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**December 30, 2009**  
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**U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission**  
**ATTN: Document Control Desk**  
**Washington, D.C. 20555-001**

**Braidwood Station, Unit 1**  
**Facility Operating License No. NPF-72**  
**NRC Docket No. STN 50-456**

**Subject: Submittal of Supporting Documentation for January 6, 2010 Regulatory Conference**

**Reference: (1) Letter from Steven West (U. S. NRC) to Charles G. Pardee (Exelon Generation Company, LLC), "Braidwood Station, Unit 1, NRC Follow-up Inspection Report 05000456/2009007; Preliminary Yellow Finding," dated November 30, 2009**

**(2) Letter from Amir Shahkarami (Exelon Generation Company, LLC) to U. S. NRC, "Response to NRC Follow-Up Inspection Report 05000456/2009007," dated December 10, 2009**

In Reference 1, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued an inspection report with respect to the June 24, 2009, failure of the B Train Containment Sump Suction Valve, 1SI8811B, to stroke full open during surveillance testing. In Reference 2, Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGC) requested a Regulatory Conference to present to the NRC our perspective on the facts and assumptions used to assess the finding and its significance. As a result, a Regulatory Conference is scheduled for January 6, 2010. The NRC requested in Reference 1 that supporting documentation be submitted at least one week prior to the conference. This letter provides the NRC with the requested supporting documentation.

Attachment 1 provides a document entitled, "BW-SDP-003, Revision 1, 'Braidwood Phase 3 SDP Evaluation of Failure of 1SI8811B to Fully Open.'" and its applicable appendices. EGC has calculated changes in core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) using the Braidwood PRA model and crediting local operator action to fully open the 1SI8811B valve. Attachments 2 through 7 provide evaluations performed to support the conclusions of BW-SDP-003, Revision 1.

Included in Appendix J of the document contained in Attachment 1 is information related to the impact and sensitivity of certain assumptions on the conclusions of EGC's SDP evaluation.

As part of the Regulatory Conference on January 6, 2010, EGC plans to present the results of our Root Cause Evaluation, the impact of the 1SI8811B failure on system operation, the expected environmental conditions that support local valve operation, and the dominant risk scenarios and SDP evaluation results.

Aool  
NAK

If you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact me at (815) 417-2800.

Respectfully,



David Gullott  
Regulatory Assurance Manager  
Braidwood Station

- Attachments:
- (1) BW-SDP-003, Revision 1, "Braidwood Phase 3 SDP Evaluation of Failure of 1SI8811B to Fully Open"
  - (2) EC #377204, "Evaluate 1SI8811B Flow at Partial Opening"
  - (3) EC #377329, "Post SBLOCA Dose Rate Assessment for 1SI8811A/B Accessibility"
  - (4) EC #378302, "Evaluate Temperature of the Pipe Penetration Curve Wall Area Aux. Bldg. Elev. 364', Using a Bounding Case and Realistic Case" Revised Analysis from EC #377814
  - (5) EC #378180, "Analysis to Determine Back Flow from RWST to ECCS Recirculation Sump While 1SI8811A/B and 1SI8812A/B are Open for Six Minutes"
  - (6) ER 392870, "Accessibility of 1SI8811B Following SBLOCA – Revised for 5.2 Inch Break," November 17, 2009
  - (7) ER 393342, "Accessibility of 1SI8811B Following SBLOCA – Revised to Include Potential ECCS Termination at RWST Empty"

Cc: Regional Administrator, USNRC, Region III  
NRC Resident Inspector, Braidwood Station  
Rick Skokowski, USNRC Region III  
Laura Kozak, USNRC Region III

**ATTACHMENT 1**

**BW-SDP-003, Revision 1, "Braidwood Phase 3 SDP Evaluation of Failure of  
1SI8811B to Fully Open"**

**Braidwood Station**

**Braidwood  
PRA APPLICATION NOTEBOOK**

**BW-SDP-003**

**Revision 1**

**Braidwood Phase 3 SDP Evaluation of  
Failure of 1SI8811B to Fully Open**

**December 2009**

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## REVISION HISTORY

Section	Revision	Comment
Main Report	1	Revised based on change of boundary conditions –
Appendix A	2	Operators will trip RH pumps prior to closing an SI8812 valve if there is dual indication on the associated SI8811 valve. Also considers flow diversion from RWST to Sump
Appendix B	2	
Appendix C	1	Revised to use correct alpha factor for SI8811 valves
Appendix D	1	Revised based on change of boundary conditions –
Appendix E	2	Operators will trip RH pumps prior to closing an SI8812 valve if there is dual indication on the associated SI8811 valve. Also considers flow diversion from RWST to Sump
Appendix F	1	
Appendix G	1	Added for Revision 1
Appendix H	1	Added for Revision 1
Appendix I	1	Added for Revision 1
Appendix J	0	Added for Revision 1

## 1. PURPOSE

This evaluation examines the risk significance associated with failure of 1SI8811B (ECCS Sump Recirculation MOV) to fully open (Reference 3).

## 2. BACKGROUND

On 6/24/2009, during performance of 1BwOSR 5.5.8.SI-7B "Safety Injection System Containment Sump 1SI8811B Valve Stroke Surveillance" & 1BwOSR 5.5.8.SI-2B "Train B Safety Injection System Isolation Valve Indication Surveillance" 1SI8811B failed to fully open. The 1SI8811B control board indication went dual, but never indicated full open. Locally 1SI8811B was observed approximately 30 to 40 percent open. Investigation found water in the actuator limit switch (LS) compartment, and it was determined the actuator torque switch (TS) for the 1SI8811B was corroded and non functional. The cause of the corrosion was determined to be water intrusion into the LS compartment through the conduit. The TS and LS finger bases were replaced. On June 26, 2009 at 02:42 hours, the valve was restored to operable status.

A review of past performance of the 1SI8811B valve indicated that the last time the valve was stroked successfully was September 20, 2007 (Reference 3). The exact time of the failure cannot be determined, however it can be determined that the failure occurred between the times 1SI8811B was successfully stroked and when the failure was discovered.

Based on the failure mode, the valve would have been capable of opening to the bypass LS setting of approximately 34 percent open, and the valve was capable of passing the required ECCS recirculation flow at this partial opening position.

However, failure of 1SI8811B to fully open prevented 1SI8804B, Residual Heat Removal to Safety Injection, and 1CS009B Containment Spray Pump 1B Sump Suction Valve from opening. As a result of dual indication on 1SI8811B, even though the 1SI8811B valve was capable of passing the required ECCS recirculation flow, it is expected that had there been an event requiring ECCS recirculation, the operators would have placed the RH pump in pull-to-lock prior to closing 1SI8812B to prevent isolation of suction sources on a running pump. In this configuration, the ability to achieve ECCS recirculation is highly dependent on the success of subsequent operator actions.

## 3. ANALYSIS INPUTS

### **Fault Exposure Time**

Reference 3 documents that 1SI8811B was last successfully stroked on 9/20/07. The valve was repaired and returned to service on 6/26/09. Therefore the fault exposure time is  $\frac{1}{2} * (6/24/09 - 9/20/07) + 2 = 323.5$  days. This includes the 2 days of repair time when the valve was known to be unavailable.

### **Impact of Partial Opening of 1SI8811B on RH Flow**

Reference 4 evaluated the impact of the partial opening of 1SI8811B on the ability the B RH pump to provide flow for ECCS Recirculation. The evaluation concluded that the

valve opened sufficiently to provide full flow capability. Therefore, this condition had no direct impact on the ability of the RH pumps to provide flow for ECCS recirculation. However, since the failure would have resulted in dual position indication for the valve, the operators would be expected, per their training, to put the pump in pull-to-lock prior to closing 1SI8812B. Securing the RH pump is based on operator knowledge of the potential to deprive the pump of all suction sources if 1SI8812B is closed without 1SI8811B being open. This disables the train for the purposes of ECCS recirculation until such time as the valve is locally opened and the pump is restarted. Appendix A provides more detail regarding this action.

### **Common Cause Analysis**

A review by Plant Engineering of the design configuration of the 1SI8811A versus the 1SI8811B valve configuration showed that the A train valve was less likely to have water intrusion in the control circuitry than the B train valve. An inspection of the 1SI8811A valve found no evidence of moisture/corrosion (Reference 21). Furthermore, a test of the valve confirmed its functionality. However, there is not sufficient justification to rule out common cause failure (CCF) potential. Therefore, the impact of CCF potential between two valves was assessed in this evaluation. This is a conservative assumption.

### **Impact of Partial Opening of 1SI8811B on other Components**

1SI8811B has 2 interlocks that are not made up unless the valve is fully open:

- 1SI8804B: Failure of the 1SI8811B from fully opening prevents 1SI8804B from being opened to support Intermediate Head ECCS Recirculation.
- 1CS009B: Failure of the 1SI8811B from fully opening prevents 1CS009B from being opened to support Containment Spray Recirculation. (CS is not modeled in the PRA as it is not required to prevent Containment Over pressurization).

### **Procedural Direction for Locally Opening 1SI8811A/B**

Regardless of the scenario, procedural direction for locally opening the 1SI8811 valves is provided in 1BwCA-1.1 (Reference 10). Appendix F provides additional details regarding the expected procedure steps once the need for transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation is reached. Following a trip, safe shutdown qualified equipment operators report to the control room to be available for taking local actions required to implement the EOPs.

### **Quantitative Credit for Locally Opening 1SI8811A/B**

The condition of the 1SI8811B valve at the time of the partial failure only precluded automatic and remote manipulation of the valve using the valve motor operator and would not have precluded local operator manipulation of valve. The ASME/ANS PRA Standard (Reference 18), as endorsed by Reg. Guide 1.200 (Reference 19), provides specific requirements for the crediting of operator recovery actions, such as the local operation of the 1SI8811A/B valves.

The ASME/ANS PRA Standard contains a high-level requirement specifically related to crediting recovery actions:

*“Recovery actions (at the cutset or scenario level) shall be modeled only if it has been demonstrated that the action is plausible and feasible for those scenarios to which they are applied.”*

In addition, the PRA Standard provides the following note to clarify what is meant by a “recovery action”:

*“Recovery actions are actions taken in addition to those normally identified in the review of emergency, abnormal, and system operating procedures, .... They are included to allow credit for recovery from failures in cutsets or scenarios when failure to take credit would distort the insights from the risk analysis”.*

The applicable supporting requirements of the Standard include the following:

INCLUDE operator recovery actions that can restore the functions, systems, or components functions on an as-needed basis to provide a more realistic evaluation of significant accident sequences.

CREDIT operator recovery actions only if, on a plant-specific basis, the following occur:

- a) a procedure is available and operator training has included the action as part of crew’s training, or justification for the omission for one or both is provided
- b) “cues” (e.g., alarms) that alert the operator to the recovery action provided procedure, training, or skill of the craft exist
- c) attention is given to the relevant performance shaping factors
- d) there is sufficient manpower to perform the action.

ACCOUNT for any dependency between the HFE for operator recovery and any other HFEs in the sequence, scenario, or cutset to which the recovery is applied

The Human Reliability Analysis (Appendix A) addressed the additional applicable Standard requirements including:

When estimating HEPs EVALUATE the impact of the following plant-specific and scenario-specific performance shaping factors:

- a) quality [type (classroom or simulator) and frequency] of the operator training or experience
- b) quality of the written procedures and administrative controls
- c) availability of instrumentation needed to take corrective actions
- d) degree of clarity of cues/indications
- e) human-machine interface
- f) time available and time required to complete the response
- g) complexity of the required response
- h) environment (e.g., lighting, heat, radiation) under which the operator is working
- i) accessibility of the equipment requiring manipulation
- j) necessity, adequacy, and availability of special tools, parts, clothing, etc.

In accordance with the requirements of the ASME/ANS PRA Standard, a series of thermal hydraulic (T-H) analyses and other engineering studies were performed to assess the cues, timelines and viability of local operator recovery actions across the spectrum of scenarios identified.

### **Thermal Hydraulic Analysis**

The dominant risk contributors associated with failure of the 1SI8811B valve to fully open include:

- Small LOCA sequences resulting in failure to establish intermediate head ECCS recirculation.
- Medium LOCAs sequences resulting in failure to establish intermediate head ECCS recirculation.
- Bleed and Feed sequences resulting in failure to establish intermediate head ECCS recirculation. The Bleed and Feed cutsets are similar to the small LOCA sequences except that the LOCA is induced through opening the PZR PORVs.

Regardless of the initiator, the un-recovered cutsets are of essentially two types:

1. Common cause failure of the SI8811 valves to open
2. Failure of SI8811B with random failures of A Train in the ECCS recirculation mode

These cutsets are not significant contributors to the Braidwood base PRA. Consequently, no credit is given in the base model for local manual operation of the 8811A/B valves.

An important dimension of these cutsets is that there are no additional complicating failures that would impede plant or operator response. For example, in the LOCA scenarios, operators would have been able to cooldown the RCS as directed by plant emergency operating procedures prior to reaching the point where ECCS recirculation would be required and containment heat removal is available in all scenarios via the Reactor Containment Fan Coolers (RCFCs).

The Braidwood MAAP model was used to perform sensitivity studies to determine the plant thermal hydraulic conditions and time available to locally open the 1SI8811B valve to either restore the interlock and enable 1SI8804B to be opened to allow intermediate head recirculation or utilize low pressure recirculation in instances where operator action had been taken to successfully cooldown the RCS prior to reaching the time for ECCS recirculation.

To support the HRA analysis (see Appendix A), additional T-H analyses were performed (see Appendix B) to determine the LOCA conditions under which Containment Spray would actuate. This was needed for this evaluation as CS spray actuation significantly accelerates depletion of the RWST inventory and reduces the time available to the operators to establish ECCS recirculation. For example, the base PRA model conservatively assumed that CS will always actuate for Medium LOCAs in order to simplify the PRA model and avoid the need to develop additional accident sequences

and separate Human Error Probabilities (HEPs) based on the number of RCFC trains that are available. This is seen in the development of the operator action timing to establish ECCS recirculation (1SI-HPR----HSYOA) in the base model, which uses MAAP cases with no RCFCs and CS actuation for development of the HEP.

The T-H analysis described in Appendix B resulted in the following CS conditions that are used in this evaluation:

LOCA Size	# RCFC Trains Available	CS Actuation
Small LOCA (<2")	2	No
Small LOCA (<2")	1	No
Small LOCA (<2")	0	Yes
Medium LOCA (2" – 3")	2	No
Medium LOCA (2" – 3")	1	Assumed <sup>1</sup>
Medium LOCA (2" – 3")	0	Yes
Medium LOCA (3" – 5.2")	2	No
Medium LOCA (3" – 5.2")	1	Assumed <sup>2</sup>
Medium LOCA (3" – 5.2")	0	Yes

Based on these results, timelines for human failure events were developed for the dominant Small and Medium LOCA scenarios assuming CS does not actuate in the following cases:

- Small LOCA with 1 or more RCFC trains available
- Medium LOCA with Both RCFC trains available

Credit is not given for local operation of the 881 1A/B valves in cases where CS is assumed to actuate:

- Small LOCA with no RCFCs available<sup>3</sup>
- Medium LOCA with 1 or 0 RCFC trains available

**Radiation Levels during Operator Action to Locally Open 1SI8811B**

The radiation levels following a Small/Medium LOCA (up to a 5.2" diameter break, i.e., the largest Medium LOCA break size) were analyzed as being acceptable for taking the action to open valves (Reference 23). Radiation levels following any large LOCA (i.e., LOCAs >5.2" diameter) are conservatively assumed to preclude local operation of the valves due to the potential for fuel failures during the RCS blowdown.

**Temperature Curved Wall Area during Operator Action to Locally Open 1SI8811B**

The expected temperature in the curved wall area following a Small/Medium LOCA (up to a 5.2" diameter break, i.e., the largest Medium LOCA break size) were analyzed as being acceptable for taking the action to open valves (Reference 22).

1 Actual analysis shows no CS actuation, but CS is conservatively assumed to actuate as Containment pressure is ~2 psia below the CS setpoint

2 Actual analysis shows no CS actuation, but CS is conservatively assumed to actuate as Containment pressure is ~2 psia below the CS setpoint

3 This HEP was not developed as there were no cutsets prior to crediting recovery that had this condition

**RWST Flow Diversion to Containment ECCS Sump with both SI8811 and SI8812 valves open**

During the swap over to ECCS recirculation, there is time at which both the SI8811 and SI8812 valves may be open. During this period, RWST inventory will be diverted from the RWST to the containment ECCS sump. This flow diversion has the effect of accelerating the depletion of the RWST thereby reducing the time available to the operators to locally recover the SI8811 valve prior to reaching RWST Lo-3 (9% level) at which point all ECCS pumps taking suction from the RWST are secured. Reference 17 provides the analysis of the impact of the flow diversion on RWST input. This information is accounted for in the T-H analysis provided in Appendix B for determining the time windows available to locally open the SI8811 valve(s).

**4. ANALYSIS METHOD AND DECISION CRITERIA**

**Decision Criteria**

In accordance with Reference 2, the following criteria are used to assess the total risk impact of the failure of 1SI8811B to fully open:

Risk Metric	Green (per year)	White (per year)	Yellow (per year)	Red (per year)
ICDP	<1E-6	1E-6 to 1E-5	1E-5 to 1E-4	>1E-4
ILERP <sup>4</sup>	<1E-7	1E-7 to 1E-6	1E-6 to 1E-5	>1E-5

**Scope of Analysis**

The scope of this assessment includes Internal Events, External Events (Fire and Seismic) and LERF (internal events only), in accordance with Reference 2.

**SDP Model**

The current Braidwood Base PRA model is Revision 6D (Reference 5). However, a review of the alpha factor for event 1SI8811A-B-CMVCC indicated that the value used was an alpha factor that is applied in the model for High Pressure Injection MOVs; whereas the SI8811 valve is a low pressure valve (maximum pressure would be containment pressure just before failure - ~100 psig). As described in Appendix C, this analysis uses the Braidwood Base PRA model (Rev 6D) and adjusts the alpha factor to be consistent with other RH MOVs in the model. This revised model (6D2) is used in this evaluation.

The Braidwood Fire PRA model Rev 6C<sup>5</sup> was used to evaluate the impact of 1SI8811B failing to fully open from a fire risk perspective. Appendix G describes the fire risk assessment.

Braidwood does not have a seismic PRA model. A bounding seismic risk evaluation is described in Appendix H.

<sup>4</sup> ILERP is only considered if ICDP is greater than 1E-7/yr

<sup>5</sup> The fire PRA model 6C includes two updates that make it equivalent to Rev 6D of the Braidwood PRA model for internal events.

## 5. EVALUATION AND RESULTS

Based on the inputs described in Section 3, a potential risk increase from the 1SI8811B failing to fully open can be determined using the following assumptions:

1. Valve 1SI8811B is assumed to be failed. This assumption is made as it effectively fails the RH pump in the recirculation mode. Though sufficient flow through 1SI8811B was available, with dual position indication, it is expected that the operators would secure the RH pump until such time as the valve was locally opened (Recovery action).
2. Although not present, it is assumed that the failure mechanism associated with 1SI8811B (corrosion of the torque switch) could have been applicable to 1SI8811A. This is treated by increasing the Common Cause Failure Probability of the S18811 valves to open by the random failure of 1SI8811B to open, i.e., the failure probability is set to the alpha factor only.

The evaluation of the risk associated with the 1SI8811B event is documented in the following Appendices:

- Internal Events – Appendix D
- Internal Events Sensitivity Analysis – Appendix E
- Fire Risk – Appendix G
- Seismic Risk – Appendix H

The results of these evaluations are provided below:

Metric	Internal Events ICDP	Fire ICDP	Seismic ICDP	Total ICDP
CDF	7.1E-07	2.2E-07	1.9E-09	9.3E-07
LERF	8.8E-09	Not Calculated	Not Calculated	8.8E-09

## 6. TREATMENT OF UNCERTAINTY

Sensitivity studies were performed (see Appendix E) to determine the impact of changes to several assumptions used in this SDP evaluation.

These sensitivity studies concluded:

- **Number of PORVs Required for Bleed and Feed**  
Changing the success criteria to 2 PORVs required increases the baseline CDF but decreases the risk contribution from the failed valve.
- **HEP for Locally Opening 1SI8811B**  
The Human Error Probabilities for locally opening 1SI8811B was quantified using the EPRI HRA Calculator. A sensitivity study was performed to evaluate the impact of the HEP using the SPAR-H model on the SDP results. Use of the SPAR-H model does impact the results significantly; however, the stair step nature of the SPAR-H methodology's time based recovery credit is not well suited for the medium LOCA HEP quantification associated with this SDP. Because the time available for mitigating action (the system window) varies by several hours over the medium LOCA break spectrum, breaks on the smaller end of the medium LOCA spectrum have significantly longer system windows than those on the larger end. Use of the system window associated with the limiting medium LOCA break in the SPAR-H methodology results in the application of an HEP that is not representative of a large portion of the medium LOCA events. While the HEPs using the EPRI HRA Calculator also use a stair step time based recovery model, the recovery credit transitions do not occur at times that are critical to the results.
- **Common Cause Failure**  
It is known that there was no corrosion on the torque switch for 1SI8811A, and therefore, there was no actual common cause failure. The impact of not assuming a common cause failure potential was evaluated. With this different assumption, the SDP results are slightly reduced.

In addition to the sensitivity studies, there are still several sources of conservatism in the SDP analysis:

- **Break Sizes**  
The most limiting timing for a particular LOCA initiator is used for the spectrum of break sizes within a LOCA category. In addition, the timing for the worst case small LOCA is used as the recovery timing for long term bleed and feed scenarios, though significantly more time is available. Refinement of break sizes would reduce the calculated risk impact.
- **Injection with RH**  
For medium LOCAs and small LOCAs with successful RCS cooldown that represent the majority of the computed risk for this SDP, the operators are expected to secure the RH pumps when they have dual indication on 1SI8811B. However, if they are unsuccessful in locally opening 1SI8811B, they would eventually attempt to use an RH pump for injection, as the thermal hydraulic

calculations show that RCS pressure would be below the shutoff head of the RH pumps. As the 8811B valve was found to be open sufficiently to allow full RH flow (Reference 4), this action, though not proceduralized, would be successful in preventing core damage. Since it is not proceduralized, no credit is taken in the SDP, which provides a significant conservative bias to the results.

- **Hot Leg versus Cold Leg Breaks**

All LOCAs are assumed to be Hot Leg Breaks to minimize the time for operator response. Cold leg breaks extend the time window for operator action by several hours with a subsequent improvement in the credit provided for local recovery of 1SI8811B.

- **Use of Shutdown Cooling Versus ECCS Recirculation**

For Small and Medium Break LOCAs the plant operators would initiate RCS depressurization and cooldown. For a range of small and medium LOCAs, this cooldown would result in establishing Shutdown Cooling with makeup to the RCS using normal charging from the RWST. For these LOCAs, the need for ECCS recirculation may never be reached. Not modeling shutdown cooling and requiring ECCS recirculation for these sequences represents a conservative bias to the results.

- **RWST Refill**  
Though not modeled, RWST refill will provide additional time to maintain SI and CV injection for small/medium LOCA scenarios. This action is not credited in this analysis, which provides a small conservative bias to the results.
- **Injection from VCT**  
Though not modeled, injection from the VCT will provide additional time to maintain SI and CV injection for small/medium LOCA scenarios. This action is not credited in this analysis, which provides a small conservative bias to the results.
- **Containment Spray**  
No credit is taken for scenarios where containment spray is actuated. With containment spray actuation, the time available to locally open 1SI8811B will be shorter, due to the additional depletion of the RWST resulting from the use of Containment Spray. However, for a wide range of LOCAs, there would still be sufficient time to locally open the valve prior to core damage.

## 7. CONCLUSION

Based in this evaluation, credit for operator action is warranted because:

1. Procedures are available and training provided to locally open valve(s)
2. Cues exist to trigger local operator actions
3. Environment conditions would allow access to valve(s)
4. Sufficient resources available to support opening the valve(s)
5. Sufficient time available to locally open 1SI8811 valve(s)

Crediting Operator Action reduces the risk significance of the event to Green (low importance to safety) In addition; there is sufficient conservatism in the evaluation to account for uncertainties.

## 8. REFERENCES

1. T&RM ER-AA-600-1012, Rev. 8, Risk Management Documentation.
2. T&RM ER-AA-600-1041, Rev. 7, Risk Metrics – SDP & Event Analysis.
3. IR 934782
4. EC 377204, Evaluate 1SI8811B Flow At Partial Opening
5. BB PRA-014, Rev. R6D, "Byron/Braidwood PRA Quantification Notebook," December 2008.
6. 1BwEP-0, Rev 202, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Unit 1
7. 1BwEP ES-0.1, Rev 200, Reactor Trip Response Unit 1
8. 1BwEP-1, Rev 203, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant Unit 1

9. 1BwEP ES-1.3, Rev 200, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation Unit 1
10. 1BwCA-1.1 Rev 202 "Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation"
11. ER 392870, "Accessibility Of 1SI8811B Following SBLOCA - Revised For 5.2 Inch Break", 11/17/09
12. 1BwST-3, Rev 200, "Heat Sink Unit 1"
13. 1BwFR-H.1, Rev 200 "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Unit 1"
14. Input/Output Files: See Appendixes
15. Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Model for Braidwood 1 & 2 (ASP PWR B), Idaho National Laboratory, Rev 3.31, June 2007
16. Not Used
17. EC 378180 "ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE BACK FLOW FROM RWST TO ECCS RECIRCULATION SUMP WHILE 1SI8811A/B AND 1SI8812A/B ARE OPEN FOR SIX MINUTES" 12/29/09
18. RA-S-2002, "Standard for Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications," dated April 5, 2002
19. Reg Guide 1.200 Rev 1, "An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities" dated January, 2007 with additional clarifications
20. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "CCF Parameter Estimations, 2007 Update", <http://nrcoe.inl.gov/results/CCF/ParamEst2007/ccfparamest.htm>, September 2008
21. Work Order #1281802 Task 7 "EM REMOVE PLUG FOR INSPECTION OF 1SI8811A LIMIT SWITCH ENCL."
22. EC 378302, "EVALUATE TEMPERATURE OF THE PIPE PENETRATION CURVE WALL AREA AUX. BLDG. ELEV. 364', USING A BOUNDING CASE AND REALISTIC CASE REVISED ANALYSIS FROM EC 377814"
23. ER 393342 "ACCESSIBILITY OF 1SI8811B FOLLOWING SBLOCA – REVISED TO INCLUDE POTENTIAL ECCS TERMINATION AT RWST EMPTY"



**Linthicum, Roy R.:(GenCo-Nuc)**

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**From:** Krueger, Gregory A.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 30, 2009 2:38 PM  
**To:** Linthicum, Roy R.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Subject:** RE: BW-SDP-003 Approval

Roy,

I reviewed the SDP application, BW-SDP-003, and associated files on the RM website. I also confirm that you and Joe have the appropriate qualifications as documented in LMS. I approve this SDP application via email.

Note – please date your signature line when finalizing the document.

Thanks,

Greg

---

**From:** Linthicum, Roy R.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 30, 2009 3:06 PM  
**To:** Krueger, Gregory A.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Subject:** BW-SDP-003 Approval  
**Importance:** High

Greg,

Attached is BW-SDP-003 for your electronic approval. The appendixes are on the web site.

Roy Linthicum

Corporate Risk Management

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BRAIDWOOD  
PRA APPLICATION NOTEBOOK

**BW-SDP-003**

REVISION 1

APPENDIX A

HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS

DECEMBER 2009

## REVISION SUMMARY SHEET

<b>Revision</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Summary</b>
0	11/20/09	Original Issue
1	12/11/09	Addresses RWST to sump flow diversion

## 1.0 HRA Overview

In order to assess the impact of the failure of the 1/2SI8811A/B valve(s) on plant risk, it is necessary to account for the actions that would be taken by the operator to recover from the failure(s). The recovery actions include those steps that are required to successfully establish cold leg recirculation mode given a failure of the 1/2SI8811A/B valve(s) to stroke.

Because the 1/2SI8811A/B valve failure(s) occurred during the performance of the action to transition to recirculation mode, the transition to cold leg recirculation mode consists of two distinct phases. The first phase consists of the operator response up to the point where they are first required to interface with the dual indication on 1/2SI8811A/B. For this evaluation, the phase one of the response is successful (inclusion of the failure to begin the transition to recirculation mode with the failed 1SI8811A/B valve would be non-minimal). The second phase consists of the operator response once the dual indication condition on the valve(s) has been encountered. Consequently, it is only necessary to model the phase two response for cases that include failure of 1SI8811A/B.

In order to account for the conditions under which the phase two response would be required, it is necessary to identify the accident scenarios in which the mitigating actions would be taken. The Braidwood PRA model and the NRC SPAR model identify a similar set of dominant contributors, which are small and medium LOCA scenarios. Because the different LOCA sizes impact the time available to perform the transition to cold leg recirculation mode, separate HEPs have been developed for these two initiating event types. The Braidwood PRA model also identifies loss of DC Bus 111 scenarios as top contributors, but because the timing of the SLOCA event is consistent with that for the loss of DC bus transient and because the actions are otherwise the same, the HEP for the 2" SLOCA event is considered to be applicable to the loss of DC bus events. Consequently, a separate HEP was not developed for those cases. The timing for the MLOCA cases is based on a 5.2" break (per the referenced case from Appendix B).

Within the Medium LOCA scenarios, there are some contributors that include the failure of one RCFC division. MAAP analysis indicates that Containment Spray should not actuate for these scenarios, but the margin to the actuation setpoint is relatively low. Because actuation of the Containment Spray pumps would reduce RWST inventory and severely limit the credit available for mitigating actions, the recovery actions are conservatively assumed to fail for these scenarios.

An additional area of interest for MLOCA scenarios is that the timing conditions vary significantly over the range of the breaks that are defined as MLOCAs. The timing for breaks on the lower end of the MLOCA break spectrum (breaks from 2" to 3") is more closely related to the 2" LOCA scenarios than for the 5.2" MLOCA events. Because the SPAR-H HEP for the MLOCA scenario is significantly impacted by the differences in the timing conditions over the full range of the

MLOCA breaks, the MLOCA events have been parsed into two ranges to more accurately represent the reliability of the operator response. The HEP for the 5.2" MLOCA is retained for use with the breaks from 3" to 5.2" (in conjunction with corresponding changes to the initiating event frequency) and an additional HEP has been developed for use with the MLOCAs in the 2" to 3" range (also accounting for the appropriate initiating event frequency).

Finally, because Exelon and the NRC quantify HEPs using different HRA methodologies, this appendix includes assessments of the HEPs using both the Exelon HRA methodology (THERP) and the SPAR-H methodology.

It should be noted that no credit is taken for any action that would be initiated based on compliance with 50.54x, even though the action to start the RH pumps to determine if flow from the sump could be established is an obvious step to take when no other alternatives are available to protect the core. In the simulator observations performed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009, both crews elected to start the RH pumps when it was determined that no other alternatives were available to prevent core damage and cited 50.54x as the basis for doing so. The inability to credit this type of action is due to a limitation of the current HRA methodologies rather than the inability of the operators to take such action. In this case, this weakness precludes realistic modeling of plant risk.

## 1.1 Human Failure Events

As identified in Section 1.0, the operator response has been separated into two phases; the first phase includes the actions up to the point where interface with the dual indication on 1/2SI8811A/B is required, and the second phase consists of the operator actions once the dual indication condition on the valve(s) has been encountered. The following outline identifies the individual operator actions that are included in each of the phases:

- Phase 1
  - Operators fail to begin the transition to cold leg recirculation (addressed by existing HFE in the PRA model)
- Phase 2
  - Failure to locally open 1SI8811A/B and complete the transition to cold leg recirculation mode

The action to begin the swap to cold leg recirculation mode is taken in response to low RWST level. The nominal action to swap to recirculation mode is applicable for the cases in which at least one train of equipment is available. For cases in which cold leg recirculation is failed by the 1SI8811A/B valve(s), a separate HFE is required.

This HFE represents the probability that the operators will fail to locally open the failed 1SI8811A/B valves and complete the transition to cold leg recirculation given that the swap to recirculation mode has been initiated.

Because the Braidwood procedures direct the operators to a success path independent of the interpretation of the dual indication on 1SI8811A/B, a diagnosis error related to the valve's position is not a failure mode for transition to cold leg circulation mode. As a result, the Phase 2 HEP includes only an execution component. Further details related to the procedure and failure mode evaluation are provided in Section 1.2.

Table 1-1 provides a summary of the HEPs that have been developed to support the SDP.

Table 1-1  
Human Failure Event Summary

BEID	IE	Action Description	HRA Method	HEP
1SI8811B--BHPMOA	SLOCA	FAILURE TO OPEN VLV 1SI8811B AFTER REMOTE FAILURE (LOCAL-MANUAL, SLOCA)	Exelon	6.50E-03
1SI8811BSSBHPMOA	SLOCA	FAILURE TO OPEN VLV 1SI8811B AFTER REMOTE FAILURE (LOCAL-MANUAL, SLOCA, SPAR-H)	SPAR-H	9.90E-03
1SI8811B3SBHPMOA	3" MLOCA	FAILURE TO OPEN VLV 1SI8811B AFTER REMOTE FAILURE (LOCAL-MANUAL, 3" MLOCA, SPAR-H)	SPAR-H	9.90E-03
1SI8811BM-BHPMOA	MLOCA	FAILURE TO OPEN VLV 1SI8811B AFTER REMOTE FAILURE (LOCAL-MANUAL, MLOCA)	Exelon	6.00E-03
1SI8811BMSBHPMOA	MLOCA	FAILURE TO OPEN VLV 1SI8811B AFTER REMOTE FAILURE (LOCAL-MANUAL, MLOCA, SPAR-H)	SPAR-H	9.10E-02

**1.2 Treatment of the Cognitive Component for the Response to Dual Indication on 1SI8811A/B**

Typically, both execution and diagnosis errors are included as part of a post initiator HRA. In this case, however, there is no need to address the diagnosis component as explained below. This is based on the guidance in NU REG/CR-6883, section 2.2.1, which states that "When considering the question "Does this task contain a significant amount of diagnosis?" one should consider whether the operator or crew has to expend mental energy to observe and interpret what information is present (or not present), determine what that means, think of possible causes and decide what to do about it."

For scenarios in which the 1SI8811A/B valve fails to completely stroke and both the "open" and "closed" lights are illuminated (dual indication), it is recognized that the operators must interpret the dual indication and make a decision about how to proceed. However, whatever they decide regarding the valve's status results in a potential success path. Consequently there is no failure associated with this diagnosis step. Once a decision has been made, the steps to be taken are clearly delineated in the corresponding procedures.

- 1SI8811A/B interpreted as "NOT OPEN": operator directed to close 1SI8812A/B, open 1SI8811A/B locally, and establish cold leg recirculation.
- 1SI8811A/B interpreted as "OPEN": The RH pumps would remain running, 1SI8812A/B directed to be closed, and injection would be provided to the RCS via the 1SI8809A/B valve(s). For transient scenarios or for SLOCAs where the transition to cold leg recirculation is attempted at the time of the 46% RWST level cue, the procedures still provide a success path as they direct local operation of the 1CV8804A/1SI8804B valves (bypasses interlock with 1SI8811A/B) and the establishment of flow using the SI/Charging pumps.

These paths are described in more detail below.

Scenario 1, 1SI8811A/B considered to be "not open" in ES-1.3 step 3c:

If the 1SI8811A/B valve is considered to be "not open" in ES-1.3 step 3c, the operators are transferred to Attachment A. In Attachment A, step 1 questions whether or not the 1SI8811A valve is closed. If it is determined to be "not closed", the RNO action is to close 1SI8812A, which would terminate an "A" division flow diversion from the RWST to the sump. The RNO then transfers to step 4, which includes similar guidance for the "B" division. The RNO in step 4 transfers to Step 7, which in turn transfers to BwCA-1-1 where step 1c directs local closure of 1SI8811A/B. Once the 1SI8811A/B valve is open, cold leg recirculation can be established.

If the opposite interpretation of the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) status is made in Attachment A, step 1 of ES-1.3 (valve is "closed"), the operators are directed through steps 2 and 3, which attempt manual, remote operation of 1SI8811A. Step 3b closes 1SI8812A, which would terminate a flow diversion, and step 3e directs 1SI8811A to be opened. Whether or not 1SI8811A is considered to be open, the procedure path leads to step 4 where a similar process is started for the "B" division. On completion of the "B" division steps, step 7 is reached where the transfer to 1BwCA-1.1 occurs and the direction to perform the local stroke of 1SI8811A/B is given.

Scenario 2, 1SI8811A/B considered to be "open" in ES-1.3 step 3c:

In the event that the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) is believed/considered to be "open" in ES-1.3 step 3c, step 3d directs closure of the 1SI8812A/B valves, which would terminate the flow diversion from the RWST to the sump. At this point, the RH pumps would be running with suction only aligned through the partially open 1SI8811A/B valves. For MLCOA events, this would allow injection through the 1SI8809A/B valves without further action; however, even if RCS pressure is too high for injection using only the RH pumps (e.g., in a transient scenario), the procedure continues in steps 4 and 5 to align RH to the S I/Charging system suction path. In steps 5f and 5h, the direction is given to open the 1CV8804A and 1SI8804B valves, respectively. These valves are interlocked with 1SI8811A/B and would not open with 1SI8811A/B in an intermediate position. The RNO for steps 5f and 5g direct local operation of valves 1CV8804A and 1SI8804B valves, which are smaller and more easily operated than the 1SI8811A/B valves. Locally stroking the 1CV8804A/1SI8804B valve would provide an alternate success path given that suction would be available through the partially open 1SI8811A/B valves.

In summary, from the point where dual indication on 1SI8811A/B is encountered at ES-1.3 step 3c, any procedure path taken will isolate the flow diversion path from the RWST to the containment sump by closing 1SI8812A/B and emergency coolant recirculation will be established by opening either 1SI8811A/B or 1CV8804A/1SI8804B locally. Failure to interpret the 1SI8811A/B valve as "not open" is not a failure mode for establishing cold leg recirculation and it is not included in the HEP quantification for this assessment. No other significant diagnosis is required to either close 1SI8812A/B or to open 1SI8811A/B; these actions are directed as a matter of course in a procedure path that has already been initiated.

### **1.3 Applicability of HEP for Local Operation of 1SI8811A/B to Scenarios Requiring Local Operation of 1CV8804A/1SI8804B**

While it is expected that the operators would progress through the procedure path described in Scenario 1 (refer to Section 1.2) in the event of a mid-stroke failure of 1SI8811A/B, the path in Scenario 2 would also lead to success. Consequently, the diagnosis error for interpreting the dual indication on 1SI8811A/B has been excluded from the evaluation. In order to support the elimination of the diagnosis error, however, it is necessary to demonstrate that the probability of failing to establish cold leg recirculation in Scenario 2 is less than or equal to that for Scenario 1. Otherwise, failure to interpret the 1SI8811A/B valve as "not closed" would place the operators on a path that is more likely to fail than for the case where a correct diagnosis was made.

One way to demonstrate that the failure probability for the Scenario 2 path is less than for the Scenario 1 path would be to explicitly develop an HEP for Scenario 2. However, a more limited, qualitative discussion of the actions can accomplish this task given that the similarities of the actions facilitate a straightforward comparison.

- Isolation of 1SI8812A/B: For Scenario 2, the 1SI8812A/B valve(s) is directed to be isolated in the step 3d of ES-1.3, which immediately follows the step in which the dual indication is assessed and would result in a rapid termination of the flow diversion to the sump. For scenario 1, multiple steps are taken before reaching the step(s) to isolate

1SI8812A/B. This leaves Scenario 2 with significantly more volume in the RWST and a longer time to TAF.

- Time to direct local valve operation: The median time to reach the direction to locally open the 1CV8804A/1SI8804B valves is 5.6 minutes from 46% level in the RWST (Byron/Braidwood calculation SITH-1, Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Level Setpoints, 7/18/2007). Based on the simulator runs performed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009, the median time to reach the direction to open the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) is 10.5 minutes from 46% level in the RWST (based on runs 1 & 3). The simulator runs used to develop the median response time for the 1CV8804A/1SI8804B local stroke direction did not include a mid-stroke failure of 1SI8811A/B, but simulator observations on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009 showed a limited time was spent addressing the dual indication (1 minute for run 1, 3 minutes for run 3).
- Valve location and accessibility: Both the 1SI8811A/B and the 1CV8804A/1SI8804B valves are located in the same general area (364' elevation, curved wall area), so travel time and access issues are essentially the same,
- Dose-rate: The dose-rates are bounded by the 1SI8811A/B valves (The dose rate from water within the 8" pipe should be less than the dose rates from the larger 24" sump outlet piping, dose from the 24" sump line reduced by distance),
- Temperature: The temperatures around the valves would be equivalent (1CV8804A located in CWA with 1SI8811A/B) (1SI8804B located in SI pump room and the temperature may be lower as the only water flowing through the SI pump room is RWST water and SX water for the pump oil coolers),
- Manipulation time: The manipulation time for the 1CV8804A/1SI8804B valve(s) is less than the 24 minutes that are required to open the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) (1CV8804A/1SI8804B are 8 inch gate valves compared to the 24" 1SI8811A/B valves),
- Ergonomics: The 1CV8804A valve can be accessed from the floor while the 1SI8804B valve must be accessed from a ladder. Both 1SI8811 valves must be accessed from a ladder. Both use handwheels that are located at about head level. The labeling is clear for both valve sets; however, the 1SI8811A/B valves are more unique in appearance.
- Actions subsequent to local valve operation: The actions to complete the transition to recirculation mode are essentially equivalent for both scenarios. The exception is that for Scenario 1, the 1CV8804A/1SI8804B valve(s) would also have to be opened. No significant diagnosis is required to complete either Scenario 1 or Scenario 2.

Based on this information, it is concluded that the failure probability of Scenario 2 is equal to or less than that for Scenario 1 and that use of the HEP to locally close 1SI8811A/B in Scenario 2 is conservative. This supports the exclusion of the diagnosis error from the HEP and its use for either Scenario 1 or Scenario 2.

## 1.4 Applicability of 2" SLOCA Timing to Transient Scenarios

As identified in Section 1.0, the HEP developed for the 2" SLOCA events are also applied to the transient events, which require bleed and feed for cooling in the dominant scenarios. Given that the response to the failure of the 1SI8811A/B valve includes the same action steps for both initiating event types, the potential differences in the action evaluation are essentially limited to the timing inputs or those stresses caused by the timing of the event. While the time available from top of active fuel (TAF) is shorter for the transient case than for the SLOCA event (due to draindown issues), the difference in the time is not large enough to impact either the Exelon or SPAR-H HEP quantification results.

Table 1-2 shows that the time from 46% RWST level to TAF for a 2" SLOCA (case # BBSDP17a) is 9.46 hours while it is only 6.1 hours for the transient scenario (case # BBSDP25a). The 3.36 hour reduction in the system window does not impact the shift change recovery credit for the Exelon methodology or the available time classification for SPAR-H:

- Apart from credit taken in the early time frame for self review and STA availability, the time based recovery credit taken in the Exelon methodology is static apart from shift change credit. The relevant time period considered for shift change credit is measured from the time of the action cue to the end of the system window and it is static for the 6 to 14 hour time frame. Both system windows fall within this period. Recovery factor dependence is also time dependent in the EPRI HRA Calculator's application of THERP, but zero dependence is suggested when the diagnosis time is greater than one hour (which is true for either case).
- For SPAR-H, when the execution ratio falls between 5 and 50, the timing multiplier is 0.1. The execution ratio is defined to be:  $(T(\text{sw}) - T(\text{delay}) - T(1/2)) / T(m)$ . For both the SLOCA and the transient case, the multiplier would be 0.1.
  - For SLOCA this is:  $(12 \text{ hours} - 2.58 \text{ hours} - 0.133) / 0.625 = 14.86$
  - For the transient this is:  $(14.83 - 8.77 - 0.133) / 0.625 = 9.48$

In summary, the HEP developed for the SLOCA initiating events with 1SI8811A/B failure is also applied to the transient initiating event scenarios. While there is a shorter amount of time from the action cue to TAF for the transient events than for the 2" SLOCA events, the shorter time would not impact the HEP quantification. Because other aspects of the actions are the same whether they are taken for transient scenarios or for SLOCAs, use of the SLOCA HEP in transient scenarios is considered to be appropriate.

TABLE 1-2  
FLOW DIVERSION ANALYSIS

CASE DESCRIPTION <sup>1</sup>	CASE #	RWST 46.7% <sup>2</sup>	RWST 9%	TAF <sup>3</sup>	CD <sup>4</sup>	46.7% TO 9%	46.7% TO TAF	FLOW DIVERSION GPM / MIN	RUN TIME
2" SLOCA, wAFW, 2CV, 2SI, Cooldown @ .75 hr, 2 RCFC trains, Flow diversion	BBSDP17a	2.54 hr	3.57 hr	12.00 hr	15.91 hr	1.03 hr	9.46 hr	11891 / 7 min	24 hr
B&F, No AFW, 1 PORV, 1 Vent, 1CV, 1SI, 1 RCFC train, Porv & Vent Closed @ 9%, Flow diversion	BBSDP25a	8.73 hr	11.94 hr	14.83 hr	16.35 hr	3.21 hr	6.10 hr	11891 / 7 min	24 hr

Notes:

- 1) See Appendix B for a complete case description.
- 2) Initial volume corresponds to Tech Spec minimum of 400500 gal
- 3) Top of active fuel exposure
- 4) Peak cladding temperature > 1800 F

## 1.5 Event Timeline Summary

In order to better convey the timing of the events that are key to this analysis, graphical timelines have been developed for the 2" SLOCA and 5.2" MLOCA events. These timelines are similar to those that are used in the EPRI HRA Calculator, but they include additional information and have been re-structured to more clearly depict the time available between the time CL recirculation would be established and TAF in the RCS. Figures 1-1 and 1-2 represent the 2" SLOCA and 5.2" MLOCA timelines, respectively.

Figure 1-1

Small LOCA Timeline





Figure 1-2

Medium LOCA Timeline



RWST level @  
46.7%

ISI 8812 valves  
isolated

Direction given  
to open is  
I8811A1B



## 2.0 Simulator Observations and Training Input

As part of the HRA process, simulator observations were conducted on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009 to obtain information about how licensed Braidwood operators would interpret and respond to failures of the 1/2SI8811A/B to fully stroke during a transition to recirculation mode.

The following scenarios were used (in order) on a two separate crews over the two day observation period:

- 5.2" LOCA, all equipment available, at ECCS Recirculation, both SI8811 valves open 34% of full stroke, but have dual indication. Valves can be locally opened. Containment spray forced on (did not reach setpoint). (Run 1 (Crew 1), Run 3 (Crew 2))
- 5.2" LOCA, all equipment available, both SI8811 valves open 34% of full stroke, but have dual indication. If EO dispatched, valves are not accessible due to high rad levels. Containment spray forced on (did not reach setpoint). (Run 2 (Crew 1), Run 4 (Crew 2))

In addition to the simulator staff, the observation crew included an HRA analyst, a thermal hydraulics expert, and an Exelon risk management engineer. The results of the observations have been incorporated directly into the HRA quantification documentation.

