L. Cohen  
Edward L. Cohen

BY HAND


Enclosures

cc w/encs: Samuel W. Jensch, Esq.  
Mr. R. B. Briggs  
Dr. John C. Geyer  
Myron Karman, Esq.  
Angus Macbeth, Esq.  
J. Bruce MacDonald, Esq.  
Hon. Louis J. Lefkowitz  
Secretary, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel

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PDR ADDCK 05000247  
S PDR

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.  
4 Irving Place, New York, NY 10003

Lo Brewf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae



TEXT OF TELEGRAM

Re: Docket No. 50-247  
Indian Point Unit No. 2

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, *Director*  
Regulatory Operations, Region 1  
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. O'Reilly

In accordance with the Technical Specifications of Facility Operating License No. DPR-26, we wish to inform you of an Abnormal Occurrence (A.O. 3-2-10) which was identified on August 2, 1973.


Periodic surveillance test PT-M1, "Nuclear Power Range Analog Channel Functional Test", was being performed with Unit No. 2 shutdown and the primary coolant system at 350°f and 2000 psig. The limiting safety system setting of Channel III of the Overpower-Overtemperature Delta-T Reactor Trip Circuitry for  $(q_t - q_b) > \Delta I_2$  was found to be below that required by Technical Specification 2.3.1.B(5). Channels I, II and IV were found to be operating correctly. Channel III was recalibrated and retested satisfactorily.

In considering the safety implications of the occurrence, it should be noted that the discrepancy in this instrument was detected during a routine surveillance test which is performed monthly. Furthermore, there were three other trip circuits providing complete reactor protection against an excessive flux tilt. For these reasons, there are no safety implications to the occurrence.

Notification of this occurrence has been made to the Office of Regulatory Operations.

Very truly yours


Peter Zarakas  
Vice President



Peter Zarakas  
Vice President

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.  
4 Irving Place, New York, N.Y. 10003  
Telephone (212) 460-5042


Le Boeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae



August 16, 1973

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2  
AEC Docket No. 50-247  
Facility Operating  
License DPR-26

Mr. John F. O'Leary  
Directorate of Licensing  
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20545



Dear Mr. O'Leary:

The following report of Abnormal Occurrence No. 3-2-10 is provided pursuant to the requirements of Section 6.12.2 (a) of the Technical Specifications of Facility Operating License DPR-26.

On August 2, 1973, during the performance of periodic test and calibration procedure PT-MI, it was discovered that the limiting safety system setting of Channel III of the Overpower-Overtemperature Delta-T Reactor Trip Circuitry for  $(q_t - q_b) > \Delta I_2$  was below that required by Technical Specification 2.3.1.B. At the time of the occurrence, the reactor was shutdown with the primary coolant system at 350°F.

The discrepancy is believed to have resulted from an improper adjustment of the channel. To correct the situation, Channel III was recalibrated and tested satisfactorily. During future calibration checks, particular attention will be paid to these instruments to enable a more definitive determination as to the cause of the problem.

In considering the safety implications of the occurrence, it should be noted that the discrepancy in this instrument was detected during a routine surveillance test, which is performed monthly. Furthermore, there are three other trip circuits (Channel I, II and IV) providing complete reactor protection against an excessive axial flux tilt. Channel III, incidentally, was still operational for

Mr. John F. O'Leary


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August 16, 1973

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2  
AEC Docket No. 50-247  
Facility Operating  
License DPR-26

an axial tilt of  $q_D > q_t$ . For these reasons, the safety implications to the occurrence are considered to be negligible.

Very truly yours,



Copy to Mr. James P. O'Reilly (AEC)