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Q1. Are you familiar with the New York State Emergency Plan for Major Radiation Accidents Involving Nuclear Facilities?

A1. Yes.

Q2. What is your connection with the New York State Emergency Plan for Major Radiation Accidents Involving Nuclear Facilities?

A2. I participated in the development and preparation of the plan and am responsible for supervising its maintenance. I am also a senior staff member of the unit responsible for coordination of the actual operation of the plan in the event of an accident upon receipt of instructions from the Department of Health.

Q3. What is the basis for the estimate of time needed to accomplish emergency notifications and the other pre-planned emergency actions?

A3. Experience in responding to other local emergencies indicates that one to two hours from verification of the accident is a reasonable estimate of the time needed to carry out essential notifications and commence preliminary response procedures for an accident of the type covered by the plan.

The Office of Natural Disaster and Civil Defense maintains a 24-hour warning point operated by the Division of State Police. The office has designated "on-call" senior personnel, who in the past have made initial response to storms, explosions and similar disasters within 10 to 15 minutes. The initial response is to determine by telephone the immediate impact of the disaster. Under the State's plan for major radiation accidents, in this initial stage the warning point receives the call from the nuclear facility operator, then notifies the Health Department representative, and the senior Civil Defense personnel on call.

The Health Department then calls back to the nuclear facility operator to determine the immediate impact of the accident. Experience indicates that this can be accomplished within 15 to 30 minutes.

The next stage is to relay Health Department instructions to police and local officials via the various emergency communication systems. These instructions will be based upon estimates of offsite doses provided by the nuclear facility operator and will be directed to the Division of State Police at Albany and the local Civil Defense Director and Disaster Coordinator. If warranted, the Division of State Police will notify its barracks in the area of the accident, which in turn will relay instructions to the local police. In a parallel sequence of communications, the local Civil Defense Directors and Disaster Coordinators will instruct the county executive, the chief executive of any municipality involved, the county highway department, other appropriate local officials, and also the local police. Fifteen minutes from the time the Health Department calls back the nuclear facility operator is ample time for it to give its instructions to the Emergency Operating Center and to commence the primary protective actions set forth in alert A.

After assessment of the accident by the Department of Health, instructions for subsequent protective actions will be communicated to the local police, local disaster coordinators and local government chief executives by means of the emergency disaster communications systems. These actions can be commenced within one to two hours from the verification of the accident.

This estimated time span is well within the time required in past emergencies that occurred without warning. In the 1965 blackout, for example, assessments of the situation and emergency response actions commenced in less than one hour. In the 1964 ice storm in Albany, Schenectady and Saratoga Counties, the State Emergency Operating Center was manned and emergency response action commenced

within 30 minutes after notification, notwithstanding that the duty officer's telephone was a casualty of the storm.

Q4. Describe the mechanism for notifying the local police, other local officials, and the affected public with respect to the pre-planned emergency actions.

A4. There is 24-hour direct communication between the State Emergency Operating Center and the warning centers at the Westchester County Parkway Police Department and at the Peekskill Police Department via the Civil Defense warning system known as the National Alert Warning System (NAWAS). This is a dedicated telecommunications line. In addition, the State Police Headquarters has direct land line communications links with its regional headquarters, which can in turn communicate by radio with mobile units and by telephone or messenger with police. The State Police Headquarters is located in the same building as the Emergency Operating Center. Communication of instructions to the State and local police can be made by either or both of these means. The local warning point at either the Westchester Parkway Police Department or the Peekskill Police Department can also notify the local Civil Defense Director and Disaster Coordinator by telephone or mobile radio or messenger. By the same means, the local Civil Defense Director and Disaster Coordinator will advise other county and local officials whose names and numbers are listed in the Westchester County emergency directory.

Members of the public present in the low population zone will receive instructions from the State Police, with the assistance of local police, including the Westchester Parkway Police, the Civil Defense Auxiliary Police and the Peekskill Police if warranted. Communication will be by either bullhorn announcement or by house-to-house messengers. These means of notice have proved effective in other types of emergencies, such as gas leaks and chemical explosions, in which the danger was more immediate than in a radiation accident. If the hazard

potentially were to affect a broader area than the low population zone, then instructions could be broadcast via radio and television as well.

Q5. Describe the extent to which the emergency procedures to be undertaken in the event of a major radiation accident have been communicated to and discussed with the various State and local officials with potential responsibility under the plan.

A5. State and local agencies potentially responsible for action under the plan have received copies of the State's Emergency Plan for Major Radiation Accidents. In the State government this includes the Departments of Health, Education, Transportation, Environmental Conservation, Labor, Commerce and Agriculture and Markets, the Divisions of State Police and Military and Naval Affairs, the State Office for Local Government, and the Public Service Commission. In local government, this includes the Westchester Parkway and City of Peekskill Police Departments, the City of Peekskill Fire Department, the Westchester County Health Department, the Westchester County and City of Peekskill Civil Defense Directors and Disaster Coordinators and the New York City Department of Health, Office of Radiation Control. Most of these agencies participated in the developmental stages of the plans by indicating their response capabilities and the procedures they would follow if called upon to participate in its execution. The plan, therefore, is a joint statement by agencies with primary emergency responsibility and portrays anticipated actual responses based on what each agency has indicated is its response capability and the procedures it will follow in responding.