In addition to the simulator observations, training personnel were contacted to determine how the training department addresses the issue of dual valve position indication with the operators. This information has also been documented directly in the HRA quantification documentation.

The main insights of the simulator observations and training input include the following:

1. In step 3c of ES-1.3, the operators would most likely consider valve(s) 1SI8811A/B to be "not open" when a dual indication situation exists,
2. The RH pump(s) would be tripped prior to closing 1SI8812A/B in the RNO for steps 1 and 4 of Attachment A of ES-1.3. This would be performed to protect the RH pump(s) given that closing the 1SI8812A/B valves would isolate the RH pumps from all suction sources.
3. Steps 1 and 4 of Attachment A of ES-1.3 include questions about the status of 1SI8811A/B that could be interpreted differently, but either interpretation will lead the operators to the direction to locally open 1SI8811A/B in a timely manner.
4. When a success path is not available to locally open the 1SI8811A/B valves in time to prevent fuel damage, the operators would start the RH pump and monitor it for signs of cavitation. While this is not explicitly included in BwCA-1.1 to address cases where

1SI8811A/B cannot be fully opened, the operators identified that they were bound to perform whatever actions deemed necessary to protect the core by 50.54x.

5. The operators are well trained on LOCA scenarios and the associated procedures. The general action to transition to cold leg recirculation model is extremely familiar to them.
6. The Braindwood training personnel summarized the treatment of a valve with dual indication as follows: if a statement asks if a valve is open, it is only considered open if there is clear indication that it is open. The same is true for statements that ask if the valve is closed. So with dual indication, the valve is neither open nor closed.
7. Section 2.1 provides the timing insights.

## 2.1 Simulator Timeline Summary

Table 2-1 provides a summary of some notable events for each of the four simulator runs that were performed. The time scale is set so that time zero = 46% RWST level.

Table 2-2: Simulator Timing Summary

Event	Run 1 Time (Crew 1)	Run 2 Time (Crew 1)	Run 3 Time (Crew 2)	Run 4 Time (Crew 2)
46% RWST Level	0 minutes	0 minutes	0 minutes	0 minutes
ES-1.3 entered	5 seconds (briefing prior to 46% prepared the crew for entry on low RWST level cue)	5 seconds (briefing prior to 46% prepared the crew for entry on low RWST level cue)	5 seconds (briefing prior to 46% prepared the crew for entry on low RWST level cue)	5 seconds (briefing prior to 46% prepared the crew for entry on low RWST level cue)
Dual indication present (assumed to exist after normal valve stroke time elapses)	98 seconds	98 seconds	98 seconds	98 seconds
Dual position indication on 1SI8811A/B	3 minutes	3 minutes	2 minutes	2 minutes

identified				
1SI8812A/B closed	7 minutes	6 minutes	7 minutes	5 minutes
Operator dispatched for local position assessment of 1SI8811A/B	11 minutes	9 minutes	3 minutes	4 minutes
Direction given to operator to open 1SI8811A/B locally	11 minutes	9 minutes	10 minutes	4 minutes
CS pumps placed in PTL	12 minutes	11 minutes	13 minutes	8 minutes
Time when CL recirc flow established	43 minutes	45 minutes (access to 1SI8811B prohibited, RH was started on increasing core exit temp)	33 minutes	12 minutes (access to 1SI8811B prohibited, so RH was started early to check viability of injection path)

### 3.0 Plant Walkdown of 1SI8811B

In order to gain an understanding of the physical location, orientation, and some of the demands that would be required of an equipment operator (EO) performing a manual stroke of the 1SI8811B valve, a walkdown of the valve and the route that an EO would take to the valve from the EO ready room was performed on 11/11/2009. The HRA analyst performed the walkdown in conjunction with an Exelon rad tech.

Some of the details that were collected as part of the walkdown include the following:

- Travel time to the 1SI8811B valve from the EO ready room, including the time required to obtain the key to high rad areas.
- Access requirements (keys, rad protection clothing)
- Lighting of the 1SI8811A/B area
- Labeling of the valve
- Local valve position indication
- Valve characteristic relative to other valves/equipment in the same proximity
- Valve controls, human interface issues with the handwheel, access issues related specifically to the 1SI8811 valve.

The results of the walkdown are incorporated directly in the HRA quantification documentation.

#### 4.0 Human Error Probability Quantifications

Version 4.0 of the EPRI HRA Calculator™ was used to quantify the human failure events identified for this analysis. As identified in Section 1.0, assessments were performed for the dominant contributors to risk given failure of the 1/2SI8811A/B valve(s) to stroke, which include small and medium LOCA scenarios. The quantifications were performed using both the SPAR-H and CBDTM/THERP HRA methodologies in order to provide a robust assessment of human failure events relevant to this SDP. Specifically, this section includes the following quantifications:

- Section 4.1: 1SI8811B--BHPMOA, FAILURE TO OPEN VLV 1SI8811B AFTER REMOTE FAILURE (LOCAL-MANUAL, SLOCA)
- Section 4.2: 1SI8811BSBHPMOA, FAILURE TO OPEN VLV 1SI8811B AFTER REMOTE FAILURE (LOCAL-MANUAL, SLOCA, SPAR-H)
- Section 4.3: 1SI8811BM-BHPMOA, FAILURE TO OPEN VLV 1SI8811B AFTER REMOTE FAILURE (LOCAL-MANUAL, MLOCA)
- Section 4.4: 1SI8811BMSBHPMOA, FAILURE TO OPEN VLV 1SI8811B AFTER REMOTE FAILURE (LOCAL-MANUAL, MLOCA, SPAR-H)
- Section 4.5: 1SI8811B3SBHPMOA, FAILURE TO OPEN VLV 1SI8811B AFTER REMOTE FAILURE (LOCAL-MANUAL, 3" MLOCA, SPAR-H)

**4.1 1SI8811B--BHPMOA, FAILURE TO OPEN VLV 1SI8811B AFTER REMOTE FAILURE (LOCAL-MANUAL, SLOCA)**

<b>Analyst:</b>	DEM
<b>Rev. Date:</b>	12/10/09
<b>Reviewer:</b>	
<b>Cognitive Method:</b>	CBDTM/THERP
<b>Analysis Database:</b>	bwd-8811-121009.HRA (12/10/09, 1675264 Bytes)

Table 1: 1SI8811B--BHPMOA SUMMARY

<b>Analysis Results:</b>	<b>without Recovery</b>	<b>with Recovery</b>
<b>P<sub>axe</sub></b>	1.4e-01	6.5e-03
<b>Total HEP</b>		6.5e-03
<b>Error Factor</b>		5

**Related Human Interactions:**

Follows success of nominal action to begin the swap to recirculation mode.

**Initial Cue:**

Procedure direction - CA-1.1, step 1c, RNO

**Recovery Cue:**

**Cue:**

Procedures require the operators to confirm that the 1SI8811A/B valve is open during recirculation alignment.

**Degree of Clarity of Cues & Indications:**

Average

**Procedures:**

Cognitive: Not Selected

Execution: BwCA-1.1 (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation) Revision: 202

Other: Not Selected

**Cognitive Procedure:**

Step: Not Applicable

Instruction: Not Applicable

**Procedure Notes:**

Typically, both execution and diagnosis errors are included as part of a post initiator HRA. In some cases, however, there are conditions that preclude the applicability of one of these components of the HEP.

For scenarios in which the 1SI8811A/B valve fails to completely stroke and both the "open" and "closed" lights are illuminated (dual indication), it is recognized that the operators must interpret the dual indication and make a decision about how to proceed. However, their decision regarding the valve's status is unimportant given that any interpretation results in a successful outcome.

- 1SI8811A/B interpreted as "NOT OPEN": operator directed to close 1SI8812A/B, open 1SI8811A/B locally, and establish cold leg recirculation.

- 1SI8811A/B interpreted as "OPEN": The RH pumps would remain running, 1SI8812A/B directed to be closed, and injection would be provided to the RCS via the 1SI8809A/B valve(s). For transient scenarios or for SLOCAs where the transition to cold leg recirculation is attempted at the time of the 46% RWST level cue, the procedures still provide a success path as they direct local operation of the 1CV8804A/1SI8804B valves (bypasses interlock with 1SI8811A/B) and the establishment of flow using the SI/Charging pumps.

These paths are described in more detail below:

Scenario 1, 1SI8811A/B considered to be "not open" in ES-1.3 step 3c:

If the 1SI8811A/B valve is considered to be "not open" in ES-1.3 step 3c, the operators are transferred to Attachment A. In Attachment A, step 1 questions whether or not the 1SI8811A valve is closed. If it is determined to be "not closed", the RNO action is to close 1SI8812A, which would terminate an "A" division flow diversion from the RWST to the sump. The RNO then transfers to step 4, which includes similar guidance for the "B" division. The RNO is step 4 transfers to Step 7, which in turn transfers to BwCA-1-1 where step 1c directs local closure of 1SI8811A/B.

If the opposite interpretation of the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) status is made in Attachment A, step 1 of ES-1.3 ( valve is "closed"), the operators are directed through steps 2 and 3, which attempt manual, remote operation of 1SI8811A. Step 3b closes 1SI8812A, which would terminate a flow diversion, and step 3e directs 1SI8811A to be opened. Whether or not 1SI8811A is considered to be open, the procedure path leads to step 4 where a similar process is started for the "B" division. On completion of the "B" division steps, step 7 is reached where the transfer to 1BwCA-1.1 occurs and the direction to perform the local stroke of 1SI8811A/B is given:

Scenario 2, 1SI8811A/B considered to be "open" in ES-1.3 step 3c:

In the event that the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) is believed/considered to be "open" in ES-1.3 step 3c, step 3d directs closure of the 1SI8812A/B valves, which would terminate the flow diversion from the RWST to the sump. At this point, the RH pumps would be running with suction only aligned through the partially open 1SI8811A/B valves. For MLCOA events, this may allow injection through the 1SI8809A/B valves without further action; however, assuming that RCS pressure is too high for injection, the procedure continues in steps 4 and 5 to align RH to the SI/Charging system suction path. In steps 5f and 5h, the direction is given to open the 1CV8804A and 1SI8804B valves, respectively. These valves are interlocked with 1SI8811A/B and would not open with 1SI8811A/B in an intermediate position. The RNO for steps 5f and 5g direct local operation of valves 1CV8804A and 1SI8804B valves, which are smaller and more easily operated than the 1SI8811A/B valves. Locally stroking the 1CV8804A/1SI8804B valve would provide an alternate success path given that suction would be available through the partially open 1SI8811A/B valves.

If, for some reason, it was decided that there was no viable suction path for the SI/Charging pumps and that emergency coolant recirculation was lost/unavailable, the continuous action statement to transfer to BwCA-1.1 would be followed where local operation of the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) would be directed.

In summary, from the point where dual indication on 1SI8811A/B is encountered at ES-1.3 step 3c, any procedure path taken will isolate the flow diversion path from the RWST to the containment sump by

closing 1SI8812A/B and emergency coolant recirculation will be established by opening either 1SI8811A/B or 1CV8804A/1SI8804B locally. No significant diagnosis is required to either close 1SI8812A/B or to open 1SI8811A/B; these actions are directed as a matter of course in a procedure path that has already been initiated.

#### TRAINING:

Based on simulator observations and operator interviews, scenario 1 is the expected evolution. There are a number of scenarios utilized in the simulator in both initial and continuing training that exercise these portions of the procedures.

For ILT: Scenario P-18.1 Involves failure of SI8811 valve to open and exercises \_BwCA-1.1  
 Scenario C-2.2 Involves failure of SI8811 valve to open and exercises \_BwCA-1.1  
 Scenario E-7.2 Involves failure of SI8811 valve to open and exercises ES-1.3, Attachment A to open valve  
 Scenario E-9.2 Involves failure of SI8811 valve to open and exercises ES-1.3, Attachment A to open valve

For LORT (Going back just the last few years)

Scenario 0711 Involves failure of SI8812 valve to close and exercises ES-1.3, Attachment A to close the valve  
 Scenario 0716 Involves NSO Only training on \_BwEP ES-1.3, transfer to CL Recirc  
 Scenario 0765 Involves LBLOCA, transition to CL Recirc and local operation of 0SX007  
 Scenario 0811 Involves failure of both SI8811 valves to open and exercises \_BwCA-1.1, including dispatching operators to "locally" open the valve.  
 Scenario 0843 Involves LBLOCA and transition to \_BwEP ES-1.3, followed by sump blockage and transition to 1BwCA-1.3  
 Scenario 0866 Involves containment bypass and exercises \_BwCA-1.1  
 Scenario 0916 Involves LBLOCA, and transfer to CL Recirc, transfer to HL Recirc  
 Scenario 0936-2 Involves NSO training on \_BwEP ES-1.3, transfer to CL Recirc with failure of \_SI8812 to close (Timed scenario)  
 Scenario 0943 Involves Involves LBLOCA, transition to CL Recirc

Scenario 0965 Involves LBLOCA, failure of 1SI8811B, transition to 1BwCA-1.1 and local opening of 1SI8811B

Scenario 0931 OOB Evaluation of DB LBLOCA and failure of 1SI8812 to close. Timed Scenario - ALL crews PASSED

Equipment Operator (EO) training on local valve operation occurs primarily in the generic fundamentals phase, Components chapter 1, which covers the construction and operation of MOVs. Various local valve operations are covered in a sampling of EOP Lesson plans but only general direction is covered.

In summary, the RO/SRO training program addresses the specific scenario in which the 8811A/B valves fail to open remotely as well as other scenarios that require local operation of the other valves. These scenarios, as well as others, are included in both initial qualification exercises and the continuing training program. EOs are trained generically to operate MOVs locally. While there is not a specific lesson plan covering 11/2SI8811A/B local operation, the generic training is applicable to those valves.

**Training:**

Classroom, Frequency: 0.5 per year

Simulator, Frequency: 0.5 per year

**JPM Procedure:**

Not Selected

**Identification and Definition:**

This HFE represents the probability that the operators will fail to locally open the failed 1SI8811A/B valves and complete the transition to cold leg recirculation given that the swap to recirculation mode has been initiated.

The scenario evaluated for this HFE is an SLOCA event, which is a top contributors in the NRC SPAR model. The largest contributors in the Braidwood PRA with the degraded 1SI8811A/B valves are loss of DC bus scenarios, but because the SLOCA timing is more limiting than the transient case, the SLOCA scenario is used for the evaluation of this HFE.

The following provides an additional description of the scenario for which this action is evaluated:

1. Initial Conditions: Steady state, full power operation
2. Initiating Events: Small LOCA
3. Accident sequence (preceding functional failures and successes):

Reactor trip successful

Turbine trip successful

AFW operates

Level in RCS drops due to SLOCA

ECCS initiated successfully (both divisions available)

2 trains of containment spray are available, 2 RCFCs running (4 fans).

Transition to cold leg recirculation on low RWST level is initiated, but fails due to failure of 1SI8811A/B to fully open (valve only opens approximately 34%, which fails to satisfy the interlock with the 8804 valve(s)).

4. Preceding operator error or success in sequence:

Early EP-0 actions to confirm actuations performed.

EP-1 actions to ensure adequate ECCS injection performed.

EP-1 action to depressurize and cooldown is initiated, if required.

Transition to recirculation mode started

Failure of 1SI8811A/B identified.

5. Operator action success criterion: Locally open 1SI8811A/B and establish cold leg recirculation mode prior RCS level reaching TAF.

**Key Assumptions:**

- 1) Failure of the 1SI8811A/B valve in the intermediate position is assumed to result in the shutdown of RH pump 1A/B due to lack of a positive suction source. Based on this interpretation of the valve's dual

indication, the operators would be procedurally bound to perform a local, manual stroke of the valve before restarting RH pump 1A/B and completing the transition to cold leg recirculation. 2) Exelon calculation EC#377204 indicates that if the 1SI8811B had opened approximately 3/4 full stroke, adequate flow would have been available to perform swap to recirculation mode without action to locally open 1SI8811B. It should be noted that with the 1SI8811A/B valve in an intermediate position, the interlock with 1CV8804A/1SI8804B would not have cleared, but because RCS pressure would be below the RH pump shutoff head by the time recirculation mode was required, the RH pumps would be able to inject directly through the 1SI8809A/B valves and the interlock's status would be inconsequential. However, no direct credit is taken for operation of the RH pumps with the 1SI8811A/B valves in the intermediate position. 3) By the time recirculation mode is required to be in operation at the end of the system window for this action, RCS pressure would be low enough that only the RH pumps would be required to inject through the 1SI8809A/B valves for the 2" SLOCAs. Because, that this has not been explicitly demonstrated for the entire range of SLOCAs, it is assumed that alignment to the Charging/SI pumps through 1CV8804A/1SI8804B is required for success in all small LOCAs.

### **Operator Interview Insights:**

#### **OPERATOR INTERVIEWS AND SIMULATOR OBSERVATIONS:**

For cases in which both the open ("O") and the closed ("-") position indicators are simultaneously illuminated for a given valve, operator interviews performed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009 universally demonstrated that it was understood this represented a condition in which the actual position of the valve is unknown and that alternative means would be required to determine the valve's position. What was also demonstrated in the interviews and during the simulator observations was that interpretation of the valve's status with regard to responding to procedures was considered to be case specific.

For example, ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1 questions whether or not the 1SI8811A valve is closed and the two crews interpreted the dual indication differently; one crew treated it as "closed" and the other as "not closed". In the latter case, when 1SI8811A was considered "not closed" and the RNO action to close 1SI8812A was reached, it was recognized that with 1SI8811A in an undetermined state, closing 1SI8812A would potentially isolate RH pump 1A from all viable suction sources and RH pump 1A was tripped to protect it. If the valve is considered closed, the procedures attempt to manually open the valve from the control room. This path includes a step to trip RH pump 1A when 1SI8812A is closed. If 1SI8811A cannot subsequently be opened, the RH pump is left in the tripped position (same as previous case). Ultimately, either classification of the 1SI8811A valve's status ("closed" or "not closed") would lead to step 7 of Attachment A, where the operators are directed to CA-1.1 and instructed to locally open valve(s) 1SI8811A/B.

While a divergence of opinion appeared to exist on the classification a valve with dual indication in ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1, what was clear was that the indeterminate status of the valve was consistently treated in a conservative manner. ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1 is not directly questioning whether or not

the position of the valve can lead to a success or failure of a particular function and as a result, a difference in the classification of the valve's status was noted. However, for the cases where the status for the valve was directly related to whether or not it could fulfill a required function, the valves was not considered to be capable of supporting that function. For example,

- Step 3c of ES-1.3 questions whether or not the containment sump valves (1SI8811A/B) are open with the obvious intent of determining whether or not the RH pumps can draw water from the containment sump. Both crews interpreted the sump valve as not being open given the presence of dual indication on the 1SI8811A/B valve(s).

- In the RNO step of ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1, the 1SI8811A was not considered to be capable of providing an adequate suction source for RH pump 1A even though it was considered not to be closed in ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1. Consequently, RH pump 1A was tripped before 1SI8812A was closed.

- In ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 3e, 1SI8811A was considered to not be open such that it could not support cold leg recirculation mode.

- In ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 6e, 1SI8811B was considered to not be open such that it could not support cold leg recirculation mode.

- In ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 7, both 1SI8811A and B were considered to not be open such that they could not support cold leg recirculation mode.

- In CA-1.1, step 1c, both 1SI8811A and B were considered to not be open such that they could not support cold leg recirculation mode.

Based on the information obtained from the operator interviews and the simulator observations, the conclusion is that a dual indication condition on 1SI8811A/B will result in the interpretation that the valve cannot necessarily support cold leg recirculation mode and that the procedures will ultimately drive them to CA-1.1 where local action to open the valve will be directed.

All of the above is based on the pre-condition that the operators have no information about the actual position of 1SI8811A/B and that the reactor core is not yet threatened. Simulator runs 1 and 3, which were performed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009, demonstrated that while local operation of the 1SI8811A/B valves offered a potential success path to restore cold leg recirculation, the RH pump would not be started until it was verified that 1SI8811A/B was full open. For simulator runs 2 and 4, which were run on the same days, a local check of the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) position was allowed, but a manual

stroke of the valve(s) was prohibited due to high rad levels. These scenarios placed the operators in a situation where the only success path was to run the RH pump with the 1SI8811A/B valves in a partially open condition. Both crews dispatched equipment operators to perform a local assessment of the valve's position and when it became obvious to them that they could not prevent core damage without operating the RH pump(s), they elected to start the pumps. Both crews cited the 50.54x guidance that binds them to protect the core even if clear procedure guidance does not exist to direct them to do so. No credit is taken for operating the RH pumps with the 1SI8811A/B valves in a partially open condition even though plant engineering calculations indicate that such an operation would be successful.

**Manpower Requirements:**

<b>Operations:</b>	Shift Manager	1	1
	Shift Supervisor:	1	0
	STA:	1	0
	Reactor operators:	2	1
	Plant operators:	2	1
<b>Maintenance:</b>	Mechanics:	2	0
	Electricians:	2	0
	I&C Technicians:	2	0
<b>Health Physics:</b>	Technicians:	2	1
<b>Chemistry:</b>	Technicians:	1	0

**Execution Performance Shaping Factors:**

<b>Environment:</b>	Lighting	Normal
	Heat/Humidity	Hot / Humid
	Radiation	Yellow


	Atmosphere	Normal
<b>Special Requirements:</b>		
<b>Complexity of Response:</b>	Cognitive	Complex
	Execution	Complex
<b>Equipment Accessibility:</b>	Main Control Room	Accessible
	Unit 1 Containment Pipe Penetration Area	Accessible
<b>Stress:</b>	<b>High</b>	
	<i>Plant Response As Expected:</i>	No
	<i>Workload:</i>	N/A
	<i>Performance Shaping Factors:</i>	N/A

**Performance Shaping Factor Notes:**

Failure of the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) presents an unexpected condition in the plant (plant response is NOT as expected).

With regard to rad levels at the valve and access considerations, Exelon calc ECR 392870 indicates that the expected dose rate for a medium LOCA would be 1,444 mRem/hr. With a potential exposure time of up to 30 minutes, which is greater than the manipulation time for the local action, the accumulated dose would be below the administrative dose limit of 2000 m/Rem established in RP-AA-203. While this would not prevent local valve action, entering a potentially high rad area with elevated temperatures is considered to contribute to a high stress environment.

**Timing:**



**g Analysis:** While diagnosis contribution for this HFE has been excluded, the timing information related to the diagnosis of the need to transition to recirculation mode is required to establish the time available for local operation of the 1SI8811A/B valves and any applicable recovery factors. The timeline for this action has been constructed based on the successful diagnosis and interpretation of the dual indication on the 1SI8811A/B valves.

The timing for this action is complicated by the fact that a failure occurs in the equipment that is being used to carry out an action that has already been successfully diagnosed. The diagnosis tasks for the action to swap to recirculation mode and to identify the failure of the 1SI8811B valve to fully open during recirculation alignment are sequential and cannot occur during the same period of time. By definition, the diagnosis of the failed 1SI8811A/B valve(s) occurs only after successful diagnosis of the need to swap to recirculation. This is accounted for in the system window, manipulation time, and cue definitions for this action. For THERP, timing considerations are limited beyond the assessment that sufficient time is available to perform the action, but the dependence levels assignments of the recovery actions are potentially impacted by the timing.

$T(m)$ : The time required to manually stroke the 8811B valve from 34% open to full open has been determined to be 24 minutes. This time is based on an actual stroke of the valve performed by the Braidwood operators during the week of 11/02/2009. In addition, 7.5 minutes has been added to account for the time required to travel to the valve location. The travel time is based on a walkdown performed by the HRA analyst on 11/11/2009 and accounts for the time to travel from the EO ready room to the MCR to obtain a key for high rad area access (30 seconds travel, 30 seconds assumed to get key), the time to travel to the Auxiliary Building entrance (3 minutes), the time to travel from the Auxiliary Building entrance to valve 1SI8811B (3 minutes), and the time to climb the ladder to reach the handwheel on 1SI8811B (30 seconds). The time required for completing the steps to initiate cold leg recirculation mode is assumed to be 6 minutes based on operator interviews performed on 5/23/2007. This time includes all nominal steps to transition to recirculation mode, which may be required in a SLOCA. The total manipulation time is, therefore, 37.5 minutes (7.5 minutes of travel time, 24 minutes for valve stroke, 6 minutes for the steps to complete swap to recirc).

T(sw): The time for RCS level to reach TAF is used as the end of the system window for this action. B/B MAAP run BBSDP17a indicates that 12.00 hours are available to reach TAF in a small LOCA scenario from the initiating event.

T(delay) = time to 46% RWST level (cue to start transition to swap to recirc mode) + time to reach the command to open the 1SI8811A/B valve locally (accounts for completion of the action to begin the swap to recirc and respond to the dual indication on 1SI8811A/B). In this case, that time includes the time to reach 46% RWST level and the time required to reach step 1c of BwCA-1.1. B/B MAAP run BBSDP17a indicates that the time to reach 46.7% RWST level is 2.54 hours, which is the initial cue to swap to cold leg recirculation mode. Based on simulator runs performed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009, 4 data points were obtained for the time to reach the point where the direction was given to locally stroke the 1SI8811A/B valve: Run 1 = 11 minutes, Run 2 = 9 minutes, Run 3 = 10 minutes, Run 4 = 4 minutes. Because 2 crews were used to perform 4 simulator runs and the second run for each crew was highly similar to the first, it was expected that some degree of anticipation of the upcoming events would occur. As a result, the T(1/2) estimate for this case is based on the average of runs 1 and 3, the first run of the scenarios for each crew.  $T(1/2) = 10.5$  minutes  $((11 \text{ min} + 10 \text{ min}) / 2 = 10.5 \text{ min})$ . The time T(delay), therefore, is  $2.54 \text{ hr} + 0.18 \text{ hr} = 2.72 \text{ hr}$ .

T(1/2): The HRAC uses the median response time in the assessment of recovery dependence levels, but this is accounted for by the cue structure here. T(1/2) has been set to 0.01 seconds (to prevent an HRAC error message).

**Time available for recovery:** 519.30 Minutes

**SPAR-H Available time (cognitive):** 519.30 Minutes

**SPAR-H Available time (execution) ratio:** 14.85

**Minimum level of dependence for recovery:** ZD

### Execution Unrecovered

#### 1SI8811B--BHPMOA

Table 2: 1SI8811B--BHPMOA EXECUTION UNRECOVERED

Procedure: BwCA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation		Comment				Stress Factor	Over Ride	
Step No.	Instruction/Comment	Error Type	THERP		HEP			
			Table	Item				
ES-1.3, step 3a	Place control switches for SVAG valves 480V bus feeds at 1PM06J in - CLOSE	The "A" and "B" divisions are completely dependent.					5	
	-	EOM	20-7b	2	1.3E-3			
		EOC	20-12	5	1.3E-3			
		EOC	20-12	4	1.3E-3			
	<b>Total Step HEP</b>						2.0e-02	
ES1.3, At A, s1 RNO	Perform the following: a. Manually or locally close RH Pump 1A suction from RWST isol valve: 1SI8812A	The operators Step 4 of ES-1.3, Attachment A directs the same action for the "B" division. The "A" and "B" divisions are completely dependent.					5	
	-	EOM	20-7b	2	1.3E-3			
		EOC	20-12	4	1.3E-3			
		EOC	20-12	5	1.3E-3			
	<b>Total Step HEP</b>						2.0e-02	

CA-1.1, Step 1.c-RNO	Dispatch an operator to open at least one valve: -1SI8811A (364' U13 CWA), -1SI8811B (364' X13 CWA)					5		
	--	EOM	20-7b	1	4.3E-4			
		EOC	20-13	1	1.3E-3			
<b>Total Step HEP</b>							8.7e-03	
CA-1.1, Step 1.e RNO	When one train is restored, then return to procedure and step in effect.	CA-1.1, Step 1.e RNO is a continuous action statement that will send the operators back to ES-1.3, Attachment A, Step 7, which requires the operators to confirm the status of the valve via the direction "check at least 1 CNMT sump recirc flowpath established". Because the entire focus of the MCR is on the progress of opening the 1SI8811A/B valve, the continuous action statement would not be overlooked.				5		
	--	EOM	20-7b	1	4.3E-4			
	<b>Total Step HEP</b>							2.2e-03
ES-1.3 Step 5	ALIGN SI AND CENT CHG PUMPS FOR COLD LEG RECIRCULATION					5		
	--	EOM	20-7b	2	1.3E-3			
	OPEN RH to CCP isol valves - selection error	EOC	20-12	5	1.3E-3			
	CLOSE SI pump miniflow isolation valves - selection error	EOC	20-12	4	1.3E-3			
	CLOSE SI pump miniflow isolation valves -manipulation error	EOC	20-12	5	1.3E-3			
	CLOSE RH HX discharge crosstie valves - selection error	EOC	20-12	4	1.3E-3			
	CLOSE RH HX discharge crosstie valves - selection error	EOC	20-12	5	1.3E-3			
	OPEN SI and CCP suction header crosstie valves - selection	EOC	20-12	4	1.3E-3			
	OPEN SI and CCP suction header crosstie valves - manipulation	EOC	20-12	5	1.3E-3			
	OPEN RH to CCP isol valves - selection error	EOC	20-12	4	1.3E-3			

	<b>Total Step HEP</b>					5.7e-02	
ES-1.3 STEP 6	START ECCS PUMPS AS NECESSARY	CD assigned between cent charging pumps. CD assigned between SI pumps.				5	
	--	EOM	20-7b	2	1.3E-3		
	CCP - selection	EOC	20-12	4	1.3E-3		
	CCP - manipulation	EOC	20-12	5	1.3E-3		
	SI - selection	EOC	20-12	4	1.3E-3		
	Si - manipulation	EOC	20-12	5	1.3E-3		
	<b>Total Step HEP</b>					3.3e-02	
EXEC RECOV - ICR	EXEC RECOV - ICR	See Section 4.4 of the HRA Notebook for further information. This execution recovery factor is applied to the individual execution steps with a dependence factor based on the time available for recovery. Note that the execution stress factors applied to the execution subtasks are not applied to the execution recovery factor.				5	5e-2
	--	EOM	20-7b	2	1.3E-3		
	<b>Total Step HEP</b>					5.0e-02	

## Execution Recovery

### 1SI8811B--BHPMOA

Table 3: 1SI8811B--BHPMOA EXECUTION RECOVERY

Critical Step No.	Recovery Step No.	Action	HEP (Crit)	HEP (Rec)	Dep.	Cond. HEP (Rec)	Total for Step
ES-1.3, step 3a		Place control switches for SVAG valves 480V bus feeds at 1PM06J in - CLOSE	2.0e-02				1.0e-03
	EXEC RECOV - ICR	EXEC RECOV - ICR		5.0e-02	ZD	5.0e-02	
ES1.3, At A, s1 RNO		Perform the following: a. Manually or locally close RH Pump 1A suction from RWST isol valve: 1SI8812A	2.0e-02				1.0e-03
	EXEC RECOV - ICR	EXEC RECOV - ICR		5.0e-02	ZD	5.0e-02	
CA-1.1, Step 1.c-RNO		Dispatch an operator to open at least one valve: -1SI8811A (364' U13 CWA), -1SI8811B (364' X13 CWA)	8.7e-03				1.9e-05
	CA-1.1, Step 1.e RNO	When one train is restored, then return to procedure and step in effect.		2.2e-03	ZD	2.2e-03	
ES-1.3 Step 5		ALIGN SI AND CENT CHG PUMPS FOR COLD LEG RECIRCULATION	5.7e-02				2.9e-03
	EXEC RECOV - ICR	EXEC RECOV - ICR		5.0e-02	ZD	5.0e-02	
ES-1.3 STEP 6		START ECCS PUMPS AS NECESSARY	3.3e-02				1.7e-03
	EXEC RECOV - ICR	EXEC RECOV - ICR		5.0e-02	ZD	5.0e-02	
<b>Total Unrecovered:</b>			<b>1.4e-01</b>	<b>Total Recovered:</b>			<b>6.5e-03</b>

**4.2 1SI8811BSSBHPMOA, FAILURE TO OPEN VLV 1SI8811B AFTER REMOTE FAILURE (LOCAL-MANUAL, SLOCA, SPAR-H)**

<b>Analyst:</b>	DEM
<b>Rev. Date:</b>	12/10/09
<b>Reviewer:</b>	
<b>Cognitive Method:</b>	SPAR-H
<b>Analysis Database:</b>	bwd-8811-121009.HRA (12/10/09, 1675264 Bytes)

Table 4: 1SI8811BSSBHPMOA SUMMARY

<b>Analysis Results:</b>	<b>Cognitive</b>	<b>Execution</b>
<b>Failure Probability</b>	0.0e+00	9.9e-03
<b>Total HEP</b>		9.9e-03

**Plant:**

Braidwood

**Initiating Event:**

SLOCA

**Basic Event Context:**

Typically, both execution and diagnosis errors are included as part of a post initiator HRA. In some cases, however, there are conditions that preclude the applicability of one of these components of the HEP.

For scenarios in which the 1SI8811A/B valve fails to completely stroke and both the "open" and "closed" lights are illuminated (dual indication), it is recognized that the operators must interpret the dual indication and make a decision about how to proceed. However, their decision regarding the valve's status is unimportant given that any interpretation results in a successful outcome.

- 1SI8811A/B interpreted as "NOT OPEN": operator directed to close 1SI8812A/B, open 1SI8811A/B locally, and establish cold leg recirculation.
- 1SI8811A/B interpreted as "OPEN": The RH pumps would remain running, 1SI8812A/B directed to be closed, and injection would be provided to the RCS via the 1SI8809A/B valve(s). For transient scenarios or for SLOCAs where the transition to cold leg recirculation is attempted at the time of the 46% RWST level cue, the procedures still provide a success path as they direct local operation of the 1CV8804A/1SI8804B valves (bypasses interlock with 1SI8811A/B) and the establishment of flow using the SI/Charging pumps.

These paths are described in more detail below:

Scenario 1, 1SI8811A/B considered to be "not open" in ES-1.3 step 3c:

If the 1SI8811A/B valve is considered to be "not open" in ES-1.3 step 3c, the operators are transferred to Attachment A. In Attachment A, step 1 questions whether or not the 1SI8811A valve is closed. If it is determined to be "not closed", the RNO action is to close 1SI8812A, which would terminate an "A" division flow diversion from the RWST to the sump. The RNO then transfers to step 4, which includes similar guidance for the "B" division. The RNO is step 4 transfers to Step 7, which in turn transfers to BwCA-1-1 where step 1c directs local closure of 1SI8811A/B.

If the opposite interpretation of the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) status is made in Attachment A, step 1 of ES-1.3 ( valve is "closed"), the operators are directed through steps 2 and 3, which attempt manual, remote operation of 1SI8811A. Step 3b closes 1SI8812A, which would terminate a flow diversion, and step 3e directs 1SI8811A to be opened. Whether or not 1SI8811A is considered to be open, the procedure path leads to step 4 where a similar process is started for the "B" division. On completion of the "B" division steps, step 7 is reached where the transfer to 1BwCA-1.1 occurs and the direction to perform the local stroke of 1SI8811A/B is given.

Scenario 2, 1SI8811A/B considered to be "open" in ES-1.3 step 3c:

In the event that the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) is believed/considered to be "open" in ES-1.3 step 3c, step 3d directs closure of the 1SI8812A/B valves, which would terminate the flow diversion from the RWST to the sump. At this point, the RH pumps would be running with suction only aligned through the partially open 1SI8811A/B valves. For MLCOA events, this may allow injection through the 1SI8809A/B valves without further action; however, assuming that RCS pressure is too high for injection, the procedure continues in steps 4 and 5 to align RH to the SI/Charging system suction path. In steps 5f and 5h, the direction is given to open the 1CV8804A and 1SI8804B valves, respectively. These valves are interlocked with

1SI8811A/B and would not open with 1SI8811A/B in an intermediate position. The RNO for steps 5f and 5g direct local operation of valves 1CV8804A and 1SI8804B valves, which are smaller and more easily operated than the 1SI8811A/B valves. Locally stroking the 1CV8804A/1SI8804B valve would provide an alternate success path given that suction would be available through the partially open 1SI8811A/B valves.

If, for some reason, it was decided that there was no viable suction path for the SI/Charging pumps and that emergency coolant recirculation was lost/unavailable, the continuous action statement to transfer to BwCA-1.1 would be followed where local operation of the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) would be directed.

In summary, from the point where dual indication on 1SI8811A/B is encountered at ES-1.3 step 3c, any procedure path taken will isolate the flow diversion path from the RWST to the containment sump by closing 1SI8812A/B and emergency coolant recirculation will be established by opening either 1SI8811A/B or 1CV8804A/1SI8804B locally. No significant diagnosis is required to either close 1SI8812A/B or to open 1SI8811A/B; these actions are directed as a matter of course in a procedure path that has already been initiated.

#### EXPERIENCE/TRAINING:

There are a number of scenarios utilized in the simulator in both initial and continuing training that exercise these portions of the procedures.

For ILT: Scenario P-18.1 Involves failure of SI8811 valve to open and exercises \_BwCA-1.1  
 Scenario C-2.2 Involves failure of SI8811 valve to open and exercises \_BwCA-1.1  
 Scenario E-7.2 Involves failure of SI8811 valve to open and exercises ES-1.3, Attachment A to open valve  
 Scenario E-9.2 Involves failure of SI8811 valve to open and exercises ES-1.3, Attachment A to open valve

For LORT (Going back just the last few years)

Scenario 0711 Involves failure of SI8812 valve to close and exercises ES-1.3, Attachment A to close the valve  
 Scenario 0716 Involves NSO Only training on \_BwEP ES-1.3, transfer to CL Recirc

Scenario 0765 Involves LBLOCA, transition to CL Recirc and local operation of 0SX007

Scenario 0811 Involves failure of both SI8811 valves to open and exercises \_BwCA-1.1, including dispatching operators to "locally" open the valve.

Scenario 0843 Involves LBLOCA and transition to \_BwEP ES-1.3, followed by sump blockage and transition to 1BwCA-1.3

Scenario 0866 Involves containment bypass and exercises \_BwCA-1.1

Scenario 0916 Involves LBLOCA, and transfer to CL Recirc, transfer to HL Recirc

Scenario 0936-2 Involves NSO training on \_BwEP ES-1.3, transfer to CL Recirc with failure of \_SI8812 to close (Timed scenario)

Scenario 0943 Involves Involves LBLOCA, transition to CL Recirc

Scenario 0965 Involves LBLOCA, failure of 1SI8811B, transition to 1BwCA-1.1 and local opening of 1SI8811B

Scenario 0931 OOB Evaluation of DB LBLOCA and failure of 1SI8812 to close. Timed Scenario - ALL crews PASSED

Equipment Operator (EO) training on local valve operation occurs primarily in the generic fundamentals phase, Components chapter 1, which covers the construction and operation of MOVs. Various local valve operations are covered in a sampling of EOP Lesson plans but only general direction is covered.

In summary, the RO/SRO training program addresses the specific scenario in which the 8811A/B valves fail to open remotely as well as other scenarios that require local operation of the other valves. These scenarios, as well as others, are included in both initial qualification exercises and the continuing training program. EOs are trained generically to operate MOVs locally. While there is not a specific lesson plan covering 11/2SI8811A/B local operation, the generic training is applicable to those valves. While this level of training may not be considered to be as high as what is performed for the standard action to initiate cold leg recirculation, it is considered to be adequate to maintain a reasonable level of proficiency in addressing failure of the 1SI8811A/B valves. Addressing the dual indication on 1SI8811A/B is not specifically addressed, but general training covers this particular mode of failure for the valve. Treated as a "nominal training" case.

#### OPERATOR INTERVIEWS AND SIMULATOR OBSERVATIONS:

For cases in which both the open ("O") and the closed ("-") position indicators are simultaneously illuminated for a given valve, operator interviews performed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009 universally demonstrated that it was understood this represented a condition in which the actual position of the valve is unknown and that alternative means would be required to determine the valve's position. What was

also demonstrated in the interviews and during the simulator observations was that interpretation of the valve's status with regard to responding to procedures was considered to be case specific.

For example, ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1 questions whether or not the 1SI8811A valve is closed and the two crews interpreted the dual indication differently; one crew treated it as "closed" and the other as "not closed". In the latter case, when 1SI8811A was considered "not closed" and the RNO action to close 1SI8812A was reached, it was recognized that with 1SI8811A in an undetermined state, closing 1SI8812A would potentially isolate RH pump 1A from all viable suction sources and RH pump 1A was tripped to protect it. If the valve is considered closed, the procedures attempt to manually open the valve from the control room. This path includes a step to trip RH pump 1A when 1SI8812A is closed. If 1SI8811A cannot subsequently be opened, the RH pump is left in the tripped position (same as previous case). Ultimately, either classification of the 1SI8811A valve's status ("closed" or "not closed") would lead to step 7 of Attachment A, where the operators are directed to CA-1.1 and instructed to locally open valve(s) 1SI8811A/B.

While a divergence of opinion appeared to exist on the classification a valve with dual indication in ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1, what was clear was that the indeterminate status of the valve was consistently treated in a conservative manner. ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1 is not directly questioning whether or not the position of the valve can lead to a success or failure of a particular function and as a result, a difference in the classification of the valve's status was noted. However, for the cases where the status for the valve was directly related to whether or not it could fulfill a required function, the valves was not considered to be capable of supporting that function. For example,

- Step 3c of ES-1.3 questions whether or not the containment sump valves (1SI8811A/B) are open with the obvious intent of determining whether or not the RH pumps can draw water from the containment sump. Both crews interpreted the sump valve as not being open given the presence of dual indication on the 1SI8811A/B valve(s).

- In the RNO step of ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1, the 1SI8811A was not considered to be capable of providing an adequate suction source for RH pump 1A even though it was considered not to be closed in ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1. Consequently, RH pump 1A was tripped before 1SI8812A was closed.

- In ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 3e, 1SI8811A was considered to not be open such that it could not support cold leg recirculation mode.

- In ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 6e, 1SI8811B was considered to not be open such that it could not support cold leg recirculation mode.

- In ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 7, both 1SI8811A and B were considered to not be open such that they could not support cold leg recirculation mode.

- In CA-1.1, step 1c, both 1SI8811A and B were considered to not be open such that they could not support cold leg recirculation mode.

Based on the information obtained from the operator interviews and the simulator observations, the conclusion is that a dual indication condition on 1SI8811A/B will result in the interpretation that the valve cannot necessarily support cold leg recirculation mode and that the procedures will ultimately drive them to CA-1.1 where local action to open the valve will be directed.

All of the above is based on the pre-condition that the operators have no information about the actual position of 1SI8811A/B and that the reactor core is not yet threatened. Simulator runs 1 and 3, which were performed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009, demonstrated that while local operation of the 1SI8811A/B valves offered a potential success path to restore cold leg recirculation, the RH pump would not be started until it was verified that 1SI8811A/B was full open. For simulator runs 2 and 4, which were run on the same days, a local check of the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) position was allowed, but a manual stroke of the valve(s) was prohibited due to high rad levels. These scenarios placed the operators in a situation where the only success path was to run the RH pump with the 1SI8811A/B valves in a partially open condition. Both crews dispatched equipment operators to perform a local assessment of the valve's position and when it became obvious to them that they could not prevent core damage without operating the RH pump(s), they elected to start the pumps. Both crews cited the 50.54x guidance that binds them to protect the core even if clear procedure guidance does not exist to direct them to do so. No credit is taken for operating the RH pumps with the 1SI8811A/B valves in a partially open condition even though plant engineering calculations indicate that such an operation would be successful.

#### SCENARIO DEFINITION

The scenario investigated is based on the NRC SPAR model's dominant CDF contributor for cases when the 1SI8811B valve fails to open, which are small LOCA initiating events with AFW and RCFCs available for heat removal .

The following provides an additional description of the scenario for which this action is evaluated:

1. Initial Conditions: Steady state, full power operation
2. Initiating Events: Small LOCA

3. Accident sequence (preceding functional failures and successes):

Reactor trip successful

Turbine trip successful

AFW operates

Level in RCS drops due to SLOCA

ECCS initiated successfully (both divisions available)

2 trains of containment spray are available, 2 RCFCs running

Transition to cold leg recirculation on low RWST level is initiated, but fails due to failure of 1SI8811A/B to fully open (valve only opens approximately 34%, which fails to satisfy the interlock with the 8804 valve(s)).

4. Preceding operator error or success in sequence:

Early EP-0 actions to confirm actuations performed.

EP-1 actions to ensure adequate ECCS injection performed.

EP-1 action to depressurize and cooldown is initiated, if required.

Transition to recirculation mode started


Failure of 1SI8811A/B identified.

5. Operator action success criterion: Locally open 1SI8811A/B and establish cold leg recirculation mode prior RCS level reaching TAF.

6. Key Assumptions: 1) Failure of the 1SI8811A/B valve in the intermediate position is assumed to result in the shutdown of RH pump 1A/B due to lack of a positive suction source when the 1SI8812A/B valve(s) are closed. Based on this interpretation of the valve's dual indication, the operators would be procedurally bound to perform a local, manual stroke of the valve before restarting RH pump 1A/B and completing the transition to cold leg recirculation. 2) Exelon calculation EC#377204 indicates that if the 1SI8811B had opened approximately 34 full stroke, adequate flow would have been available to perform swap to recirculation mode without action to locally open 1SI8811B. It should be noted that with the 1SI8811A/B valve in an intermediate position, the interlock with 1CV8804A/1SI8804B would not have cleared, but because RCS pressure would be below the RH pump shutoff head by the time recirculation mode was required, the RH pumps would be able to inject directly through the 1SI8809A/B valves and the interlock's status would be inconsequential. However, no direct credit is taken for operation of the RH

pumps with the 1SI8811A/B valves in the intermediate position. 3) By the time recirculation mode is required to be in operation at the end of the system window for this action, RCS pressure would be low enough that only the RH pumps would be required to inject through the 1SI8809A/B valves for the 2" SLOCAs. Because, that this has not been explicitly demonstrated for the entire range of SLOCAs, it is assumed that alignment to the Charging/SI pumps through 1CV8804A/1SI8804B is required for success in all small LOCAs.

**Timing:**



g Analysis: While diagnosis contribution for this HFE has been excluded, the timing information related to the diagnosis of the need to transition to recirculation mode is required to establish the time available for local operation of the 1SI8811A/B valves and any applicable recovery factors. The timeline for this action has been constructed based on the successful diagnosis and interpretation of the dual indication on the 1SI8811A/B valves.

