


William F. Caldwell, Jr.  
Vice President

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.  
4 Irving Place, New York, N.Y. 10003  
Telephone (212) 600-6161



July 12, 1973

Indian Point Unit No. 2  
Facility Operating  
License DPR-26  
AEC Docket No. 50-247

Mr. John F. O'Leary  
Directorate of Licensing  
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. O'Leary

The following report of Abnormal Occurrence No. 3-2-9 is provided pursuant to the requirements of Section 6.6.1.B of the Technical Specifications to Facility Operating License No. DPR-26.

On July 2, 1973, during the performance of periodic test and calibration procedure PT-M12, it was discovered that the first stage turbine pressure setting was in excess of the limit defined by Facility Technical Specification 2.3.2.A.2. One of the two channels was found to be set at 10.3% of full load first stage turbine pressure, instead of the prescribed 10% maximum. Additionally, the periodic test revealed that one of the two safety injection steam flow bi-stables in Loop No. 24 was set 0.3% higher than that prescribed in Table 3.1 of the Technical Specifications.

The discrepancy is believed to have resulted from an improper initial calibration, or possibly, instrument drift. To correct the situation, the first stage turbine pressure instrument was reset so that the reactor trip would be unblocked by this channel at the prescribed 10% of full power. The safety injection steam flow bi-stable was replaced with a spare bi-stable which was properly calibrated. During future calibration checks, particular attention will be paid to these instruments so that a definite determination can be made as to whether or not instrument drift was a causative factor in this incident.

In considering the safety implications of the occurrence, it should be noted that the discrepancies in these instruments were detected during a routine surveillance test which is performed monthly. Furthermore, the protective logic will not block the reactor trip signal unless both of the two pressure instruments have sensed low turbine impulse stage pressure. Since the second instrument was calibrated correctly, the trip block would have been initiated at the proper power level.

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S PDR

John P. O'Leary


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July 12, 1973

Re Indian Point Unit No. 2  
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The safety injection high steam flow circuitry is provided with similar redundancy. The second high steam flow bistable in loop 24 was found to be within specification and would have been able to initiate safety injection. Finally, allowances for setpoint drifts of these small magnitudes were made in the original unit safety analysis. For these reasons, there are no safety implications to the occurrence.

Very truly yours



Peter Zarakas  
Assistant Vice President

md

Copy to James P. O'Reilly (AEC)