Q6. Is it necessary or desirable to provide the public with advance instructions or information about the plan for it to be effective?

A6. No, it is neither necessary nor desirable. The many variable factors involved in determining what instructions should be given to the public make it both impractical and undesirable to instruct in advance. Among the factors to be considered are the amount of radioactivity released, wind direction, traffic conditions, the time of the year and weather conditions. Any advance instructions would have to be stated as several alternative courses of action to be taken, depending upon which combination of factors existed at the time of the accident. Instructions of this nature are necessarily complicated, difficult to follow and confusing to the public. Also, because of the many variables involved, the actual emergency actions determined to be appropriate at the time of the accident might vary substantially from, or even contradict, the set of advance instructions, creating a high probability that some persons would take the wrong action, exposing them to an unnecessary risk.

Q7. If it were decided that evacuation of the low population zone was desirable to effect significant dose savings, how would residents be evacuated?

A7. The State Police would direct the evacuation, with assistance available from the Westchester County Police, Buchanan Police, and Civil Defense Auxiliary Police, if required. With so few houses involved, the residents would be instructed either by bullhorn or receive direct verbal instructions from a police officer. Evacuation would be routed over Bleakley Avenue or Broadway, depending upon the pattern of the plume. Because the zone is small in area, there would be no need for remedial movement within it.

Residents would either walk or use personal autos to leave the zone. Aged and infirm persons would be transported by police car. The instructions given

would depend upon the circumstances existing at the time of evacuation, but basically would be to evacuate in a given direction over a specified route, and if on foot, to walk to a designated area to await the arrival of public transportation. Residents with autos would be told of available shelter and set up to receive them.

Evacuation would be accomplished by six to eight State Police officers from the 30-man force at the local substation, with the assistance of seven to nine local or Civil Defense Auxiliary Police officers. Because fewer than 100 persons would be moved, evacuation could be completed within 45 to 60 minutes.

Q8. If it were decided to evacuate areas beyond the low population zone because of an accident exceeding the base case, how would such an evacuation be undertaken?

A8. The State has no pre-planned action for an accident beyond the base case. Evacuation of any larger area, however, would follow the same general procedure as evacuation of the low population zone, depending upon the size of the area and the number of persons to be moved. If a large number of people were involved, such as the population of the City of Peekskill, instructions also would be given by radio and television broadcast. More police personnel might be needed, the number depending upon the scope of the evacuation. In addition to the State Police, there are over 2,300 local police officers in the various units of government in Westchester County and an additional 1,300 local Civil Defense Auxiliary Police. The direction of evacuation would depend upon where the danger area is located, but any great population movement would be directed toward Route 9 and the Taconic Parkway. Arrangements would be made in neighboring communities or in New York City for shelter for evacuees. Food would be provided from the New York City area. Supply and transport would be through the normal means of food distribution by food processors and transporters.

Q9. Describe the State's large-scale emergency response capabilities and the time needed to commence responses under that plan.

A9. The State maintains an Emergency Plan for the Civil Defense of the State of New York to be placed in operation should the State suffer a nuclear attack. In the event of a major radiation accident endangering many persons over a large area, all applicable portions of the nuclear attack response plan can be implemented. In the event of such a catastrophe, Section 10 of the New York Executive Law empowers the Governor to call upon all State agencies to use their resources to provide aid to areas affected.

In such an emergency, the Division of State Police would maintain communications with the various governmental and police agencies in the area affected, in addition to its basic functions of controlling traffic and the movement of people. The Department of Social Services, together with the Red Cross and the Division of Military and Naval Affairs would provide housing in hotels and armories and would distribute food. Food would be obtained by the Department of Agriculture and Markets from the United States Department of Agriculture stores of surplus food, as well as through normal food distribution channels. The Health Department would provide medical assistance, and, together with the Department of Environmental Conservation, would furnish technical personnel and instrumentation for radiation measurement. The State Office for Local Government would coordinate fire protection activities. The Division of Military and Naval Affairs would provide troops. The Department of Transportation would provide heavy equipment and would organize and supervise the clearance of highways, in addition to coordinating all State emergency activities through its Office of Natural Disaster and Civil Defense. The latter office would also serve as the channel for obtaining aid and assistance from municipalities throughout the State and from the Federal government.

By utilizing the response capabilities of communities in the area affected, medical assistance, traffic control and population movement could be commenced within one to two hours from the request therefor. Immediate action would be taken by the State Police, local police, local Civil Defense Directors and Disaster Coordinators, and the local government chief executives. Subsequent action such as clearing transportation routes or furnishing food and lodging would be commenced within 24 hours. The State has not experienced a large-scale emergency requiring the nuclear attack response plan to be put into operation. Periodically, however, the plan has been put in effect on a test basis. In each case, the State Emergency Operating Center was manned and operational in less than 20 minutes. On April 1, 1966, moreover, a surprise test was conducted in which the State Emergency Operating Center was manned and operational within 20 minutes, and manned with sufficient personnel to deal with the consequences of a nuclear attack in less than three hours.