The timing for this action is complicated by the fact that a failure occurs in the equipment that is being used to carry out an action that has already been successfully diagnosed. The diagnosis tasks for the action to swap to recirculation mode and to identify the failure of the 1SI8811B valve to fully open during recirculation alignment are sequential and cannot occur during the same period of time. By definition, the diagnosis of the failed 1SI8811A/B valve(s) occurs only after successful diagnosis of the need to swap to recirculation. This is accounted for in the system window, manipulation time, and cue definitions for this action. Because the availability of time for the local operation of 1SI8811A/B is a factor which can directly impact an HEP, it is necessary to define the timeline for the HEP quantification:

For the SPAR-H execution ratio, the following is assumed:  $Execution\ Ratio = T(sw) - T(delay) - T(1/2) / T(m)$

Where:

$T(delay)$  = time to 46% RWST level (cue to start transition to swap to recirc mode) + time to reach step 3c of ES-1.3 (accounts for completion of the action to begin the swap to recirc). In this case, that time includes the time to reach 46% RWST level and the time required to reach step 3c of ES-1.3. B/B MAAP run BBSDP17a indicates that the time to reach 46.7% RWST level is 2.54 hours, which is the initial cue

to swap to cold leg recirculation mode. Based on simulator runs performed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009, 4 data points were obtained for the time to reach step 3c of ES-1.3: Run 1= 3 minutes, Run 2 = 3 minutes, Run 3 = 2 minutes, Run 4 = 2 minutes. The median time is the average of the two central data points of the even number of trials, or 2.5 minutes  $((2+3)/2=2.5)$ . The time T(delay), therefore, is  $2.54 \text{ hr} + 0.04 \text{ hr} = 2.58 \text{ hr}$ .

T(m): The time required to manually stroke the 8811B valve from 34% open to full open has been determined to be 24 minutes. This time is based on an actual stroke of the valve performed by the Braidwood operators during the week of 11/02/2009. In addition, 7.5 minutes has been added to account for the time required to travel to the valve location. The travel time is based on a walkdown performed by the HRA analyst on 11/11/2009 and accounts for the time to travel from the EO ready room to the MCR to obtain a key for high rad area access (30 seconds travel, 30 seconds assumed to get key), the time to travel to the Auxiliary Building entrance (3 minutes), the time to travel from the Auxiliary Building entrance to valve 1SI8811B (3 minutes), and the time to climb the ladder to reach the handwheel on 1SI8811B (30 seconds). The time required for completing the steps to initiate cold leg recirculation mode is assumed to be 6 minutes based on operator interviews performed on 5/23/2007. This time includes all nominal steps to transition to recirculation mode, which may be required in SLOCA cases. The total manipulation time is, therefore, 37.5 minutes (7.5 minutes of travel time, 24 minutes for valve stroke, 6 minutes for the steps to complete swap to recirc).

T(sw): The time for RCS level to reach TAF is used as the end of the system window for this action. B/B MAAP run BBDP17a indicates that 12.00 hours are available to reach TAF in a small LOCA scenario from the initiating event.

T(1/2): Based on simulator runs performed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009, 4 data points were obtained for the time to begin the response (command to open valve, not just check the valves status) from the time that step 3c of ES-1.3 was reached. The results of the simulator runs showed the following: Run 1= 8 minutes, Run 2 = 6 minutes, Run 3 = 8 minutes, Run 4 = 2 minutes. Because 2 crews were used to perform 4 simulator runs and the second run for each crew was highly similar to the first, it was expected that some degree of anticipation of the upcoming events would occur. As a result, the T(1/2) estimate for this case is based on the average of runs 1 and 3, the first run of the scenarios for each crew.  $T(1/2) = 8 \text{ minutes} ((8 \text{ min} + 8 \text{ min}) / 2 = 8 \text{ min})$ .

**Time available for recovery:** 519.70 Minutes

**SPAR-H Available time (cognitive):** 527.70 Minutes

**SPAR-H Available time (execution) ratio:** 14.86

Minimum level of dependence for recovery: ZD

**PART I. DIAGNOSIS**

No Part I

Diagnosis HEP:

0.0e+00

**PART II. ACTION**

PSFs	PSF Levels		Multiplier for Diagnosis
<b>Available Time</b>  (recommended choice based on timing information in bold)	Inadequate Time		P(failure) = 1.0
	Time available is ~ the time required		10
	Nominal time		1
	<b>Time available &gt;= 5x the time required</b>	X	0.1
	Time available >= 50x the time required		0.01
	Insufficient Information		1
	<i>Refer to the timing analysis.</i>		
<b>Stress/Stressors</b>	Extreme	X	5
	High		2
	Nominal		1
	Insufficient Information		1
	<i>The scenario to which this action is applied is a Small LOCA event for which high pressure injection is successful. After injecting for about 2.5 hours, the RWST low level alarm would be reached.</i>		

	<p><i>While the LOCA event is a high stress scenario, the successful control of the plant over the 2 to 3 hour cooldown time is considered to significantly reduce the level of stress. At the time the swap to recirculation mode would occur, the work load would be relatively low, the diagnosis of the need to swap to recirculation mode would have been successfully made, and the transition would be proceeding in an orderly manner until the 8811A/B valves are actuated. The failure of the 1S18811A/B valve(s) to stroke would introduce an additional level of stress given that a suction path from the containment sump to the RH pumps is required to maintain the reactor in a stable state. The equipment operators would be required to enter the Auxiliary Building to manually operate the valve, which is potentially a high rad/high temperature area. Exelon calc ECR 392870 indicates that the expected dose rate for a medium LOCA, which would bound the SLOCA case, would be 1,444 mRem/hr. With a potential exposure time of up to 30 minutes, which is greater than the manipulation time for the local action, the accumulated dose would be below the administrative dose limit of 2000 m/Rem established in RP-AA-203. While the accumulated dose would not preclude this action from being performed, "extreme" stress is chosen to account for the difficult working conditions, even though many hours would be available to perform the manipulation before the core would be jeopardized.</i></p>		
<b>Complexity</b>	Highly complex		5
	Moderately complex	X	2
	Nominal		1
	Insufficient Information		1
	<p><i>Manual operation of a valve is a straightforward task with which the operators are familiar through training and similar tasks performed as part of normal plant operations, but the physical requirements of opening the valve are potentially challenging. In order to manually stroke the valve, it is necessary to stand on top of the valve's enclosure in a semi confined area and turn a handwheel that is located at face level. Elevated temperatures in the area during a LOCA evolution could contribute to some discomfort during the operation, but it is not expected to be prohibitive in any way for the SLOCA scenario. The valve area is well lit and the open stem design provides a clear indication of the valve's position. With regard to valve identification, the valve is tagged with a label that is easy to read, but more importantly, it is highly unique and could not be mistaken for any other valve in the area. The "A" and "B" 1S18811 valves are on the same elevation, but they are separated by at least 30 yards and are accessed by turning different directions upon entry into the curved wall area. While the action</i></p>		


	<p><i>itself is a straightforward manipulation on a highly unique valve, the action is considered to be "moderately complex" due to the position the equipment operator must be in to perform the valve stroke and the length of time that is required to complete the stroke (24 minutes from 34%). Once the valve is open, the remainder of the task is a highly trained action and is not considered to significantly contribute to difficulty of the action.</i></p>	
<b>Experience/Training</b>	Low	3
	Nominal	X 1
	High	0.5
	Insufficient Information	1
	<p><i>Refer to the "Experience/Training" portion of the "Basic Event Context" discussion.</i></p>	
<b>Procedures</b>	Not available	50
	Incomplete	20
	Available, but poor	5
	Nominal	X 1
	Insufficient Information	1
	<p><i>Step 1c RNO of CA-1.1 directs local operation of 1SI8811A/B to be performed once it has been determined that it cannot be opened remotely. No additional procedures are required for a valve manipulation. Assessed as "nominal".</i></p>	
<b>Ergonomics/HMI</b>	Missing/Misleading	50
	Poor	X 10
	Nominal	1
	Good	0.5
	Insufficient Information	1
	<p><i>As identified in the "complexity" discussion for the execution task, the valve is highly unique such that mistaking it for another valve is a negligible concern, but the position the operator has to be in to stroke the valve is challenging. The footing is narrow (about 2.5 feet), semi-confined, and the handwheel is at face level, which makes operation slow and difficult relative to a floor mounted valve with the handwheel at waist level. During an accident, the area may be at elevated temperature and radiation levels. While these</i></p>	

	<i>factors may be a cause for some discomfort and stress, they are not expected to be prohibitive or even a large concern for small LOCA scenarios. Overall, this is considered to be an example of relatively "poor" human-machine interface conditions.</i>		
<b>Fitness for Duty</b>	Unfit		P(failure) = 1.0
	Degraded Fitness		5
	Nominal	X	1
	Insufficient Information		1
	<i>No fitness for duty issues have been identified. The nominal case is used.</i>		
<b>Work Processes</b>	Poor		5
	Nominal	X	1
	Good		0.5
	Insufficient Information		0.5
	<i>For emergency situations, operator interviews performed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009 indicate that there would be no requirement to "dress-out" before entering the Auxiliary Building to perform the manual valve stroke, which is well known to the operators. With regard to access to the Auxiliary Building (high rad area), the equipment operators would be required to obtain a key from the MCR for entry. This is not an unusual situation and given the proximity of the equipment operator ready room to the MCR, it does not significantly impact the manipulation time for valve operation. Radio communication would be available between the MCR and the equipment operator. No work process issues have been identified that would impact the performance of the manual stroke of 1SI8811A/B.</i>		

**Action Probability:**

9.9e-03 [Adjustment applied:  $1.0E-3 * 1.0e+01 / (1.0E-3 * (1.0e+01 - 1) + 1)$ ]

**PART III. DEPENDENCY**



**Task Failure WITHOUT Formal Dependence:**

9.9e-03

**Task Failure WITH Formal Dependence:**

9.9e-03

**4.3 1S18811BM-BHPMOA, FAILURE TO OPEN VLV 1S18811B AFTER REMOTE FAILURE (LOCAL-MANUAL, MLOCA)**

<b>Analyst:</b>	DEM
<b>Rev. Date:</b>	12/10/09
<b>Reviewer:</b>	
<b>Cognitive Method:</b>	CBDTM/THERP
<b>Analysis Database:</b>	bwd-8811-121009.HRA (12/10/09, 1675264 Bytes)

Table 5: 1S18811BM-BHPMOA SUMMARY

<b>Analysis Results:</b>	<b>without Recovery</b>	<b>with Recovery</b>
<b>P<sub>axe</sub></b>	6.7e-02	6.0e-03
<b>Total HEP</b>		6.0e-03
<b>Error Factor</b>		5

**Related Human Interactions:**

Follows success of nominal action to begin the swap to recirculation mode.

**Initial Cue:**

Procedure direction - CA-1.1, step 1c, RNO

**Recovery Cue:**

**Cue:**

Procedures require the operators to confirm that the S18811A/B valve is open during recirculation alignment.

**Degree of Clarity of Cues & Indications:**

Average

**Procedures:**

Cognitive: Not Selected

Execution: BwCA-1.1 (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation) Revision: 202

Other: Not Selected

**Cognitive Procedure:**

Step: Not Applicable

Instruction:

**Procedure Notes:**

Typically, both execution and diagnosis errors are included as part of a post initiator HRA. In some cases, however, there are conditions that preclude the applicability of one of these components of the HEP.

For scenarios in which the 1SI8811A/B valve fails to completely stroke and both the "open" and "closed" lights are illuminated (dual indication), it is recognized that the operators must interpret the dual indication and make a decision about how to proceed. However, their decision regarding the valve's status is unimportant given that any interpretation results in a successful outcome.

- 1SI8811A/B interpreted as "NOT OPEN": operator directed to close 1SI8812A/B, open 1SI8811A/B locally, and establish cold leg recirculation.
- 1SI8811A/B interpreted as "OPEN": The RH pumps would remain running, 1SI8812A/B directed to be closed, and injection would be provided to the RCS via the 1SI8809A/B valve(s). For transient scenarios or for SLOCAs where the transition to cold leg recirculation is attempted at the time of the 46% RWST level cue, the procedures still provide a success path as they direct local operation of the 1CV8804A/1SI8804B valves (bypasses interlock with 1SI8811A/B) and the establishment of flow using the SI/Charging pumps.

These paths are described in more detail below:

Scenario 1, 1SI8811A/B considered to be "not open" in ES-1.3 step 3c:

If the 1SI8811A/B valve is considered to be "not open" in ES-1.3 step 3c, the operators are transferred to Attachment A. In Attachment A, step 1 questions whether or not the 1SI8811A valve is closed. If it is determined to be "not closed", the RNO action is to close 1SI8812A, which would terminate an "A" division flow diversion from the RWST to the sump. The RNO then transfers to step 4, which includes similar guidance for the "B" division. The RNO is step 4 transfers to Step 7, which in turn transfers to BwCA-1-1 where step 1c directs local closure of 1SI8811A/B.

If the opposite interpretation of the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) status is made in Attachment A, step 1 of ES-1.3 ( valve is "closed"), the operators are directed through steps 2 and 3, which attempt manual, remote operation of 1SI8811A. Step 3b closes 1SI8812A, which would terminate a flow diversion, and step 3e directs 1SI8811A to be opened. Whether or not 1SI8811A is considered to be open, the procedure path leads to step 4 where a similar process is started for the "B" division. On completion of the "B" division steps, step 7 is reached where the transfer to 1BwCA-1.1 occurs and the direction to perform the local stroke of 1SI8811A/B is given.

Scenario 2, 1SI8811A/B considered to be "open" in ES-1.3 step 3c:

In the event that the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) is believed/considered to be "open" in ES-1.3 step 3c, step 3d directs closure of the 1SI8812A/B valves, which would terminate the flow diversion from the RWST to the sump. At this point, the RH pumps would be running with suction only aligned through the partially open 1SI8811A/B valves. For MLCOA events, this may allow injection through the 1SI8809A/B valves without further action; however, assuming that RCS pressure is too high for injection, the procedure continues in steps 4 and 5 to align RH to the SI/Charging system suction path. In steps 5f and 5h, the direction is given to open the 1CV8804A and 1SI8804B valves, respectively. These valves are interlocked with 1SI8811A/B and would not open with 1SI8811A/B in an intermediate position. The RNO for steps 5f and 5g direct local operation of valves 1CV8804A and 1SI8804B valves, which are smaller and more easily operated than the 1SI8811A/B valves. Locally stroking the 1CV8804A/1SI8804B valve would provide an alternate success path given that suction would be available through the partially open 1SI8811A/B valves.

If, for some reason, it was decided that there was no viable suction path for the SI/Charging pumps and that emergency coolant recirculation was lost/unavailable, the continuous action statement to transfer to BwCA-1.1 would be followed where local operation of the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) would be directed.

In summary, from the point where dual indication on 1SI8811A/B is encountered at ES-1.3 step 3c, any procedure path taken will isolate the flow diversion path from the RWST to the containment sump by closing 1SI8812A/B and emergency coolant recirculation will be established by opening either 1SI8811A/B or 1CV8804A/1SI8804B locally. No significant diagnosis is required to either close

1SI8812A/B or to open 1SI8811A/B; these actions are directed as a matter of course in a procedure path that has already been initiated.

#### TRAINING:

Based on simulator observations and operator interviews, scenario 1 is the expected evolution. There are a number of scenarios utilized in the simulator in both initial and continuing training that exercise these portions of the procedures.

For ILT: Scenario P-18.1 Involves failure of SI8811 valve to open and exercises \_BwCA-1.1  
 Scenario C-2.2 Involves failure of SI8811 valve to open and exercises \_BwCA-1.1  
 Scenario E-7.2 Involves failure of SI8811 valve to open and exercises ES-1.3, Attachment A to open valve  
 Scenario E-9.2 involves failure of SI8811 valve to open and exercises ES-1.3, Attachment A to open valve

For LORT (Going back just the last few years)

Scenario 0711 Involves failure of SI8812 valve to close and exercises ES-1.3, Attachment A to close the valve  
 Scenario 0716 Involves NSO Only training on \_BwEP ES-1.3, transfer to CL Recirc  
 Scenario 0765 Involves LBLOCA, transition to CL Recirc and local operation of OSX007  
 Scenario 0811 Involves failure of both SI8811 valves to open and exercises \_BwCA-1.1, including dispatching operators to "locally" open the valve.  
 Scenario 0843 Involves LBLOCA and transition to \_BwEP ES-1.3, followed by sump blockage and transition to 1BwCA-1.3  
 Scenario 0866 Involves containment bypass and exercises \_BwCA-1.1  
 Scenario 0916 Involves LBLOCA, and transfer to CL Recirc, transfer to HL Recirc  
 Scenario 0936-2 Involves NSO training on \_BwEP ES-1.3, transfer to CL Recirc with failure of \_SI8812 to close (Timed scenario)  
 Scenario 0943 Involves Involves LBLOCA, transition to CL Recirc

Scenario 0965 Involves LBLOCA, failure of 1SI8811B, transition to 1BwCA-1.1 and local opening of 1SI8811B

Scenario 0931 OOB Evaluation of DB LBLOCA and failure of 1SI8812 to close. Timed Scenario - ALL crews PASSED

Equipment Operator (EO) training on local valve operation occurs primarily in the generic fundamentals phase, Components chapter 1, which covers the construction and operation of MOVs. Various local valve operations are covered in a sampling of EOP Lesson plans but only general direction is covered.

In summary, the RO/SRO training program addresses the specific scenario in which the 8811A/B valves fail to open remotely as well as other scenarios that require local operation of the other valves. These scenarios, as well as others, are included in both initial qualification exercises and the continuing training program. EOs are trained generically to operate MOVs locally. While there is not a specific lesson plan covering 11/2SI8811A/B local operation, the generic training is applicable to those valves.

**Training:**

Classroom, Frequency: 0.5 per year

Simulator, Frequency: 0.5 per year

**JPM Procedure:**

Not Selected

**Identification and Definition:**

This HFE represents the probability that the operators will fail to locally open the failed 1SI8811A/B valves and complete the transition to cold leg recirculation given that the swap to recirculation mode has been initiated.

The scenario evaluated for this HFE is an MLOCA event, which is a top contributors in both the Braidwood PRA and the NRC SPAR model. The following provides an additional description of the scenario for which this action is evaluated:

The following provides an additional description of the scenario for which this action is evaluated:

1. Initial Conditions: Steady state, full power operation
2. Initiating Events: Medium LOCA
3. Accident sequence (preceding functional failures and successes):

Reactor trip successful

Turbine trip successful

AFW operates

Level in RCS drops due to MLOCA

ECCS initiated successfully (both divisions available)

2 trains of containment spray are available, 2 divisions of RCFCs running (4 fans).

Transition to cold leg recirculation on low RWST level fails due to failure of 1SI8811B to fully open (valve only opens approximately 34%, which fails to satisfy the interlock with the 8804 valve(s)).

4. Preceding operator error or success in sequence:

Early EP-0 actions to confirm actuations performed.

EP-1 actions to ensure adequate ECCS injection performed.

EP-1 action to depressurize and cooldown not required due to impact of break

Transition to recirculation mode started

Failure of 1SI8811A/B identified.

5. Operator action success criterion: Locally open 1SI8811A/B and establish cold leg recirculation mode prior RCS level reaching TAF.

**Key Assumptions:**

1) Failure of the 1SI8811B valve in the intermediate position is assumed to result in the shutdown of RH pump 1B due to lack of a positive suction source. Based on this interpretation of the valve's dual indication, the operators would be procedurally bound to perform a local, manual stroke of the valve before restarting RH pump 1B and completing the transition to cold leg recirculation. 2) Exelon calculation EC#377204 indicates that if the 1SI8811B had opened approximately 34 full stroke, adequate flow would have been available to perform swap to recirculation mode without action to locally open 1SI8811B. It should be noted that with the 1SI8811A/B valve in an intermediate position, the interlock with 1CV8804A/1SI8804B would not have cleared, but because RCS pressure would be below the RH pump shutoff head by the time recirculation mode was required, the RH pumps would be able to inject directly through the 1SI8809A/B valves and the interlock's status would be inconsequential. However, no direct credit is taken for operation of the RH pumps with the 1SI8811A/B valves in the intermediate position.

### Operator Interview Insights:

#### OPERATOR INTERVIEWS AND SIMULATOR OBSERVATIONS:

For cases in which both the open ("O") and the closed ("-") position indicators are simultaneously illuminated for a given valve, operator interviews performed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009 universally demonstrated that it was understood this represented a condition in which the actual position of the valve is unknown and that alternative means would be required to determine the valve's position. What was also demonstrated in the interviews and during the simulator observations was that interpretation of the valve's status with regard to responding to procedures was considered to be case specific.

For example, ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1 questions whether or not the 1SI8811A valve is closed and the two crews interpreted the dual indication differently; one crew treated it as "closed" and the other as "not closed". In the latter case, when 1SI8811A was considered "not closed" and the RNO action to close 1SI8812A was reached, it was recognized that with 1SI8811A in an undetermined state, closing 1SI8812A would potentially isolate RH pump 1A from all viable suction sources and RH pump 1A was tripped to protect it. If the valve is considered closed, the procedures attempt to manually open the valve from the control room. This path includes a step to trip RH pump 1A when 1SI8812A is closed. If 1SI8811A cannot subsequently be opened, the RH pump is left in the tripped position (same as previous case). Ultimately, either classification of the 1SI8811A valve's status ("closed" or "not closed") would lead to step 7 of Attachment A, where the operators are directed to CA-1.1 and the direction to locally open valve(s) 1SI8811A/B.

While a divergence of opinion appeared to exist on the classification a valve with dual indication in ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1, what was clear was that the indeterminate status of the valve was consistently treated in a conservative manner. ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1 is not directly questioning whether or not the position of the valve can lead to a success or failure of a particular function and as a result, a difference in the classification of the valve's status was noted. However, for the cases where the status

for the valve was directly related to whether or not it could fulfill a required function, the valves was not considered to be capable of supporting that function. For example,

- Step 3c of ES-1.3 questions whether or not the containment sump valves (1SI8811A/B) are open with the obvious intent of determining whether or not the RH pumps can draw water from the containment sump. Both crews interpreted the sump valve as not being open given the presence of dual indication on the 1SI8811A/B valve(s).

- In the RNO step of ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1, the 1SI8811A was not considered to be capable of providing an adequate suction source for RH pump 1A even though it was considered not to be closed in ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1. Consequently, RH pump 1A was tripped before 1SI8812A was closed.

- In ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 3e, 1SI8811A was considered to not be open such that it could not support cold leg recirculation mode.

- In ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 6e, 1SI8811B was considered to not be open such that it could not support cold leg recirculation mode.

- In ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 7, both 1SI8811A and B were considered to not be open such that they could not support cold leg recirculation mode.

- In CA-1.1, step 1c, both 1SI8811A and B were considered to not be open such that they could not support cold leg recirculation mode.

Based on the information obtained from the operator interviews and the simulator observations, the conclusion is that a dual indication condition on 1SI8811A/B will result in the interpretation that the valve cannot necessarily support cold leg recirculation mode and that the procedures will ultimately drive them to CA-1.1 where local action to open the valve will be directed.

All of the above is based on the pre-condition that the operators have no information about the actual position of 1SI8811A/B and that the reactor core is not yet threatened. Simulator runs 1 and 3, which were performed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009, demonstrated that while local operation of the 1SI8811A/B valves offered a potential success path to restore cold leg recirculation, the RH pump would not be started until it was verified that 1SI8811A/B was full open. For simulator runs 2 and 4, which were run on the same days, a local check of the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) position was allowed, but a manual stroke of the valve(s) was prohibited due to high rad levels. These scenarios placed the operators in a situation where the only success path was to run the RH pump with the 1SI8811A/B valves in a partially

open condition. Both crews dispatched equipment operators to perform a local assessment of the valve's position and when it became obvious to them that they could not prevent core damage without operating the RH pump(s), they elected to start the pumps. Both crews cited the 50.54x guidance that binds them to protect the core even if clear procedure guidance does not exist to direct them to do so. No credit is taken for operating the RH pumps with the 1SI8811A/B valves in a partially open condition even though plant engineering calculations indicate that such an operation would be successful.

**Manpower Requirements:**

<b>Operations:</b>	Shift Manager	1	1
	Shift Supervisor:	1	0
	STA:	1	0
	Reactor operators:	2	1
	Plant operators:	2	1
<b>Maintenance:</b>	Mechanics:	2	0
	Electricians:	2	0
	I&C Technicians:	2	0
<b>Health Physics:</b>	Technicians:	2	1
<b>Chemistry:</b>	Technicians:	1	0

**Execution Performance Shaping Factors:**

<b>Environment:</b>	Lighting	Normal
	Heat/Humidity	Hot / Humid
	Radiation	Yellow
	Atmosphere	Normal


<b>Special Requirements:</b>		
<b>Complexity of Response:</b>	Cognitive	Complex
	Execution	Complex
<b>Equipment Accessibility:</b>	Main Control Room	Accessible
	Unit 1 Containment Pipe Penetration Area	Accessible
<b>Stress:</b>	<b>High</b>	
	<i>Plant Response As Expected:</i>	No
	<i>Workload:</i>	N/A
	<i>Performance Shaping Factors:</i>	N/A

**Performance Shaping Factor Notes:**

Failure of the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) presents an unexpected condition in the plant (plant response is NOT as expected).

With regard to rad levels at the valve and access considerations, Exelon calc ECR 392870 indicates that the expected dose rate for a medium LOCA would be 1,444 mRem/hr. With a potential exposure time of up to 30 minutes, which is greater than the manipulation time for the local action, the accumulated dose would be below the administrative dose limit of 2000 m/Rem established in RP-AA-203. While this would not prevent local valve action, entering a potentially high rad area with elevated temperatures is considered to contribute to a high stress environment.

**Timing:**



**g Analysis:** While diagnosis contribution for this HFE has been excluded, the timing information related to the diagnosis of the need to transition to recirculation mode is required to establish the time available for local operation of the 1SI8811A/B valves and any applicable recovery factors. The timeline for this action has been constructed based on the successful diagnosis and interpretation of the dual indication on the 1SI8811A/B valves.

The timing for this action is complicated by the fact that a failure occurs in the equipment that is being used to carry out an action that has already been successfully diagnosed. The diagnosis tasks for the action to swap to recirculation mode and to identify the failure of the 1SI8811B valve to fully open during recirculation alignment are sequential and cannot occur during the same period of time. By definition, the diagnosis of the failed 1SI8811A/B valve(s) occurs only after successful diagnosis of the need to swap to recirculation. This is accounted for in the system window, manipulation time, and cue definitions for this action. For THERP, timing considerations are limited beyond the assessment that sufficient time is available to perform the action, but the dependence levels assignments of the recovery actions are potentially impacted by the timing.

$T(m)$ : The time required to manually stroke the 8811B valve from 34% open to full open has been determined to be 24 minutes. This time is based on an actual stroke of the valve performed by the Braidwood operators during the week of 11/02/2009. In addition, 7.5 minutes has been added to account for the time required to travel to the valve location. The travel time is based on a walkdown performed by the HRA analyst on 11/11/2009 and accounts for the time to travel from the EO ready room to the MCR to obtain a key for high rad area access (30 seconds travel, 30 seconds assumed to get key), the time to travel to the Auxiliary Building entrance (3 minutes), the time to travel from the Auxiliary Building entrance to valve 1SI8811B (3 minutes), and the time to climb the ladder to reach the handwheel on 1SI8811B (30 seconds). The time required for completing the steps to initiate cold leg recirculation mode is less than 1 minute based on simulator runs observed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009. Once the 1SI8811A/B valve is open, the operators are returned to ES-1.3, Attachment A, Step 7, which directs the operators to check that a train of recirculation has been established. This requires the start of the RH pump corresponding to the 1SI8811 valve that was successfully opened. Start of the RH pump will result in flow from the sump, to the pump, through the Hx, and to the cold leg through valve 1SI8809A/B because the MLOCA has depressurized the RCS below the RH shutoff head. The total manipulation time is, therefore, 32.5 minutes (7.5 minutes of travel time, 24 minutes for valve stroke, 1 minute for the step to complete swap to recirc).

T(sw): The time for RCS level to reach TAF is used as the end of the system window for this action. B/B MAAP run BBSDP15a indicates that 2.73 hours are available to reach TAF in a medium LOCA scenario from the initiating event.

T(delay) = time to 46% RWST level (cue to start transition to swap to recirc mode) + time to reach the command to open the 1SI8811A/B valve locally (accounts for completion of the action to begin the swap to recirc and respond to the dual indication on 1SI8811A/B). In this case, that time includes the time to reach 46% RWST level and the time required to reach step 1c of BwCA-1.1. B/B MAAP run BBSDP15a indicates that the time to reach 46.7% RWST level is 44.4 minutes, which is the initial cue to swap to cold leg recirculation mode. Based on simulator runs performed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009, 4 data points were obtained for the time to reach the point where the direction was given to locally stroke the 1SI8811A/B valve: Run 1= 11 minutes, Run 2 = 9 minutes, Run 3 = 10 minutes, Run 4 = 4 minutes. Because 2 crews were used to perform 4 simulator runs and the second run for each crew was highly similar to the first, it was expected that some degree of anticipation of the upcoming events would occur. As a result, the T(1/2) estimate for this case is based on the average of runs 1 and 3, the first run of the scenarios for each crew.  $T(1/2) = 10.5$  minutes  $((11 \text{ min} + 10 \text{ min}) / 2 = 10.5 \text{ min})$ . The time T(delay), therefore, is 44.4 minutes + 10.5 minutes = 54.9 minutes

T(1/2): The HRAC uses the median response time in the assessment of recovery dependence levels, but this is accounted for by the cue structure here. T(1/2) has been set to 0.01 seconds (to prevent an HRAC error message).

**Time available for recovery:** 76.40 Minutes

**SPAR-H Available time (cognitive):** 76.40 Minutes

**SPAR-H Available time (execution) ratio:** 3.35

**Minimum level of dependence for recovery:** ZD

### Execution Unrecovered

#### 1SI8811BM-BHPMOA

Table 6: 1SI8811BM-BHPMOA EXECUTION UNRECOVERED

Procedure: BwCA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation			Comment			Stress Factor	Over Ride	
Step No.	Instruction/Comment	Error Type	THERP		HEP			
			Table	Item				
ES-1.3, step 3a	Place control switches for SVAG valves 480V bus feeds at 1PM06J in -CLOSE	The "A" and "B" divisions are completely dependent.					5	
	--	EOM	20-7b	2	1.3E-3			
		EOC	20-12	5	1.3E-3			
		EOC	20-12	4	1.3E-3			
	<b>Total Step HEP</b>							2.0e-02
ES1.3, At A, s1 RNO	Perform the following: a: Manually or locally close RH Pump 1A suction from RWST isol valve: 1SI8812A	The operators Step 4 of ES-1.3, Attachment A directs the same action for the "B" division. The "A" and "B" divisions are completely dependent.					5	
	--	EOM	20-7b	2	1.3E-3			
		EOC	20-12	4	1.3E-3			
		EOC	20-12	5	1.3E-3			
	<b>Total Step HEP</b>							2.0e-02

CA-1.1, Step 1.c RNO	Dispatch an operator to open at least one valve: -1SI8811A (364' U13 CWA), -1SI8811B (364' X13 CWA)					5	
	--	EOM	20-7b	1	4.3E-4		
			EOC	20-13	1	1.3E-3	<b>Total Step HEP</b>
CA-1.1, Step 1.e RNO	When one train is restored, then return to procedure and step in effect.	CA-1.1, Step 1.e RNO is a continuous action statement that will send the operators back to ES-1.3, Attachment A, Step 7, which requires the operators to confirm the status of the valve via the direction "check at least 1 CNMT sump recirc flowpath established". Because the entire focus of the MCR is on the progress of opening the 1SI8811A/B valve, the continuous action statement would not be overlooked.				5	
	--	EOM	20-7b	1	4.3E-4		
			<b>Total Step HEP</b>				2.2e-03
ES-1.3, ATT A Step 7	CHECK AT LEAST ONE CNMT SUMP RECIRC FLOWPATH ESTABLISHED	When CA-1.1 returns the operators to ES-1.3 after 1SI8811A/B is opened, this step would result in the start of an RH pump. Because the MLOCA depressurizes the reactor below the RH pump shutoff head, this is the only step required to initiate CL recirculation.				5	
	--	EOM	20-7b	2	1.3E-3		
		EOC	20-12	3	1.3E-3		
		EOC	20-12	5	1.3E-3		
			<b>Total Step HEP</b>				2.0e-02
EXEC RECOV - ICR	EXEC RECOV - ICR	See Section 4.4 of the HRA Notebook for further information. This execution recovery factor is applied to the individual execution steps with a dependence factor based on the time available for recovery. Note that the execution stress factors applied to the execution subtasks are not applied to the execution				5	0.1

		recovery factor.					
	-	EOM	20-7b	2	1.3E-3		
	<b>Total Step HEP</b>						1.0e-01

## Execution Recovery

### 1SI8811BM-BHPMOA

Table 7: 1SI8811BM-BHPMOA EXECUTION RECOVERY

Critical Step No.	Recovery Step No.	Action	HEP (Crit)	HEP (Rec)	Dep.	Cond. HEP (Rec)	Total for Step
ES-1.3, step 3a		Place control switches for SVAG valves 480V bus feeds at 1PM06J in - CLOSE	2.0e-02				2.0e-03
	EXEC RECOV - ICR	EXEC RECOV - ICR		1.0e-01	ZD	1.0e-01	
ES1.3, At A, s1 RNO		Perform the following: a. Manually or locally close RH Pump 1A suction from RWST isol valve: 1SI8812A	2.0e-02				2.0e-03
	EXEC RECOV - ICR	EXEC RECOV - ICR		1.0e-01	ZD	1.0e-01	
CA-1.1, Step 1.c-RNO		Dispatch an operator to open at least one valve: -1SI8811A (364' U13 CWA), -1SI8811B (364' X13 CWA)	8.7e-03				1.9e-05
	CA-1.1, Step 1.e RNO	When one train is restored, then return to procedure and step in effect.		2.2e-03	ZD	2.2e-03	
ES-1.3, ATT A Step 7		CHECK AT LEAST ONE CNMT SUMP RECIRC FLOWPATH ESTABLISHED	2.0e-02				2.0e-03
	EXEC RECOV - ICR	EXEC RECOV - ICR		1.0e-01	ZD	1.0e-01	
<b>Total Unrecovered:</b>			<b>6.7e-02</b>	<b>Total Recovered:</b>			<b>6.0e-03</b>

**4.4 1SI8811BMSBHPMOA, FAILURE TO OPEN VLV 1SI8811B AFTER REMOTE FAILURE (LOCAL-MANUAL, MLOCA, SPAR-H)**

<b>Analyst:</b>	DEM
<b>Rev. Date:</b>	12/10/09
<b>Reviewer:</b>	
<b>Cognitive Method:</b>	SPAR-H
<b>Analysis Database:</b>	bwd-8811-121009.HRA (12/10/09, 1675264 Bytes)

Table 8: 1SI8811BMSBHPMOA SUMMARY

<b>Analysis Results:</b>	<b>Cognitive</b>	<b>Execution</b>
<b>Failure Probability</b>	0.0e+00	9.1e-02
<b>Total HEP</b>		9.1e-02

**Plant:**

Braidwood

**Initiating Event:**

MLOCA

**Basic Event Context:**

Typically, both execution and diagnosis errors are included as part of a post initiator HRA. In some cases, however, there are conditions that preclude the applicability of one of these components of the HEP.

For scenarios in which the 1SI8811A/B valve fails to completely stroke and both the "open" and "closed" lights are illuminated (dual indication), it is recognized that the operators must interpret the dual indication and make a decision about how to proceed. However, their decision regarding the valve's status is unimportant given that any interpretation results in a successful outcome.

- 1SI8811A/B interpreted as "NOT OPEN": operator directed to close 1SI8812A/B, open 1SI8811A/B locally, and establish cold leg recirculation.
- 1SI8811A/B interpreted as "OPEN": The RH pumps would remain running, 1SI8812A/B directed to be closed, and injection would be provided to the RCS via the 1SI8809A/B valve(s). For transient scenarios or for SLOCAs where the transition to cold leg recirculation is attempted at the time of the 46% RWST level cue, the procedures still provide a success path as they direct local operation of the 1CV8804A/1SI8804B valves (bypasses interlock with 1SI8811A/B) and the establishment of flow using the SI/Charging pumps.

These paths are described in more detail below:

Scenario 1, 1SI8811A/B considered to be "not open" in ES-1.3 step 3c:

If the 1SI8811A/B valve is considered to be "not open" in ES-1.3 step 3c, the operators are transferred to Attachment A. In Attachment A, step 1 questions whether or not the 1SI8811A valve is closed. If it is determined to be "not closed", the RNO action is to close 1SI8812A, which would terminate an "A" division flow diversion from the RWST to the sump. The RNO then transfers to step 4, which includes similar guidance for the "B" division. The RNO is step 4 transfers to Step 7, which in turn transfers to BwCA-1-1 where step 1c directs local closure of 1SI8811A/B.

If the opposite interpretation of the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) status is made in Attachment A, step 1 of ES-1.3 ( valve is "closed"), the operators are directed through steps 2 and 3, which attempt manual, remote operation of 1SI8811A. Step 3b closes 1SI8812A, which would terminate a flow diversion, and step 3e directs 1SI8811A to be opened. Whether or not 1SI8811A is considered to be open, the procedure path leads to step 4 where a similar process is started for the "B" division. On completion of the "B" division steps, step 7 is reached where the transfer to 1BwCA-1.1 occurs and the direction to perform the local stroke of 1SI8811A/B is given.

Scenario 2, 1SI8811A/B considered to be "open" in ES-1.3 step 3c:

In the event that the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) is believed/considered to be "open" in ES-1.3 step 3c, step 3d directs closure of the 1SI8812A/B valves, which would terminate the flow diversion from the RWST to the sump. At this point, the RH pumps would be running with suction only aligned through the partially open 1SI8811A/B valves. For MLCOA events, this may allow injection through the 1SI8809A/B valves without further action; however, assuming that RCS pressure is too high for injection, the procedure continues in steps 4 and 5 to align RH to the SI/Charging system suction path. In steps 5f and 5h, the direction is given to open the 1CV8804A and 1SI8804B valves, respectively. These valves are interlocked with

1SI8811A/B and would not open with 1SI8811A/B in an intermediate position. The RNO for steps 5f and 5g direct local operation of valves 1CV8804A and 1SI8804B valves, which are smaller and more easily operated than the 1SI8811A/B valves. Locally stroking the 1CV8804A/1SI8804B valve would provide an alternate success path given that suction would be available through the partially open 1SI8811A/B valves.

If, for some reason, it was decided that there was no viable suction path for the SI/Charging pumps and that emergency coolant recirculation was lost/unavailable, the continuous action statement to transfer to BwCA-1.1 would be followed where local operation of the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) would be directed.

In summary, from the point where dual indication on 1SI8811A/B is encountered at ES-1.3 step 3c, any procedure path taken will isolate the flow diversion path from the RWST to the containment sump by closing 1SI8812A/B and emergency coolant recirculation will be established by opening either 1SI8811A/B or 1CV8804A/1SI8804B locally. No significant diagnosis is required to either close 1SI8812A/B or to open 1SI8811A/B; these actions are directed as a matter of course in a procedure path that has already been initiated.

#### EXPERIENCE/TRAINING:

There are a number of scenarios utilized in the simulator in both initial and continuing training that exercise these portions of the procedures.

For ILT: Scenario P-18.1 Involves failure of SI8811 valve to open and exercises \_BwCA-1.1  
 Scenario C-2.2 Involves failure of SI8811 valve to open and exercises \_BwCA-1.1  
 Scenario E-7.2 Involves failure of SI8811 valve to open and exercises ES-1.3, Attachment A to open valve  
 Scenario E-9:2 Involves failure of SI8811 valve to open and exercises ES-1.3; Attachment A to open valve

For LORT (Going back just the last few years)

Scenario 0711 Involves failure of SI8812 valve to close and exercises ES-1.3, Attachment A to close the valve  
 Scenario 0716 Involves NSO Only training on \_BwEP ES-1.3, transfer to CL Recirc

- Scenario 0765 Involves LBLOCA, transition to CL Recirc and local operation of 0SX007
- Scenario 0811 Involves failure of both SI8811 valves to open and exercises \_BwCA-1.1, including dispatching operators to "locally" open the valve.
- Scenario 0843 Involves LBLOCA and transition to \_BwEP ES-1.3, followed by sump blockage and transition to 1BwCA-1.3
- Scenario 0866 Involves containment bypass and exercises \_BwCA-1.1
- Scenario 0916 Involves LBLOCA, and transfer to CL Recirc, transfer to HL Recirc
- Scenario 0936-2 Involves NSO training on \_BwEP ES-1.3, transfer to CL Recirc with failure of \_SI8812 to close (Timed scenario)
- Scenario 0943 Involves Involves LBLOCA, transition to CL Recirc
- Scenario 0965 Involves LBLOCA, failure of 1SI8811B, transition to 1BwCA-1.1 and local opening of 1SI8811B
- Scenario 0931 OOB Evaluation of DB LBLOCA and failure of 1SI8812 to close. Timed Scenario - ALL crews PASSED

Equipment Operator (EO) training on local valve operation occurs primarily in the generic fundamentals phase, Components chapter 1, which covers the construction and operation of MOVs. Various local valve operations are covered in a sampling of EOP Lesson plans but only general direction is covered.

In summary, the RO/SRO training program addresses the specific scenario in which the 8811A/B valves fail to open remotely as well as other scenarios that require local operation of the other valves. These scenarios, as well as others, are included in both initial qualification exercises and the continuing training program. EOs are trained generically to operate MOVs locally. While there is not a specific lesson plan covering 11/2SI8811A/B local operation, the generic training is applicable to those valves. While this level of training may not be considered to be as high as what is performed for the standard action to initiate cold leg recirculation, it is considered to be adequate to maintain a reasonable level of proficiency in addressing failure of the 1SI8811A/B valves. Addressing the dual indication on 1SI8811A/B is not specifically addressed, but general training covers this particular mode of failure for the valve. Treated as a "nominal training" case.

#### OPERATOR INTERVIEWS AND SIMULATOR OBSERVATIONS:

For cases in which both the open ("O") and the closed ("-") position indicators are simultaneously illuminated for a given valve, operator interviews performed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009 universally demonstrated that it was understood this represented a condition in which the actual position of the valve is unknown and that alternative means would be required to determine the valve's position. What was

also demonstrated in the interviews and during the simulator observations was that interpretation of the valve's status with regard to responding to procedures was considered to be case specific.

For example, ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1 questions whether or not the 1SI8811A valve is closed and the two crews interpreted the dual indication differently; one crew treated it as "closed" and the other as "not closed". In the latter case, when 1SI8811A was considered "not closed" and the RNO action to close 1SI8812A was reached, it was recognized that with 1SI8811A in an undetermined state, closing 1SI8812A would potentially isolate RH pump 1A from all viable suction sources and RH pump 1A was tripped to protect it. If the valve is considered closed, the procedures attempt to manually open the valve from the control room. This path includes a step to trip RH pump 1A when 1SI8812A is closed. If 1SI8811A cannot subsequently be opened, the RH pump is left in the tripped position (same as previous case). Ultimately, either classification of the 1SI8811A valve's status ("closed" or "not closed") would lead to step 7 of Attachment A, where the operators are directed to CA-1.1 and instructed to locally open valve(s) 1SI8811A/B.

While a divergence of opinion appeared to exist on the classification a valve with dual indication in ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1, what was clear was that the indeterminate status of the valve was consistently treated in a conservative manner. ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1 is not directly questioning whether or not the position of the valve can lead to a success or failure of a particular function and as a result, a difference in the classification of the valve's status was noted. However, for the cases where the status for the valve was directly related to whether or not it could fulfill a required function, the valves was not considered to be capable of supporting that function. For example,

- Step 3c of ES-1.3 questions whether or not the containment sump valves (1SI8811A/B) are open with the obvious intent of determining whether or not the RH pumps can draw water from the containment sump. Both crews interpreted the sump valve as not being open given the presence of dual indication on the 1SI8811A/B valve(s).

- In the RNO step of ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1, the 1SI8811A was not considered to be capable of providing an adequate suction source for RH pump 1A even though it was considered not to be closed in ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1. Consequently, RH pump 1A was tripped before 1SI8812A was closed.

- In ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 3e, 1SI8811A was considered to not be open such that it could not support cold leg recirculation mode.

- In ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 6e, 1SI8811B was considered to not be open such that it could not support cold leg recirculation mode.

- In ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 7, both 1SI8811A and B were considered to not be open such that they could not support cold leg recirculation mode.

- In CA-1.1, step 1c, both 1SI8811A and B were considered to not be open such that they could not support cold leg recirculation mode.

Based on the information obtained from the operator interviews and the simulator observations, the conclusion is that a dual indication condition on 1SI8811A/B will result in the interpretation that the valve cannot necessarily support cold leg recirculation mode and that the procedures will ultimately drive them to CA-1.1 where local action to open the valve will be directed.

All of the above is based on the pre-condition that the operators have no information about the actual position of 1SI8811A/B and that the reactor core is not yet threatened. Simulator runs 1 and 3, which were performed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009, demonstrated that while local operation of the 1SI8811A/B valves offered a potential success path to restore cold leg recirculation, the RH pump would not be started until it was verified that 1SI8811A/B was full open. For simulator runs 2 and 4, which were run on the same days, a local check of the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) position was allowed, but a manual stroke of the valve(s) was prohibited due to high rad levels. These scenarios placed the operators in a situation where the only success path was to run the RH pump with the 1SI8811A/B valves in a partially open condition. Both crews dispatched equipment operators to perform a local assessment of the valve's position and when it became obvious to them that they could not prevent core damage without operating the RH pump(s), they elected to start the pumps. Both crews cited the 50.54x guidance that binds them to protect the core even if clear procedure guidance does not exist to direct them to do so. No credit is taken for operating the RH pumps with the 1SI8811A/B valves in a partially open condition even though plant engineering calculations indicate that such an operation would be successful.

## SCENARIO DEFINITION

The scenario evaluated for this HFE is an MLOCA event, which is a top contributors in both the Braidwood PRA and the NRC SPAR model. The following provides an additional description of the scenario for which this action is evaluated:

1. Initial Conditions: Steady state, full power operation
2. Initiating Events: Medium LOCA
3. Accident sequence (preceding functional failures and successes):

Reactor trip successful

Turbine trip successful

AFW operates

Level in RCS drops due to MLOCA

ECCS initiated successfully (both divisions available)

2 trains of containment spray are available, 2 divisions of RCFCs running (4 fans).

Transition to cold leg recirculation on low RWST level fails due to failure of 1SI8811B to fully open (valve only opens approximately 34%, which fails to satisfy the interlock with the 8804 valve(s)). Train A fails due to CCF or random equipment failures.

4. Preceding operator error or success in sequence:

Early EP-0 actions to confirm actuations performed.

EP-1 actions to ensure adequate ECCS injection performed.

EP-1 action to depressurize and cooldown not required due to impact of break


Transition to recirculation mode started

Failure of 1SI8811A/B identified.

5. Operator action success criterion: Locally open 1SI8811A/B and establish cold leg recirculation mode prior RCS level reaching TAF.

