

BEFORE THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

In the Matter of )

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY )  
OF NEW YORK )  
INDIAN POINT UNIT No. 2 )

Docket No. 50-247

ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF ISSUES  
AND PROPOSED CROSS EXAMINATION  
BY THE CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR  
THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT

I. Emergency Planning by New York State

- A. The State has not made adequate plans for coping with a radiation emergency at Indian Point No. 2,
1. There has been no listing of available personnel and their location
  2. There has been no listing of available equipment and its location.
  3. There has been no listing of available food and water supplies and their location
  4. There has been no listing of available alternate shelter and its location
  5. There has been no detailed explanation of proposed evacuation routes in the event of evacuation of the LPZ and no explanation of proposed evacuation routes in the event of greater evacuation
  6. There is no plan to advise the public in advance of the actions to be taken to minimize their exposure to radiation in the event no evacuation is required nor to advise them of the actions to be taken in the event of an evacuation including alternate evacuation routes

8110310234 711025  
PDR ADOCK 05000247  
G PDR

7. There is no training, general instruction or testing for the public and nor for the State personnel except for tests of the State personnel ability to man the EOC,

SUPPORTING EVIDENCE--The entire record of this proceeding and the proposed testimony of the State of New York

- B. There are readily available examples of the kind of detail planning required in preparing an adequate emergency plan and New York has not profited from any of these

SUPPORTING EVIDENCE--Transcript of proceedings In the Matter of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (AEC Docket No. 50-271) dated October 15, 1971 containing the State Emergency Plans of the State of Vermont, Evacuation Plans of the Towns of Guilford and Vernon, Vermont and discussion of further aspects of the State of Vermont emergency planning by responsible state officials.

C. Further Cross Examination

1. What is the scientific and technical facts upon which New York relies in establishing the "base case"
2. Would evacuation be used in all cases where the dose would be reduced to below 500 mr and if not why not?
3. What are the precise criteria to be used in deciding whether to evacuate and who will make the decision to evacuate.
4. Under the most unfavorable weather conditions for purposes of communication and evacuation, what is the earliest time at which
  - a. evacuation of LPZ could commence
  - b. evacuation of areas outside the LPZ (up to 5 miles radius from site) would commence
  - c. evacuation of LPZ would be completed
  - d. evacuation of areas outside of the LPZ (up to 5 miles radius from site) would be completed
5. Upon what tests, drills or actual experiences involving comparable problems are the previous

answers based

6. Are Bleakley Avenue and Broadway the only portion of the evacuation route that have been determined. Where does the evacuation route end. What effect would heavy traffic have on the proposed evacuation routes.
7. Why does the worst case (i.e. worse than the base case) have the least preplanned protective actions.
8. What evacuation was required during the 1965 blackout and the 1964 ice storm, how were they accomplished, what was the time sequence. In short, describe in detail.
9. Explain in detail how bull horns and house-to-house messengers have been used in cases of gas leaks and chemical explosions. Describe fully the specific events and the time sequence of these events.
10. What sociological, psychological or other data support the conclusions in A.6 on page 5 of the testimony of Edward H. L. Smith and what are his qualifications to evaluate such data.

## II. PLANT SECURITY

[At the request of the Applicant, the matters covered in this paragraph are separately attached and are to be treated on a confidential basis by all those receiving them]

## III. ECCS

### A. Applicant has not proven that it will meet the Interim Criteria

1. Applicant concedes that the calculated peak clad temperatures of 200°F will be reached in a LOCA without regard to the distortion of core geometry and that such distortion could add 100°F to the peak clad temperatures

SUPPORTING EVIDENCE--Answer to Question C.1  
(October 12, 1971 Response)

2. Applicant's tests of the performance of fuel rods and possible flow blockage at temperatures in excess of 1600°F assume random swelling in conflict with more reliable and more recent tests which demonstrate more flow blockage of more rods at lower temperatures

SUPPORTING EVIDENCE--ORNL-4635 (to be offered  
as Intervenor's Exhibit EE)

B. A thorough explanation of our present position on ECCS is given in the Union of Concerned Scientists Critique of the New AEC Design Criteria for Reactor Safety Systems (October, 1971). Copy attached.


1. We request that the Board take official notice of the documents referred to in the Critique and not already in evidence in the proceeding
2. We urge the Board to adopt the conclusions of the report as applicable to this plant. We believe that the Interim Criteria on ECCS are not regulations of the Commission and not subject to any special status in this proceeding. We will brief this issue when we submit our Proposed Findings of Fact. To the extent the Board rejects this legal argument, then our presentation on the ECCS should be treated as a challenge to a Commission regulation under the doctrine of the Calvert Cliffs memorandum.
3. At this time the Critique is not being offered as direct evidence by us pending confirmation of the availability of one of the authors to sponsor its introduction. The authors through the Union of Concerned Scientists are currently actively involved in an intervention in Boston Edison Co. (No. 50-293) and may not be available to attend the final radiological safety evidentiary session commencing on November 1, 1971. If they cannot attend the document will not be offered as evidence but should of course be treated as a statement of our position.

