

EDO Principal Correspondence Control

FROM: DUE: 02/08/10

EDO CONTROL: G20100014
DOC DT: 01/02/10
FINAL REPLY:

Thomas Gurdziel
Oswego, New York

TO:

Borchardt, EDO

FOR SIGNATURE OF :

** GRN **

CRC NO:

Leeds, NRR

DESC:

ROUTING:

2.206 - Entergy/Indian Point Siren System
(EDATS: OEDO-2010-0010)

Borchardt
Virgilio
Mallett
Ash
Mamish
Burns/Rothschild
Leeds, NRR
Zimmerman, OE
Caputo, OI
Burns, OGC
Trocine, OEDO

DATE: 01/11/10

ASSIGNED TO:

CONTACT:

RI

Collins

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:

Template: EDO-001

EDIDS: EDO-01

EDATS

Electronic Document and Action Tracking System

EDATS Number: OEDO-2010-0010

Source: OEDO

General Information

Assigned To: RegionI

OEDO Due Date: 2/8/2010

Other Assignees:

SECY Due Date: NONE

Subject: 2.206 - Entergy/Indian Point Siren System

Description:

CC Routing: NRR; OE; OI; OGC

ADAMS Accession Numbers - Incoming: NONE

Response/Package: NONE

Other Information

Cross Reference Number: G20100014

Staff Initiated: NO

Related Task:

Recurring Item: NO

File Routing: EDATS

Agency Lesson Learned: NO

OEDO Monthly Report Item: NO

Process Information

Action Type: 2.206 Review

Priority: Medium

Signature Level: RegionI

Sensitivity: None

Urgency: NO

Approval Level: No Approval Required

OEDO Concurrence: NO

OCM Concurrence: NO

OCA Concurrence: NO

Special Instructions:

Document Information

Originator Name: Thomas Gurdziel

Date of Incoming: 1/2/2010

Originating Organization: Citizens

Document Received by OEDO Date: 1/8/2010

Addressee: R. W. Borchardt, EDO

Date Response Requested by Originator: NONE

Incoming Task Received: Letter

9 Twin Orchard Drive
Oswego, NY 13126
January 2, 2010

Mr. Bill Borchardt
Executive Director for Operations
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Executive Director for Operations Bill Borchardt:

This is a 2.206 letter.

It is perhaps a little too easy to sit back and just say: I don't like this. So, I have decided to write this letter 1) to say I don't like the present reliability of the Entergy/Indian Point battery backup emergency siren system, and 2) to provide some courses of action.

Right now it looks like the new siren system works for one non-silent test, then fails the next.

Course of action 1 (for the plant owner) Reduce the time between tests and do all tests twice: as non-silent with normal power, and non-silent with backup power, until FEMA acceptance is obtained.

Course of action 2 (for the plant owner) Change the siren activation sequence so that one county after another (but not at the same time) sounds the sirens.

Course of action 3 (for the plant owner) Replace all people presently assigned to new siren operation, maintenance and/or repair.

Course of action 4 (for the plant owner) Design and build a replacement new battery backup emergency siren system that is not as complicated as the present one.

Course of action 1 (for the NRC) If the cause(s) of the recent total failure to sound all sirens in Putnam County is not identified and corrective actions fully taken in 30 days from the event, using the 2.206 process, direct that plant power be reduced by 10% that day and, additionally, by 10% each month following until the plants are shutdown cold.

Reason: If they can provide sufficient management direction and adequate resources to straighten out equipment problems at Vermont Yankee (like collapsing cooling tower cells and falling 100 ton loads of spent nuclear fuel in a cask), maybe this will provide sufficient motivation to also be successful with equipment at Indian Point. But if it doesn't, New Yorkers living nearby will be safer with shutdown plants and unreliable sirens than they would be with running plants and unreliable sirens (in my opinion).

Thank you,

Thomas Gurdziel