6. Key Assumptions: 1) Failure of the 1SI8811A/B valve in the intermediate position is assumed to result in the shutdown of RH pump 1A/B due to lack of a positive suction source when the 1SI8812A/B valve(s) are closed. Based on this interpretation of the valve's dual indication, the operators would be procedurally bound to perform a local, manual stroke of the valve before restarting RH pump 1A/B and completing the transition to cold leg recirculation. 2) Exelon calculation EC#377204 indicates that if the 1SI8811B had opened approximately 34 full stroke, adequate flow would have been available to perform swap to recirculation mode without action to locally open 1SI8811B. It should be noted that with the 1SI8811A/B valve in an intermediate position, the interlock with 1CV8804A/1SI8804B would not have cleared, but because RCS pressure would be below the RH pump shutoff head by the time recirculation mode was required, the RH pumps would be able to inject directly through the 1SI8809A/B valves and the interlock's status would be inconsequential. However, no direct credit is taken for operation of the RH pumps with the 1SI8811A/B valves in the intermediate position.

**Timing:**



**g Analysis:** While diagnosis contribution for this HFE has been excluded, the timing information related to the diagnosis of the need to transition to recirculation mode is required to establish the time available for local operation of the 1SI8811A/B valves and any applicable recovery factors. The timeline for this action has been constructed based on the successful diagnosis and interpretation of the dual indication on the 1SI8811A/B valves.

The timing for this action is complicated by the fact that a failure occurs in the equipment that is being used to carry out an action that has already been successfully diagnosed. The diagnosis tasks for the action to swap to recirculation mode and to identify the failure of the 1SI8811B valve to fully open during recirculation alignment are sequential and cannot occur during the same period of time. By definition, the diagnosis of the failed 1SI8811A/B valve(s) occurs only after successful diagnosis of the need to swap to recirculation. This is accounted for in the system window, manipulation time, and cue definitions for this action. Because the availability of time for the local operation of 1SI8811A/B is a factor which can directly impact an HEP, it is necessary to define the timeline for the HEP quantification:

For the SPAR-H execution ratio, the following is assumed:  $Execution\ Ratio = \frac{T(sw) - T(delay) - T(1/2)}{T(m)}$

Where:

T(delay) = time to 46% RWST level (cue to start transition to swap to recirc mode) + time to reach step 3c of ES-1.3 (accounts for completion of the action to begin the swap to recirc). In this case, that time includes the time to reach 46% RWST level and the time required to reach step 3c of ES-1.3. B/B MAAP run BBSDP15a indicates that the time to reach 46.7% RWST level is 44.4 minutes, which is the initial

cue to swap to cold leg recirculation mode. Based on simulator runs performed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009, 4 data points were obtained for the time to reach step 3c of ES-1.3: Run 1 = 3 minutes, Run 2 = 3 minutes, Run 3 = 2 minutes, Run 4 = 2 minutes. The median time is the average of the two central data points of the even number of trials, or 2.5 minutes  $((2+3)/2=2.5)$ . The time T(delay), therefore, is 44.4 min + 2.5 min = 46.9 min.

T(m): The time required to manually stroke the 8811B valve from 34% open to full open has been determined to be 24 minutes. This time is based on an actual stroke of the valve performed by the Braidwood operators during the week of 11/02/2009. In addition, 7.5 minutes has been added to account for the time required to travel to the valve location. The travel time is based on a walkdown performed by the HRA analyst on 11/11/2009 and accounts for the time to travel from the EO ready room to the MCR to obtain a key for high rad area access (30 seconds travel, 30 seconds assumed to get key), the time to travel to the Auxiliary Building entrance (3 minutes), the time to travel from the Auxiliary Building entrance to valve 1SI8811B (3 minutes), and the time to climb the ladder to reach the handwheel on 1SI8811B (30 seconds). The time required for completing the steps to initiate cold leg recirculation mode is less than 1 minute based on simulator runs observed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009. Once the 1SI8811A/B valve is open, the operators are returned to ES-1.3, Attachment A, Step 7, which directs the operators to check that a train of recirculation has been established. This requires the start of the RH pump corresponding to the 1SI8811 valve that was successfully opened. Start of the RH pump will result in flow from the sump, to the pump, through the Hx, and to the cold leg through valve 1SI8809A/B because the MLOCA has depressurized the RCS below the RH shutoff head. The total manipulation time is, therefore, 32.5 minutes (7.5 minutes of travel time, 24 minutes for valve stroke, 1 minute for the step to complete swap to recirc).

T(sw): The time for RCS level to reach TAF is used as the end of the system window for this action. B/B MAAP run BBSDP15a indicates that 2.73 hours are available to reach TAF in a medium LOCA scenario from the initiating event.

T(1/2): Based on simulator runs performed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009, 4 data points were obtained for the time to begin the response (command to open valve, not just check the valves status) from the time that step 3c of ES-1.3 was reached. The results of the simulator runs showed the following: Run 1 = 8 minutes, Run 2 = 6 minutes, Run 3 = 8 minutes, Run 4 = 2 minutes. Because 2 crews were used to perform 4 simulator runs and the second run for each crew was highly similar to the first, it was expected that some degree of anticipation of the upcoming events would occur. As a result, the T(1/2) estimate for this case is based on the average of runs 1 and 3, the first run of the scenarios for each crew.  $T(1/2) = 8$  minutes  $((8 \text{ min} + 8 \text{ min}) / 2 = 8 \text{ min})$ .

**Time available for recovery: 76.40 Minutes**

**SPAR-H Available time (cognitive): 84.40 Minutes**

SPAR-H Available time (execution) ratio: 3.35

Minimum level of dependence for recovery: ZD

**PART I. DIAGNOSIS**

No Part I

Diagnosis HEP:

0.0e+00

**PART II. ACTION**

PSFs	PSF Levels		Multiplier for Diagnosis
<b>Available Time</b>  (recommended choice based on timing information in bold)	Inadequate Time		P(failure) = 1.0
	Time available is ~ the time required		10
	<b>Nominal time</b>	X	1
	Time available >= 5x the time required		0.1
	Time available >= 50x the time required		0.01
	Insufficient Information		1
	<i>Refer to the timing analysis.</i>		
<b>Stress/Stressors</b>	Extreme	X	5
	High		2
	Nominal		1

	Insufficient Information		1
	<p><i>The scenario to which this action is applied is a Medium LOCA event for which high pressure injection is successful. The depressurization process occurs as a result of the RCS break in conjunction with some cooling, which is supplemented by heat removal through the SGs. At the time the swap to recirculation mode would occur (RWST low level alarm at about 45 minutes), the work load would be relatively low and the transition would be proceeding in an orderly manner until the status of the SI8811A/B valves is checked. The failure of the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) to stroke would introduce an additional level of stress given that a suction path from the containment sump to the RH pumps is required to maintain the reactor in a stable state. The equipment operators would be required to enter the Auxiliary Building to manually operate the valve, but given that about two hours would be available to perform the manipulation before the TAF would be reached in the RCS, time stress would not be a major factor. The presence of elevated temperatures and radiation levels, however, would be a potential concern. Exelon calc ECR 392870 indicates that the expected dose rate for a medium LOCA would be 1,444 mRem/hr. With a potential exposure time of up to 30 minutes, which is greater than the manipulation time for the local action, the accumulated dose would be below the administrative dose limit of 2000 m/Rem established in RP-AA-203. While the accumulated dose would not preclude this action from being performed, "extreme" stress is chosen to account for the difficult working conditions.</i></p>		
<b>Complexity</b>	Highly complex		5
	Moderately complex	X	2
	Nominal		1
	Insufficient Information		1
	<p><i>Manual operation of a valve is a straightforward task with which the operators are familiar through training and similar tasks performed as part of normal plant operations, but the physical requirements of opening the valve are potentially challenging. In order to manually stroke the valve, it is necessary to stand on top of the valve's enclosure in a semi confined area and turn a handwheel that is located at face level. Elevated temperatures in the area during a LOCA evolution could contribute to some discomfort during the operation, but it is not expected to be prohibitive in any way for the MLOCA scenario. The valve area is well lit and the open stem design provides a clear indication of the valve's position. With regard to valve identification, the valve is tagged with a label that is easy to read, but more importantly, it is highly unique and could not</i></p>		


	<p><i>be mistaken for any other valve in the area. The "A" and "B" 1SI8811 valves are on the same elevation, but they are separated by at least 30 yards and are accessed by turning different directions upon entry into the curved wall area. While the action itself is a straightforward manipulation on a highly unique valve, the action is considered to be "moderately complex" due to the position the equipment operator must be in to perform the valve stroke and the length of time that is required to complete the stroke (24 minutes from 34%). Once the valve is open, the remainder of the task is a highly trained action and is not considered to significantly contribute to difficulty of the action.</i></p>	
<b>Experience/Training</b>	Low	3
	Nominal	X 1
	High	0.5
	Insufficient Information	1
	<p><i>Refer to the "Experience/Training" portion of the "Basic Event Context" discussion.</i></p>	
<b>Procedures</b>	Not available	50
	Incomplete	20
	Available, but poor	5
	Nominal	X 1
	Insufficient Information	1
	<p><i>Step 1c RNO of CA-1.1 directs local operation of 1SI8811A/B to be performed once it has been determined that it cannot be opened remotely. No additional procedures are required for a valve manipulation. Assessed as "nominal".</i></p>	
<b>Ergonomics/HMI</b>	Missing/Misleading	50
	Poor	X 10
	Nominal	1
	Good	0.5
	Insufficient Information	1
	<p><i>As identified in the "complexity" discussion for the execution task, the valve is highly unique such that mistaking it for another valves is a negligible concern, but the position the operator has to be in to stroke the valve is challenging. The footing is narrow (about 2.5</i></p>	

	<p><i>feet), semi-confined, and the handwheel is at face level, which makes operation slow and difficult relative to a floor mounted valve with the handwheel at waist level. During an accident, the area may be at elevated temperature and radiation levels. While these factors may be a cause for some discomfort and stress, they are not expected to be prohibitive for medium LOCA scenarios. Overall, this is considered to be an example of relatively "poor" human-machine interface conditions.</i></p>		
<b>Fitness for Duty</b>	Unfit		P(failure) = 1.0
	Degraded Fitness		5
	Nominal	X	1
	Insufficient Information		1
	<p><i>No fitness for duty issues have been identified. The nominal case is used.</i></p>		
<b>Work Processes</b>	Poor		5
	Nominal	X	1
	Good		0.5
	Insufficient Information		0.5
	<p><i>For emergency situations, operator interviews performed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009 indicate that there would be no requirement to "dress-out" before entering the Auxiliary Building to perform the manual valve stroke, which is well known to the operators. With regard to access to the Auxiliary Building (high rad area), the equipment operators would be required to obtain a key from the MCR for entry. This is not an unusual situation and given the proximity of the equipment operator ready room to the MCR, it does not significantly impact the manipulation time for valve operation. Radio communication would be available between the MCR and the equipment operator. No work process issues have been identified that would impact the performance of the manual stroke of 1SI8811A/B.</i></p>		

**Action Probability:**

9.1e-02 [Adjustment applied:  $1.0E-3 * 1.0e+02 / (1.0E-3 * (1.0e+02 - 1) + 1)$ ]

PART III. DEPENDENCY



**Task Failure WITHOUT Formal Dependence:**

9.1e-02

**Task Failure WITH Formal Dependence:**

9.1e-02

**4.5 1SI8811B3SBHPMOA, FAILURE TO OPEN VLV 1SI8811B AFTER REMOTE FAILURE (LOCAL-MANUAL, 3" MLOCA, SPAR-H)**

<b>Analyst:</b>	DEM
<b>Rev. Date:</b>	12/10/09
<b>Reviewer:</b>	
<b>Cognitive Method:</b>	SPAR-H
<b>Analysis Database:</b>	bwd-8811-121009.HRA (12/10/09, 1675264 Bytes)

Table 9: 1SI8811B3SBHPMOA SUMMARY

<b>Analysis Results:</b>	<b>Cognitive</b>	<b>Execution</b>
<b>Failure Probability</b>	0.0e+00	9.9e-03
<b>Total HEP</b>		9.9e-03

**Plant:**

Braidwood

**Initiating Event:**

3" MLOCA

**Basic Event Context:**

Typically, both execution and diagnosis errors are included as part of a post initiator HRA. In some cases, however, there are conditions that preclude the applicability of one of these components of the HEP.

For scenarios in which the 1SI8811A/B valve fails to completely stroke and both the "open" and "closed" lights are illuminated (dual indication), it is recognized that the operators must interpret the dual indication and make a decision about how to proceed. However, their decision regarding the valve's status is unimportant given that any interpretation results in a successful outcome.

- 1SI8811A/B interpreted as "NOT OPEN": operator directed to close 1SI8812A/B, open 1SI8811A/B locally, and establish cold leg recirculation.
- 1SI8811A/B interpreted as "OPEN": The RH pumps would remain running, 1SI8812A/B directed to be closed, and injection would be provided to the RCS via the 1SI8809A/B valve(s). For transient scenarios or for SLOCAs where the transition to cold leg recirculation is attempted at the time of the 46% RWST level cue, the procedures still provide a success path as they direct local operation of the 1CV8804A/1SI8804B valves (bypasses interlock with 1SI8811A/B) and the establishment of flow using the SI/Charging pumps.

These paths are described in more detail below:

Scenario 1, 1SI8811A/B considered to be "not open" in ES-1.3 step 3c:

If the 1SI8811A/B valve is considered to be "not open" in ES-1.3 step 3c, the operators are transferred to Attachment A. In Attachment A, step 1 questions whether or not the 1SI8811A valve is closed. If it is determined to be "not closed", the RNO action is to close 1SI8812A, which would terminate an "A" division flow diversion from the RWST to the sump. The RNO then transfers to step 4, which includes similar guidance for the "B" division. The RNO is step 4 transfers to Step 7, which in turn transfers to BwCA-1-1 where step 1c directs local closure of 1SI8811A/B.

If the opposite interpretation of the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) status is made in Attachment A, step 1 of ES-1.3 ( valve is "closed"), the operators are directed through steps 2 and 3, which attempt manual, remote operation of 1SI8811A. Step 3b closes 1SI8812A, which would terminate a flow diversion, and step 3e directs 1SI8811A to be opened. Whether or not 1SI8811A is considered to be open, the procedure path leads to step 4 where a similar process is started for the "B" division. On completion of the "B" division steps, step 7 is reached where the transfer to 1BwCA-1.1 occurs and the direction to perform the local stroke of 1SI8811A/B is given.

Scenario 2, 1SI8811A/B considered to be "open" in ES-1.3 step 3c:

In the event that the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) is believed/considered to be "open" in ES-1.3 step 3c, step 3d directs closure of the 1SI8812A/B valves, which would terminate the flow diversion from the RWST to the sump. At this point, the RH pumps would be running with suction only aligned through the partially open 1SI8811A/B valves. For MLCOA events, this may allow injection through the 1SI8809A/B valves without further action; however, assuming that RCS pressure is too high for injection, the procedure continues in steps 4 and 5 to align RH to the SI/Charging system suction path. In steps 5f and 5h, the direction is given to open the 1CV8804A and 1SI8804B valves, respectively. These valves are interlocked with

1SI8811A/B and would not open with 1SI8811A/B in an intermediate position. The RNO for steps 5f and 5g direct local operation of valves 1CV8804A and 1SI8804B valves, which are smaller and more easily operated than the 1SI8811A/B valves. Locally stroking the 1CV8804A/1SI8804B valve would provide an alternate success path given that suction would be available through the partially open 1SI8811A/B valves.

If, for some reason, it was decided that there was no viable suction path for the SI/Charging pumps and that emergency coolant recirculation was lost/unavailable, the continuous action statement to transfer to BwCA-1.1 would be followed where local operation of the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) would be directed.

In summary, from the point where dual indication on 1SI8811A/B is encountered at ES-1.3 step 3c, any procedure path taken will isolate the flow diversion path from the RWST to the containment sump by closing 1SI8812A/B and emergency coolant recirculation will be established by opening either 1SI8811A/B or 1CV8804A/1SI8804B locally. No significant diagnosis is required to either close 1SI8812A/B or to open 1SI8811A/B; these actions are directed as a matter of course in a procedure path that has already been initiated.

#### EXPERIENCE/TRAINING:

There are a number of scenarios utilized in the simulator in both initial and continuing training that exercise these portions of the procedures.

- For ILT:
- Scenario P-18.1 Involves failure of SI8811 valve to open and exercises \_BwCA-1.1
  - Scenario C-2.2 Involves failure of SI8811 valve to open and exercises \_BwCA-1.1
  - Scenario E-7.2 Involves failure of SI8811 valve to open and exercises ES-1.3, Attachment A to open valve
  - Scenario E-9.2 Involves failure of SI8811 valve to open and exercises ES-1.3, Attachment A to open valve

For LORT (Going back just the last few years)

- Scenario 0711 Involves failure of SI8812 valve to close and exercises ES-1.3, Attachment A to close the valve
- Scenario 0716 Involves NSO Only training on \_BwEP ES-1.3, transfer to CL Recirc

Scenario 0765 Involves LBLOCA, transition to CL Recirc and local operation of 0SX007

Scenario 0811 Involves failure of both SI8811 valves to open and exercises \_BwCA-1.1, including dispatching operators to "locally" open the valve.

Scenario 0843 Involves LBLOCA and transition to \_BwEP ES-1.3, followed by sump blockage and transition to 1BwCA-1.3

Scenario 0866 Involves containment bypass and exercises \_BwCA-1.1

Scenario 0916 Involves LBLOCA, and transfer to CL Recirc, transfer to HL Recirc

Scenario 0936-2 Involves NSO training on \_BwEP ES-1.3, transfer to CL Recirc with failure of \_SI8812 to close (Timed scenario)

Scenario 0943 Involves Involves LBLOCA, transition to CL Recirc

Scenario 0965 Involves LBLOCA, failure of 1SI8811B, transition to 1BwCA-1.1 and local opening of 1SI8811B

Scenario 0931 OOB Evaluation of DB LBLOCA and failure of 1SI8812 to close. Timed Scenario - ALL crews PASSED

Equipment Operator (EO) training on local valve operation occurs primarily in the generic fundamentals phase, Components chapter 1, which covers the construction and operation of MOVs. Various local valve operations are covered in a sampling of EOP Lesson plans but only general direction is covered.

In summary, the RO/SRO training program addresses the specific scenario in which the 8811A/B valves fail to open remotely as well as other scenarios that require local operation of the other valves. These scenarios, as well as others, are included in both initial qualification exercises and the continuing training program. EOs are trained generically to operate MOVs locally. While there is not a specific lesson plan covering 11/2SI8811A/B local operation, the generic training is applicable to those valves. While this level of training may not be considered to be as high as what is performed for the standard action to initiate cold leg recirculation, it is considered to be adequate to maintain a reasonable level of proficiency in addressing failure of the 1SI8811A/B valves. Addressing the dual indication on 1SI8811A/B is not specifically addressed, but general training covers this particular mode of failure for the valve. Treated as a "nominal training" case.

#### OPERATOR INTERVIEWS AND SIMULATOR OBSERVATIONS:

For cases in which both the open ("O") and the closed ("-") position indicators are simultaneously illuminated for a given valve, operator interviews performed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009 universally demonstrated that it was understood this represented a condition in which the actual position of the valve is unknown and that alternative means would be required to determine the valve's position. What was

also demonstrated in the interviews and during the simulator observations was that interpretation of the valve's status with regard to responding to procedures was considered to be case specific.

For example, ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1 questions whether or not the 1SI8811A valve is closed and the two crews interpreted the dual indication differently; one crew treated it as "closed" and the other as "not closed". In the latter case, when 1SI8811A was considered "not closed" and the RNO action to close 1SI8812A was reached, it was recognized that with 1SI8811A in an undetermined state, closing 1SI8812A would potentially isolate RH pump 1A from all viable suction sources and RH pump 1A was tripped to protect it. If the valve is considered closed, the procedures attempt to manually open the valve from the control room. This path includes a step to trip RH pump 1A when 1SI8812A is closed. If 1SI8811A cannot subsequently be opened, the RH pump is left in the tripped position (same as previous case). Ultimately, either classification of the 1SI8811A valve's status ("closed" or "not closed") would lead to step 7 of Attachment A, where the operators are directed to CA-1.1 and instructed to locally open valve(s) 1SI8811A/B.

While a divergence of opinion appeared to exist on the classification a valve with dual indication in ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1, what was clear was that the indeterminate status of the valve was consistently treated in a conservative manner. ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1 is not directly questioning whether or not the position of the valve can lead to a success or failure of a particular function and as a result, a difference in the classification of the valve's status was noted. However, for the cases where the status for the valve was directly related to whether or not it could fulfill a required function, the valves was not considered to be capable of supporting that function. For example,

- Step 3c of ES-1.3 questions whether or not the containment sump valves (1SI8811A/B) are open with the obvious intent of determining whether or not the RH pumps can draw water from the containment sump. Both crews interpreted the sump valve as not being open given the presence of dual indication on the 1SI8811A/B valve(s).

- In the RNO step of ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1, the 1SI8811A was not considered to be capable of providing an adequate suction source for RH pump 1A even though it was considered not to be closed in ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 1. Consequently, RH pump 1A was tripped before 1SI8812A was closed.

- In ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 3e, 1SI8811A was considered to not be open such that it could not support cold leg recirculation mode.

- In ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 6e, 1SI8811B was considered to not be open such that it could not support cold leg recirculation mode.

- In ES-1.3, Attachment A, step 7, both 1SI8811A and B were considered to not be open such that they could not support cold leg recirculation mode.

- In CA-1.1, step 1c, both 1SI8811A and B were considered to not be open such that they could not support cold leg recirculation mode.

Based on the information obtained from the operator interviews and the simulator observations, the conclusion is that a dual indication condition on 1SI8811A/B will result in the interpretation that the valve cannot necessarily support cold leg recirculation mode and that the procedures will ultimately drive them to CA-1.1 where local action to open the valve will be directed.

All of the above is based on the pre-condition that the operators have no information about the actual position of 1SI8811A/B and that the reactor core is not yet threatened. Simulator runs 1 and 3, which were performed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009, demonstrated that while local operation of the 1SI8811A/B valves offered a potential success path to restore cold leg recirculation, the RH pump would not be started until it was verified that 1SI8811A/B was full open. For simulator runs 2 and 4, which were run on the same days, a local check of the 1SI8811A/B valve(s) position was allowed, but a manual stroke of the valve(s) was prohibited due to high rad levels. These scenarios placed the operators in a situation where the only success path was to run the RH pump with the 1SI8811A/B valves in a partially open condition. Both crews dispatched equipment operators to perform a local assessment of the valve's position and when it became obvious to them that they could not prevent core damage without operating the RH pump(s), they elected to start the pumps. Both crews cited the 50.54x guidance that binds them to protect the core even if clear procedure guidance does not exist to direct them to do so. No credit is taken for operating the RH pumps with the 1SI8811A/B valves in a partially open condition even though plant engineering calculations indicate that such an operation would be successful.

#### SCENARIO DEFINITION

The scenario evaluated for this HFE is a 3" MLOCA event, which is a top contributors in both the Braidwood PRA and the NRC SPAR model. The following provides an additional description of the scenario for which this action is evaluated:

1. Initial Conditions: Steady state, full power operation
2. Initiating Events: 3" Medium LOCA
3. Accident sequence (preceding functional failures and successes):

Reactor trip successful

Turbine trip successful

AFW operates

Level in RCS drops due to 3" MLOCA

ECCS initiated successfully (both divisions available)

2 trains of containment spray are available, 2 divisions of RCFCs running (4 fans).

Transition to cold leg recirculation on low RWST level fails due to failure of 1SI8811B to fully open (valve only opens approximately 34%, which fails to satisfy the interlock with the 8804 valve(s)). Train A fails due to CCF or random equipment failures.

4. Preceding operator error or success in sequence:

Early EP-0 actions to confirm actuations performed.

EP-1 actions to ensure adequate ECCS injection performed.

EP-1 action to depressurize and cooldown not required due to impact of break


Transition to recirculation mode started

Failure of 1SI8811A/B identified.

5. Operator action success criterion: Locally open 1SI8811A/B and establish cold leg recirculation mode prior RCS level reaching TAF.

6. Key Assumptions: 1) Failure of the 1SI8811A/B valve in the intermediate position is assumed to result in the shutdown of RH pump 1A/B due to lack of a positive suction source when the 1SI8812A/B valve(s) are closed. Based on this interpretation of the valve's dual indication, the operators would be procedurally bound to perform a local, manual stroke of the valve before restarting RH pump 1A/B and completing the transition to cold leg recirculation. 2) Exelon calculation EC#377204 indicates that if the 1SI8811B had opened approximately 34 full stroke, adequate flow would have been available to perform swap to recirculation mode without action to locally open 1SI8811B. It should be noted that with the 1SI8811A/B valve in an intermediate position, the interlock with 1CV8804A/1SI8804B would not have cleared, but because RCS pressure would be below the RH pump shutoff head by the time recirculation mode was required, the RH pumps would be able to inject directly through the 1SI8809A/B valves and the interlock's status would be inconsequential. However, no direct credit is taken for operation of the RH pumps with the 1SI8811A/B valves in the intermediate position.

**Timing:**



Timing

g Analysis: While diagnosis contribution for this HFE has been excluded, the timing information related to the diagnosis of the need to transition to recirculation mode is required to establish the time available for local operation of the 1SI8811A/B valves and any applicable recovery factors. The timeline for this action has been constructed based on the successful diagnosis and interpretation of the dual indication on the 1SI8811A/B valves.

The timing for this action is complicated by the fact that a failure occurs in the equipment that is being used to carry out an action that has already been successfully diagnosed. The diagnosis tasks for the action to swap to recirculation mode and to identify the failure of the 1SI8811B valve to fully open during recirculation alignment are sequential and cannot occur during the same period of time. By definition, the diagnosis of the failed 1SI8811A/B valve(s) occurs only after successful diagnosis of the need to swap to recirculation. This is accounted for in the system window, manipulation time, and cue definitions for this action. Because the availability of time for the local operation of 1SI8811A/B is a factor which can directly impact an HEP, it is necessary to define the timeline for the HEP quantification:

For the SPAR-H execution ratio, the following is assumed: Execution Ratio =  $(T_{sw}) - T_{(delay)} - T_{(1/2)} / T_{(m)}$

Where:

T(delay) = time to 46% RWST level (cue to start transition to swap to recirc mode) + time to reach step 3c of ES-1.3 (accounts for completion of the action to begin the swap to recirc). In this case, that time includes the time to reach 46% RWST level and the time required to reach step 3c of ES-1.3. B/B MAAP run BBSDP16a indicates that the time to reach 46.7% RWST level is 2.00 hours, which is the initial cue

to swap to cold leg recirculation mode. Based on simulator runs performed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009, 4 data points were obtained for the time to reach step 3c of ES-1.3: Run 1= 3 minutes, Run 2 = 3 minutes, Run 3 = 2 minutes, Run 4 = 2 minutes. The median time is the average of the two central data points of the even number of trials, or 2.5 minutes  $((2+3)/2=2.5)$ . The time T(delay), therefore, is 2.00 hr + 0.04 hr = 2.04 hr.

T(m): The time required to manually stroke the 8811B valve from 34% open to full open has been determined to be 24 minutes. This time is based on an actual stroke of the valve performed by the Braidwood operators during the week of 11/02/2009. In addition, 7.5 minutes has been added to account for the time required to travel to the valve location. The travel time is based on a walkdown performed by the HRA analyst on 11/11/2009 and accounts for the time to travel from the EO ready room to the MCR to obtain a key for high rad area access (30 seconds travel, 30 seconds assumed to get key), the time to travel to the Auxiliary Building entrance (3 minutes), the time to travel from the Auxiliary Building entrance to valve 1SI8811B (3 minutes), and the time to climb the ladder to reach the handwheel on 1SI8811B (30 seconds). The time required for completing the steps to initiate cold leg recirculation mode is less than 1 minute based on simulator runs observed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009. Once the 1SI8811A/B valve is open, the operators are returned to ES-1.3, Attachment A, Step 7, which directs the operators to check that a train of recirculation has been established. This requires the start of the RH pump corresponding to the 1SI8811 valve that was successfully opened. Start of the RH pump will result in flow from the sump, to the pump, through the Hx, and to the cold leg through valve 1SI8809A/B because the MLOCA has depressurized the RCS below the RH shutoff head. The total manipulation time is, therefore, 32.5 minutes (7.5 minutes of travel time, 24 minutes for valve stroke, 1 minute for the step to complete swap to recirc).

T(sw): The time for RCS level to reach TAF is used as the end of the system window for this action. B/B MAAP run BBDP16a indicates that 6.96 hours are available to reach TAF in a 3" MLOCA scenario from the initiating event.

T(1/2): Based on simulator runs performed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009, 4 data points were obtained for the time to begin the response (command to open valve, not just check the valves status) from the time that step 3c of ES-1.3 was reached. The results of the simulator runs showed the following: Run 1= 8 minutes, Run 2 = 6 minutes, Run 3 = 8 minutes, Run 4 = 2 minutes. Because 2 crews were used to perform 4 simulator runs and the second run for each crew was highly similar to the first, it was expected that some degree of anticipation of the upcoming events would occur. As a result, the T(1/2) estimate for this case is based on the average of runs 1 and 3, the first run of the scenarios for each crew.  $T(1/2) = 8$  minutes  $((8 \text{ min} + 8 \text{ min}) / 2 = 8 \text{ min})$ .

**Time available for recovery:** 254.70 Minutes

**SPAR-H Available time (cognitive):** 262.70 Minutes

SPAR-H Available time (execution) ratio: 8.84

Minimum level of dependence for recovery: ZD

**PART I. DIAGNOSIS**

No Part I

Diagnosis HEP:

0.0e+00

**PART II. ACTION**

PSFs	PSF Levels		Multiplier for Diagnosis
<b>Available Time</b>  (recommended choice based on timing information in bold)	Inadequate Time		P(failure) = 1.0
	Time available is ~ the time required		10
	Nominal time		1
	<b>Time available &gt;= 5x the time required</b>	X	0.1
	Time available >= 50x the time required		0.01
	Insufficient Information		1
	<i>Refer to the timing analysis.</i>		
<b>Stress/Stressors</b>	Extreme	X	5
	High		2
	Nominal		1

	Insufficient Information		1
	<p><i>The scenario to which this action is applied is a 3" LOCA event for which high pressure injection is successful. After injecting for about 2 hours, the RWST low level alarm would be reached. While the LOCA event is a high stress scenario, the successful control of the plant over the 2 cooldown time is considered to significantly reduce the level of stress. At the time the swap to recirculation mode would occur, the work load would be relatively low, the diagnosis of the need to swap to recirculation mode would have been successfully made, and the transition would be proceeding in an orderly manner until the 8811A/B valves are actuated. The failure of the 1S18811A/B valve(s) to stroke would introduce an additional level of stress given that a suction path from the containment sump to the RH pumps is required to maintain the reactor in a stable state. The equipment operators would be required to enter the Auxiliary Building to manually operate the valve, which is potentially a high rad/high temperature area. Exelon calc ECR 392870 indicates that the expected dose rate for a medium LOCA, which would bound the SLOCA case, would be 1,444 mRem/hr. With a potential exposure time of up to 30 minutes, which is greater than the manipulation time for the local action, the accumulated dose would be below the administrative dose limit of 2000 m/Rem established in RP-AA-203. While the accumulated dose would not preclude this action from being performed, "extreme" stress is chosen to account for the difficult working conditions, even though many hours would be available to perform the manipulation before the core would be jeopardized.</i></p>		
<b>Complexity</b>	Highly complex		5
	Moderately complex	X	2
	Nominal		1
	Insufficient Information		1
	<p><i>Manual operation of a valve is a straightforward task with which the operators are familiar through training and similar tasks performed as part of normal plant operations, but the physical requirements of opening the valve are potentially challenging. In order to manually stroke the valve, it is necessary to stand on top of the valve's enclosure in a semi confined area and turn a handwheel that is located at face level. Elevated temperatures in the area during a LOCA evolution could contribute to some discomfort during the operation, but it is not expected to be prohibitive in any way for the 3" MLOCA scenario. The valve area is well lit and the open stem design provides a clear indication of the valve's position. With regard to valve identification, the valve is tagged with a label that is easy to read, but more importantly, it is highly unique and could not</i></p>		


	<p><i>be mistaken for any other valve in the area. The "A" and "B" 1SI8811 valves are on the same elevation, but they are separated by at least 30 yards and are accessed by turning different directions upon entry into the curved wall area. While the action itself is a straightforward manipulation on a highly unique valve, the action is considered to be "moderately complex" due to the position the equipment operator must be in to perform the valve stroke and the length of time that is required to complete the stroke (24 minutes from 34%). Once the valve is open, the remainder of the task is a highly trained action and is not considered to significantly contribute to difficulty of the action.</i></p>		
<b>Experience/Training</b>	Low		3
	Nominal	X	1
	High		0.5
	Insufficient Information		1
	<p><i>Refer to the "Experience/Training" portion of the "Basic Event Context" discussion.</i></p>		
<b>Procedures</b>	Not available		50
	Incomplete		20
	Available, but poor		5
	Nominal	X	1
	Insufficient Information		1
	<p><i>Step 1c RNO of CA-1.1 directs local operation of 1SI8811A/B to be performed once it has been determined that it cannot be opened remotely. No additional procedures are required for a valve manipulation. Assessed as "nominal".</i></p>		
<b>Ergonomics/HMI</b>	Missing/Misleading		50
	Poor	X	10
	Nominal		1
	Good		0.5
	Insufficient Information		1
	<p><i>As identified in the "complexity" discussion for the execution task, the valve is highly unique such that mistaking it for another valve is a negligible concern, but the position the operator has to be in to stroke the valve is challenging. The footing is narrow (about 2.5</i></p>		

	<p><i>feet), semi-confined, and the handwheel is at face level, which makes operation slow and difficult relative to a floor mounted valve with the handwheel at waist level. During an accident, the area may be at elevated temperature and radiation levels. While these factors may be a cause for some discomfort and stress, they are not expected to be prohibitive or even a large concern for 3" MLOCA scenarios. Overall, this is considered to be an example of relatively "poor" human-machine interface conditions.</i></p>		
<b>Fitness for Duty</b>	Unfit		P(failure) = 1.0
	Degraded Fitness		5
	Nominal	X	1
	Insufficient Information		1
	<p><i>No fitness for duty issues have been identified. The nominal case is used.</i></p>		
<b>Work Processes</b>	Poor		5
	Nominal	X	1
	Good		0.5
	Insufficient Information		0.5
	<p><i>For emergency situations, operator interviews performed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009 indicate that there would be no requirement to "dress-out" before entering the Auxiliary Building to perform the manual valve stroke, which is well known to the operators. With regard to access to the Auxiliary Building (high rad area), the equipment operators would be required to obtain a key from the MCR for entry. This is not an unusual situation and given the proximity of the equipment operator ready room to the MCR, it does not significantly impact the manipulation time for valve operation. Radio communication would be available between the MCR and the equipment operator. No work process issues have been identified that would impact the performance of the manual stroke of 1SI8811A/B.</i></p>		

**Action Probability:**

9.9e-03 [Adjustment applied:  $1.0E-3 * 1.0e+01 / (1.0E-3 * (1.0e+01 - 1) + 1)$ ]

PART III. DEPENDENCY



**Task Failure WITHOUT Formal Dependence:**

9.9e-03

**Task Failure WITH Formal Dependence:**

9.9e-03

RM DOCUMENTATION NO. BW-SDP-003 Appendix A REV: 2 PAGE NO. A93 of A93

STATION: Braidwood

UNIT(S) AFFECTED: UNIT 1

TITLE: Braidwood Phase 3 SDP Evaluation of Failure of 1SI8811B to Fully Open  
Appendix A – Human Reliability Analysis

SUMMARY (Include UREs incorporated):

This Appendix documents the human reliability analysis performed to evaluate the operator actions required to establish cold leg recirculation given failure of the 1/2SI8811A/B valve(s) to fully stroke.

Number of pages: Total 93 pages, including this page.

RM Document Level: Category 2, per ER-AA-600-1012

Review required after periodic Update

Internal RM Documentation

External RM Documentation

Electronic Calculation Data Files: (EPRI HRA Calculator, Version 4.0, bwd-8811-121809.HRA/1,636kb/12/18/2009/09:36)

See Section 5 for Data Files

Method of Review:  Detailed  Alternate  Review of External Document

This RM documentation supersedes: N/A in its entirety.

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	Print	Sign	Date

**BRAIDWOOD  
PRA APPLICATION NOTEBOOK**

**BW-SDP-003**

**APPENDIX B  
REVISION 2**

**MAAP4 THERMAL HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS TO  
SUPPORT TIMING FOR LOCALLY OPENING  
1SI8811B**

**DECEMBER 2009**

**REVISION SUMMARY SHEET**

<b>Revision</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Summary</b>
0	9/2009	Original Issue
1	11/2009	Updated results to include simulator observations and comparison
2	12/2009	Updated results to include RWST flow diversion sensitivities and uncertainty analysis.

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## **1.0 PURPOSE & SCOPE**

The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the plant thermal hydraulic response and the timing of key events following small and medium LOCAs with AFW available and transients with concurrent loss of AFW. Four sets of accident sequences were simulated with MAAP4.0.6 and the corresponding Byron/Braidwood MAAP4 parameter file: containment spray sensitivity cases, RWST depletion analysis and 2 sets of uncertainty analyses. The accident sequence initiators are a small LOCA, a medium LOCA, and a transient with different configurations of ECCS, containment cooling and AFW availability. This assessment determines RWST depletion timings and other important key timings which are inputs to the human reliability analysis for this SDP and evaluates alternative success paths such as low pressure recirculation for LOCAs where RCS cooldown is successful.

## **2.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA**

### **2.1 PURPOSE OF USING DETERMINISTIC ANALYSIS**

The assessment of plant response under postulated severe accident scenarios is a complex integrated evaluation. The primary system and containment responses are sensitive to the calculated pressures, temperatures, flows, and event timings. These parameters also affect the operator action timings, the radionuclide release timings, and the mitigating system performance assessments. Therefore, the proper plant-specific characterization of the severe accident progression is important to the realistic representation of the plant and highly desirable for the PRA assessment. These deterministic calculations provide the following information:

- The time for core coolant boiloff;
  - The time for core damage and RPV breach;
  - The pressures and temperatures for various accident scenarios in the pressurizer, steam generator, and containment;
  - The times to reach these pressures and temperatures which are key to the assessment of potential success paths and recovery actions.
-

## **2.2 DESCRIPTION OF MAAP**

The Modular Accident Analysis Program (MAAP), an integral systems analysis computer code for assessing severe accidents, was initially developed during the Industry Degraded Core Rule-Making (IDCOR) Program. At the completion of IDCOR, ownership of MAAP was transferred to EPRI. Subsequently, the code evolved into a major analytical tool (MAAP 3.0B) for supporting the plant specific Individual Plant Examinations (IPEs) requested by NRC Generic Letter 88-20. Furthermore, MAAP 3.0B was used as the basis to model the Ontario Hydro CANDU designs. As the attention of plant-specific analyses was expanded to include accident management evaluations, the scope of MAAP (its design basis) was expanded to include the necessary models for accident management assessments. Through support by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the MAAP4 design basis was further extended to include the Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) designs currently being developed by the reactor vendors. MAAP4 has also been expanded to represent the VVER designs used in Finland and central Europe.

MAAP is a computer code that simulates light water reactor system response to accident initiation events. The code is currently the primary tool used by all US utilities to support their PRA analysis needs. MAAP4 is currently being maintained by EPRI with a users group that represents over 50 organizations. In addition, there have been substantial interactions with the NRC to familiarize them with MAAP, its capabilities and limitations, in order to minimize any questions relating to the use of the code for future applications.

Again, the purpose of MAAP4 is to provide an accident analysis code that can be used with confidence by the nuclear industry in all phases of severe accident studies, including accident management, for current reactor/containment designs and for ALWRs. MAAP4 includes models for the important accident phenomena that might occur within the primary system, in the containment, and/or in the auxiliary/reactor building. For a specified reactor and containment system, MAAP4 calculates the progression of the postulated accident sequence, including the disposition of the fission

---

products, from a set of initiating events to either a safe, stable state or to an impaired containment condition (by overpressure or over temperature) and the possible release of fission products to the environment.

### **2.3 PWR PRIMARY SYSTEM THERMAL HYDRAULICS**

The PWR primary system model calculates the thermal hydraulic conditions in the reactor pressure vessel, the hot legs, the cold legs and the primary side of the steam generators. (The pressurizer is treated in a separate model.) The primary system is divided into two loops, the "broken" loop and the "unbroken" loop. The user specifies how many actual loops are in each loop in the model, and which loop contains the surge line to the pressurizer. (The terms "broken" and "unbroken" are misnomers in that breaks can be modeled in either or both of the loops; they are carryovers from earlier, more restrictive versions of the code.)

There are sixteen gas nodes in the model: the core, upper plenum, broken and unbroken hot legs, broken and unbroken hot and cold leg tubes for U-tube steam generators, broken and unbroken candy cane and tubes for once-through steam generators (OTSGs), broken and unbroken cross-over (intermediate) legs, broken and unbroken cold legs, downcomer and reactor dome. There are six water pools: the core, broken and unbroken cold leg tubes, broken and unbroken cross-over legs and downcomer. In addition, there are nineteen primary system structural heat sinks, which are modeled as two-dimensional slabs. Because the number of gas volumes is larger than the number of water pools, a pool can occupy several gas volumes.

When steam first forms in the reactor coolant loops during a MAAP4 calculation, the two phases are assumed to be homogeneously mixed. If the main (reactor) coolant pumps are operating, water flow rates between the primary system pools are adjusted so that the individual void fractions match the system average void fraction, and energy is transferred between the pools so that the water and gas are all at a uniform temperature and pressure. The same treatment is used if the internal gas velocities are sufficiently

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high to cause water entrainment, as occurs during the early phase of a large break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA).

Once the pumps have stopped running and the void fraction is less than a user-specified criterion for phase separation, the same well-mixed treatment is used to model natural circulation in a simple manner. Because the PWR thermal-hydraulic model does not explicitly account for the conservation of momentum, which would require a substantially more complex model, it does not calculate natural circulation flow rates. Hence, during this phase the heat transfer from the primary system to the steam generators is based on a user-supplied heat transfer coefficient.

When the void fraction exceeds the user-specified criterion for phase separation, the gas and water pools are no longer assumed to be intimately mixed, and are treated separately in a gas-over-water configuration. For these conditions the gas in each node can have a unique temperature, distinct from the pool temperature. When the water level is above the elevation of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) inlet and outlet nozzles, it is assumed that there is enough water in the primary system to permit free communication between the core, intermediate leg and downcomer pools, with a common collapsed water level. As the water level continues to drop, the pools are uncoupled and water spills from one pool to another.

The thermal-hydraulic model calculates water transport, gas transport, steaming, and heat transfer to the structures that interface with the secondary side and the containment. Condensation is modeled in certain circumstances: steam can condense on cold emergency core cooling system (ECCS) water injected into the cold leg and onto the inside surface of steam generator tubes if the secondary side still contains water. Once the accident progresses to core uncover, the level of detail in the calculations increases, and the modeling includes such phenomena as natural circulation of superheated gases in the vessel and in the hot leg (counter-current flow).

At each time step, the code calculates the influx of water through makeup flow, accumulator flow, and high pressure, low pressure and charging pump injection

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systems, as appropriate. It also calculates water and gas flow from the primary system through breaks, steam generator tube ruptures (SGTRs) and other user-specified openings, as well as fluid transport between the primary system and the pressurizer via the surge line.

## **2.4 PWR PRESSURIZER THERMAL HYDRAULICS**

The pressurizer is modeled as a single control volume, with one water pool and one gas node. The water and gas can be at different temperatures (which are also distinct from the primary system fluid temperatures). Calculations of the thermal-hydraulic conditions in the pressurizer account for evaporation, condensation, steam stripping due to steam and non-condensable gases sparging through the water pool, and water and gas exchange with the primary system via the surge line and with the containment through relief valves and safety valves. Mass and energy contributions from pressurizer sprays and heaters, and heat transfer to structures are also included.

## **2.5 CORE**

The core model predicts the thermal-hydraulic behavior of the core and the water and gas contained within the core boundary and the response of core components during all phases of a sequence. The calculations are performed on a nodal basis. Users can specify up to fifty axial rows and seven radial rings (channels); typically thirteen to thirty-three axial rows (ten to thirty for the active core, two below the active core for the core support plate and the lower tie plate and lower gas plenum, and one above the active core for the upper tie plate and upper gas plenum) and five to seven radial rings provide adequate resolution.

The code tracks the mass, energy and temperature of the following constituents in each node:

- Fuel (UO<sub>2</sub>)
  - Cladding (Zr, ZrO<sub>2</sub>, stainless steel, steel oxide)
  - Fuel canister (Zr, ZrO<sub>2</sub>)
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- Control blade (B4C, stainless steel, steel oxide)
- Control rod or water rod (Ag-In-Cd or B4C, stainless steel, steel oxide, Zr, ZrO<sub>2</sub>)
- Structural materials (Zr, ZrO<sub>2</sub>, stainless steel, steel oxide)

Input quantities include the initial masses of the different materials, the geometry of the constituents, and axial and radial peaking factors.

The initial core power is specified by the user. Decay power is determined from the ANSI/ANS decay heat correlation [1].

Consistent with the models in the rest of the primary system, a single temperature is calculated for the entire water pool contained in the core, but individual gas temperatures and steam and hydrogen fractions are calculated for each core node. Auxiliary calculations are used to estimate the elevation where the coolant reaches saturation.

The dominant intra-nodal heat transfer processes between the fuel, cladding, fuel canisters, control blades, control or water rods, structural materials and coolant are calculated. The code also calculates conduction and convection heat transfer between nodes (axially and radially), radial thermal radiation between neighboring nodes and radiation to vessel internal structures.

In addition to calculating water flow into the bottom of the core from the lower plenum and water and steam out of the top of the core, the code models upper head injection systems.

MAAP4 contains a diverse and detailed set of models for calculating the oxidation of core constituents and their melting and subsequent transport. Detailed information about these models can be found in the MAAP4 User's Manual [2].

## **2.6 CONTAINMENT AND REACTOR / AUXILIARY BUILDING**

The same model is used for the containment and the reactor/auxiliary building. It is a generalized node and junction model. The user can specify a maximum of 40

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compartment nodes, 200 distributed heat sinks, 200 lumped heat sinks and 200 flow junctions. Five different types of flow junctions can be defined:

- A normally open flow path
- A normally closed flow path designed to fail open on a pressure differential
- A flow path that simulates a vacuum breaker or a check valve
- A loop seal flow path
- A normally closed flow path designed to fail when core debris in the containment erodes the concrete more than a specified distance

Starting with the masses and energies of gas constituents and water in each compartment, the code calculates thermodynamic properties. It then computes gas and water flows between the compartments, heat transfer to internal and boundary heat sinks, condensation and evaporation, and other phenomena using semi-implicit methods to account for inter-dependencies in a stable fashion. An optional subnodal physics model can be employed to account for stratification due to non-homogeneous gas properties within a compartment and for buoyant plume dispersion between compartments. An unusual feature of the flow calculations is that they account not only for unidirectional natural circulation of gas and water, but also for counter-current flow of gas and water through large junctions.

Containment engineered safeguards systems are modeled, including sprays, gas coolers, water heat exchangers, and hydrogen igniters and recombiners. Normally closed flow paths are used to represent containment vulnerabilities, which can then fail open based on user-defined criteria. Leakage in or out of the containment is modeled with normally open flow paths.