C. Further development of our case on the ECCS must await answers to outstanding questions. We recommend the following procedure.

- a. Applicant and the staff shall treat all outstanding inquiries<sup>1</sup> (see letters dated September 16 and October 12) as proposed cross-examination and should come to the hearing prepared to answer all of these inquiries
- b. The Board is requested to take official notice of all of the documents referred to in those two letters of inquiry
- c. Applicant and staff should have their witnesses respond to the outstanding inquiries orally at the hearing without interruption by counsel for CCPE. This should occur beginning November 1. On the first day following presentation of this material, CCPE will commence its cross-examination based on the answers then contained in the transcript

- d. We will want to cross examine Applicant's witnesses who can discuss the computer codes used in the analysis of ECCS performance in light of the points made on pages 16-25 of the attached Critique

Respectfully submitted,



Anthony J. Roisman  
Counsel for Citizens' Committee  
for the Protection of the  
Environment

1/

Applicant responded to Section C of the September 16 letter by a document dated October 12, 1971. The staff has not commented on these questions nor responded in writing to any questions. Applicant has not responded to any other questions.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS FOR WHICH  
BOARD IS REQUESTED TO  
TAKE OFFICIAL NOTICE

1. P.L. Rittenhouse and R.A. Dean, "Preface: Symposium on Fuel Rod Failure and Its Effects, "Nuclear Technology, XI, 4, (August 1971)
2. R.D. Waddell, Jr., "Measurement of Light-Water Reactor Coolant Channel Reduction Arising from Cladding Deformation During a Loss-of-Coolant Accident, "Nuclear Technology, XI, 4, (August 1971)
3. A Metallurgical Evaluation of Simulated BWR Emergency Core-Cooling Tests (IN-1453) February 1971.
4. Committee on Reactor Safety Technology (Crest), European Nuclear Energy Agency, Water-Cooled Reactor Safety, OECD, Paris, May 1970
5. Nuclear Technology, August 1971 -- an issue partially devoted to a symposium on fuel rod failure and its effects.
6. Nuclear Safety, September-October, 1971 -- especially the articles by G.O. Bright and P. L. Rittenhouse
7. IN-1445, February 1971
8. IN-1321, June 1970
9. IN-1387
10. Semiscale Tests 845 Through 851, June 29, 1971
11. IN-1444
12. HW-80535
13. ANL-6548
14. ANL-6548
15. ORNL-TM-2742
16. ORNL-TM-3188

BEFORE THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

In the Matter of )

CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY )  
OF NEW YORK )

INDIAN POINT UNIT NO. 2 )

Docket No. 50-247

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Additional Statement of Issues and Proposed Cross Examination by the Citizens Committee for the Protection of the Environment, were mailed, postage prepaid, this 26th day of October, 1971 to the following:

\* Samuel W. Jensch, Esq.  
Chairman  
Atomic Safety & Licensing  
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20545

J. D. Bond, Esq.  
Alternate Chairman  
Atomic Safety & Licensing  
18700 Woodway Drive  
Derwood, Maryland 20752

\* Dr. John C. Geyer, Chairman  
Department of Geography and  
Environmental Engineering  
The Johns Hopkins University  
Baltimore, Maryland 21218

\* Mr. R. B. Briggs, Director  
Molten-Salt Reactor Program  
Oak Ridge National Laboratory  
P.O. Box Y  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830

Dr. Walter H. Jordan  
Oak Ridge National Laboratory  
P.O. Box X  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830

\* Arvin E. Upton, Esq.  
LeBocuf, Lam, Leiby & MacRae  
1821 Jefferson Place, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.


\* J. Bruce MacDonald, Esq.  
N.Y. State Department of Commerce  
112 State Street  
Albany, New York 12207

Honorable Louis J. Lefkowitz  
Attorney General of New York  
80 Centre Street  
New York, New York

Angus McBeth, Esq.  
Natural Resources Defense Council  
36 West 44th Street  
New York, New York 10036

Mr. Stanley T. Robinson, Jr.  
Chief, Public Proceedings Branch  
Office of the Secretary  
of the Commission  
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20545

\* Myron Karman, Esq.  
Office of General Counsel  
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission  
Washington, DC. 20545  
Mail Station: P 506A

  
Anthony Roisman

\* These parties are the only ones receiving a copy of  
Paragraph II. Plant Security.