## **2.7 FISSION PRODUCTS**

MAAP4 contains models that calculate the release of fission products from the core and relocated core material in-vessel, and from core debris ex-vessel. It also calculates the transport and deposition of fission products in the primary system and in the containment, and the release of fission products to the reactor/auxiliary building and the

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environment through containment leakage and failure paths. The code sorts the initial masses of twenty-two fission product elements into thirteen groups and then tracks the mass of each group in each of four physical states (vapor, aerosol, deposited on surfaces and contained in corium) in the various components of the primary system and containment. It also calculates the decay energy generated by each group in each location. The fission product models are only applicable to Level 2 PRA calculations, so they are not discussed further here. Detailed information about these models can be found in the MAAP4 User's Manual [2].

## **2.8 COMPUTATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DESIGN PHILOSOPHY**

The MAAP4 code is written primarily in Fortran, and can be run on a variety of computer platforms, most commonly PCs. The format of the input and output files is tailored to plant engineers. Users can control phenomena through flags and uncertainty parameters. The calculations are done in SI units; users have the option of specifying that the input and/or output quantities be in either SI or British units.

The code is modular, consisting of several hundred subroutines and functions which fall into four categories. The high level routines include the main program, input and output routines, data storage and retrieval routines and numerical integration routines. The system and region routines set the flags that define the status of the various systems and contain the differential equations for the conservation of the state variables, principally the masses and energies of the constituents in the individual volumes. The phenomenological routines contain the equations for determining the rates-of-change of the state variables within and between the individual volumes; these routines are the core of the code. The property and utility routines generate physical properties and perform mathematical operations. There is an overlying parallel structure between the thermal-hydraulic routines and the fission product routines in the code architecture.

The equations in MAAP4 are essentially lumped parameter, non-linear, ordinary differential equations in time. The overall calculation scheme proceeds as follows. First, quantities such as pressure and temperature are calculated given the current values of

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the state variables (e.g., masses and internal energies). Next, the rates-of-change of the state variables are determined by summing the contributions of each modeled phenomenon. Then, new values of the state variables are obtained by integrating their rates-of-change using a prospective time step. Finally, the fractional changes of key state variables are assessed; if any exceed input criteria the time step is reduced and the rates-of-change and integration calculations are repeated. The last step is performed because some rates-of-change, e.g., those that are based on assumed quasi-steady behavior, depend explicitly on the time step.

The models in MAAP4 have been designed so that the code is fast running. This is a hallmark of MAAP. The primary means of achieving this objective are the use of quasi-steady modeling wherever appropriate, relatively coarse nodalization, and the largest possible time step consistent with the level of detail desired. Smaller values of the time step are used when key quantities are rapidly changing and larger values are used when conditions are relatively stable. The code also uses smaller time steps in some of the localized primary system thermal-hydraulic calculations, eliminating the need for the bulk of the calculations to be run with the smaller time steps. Other features that contribute to the code's speed are the use of tabularized results and correlations from other computations rather than the incorporation of specific detailed calculations, and non-uniform levels of nodalization that reflect the magnitudes of the potential gradients. The result is that the code execution time is generally several orders of magnitude faster than problem time on a typical PC, and considerably faster than most comparable codes.

In conjunction with designing the code so that it is fast running, the level of detail in the models is commensurate with the level of precision required for anticipated PRA applications. Furthermore, a central feature of the code's design philosophy is that the level of detail in the models tends to increase as conditions in the plant become more severe. To balance these characteristics, many of the key models incorporate input parameters that allow users to investigate the sensitivity of the results to variations in the calculations as a way of evaluating the potential impact on the results if more complex, detailed models had been used. Examples of such parameters are the void

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fraction above which the phases separate in the PWR primary system (discussed above), and a flag that indicates whether or not steam and water flows from the primary system to the containment are assumed to be intimately mixed. The bulk of the parameters that are used for uncertainty and sensitivity studies are in the Model and Control sections of the parameter file.

## **2.9 MAAP4 DOCUMENTATION**

The MAAP4 code is documented in the MAAP4 User's Manual [2], the Users Guide's (i.e., the six sample parameter files) and the MAAP 4.0.6 Transmittal Document [3].

The User's Manual contains detailed information on how to prepare input files and execute the code, and detailed descriptions of the models in the code, including descriptions of the individual subroutines and functions. It is currently distributed in hardcopy form, and is undergoing a transition into electronic form. Components of the manual are updated in conjunction with updates to the code. The manual is divided into four volumes:

### **Volume I User Guidance**

- Code installation and operation
- Input and output files

### **Volume II Code Structure and Theory**

- Summary of models
- Subroutine and function descriptions

### **Volume III Benchmarking**

- Key benchmarks
- Plant benchmarks
- Integral experiment benchmarks
- Separate effects benchmarks

### **Volume IV Optional Features**

- MAAP4-GRAAPH graphical interface
-

- MAAP4-DOSE code for radiological calculations

The User's Guides contain detailed descriptions and default values and ranges of the input parameters included in the parameter file. The guides are essentially sample parameter files, and can be used as templates for plant-specific parameter files. They are distributed electronically.

A transmittal document accompanies each revision of the code. It contains information on code installation and execution, summaries of the changes made to the code since the previous revision, and discussions of the impact of the changes on the code results. It is distributed electronically. The current version of the code is MAAP 4.0.6.

The source code is an additional documentation resource. It is available electronically on an as-needed basis.

## **2.10 CODE VALIDATION**

As mentioned above, MAAP was developed as part of the IDCOR Program. The purpose of MAAP is to simulate the behavior of a light water reactor to a wide range of accident conditions. Initial applications of the code were focused on modeling severe accident progression in support of the Individual Plant Examinations (IPE). Later, MAAP has been used to assess Level 1 PRA success criteria and general accident timing.

In 1992, EPRI completed the MAAP Thermal Hydraulic Qualification and Application project (TR-100741). This effort identified the accident sequences of interest, important thermal-hydraulic phenomena, and the MAAP parameters which control these phenomena.

Data from separate effects tests, integral effects tests, actual plant data, and plant predictions by other codes were all compared against MAAP. This project then used the insights from the benchmark activity to provide utilities with application guidelines for using MAAP.

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The following comparisons were included in the evaluation:

#### PWR Data Predictions

- Westinghouse 4-loop, LOOP
- Westinghouse 4-loop, reactor trip

#### Code Comparisons

- PWR-RETRAN
  - Westinghouse 4-loop, loss of feedwater
  - Westinghouse 4-loop, failed PORV
  - Westinghouse 4-loop, SGTR
  - Westinghouse 4-loop, SGTR with stuck secondary PORV
  - Westinghouse 4-loop, reactor trip
  - Westinghouse 4-loop, steam line break
- PWR-RELAP
  - Westinghouse 4-loop, small LOCA
  - Westinghouse 4-loop, small LOCA with loss of injection
- BWR-SAFE
  - BWR/4, Stuck open relief valve w/o injection
  - BWR/4, Stuck open relief valve with injection
  - BWR/4, Loss of feedwater with injection

#### Integral Test Predictions

- PWR - Semiscale
  - 0.5%, 2.1% and 5% small break LOCAs
  - 5% small LOCA
  - SBO w and w/o stuck open PORV
  - SGTR (several cases)
- BWR - Full Scale Integral Simulation Test (FIST)
  - Intermediate break LOCA w injection
  - Failure to maintain level w/o injection at decay power
  - Failure to maintain level w/o power shutdown

#### Separate Effect Test Predictions

- GE Vessel Blowdown Experiment
  - EPRI PWR Safety Valve tests
-

Close agreement was obtained for the variety of comparisons. The study resulted in several enhancements to MAAP and the development of application guidelines to assist the users of the code.

The Applications Guidelines:

- Allow users to determine if MAAP is appropriate for sequence under consideration
- Identify initiating events and accident scenarios
- Describe relevant MAAP models
- Provide guidance on setting up the calculation, sensitivity analysis, and interpretation of results
- Identify limitations

The development of MAAP has also included other benchmarks to validate the phenomenological models. The current MAAP Users Manual includes the following comparisons:

- Hydrogen mixing experiments at HDR reactor in Germany
- CORA test facility at Karlsruhe, Germany
- TMI-2
- 1985 Davis-Besse Loss of main and auxiliary feedwater
- 1979 Oyster Creek trip with loss of feedwater
- 1979 Prairie Island Unit 1 SGTR
- Hydrogen mixing experiments at the Hanford Containment Systems Test Facility (CSTF)
- Direct Containment Heating Integral Effects Tests (IET) in the Containment Technology Test Facility
- Pacific Northwest Laboratory Ice Condenser Aerosol Tests
- Waltz Mill Test Facility

## **2.11 CODE LIMITATIONS**

The overall conclusion from the EPRI MAAP Thermal-Hydraulic Qualification Studies was that MAAP had a wide range of applicability; however, a few limitations were identified. In many instances, code limitations can be addressed with proper sensitivity analysis to assure that the results are insensitive to any modeling deficiencies. The

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current position on MAAP code limitations can be found on the secure MAAP4 web site. That list of code limitations has been provided in Table 2-1.

Relative to Braidwood, this means that the minimum systems required to mitigate a large break LOCA should be based on a source other than MAAP. In this case, plant design basis analysis forms the basis for that success criteria.

The MAAP4 Applications Guidance Document to be released later in 2009 will include a more detailed description of code limitations and methods to address them.

**TABLE 2-1  
USE OF MAAP TO REPRESENT LEVEL 1 SUCCESS CRITERIA FOR THE CORE**

ACCIDENT DEFINITION	COMMENT
Double Ended Guillotine Cold Leg Break	Since the accident causes the flow to reverse initially, do not use MAAP until reflow is complete. Use DBA codes during this interval. After reflow MAAP will track the accident sequences.
Double Ended Hot Leg Rupture	Flow in the core does not reverse and MAAP can be used.
Large Break Cold Leg LOCA but Less Than a DECL Break (Leak-Before-Break)	If the flow within the core is not reversed, MAAP will calculate the appropriate heat up and potential shutdown of the nuclear reaction; benchmark with LOFT FP-2 demonstrates the code capabilities.
Medium LOCA	Since the flow does not reverse within the core, MAAP can be used for such success criteria.
Small Break LOCA	MAAP treats the behavior under small break LOCAs quite well. This is evidenced by the successful benchmark with the TMI-2 accident behavior. Also, the MAAP model has been successfully benchmarked with the Prairie Island steam generator tube rupture.
Loss of Heat Sink Accidents	MAAP represents the behavior of the core under these conditions quite well. This is best evidenced by the benchmarks with the Davis-Besse Loss-of-feedwater event (PWR) and the Oyster Creek loss-of-feedwater event (BWR).
Main Steam Line Break	This is a rare initiating event for severe core damage, but the MAAP model has been benchmarked with the Westinghouse MB-2 experiments for steam generator response to loss-of-feedwater, MSLB, etc.

### 3.0 METHODOLOGY

An analysis was performed with MAAP4.0.6 using the existing Byron/Braidwood parameter file [4, 5]. This version of the code and the plant parameter file are currently used to support the Byron and Braidwood PRA. Multiple cases were performed to investigate containment spray initiation and timing (Section 3.1). These were followed by a set of cases to determine RWST depletion timing for specific LOCA and bleed and feed scenarios (Section 3.2). A third and fourth set of cases were performed to determine uncertainty with respect to modeling input (Section 3.3 and 3.4). References for the case definitions are defined in Attachment 1.

### 3.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SENSITIVITY

Containment spray sensitivities were performed to determine initiation times and maximum containment pressures for varying sized breaks with 0, 1 and 2 trains of RCFCs. Table 4-1 includes LOCA sizes and RCFCs configurations for cases BBSDP08 thru BBSDP14b. Information is reported for spray initiation and maximum containment pressure for each case.

The features of the containment spray cases are as follows:

- LOCA initiated at time = 0
- RCPs tripped on RCS pressure < 1425 psig
- Containment spray initiated @ 20 psig containment pressure
- 2 CS pumps available and secured below 9% RWST level
- 0, 1 or 2 RCFC Trains available
- No containment leakage modeled
- 2 RH, 2 SI and 2 CV available
- Cooldown of 100° F initiated @ 45 minutes

### 3.2 RWST DEPLETION SENSITIVITY

After feedback from observations of the simulator runs at Braidwood and review of the Refueling Water Storage Tank Setpoints calculation [8] it was determined that the affects of flow diversion through the 8812 valves should be explicitly accounted for in the scenario timelines. The Braidwood design is such that the RWST water can be diverted to the containment ECCS sump commencing when 8811 valves are opened on low RWST level (level < 46.7%) and until the 8812 valves are closed. The diversion rate is a function of a variety of factors including ECCS pump flows and containment pressure. Such diversion can occur even with 8811 valves partially open. The flow diversion rates from the RWST to the sump were developed separately [9] and incorporated into the MAAP thermal hydraulic analyses for the LOCA and bleed and feed cases. The RWST flow diversion calculation determined sump flows through the 8812 valves for a period of 6 minutes following the RWST reaching a level of 46.7%

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with ECCS injecting. RWST depletion results were compiled for varying sized LOCAs and the bleed and feed case.

Initial cases were run with MAAP4 to determine the time to 46.7% RWST level without flow diversion. That timing was used as the 46.7% timing for each subsequent case. The flow diversion from the PIPE-FLO analysis [9] was added to the subsequent cases by reducing the initial RWST inventory to simulate additional inventory loss past 46.7%. The cases that were performed to simulate closing the 8812 valves terminated the flow diversion at 7 minutes after reaching an RWST level of 46.7%.

The features of the RWST depletion cases are as follows. Results are presented in Table 4-2.

#### **Medium 5.2" LOCA - BBSDP15a**

- Medium 5.2" LOCA (0.148 ft<sup>2</sup>) located in the hot leg
- Initial RWST inventory = 400500 gal (Tech Spec Minimum)
- RWST flow diversion of 5236.5 gpm for 7 min after RWST reaches 46.7%
- Cooldown of 100°F per hour initiated @ 45 minutes
- RCPs tripped on RCS pressure < 1425 psig
- 3 Accumulators available
- 2 RH, 2 SI and 2 CV available
- RHR available for injection below shutoff head (~190 psia) and secured 7 minutes after RWST reaches 46.7%
- 2 CS pumps available and secured below 9% RWST level
- All ECCS secured below 9% RWST level
- AFW modeled with 1 train (2 trains not needed)
- 2 RCFC trains (4 fan coolers) available

#### **Small 2" LOCA - BBSDP17a**

- Small 2" LOCA (0.022 ft<sup>2</sup>) located in the hot leg
  - Initial RWST inventory = 400500 gal (Tech Spec Minimum)
  - RWST flow diversion of 11891 gpm for 7 min after RWST reaches 46.7% (PIPE-FLO analysis for 2" break assumed RH operation).
-

Since this results in a smaller flow diversion, the larger flow diversion for a 0.86" break was conservatively used.)

- Cooldown of 100°F per hour initiated @ 45 minutes
- RCPs tripped on RCS pressure < 1425 psig
- No Accumulators available
- 2 RH, 2 SI and 2 CV available
- RHR available for injection below shutoff head (~190 psia) and secured 7 minutes after RWST reaches 46.7%
- 2 CS pumps available and secured below 9% RWST level
- All ECCS secured below 9% RWST level
- AFW modeled with 1 train (2 trains not needed)
- 2 RCFC trains (4 fan coolers) available

#### **Medium 3" LOCA - BBSDP16a**

- Medium 3" LOCA (0.049 ft<sup>2</sup>) located in the hot leg
- Initial RWST inventory = 400500 gal (Tech Spec Minimum)
- RWST flow diversion of 7310 gpm for 7 min after RWST reaches 46.7% (PIPE-FLO results were not generated for a 3" break, the 2" break flow diversion was conservatively assumed.)
- Cooldown of 100°F per hour initiated @ 45 minutes
- RCPs tripped on RCS pressure < 1425 psig
- No Accumulators available
- 2 RH, 2 SI and 2 CV available
- RHR available for injection below shutoff head (~190 psia) and secured 7 minutes after RWST reaches 46.7%
- 2 CS pumps available and secured below 9% RWST level
- All ECCS secured below 9% RWST level
- AFW modeled with 1 train (2 trains not needed)
- 2 RCFC trains (4 fan coolers) available

#### **Small 0.86" LOCA - BBSDP18a**

- Small 0.86" LOCA (0.004 ft<sup>2</sup>) located in the hot leg
  - Initial RWST inventory = 400500 gal (Tech Spec Minimum)
-

- RWST flow diversion of 11891 gpm for 7 min after RWST reaches 46.7%
- Cooldown of 100°F per hour initiated @ 45 minutes
- RCPs tripped on RCS pressure < 1425 psig
- No Accumulators available
- 2 RH, 2 SI and 2 CV available
- RHR available for injection below shutoff head (~190 psia) and secured 7 minutes after RWST reaches 46.7%
- 2 CS pumps available and secured below 9% RWST level
- All ECCS secured below 9% RWST level
- AFW modeled with 1 train (2 trains not needed)
- 2 RCFC trains (4 fan coolers) available

#### **Bleed & Feed - BBSDP25a**

- Bleed and Feed, 1 Porv & 1 Reactor Head Vent (secured @ 9% RWST Level)
  - Initial RWST inventory = 400500 gal (Tech Spec Minimum)
  - RWST flow diversion of 11891 gpm for 7 min after RWST reaches 46.7% (Since PIPE-FLO results were generated for bleed and feed with a combined 2" LOCA, the flow diversion for the 0.86" case was conservatively assumed for the bleed and feed case.)
  - RCPs tripped on RCS pressure < 1425 psig
  - No Accumulators available
  - 1 SI and 1 CV available
  - RHR available for injection below shutoff head (~190 psia) and secured 7 minutes after RWST reaches 46.7%
  - 2 CS pumps available and secured below 9% RWST level
  - All ECCS secured below 9% RWST level
  - No AFW available
  - 1 RCFC train (2 fan coolers) available
-

### 3.3 5.2" LOCA RWST DEPLETION UNCERTAINTY SENSITIVITIES

Multiple cases were developed to determine the sensitivity of the timing results to the uncertainty of the MAAP input. Sensitivities identified in previous MAAP4 benchmark studies included changes to the break flow, primary system void fraction, steam generator natural circulation heat transfer coefficient, and the break location. Results are presented in Table 4-3.

The changes and basis for each sensitivity case are as follows:

#### **BBSDP15a**

See Section 3.2 for base case description

#### **BBSDP15a1 - Break Size Sensitivity**

Same as **BBSDP15a** except:

- 10% increase in LOCA break size

From Reference 6: Section 2.3.2 Sensitivity Study Results for "Variation in Break Area". The investigation to critical flow uncertainty recommends a change to break flow area of 10%.

#### **BBSDP15a2 - Primary System Void Fraction Sensitivity**

Same as **BBSDP15a** except:

- VFSEP = 0.6 (base case = 0.5)

VFSEP is the void fraction in the primary system above which the two-phase mixture characteristics no longer lead to the carrying of water over the highest point in the reactor coolant system. Typically this is the top of the steam generators for the inverted U-tube designs and the top of the hot legs for the B&W designs. As a result, the phases separate to a large degree. Two-phase natural circulation can still continue but in a different manner, e.g., countercurrent reflux cooling between the steam generators and the core. This parameter influences the time at which the core is uncovered. It also affects the void fraction of the break flow for primary system LOCA sequences. In addition, the heat transfer to the secondary side is somewhat influenced by this parameter. Values between 0.4 and 0.6 are typical

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of the Flecht-Seaset tests (EPRI Report NP-3497 - Flecht-Seaset experiment).

From Reference 7: The sensitivity of the primary system response to the value of VFSEP should be evaluated routinely, as suggested in Section 4 (Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis) of this document. And from Reference 1 (parameter file guidance): Adjust for sequences and sensitivity in conjunction with VFSEP for Level 1 and Level 2 sequences.

Values for the parameter were verified from 0.4 to 0.6 and the 0.6 resulted in the greatest RWST deletion times.

### **BBSDP15a3 - Steam Generator Natural Circulation Heat Transfer Coefficient Sensitivity**

Same as **BBSDP15** except:

- HTSTAG adjusted to 500 W/M\*\*2-C (base case = 850.0 W/M\*\*2-C)

HTSTAG is the natural circulation (reactor coolant pumps off) steam generator primary side heat transfer coefficient when single- or two-phase natural circulation is occurring in the coolant loops. Note that the coolant velocity and void fraction distribution are not computed under these conditions.

From Reference 4 (parameter file guidance): It is suggested that users assess the sensitivity of the results to the value of HTSTAG for Level 1 sequences, using values between 425 and 2500 W/m\*\*2-C. It has the potential to have a limited affect on heat transfer to the steam generator.

The lower end of the applicable range was selected to minimize secondary side heat transfer and maximize ECCS demand resulting in a more rapid RWST depletion.

### **BBSDP15a4 - Break Location Sensitivity**

Same as **BBSDP15a** except:

- Changed break location from hot leg to cold leg
-

### 3.4 2" LOCA RWST DEPLETION UNCERTAINTY SENSITIVITIES

Multiple cases were developed to determine the sensitivity of the timing results to the uncertainty of the MAAP input. Sensitivities included changes to the break flow, primary system void fraction, steam generator natural circulation heat transfer coefficient, and the break location. Results are presented in Table 4-4.

The changes and basis for each sensitivity case are as follows:

#### **BBSDP17a**

See Section 3.2 for base case description

#### **BBSDP17a1 - Break Size Sensitivity**

Same as **BBSDP17a** except:

- 10% increase in LOCA break size

Refer to Section 3.3 for parameter description.

#### **BBSDP17a2 - Primary System Void Fraction Sensitivity**

Same as **BBSDP17a** except:

- VFSEP = 0.6 (base case = 0.5)

Refer to Section 3.3 for parameter description.

#### **BBSDP17a3 - Steam Generator Natural Circulation Heat Transfer Coefficient Sensitivity**

Same as **BBSDP17a** except:

- HTSTAG adjusted to 500 W/M\*\*2-C (was 850.0 W/M\*\*2-C)
-

Refer to Section 3.3 for parameter description.

**BBSDP17a4 - Break Location Sensitivity**

Same as **BBSDP17a** except:

- Changed break location from hot leg to cold leg
-

4.0 RESULTS

TABLE 4-1  
 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SENSITIVITY

CASE #	LOCA SIZE <sup>1</sup>	RCFC TRAINS <sup>2</sup>	CONT SPRAYS INITIATE	MAX CONT PRESSURE <sup>3</sup>	SIMULATION TIME
BBSDP08	5.2"	2	NA	30.7 psia	1 HR
BBSDP08a	5.2"	1	NA	33.4 psia	1 HR
BBSDP08b	5.2"	0	14 min	35.1 psia	1 HR
BBSDP09	4.5"	2	NA	30.1 psia	1 HR
BBSDP09a	4.5"	1	NA	33.3 psia	1 HR
BBSDP09b	4.5"	0	17 min	35.1 psia	1 HR
BBSDP10	4.0"	2	NA	29.5 psia	1 HR
BBSDP10a	4.0"	1	NA	33.1 psia	1 HR
BBSDP10b	4.0"	0	21 min	35.1 psia	1 HR
BBSDP11a	3.5"	1	NA	32.8 psia	1 HR
BBSDP11b	3.5"	0	26 min	35.1 psia	1 HR
BBSDP12	3.0"	2	NA	27.9 psia	1 HR
BBSDP12a	3.0"	1	NA	32.4 psia	1 HR
BBSDP12b	3.0"	0	33 min	35.1 psia	1 HR
BBSDP13b	2.5"	0	48 min	35.1 psia	1 HR
BBSDP14	2.0"	2	NA	22.8 psia	2 HR
BBSDP14a	2.0"	1	NA	25.6 psia	2 HR
BBSDP14b	2.0"	0	1.7 hr	34.9 psia	2 HR

Notes:

1. LOCA area is increased by 10% to account for uncertainty (e.g. 5.2" is set to 5.45")
2. Each train contains 2 fan coolers with cooling water temperature of 100F
3. Spray set point is 20 psig = 34.7 psia

**TABLE 4-2  
 RWST DEPLETION ANALYSIS**

CASE DESCRIPTION <sup>1</sup>	CASE #	RWST 46.7% <sup>2</sup>	RWST 9%	TAF <sup>3</sup>	CD <sup>4</sup>	46.7% TO 9%	46.7% TO TAF	FLOW DIVERSION GPM / MIN	SIMULATION TIME
5.2" MLOCA, wAFW, 2CV, 2SI, Cooldown @ .75 hr, 2 RCFC trains, flow diversion for 7 min.	BBSDP15a	44 min	1.86 hr	2.73 hr	3.48 hr	1.12 hr	1.99 hr	5237 / 7 min	6 hr
3" MLOCA, wAFW, 2CV, 2SI, Cooldown @ .75 hr, 2 RCFC trains, flow diversion for 7 min.	BBSDP16a	2.00 hr	3.08 hr	6.96 hr	8.74 hr	1.08 hr	4.96 hr	7310 / 7 min	12 hr
2" SLOCA, wAFW, 2CV, 2SI, Cooldown @ .75 hr, 2 RCFC trains, flow diversion for 7 min.	BBSDP17a	2.54 hr	3.57 hr	12.00 hr	15.91 hr	1.03 hr	9.46 hr	11891 / 7 min	24 hr
.86" SLOCA, wAFW, 2CV, 2SI, Cooldown @ .75 hr, 2 RCFC trains, flow diversion for 7 min.	BBSDP18a	5.23 hr	8.00 hr	28.21 hr	30.45 hr	2.77 hr	22.98 hr	11891 / 7 min	36 hr
B&F, No AFW, 1 PORV, 1 Vent, 1CV, 1SI, 1 RCFC train, Porv & Vent Closed @ 9%, flow diversion for 7 min.	BBSDP25a	8.73 hr	11.94 hr	14.83 hr	16.35 hr	3.21 hr	6.10 hr	11891 / 7 min	24 hr

Notes:

- 1) See Section 3.2 for complete case description
- 2) Initial volume corresponds to Tech Spec minimum of 400500 gal
- 3) Top of active fuel exposure
- 4) Peak cladding temperature > 1800 F

**TABLE 4-3  
 5.2" LOCA WITH RWST DEPLETION UNCERTAINTY SENSITIVITY**

<b>CASE DESCRIPTION<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>CASE #</b>	<b>RWST 46.7%<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>RWST 9%</b>	<b>TAF<sup>3</sup></b>	<b>CD<sup>4</sup></b>	<b>46.7% TO 9%</b>	<b>46.7% TO TAF</b>	<b>FLOW DIVERSION GPM / MIN</b>	<b>SIMULATION TIME</b>
5.2" MLOCA, wAFW, 2CV, 2SI, 2CS, Cooldown @ .75 hr, 2 RCFC train, flow diversion for 7 min	BBSDP15a	45 min	1.86 hr	2.73 hr	3.48 hr	1.12 hr	1.99 hr	5236.5 / 7 min	6 hr
10% LOCA increase	BBSDP15a1	41 min	1.76 hr	2.50 hr	3.20 hr	1.07 hr	1.81 hr	5236.5 / 7 min	6 hr
VFSEP/VFCIRC	BBSDP15a2	45 min	1.86 hr	2.73 hr	3.48 hr	1.12 hr	1.99 hr	5236.5 / 7 min	6 hr
HTSTAG	BBSDP15a3	45 min	1.85 hr	2.72 hr	3.46 hr	1.11 hr	1.98 hr	5236.5 / 7 min	6 hr
Cold Leg	BBSDP15a4	1.58 hr	2.68 hr	5.46 hr	6.28 hr	1.10 hr	3.88 hr	5236.5 / 7 min	12 hr

Notes:

- 1) See Section 3.3 for variable description
- 2) Initial volume corresponds to Tech Spec minimum of 400500 gal
- 3) Top of active fuel exposure
- 4) Peak cladding temperature > 1800 F

**TABLE 4-4  
 2" LOCA WITH RWST DEPLETION UNCERTAINTY SENSITIVITY**

CASE DESCRIPTION <sup>1</sup>	CASE #	RWST 46.7% <sup>2</sup>	RWST 9%	TAF <sup>3</sup>	CD <sup>4</sup>	46.7% TO 9%	46.7% TO TAF	FLOW DIVERSION GPM / MIN	SIMULATION TIME
2" MLOCA, wAFW, 2CV, 2SI, 2CS, Cooldown @ .75 hr, 2 RCFC train, flow diversion for 7 min	BBSDP17a	2.54 hr	3.57 hr	12.00 hr	15.91 hr	1.03 hr	9.46 hr	11891 / 7 min	24 hr
10% LOCA increase	BBSDP17a1	2.50 hr	3.53 hr	11.11 hr	14.62 hr	1.03 hr	8.61 hr	11891 / 7 min	24 hr
VFSEP/ VFCIRC	BBSDP17a2	2.54 hr	3.58 hr	12.21 hr	16.14 hr	1.04 hr	9.67 hr	11891 / 7 min	24 hr
HTSTAG	BBSDP17a3	2.54 hr	3.58 hr	11.94 hr	15.83 hr	1.04 hr	9.40 hr	11891 / 7 min	24 hr
Cold Leg	BBSDP17a4	2.54 hr	3.58 hr	22.85 hr	27.00 hr	1.04 hr	20.31 hr	11891 / 7 min	36 hr

Notes:

- 1) See Section 3.3 for variable description
- 2) Initial volume corresponds to Tech Spec minimum of 400500 gal
- 3) Top of active fuel exposure
- 4) Peak cladding temperature > 1800 F

## 5.0 CONCLUSIONS

Results from Table 4-1 demonstrate that containment sprays will not actuate if two trains of RCFCs are available following small or medium LOCAs. Also, containment sprays will not actuate for the small LOCA when a single train of RCFCs are available.

The RWST depletion cases in Table 4-2 model medium LOCAs with successful RCS cooldown, loss of recirculation, all trains of ECCS available, and an RWST flow diversion for 7 minutes. For the medium LOCA's, there is over 2 hours available from 46.7% (Lo-2) RWST level and a core water level at TAF. For small LOCAs with the same configuration of ECCS and flow diversion, there is at least 9.5 hours available from 46.7% (Lo-2) RWST level and a core water level at TAF.

## 6.0 REFERENCES

1. Decay Heat Power in Light Water Reactors. American National Standards Institute, Washington, D.C., 1979. Revised American National Standard ANSI/ANS-5.1-1979.
  2. MAAP4 Modular Accident Analysis Program for LWR Power Plants User's Manual. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA: 1994–2005. RP3131-02.
  3. Transmittal Document for MAAP4 Code Revision MAAP 4.0.6. Fauske & Associates, LLC, Burr Ridge, IL: 2005. FAI/05-47.
  4. MAAP4 Parameter File Notebook, BB PRA-009, Rev 2, Jan 2008.
  5. Level 1 MAAP Thermal-Hydraulic Calculation Notebook, BB PRA-007, Rev 0, Jan 2008.
  6. MAAP Thermal-Hydraulic Qualification Studies, EPRI TR-100741, Final Report, June 1992.
  7. MAAP Applications Guidance, "Desktop Reference for Using MAAP4 Software", EPRI 101675, Revision 1, Nov 2008.
  8. Refueling Water Storage Tank Setpoints, SITH-1, Revision 7, Sept 2007.
  9. Analysis of RWST Back Flow to the Containment Sumps, Evaluation 2009-13491, Revision 0.
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**Attachment 1**

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**REFERENCES FOR CASE DEFINITIONS**

INDEX	CASE DEFINITION	REFERENCE
1	Initial RWST Volume - 400500 gallons	Tech Spec SR 3.5.4.3, Amendment 98.
2	Charging Pump Curves	PSA-B-98-08, Rev. 2, 8/30/99. 1 Charging Pump : Table 25 2 Charging Pumps : Table 27
3	SI Pump Curves	PSA-B-98-08, Rev. 2, 8/30/99, 1 SI : Table 21, 2 SI : Table 23
4	RH Pump Curves	MAAP4 Parameter File Notebook, BB PRA-009, Rev 2, Jan 2008. 1 RH Pump : Parameter File 2 RH Pumps: Double Parameter File Flow
5	RCP Trip @ Primary System Pressure of 1425 psig	1BwEP-0, Step 20, Rev. 202, WOG2.
6	Steam Generator Cool Down Cooldown @ 100°F after 45 minutes	1BwEP-ES-1.2, Step 8a, Rev. 202, WOG2.
7	Containment Spray initiated @ 20 psig	MAAP4 Parameter File Notebook, BB PRA-009, Rev 2, Jan 2008. Parameter File
8	All ECCS Secured Below 9% RWST Level	1BwFEP-F:1.3, Rev. 200, WOG2.
9	RWST flow diversion Flows	Analysis of RWST Back Flow to the Containment Sumps, Evaluation 2009-13491, Revision 0.
10	1" Reactor Vent	DWG M-60, Sheet 1B, Rev BE.
11	Service Water for RCFCs - 100°F	FSAR Table 6.2-56, Rev 11, Dec 2006.
12	46.7% RWST Level	Refueling Water Storage Tank Setpoints, SITH-1, Rev 7, Sept 2007.
13	9% RWST Level	Refueling Water Storage Tank Setpoints, SITH-1, Rev 7, Sept 2007.
14	LPI (RH) Secured 7 minutes Past 46.7%	Simulator runs observed on 11/10/2009 and 11/11/2009.
15	PORV and Reactor Vent Secured Below 9% RWST Level	1BwFR-C.1, Step 8, Rev. 200, WOG2.

STATION: Braidwood

UNIT(S) AFFECTED: UNIT 1

TITLE:

Braidwood Phase 3 SDP Evaluation of Failure of 1SI8811B to Fully Open  
MAAP4 THERMAL HYDRAULIC ANALYSIS TO SUPPORT TIMING FOR LOCALLY  
OPENING 1SI8811B

SUMMARY (Include UREs incorporated):

This document utilized MAAP4.0.6 to evaluate the timing associated with locally opening  
1SI8811B

Number of pages: Total 35 pages, including this page.

RM Document Level: Category 2, per ER-AA-600-1012

Review required after periodic Update

Internal RM Documentation

External RM Documentation

Electronic Calculation Data Files: (Program Name, Version, File Name  
extension/size/date/hour/min)

See Section 5 for Data Files

Method of Review:  Detailed  Alternate  Review of External Document  
This RM documentation supersedes: N/A in its entirety.

Prepared by: Mark T. Cursey / [Signature] / 12/16/09  
Name Signature Date

Reviewed by: Alex J. Huning / [Signature] / 12/16/09  
Name Signature Date

Approved by: N/A / / /  
Name Signature Date

**Braidwood  
PRA APPLICATION NOTEBOOK**

**BW-SDP-003**

**Appendix C**

**Revision 1**

**Internal Events Model Changes**

**November 2009**

CONTACTS	BYRON	Braidwood
Site Risk Mgmt Engineer	N/A	Mark Melnicoff (815-417-4020)
Corp. Risk Mgmt Engineer	Roy Linthicum (630-657-3846) Young H. In (630-657-3858)	

## 1. INCORRECT ALPHA FACTOR FOR 1SI8811 VALVES

A review of the alpha factor for event 1SI8811A-B-CMVCC indicated that the value used was an alpha factor that is applied in the model for High Pressure Injection MOVs; whereas the SI8811 valve is a low pressure valve (maximum pressure would be containment pressure just before failure - ~100 psig). Therefore, the alpha factor for this event was changed to 1.58E-02, which is the value used in the 6D model for other RH valves based on Reference 1.

- These changes were made to the Rev 6D reliability database (A6D.RR) and saved as file A6D2.RR. The database was then loaded into the A6D cutset files and saved as file A6D2.cut.
- Note that the current version of the NRC CCF database (Reference 2) has different CCF parameters for RH valves. The impact of this is investigated as sensitivity in Appendix E.

### New Baseline Values

The new baseline CDF and LERF values are provided below:

Configuration	6D2	6D
A11 CDF	2.08E-5/yr	2.11E-5/yr
A12 CDF	2.11E-5/yr	2.13E-5/yr
A11 LERF	2.41E-6/yr	2.41E-6/yr
A12 LERF	2.42E-6/yr	2.42E-6/yr

## 2. Model Review Requirements

Given the limited changes that were made to the model, the model review can be limited to a review of the data change made in Section 1.

## 3. SOFTWARE USED

- CAFTA 5.3 (EX0007572)
- PRAQUANT 5.0a (EX0007583)
- QRECOVER 2.3c (EX0007637)
- FORTE 2.2f (EX0003553)
- BW-SDP-003 App C Files R1.zip 1,393 KB, 11/23/09 12:10PM

## 6. REFERENCES

1. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "CCF Parameter Estimations, 2003 Update", <http://nrcoe.inl.gov/results/CCF/ParamEst2003/ccfparamest.htm>, May 2006.
2. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "CCF Parameter Estimations, 2007 Update", <http://nrcoe.inl.gov/results/CCF/ParamEst2007/ccfparamest.htm>, September 2008.



**Braidwood  
PRA APPLICATION NOTEBOOK**

**BW-SDP-003**

**Revision 1**

**Braidwood Phase 3 SDP Evaluation of  
Failure of 1SI8811B to Fully Open**

**Appendix D**

**Internal Events Evaluation**

**December 2009**

CONTACTS	BYRON	Braidwood
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Corp. Risk Mgmt Engineer	Roy Linthicum (630-657-3846) Young H. In (630-657-3858)	

**1. PURPOSE**

This evaluation examines the risk significance from internal events associated with failure of 1SI8811B (ECCS Sump Recirculation MOV) to fully open.

**2. EVALUATION**

**Impact of failure with No Recovery**

The SDP evaluation was performed assuming that 1SI8811B opened sufficiently to pass adequate flow to the RH pump; however, based on dual position indication, it is further assumed that the control room staff would secure the pump to prevent the possibility of pump damage, in accordance with their training. This was modeled by replacing basic event 1SI8811B---MVCC with event 1SI8811BFAILED (probability = 1.0). In addition, as the potential for common cause failure can not be ruled out, basic event 1SI8811A-B - CMVCC was replaced with basic event 1SI8811AB CCF (probability = 1.58E-02; the basic event probability divided by the random failure rate). [Replacements were performed by modifying the base model flag files. The flag files were renamed A11D\_1SI8811BFAILED.caf and A11D\_1SI8811BFAILED.caf]. Model revision 6D2 (see Appendix C), which is the 6D model of record (MOR) modified to reflect a correction to the 1SI8811 common cause failure alpha factor, was then quantified to determine the instantaneous change in CDF and LERF<sup>1</sup>.

The results are provided below.

<b>SDP Base Case - 1SI8811B Failed with NO credit for Local Opening<sup>2</sup></b>			
<b>Case</b>	<b>Truncation</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Delta (SDP Base Case – Rev 6D2 Base Case)</b>
A11C_SDP	1.00E-10	1.66E-04	1.45E-04
A12D_SDP	1.00E-10	1.67E-04	1.46E-04
A11L_SDP	1.00E-11	4.28E-06	1.87E-06
A12L_SDP	1.00E-11	4.30E-06	1.88E-06

<b>Rev 6D2 Base Case</b>			
A11C	1.00E-10	2.08E-05	
A12C	1.00E-10	2.11E-05	
A11L	1.00E-11	2.41E-06	
A12L	1.00E-11	2.42E-06	

<sup>1</sup> Although a newer model of record, 6E1 is now in effect, the new MOR includes the AF cross-tie mod, which was not operational during the time frame of interest to this evaluation.

<sup>2</sup> See Files 1SI8811B SDP R1, Sheet "SDP-No Credit for Recovery", R6D1\_1SI8811BR1-NO RECOVERY.qnt and R6D1\_1SI8811BR1 - No Recovery.CUT

Metric	Exposure Period		Internal Events	
	Days	Fraction <sup>3</sup>	$\Delta$ CDF (/year) <sup>4</sup>	ICDP
CDF	323.5 <sup>5</sup>	8.86E-01	1.46E-04	1.29E-04
LERF	323.5	8.86E-01	1.87E-06	1.66E-06

**Recovery – Small LOCA and Long Term Bleed and Feed Only**

A review of the dominant cutsets from the non-recovered case (Appendix I) identified that the major risk contributors were Long Term Bleed and Feed (with 1 Train of ECCS failed), Small LOCAs with either all equipment available or 1 train ECCS failed and Medium LOCAs with either all equipment available or 1 train ECCS failed. Since there is procedural direction in 1BwCA-1.1 to locally open the sump recirculation valves (SI8811), local recovery can be credited. Appendix A documents the human error probability (HEP) associated with this action. Basic event 1SI8811B-SBHPMOA in the non-recovered cutsets was assigned the HEP of 6.5E-03. Based on the results developed in Appendix B, however, containment spray would only be expected to actuate for a 2" diameter break if no RCFCs are available. One train of RCFCs is sufficient for small LOCAs to prevent CS actuation. The un-recovered cutsets were reviewed and it was determined that there were no sequences with failure of either SI8811 valve that would result in failure of both trains of RCFCs. Therefore, these sequences are considered negligible and an HEP was not developed for these cutsets.

This was accomplished using recovery file QRX-1SI8811BFAILED.txt and then changing the probability of event 1SI8811B-SBHPMOA to 6.5E-03 in the recovered cutset file.

The cutsets were then reviewed to determine if the were any new dependencies introduced through the addition of the recovery action. With one exception, all other operator actions with the recovered cutsets were actions sufficient removed in time and also occurred prior to the operator action to transition to ECCS recirculation. Therefore, these actions have zero dependency on the action to locally open 1SI8811B. The one exception was 1SISUMPVLV-HMVOA, which is the action to manual open the valves from the control room do to failure of the open signal to the valve. Failure of this action is assumed to have complete dependence with the local action to open the valve. As a result, local recovery was removed from this cutset.

<sup>3</sup> See Section 3.0, Main Report, for calculation of the exposure days that includes 2 days repair time.

<sup>4</sup> Average between A11 and A22 configurations

<sup>5</sup> See Section 3.0, Main Report, for calculation of the exposure days that includes 2 days repair time.

The results are provided below.

SDP Base Case - 1SI8811B Failed with credit for Local Opening during Small LOCA and B&F Only <sup>6</sup>				
Case	Truncation	Frequency	Delta	
A11C SDP	1.00E-10	3.66E-05	1.57E-05	
A12D SDP	1.00E-10	3.68E-05	1.58E-05	
A11L SDP	1.00E-11	2.54E-06	1.29E-07	
A12L SDP	1.00E-11	2.55E-06	1.29E-07	

Metric	Exposure Period		Internal Events	
	Days	Fraction <sup>2</sup>	ΔCDF (/year) <sup>7</sup>	ICDP
CDF	323.5 <sup>8</sup>	8.86E-01	1.58E-05	1.40E-05
LERF	323.5	8.86E-01	1.29E-07	1.14E-07

**Recovery – Medium LOCA, Small LOCA and Long Term Bleed and Feed**

With failure of the 1SI8811B (with no credit for local recovery), medium LOCAs become a significant contributor to CDF. Additional T-H analyses were performed (see Appendix B) to determine the LOCA conditions under which Containment Spray would actuate. This was needed for this evaluation as CS spray actuation significantly accelerates depletion of the RWST inventory and reduces the time available to the operators to establish ECCS recirculation. For example, the base PRA model conservatively assumed that CS will always actuate for Medium LOCAs in order to simplify the PRA model and avoid the need to develop additional accident sequences and separate Human Error Probabilities (HEPs) based on the number of RCFC trains that are available. This is seen in the development of the operator action timing to establish ECCS recirculation (1SI-HPR---HSYOA) in the base model, which uses MAAP cases with no RCFCs and CS actuation for development of the HEP.

Therefore, additional modeling detail for medium LOCAs was considered to determine how many RCFCs are required to prevent CS actuation. However, if only 1 Train of RCFCs (2 individual units) operates, CS is expected to actuate, especially for the large end of the break size. For break sizes in the 2” – 3” diameter range, CS spray may or may not actuate with 1 Train of RCFCs. If neither train of RCFCs is available, then CS actuation is expected to occur. Therefore, the SDP evaluation includes this additional modeling detail by using different HEPs, depending on the status of the RCFCs.

To support the HRA analysis, additional T-H analysis were performed (see Appendix B) to determine the LOCA conditions under which Containment Spray would actuate. This

<sup>6</sup> See Files 1SI8811B SDP R1, Sheet “SDP-SLOCA Recovery Only”, R6D1\_1SI8811BR1-SLOCA RECOVERY ONLY.qnt and R6D1\_1SI8811BR1 - SLOCA Recovery Only.CUT.

<sup>7</sup> Average between A11 and A12 configurations

<sup>8</sup> See Section 3.0, Main Report, for calculation of the exposure days that includes 2 days repair time.

was needed for this evaluation as CS spray actuation significantly reduces the time available to the operators to establish ECCS recirculation. The base PRA model conservatively assumed that CS would always actuate for Medium LOCAs to simplify the model to avoid developing separate Human Error Probabilities (HEPs) dependant on the number of RCFC trains that are available. The T-H analysis performed in Appendix B resulted in the following conditions that are used in this evaluation:

LOCA Size	# RCFC Trains Available	CS Actuation
Small LOCA (<2")	2	No
Small LOCA (<2")	1	No
Small LOCA (<2")	0	Yes
Medium LOCA (2" – 3")	2	No
Medium LOCA (2" – 3")	1	Assumed <sup>9</sup>
Medium LOCA (2" – 3")	0	Yes
Medium LOCA (3" – 5.2")	2	No
Medium LOCA (3" – 5.2")	1	Assumed <sup>10</sup>
Medium LOCA (3" – 5.2")	0	Yes

Based on these results, potential timelines for human failure events were developed based on time available to take the action:

- Small LOCA with 1 or more RCFC trains available
- Medium LOCA with Both RCFC trains available
- 

Credit is not given for local operation of the 881 1A/B valves in cases where CS is assumed to actuate:

- Small LOCA with no RCFCs available<sup>11</sup>
- Medium LOCA with 1 or 0 RCFC trains available

The HEP for medium LOCAs without CS spray actuation are developed in Appendix A. With CS spray actuation and the draining of RW ST inventory to the sump during the time when both the S18811 and S18812 valves are open, it is conservatively assumed that there is insufficient time to locally open the S18811A/B valves. These conditions are applied based on cutset review to the action 1S18811B-MBHPMOA as follows:

Medium LOCA with both RCFC trains available (No CS actuation) – 6.0E-03  
 Medium LOCA with 1 or 0 RCFC trains available (CS actuation) – 1.0

This was accomplished by adding event 1S18811B-MBHPMOA (probability = 6.0E-3) to all medium LOCA cutsets with failure of 1S18811. Then event 1S111B-MLADJUST (probability = 1.0/6.0E-03 = 166.7) was added to those cutsets with 1S18811B-MBHPMOA that also fail 1 train of RCFCs (i.e., cutsets with loss of a DC or AC train or loss of 1 train of RCFC actuation). This eliminates credit for the action to locally open 1S18811A/B for these cutsets.

<sup>9</sup> Actual analysis shows no CS actuation, but CS is assumed to actuate as Containment pressure is ~2 psia below the CS setpoint

<sup>10</sup> Actual analysis shows no CS actuation, but CS is assumed to actuate as Containment pressure is within ~2 psia of the setpoint

<sup>11</sup> This HEP was not developed as there were no cutsets prior to crediting recovery that had this condition

The results are provided below.

SDP Base Case - 1SI8811B Failed with credit for Local Opening Following MLOCA, SLOCA, and B&F <sup>12</sup>			
Case	Truncation	Frequency	Delta
A11C SDP	1.00E-10	2.16E-05	7.90E-07
A12D SDP	1.00E-10	2.19E-05	8.19E-07
A11L SDP	1.00E-11	2.42E-06	9.90E-09
A12L SDP	1.00E-11	2.43E-06	9.90E-09

Metric	Exposure Period		Internal Events	
	Days	Fraction <sup>2</sup>	$\Delta$ CDF (/year) <sup>13</sup>	ICDP
CDF	323.5 <sup>14</sup>	8.86E-01	8.05E-07	7.13E-07
LERF	323.5	8.86E-01	9.90E-09	8.77E-09

The following files were used in this evaluation:

BW-SDP-003 App D Files R1.zip, 3,586kb, 12/17/09, 10:57am

**3. SOFTWARE USED**

- CAFTA 5.3 (EX0007572)
- PRAQUANT 5.0a (EX0007583)
- QRECOVER 2.3c (EX0007637)
- FORTE 2.2f (EX0003553)

<sup>12</sup> See File 1SI8811B SDP R1, Sheet "SDP-Full Recovery", R6D1\_1SI8811BR1-LOCA & B&F.qnt and R6D1\_1SI8811BR1 - R6D1\_1SI8811BR1 - LOCA & B&F Recovery.CUT

<sup>13</sup> Average between A11 and A12 configurations

<sup>14</sup> See Section 3.0, Main Report, for calculation of the exposure days that includes 2 days repair time.



**Braidwood  
PRA APPLICATION NOTEBOOK**

**BW-SDP-003**

**Revision 2**

**Braidwood Phase 3 SDP Evaluation of  
Failure of 1SI8811B to Fully Open**

**Appendix E  
Sensitivity Studies**

**December 2009**

CONTACTS	BYRON	Braidwood
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Corp. Risk Mgmt Engineer	Roy Linthicum (630-657-3846) Young H. In (630-657-3858)	

## 1. PURPOSE

This Appendix evaluates the impact of different assumptions used in the SDP evaluation. The scope of these evaluations are:

- Success Criteria for the number of Pzr PORVs required for Bleed and Feed Cooling
- Use of the SPAR-H model versus the HRA Calculator for determining credit for recovery of 1SI8811B.
- Impact of not assuming common cause failure potential between 1SI8811A/B

## 2. SUCCESS CRITERIA FOR THE NUMBER OF PZR PORVS REQUIRED FOR BLEED AND FEED COOLING

The risk impacts of failure of 1SI8811B to fully open include a significant contribution from Loss of DC Bus 111 initiating events with random failures of the B AF pump followed by successful Bleed and Feed using 1 Pzr PORV. A review of the NRC SPAR model for Braidwood (Reference E2) identified a different assumption related to Bleed and Feed, specifically, that 2 Pzr PORVs are required for success.

For this sensitivity study, the R6D2 Fault tree (Master6D\_1PORV.caf) was revised by changing gate 1RC-PORV-1-RQD to 1RC-PORV-2-RQD for all Bleed and Feed scenarios that credit only 1 PORV for success.

The results of the SDP analysis using the revised requirement for requiring 2 Pzr PORVs for Bleed and Feed is provided below:

2 PORVs Required Sensitivity Case - 1SI8811B Partially open with credit for Local Opening			
Case	Truncation	Frequency	Delta
A11C	1.00E-10	8.50E-05	5.66E-07
A12C	1.00E-10	8.56E-05	5.68E-07
A11L	1.00E-11	5.24E-06	9.80E-09
A12L	1.00E-11	5.26E-06	9.90E-09

2 PORV Require Base Case		
Case	Truncation	Frequency
A11C	1.00E-10	8.44E-05
A12C	1.00E-10	8.51E-05
A11L	1.00E-11	5.23E-06
A12L	1.00E-11	5.25E-06

Unit	Exposure Period		Internal Events	
	Days	Fraction <sup>1</sup>	ΔCDF (/year)	ICDP
CDF	323.5	8.86E-01	5.67E-07	5.02E-07
LERF	323.5	8.86E-01	9.85E-09	8.72E-09

<sup>1</sup> Fraction = # days divided by 365.25 days/year, including 2 days repair time

The results of this sensitivity study show that with the revised Pzr PORV success criterion, the risk impact of the 1SI8811B failure is less than the impact using the base Braidwood PRA model. This lower risk impact with this assumption can be explained by recognizing that the risk impact with the current success criteria includes a significant contribution from the Loss of DC Bus 111 Initiating Event. With the change in Pzr PORV success criteria, the Loss of DC Bus 111 fails one Pzr PORV, and hence Bleed and Feed. As a result, further failure of the 1SI8811B valve has no impact on these scenarios as they go to core damage due to failure create a bleed path, regardless of the status of the SI8811 valves.

Files Used:

BW-SDP-003 App E 2PORV Files.zip 3,104,784B, 12/11/09, 7:55pm

**3. USE OF THE SPAR-H MODEL VERSUS THE HRA CALCULATOR**

A sensitivity study was done to determine the impact of using a different human reliability probability methodology (SPAR-H) rather the EPRI HRA Calculator which is the methodology used in the Braidwood PRA. This different methodology was only applied to the action to locally open the SI8811 valves. Appendix A provides HEP values using the SPAR-H methodology. These values were substituted into the SDP result file as shown below:

Basic Event	Applied	HRA Calc	SPAR-H
1SI8811B-SBHPMOA	Small LOCAs	6.5E-03	9.9E-03
1SI8811B-MBHPMOA	Medium LOCAs – All RCFCs Available	6.0E-03	9.1E-02
1SI11B-MLADJUST	Medium LOCAs – Multiplier when 1 or more RCFC trains unavailable	166.7	11.0 (1/9.1E-02)

The results of this sensitivity study are provided below:

SPAR Model versus HRAC			
Case	Truncation	Frequency	Delta
A11C SDP	1.00E-10	2.33E-05	2.50E-06
A12D SDP	1.00E-10	2.36E-05	2.53E-06
A11L SDP	1.00E-11	2.44E-06	2.53E-08
A12L SDP	1.00E-11	2.44E-06	2.38E-08

Rev 6D2 Base Case			
A11D1_CDF	1.00E-10	4042	2.08E-05
A12D1_CDF	1.00E-10	4221	2.11E-05
A11D1_LERF	1.00E-11	5162	2.41E-06
A12D1_LERF	1.00E-11	5355	2.42E-06

Unit	Exposure Period		Internal Events	
	Days	Fraction <sup>2</sup>	ΔCDF (/year)	ICDP/ILERP
CDF	323.5	8.86E-01	2.52E-06	2.23E-06
LERF	323.5	8.86E-01	2.46E-08	2.17E-08

Use of the SPAR-H model results in slightly higher SDP results than the EPRI HRA calculator.

Files Used:

BW-SDP-003 App E SPAR-H Files.zip 883,719B, 12/11/09, 8:16pm

<sup>2</sup> Fraction = # days divided by 365.25 days/year, including 2 days repair time

#### 4. NO COMMON CAUSE FAILURE

As it is known that the 1SI8811A valve was not failed due to corrosion of the torque switch, a sensitivity study was done to determine the impact of the assumption that a common cause failure potential existed. This was done by setting the probability for common cause failure of both SI8811 valves back to its original value. The results are presented below:

SDP Case – No Common Cause Failure			
Case	Truncation	Frequency	Delta
A11C_SDP	1.00E-10	2.13E-05	5.10E-07
A12D_SDP	1.00E-10	2.16E-05	4.80E-07
A11L_SDP	1.00E-11	2.42E-06	1.00E-08
A12L_SDP	1.00E-11	2.43E-06	1.00E-08

Rev 6D1 Base Case			
A11D1_CDF	4042	2.08E-05	
A12D1_CDF	4221	2.11E-05	
A11D1_LERF	5162	2.41E-06	
A12D1_LERF	5355	2.42E-06	

Unit	Exposure Period		Internal Events	
	Days	Fraction <sup>3</sup>	ΔCDF (/year)	ICDP
CDF	323.5	8.86E-01	4.95E-07	4.36E-07
LERF	323.5	8.86E-01	1.00E-08	8.80E-09

The assumption that there is a common cause failure potential for 1SI8811A introduces a significant conservatism (a factor of 2) to the results.

Files Used:


BW-SDP-003 App E No CCF.zip 882,226B, 12/12/09, 6:34am

#### 5. CONCLUSIONS

The table below summarizes the results of the sensitivity analysis.

Case	IE SDP Result	% Change
Base	7.13E-07	N/A
# PORVs	5.02E-07	-30%
SPAR-H	2.23E-06	213%
No CCF	4.36E-07	-39%

<sup>3</sup> Fraction = # days divided by 365.25 days/year, including 2 days repair time



The following conclusions can be made from these sensitivity studies:

- Number of PORVs Required for Bleed and Feed**  
 The number of PORVs required for Bleed and Feed is NOT a Key assumption. Changing the success criteria to 2 PORVs required increases the baseline CDF but decreases the risk contribution from the failed valve.
- SPAR-H versus HRA Calculator**  
 The Human Error Probabilities for locally opening 1SI8811B was quantified using the EPRI HRA Calculator. A sensitivity study was performed to evaluate the impact of the HEP using the SPAR-H model on the SDP results. Use of the SPAR-H model does impact the results significantly; however, the stair step nature of the SPAR-H methodology's time based recovery credit is not well suited for the medium LOCA HEP quantification associated with this SDP. Because the time available for mitigating action (the system window) varies by several hours over the medium LOCA break spectrum, breaks on the smaller end of the medium LOCA spectrum have significantly longer system windows than those on the larger end. Use of the system window associated with the limiting medium LOCA break in the SPAR-H methodology results in the application of an HEP that is not representative of a large portion of the medium LOCA events. While the HEPs using the EPRI HRA Calculator also use a stair step time based recovery model, the recovery credit transitions do not occur at times that are critical to the results.
- No Common Cause Failure**  
 It is known that there was no corrosion on the torque switch for 1SI8811A, and therefore, there was no actual common cause failure. The impact of not assuming a common cause failure potential was evaluated. With this different assumption, the SDP results are slightly reduced.

Taking into account the sensitivity evaluations, the internal events contribution to the SDP should be Green.

## 6. SOFTWARE & FILES USED

- CAFTA 5.3 (EX0007572)
- PRAQUANT 5.0a (EX0007583)
- QRECOVER 2.3c (EX0007637)
- FORTE 2.2f (EX0003553)
- BW-SDP-003 App E Files R1.ZIP, 4,758Kb, 12/17/09, 10:10am

## 7. REFERENCES

- E1). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "CCF Parameter Estimations, 2007 Update", <http://nrcoe.inl.gov/results/CCF/ParamEst2007/ccfparamest.htm>, September 2008.
- E2). Standardized Plant Analysis Risk Model for Braidwood 1 & 2 (ASP PWR B), Idaho National Laboratory, Rev 3.31, June 2007

RM DOCUMENTATION NO. BW-SDP-003 Appdendix E REV: 2 PAGE NO. E8 of 8

STATION: Braidwood

UNIT(S) AFFECTED: UNIT 1

TITLE:

Braidwood Phase 3 SDP Evaluation of Failure of 1SI8811B to Fully Open

Appendix E - Sensitivity Studies

SUMMARY (Include UREs incorporated):

This document evaluates the risk significance of failure of 1SI8811B to fully open, as documented in IR 934782.

Number of pages: Total 9 pages, including this page.

RM Document Level: Category 2, per ER-AA-600-1012

Review required after periodic Update

Internal RM Documentation

External RM Documentation

Electronic Calculation Data Files: (Program Name, Version, File Name extension/size/date/hour/min)

See Section 9 for Data Files

Method of Review:  Detailed  Alternate  Review of External Document

This RM documentation supersedes: N/A in its entirety.

Prepared by: Roy Linthicum

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12-30-09

Date

Reviewed by: Joe Edom

Print

[Signature]

Sign

12-30-2009

Date

Approved by: N/A

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**Braidwood  
PRA APPLICATION NOTEBOOK**

**BW-SDP-003**

**Revision 1**


**Braidwood Phase 3 SDP Evaluation of  
Failure of 1SI8811B to Fully Open**

**Appendix F**


**EOP Flow Chart**

**December 2009**

<b>CONTACTS</b>	<b>BYRON</b>	<b>Braidwood</b>
<b>Site Risk Mgmt Engineer</b>	N/A	Mark Melnicoff (815-417-4020)
<b>Corp. Risk Mgmt Engineer</b>	<b>Roy Linthicum (630-657-3846)</b> <b>Young H. In (630-657-3858)</b>	


<b>RM DOCUMENTATION NO. BW-SDP-003 Appdendix F REV: 1 PAGE NO. F2of 4</b>		
<b>STATION: Braidwood</b> <b>UNIT(S) AFFECTED: UNIT 1</b>		
<b>TITLE:</b>  <p style="text-align: center;">Braidwood Phase 3 SDP Evaluation of Failure of 1SI8811B to Fully Open</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Appendix F – EOP Flowchart</p>		
<b>SUMMARY (Include UREs incorporated):</b> <p><b>This document evaluates the risk significance of failure of 1SI8811B to fully open, as documented in IR 934782.</b></p>		
<b>Number of pages: <u>Total 4 pages, including this page.</u></b> <b>RM Document Level: <u>Category 2, per ER-AA-600-1012</u></b>		
<input type="checkbox"/> Review required after periodic Update		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Internal RM Documentation	<input type="checkbox"/> External RM Documentation	
<b>Electronic Calculation Data Files: (Program Name, Version, File Name extension/size/date/hour/min)</b> N/A		
<b>Method of Review: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Detailed <input type="checkbox"/> Alternate <input type="checkbox"/> Review of External Document</b> This RM documentation supersedes: <u>N/A</u> in its entirety.		
Prepared by:	<u>Roy Linthicum</u> <small>Print</small>	 <small>Sign</small>
		<u>12/2/09</u> <small>Date</small>
Reviewed by:	<u>Young In</u> <small>Print</small>	 <small>Sign</small>
		<u>12/3/09</u> <small>Date</small>
Approved by:	<u>N/A</u> <small>Print</small>	<small>Sign</small>
		<small>Date</small>

### Operator Action Decision Tree



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**Braidwood  
PRA APPLICATION NOTEBOOK**

**BW-SDP-003**

**Revision 1**

**Braidwood Phase 3 SDP Evaluation of  
Failure of 1SI8811B to Fully Open**

**Appendix G**

**Fire Evaluation**

**December 2009**

CONTACTS	BYRON	Braidwood
Site Risk Mgmt Engineer	N/A	Mark Melnicoff (815-417-4020)
Corp. Risk Mgmt Engineer	Roy Linthicum (630-657-3846) Young H. In (630-657-3858)	

## 1. PURPOSE

This Appendix evaluates the impact of the failure of 1SI8811B on risk associated with fires at Braidwood Unit 1.

## 2. FIRE EVALUATION

The fire risk impact was evaluated using the Braidwood Fire PRA model Revision 6C, with two updates (Reference G2):

- The seal LOCA flag was set to a probability of 0.21 and
- The 'OR' gate under event 2AF-RCTRIP-INFLOW was changed to an 'AND' gate.

The following change was made to the base model prior to performing the evaluation:

- The probability of CCF of the 1SI8811 valves (1SI8811A-B-CMVCC) was changed to  $4.11E-5$  to account for the correct alpha factor, as noted in Appendix C.

The following additional refinements were made to the fire scenario quantifications to eliminate conservatism in the quantification of the scenarios which contribute to the delta CDF associated with this SDP:

- 1-1 (Containment Fire, bounding fire): A manual action to open RHR to CV pump valve 1CV8804A is credited using the HE P for the 1SI8811B valve ( $6.5E-3$ ) which is bounding for an operator action for valve 1CV8804A, as discussed in Appendix A.
- 5.6-1-E (DC Bus 1DC05E Fire) and 5.6-2-D (DC Buses 2DC03E AND 2DC05E Fire, which causes loss of U2 to U1 DC crosstie): A non suppression probability of  $3.65E-2$  was included based on the panel being a vented low voltage panel (using the same factor employed for low voltage panels elsewhere in the fire PRA, per reference G2).
- 11.3-1-B (MCC 1AP21E Fire) and 11.5A-1-B (MCC 1AP25E Fire): these scenarios are split into two scenarios, one to represent scenarios where spurious operations within the MCC would occur (all potential spurious actuations are assumed to occur simultaneously in this scenario) the other scenario addresses the more likely situation where the fire causes the MCC to deenergize. A 0.1 split fraction is conservatively applied to the spurious operation scenario and a 0.9 split fraction is applied for the complement scenario where the MCCs deenergize. For the 0.1 split fraction scenarios for 11.3-1-B a circuit failure probability has been applied for basic events associated with valves 1SI8811A (0.67 on spurious close and 0.33 on spurious open), 1CV112B (0.67 on fails to close and 0.33 on spurious close) and 1CC9413A (0.33 on spurious close). For the 0.1 split fraction scenario for 11.5A-1-B the failure probability was set at 0.1 for valves 1AF005A and 1AF005B representing a screening value failure probability for an operator action to position each valve.

This resulted in the following baseline fire CDF:

Configuration	Base CDF	Modified CDF
A11	6.32E-5	5.21E-5
A12	6.17E-5	4.96E-5
Average	6.25E-5	5.09E-5

The impact of the 1SI8811B failure was evaluated by making the following changes in the fire model:

- Basic event 1SI8811B---MVCC was revised to be  $6.5E-03$ , except for cases where it was already failed due to the fire. This value is based on:
  - The HEP for Small LOCAs developed in Appendix A. This represents failure (1.0) times failure to locally recover the valve ( $6.5E-03$ )
  - LOCAs associated with fires are limited to Small LOCA or Bleed and Feed scenarios, with Small LOCA being the more time limiting.
  - Since ECCS recirculation is reached several hours into the event, the fire would be extinguished prior to the need to locally open the valve. Therefore, additional performance shaping factors are not used.
- For fires in the curved wall area which may prevent access to the 1SI8811B, the fire would also fail 1SI8811B due to fire damage, therefore the recovery is not credited for this area.
- Basic event 1SI8811A-B-CMVCC was revised to be  $1.03E-04$ . This value is based on:
  - The alpha factor ( $1.58E-02$ ) times the failure to locally recover the valves ( $6.5E-3$ ).
- The quantification results for the fire scenarios with significant contributions to the delta CDF were reviewed to confirm that the cutsets contributing to the delta CDF were not associated with configurations where all containment fan coolers were lost consistent with the assumption in the development of the 1SI8811B recovery factor that at least one fan cooler is available for a small LOCA.

The results of the Fire SDP evaluation are provided below:

Fire			
Case	Truncation	Frequency	Delta
A11C_SDP	1E-09	5.25E-5	4.0E-7
A12C_SDP	1E-09	4.97E-5	1.0E-7
Average		5.11E-5	2.5E-7

Rev 6C Base Case		
A11C1_CDF	1E-09	5.21E-5
A12C1_CDF	1E-09	4.96E-5

Unit	Exposure Period		Internal Events	
	Days	Fraction <sup>1</sup>	ΔCDF (/year)	ICDP/ILERP
CDF	323.5	8.84E-01	2.5E-7	2.21E-7

Files Used:

1S18811B\_SDP\_final.zip 5,168kb, 12/13/09, 4:09pm

**3. SOFTWARE USED**


- CAFTA 5.2 (EX0007196)
- PRAQUANT 4.0a (EX0000197)
- FORTE 2.2f (EX0003553)
- FRANCS32 3.0d (EX0006621)

**4. REFERENCES**

G1) Braidwood Fire PRA Model Revision 6C, Dated 5/22/08.

G2) Braidwood Fire Modeling Analysis, 6389-400-4, Rev 4 1/15/09

<sup>1</sup> Fraction = # days divided by 365.25 days/year

RM DOCUMENTATION NO: BW-SDP-003 Appdendix G REV: 1		PAGE NO: G5 of 55	
STATION: Braidwood			
UNIT(S) AFFECTED: UNIT 1			
TITLE:			
Braidwood Phase 3 SDP Evaluation of Failure of 1SI8811B to Fully Open  Appendix G - Fire Evaluation			
SUMMARY (Include UREs incorporated):			
This document evaluates the risk significance of failure of 1SI8811B to fully open, as documented in IR 934782.			
Number of pages: <u>Total 5 pages, including this page.</u>			
RM Document Level: <u>Category 2, per ER-AA-600-1012</u>			
<input type="checkbox"/> Review required after periodic Update			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Internal RM Documentation		<input type="checkbox"/> External RM Documentation	
Electronic Calculation Data Files: (Program Name, Version, File Name extension/size/date/hour/min)			
See Section 2 for Data Files			
Method of Review: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Detailed <input type="checkbox"/> Alternate <input type="checkbox"/> Review of External Document			
This RM documentation supersedes: <u>N/A</u> in its entirety.			
Prepared by:	<u>Usama Farradj/ Thomas Sarver</u>	<u> </u>	<u>12-17-09</u> <u>2009/12/17</u>
	Print	Sign	Date
Reviewed by:	<u>Roy Linthicum</u>	<u></u>	<u>12/30/09</u>
	Print	Sign	Date
Approved by:	<u>N/A</u>	<u>/</u>	<u>/</u>
	Print	Sign	Date

**Braidwood  
PRA APPLICATION NOTEBOOK**

**BW-SDP-003**

**Revision 1**

**Braidwood Phase 3 SDP Evaluation of  
Failure of 1SI8811B to Fully Open**

**Appendix H**

**Seismic Evaluation**

**December 2009**

CONTACTS	BYRON	Braidwood
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Corp. Risk Mgmt Engineer	Roy Linthicum (630-657-3846) Young H. In (630-657-3858)	

## 1. PURPOSE

This Appendix performs a bounding evaluation of the impact of the failure of 1SI8811B on risk associated with seismic events at Braidwood Unit 1.

## 2. SEISMIC EVALUATION

Braidwood station does not have a seismic PRA model. To evaluate the risk from seismic events, a bounding evaluation (based on Reference H1 and H2) was performed by assuming that all seismic induced LOCAs will result in core damage as a result of the failed 1SI8811B valve. This is considered bounding for the following reasons:

- For failure of 1SI8811B to result in a risk increase due to a seismic event, the RH train must be available following the event. In this case, there is still the potential to locally open the valve. Though the seismic event may increase the failure probability of this recovery action, it should not be 1.0. Given that there is at least 2 hours available to open the valve (see Appendix B), the HEP values calculated in Appendix A for internal events were multiplied by a factor of 10 for use in this bounding evaluation.
- Given a seismic event, if the seismic event is sufficient to fail the RWST, the impact of the partial opening of 1SI8811A/B will have no impact on the risk assessment, as there will not be sufficient inventory for ECCS injection to mitigate a seismically induced LOCA. This is accounted for in the seismic evaluation.
- Given a seismic event, if the seismic event is sufficient to cause a loss of offsite power and fail the EDGs, the impact of the partial opening of 1SI8811A/B will have no impact on the risk assessment, as there will not be power available for ECCS injection/recirculation. This is accounted for in the seismic evaluation.

The bounding seismic risk impact is calculated in "Seismic Event Tree - 1SI8811B.xls" in the file specified below.



This resulted in a bounding seismic ICDP of 1.9E-09.

### **Files Used:**

BW-SDP-003 App H R1 Seismic.zip, 17KB, 12/15/09, 10:24am

## 3. REFERENCES

- H1) NUREG-1488, "Revised Livermore Seismic Hazard Estimates for 69 Nuclear Power Plant Sites East of the Rocky Mountains," April 1994.
- H2) NUREG/CR-4550 "Analysis of Core Damage Frequency from Internal Events," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, (Vol. 3, Rev. 1) April 1990
- H3) NUREG/CR-6544 "A Methodology for Analysing Precursors to Earthquake-Initiated and Fire-Initiated Accident Sequences" March 1998

RM DOCUMENTATION NO. BW-SDP-003 Appdendix H		REV: 1	PAGE NO. H3of 3
STATION: Braidwood			
UNIT(S) AFFECTED: UNIT 1			
TITLE:			
<p><b>Braidwood Phase 3 SDP Evaluation of Failure of 1SI8811B to Fully Open</b></p> <p><b>Appendix H - Seismic Evaluation</b></p>			
SUMMARY (Include UREs incorporated):			
This document evaluates the risk significance of failure of 1SI8811B to fully open, as documented in IR 934782.			
Number of pages: <u>Total 18 pages, including this page.</u>			
RM Document Level: <u>Category 2, per ER-AA-600-1012</u>			
<input type="checkbox"/> Review required after periodic Update			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Internal RM Documentation		<input type="checkbox"/> External RM Documentation	
Electronic Calculation Data Files: (Program Name, Version, File Name extension/size/date/hour/min)			
See Section 2 for Data Files			
Method of Review: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Detailed <input type="checkbox"/> Alternate <input type="checkbox"/> Review of External Document			
This RM documentation supersedes: <u>N/A</u> in its entirety.			
Prepared by:	<u>Roy Linthicum</u>	<u></u>	<u>12/14/09</u>
	Print	Sign	Date
Reviewed by:	<u>Joe Edom</u>	<u></u>	<u>2/15/09</u>
	Print	Sign	Date
Approved by:	<u>N/A</u>	<u>/</u>	<u>/</u>
	Print	Sign	Date

## RESULTS SUMMARY FOR BOUNDING SEISMIC RISK CONTRIBUTION FROM 1SI8811B FAILURE

### Delta CDF CONTRIBUTION BY EARTHQUAKE INTERVAL

Seq.	Description	EARTHQUAKE INTERVAL (cm/s/s)										CDF	% of Total
		S-IE1 50 - 75	S-IE2 75 - 150	S-IE3 150 -250	S-IE4 250 - 300	S-IE5 300 - 400	S-IE6 400 - 500	S-IE7 500 - 650	S-IE8 650 - 800	S-IE9 800 - 1000	S-IE10 > 1000		
Seq. 3	Seismic induced LOCA, common cause failure of 1SI8811A/B w/ Failure to recover 1SI8811A/B	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	3.41E-11	3.02E-11	4.31E-11	1.47E-11	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	1.22E-10	5.7%
Seq 5	Seismic induced Loop/LOCA, common cause failure of 1SI8811A/B w/ Failure to recover 1SI8811A/B	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	1.34E-11	5.09E-11	2.30E-10	3.20E-10	5.07E-10	3.79E-10	2.95E-10	2.27E-10	2.02E-09	94.3%
	<b>Total ΔCDF</b>	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	4.75E-11	8.11E-11	2.73E-10	3.34E-10	5.07E-10	3.79E-10	2.95E-10	2.27E-10	<b>2.14E-09</b>	
	<b>Fraction of Total CDF</b>	0%	0%	2%	4%	13%	16%	24%	18%	14%	11%		

Exposure Window (days): 323.5 (included in delta CDF)  
 ICDP = 1.90E-09 GREEN

**ASSUMPTIONS**

- 1) Only concerned about the delta risk, not total seismic risk
- 2) Recovery is assumed to be x10 IE HEP, based on decreased accessibility but significant time (at least 2 hours) to restore valve

Seismic Event	RWST	LOCA	LOOP	EDGs	Successful Shutdown	Sequence Number	Endstate	Frequency
S-IE1	RWST	LOCA	LOOP	EDGs	SHUTDN			
1.98E-04	1.00E+00					Seq. 1	No Change	—
	1.00E+00					Seq. 2	No Change	—
	1.00E+00		1.00E+00			Seq. 3	CD	0.00E+00
	0.00E+00		1.00E+00			Seq. 4	No Change	—
	6.07E-05			1.00E+00		Seq. 5	CD	0.00E+00
	0.00E+00			0.00E+00		Seq. 6	No Change	—
	0.00E+00					Seq. 7	No Change	—
<b>Total delta CDF</b>								0.00E+00

Seismic Event	RWST	No LOCA Occurs	LOOP	EDGs	Successful Shutdown	Sequence Number	Endstate	Frequency	
S-IE2	RWST	LOCA	LOOP	EDGs	SHUTDN				
1.61E-04	1.00E+00					Seq. 1	No Change	---	
	1.00E+00	1.00E+00				Seq. 2	No Change	---	
	0.00E+00		9.86E-01			Seq. 3	CD	0.00E+00	
	1.00E+00		1.00E+00				Seq. 4	No Change	---
	1.42E-02		1.00E+00			Seq. 5	CD	0.00E+00	
	0.00E+00		0.00E+00				Seq. 6	No Change	---
	4.93E-07		1.00E+00				Seq. 7	No Change	---
<b>Total delta CDF</b>								0.00E+00	

Seismic Event	RWST	No LOCA Occurs	LOOP	EDGs	Successful Shutdown	Sequence Number	Endstate	Frequency
S-IE3	RWST	LOCA	LOOP	EDGs	SHUTDN			
4.58E-05	1.00E+00	9.99E-01			9.99E-01	Seq. 1	No Change	—
					9.99E-01	Seq. 2	No Change	—
		1.01E-03	7.18E-01		1.03E-03	Seq. 3	CD	3.41E-11
					9.99E-01	Seq. 4	No Change	—
			2.82E-01	1.00E+00	1.03E-03	Seq. 5	CD	1.34E-11
				3.27E-05		Seq. 6	No Change	—
			1.28E-04			Seq. 7	No Change	—
<b>Total delta CDF</b>								4.75E-11

Seismic Event	RWST	No LOCA Occurs	LOOP	EDGs	Successful Shutdown	Sequence Number	Endstate	Frequency
S-IE4	RWST	LOCA	LOOP	EDGs	SHUTDN			
<p>The diagram shows a fault tree for event S-IE4. The top event is S-IE4 with a probability of 8.53E-06. It branches into two main paths: one through RWST (9.98E-01) and another through No LOCA Occurs (9.91E-01). The RWST path further branches into LOCA (9.30E-03) and LOOP (3.73E-01). The LOOP path branches into EDGs (9.99E-01) and Successful Shutdown (1.02E-03). The EDGs path branches into SHUTDN (9.99E-01) and another path (7.05E-04). The SHUTDN path branches into CD (1.02E-03) and No Change (9.99E-01). The CD path branches into No Change (5.09E-11) and another path (1.51E-03). The 1.51E-03 path branches into No Change (1.51E-03) and another path (7.05E-04). The 7.05E-04 path branches into No Change (7.05E-04) and another path (1.02E-03). The 1.02E-03 path branches into No Change (1.02E-03) and another path (1.02E-03). The 1.02E-03 path branches into No Change (1.02E-03) and another path (1.02E-03).</p>						Seq. 1	No Change	—
						Seq. 2	No Change	—
						Seq. 3	CD	3.02E-11
						Seq. 4	No Change	—
						Seq. 5	CD	5.09E-11
						Seq. 6	No Change	—
						Seq. 7	No Change	—
<b>Total delta CDF</b>								8.11E-11

Seismic Event	RWST	No LOCA Occurs	LOOP	EDGs	Successful Shutdown	Sequence Number	Endstate	Frequency
S-IE5	RWST	LOCA	LOOP	EDGs	SHUTDN			
		9.68E-01				Seq. 1	No Change	—
	9.93E-01				9.99E-01	Seq. 2	No Change	—
		3.20E-02	1.57E-01		1.04E-03	Seq. 3	CD	4.31E-11
8.33E-06				9.95E-01	9.99E-01	Seq. 4	No Change	—
			8.43E-01		1.04E-03	Seq. 5	CD	2.30E-10
				4.84E-03		Seq. 6	No Change	—
	7.31E-03					Seq. 7	No Change	—
<b>Total delta CDF</b>								2.73E-10

Seismic Event	RWST	No LOCA Occurs	LOOP	EDGs	Successful Shutdown	Sequence Number	Endstate	Frequency
S-IE6	RWST	LOCA	LOOP	EDGs	SHUTDN			
<p>The diagram shows a fault tree for event S-IE6. The top event is S-IE6 with a probability of 3.56E-06. It branches into two main paths: one through RWST (9.71E-01) and another through a lower probability path (2.89E-02). The RWST path further branches into No LOCA Occurs (9.11E-01) and LOCA (8.86E-02). The No LOCA path branches into LOOP (4.29E-02) and EDGs (9.99E-01). The LOCA path branches into LOOP (9.57E-01) and EDGs (9.75E-01). The LOOP path branches into EDGs (1.12E-03) and SHUTDN (1.12E-03). The EDGs path branches into SHUTDN (9.99E-01) and SHUTDN (1.12E-03). The SHUTDN path branches into No Change (9.99E-01) and No Change (1.12E-03). The SHUTDN path branches into No Change (9.99E-01) and No Change (1.12E-03).</p>						Seq. 1	No Change	—
						Seq. 2	No Change	—
						Seq. 3	CD	1.47E-11
						Seq. 4	No Change	—
						Seq. 5	CD	3.20E-10
						Seq. 6	No Change	—
						Seq. 7	No Change	—
<b>Total delta CDF</b>								3.34E-10

Seismic Event	RWST	No LOCA Occurs	LOOP	EDGs	Successful Shutdown	Sequence Number	Endstate	Frequency
S-IE7	RWST	LOCA	LOOP	EDGs	SHUTDN			
						Seq. 1	No Change	—
						Seq. 2	No Change	—
						Seq. 3	CD	0.00E+00
						Seq. 4	No Change	—
						Seq. 5	CD	5.07E-10
						Seq. 6	No Change	—
						Seq. 7	No Change	—
<b>Total delta CDF</b>								5.07E-10

Seismic Event	RWST	No LOCA Occurs	LOOP	EDGs	Successful Shutdown	Sequence Number	Endstate	Frequency
S-IE8	RWST	LOCA	LOOP	EDGs	SHUTDN			
9.02E-07	8.06E-01	6.30E-01			9.98E-01	Seq. 1	No Change	—
						Seq. 2	No Change	—
		3.70E-01	0.00E+00		1.81E-03	Seq. 3	CD	0.00E+00
					9.98E-01	Seq. 4	No Change	—
			1.00E+00	7.76E-01	1.81E-03	Seq. 5	CD	3.79E-10
				2.24E-01		Seq. 6	No Change	—
			1.94E-01			Seq. 7	No Change	—
<b>Total delta CDF</b>								3.79E-10

Seismic Event	RWST	No LOCA Occurs	LOOP	EDGs	Successful Shutdown	Sequence Number	Endstate	Frequency	
S-IE9	RWST	LOCA	LOOP	EDGs	SHUTDN				
4.99E-07	6.53E-01	3.50E-01	0.00E+00	5.85E-01	9.98E-01	Seq. 1	No Change	—	
		6.50E-01			2.38E-03	Seq. 2	No Change	—	
					9.98E-01	Seq. 3	CD	0.00E+00	
		3.47E-01			1.00E+00	2.38E-03	Seq. 4	No Change	—
					4.15E-01	2.38E-03	Seq. 5	CD	2.95E-10
							Seq. 6	No Change	—
							Seq. 7	No Change	—
<b>Total delta CDF</b>								2.95E-10	

Seismic Event	RWST	No LOCA Occurs	LOOP	EDGs	Successful Shutdown	Sequence Number	Endstate	Frequency
S-IE10	RWST	LOCA	LOOP	EDGs	SHUTDN			
4.24E-07	4.09E-01	-3.00E-01			9.97E-01	Seq. 1	No Change	—
						Seq. 2	No Change	—
		1.30E+00	0.00E+00		3.29E-03	Seq. 3	CD	0.00E+00
					9.97E-01	Seq. 4	No Change	—
			1.00E+00	3.06E-01	3.29E-03	Seq. 5	CD	2.27E-10
				6.94E-01		Seq. 6	No Change	—
			5.91E-01			Seq. 7	No Change	—
<b>Total delta CDF</b>								2.27E-10

**BRAIDWOOD SEISMIC HAZARD CURVE  
(Ref. NUREG-1488)**

<b>Seismic Interval (cm/s/s)</b>	<b>Seismic Interval Exceedance Frequency (1/yr)</b>	<b>Interval</b>
50 - 75	1.98E-04	S-IE1
75 - 150	1.61E-04	S-IE2
150 - 250	4.58E-05	S-IE3
250 - 300	8.53E-06	S-IE4
300 - 400	8.33E-06	S-IE5
400 - 500	3.56E-06	S-IE6
500 - 650	2.24E-06	S-IE7
650 - 800	9.02E-07	S-IE8
800 - 1000	4.99E-07	S-IE9
> 1000	4.24E-07	S-IE10

**SEISMIC-INDUCED LOCA PROBABILITIES BY SEISMIC INTERVAL**

Seismic Interval (cm/s/s)	Magnitude For Fragility Calculation		(Notes 1, 2, 3)				Total LOCA Probability	Recovery with SI8811 (Notes 4, 5)	Interval
	(cm/s/s)	(g)	RVR	Large LOCA	Medium LOCA	Small LOCA			
50 - 75	63	0.064	Negligible	Negligible	Negligible	Negligible	0E+00	0E+00	S-IE1
75 - 150	113	0.115	Negligible	Negligible	Negligible	Negligible	0E+00	0E+00	S-IE2
150 - 250	200	0.204	Negligible	Negligible	1E-05	1E-03	1E-03	1.0E-03	S-IE3
250 - 300	275	0.280	Negligible	Negligible	3E-04	9E-03	9E-03	1.0E-03	S-IE4
300 - 400	350	0.357	Negligible	3E-05	2E-03	3E-02	3E-02	1.0E-03	S-IE5
400 - 500	450	0.459	3E-05	6E-04	8E-03	8E-02	9E-02	1.1E-03	S-IE6
500 - 650	575	0.586	3E-04	3E-03	2E-02	2E-01	2E-01	1.2E-03	S-IE7
650 - 800	725	0.739	2E-03	2E-02	5E-02	3E-01	4E-01	1.8E-03	S-IE8
800 - 1000	900	0.918	1E-02	6E-02	9E-02	5E-01	7E-01	2.4E-03	S-IE9
> 1000	1200	1.224	7E-02	2E-01	2E-01	9E-01	1E+00	3.3E-03	S-IE10

NOTES:

1. Values less than 1E-5 considered "Negligible"
2. Based on NUREG/CR-4550 V3, Rev 1, Part 3, Figure 4.26
3. Based on NUREG/CR-4550 V3, Rev 1, Part 3, Figure 4.27
4. Recovery is assumed to be x10 IE HEP, based on decreased accessibility but significant time (at least 2 hours) to restore valve
5. Recovery includes probability that 1S18811A fails to fully open, given that 1S18811B fails to fully open (alpha factor)

**OFFSITE POWER & EDG SEISMIC FRAGILITIES BY SEISMIC INTERVAL**

Seismic Interval (cm/s/s)	Magnitude For Fragility Calculation		Offsite Power Fragility	EDG Fragility	Interval
	(cm/s/s)	(g)			
50 - 75	63	0.064	6.07E-05	0.00E+00	S-IE1
75 - 150	113	0.115	1.42E-02	0.00E+00	S-IE2
150 - 250	200	0.204	2.82E-01	3.27E-05	S-IE3
250 - 300	275	0.280	6.27E-01	7.05E-04	S-IE4
300 - 400	350	0.357	8.43E-01	4.84E-03	S-IE5
400 - 500	450	0.459	9.57E-01	2.52E-02	S-IE6
500 - 650	575	0.586	1.00E+00	9.00E-02	S-IE7
650 - 800	725	0.739	1.00E+00	2.24E-01	S-IE8
800 - 1000	900	0.918	1.00E+00	4.15E-01	S-IE9
> 1000	1200	1.224	1.00E+00	6.94E-01	S-IE10

**Ceramic Insulator seismic capacity data from NUREG/CR-4550**

<u>Mf (g)</u>	<u>Br</u>	<u>Bu</u>	<u>HCLPF</u>
0.25	0.25	0.25	0.110

**EDG seismic capacity data from NUREG/CR-4550**

<u>Am (g)</u>	<u>Br</u>	<u>Bu</u>	<u>HCLPF</u>
1	0.25	0.31	0.397
2.73E-08	1		
	0.25	0.31	

**NOTES:**

1. Fragility (i.e., failure probability) =  $\Phi [\ln(A/A_m)/\beta_c]$ . A is the g level in question.  $A_m$  is the median seismic capacity.  $\beta_c = (\beta_u^2 + \beta_r^2)^{0.5}$ .
2. seismic fragility less than or equal to 1E-7 set to 0.0
3. At a calculated value of  $\geq 0.99$ , the value 1.00 is printed by the cell equation.

**RWST SEISMIC FRAGILITIES BY SEISMIC INTERVAL**

Seismic Interval (cm/s/s)	Magnitude For Fragility Calculation		RWST Fragility	Interval
	(cm/s/s)	(g)		
50 - 75	63	0.064	0.00E+00	S-IE1
75 - 150	113	0.115	4.93E-07	S-IE2
150 - 250	200	0.204	1.28E-04	S-IE3
250 - 300	275	0.280	1.51E-03	S-IE4
300 - 400	350	0.357	7.31E-03	S-IE5
400 - 500	450	0.459	2.89E-02	S-IE6
500 - 650	575	0.586	8.61E-02	S-IE7
650 - 800	725	0.739	1.94E-01	S-IE8
800 - 1000	900	0.918	3.47E-01	S-IE9
> 1000	1200	1.224	5.91E-01	S-IE10

**RWST seismic capacity based on NUREG/CR-6544**

<u>Am (g)</u>	<u>Br</u>	<u>Bu</u>	<u>HCLPF</u>
1.1	0.3	0.35	0.376

NOTES:

1. Fragility (i.e., failure probability) =  $\Phi [\ln(A/A_m)/\beta c]$ . A is the g level in question.  $A_m$  is the median seismic capacity.  $\beta c = (\beta u^2 + \beta r^2)^{0.5}$ .
2. seismic fragility less than or equal to 1E-7 set to 0.0
3. At a calculated value of  $\geq 0.99$ , the value 1.00 is printed by the cell equation.

**Braidwood  
PRA APPLICATION NOTEBOOK**

**BW-SDP-003**

**Revision 0**

**Braidwood Phase 3 SDP Evaluation of  
Failure of 1SI8811B to Fully Open**

**Appendix J**

**Additional Sensitivity Studies to Address NRC Concerns**

**December 2009**

CONTACTS	BYRON	Braidwood
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### 1. PURPOSE

Based on interactions with the NRC Senior Reactor Analysts, this Appendix evaluates the impact of different assumptions used in the SDP evaluation. The scope of these evaluations are:

- Impact of using Alpha Factors for “Pooled MOVs” versus “RH MOVs” for the 1SI8811 Valves.
- Impact of requiring 10 minutes to close 1SI8812 valves versus 7 minutes
- Impact of different assumed cool down rates
- Impact of doubling the time it takes to local open 1SI8811B
- Impact of using time to RWST 9% versus core uncover (Top of Active Fuel) for determining time available to open 1SI8811B.

### 2. IMPACT OF USING ALPHA FACTORS FOR “POOLED MOVs” VERSUS “RH MOVs” FOR THE 1SI8811 VALVES

The NRC SPAR model uses the “Pooled MOV” common cause failure data for all MOVs. This sensitivity study investigates the impact of changing the alpha factor for the SI8811 valves to use the Pooled MOV alpha factor (2.28E-02) [Reference J1].

For this sensitivity study, the alpha factor for the SI8811 valves was changed to 2.28E-2 in both the base internal events model and the SDP case.

The results of the sensitivity analysis using the revised alpha factors are provided below:

Use of Pooled MOV Alpha Factor			
Case	Truncation	Frequency	Delta
A11C	1.00E-10	2.20E-05	1.10E-06
A12C	1.00E-10	2.22E-05	1.13E-06
A11L	1.00E-11	2.42E-06	1.20E-08
A12L	1.00E-11	2.43E-06	1.40E-08

Base Case – Pooled MOV CCF		
Case	Truncation	Frequency
A11C	1.00E-10	2.09E-05
A12C	1.00E-10	2.11E-05
A11L	1.00E-11	2.41E-06
A12L	1.00E-11	2.42E-06

Unit	Exposure Period		Internal Events	
	Days	Fraction <sup>1</sup>	ΔCDF (/year)	ICDP
CDF	323.5	8.86E-01	1.12E-06	9.88E-07
LERF	323.5	8.86E-01	1.30E-08	1.15E-08

The results of this sensitivity study show that using the Pooled MOV alpha factors rather than the RH MOV alpha factor for the 1SI8811 valves results in a slightly higher SDP

<sup>1</sup> Fraction = # days divided by 365.25 days/year, including 2 days repair time

result. Though the internal events SDP is still below the Green/White Threshold of 1E-06, the addition of fire and seismic risk would result in a value slightly greater than 1E-06. It should be noted, however, that use of the RH MOV values is considered the appropriate value to use as the 1SI8811 valves see system conditions representative of the RH system.

Files Used:

BW-SDP-003 App J Alpha Factor Files.zip 1,658,630B, 12/26/09, 9:48p m

**3. IMPACT OF REQUIRING 10 MINUTES VERSUS 7MINUTES TO CLOSE 1SI8812 VALVES**

This sensitivity investigates the impact of assuming it takes 10 minutes for the control room staff to close the 1SI8812 valves (stopping the flow diversion to Containment Sump).

The HEPs for the local opening of 1SI8811B were changed as follows:

Initiator	Base HEP		Sensitivity	
	Time Available	HEP	Time Available	HEP
Small LOCA (BBSDP15a10)	9.46 hours	6.5E-03	8.64 hours	6.5E-03
Medium LOCA (BBSDP17a10)	1.99 hours	6.0E-03	1.79 hours	6.0E-03

Use of 10 minutes versus 7 minutes as the time assumed to close the 1SI8812 valves to stop the flow diversion from the RWST to the Containment Sump does not result in a change to the HEP used. This is a result of the step function of the HEP methodology which uses discrete time intervals to adjust the HEPs. As the impact of the time windows is small, there is no impact on the HEPs. Therefore, requiring 10 minutes versus 7 minutes to close the 1SI8812 valves has no impact on the SDP results.

Files Used:

MAAP Case BBSDP15a10  
 MAAP Case BBSDP17a10

#### 4. IMPACT OF DIFFERENT ASSUMED RCS COOLDOWN RATES

Sensitivity analyses were performed to investigate different assumptions for the RCS cooldown rate. The base case analyses all assumed a prescribed cooldown rate of 100 °F/hr. The following sensitivity cases were executed:

Case BBSDP17aNC: 2" SLOCA with AFW, 2CV, 2SI, 2 RCFC trains, flow diversion for 7 minutes, and without cooldown

Case BBSDP18a50: .86" SLOCA with AFW, 2CV, 2SI, 2 RCFC trains, flow diversion for 7 minutes, and 50 F/hr cooldown initiated at 45 minutes

The following provides the results of the selected sensitivity analyses:

CASE DESCRIPTION <sup>1</sup>	CASE #	RWST 46.7% <sup>2</sup>	RWST 9%	TAF <sup>3</sup>	CD <sup>4</sup>	46.7% TO 9%	46.7% TO TAF
2" SLOCA, wAFW, 2CV, 2SI, Cooldown @ .75 hr, 2 RCFC trains, flow diversion for 7 min.	BBSDP17a	2.54 hr	3.57 hr	12.00 hr	15.91 hr	1.03 hr	9.46 hr
No cooldown	BBSDP17aNC	2.54 hr	3.66 hr	5.45 hr	6.21 hr	1.12 hr	2.91 hr
.86" SLOCA, wAFW, 2CV, 2SI, Cooldown @ .75 hr, 2 RCFC trains, flow diversion for 7 min.	BBSDP18a	5.23 hr	8.00 hr	28.21 hr	30.45 hr	2.77 hr	22.98 hr
50F HR	BBSDP18a50	5.23 hr	8.32 hr	28.82 hr	31.10 hr	3.09 hr	23.59 hr

Notes:

- 1) See Appendix B, Section 3.2 for complete case description
- 2) Initial volume corresponds to Tech Spec minimum of 400,500 gal
- 3) Top of active fuel exposure
- 4) Peak cladding temperature > 1800 °F

In both cases, a reduction in the cooldown rate results in a slightly longer time period to reach 9% RWST level. This is due to slightly higher RCS pressures yielding smaller ECCS flow rates and a corresponding slower RWST depletion rate.

For the 5.2" break, no additional cooldown was assumed in the original analysis as the break flow provided a cooldown rate in excess of 100 °F/hr.

As a result, use of a 100 °F/hr cooldown rate is conservative with respect to RWST flow diversion and time available to locally open 1SI8811B.

Files Used:

MAAP Case BBSDP17aNC  
 MAAP Case BBSDP18a50

**5. IMPACT OF DOUBLING THE TIME IT TAKES TO LOCALLY OPEN 1SI8811B**

This sensitivity study investigates the impact of doubling the time required (48 minutes versus 24 minutes) to determine the sensitivity to adverse temperature conditions on the SDP evaluation. Reference J3 notes that the temperature in area is expected to be less than 90F based on realistic assumptions in the area. In the worse case, design basis assumptions would result in temperatures being less than 115F. Since the timing estimates for manually stroking the valve were down at ~75F, this sensitivity investigates the impact of the higher temperatures resulting in a longer time being required to stroke the valve open. Based on engineering judgment, it is not expected that these temperatures would result in more than doubling the time required to locally stroke the valve open.

The HEPs for the local opening of 1SI8811B were changed as follows:

Initiator	Base HEP		Sensitivity	
	Time Available	HEP	Time Available	HEP
Small LOCA	9.46 hours	6.5E-03	9.06 hours	6.5E-03
Medium LOCA	1.99 hours	6.0E-03	1.59 hours	6.5E-03

The results of this sensitivity study are provided below:

<b>x2 Time to Locally Open 1SI8811B</b>			
Case	Truncation	Frequency	Delta
A11C SDP	1.00E-10	2.16E-05	8.01E-07
A12D SDP	1.00E-10	2.19E-05	8.41E-07
A11L SDP	1.00E-11	2.42E-06	1.03E-08
A12L SDP	1.00E-11	2.43E-06	1.38E-08

<b>Rev 6D2 Base Case</b>			
A11D1 CDF	1.00E-10		2.08E-05
A12D1 CDF	1.00E-10		2.11E-05
A11D1 LERF	1.00E-11		2.41E-06
A12D1 LERF	1.00E-11		2.42E-06

Unit	Exposure Period		Internal Events	
	Days	Fraction <sup>2</sup>	ΔCDF (/year)	ICDP/ILERP
CDF	323.5	8.86E-01	8.21E-07	7.27E-07
LERF	323.5	8.86E-01	1.21E-08	1.07E-08

The impact of doubling the time required to locally open 1SI8811B is negligible and will not impact the conclusions of the SDP evaluation.

**Files Used:**

BW-SDP-003 App J – x2 Local time.zip 863KB, 12/28/09, 8:37am  
 bwd-8811-121009-48minsens.HRA 1,675,264B, 12/29/09, 8:51pm

<sup>2</sup> Fraction = # days divided by 365.25 days/year, including 2 days repair time

**6. IMPACT OF USING TIME TO RWST 9% VERSUS CORE UNCOVERY (TOP OF ACTIVE FUEL) FOR DETERMINING TIME AVAILABLE TO OPEN 1SI8811B.**

This sensitivity study investigates the impact of using the time to RWST 9% versus the time to core uncovery for the time available in the HEP calculations.

The HEPs for the local opening of 1SI8811B were changed as follows:

Initiator	Base HEP		Sensitivity	
	Time Available	HEP	Time Available	HEP
Small LOCA	9.46 hours	6.5E-03	1.03 hours	7.6E-02
Medium LOCA	1.99 hours	6.0E-03	1.12 hours	1.5E-02

The results of this sensitivity study are provided below:

Time Limited by RWST 9%			
Case	Truncation	Frequency	Delta
A11C SDP	1.00E-10	3.08E-05	1.00E-05
A12D SDP	1.00E-10	3.12E-05	1.02E-05
A11L SDP	1.00E-11	2.54E-06	1.29E-07
A12L SDP	1.00E-11	2.55E-06	1.34E-07

Rev 6D2 Base Case			
A11D1 CDF	1.00E-10		2.08E-05
A12D1 CDF	1.00E-10		2.11E-05
A11D1 LERF	1.00E-11		2.41E-06
A12D1 LERF	1.00E-11		2.42E-06

Unit	Exposure Period		Internal Events	
	Days	Fraction <sup>3</sup>	ΔCDF (/year)	ICDP/ILERP
CDF	323.5	8.86E-01	1.01E-05	8.94E-06
LERF	323.5	8.86E-01	1.32E-07	1.17E-07

Basing the time available on the time required to reach 9% in the RWST has a significant impact on the SDP. However, as noted in Reference J2, no adverse environment conditions are expected as a result of terminating all ECCS injection until the core becomes uncovered. Therefore, it is appropriate to use time to core uncover, rather than the time to RWST 9% as the time window for locally opening 1SI8811B.

**Files Used:**

RD61\_1SI8811BR1 – RWST 9.zip 1,187,794B, 12/29/09, 4:25pm  
 bwd-8811-121009-9%sens.HRA 1,675,264B, 12/29/09, 8:51pm

<sup>3</sup> Fraction = # days divided by 365.25 days/year, including 2 days repair time

## 7. SUMMARY

The table below summarizes the results of the sensitivity analysis.

Case	IE SDP Result	% Change
<b>Base</b>	7.13E-07	N/A
Pooled MOV CCF	9.88E-07	39%
10 minutes to Close 1SI8812 Valves	7.13E-07	0%
RCS Cooldown Rates	7.13E-07	0%
2x Time to Locally Open 1SI8811B	7.27E-07	2%
Time Available based on RWST 9%	8.94E-06	1154%

## 8. SOFTWARE & FILES USED

- CAFTA 5.3 (EX0007572)
- BW-SDP-003 App J Files R0.ZIP, 3,722Kb, 12/29/09, 8:53pm

## 9. REFERENCES

- J1). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "CCF Parameter Estimations, 2005 Update", <http://nrcoe.inl.gov/results/CCF/ParamEst2005/ccfparamest.htm>, September 2008.
- J2). ER 393342 "ACCESSIBILITY OF 1SI8811B FOLLOWING SBLOCA – REVISED TO INCLUDE POTENTIAL ECCS TERMINATION AT RWST EMPTY"
- J3) EC 378302, "EVALUATE TEMPERATURE OF THE PIPE PENETRATION CURVE WALL AREA AUX. BLDG. ELEV. 364', USING A BOUNDING CASE AND REALISTIC CASE REVISED ANALYSIS FROM EC 377814"

J

<b>RM DOCUMENTATION NO. BW-SDP-003 Appdendix J REV: 0</b>		<b>PAGE NO. E10 of 10</b>	
<b>STATION: Braidwood</b>		<i>12/30/09</i>	
<b>UNIT(S) AFFECTED: UNIT 1</b>			
<b>TITLE:</b>  <b>Braidwood Phase 3 SDP Evaluation of Failure of 1SI8811B to Fully Open</b>  <b>Appendix J – Additional Sensitivity Studies to Address NRC Concerns</b>			
<b>SUMMARY (Include UREs incorporated):</b>  This Appendix performs several sensitivity studies to address NRC concerns regarding the SDP for the 1SI8811B valve failure to fully open  Number of pages: <u>Total 10 pages, including this page.</u> RM Document Level: <u>Category 2, per ER-AA-600-1012</u>			
<input type="checkbox"/> Review required after periodic Update			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Internal RM Documentation		<input type="checkbox"/> External RM Documentation	
Electronic Calculation Data Files: (Program Name, Version, File Name extension/size/date/hour/min) See Sections 2 – 6, 8 for Data Files			
Method of Review: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Detailed <input type="checkbox"/> Alternate <input type="checkbox"/> Review of External Document This RM documentation supersedes: <u>N/A</u> in its entirety.			
Prepared by:	Roy Linthicum	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>12/30/09</i>
	Print	Sign	Date
Prepared by:	Jeff Gabor	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>12/30/09</i>
	Print	Sign	Date
Reviewed by:	Young In	<i>1. See Attached</i>	<i>1</i>
	Print	Sign	Date
Approved by:	N/A	<i>1</i>	<i>1</i>
	Print	Sign	Date

**Linthicum, Roy R.:(GenCo-Nuc)**

---

**From:** In, Young H.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 30, 2009 9:12 AM  
**To:** Linthicum, Roy R.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Subject:** RE: BW-SDP-003 Appendix J, Rev 0

Roy,

I reviewed the BW-SDP-003 Appendix J, Rev 0, and this email provides my electronic approval.

Young

-----Original Message-----

From: Linthicum, Roy R.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
Sent: Wed 12/30/2009 6:29 AM  
To: In, Young H.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
Subject: BW-SDP-003 Appendix J, Rev 1

Young,

Your comments BW-SDP-003 Appendix J, Rev 0 have been incorporated. Please respond with your electronic concurrence.

Roy Linthicum

Corporate Risk Management

630-657-3846 (Cantera)

630-926-3034 (Cell)

Text Messages: 6309263034@messaging.sprintpcs.com

**ATTACHMENT 2**

**EC #377204, "Evaluate 1SI8811B Flow at Partial Opening"**

**Braidwood Station**

**Engineering Change**

EC Number : 0000377204 000  
Status/Date : CLOSED 10/12/2009  
Facility : BRW  
Type/Sub-type: EVAL PROG



Print Date: 12/30/2009



Page: 1

EC Title: EVALUATE 1SI8811B FLOW AT PARTIAL OPENING

Mod Nbr : 0000377204      KW1: SR      KW2:      KW3:      KW4:      KW5:

Master EC : N      Work Group :      Temporary : N  
Outage : N      Alert Group: A8951NESPR      Aprd Reqd Date:  
WO Required : N      Image Addr :      Exp Insvc Date:  
Adv Wk Appvd:      Alt Ref. :      Expires On : 07/02/2012  
Auto-Advance: Y      Priority : CL      Auto-Asbuild : N  
Caveat Outst:      Department :      Discipline :  
Resp Engr : ROBERT      C BEDFORD  
Location :

<u>Milestone</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>PassPort</u>	<u>Name</u>		<u>Req By</u>
030-DAR CONCUR	10/07/2009	BRWGB	BAL	GARY	CANCELED
110-PREPARE EC	10/01/2009	BRWZB	BEDFORD	ROBERT	APPROVED
120-REVIEW EC	10/06/2009	BRZZC	COLE	THOMAS	APPROVED
see topic notes					
200-DISC RVW-M	10/07/2009	PWR69	SHAH	SHASHIKANT	APPROVED
210-DEPT RVW-01	10/07/2009	CSCTT	THYGESEN	THEODORE	APPROVED

**Corporate Engineering Review**

As an experienced valve engineer, and holder of certification by Exelon Certification Guide N-AN-ENG-CERT-DG02, I have performed an independent review of this Engineering Evaluation, and find it to be thorough and accurate.

Ted Thygesen

Exelon Corporate Valve Engineer

240-ITPR-EPR	10/07/2009	BRWGB	BAL	GARY	APPROVED
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HU-AA-1212 was utilized to perform a pre-job brief. This review determined

a Risk Consequence Severity Level of Low, and a Low Probability of error yielding a risk rank of 1 (Existing Process Reviews).

300-APPROVE EC	10/07/2009	BRWGB	BAL	GARY	APPROVED
900-ARCHIVE EC	10/12/2009	BRZEF	RIORDAN	GAIL	CLOSED

**Units**

<u>Fac</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Description</u>
BRW	01	UNIT ONE

**Systems**

<u>Fac</u>	<u>System</u>	<u>Description</u>
BRW	SI	SAFETY INJECTION

**Engineering Change**

EC Number : 0000377204 000  
Status/Date : CLOSED 10/12/2009  
Facility : BRW  
Type/Sub-type: EVAL PROG



Print Date: 12/30/2009



Page: 2

**Affected Equipment List**

<u>Fac</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Op Sys</u>	<u>Division</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>System</u>	<u>Class</u>
BRW	01				SI	
	Equipment :	MOVA	8811B	Minor Rev:		
	Component :	V20	<	Major Rev:		
	Equip. Tag:	1SI8811B				
	State:	Reviewed?	Y	Inst/Rm:	Rev Trackable:	Y Inc: N
	Name :	CNMT SUMP 1B ISOL VLV				

**Reference Documents List**

<u>Facility</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>SubType</u>	<u>Document</u>	<u>Sheet</u>
BRW	DWGV		77920	
Title: VALVE ASSY 24" MOT OP GATE				
BRW	DWGC		M-61	4
Title: DIAGRAM OF SAFETY INJECTION UNIT 1 (CRITICAL CONTROL ROOM DRAWING)				

**Planning/Scheduling Information**

Planning Start : Level of Effort:

<u>Planning Event</u>	<u>From Date</u>	<u>Thru Date</u>
100-PREP EVAL		

**Cross References**

<u>Ref.</u>	<u>Sub-</u>	<u>Description</u>
<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>	
AR	00934782	1SI8811B FAILED TO STROKE FULL OPEN DURING SUR
EC	0000376161	EVALUATE 1SI8811B FLOW AT PARTIAL OPENING
ER	0000392325	DETERMINE ACCESSIBILITY OF 1SI8811B FOLLOWING

**Engineering Change Comments**

Comments Last Updated By: BRWZB Last Updated Date: 10/07/2009

## **1. REASON FOR EVALUATION / SCOPE**

In accordance with Issue Report #934782 valve 1SI8811B, Containment Sump Isolation Valve, failed to fully stroke open during surveillance testing. Valve 1SI8811B was being stroked in accordance with Operating Surveillance procedures 1BwOSR 5.5.8.SI-7B, Safety Injection System Containment Sump 1SI8811B Valve Stroke Surveillance, and 1BwOSR 5.5.8.SI-2B, Train B Safety Injection System Isolation Valve Indication Surveillance. During the open stroke the valve opened approximately 35 percent and stopped as indicated by valve stem position. Control Room valve position indicating lights were both lit (dual indication), indicating the breaker was not in a tripped condition. Troubleshooting in accordance with work order #1245941 found that the torque switch inside the limit switch compartment was no longer functional due to corrosion. The corrosion was due to water intrusion into the limit switch compartment that was apparent after the actuator limit switch compartment cover was removed.


Based on the nature of the torque switch failure the 1SI8811B valve traveled open until the open torque switch bypass circuit transferred from the torque switch. Due to the stuck open side torque switch contacts the valve stopped at approximately 35 percent open. The open bypass limit switch is set during diagnostic testing and is required to be set anywhere between 30 and 40 percent.

The 1SI8811B valve is normally closed and required to open during the recirculation phase of Emergency Core Cooling to provide water from the containment sump to the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Containment Spray (CS) pumps. The 1SI8811B valve is safety related and seismic category I. The valve is required to open to maintain adequate flow and NPSH for the RHR and CS pumps. This evaluation will determine whether the valve could pass design RHR pump flow at the actual opening percentage for the valve.

This EC supercedes EC#376161 in its entirety. This EC removes Containment Spray flow and incorporates conservative assumptions for flow and head loss through the 1SI8811B valve.

## **2. DETAILED EVALUATION**

The first step is to determine the actual percentage the 1SI8811B valve opened based on the open bypass setting. The last diagnostic test was performed 05/17/06 in accordance with work order #695341. The following information was taken from the diagnostic test review, the design drawing (reference 5) and the MIDAS Data Sheet (reference 7):



The time ( $t=$ ) values were taken from the diagnostic testing data. The internal actuator limit switch assembly and valve stem are driven from the actuator gearing and the open bypass and open limit contacts are controlled from this assembly. Due to being driven from actuator gearing these contacts actuate at exactly the same stem position from stroke to stroke. The only variation in these times from stroke to stroke is the time related to contact wipe that is measured in thousandths of a second.

When the actuator is demanded to open the motor starts ( $t=0$ ) and the actuator gearing starts to move. After hammer blow occurs and stem thread lash is taken up the stem starts to move taking up disk t-head clearance prior to disk unwedging. At  $t=1.814$  the disk unwedges from the valve seat and starts to travel open. At  $t=4.889$  the disk travels approximately 0.75 inches and starts to uncover the port allowing flow to occur. At  $t=96.608$  the valve disk has traveled to the full open (backseated) position. Although the disk will be out of the flow stream prior to contacting the backseat the backseat stem position was conservatively chosen. The 1SI8811B open limit was set at 97 percent of the full backseat stroke therefore the open limit time was adjusted to account for the stem traveling to the backseat position.

Disk Unwedging Time (diagnostic label O9)  $t = 1.814$  seconds (Reference 4)

Contactors Dropout at Full Open (diagnostic label O17)  $t = 93.709$  seconds  
(Reference 4)

Open Bypass Time  $t = 36.385$  seconds (diagnostic label O12) (Reference 4)

Open limit setting (percent of stroke) = 97% (Reference 4)

Internal valve diameter = 22.6 inches (Reference 5)

Stroke time (seat to backseat) =  $93.709 / 0.97 = 96.608$  seconds

Stroke length = 23.56 inches (Reference 7)

Stem speed =  $23.56 \text{ inches} / 96.608 \text{ seconds} = 0.2439 \text{ inches/sec}$

Stroke length to start uncovering port = 0.75 inches (conservative value based on reference 9)

Time to start uncovering port =  $0.75 \text{ inches} / 0.2439 \text{ inches/sec} = 3.075$  seconds

Stem travel time after uncovering port  $t = 96.608 - 3.075 - 1.814 = 91.719$  seconds

Open bypass travel time  $t = 36.385 - 3.075 - 1.814 = 31.496$  seconds

Bypass as a percent of full stroke =  $31.496 / 91.719 = 34.34$  percent

The second step is to determine the head loss through the 1SI8811B at 34.34 percent open during the maximum expected flow rate scenario. Only the RH pump flow will be considered due to the CS pump flowpath interlocks not being made up at a partial opening position.

RH Pump Flow = 5000 gpm (Reference 2, Maximum)

Lowest RHR NPSH Margin = 3.7 ft (Reference 2)

Cv of Valve at approximately 30 percent open = 5000 (Reference 3, conservative value based on actual open percentage of 34.34%)

Total Maximum Flow (Q) = 5000 gpm

Resistance Coefficient  $K = 891 (d)^4 / C_v^2 = 891 (22.60)^4 / (5000)^2 = 9.298$   
(Reference 1, Equation 3-16)

$d$  = Valve internal diameter = 22.60 in (Reference 5)

Head Loss  $h_L = 0.00259 K Q^2 / d^4 = 0.00259 (9.298) (5000)^2 / 22.60^4 = 2.308$  ft  
(Reference 1, Equation 3-14)

Therefore, comparing the RHR NPSH margin of 3.7 ft with the head loss through a partially open valve of 2.31 ft indicates there is margin to ensure adequate

NPSH with 1SI8811B partially open at approximately 34.34 percent. Additional margin is available however not included in this evaluation as follows:

1. The original Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) analysis (Reference 2) calculates the head loss through the containment sump piping. This piping contains valve 1SI8811B and therefore, the portion of the loss attributed to 1SI8811B may be subtracted from the loss calculated based on a partially open valve yielding slightly greater margin.
2. The original Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) analysis (Reference 2) utilizes NPSH required values based on conservative max pump flow values vs those flow values utilized in reference 6. This yields higher required NPSH values and decreases the margin between required and available NPSH. Using the lower flow rates (RHR only) will lower the required NPSH decreasing the required NPSH and increasing the margin between the required and available NPSH.
3. Residual Heat Removal pump flow of 5000 gpm used in this analysis is conservative relative to actual maximum flow rate determined during preoperational testing (Reference 2).
4. The Cv value vs percent open for 1SI8811B was obtained from the manufacturer (reference 3). Discussions with the manufacturer determined that this Cv chart was constructed from testing performed on two gate valves of different sizes and configurations and was not a specific Cv chart for the 1SI8811B model valve. A Cv of approximately 5000 was chosen from this chart to conservatively bound the Cv value at 34.34 percent. This value was compared with gate valve Cv values determined using two other sources. The calculations using the referenced sources provided below determined that the Cv provided by the manufacturer is conservative.

#### Cv calculation utilizing reference #1

Utilizing methodology for gate valve with wedge disk and Equivalent Length In Pipe Diameters (Page A-30)

One half open (50%)  $L/D = 160$

One-quarter open (25%)  $L/D = 900$

Equivalent Lengths L and L/D and Resistance Coefficient K (Page A-31)

One half open (50%)  $K = 1.8$

One-quarter open (25%)  $K = 10.3$

Equivalents of Resistance Coefficient K and Flow Coefficient Cv (Page A-32)

One half open (50%)  $C_v = 11382$

One -quarter open (25%)  $C_v = 4758$

$C_v$  at approximately 34.34 percent open = 7249

It should be noted that the  $C_v$  value above falls between 25 and 50 percent and due to the shape of the  $C_v$  curve the actual value at 34.34% would be slightly lower than this value.

#### $C_v$ calculation utilizing reference #8

Utilizing the attached curve labeled "Hydraulic (Tau) Characteristics of Valves" the Tau value at 34.34% open yields a Tau value of approximately 0.15.

$$\text{Tau} = C_v / C_{vu}$$

$$C_v = \text{Tau} \times C_{vu}$$

$C_v$  = Flow coefficient at partial opening of 34.34%

$C_{vu}$  = Flow coefficient at full open of 39836 (Reference 5)

$$C_v = 0.15 \times 39836 = 5975$$

### **3. CONCLUSIONS/FINDINGS**


The results of this evaluation indicate that NPSH margin exists with a partially open 1SI8811B valve ensuring that adequate accident flows (RHR) can be provided during the recirculation phase of a design basis Loss of Coolant Accident.

### **4. REFERENCES**

1. Crane Technical Paper 410, Flow of Fluids through Valves, Fittings, and Pipe, 1969
2. Design Analysis BYR06-058 / BRW-06-0035-M, NPSHA for RHR & CS During Post LOCA Recirculation, Revision 1A
3. Vendor Contact Form dated 07/09/09, Flowserve Corporation Chart of Approximate Flow Coefficient ( $C_v$ ) vs. Percent (%) Open, Size 24, Pressure Class 300 Flex Wedge Gate Valve, Drawing 77920.

4. Work order # 695341 Diagnostic Test dated 05/17/06 and file E:\MIDAS on Ksqzkfs01 \ Quicklook Data \ Braidwood \ Unit 1 \ 1SI \ 1SI8812B \ 06a0arew (Opened with Quicklook software)
5. Vendor Design Drawing 77920, Revision F
6. Design Analysis BYR06-029 / BRW-06-0016-M, SI/RHR/CS/CV System Hydraulic Analysis in Support of GSI-191, Revision 3
7. MIDAS Data Sheet BRA-1SI8811B Revision 3
8. Hydraulic Design Handbook, McGraw-Hill, Copyright 1999
9. Vendor Contact Form dated 10/05/09, reference dimension from disk fully seated to point of just uncovering valve port, Size 24, Pressure Class 300 Flex Wedge Gate Valve, Drawing 77920.

HU-AA-1212 Technical pre-job brief performed 07/9/09 for EC#376161. ITP review is not required.




ER-AA-2030  
Revision 8  
Page 29 of 47

**ATTACHMENT 2  
VENDOR CONTACT FORM  
Page 1 of 2**

<p><b>Vendor Contact Form</b></p>	
<p><b>Purpose of Contact (Problem Description):</b> Valve 1SI8811B failed to fully open during surveillance testing and an evaluation is being performed to determine the flow that could pass through the valve in a partially open state. To determine the flow through a partially open valve a flow coefficient (Cv) vs percent open curve is required.</p>	
<p><b>Assistance Requested:</b> Provide an approximate flow coefficient (Cv) vs percent open curve for Borg Warner Valve, Size 24 inch, Pressure Class 300 Flex Wedge Gate Valve, NVD - Drawing 7792C.</p>	
<p><b>Guidance Provided (attach additional sheets as needed):</b> The attached curve of approximate flow coefficient (Cv) vs percent open provides the Cv at various percentages of valve opening for the valve listed on drawing 77920.</p>	
<p><b>Recommendation Provided (attach additional sheets as needed):</b> Utilize the attached curve for approximate flow coefficient (Cv) vs percent open for Borg Warner Valve, Size 24-inch, Pressure Class 300 Flex Wedge Gate Valve, Drawing 77920.</p>	
<p><b>Prepared by:</b> Floyd Bensinger / </p> <p style="text-align: center; font-size: small;">Printed Name / Signature</p>	<p><b>Date:</b> 07/09/09</p>
<p><b>Organization:</b> Flowserve Corp.</p>	
<p><b>Phone/Fax:</b> 918-631-3200 / 918-631-3388</p>	

Approximate Flow Coefficient (Cv) vs. Per Cent (%) Open,  
Size 24, Pressure Class 300 Flex Wedge Gate Valve, NVD - Drawing 77920

FAB  
7/1/09



ER-AA-2030  
Revision 9  
Page 21 of 40

**ATTACHMENT 2  
VENDOR CONTACT FORM  
Page 1 of 2**

<b>Vendor Contact Form</b>	
<b>Instructions:</b> 1. Exelon Engineer to complete Sections 1 through 4 and forward to Vendor. 2. Vendor to complete last section and promptly return (via fax) to Exelon Engineer. 3. Exelon Engineer to submit completed form to WEIR per CC:AA-204 & CC:MW/204-1001.	
<b>Purpose of Contact (Problem Description):</b> Valve 1SI8811B failed to fully open during surveillance testing and an evaluation is being performed to determine the flow that could pass through the valve in a partially open state. To determine the amount of port uncovered with a partially open valve the amount of disk travel to move from the fully seated position to a position of just starting to uncover the port is requested. This information with the distance traveled after uncovering the port will be used to determine the percent of valve opening.	
<b>Assistance Requested:</b> Provide an approximate distance from a full closed/seated position to a position of just starting to uncover the port for Borg Warner Valve, Size 24 inch, Pressure Class 300 Flex Wedge Gate Valve, NVD - Drawing 77920.	
<b>Guidance Provided (attach additional sheets as needed):</b> The distance from a full closed/seated position to a position of just starting to uncover the port for Borg Warner Valve, Size 24 inch, Pressure Class 300 Flex Wedge Gate Valve, NVD - Drawing 77920 is approximately 5/8 inch.	
<b>Recommendation Provided (attach additional sheets as needed):</b> See guidance provided above.	
<b>Prepared by:</b> Floyd Bensinger	 <small>Printed Name / Signature</small>
<b>Date:</b> 10/06/09	
<b>Organization:</b> Flowserve Corp.	
<b>Phone/Fax:</b> 919-831-3200 / 919-831-3369	

**ATTACHMENT 3**

**EC #377329, "Post SBLOCA Dose Rate Assessment For 1SI8811A/B Accessibility"**

**Braidwood Station**

**Engineering Change**

EC Number : 0000377329 000  
Status/Date : CLOSED 11/04/2009  
Facility : BRW  
Type/Sub-type: EVAL MECH



Print Date: 12/30/2009



Page: 1

EC Title: POST SBLOCA DOSE RATE ASSESSMENT FOR 1SI8811A/B ACCESSIBILITY

Mod Nbr : KW1: SR KW2: KW3: KW4: KW5:  
Master EC : N Work Group : Temporary : N  
Outage : N Alert Group: A8952DER Aprd Reqd Date:  
WO Required : N Image Addr : Exp Insvc Date:  
Adv Wk Appvd: Alt Ref. : Expires On : 07/04/2012  
Auto-Advance: Y Priority : Auto-Asbuild : N  
Caveat Outst: Department : Discipline :  
Resp Engr : THOMAS COLE  
Location :

<u>Milestone</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>PassPort</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Req By</u>
110-PREPARE EC	10/09/2009	BRZZC	COLE	THOMAS APPROVED
Evaluation prepared by Thomas Mscisz (see PDF file in Evaluation Details for signature)				
120-REVIEW EC	10/09/2009	ZIOCM	MOKIJEWSKI	CHARLES APPROVED
Detailed, Independent Review of the dose assessment by Jessica DeLaRosa (see PDF file in Evaluation Details for signature).				
A detailed, independent review of the EC for administrative requirements was performed by C. Mokijewski, Braidwood Site Engineering.				
240-ITPR-EPR	10/09/2009	BRZRZ	BELAIR	RAYMOND APPROVED
The Consequence Risk Factors in Attachment 2 of HU-AA-1212 have been reviewed for applicability and all were of LOW or N/A severity level. Therefore, this EC will be prepared, reviewed, and approved using existing process reviews.				
300-APPROVE EC	10/09/2009	BRZRZ	BELAIR	RAYMOND APPROVED
Evaluation approved by Jeffrey Esterman (see PDF file in Evaluation Details for signature)				
Per CC-AA-309-101, documenting a DAR review in a Technical Evaluation is at the discretion of the approving Manager. No DAR was included with the evaluation performed by Corporate Engineering. However, based on a review of the evaluation, all appropriate topics have been covered. Thus, no DAR will be included with this EC.				
900-ARCHIVE EC	11/04/2009	BRZEF	RIORDAN	GAIL CLOSED

**Units**

<u>Fac</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Description</u>
BRW	NA	NOT APPLICABLE

**Engineering Change**

EC Number : 0000377329 000  
Status/Date : CLOSED 11/04/2009  
Facility : BRW  
Type/Sub-type: EVAL MECH



Print Date: 12/30/2009



Page: 2

**Systems**

**Fac System Description**  
BRW -- NO SYSTEM IMPACT

**Planning/Scheduling Information**

Planning Start : Level of Effort:

**Planning Event From Date Thru Date**  
100-PREP EVAL

**Cross References**

Ref. Type	Number	Sub-Number	Description
ER	0000392325		DETERMINE ACCESSIBILITY OF 1SI8811B FOLLOWING
ER	0000391371		REQUEST ECR TO VALIDATE ACCESSIBILITY OF 1SI88
AS	00946391	0100	REQUEST ECR TO VALIDATE ACCESSIBILITY OF 1SI88
AS	00946391	0300	Document Exelon Review of Applicability of Wes
AR	00934782		1SI8811B FAILED TO STROKE FULL OPEN DURING SUR

**Engineering Change Comments**

**Comments** Last Updated By: **ZIOCM** Last Updated Date: **10/09/2009**

Originator: JAMES T PETTY Supv Contacted: Smith, Panici, Graves

Condition Description:

Request is to validate accessibility of 1SI8811A/B (from a dose perspective

when attempting to transfer to cold leg recirc following a SBLOCA, a small medium break LOCA, or an event that essentially equates to a SBLOCA (e.g., RCP Seal failure or stuck open PORV).

Immediate actions taken:

Discussed with Engineering Director and other engineering personnel.

Recommended Actions:

ECR

Operable Basis:

Reportable Basis:

Reviewed by: RANDALL L RAHRIG 07/27/2009 21:21:09 CDT

Reviewer Comments:

This is an administrative issue that does not identify an equipment deficiency on installed plant equipment.

+++++

(7/30/09 DL) Per MRC, Engineering to present completed ECR/EC to MRC for review.

+++++

*(Text excerpt from Dose Rate Assessment PDF file attached. Westinghouse LTR-LIS-09-597 PDF file attached.)*

Technical Evaluation  
Braidwood Station

Determine Local Dose Rates for Manual Operation of Valve 1SI8811B  
During a Small Break LOCA

Reason For Evaluation / Scope:

This Technical Evaluation is performed to demonstrate acceptable local area dose rates if plant personnel are required to access the area in order to manually operate the 1SI8811B valve after a small break LOCA (SBLOCA).

This evaluation is applicable to both Byron and Braidwood Stations.

Detailed Evaluation:

The 1SI8811B valve (ECCS Sump Recirculation MOV) is attached to a 24" OD schedule 40 pipe. The valve is enclosed in a "can" made of 3/8" thick steel (Drawing M- 195). However, since the can has openings in it, credit for this shielding is not taken. Lead blankets are wrapped around sections of the pipe. However, since these are temporary (with limited weight restrictions), shielding credit is not taken. From Drawing M-230, the center of the valve is situated on the pipe at approximately 4 feet after the pipe exits the wall. At a distance of approximately 10 feet from the center of the valve on the other side, the pipe curves 90 degrees to the right, with 14 feet of pipe angled back towards the valve area before dropping below the floor elevation. Therefore, the geometry is broken into two cases for MicroShield. Case 1 calculates a dose rate at the valve operator due to the piping on either side of the valve (pipe sections corresponding to 4 feet to the left and 10 feet to the right of the valve center). Case 2 calculates the dose rate due to the 14 feet of pipe that is angled back towards the valve (see sketch excerpted from Drawing M-230, Sheet 1). The dose receptor location was chosen at 1 foot from the outside of the pipe. This corresponds to the typical definition of a general area dose rate. Note that the Unit 2 valve is situated in a similar (albeit reverse) location with respect to the piping. Therefore, this evaluation also pertains to Unit 2.

The source term assumed inside the pipe is due to the maximum activity allowed by Technical Specifications. This activity is 60 uCi/gm Dose Equivalent Iodine-131 and 603 uCi/gm Dose Equivalent Xenon-133 (TS 3.4.16 from TSTF-490 Submittal using DEX-133). This is a reasonable assumption since no fuel damage is expected during a SBLOCA (Westinghouse LTR-LIS-09-597).

MicroShield Results:

Case 1: 1323 mR/hr

Case 2: 121 mR/hr

TOTAL: 1444 mR/hr

As a sensitivity study, Case 1 was re-performed without the noble gas contribution (Case 3). The resultant dose rate was only 1 mR/hr less. Therefore, it can be said that noble gas activity is not a significant contributor to the total dose rate from this piping carrying ECCS water during a SBLOCA.

Conclusion:

The total dose rate at the valve operator is calculated to be 1444 mR/hr. The metal "can" surrounding the valve and lead blanket shielding on the pipe, although not credited, will result in dose rates less than those calculated here.

References:

1. Drawing M-195, Rev. AK
2. Drawing M-230, Sheet 1, Rev. U
3. Technical Specification 3.4.16 (from TSTF-490 Submittal using DEX-133)
4. Westinghouse LTR-LIS-09-597

Attachments:

Attachment A: MicroShield Output for Case 1 (2 pages)

Attachment B: MicroShield Output for Case 2 (2 pages)

Attachment C: Sketch Excerpted from Drawing M-230, Sheet 1 (1 page)

Attachment D: MicroShield Output for Sensitivity Study Case 3 (2 pages)



"BRW Tech Eval  
377329.pdf"



CCE-09-97.pdf



Westinghouse Electric Company  
Nuclear Services  
P.O. Box 355  
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230-0355  
USA

Ms. Annie Wong  
Exelon Nuclear  
4300 Winfield Road  
Warrenville, IL 60555

Direct tel: 412-374-4901  
Direct fax: 412-374-3257  
e-mail: garofafd@westinghouse.com

Our ref: CCE-09-97

September 25, 2009

**EXELON NUCLEAR  
BRAIDWOOD UNIT 1  
Transmittal of LTR-LIS-09-597: "Small Break LOCA (SBLOCA) Rod  
Burst Evaluation Supporting Justification of Past Operation (JPO) of Braidwood Unit 1 (CCE)"**

Dear Ms. Wong:

Per Reference 1, Exelon Nuclear has requested Westinghouse to perform an evaluation to determine the maximum number of rods that would burst following a Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA) at Braidwood Unit 1. Per discussion with A. Wong of Exelon, a sump suction valve was stuck in the closed position earlier in the current operating cycle; if the signal to switchover to cold leg recirculation would have been generated, an operator would have had to manually open the valve to ensure adequate emergency core cooling system (ECCS) flow. For a SBLOCA transient in this scenario, assuming that all rods in the core burst would result in unacceptable radiological dose. Exelon has therefore requested Westinghouse to determine the maximum number of rods that would burst following a SBLOCA in order to support a Justification of Past Operation (JPO) determination with respect to radiological dose for Braidwood Unit 1. The SBLOCA scenario to be considered is a break size up to 2 inch equivalent diameter with a failure of one train of ECCS.

**SBLOCA Evaluation**

The current SBLOCA analysis-of-record (AOR) for Braidwood Unit 1 is documented in References 2 and 3. A SBLOCA evaluation of reduced ECCS flow was performed in Reference 4, with additional qualitative evaluations documented in References 5 and 6. Hot rod and hot assembly average rod burst was observed to occur for a 1.75-inch break in the Reference 4 supporting calculations.

Since this effort is intended to support a JPO, a qualitative evaluation based on References 2 to 6 is performed herein to show that using more realistic assumptions would result in no rod burst following a SBLOCA less than or equal to 2-inches in diameter.

In order for hot rod or hot assembly average rod burst to occur during a SBLOCA (for fuel with ZIRLO™ cladding), the cladding temperature must reach a specific burst temperature, which varies with time as a

function of the differential pressure across the cladding. By crediting more realistic assumptions, the SBLOCA cladding temperatures can be reduced, minimizing the likelihood for rod burst to occur.

#### ANS-5.1-1979 + 2 $\sigma$ Uncertainty Decay Heat

The NOTRUMP Evaluation Model (EM) uses the ANS-5.1-1971 + 20% decay heat model consistent with 10 CFR 50 Appendix K requirements. A more realistic decay heat model (ANS-5.1-1979 + 2 $\sigma$  uncertainty) would result in less core boil-off and shorter, shallower core uncoveries. This would significantly lower cladding temperatures, thereby reducing the likelihood that burst temperatures would be reached at any point during the SBLOCA transient.

#### Cycle-Specific Core Design Data

The SBLOCA analyses documented in References 2-4 were performed assuming a conservatively high axial offset and maximum peaking factor and assembly average power values.

Per Reference 7, the maximum axial offset predicted to occur for the current Braidwood Unit 1 operating cycle (Cycle 15) is +3.23%, significantly lower than the value of +13% used in the Braidwood Unit 1 SBLOCA analyses (see p. 6.1.1-2 of Reference 2). Modeling a reduced axial offset would result in lower power generation in the upper part of the core, resulting in lower calculated cladding temperatures and a lower likelihood for burst to occur.

A review of the Braidwood Unit 1 calculations performed in support of the Reference 4 evaluation shows that rod burst is only observed to occur for burnups greater than 45 GWD/MTU. Per the most conservative  $F_{\Delta H}$  Burndown Credit Limit provided by the Westinghouse Core Engineering (CE) group in Reference 8 (extra 10%), the  $F_{\Delta H}$  burndown credit at 45 GWD/MTU would be calculated as follows:

$$F_{\Delta H} (45 \text{ GWD/MTU}) = 1.160 - 6.00E-06 * 45000 \text{ MWD/MTU} = 0.89, \text{ or an 11\% reduction in } F_{\Delta H}.$$

Since the 1.04 minimum ratio of  $F_{\Delta H} / P_{HA}$  still applies, this 11% reduction could also be directly applied to  $P_{HA}$ . The  $F_{\Delta H}$  and  $P_{HA}$  values assumed in the SBLOCA analysis are 1.7 and 1.514 (see Table 6.1.1-1 of Reference 2), respectively, and when reduced by 11% results in  $F_{\Delta H}$  and  $P_{HA}$  values of 1.513 and 1.347. Like the reduction in axial offset, this reduction in  $F_{\Delta H}$  and  $P_{HA}$  would result in lower calculated cladding temperatures and a lower likelihood for burst to occur.

#### Realistic ECCS Flows

The ECCS flows used in the Braidwood Unit 1 SBLOCA analyses are minimum safeguards flows, and reflect maximum pump degradation, maximum resistances, etc.; these flows were also conservatively reduced in References 2-4 by 5% or 7% per Exelon's request. These minimum safeguards flows are appropriate for Appendix K SBLOCA analysis purposes, but do not reflect realistic ECCS flows. Additional ECCS flow would result in better core cooling, shorter core uncover periods and lower cladding temperature results.

Additionally, it is noted that the ECCS recirculation phase flows used in the Reference 4 supporting calculations were superseded by higher flows evaluated in References 4 and 5. An examination of the recirculation phase intact loop flows evaluated in Reference 5 reveals that they are actually higher than the original flows used in the AOR. Therefore, the cladding temperature transients are more reasonably portrayed by the results presented in References 2 and 3, which did not exhibit rod burst for any of the beginning-of-life (BOL) cases described therein. Burnup studies were not performed for the limiting

break size(s) from References 2 and 3 since the PCTs were below 1700°F; at cladding temperatures below 1700°F, PCTs for rod burst cases would not be expected to exceed those observed at BOL. While completion of burnup studies may show rod burst at higher burnups when using standard Appendix K NOTRUMP EM assumptions; if the conservatisms described above were replaced with more realistic treatments of decay heat, core design parameters and ECCS performance, PCTs would be sufficiently reduced to prevent rod burst.

### **Conclusion**

Based on the evaluation performed herein, elimination of conservatisms in the Braidwood Unit 1 SBLOCA analysis such as use of realistic decay heat, cycle-specific core design data and more realistic ECCS flows would result in significantly reduced cladding temperature results and lower likelihood for hot rod and/or hot assembly rod burst to occur. Therefore, it can be concluded that for the purposes of a JPO safety significance determination, zero rods would burst following a SBLOCA for Braidwood Unit 1.

### **References**

1. Exelon TSD, "SBLOCA Rod Burst Evaluation," September 21, 2009.
2. CAE-00-125 / CCE-00-125, "Commonwealth Edison Company, Byron and Braidwood Units 1 and 2, Power Uprate Project, Transmittal of Documents," May 10, 2000.
3. CAE-01-009 / CCE-01-008, "Exelon Nuclear, Byron and Braidwood Units 1 and 2, Transmittal of Revised License Report and UFSAR Markups for SBLOCA Analysis," January 25, 2001.
4. CAE-07-49 / CCE-07-48, "Exelon Nuclear, Byron and Braidwood Units 1 & 2, Phase 2 Evaluation of Reduced SI Flow During Recirculation Phase of ECCS," April 16, 2007.
5. CAE-08-49 / CCE-08-91, "Exelon Nuclear, Byron and Braidwood Units 1 & 2, Transmittal of Evaluations for Final Reduced ECCS Flows (LTR-CRA-08-130 Attachments 1 and 2; LTR-LIS-08-374 Attachment 1)," July 17, 2008.
6. CAE-09-27 / CCE-09-43, "Exelon Nuclear, Braidwood and Byron Units 1 and 2, Maximum ECCS Flow Increase Evaluation," June 17, 2009.
7. NF-CB-09-32, Revision 2, "Exelon Nuclear, Byron/Braidwood Nuclear Power Plants, Braidwood Unit 1 Cycle 15 Curvebook, NDR and POP – Revision 2," April 1, 2009.
8. CE-09-109, "Peaking Factor Burndown Limits for Byron/Braidwood Units' Updated BELOCA Analysis," February 27, 2009.

If you have any questions, please contact me at 412-374-4901.

Very truly yours,



for

Frank D. Garofalo  
Customer Projects Manager  
Exelon Nuclear

cc: T. Cole Exelon  
R. Linthicum Exelon  
J. Rommel Exelon  
T. Mattson Exelon  
L. Livingston Westinghouse / Cantera  
G. P. Bundick Westinghouse / Byron  
F. D. Garofalo Westinghouse  
J. A. Stepanic Westinghouse  
C. Boyd Westinghouse  
D. Crytzer Westinghouse  
N. Andreycheck Westinghouse  
K. Shearer Westinghouse  
K. Hollenback Westinghouse  
Exelon Project Letter File

**Technical Evaluation  
Braidwood Station**

**Determine Local Dose Rates for Manual Operation of Valve 1SI8811B  
During a Small Break LOCA**

**Reason For Evaluation / Scope:**

This Technical Evaluation is performed to demonstrate acceptable local area dose rates if plant personnel are required to access the area in order to manually operate the 1SI8811B valve after a small break LOCA (SBLOCA).

This evaluation is applicable to both Byron and Braidwood Stations.

**Detailed Evaluation:**

The 1SI8811B valve (ECCS Sump Recirculation MOV) is attached to a 24" OD schedule 40 pipe. The valve is enclosed in a "can" made of 3/8" thick steel (Drawing M-195). However, since the can has openings in it, credit for this shielding is not taken. Lead blankets are wrapped around sections of the pipe. However, since these are temporary (with limited weight restrictions), shielding credit is not taken. From Drawing M-230, the center of the valve is situated on the pipe at approximately 4 feet after the pipe exits the wall. At a distance of approximately 10 feet from the center of the valve on the other side, the pipe curves 90 degrees to the right, with 14 feet of pipe angled back towards the valve area before dropping below the floor elevation. Therefore, the geometry is broken into two cases for MicroShield. Case 1 calculates a dose rate at the valve operator due to the piping on either side of the valve (pipe sections corresponding to 4 feet to the left and 10 feet to the right of the valve center). Case 2 calculates the dose rate due to the 14 feet of pipe that is angled back towards the valve (see sketch excerpted from Drawing M-230, Sheet 1). The dose receptor location was chosen at 1 foot from the outside of the pipe. This corresponds to the typical definition of a general area dose rate. Note that the Unit 2 valve is situated in a similar (albeit reverse) location with respect to the piping. Therefore, this evaluation also pertains to Unit 2.

The source term assumed inside the pipe is due to the maximum activity allowed by Technical Specifications. This activity is 60 uCi/gm Dose Equivalent Iodine-131 and 603 uCi/gm Dose Equivalent Xenon-133 (TS 3.4.16 from TSTF-490 Submittal using DEX-133). This is a reasonable assumption since no fuel damage is expected during a SBLOCA (Westinghouse LTR-LIS-09-597).

**MicroShield Results:**

Case 1: 1323 mR/hr  
Case 2: 121 mR/hr  
TOTAL: 1444 mR/hr

As a sensitivity study, Case 1 was re-performed without the noble gas contribution (Case 3). The resultant dose rate was only 1 mR/hr less. Therefore, it can be said that noble gas activity is not a significant contributor to the total dose rate from this piping carrying ECCS water during a SBLOCA.

**Conclusions / Findings:**


The total dose rate at the valve operator is calculated to be 1444 mR/hr. The metal "can" surrounding the valve and lead blanket shielding on the pipe, although not credited, will result in dose rates less than those calculated here.

**References:**


1. Drawing M-195, Rev. AK
2. Drawing M-230, Sheet 1, Rev. U
3. Technical Specification 3.4.16 (from TSTF-490 Submittal using DEX-133)
4. Westinghouse LTR-LIS-09-597

**Attachments:**

- Attachment A: MicroShield Output for Case 1 (2 pages)
- Attachment B: MicroShield Output for Case 2 (2 pages)
- Attachment C: Sketch Excerpted from Drawing M-230, Sheet 1 (1 page)
- Attachment D: MicroShield Output for Sensitivity Study Case 3 (2 pages)

Preparer:  Date: 10/06/2009  
Thomas J. Macisz

Independent Reviewer:  Date: 10/07/2009  
Jessica DeLaRosa

Approved:  Date: 10/08/2009  
John Rommel

MicroShield v5.03 (5.03-00095)  
PECO Energy

Page : 1  
DOS File: 8811B-1.MS5  
Run Date: October 6, 2009  
Run Time: 4:15:01 PM  
Duration: 00:00:02

Tech Eval EC 377329  
Attachment A

File Ref: \_\_\_\_\_  
Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
By: \_\_\_\_\_  
Checked: \_\_\_\_\_

Case Title: 1SI8811B **Case 1**  
Description: 14 ft of Pipe With Valve on it  
Geometry: 7 - Cylinder Volume - Side Shields



**Source Dimensions**  
Height 426.72 cm 14 ft 0.0 in  
Radius 28.735 cm 11.3 in

**Dose Points**

	X	Y	Z
# 1	60.96 cm	121.92 cm	0 cm
	2 ft	4 ft	0.0 in

**Shields**

Shield Name	Dimension	Material	Density
Source	39.09 ft <sup>3</sup>	Water	1
Transition		Air	0.00122
Air Gap		Air	0.00122
Wall Clad	.057 ft	Iron	7.86

**Source Input**

Grouping Method : Actual Photon Energies

Nuclide	curies	becquerels	uCi/cm <sup>3</sup>	Bq/cm <sup>3</sup>
I-131	6.6415e+001	2.4574e+012	6.0000e+001	2.2200e+006
Xe-133	6.6747e+002	2.4696e+013	6.0300e+002	2.2311e+007

**Buildup**

The material reference is : Wall Clad

**Integration Parameters**

Radial	10
Circumferential	10
Y Direction (axial)	20

**Results**

Energy MeV	Activity photons/sec	Fluence Rate		Exposure Rate	
		MeV/cm <sup>2</sup> /sec No Buildup	MeV/cm <sup>2</sup> /sec With Buildup	mR/hr No Buildup	mR/hr With Buildup
0.0041	1.352e+10	0.000e+00	3.876e-24	0.000e+00	2.889e-24
0.0043	1.517e+12	0.000e+00	4.540e-22	0.000e+00	3.243e-22
0.0295	3.310e+10	1.008e-49	7.335e-23	1.055e-51	7.676e-25
0.0298	6.140e+10	6.680e-48	1.376e-22	6.768e-50	1.394e-24
0.0306	3.369e+12	2.304e-42	7.792e-21	2.148e-44	7.263e-23
0.031	6.239e+12	1.198e-40	1.463e-20	1.080e-42	1.319e-22
0.0336	2.183e+10	6.084e-34	5.723e-23	4.328e-36	4.071e-25
0.035	2.239e+12	4.445e-28	6.248e-21	2.816e-30	3.958e-23
0.0796	5.348e+10	2.478e-01	4.620e-01	3.928e-04	7.325e-04
0.0802	6.434e+10	3.450e-01	6.469e-01	5.455e-04	1.023e-03
0.081	9.010e+12	5.931e+01	1.121e+02	9.343e-02	1.766e-01

Page : 2  
 DOS File: 8811B-1.MS5  
 Run Date: October 6, 2009  
 Run Time: 4:15:01 PM  
 Duration: 00:00:02

Tech Eval EC 377329  
 Attachment A

<u>Energy</u> MeV	<u>Activity</u> photons/sec	<u>Fluence Rate</u> MeV/cm <sup>2</sup> /sec		<u>Exposure Rate</u> mR/hr	
		No Buildup	With Buildup	No Buildup	With Buildup
0.1772	6.508e+09	5.304e+01	1.805e+02	9.103e-02	3.098e-01
0.1777	1.758e+10	1.448e+02	4.936e+02	2.486e-01	8.477e-01
0.2843	1.487e+11	4.945e+03	2.004e+04	9.311e+00	3.775e+01
0.3258	6.162e+09	2.838e+02	1.164e+03	5.436e-01	2.229e+00
0.3294	5.662e+09	2.676e+02	1.097e+03	5.131e-01	2.105e+00
0.3645	1.994e+12	1.188e+05	4.869e+05	2.300e+02	9.426e+02
0.503	8.859e+09	1.066e+03	4.137e+03	2.092e+00	8.120e+00
0.637	1.784e+11	3.523e+04	1.269e+05	6.850e+01	2.467e+02
0.6427	5.395e+09	1.085e+03	3.895e+03	2.109e+00	7.569e+00
0.7229	4.429e+10	1.137e+04	3.904e+04	2.186e+01	7.508e+01
<b>TOTALS:</b>	2.504e+13	1.733e+05	6.840e+05	3.354e+02	1.323e+03


MicroShield v5.03 (5.03-00095)  
PECO Energy

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Run Time: 4:15:28 PM  
Duration: 00:00:02

File Ref: \_\_\_\_\_  
Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
By: \_\_\_\_\_  
Checked: \_\_\_\_\_

Tech Eval EC 377329  
Attachment B

Case Title: 1SI8811B **Case 2**  
Description: 14 ft of Pipe 9 feet from valve  
Geometry: 7 - Cylinder Volume - Side Shields



**Source Dimensions**  
Height 426.72 cm 14 ft 0.0 in  
Radius 28.735 cm 11.3 in

**Dose Points**

	X	Y	Z
# 1	304.8 cm 10 ft 0.0 in	0 cm 0.0 in	0 cm 0.0 in

**Shields**

Shield Name	Dimension	Material	Density
Source	39.09 ft <sup>3</sup>	Water	1
Transition		Air	0.00122
Air Gap		Air	0.00122
Wall Clad	.057 ft	Iron	7.86

**Source Input**

Grouping Method : Actual Photon Energies

Nuclide	curies	becquerels	μCi/cm <sup>3</sup>	Bq/cm <sup>3</sup>
I-131	6.6415e+001	2.4574e+012	6.0000e+001	2.2200e+006
Xe-133	6.6747e+002	2.4696e+013	6.0300e+002	2.2311e+007

**Buildup**

The material reference is : Wall Clad

**Integration Parameters**

Radial	10
Circumferential	10
Y Direction (axial)	20

**Results**


Energy MeV	Activity photons/sec	Fluence Rate		Exposure Rate	
		No Buildup MeV/cm <sup>2</sup> /sec	With Buildup MeV/cm <sup>2</sup> /sec	No Buildup mR/hr	With Buildup mR/hr
0.0041	1.352e+10	0.000e+00	2.863e-25	0.000e+00	2.134e-25
0.0043	1.517e+12	0.000e+00	3.354e-23	0.000e+00	2.395e-23
0.0295	3.310e+10	9.305e-51	5.418e-24	9.738e-53	5.670e-26
0.0298	6.140e+10	6.102e-49	1.016e-23	6.183e-51	1.030e-25
0.0306	3.369e+12	2.056e-43	5.755e-22	1.916e-45	5.365e-24
0.031	6.239e+12	1.060e-41	1.080e-21	9.554e-44	9.741e-24
0.0336	2.183e+10	5.151e-35	4.228e-24	3.664e-37	3.007e-26
0.035	2.239e+12	3.710e-29	4.615e-22	2.350e-31	2.924e-24
0.0796	5.348e+10	2.401e-02	4.478e-02	3.806e-05	7.100e-05
0.0802	6.434e+10	3.341e-02	6.267e-02	5.282e-05	9.909e-05
0.081	9.010e+12	5.739e+00	1.085e+01	9.041e-03	1.710e-02

Page : 2  
 DOS File: 8811B-2.MS5  
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 Run Time: 4:15:28 PM  
 Duration: 00:00:02

Tech Eval EC 377329  
 Attachment B

<u>Energy</u> MeV	<u>Activity</u> photons/sec	<u>Fluence Rate</u> MeV/cm <sup>2</sup> /sec		<u>Exposure Rate</u> mR/hr	
		No Buildup	With Buildup	No Buildup	With Buildup
0.1772	6.508e+09	4.883e+00	1.669e+01	8.381e-03	2.864e-02
0.1777	1.758e+10	1.333e+01	4.563e+01	2.289e-02	7.836e-02
0.2843	1.487e+11	4.545e+02	1.846e+03	8.558e-01	3.477e+00
0.3258	6.162e+09	2.608e+01	1.070e+02	4.995e-02	2.049e-01
0.3294	5.662e+09	2.458e+01	1.009e+02	4.714e-02	1.934e-01
0.3645	1.994e+12	1.091e+04	4.466e+04	2.113e+01	8.644e+01
0.503	8.859e+09	9.772e+01	3.766e+02	1.918e-01	7.393e-01
0.637	1.784e+11	3.224e+03	1.148e+04	6.268e+00	2.232e+01
0.6427	5.395e+09	9.930e+01	3.525e+02	1.929e-01	6.849e-01
0.7229	4.429e+10	1.039e+03	3.522e+03	1.998e+00	6.773e+00
TOTALS:	2.504e+13	1.590e+04	6.252e+04	3.077e+01	1.210e+02

Tech Eval EC 377329  
Attachment C



Sketch excerpted From Drawing M-230, Sh 1  
Rev. U

**MicroShield v5.03 (5.03-00095)  
PECO Energy**

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 DOS File: 8811B-1A.MS5  
 Run Date: October 6, 2009  
 Run Time: 4:15:58 PM  
 Duration: 00:00:01

*Tech Eval EL 377329  
Attachment D*

File Ref: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Date: \_\_\_\_\_  
 By: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Checked: \_\_\_\_\_

**Case Title: 1SI8811B (Case 3)**  
**Description: 14 ft of Pipe With Valve on it - NO NG**  
**Geometry: 7 - Cylinder Volume - Side Shields**



		Source Dimensions	
Height	426.72 cm	14 ft	0.0 in
Radius	28.735 cm		11.3 in

Dose Points			
#	X	Y	Z
# 1	60.96 cm	121.92 cm	0 cm
	2 ft	4 ft	0.0 in

Shields			
Shield Name	Dimension	Material	Density
Source	39.09 ft <sup>3</sup>	Water	1
Transition		Air	0.00122
Air Gap		Air	0.00122
Wall Clad	.057 ft	Iron	7.86

**Source Input**

**Grouping Method : Actual Photon Energies**

Nuclide	curies	becquerels	μCi/cm <sup>3</sup>	Bq/cm <sup>3</sup>
I-131	6.6415e+001	2.4574e+012	6.0000e+001	2.2200e+006

**Buildup**

**The material reference is : Wall Clad**

**Integration Parameters**

Radial	10
Circumferential	10
Y Direction (axial)	20

**Results**

Energy MeV	Activity photons/sec	Fluence Rate	Fluence Rate	Exposure Rate	Exposure Rate
		MeV/cm <sup>2</sup> /sec No Buildup	MeV/cm <sup>2</sup> /sec With Buildup	mR/hr No Buildup	mR/hr With Buildup
0.0041	1.352e+10	0.000e+00	3.876e-24	0.000e+00	2.889e-24
0.0295	3.310e+10	1.008e-49	7.335e-23	1.055e-51	7.676e-25
0.0298	6.140e+10	6.680e-48	1.376e-22	6.768e-50	1.394e-24
0.0336	2.183e+10	6.084e-34	5.723e-23	4.328e-36	4.071e-25
0.0802	6.434e+10	3.450e-01	6.469e-01	5.455e-04	1.023e-03
0.1772	6.508e+09	5.304e+01	1.805e+02	9.103e-02	3.098e-01
0.2843	1.487e+11	4.945e+03	2.004e+04	9.311e+00	3.775e+01
0.3258	6.162e+09	2.838e+02	1.164e+03	5.436e-01	2.229e+00
0.3294	5.662e+09	2.676e+02	1.097e+03	5.131e-01	2.105e+00
0.3645	1.994e+12	1.188e+05	4.869e+05	2.300e+02	9.426e+02
0.503	8.859e+09	1.066e+03	4.137e+03	2.092e+00	8.120e+00
0.637	1.784e+11	3.523e+04	1.269e+05	6.850e+01	2.467e+02

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Attachment D

<u>Energy</u> MeV	<u>Activity</u> photons/sec	<u>Fluence Rate</u> MeV/cm <sup>2</sup> /sec <u>No Buildup</u>	<u>Fluence Rate</u> MeV/cm <sup>2</sup> /sec <u>With Buildup</u>	<u>Exposure Rate</u> mR/hr <u>No Buildup</u>	<u>Exposure Rate</u> mR/hr <u>With Buildup</u>
0.6427	5.395e+09	1.085e+03	3.895e+03	2.109e+00	7.569e+00
0.7229	4.429e+10	1.137e+04	3.904e+04	2.186e+01	7.508e+01
TOTALS:	2.593e+12	1.731e+05	6.834e+05	3.350e+02	4.322e+03

**ATTACHMENT 4**

**EC #378302, "Evaluate Temperature of the Pipe Penetration Curve Wall Area Aux.  
Bldg. Elev. 364', Using a Bounding Case and Realistic Case"  
Revised Analysis From EC #377814**

**Braidwood Station**

## Engineering Change

Company Name : EXELON GENERATION CO.,LLC  
EC Number : 0000378302 000  
Status/Date : MODIFIED 12/30/2009  
Facility : BRW BRAIDWOOD GENERATING STATION  
Type/Sub-type: EVAL MECH

Print Date: 12/30/2009

**Exelon**<sup>SM</sup>

Page: 1

EC Title: EVALUATE TEMPERATURE OF THE PIPE PENETRATION CURVE WALL AREA AUX.  
BLDG. ELEV. 364', USING A BOUNDING CASE AND REALISTIC CASE  
REVISED ANALYSIS FROM EC 377814

Mod Nbr : 0000378302      KW1: SR      KW2:      KW3:      KW4:      KW5: EMERG

Master EC	: N	Work Group	:	Temporary	:	N
Outage	: N	Alert Group	: DEM	Aprd Reqd Date	:	12/30/2009
WO Required	: N	Image Addr	:	Exp Insvc Date	:	
Adv Wk Appvd	:	Alt Ref.	:	Expires On	:	09/24/2012
Auto-Advance	: Y	Priority	: BH	Auto-Asbuild	:	N
Caveat Outst	:	Department	: 08952	Discipline	:	DEM
Resp Engr	: NICHOLAS	J RADLOFF	:		:	
Location	:		:		:	

### Units

<u>Fac</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Description</u>
BRW	01	UNIT ONE

### Systems

<u>Fac</u>	<u>System</u>	<u>Description</u>
BRW	VA	AUX BLDG HVAC

### Engineering Change

EC Number : 0000378302 000  
Status/Date : MODIFIED 12/30/2009  
Facility : BRW  
Type/Sub-type: EVAL MECH



Print Date: 12/30/2009

# Exelon<sup>SM</sup>

Page: 1

EC Title: EVALUATE TEMPERATURE OF THE PIPE PENETRATION CURVE WALL AREA AUX.  
BLDG. ELEV. 364', USING A BOUNDING CASE AND REALISTIC CASE  
REVISED ANALYSIS FROM EC 377814

Mod Nbr : 0000378302      KW1: SR      KW2:      KW3:      KW4:      KW5: EMERG

Master EC : N	Work Group :	Temporary :	N
Outage : N	Alert Group: DEM	Aprd Reqd Date:	12/30/2009
WO Required : N	Image Addr :	Exp Insvc Date:	
Adv Wk Appvd:	Alt Ref. :	Expires On :	09/24/2012
Auto-Advance: Y	Priority : BH	Auto-Asbuild :	N
Caveat Outst:	Department : 08952	Discipline :	DEM
Resp Engr : NICHOLAS	J RADLOFF		
Location :			

<u>Milestone</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>PassPort</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Reg By</u>	
030-DAR CONCUR	12/29/2009	BRWUG	GOSNELL	JAMES	CANCELED
110-PREPARE EC	12/28/2009	QDCNR	RADLOFF	NICHOLAS	APPROVED
120-REVIEW EC	12/29/2009	BRWUG	GOSNELL	JAMES	APPROVED

This EC is safety-related, therefore, an independent review was performed. As reviewer and supervisor, I did not specify a specific approach to use, rule out any design considerations or establish design inputs. Also, due to the holidays, I was the only available qualified reviewer.

210-DEPT RVW-01	12/29/2009	QAD6I	LINTHICUM	ROY	APPROVED
Independent review performed by PRA specialist to ensure assumptions and conditions are consistent with the SDP.					
240-ITPR-OTHER	12/30/2009	BYRGO	BARAN	DAVID	APPROVED
ITPR by Dave Baran.					
300-APPROVE EC	12/30/2009	BRZRB	BELAIR	RAYMOND	APPROVED
900-ARCHIVE EC					CLOSED

#### Units

<u>Fac</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Description</u>
BRW	01	UNIT ONE

#### Systems

<u>Fac</u>	<u>System</u>	<u>Description</u>
BRW	VA	AUX BLDG HVAC

#### Reference Documents List

<u>Facility</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>SubType</u>	<u>Document</u>	<u>Sheet</u>
BRW	CALC	ENG	VA-102	

Title: AUX.BLDG ENERGY LOAD CALCS FOR EL. 330 346 364 383401 AND 426 IN ABNOR

**Engineering Change**

EC Number : 0000378302 000  
Status/Date : MODIFIED 12/30/2009  
Facility : BRW  
Type/Sub-type: EVAL MECH



Print Date: 12/30/2009



Page: 2

BRW CALC ENG VA-101

Title: AUXILIARY BUILDING ENERGY LOAD FOR EL. 330'-0", 346'-0", 364'-0" AND 3

BRW CALC ENG BRW-96-461-M

Title: JUSTIFICATION OF EQ ZONE TEMPERATURES AND ALARA MINIMUM AIRFLOW REQUIR

**Planning/Scheduling Information**

Planning Start : Level of Effort:

<u>Planning Event</u>	<u>From Date</u>	<u>Thru Date</u>
100-PREP EVAL		

**Cross References**

<u>Ref.</u>	<u>Sub-</u>	<u>Description</u>
<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>	
AR	00991564	CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY DURING RH SYSTEM DRAININ
AR	00988355	NRC QUESTION ON BWEP ES-1.3 DIRECTIONS
AR	00986813	CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY DURING RH SYSTEM DRAININ
AR	00988980	NRC EXITED YELLOW FINDING FOR 1SI8811B FAILURE
AR	00986803	NRC / IEMA CONCERN WITH RAIN INTRUSTION TO U-1

**Engineering Change Comments**

Comments Last Updated By: **BRWUG** Last Updated Date: **12/23/2009**

Engineering Change Number: EC 378302 Rev.000

**Purpose**

The purpose of this evaluation is twofold. First, to determine a bounding ambient temperature and relative humidity of the Unit 1 Spray Additive Tank Room and Pipe Penetration Area (i.e, U-1 Curved Wall Area) at floor Elevation 364' of the Auxiliary Building while a design basis accident LOCA on Unit 1 has occurred and the 1SI8811B valve fails to fully open. This bounding case includes a loss of offsite power (LOOP) coincident with the LOCA. A second analysis presents a realistic scenario considering actual plant operating history and operating configuration to determine a maximum expected area temperature and relative humidity for the same LOCA with no LOOP. The evaluation results will be used to support the Significant Determination Process (SDP) final evaluation for the failed 1SI8811B valve.

**Conclusion**

The temperature and humidity for the Unit 1 Spray Additive Tank Room and Pipe Penetration Area (Curved Wall Area) at floor Elevation 364' of the Auxiliary Building is presented in the table below. The room conditions in this evaluation are only applicable for the conditions that are listed above scope. The temperature and relative humidity remain bounded by the temperature and humidity values listed in the UFSAR Table. 3.11-2

Accident	Maximum Temperature (°F)	Maximum Humidity (%RH)
Design LOOP/LOCA	114.1	27
Realistic LOCA only	90	52
UFSAR Table 3.77-2	130	8 - 70

**ATTACHMENT 1**  
**Design Attribute Review (DAR)**  
 EC 378302 Rev.000

**When** a topic is determined applicable, **the box  is checked, and** the applicable topic is discussed. **IF** the information is discussed in other note panels a reference to the documentation required is given in accordance with the applicable procedures governing a particular Attribute.

Section Applicable	Design Change Attribute
4.1.4.1. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<p><b>IDENTIFY Basic SSC Functions</b></p> <p><u>Auxiliary Building Ventilation (VA)</u> – The Auxiliary building HVAC (VA) is designed to provide an adequate environment for personnel health, safety, and proper functioning of equipment within the Auxiliary Building plant areas for normal and abnormal events. The areas served include the Auxiliary Building and Fuel Handling Building (FHB), but exclude the solid radwaste facilities control room, control room, and laboratory areas within the Auxiliary Building. The VA system is designed to maintain offsite radiological releases from the Auxiliary and FHB to within acceptable limits during normal and abnormal plant conditions.</p> <p>The Non-accessible Area Exhaust Filter Plenum Ventilation System filters air from the area of the active Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) components during the recirculation phase of a Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA). The Non-accessible Area Exhaust Filter Plenum Ventilation System, in conjunction with other normally operating systems, also provides environmental control of temperature in the ECCS pump room area and lower levels of the Auxiliary Building. The VA system is safety related.</p> <p>The Auxiliary Building exhaust system is designed to run continuously during all normal plant operations and exhaust auxiliary building air after filtering through prefilter and HEPA filter banks. Provisions are also made to route the effluents from non-accessible cubicles in the auxiliary building through charcoal adsorbers and HEPA filters automatically on a safety injection signal from Unit 1 or 2 and manually through a control switch in the main control room. On a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), the auxiliary building supply and exhaust fans powered by the affected unit are tripped. Two out of six charcoal booster fans are started to maintain negative pressure in the auxiliary building and route the exhaust air from non-accessible cubicles through the charcoal adsorber and upstream/downstream HEPA filters before exhausting to the outdoor atmosphere.</p> <p>FHB exhaust ventilation subsystem of VA is utilized to reduce gaseous iodine and particulate concentrations in the exhaust air from the FHB which are potentially present following a fuel drop accident, involving recently irradiated fuel.</p>
4.1.4.2. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<p><b>IDENTIFY Configuration Change safety classification.</b></p> <p>This EC is classified as safety related. The evaluation supports a safety related system (VA).</p>
4.1.4.3.	<p><b>IDENTIFY Seismic Classification of the SSC.</b></p>

**ATTACHMENT 1**  
**Design Attribute Review (DAR)**  
 EC 378302 Rev.000

Section Applicable	Design Change Attribute
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	This EC is classified as seismic category I. The evaluation involves seismic category I system VA and Aux. Bldg.
4.1.5. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	PROVIDE the performance requirements and design conditions (including margin) of the SSC needed to evaluate the change from the existing to the modified systems, structures, or components.  See Evaluation Details
4.1.6. <input type="checkbox"/>	DETERMINE the design requirements necessary to facilitate periodic surveillance testing and acceptance testing that is necessary for the Configuration Change being considered.
4.1.7. <input type="checkbox"/>	DETERMINE the Codes, Standards, and Regulatory Requirements applicable to the Configuration Change.
4.1.8. <input type="checkbox"/>	IDENTIFY PWR Sump GL 2004-02 Program impacts Braidwood, Byron, and TMI only
4.1.9. <input type="checkbox"/>	DETERMINE changes required to existing Design Analysis or new parameters that require new calculations or calculation revisions that are used to assess the acceptability of a system or a component function in meeting various physical requirements.
4.1.10. <input type="checkbox"/>	If Redundancy, Diversity and Separation requirements are identified or affected, then REVIEW the original design basis as well as any subsequent modifications.
4.1.11. <input type="checkbox"/>	IDENTIFY any Failure Effects requirements. (See Attachment 12)
4.1.12. <input type="checkbox"/>	IDENTIFY Fire Protection and Appendix R Safe Shutdown requirements, by using the "Screening for Approved Fire Protection Program (AFPP) Impact", Attachment 2.
4.1.13. <input type="checkbox"/>	DETERMINE any <u>Material</u> requirements, such as material grade, product form, compatibility with existing or other new materials, galvanic interaction between dissimilar metals, special welding material requirements, critical properties, performance characteristics, alternative materials as well as any <u>Material Suitability</u> requirements such as compatibility, electrical insulation properties, protective coating, corrosion resistance, mechanical insulation etc. necessary for the Configuration Change.
4.1.14. <input type="checkbox"/>	Determine environmental conditions and impacts.

**ATTACHMENT 1**  
**Design Attribute Review (DAR)**  
 EC 378302 Rev.000

Section Applicable	Design Change Attribute
4.1.15. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	DETERMINE if Environmental Qualification (EQ) of equipment is affected. (see Attachment 3)  No adverse impact as discussed in EVAL DETAILS.
4.1.16. <input type="checkbox"/>	REVIEW the Operating Experience databases through the INPO Internet Site or equivalent in accordance with LS-AA-115.
4.1.17. <input type="checkbox"/>	DETERMINE if the configuration change may affect the existing Equipment Performance Information Exchange (EPIX) database.
4.1.18. <input type="checkbox"/>	DETERMINE if the Configuration Change may affect the existing Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Mitigating System Performance Index (MSPI) Basis Document PRA content, and shutdown risk models by using the screening checklist in Attachment 4.
4.1.19. <input type="checkbox"/>	EVALUATE if System Operational Requirements have changed.
4.1.20. <input type="checkbox"/>	IDENTIFY any Human Factors requirements.
4.1.21.	IDENTIFY procedure changes per direction in Attachment 9.
4.1.22. <input type="checkbox"/>	IDENTIFY any changes or additional training requirements for various departments, per direction in Attachment 9.
4.1.23. <input type="checkbox"/>	CONSIDER the functional and physical system interface requirements, including the affect of cumulative tolerances between the subject system or component and adjacent or related support systems, structures, and components that may have been affected by the Configuration Change.
4.1.24. <input type="checkbox"/>	DETERMINE specialized layout and arrangement requirements, such as protection from normal vehicle traffic flow, or physical location preferences that minimize plant operating requirements for both the structures and systems being modified, and adjacent equipment and that avoid susceptibility for water hammer and gas accumulation.

**ATTACHMENT 1**  
**Design Attribute Review (DAR)**  
 EC 378302 Rev.000

Section Applicable	Design Change Attribute
4.1.25. <input type="checkbox"/>	DETERMINE if the Radiation Protection/ALARA programs are affected by review of changes that affect any of the following during normal or post accident conditions: Radiation sources; changes affecting controlled radiation areas; primary coolant fluid systems (Cobalt Materials); contaminated systems; radiation monitoring systems; HVAC Systems which could transport airborne contaminants; change or alter shielding. (see Attachment 5)
4.1.26. <input type="checkbox"/>	DETERMINE the need for walkdowns to look at accessibility to the work area(s) and any special installation considerations that need to be addressed during design development.
4.1.27. <input type="checkbox"/>	DETERMINE Accessibility for maintenance, repair and In-Service Inspection (ISI) and In-Service Testing (IST), and the conditions under which these activities will be performed.
4.1.28. <input type="checkbox"/>	DETERMINE handling, storage, cleaning, and shipping requirements, as well as transportability requirements for items which require special handling during transit from supplier to site, from site to vendor (for repair), or from site receiving to final placement in the plant.
4.1.29. <input type="checkbox"/>	DETERMINE the effect of the Configuration Change on existing Emergency Plan or environmental and discharge monitoring that are used to prevent undue risk to public health and safety.
4.1.30. <input type="checkbox"/>	DETERMINE Industrial Safety requirements such as restricting the use of dangerous materials, hazardous chemicals, escape provisions from enclosures, pertinent OSHA requirements, and grounding of electrical systems.
4.1.31. <input type="checkbox"/>	DETERMINE impact on nuclear fuel, core components, core design, reactivity management, criticality control and accountability of nuclear materials as well as transient and / or accident analysis, by using Attachment 6.
4.1.32. <input type="checkbox"/>	DETERMINE Load Path requirements for installation, removal, and repair of equipment and replacement of major components.

**ATTACHMENT 1**  
**Design Attribute Review (DAR)**  
 EC 378302 Rev.000

Section Applicable	Design Change Attribute
4.1.33. <input type="checkbox"/>	IDENTIFY Mechanical System Characteristics where design limits are placed on the mechanical properties of a system or components.
4.1.34. <input type="checkbox"/>	IDENTIFY Chemistry requirements where limits are placed on the chemical properties of a system or component based upon safety, reliability, ALARA, economics, or other considerations.
4.1.35. <input type="checkbox"/>	IDENTIFY Electrical requirements where limits are placed on the electrical properties of a system or component.
4.1.36. <input type="checkbox"/>	IDENTIFY Instrument and Control requirements, including digital technology requirements.
4.1.37. <input type="checkbox"/>	IDENTIFY Security requirements such as site monitoring, alarm systems, vehicle barrier systems, security and security lighting.
4.1.38. <input type="checkbox"/>	IDENTIFY Civil/Structural requirements where design limits are placed on the structural properties of a SSC such as equipment foundations and component supports.
4.1.39. <input type="checkbox"/>	If the Configuration Change adds, relocates, or alters Seismic Category I mechanical and/or electrical components then ENSURE that the Seismic Dynamic Qualification (SD/Q) of the components has been addressed per CC-AA-320-001.
4.1.40. <input type="checkbox"/>	DETERMINE Personnel Requirements and Limitations such as the need for trade specialists and engineering experts as well as support personnel, such as Radiation Chemistry technicians, welding technicians with special expertise, use of specific contractor or station procedures for installation or the need for mock-ups for training, installation, or operation.
4.1.41. <input type="checkbox"/>	LIST special procedures and installation specifications that apply, but are not part of the normal installation procedural direction.

**ATTACHMENT 1**  
**Design Attribute Review (DAR)**  
 EC 378302 Rev.000

Section Applicable	Design Change Attribute
4.1.42. <input type="checkbox"/>	DETERMINE Interfacing Department impact of the Configuration Change, such as Operations, Plant Engineering, Training (including Plant Simulator), Maintenance, Reactor Engineering, Radiation Protection and others. (see Attachments 10A through 10H)
4.1.43. <input type="checkbox"/>	CONSIDER impact on License Renewal/Life Extension Projects that may be in process, or may have already been approved. (see Attachment 11)
4.1.44. <input type="checkbox"/>	REVIEW the proposed changes for conformance with requirements of any applicable Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited (NEIL) Insurance Standard, or other appropriate insurance standards.
4.1.45. <input type="checkbox"/>	A comprehensive single point vulnerability (SPV) review of the configuration change shall be performed to ensure the configuration change does not add the potential to cause an unplanned reactor SCRAM.
4.1.46. <input type="checkbox"/>	Impact on Steam Generator Replacement Projects (PWR only, see Attachment 13)
4.4. <input type="checkbox"/>	Configuration Control Activities- Use of Attachment 7
4.5. <input type="checkbox"/>	Determination of Program Impact - Use of Attachment 8

**1. Reason for Evaluation/Scope:**

The purpose of this evaluation is to determine a bounding expected ambient temperature and relative humidity of the Unit 1 Spray Additive Tank Room and Pipe Penetration Area (i.e., U-1 Curved Wall Area or CWA) at floor Elevation 364' of the Auxiliary Building based on different PRA scenarios listed below in conjunction with the 1SI8811B valve failing to fully open.

Also, for conservative measures, a calculation will be performed to determine the expected temperature and relative humidity in the U-1 CWA during a LOOP/LOCA.

For comparison sake, Reference 4.9 states that 1SI881B is located in EQ zone A13C which has a maximum temperature of 130F and relative humidity of 8 to 70%. Also, VA-101 Rev. 006B "Auxiliary Building Energy Load for EL. 330'-0", 346'-0", 364'-0" and 383'-0" predicts a maximum temperature in this room of 92.6 °F for normal operation. Neither of these conservative analyses are invalidated or exceeded by this analysis.

This evaluation result will be used to support the Braidwood Phase 3 Significant Determination Process (SDP) Evaluation of Failure of 1SI8811B to Fully Open, BW-SDP-003. The piping heat load contributions for this evaluation are based on the following scenarios:

- A small or medium break Loss of Coolant Accident has occurred on Braidwood U-1
- The 1A and 1B SI and CV pumps inject to the Reactor Coolant System taking suction from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)
- The 1A and 1B Containment Spray (CS) pump does not actuate.
- Valve 1SI8811B, 1B Containment Recirculation sump isolation, fails to stroke fully open and stops at 34% open. Valve 1SI8811A, 1A Containment Recirculation sump isolation, also fails to open fully. Consequently, the CV and SI pumps are not switched over to the Containment Recirculation sumps. Since the SI8811A/B valves open partially, it is assumed that both RH pumps are stopped and do not operate in long term recirculation to the RCS Cold Leg until operator action is taken to fully open the 1SI8811A/B valves and restart the RH pumps. This scenario causes no significant increase in the heat load from piping located in the CWA until the RH pumps are restarted.
- Operations personnel are dispatched to the Auxiliary Building El. 364 ft, Curved Wall Area (CWA), to open valve 1SI8811B locally with the handwheel on the valve operator. The bounding timeframe credited for operator response in the U-1 364' curved wall area is assumed to be 13 hours which includes the time from receiving the SI signal to the time the operator exits the U-1 364' curved wall area. The fluid temperatures that have been evaluated are bounding because they are hottest since they are taken at about 30 minutes after the accident for a Large Break LOCA scenario.

**2. Inputs:**

- 2.1 According to Reference 4.1 (page A2) and Ref. 4.5, the VA supply airflow to the Unit 1 Spray Additive Tank Room and Pipe Penetration Area (Room #138) of Auxiliary Building Elevation 364' is 5343 cfm (ft<sup>3</sup>/min) for VA two fan operation (prior to modification D20-0-00-355 where main supply/exhaust fan blade angles were changed). The calculated maximum U-1 CWA temperature during normal operation is 92.6 °F based on a calculated heat load of 362,215 Btu/Hr (Ref. 4.5).
- 2.2 According to Reference 4.3, the temperature for supply air to the room is 106.3 °F. This temperature conservatively includes additional heat load from maximum design outside air temperature of 95 °F DB/78 °F WB with no credit taken for auxiliary building chillers or VA

main supply/exhaust fans operating (i.e., LOOP/LOCA). The calculated heat load for the U-1 CWA during VA abnormal operation is 146,500 Btu/Hr.

- 2.3 U-1 CWA design ambient temperature limit during normal operation is 122 °F in accordance with Reference 4.5. Per Ref. 4.9 and 4.1, The EQ ambient temperature limit for the U-1 CWA is 130 °F during normal operation. Because the VA system was designed to maintain the area below 122 °F, the maximum temperature limit for the area will be conservatively established at 122 °F.
- 2.4 From Ref. 4.3, the Non-Accessible (NAC) Booster fan airflow is 48000 cfm/fan with two NAC booster fans operating and supply airflow into the U-1 364' CWA is 4,911 cfm ( No main supply/exhaust fans operating).
- 2.5 Based on Ref. 4.7, the VA summer operating lineup during this timeframe was one main supply fan, one main exhaust fan, and one auxiliary building chiller operating. The highest temperature recorded during operator rounds for the 1B SI pump room did not exceed 90 °F. The VA main supply fan air temperature to the Auxiliary Building was approximately 70 °F.

### **3. Assumptions:**

- 3.1 For the LOOP/LOCA scenario, the Auxiliary Building Ventilation (VA) operating lineup is assumed to be in booster-only fan lineup which includes one Fuel Handling Building (FHB) booster fan and two Non-Accessible (NAC) booster fans running during maximum design summer time conditions of 95 °F DB/78 °F WB. These air conditions correspond to an enthalpy of 41.82 BTU/lb. This VA operating lineup and design temperature establishes a conservative bounding condition during the LOOP/LOCA accident scenario by creating the lowest possible supply airflows into the curved wall area with the highest ambient temperature and humidity profiles for the U-1 CWA. (i.e., no credit taken for having auxiliary building chillers available during summer or additional VA main supply/exhaust fans running). (Note that the highest recorded air temperature during the summer of 2008 at the Morris Illinois weather reporting station was 93 °F. Additionally, no day could be found where the combination of daily high temperature and recorded dew point resulted in an air enthalpy that exceeded 41.82 BTU/lb.)
- 3.2 Due to the short duration for the operator response into the curved wall area for the aforementioned PRA scenarios and the expected slow conduction of heat into the U-1 curved wall area, the heat transmission load was assumed to be negligible, thus was not considered as a design input into the overall heat load calculation.
- 3.3 There are no plant barrier impairments affecting the curved wall area configuration that could change the ventilation configuration design airflows or flow path.

### **4. References**

- 4.1 Calculation BRW-96-461-M, Rev. 002B, "Justification of EQ Zone Temperatures and ALARA Minimum Airflow Requirements during VA Two-Fan operation".
- 4.2 EC 377814, Rev. 000 "Evaluate Temperature of the Curve Wall Area Aux. Bldg. Elev. 364', Using Flow from Booster Fan Operation Only".
- 4.3 VA-102 Rev 003A "Aux. Bldg Energy Load Calculation for EL. 330', 346', 364', 383', 401' and 426 in Abnormal Condition"
- 4.4 BW-SDP-003 "Braidwood Phase 3 SDP Evaluation of Failure of 1SI8811B to Fully Open"

- 4.5 VA-101 Rev. 006B "Auxiliary Building Energy Load for EL. 330'-0", 346'-0", 364'-0" and 383'-0".
- 4.6 Sargent & Lundy Mechanical Department Standard, MES-7.2, Piping Heat Losses - Insulated and Uninsulated
- 4.7 Review of PI Temperature Trend Data, Operator Rounds Data, Plant Engineering VA System Quarterly Walkdown Trend Data, and VA Operating Lineups for Auxiliary Building and U-1 CWA temperatures during timeframe of September 20, 2007 – June 24, 2009.
  - a. The VA main supply fan air temperature was approximately 70 °F during summer time.
  - b. The Curved Wall Area did not exceed 90 °F during the entire time in question. This was determined by reviewing daily temperature measurements of the 1B SI pump room and 1B CV pump room which both receive air directly from the CWA.
  - c. VA lineup during summertime was one main supply/exhaust fan and one auxiliary building chiller operating throughout summer.
- 4.8 Historical weather data obtained from <http://www.wunderground.com/> for Morris Illinois.
- 4.9 UFSAR Sec. 3.11, Table 3.11-2 – Environmental Design of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment

## **5. Method of Analysis**

### **Bounding LOOP/LOCA Calculation**

The calculated temperature increase due to additional heat loads in the CWA will be estimated based on conservative VA NAC booster fan airflow of 4,911 cfm.

The relationship  $Q = 1.05 \times \Delta t \times \text{CFM}$  (Reference 4.1) will be used to determine the  $\Delta T$  due to total heat loads in the CWA during VA abnormal booster only fan operation.

The NAC booster fan airflow to the Unit I Spray Additive Tank and Pipe Penetration Area (U-1 364', 383', and 401' CWA - Room 138) is from Reference 4.3, page 110.

The total piping heat loads referenced in Ref. 4.3 calculation for room 138 are recalculated based on actual LOOP/LOCA piping operational lineup configurations in the CWA. Refer to Attachment A for a line by line disposition. Ref. 4.6 provides the guidance to calculate piping heat dissipation (Btu/Hr) to the room 138 and documenting it in Attachment A (shown below).

### **Realistic U-1 CWA Ambient Temperature and Relative Humidity During PRA Scenarios**

The VA main supply fan air temperature to the U-1 CWA is no more than 70 °F with an Auxiliary Building chiller running. (Ref. 4.7)

The 1B SI pump room air temperature did not exceed 90°F for the period in question. (Ref. 4.7)

With a supply fan temperature of 70 °F, the air will be assumed to be saturated (100% RH) to conservatively maximize the humidity level to the U-1 CWA. Based on plotting the initial state of the air, the final relative humidity of the air can be determined knowing the final temperature (90°F) and plotting the sensible heating process via the psychrometric chart.

**6. Numeric Analysis**

**Bounding LOOP/LOCA Calculation - Temperature of Unit 1 Spray Additive Tank & Pipe Penetration (Room 138):**

From Reference 4.3, the temperature for supply air to the U-1 CWA room is conservatively calculated at 106.3 °F. This temperature conservatively includes additional heat load from the maximum outside design air conditions of 95 °F DB/78 °F WB.

**Supply Air Temperature from Ref. 4.3 page 110 →       $T_S = 106.3 \text{ °F (Conservative)}$**

**Piping Heat Loads:**

(From Attachment A, Abnormal Operations)       **$Q_{abp} = 3,052 \text{ (Btu/Hr)}$**

**Electric Heat Gain (Ref. 4.3-page 68)**       **$Q_{Ele} = 32,765 \text{ (Btu/Hr)}$**

**Electric Lighting Heat Gain (Ref. 4.3-page 68)**       **$Q_L = 4,555 \text{ (Btu/Hr)}$**

**$Q_{abn} = Q_{abp} + Q_{Ele} + Q_L$**        **$Q_{abn} = 40,372 \text{ (Btu/Hr)}$**

The above abnormal operation piping heat load is recalculated in Attachment A tables, (shown below) will be used along with NAC booster fan airflow into the room # 138 of 4911 cfm (input 2.4).

Based on the above, the  $\Delta T$  is calculated using VA non-accessible booster fan airflow of 4911 cfm, as shown below.

**$Q_{Abn} = 1.05x \Delta T x CFM_{Boost}$**       (Reference 4.1)

Where:

**$Q_{Abn}$**  = Sensible Heat (Btu/Hr)

**$\Delta T$**  = Temperature Difference (°F)

**$CFM_{Boost}$**  = Air Flow Supply to Rm. #138 with two NAC booster fans running (ft<sup>3</sup> per Minute - cfm)

**$CFM_{Boost} = 4,911 \text{ cfm}$**

**$\Delta T = \frac{Q_{Abn}}{1.05x CFM_{Boost}}$**

**$\Delta T = 7.8 \text{ °F}$**

**$T_{CWA} = T_S + \Delta T$**

**$T_{CWA} = 114.1 \text{ °F}$**

The estimated conservative calculated temperature for the Unit 1 Spray Additive Tank Room and Pipe Penetration Area during LOOP/LOCA would not have been more than:

$$T_{CWA} = 114.1 \text{ }^{\circ}\text{F}$$

Using a psychrometric chart plotting initial and final temperatures determined that the final relative humidity is approximately 27% RH based on 95 °F DB/78 °F WB entering air condition and 114.1 °F final temperature.

**Final U-1 CWA RH = 27% RH**

**Final U-1 CWA  $T_{CWA}$  = 114.1 °F**

### **Realistic U-1 CWA Ambient Temperature and Relative Humidity During PRA Scenarios**

Based on Reference 4.7, the PI temperature trend data for the 1B SI pump room was reviewed during this timeframe. The highest recorded temperature recorded in the 1B SI pump room was 90 °F. This temperature can be utilized as a representative temperature data point for Room 138. This is because air is exhausted from Room 138 into both the 1B SI pump room and 1B CV pump rooms, eventually exhausting to the VA non-accessible exhaust filtration system. Because the 1B SI pump is normally in standby condition (i.e., no additional cooling in the room), the temperature recorded during operator rounds would be representative of the U-1 CWA ambient temperatures during normal operation.

Because the RH pumps did not draw hot water from the containment sumps while the 1SI8811A/B valves are in a partially opened position during the PRA scenarios, no additional heat loads from RH system piping would be credited in the U-1 CWA until the 1SI8811A/B valves are fully opened. Based on design input Ref. 2.1 and 2.2, the calculated heat load in the U-1 CWA (Room 138) under abnormal conditions (i.e., LOOP/LOCA) is much lower than normal operating conditions. With the RH pumps isolated, the calculated heat load during abnormal conditions becomes even lower (i.e., no additional piping heat load from RH pumps operating in containment recirculation mode). Therefore, based on engineering judgment, the highest recorded temperature determined from the PI data and operator rounds temperature trends recorded during normal operation in the summer time would be expected to be representative of the highest ambient temperature condition that would be seen during the PRA accident scenarios (i.e., LOCA only). The highest temperature data recorded in the 1B SI pump room without the SI pump or room cooler operating was 90 °F based on Reference 4.7. Therefore, this temperature can be considered to be representative of the highest temperature in the U-1 CWA during the PRA accident scenarios of either a small break or medium break LOCA.

Based on the following design inputs:

Initial supply air to the Auxiliary Building – 70 °F DB

Initial supply air relative humidity – 100% RH

Final exhaust air leaving U-1 CWA - 90 °F DB

Psychrometric Chart Plotting Results (See Attachment B):

**Final relative humidity for U-1 CWA – 52 % RH**

Based on actual temperature trend data for the aforementioned timeframe of September 20,2007 – June 24, 2009, the estimated temperature and relative humidity for the Unit 1 Spray Additive Tank Room and Pipe Penetration Area would not have been more than:

**Final U-1 CWA T<sub>CWA</sub> = 90 °F**  
**Final U-1 CWA Humidity = 52% RH**

**7. Conclusion**

**BOUNDING LOOP/LOCA ACCIDENT SCENARIO**

The temperature and relative humidity for the Unit 1 Spray Additive Tank Room and Pipe Penetration Area (Curved Wall Area) at floor Elevation 364' of the Auxiliary Building is estimated to not exceed **114.1 °F and 27% RH**. The estimated temperature in this evaluation is only applicable for the conditions that are listed in sections 1 through 3 of this evaluation.

**REALISTIC CWA PRA ACCIDENT SCENARIOS**

The temperature and relative humidity for the Unit 1 Spray Additive Tank Room and Pipe Penetration Area (Curved Wall Area) at floor Elevation 364' of the Auxiliary Building is estimated to not exceed **90 °F and 52% RH**. The estimated temperature in this evaluation is only applicable for the conditions that are listed in sections 1 through 3 of this evaluation.

In conclusion, the LOOP/LOCA and Realistic accident evaluation results remain below the temperature and relative humidity values referenced in the UFSAR Sec. 3.11, and therefore, remain bounded by the values established per Ref. 4.9.

**Prepared By:** Nick Radloff

**Date:** Refer to EC Milestone

**Reviewed By:** James Gosnell

**Date:** Refer to EC Milestone

**Approved By:** Raymond Belair

**Date:** Refer to EC Milestone

**See Attachment “A” Below**

**Attachment A**  
**Piping Heat Load Calculation for Curved Wall Area**



Piping Heat Loads  
Calc for CWA.pdf

**Attachment B**  
**Psychrometric Chart Plot**



Psychrometric Chart  
Plot.pdf

**ATTACHMENT 5**

**EC 378180, "Analysis to Determine Back Flow from RWST to ECCS Recirculation Sump While 1SI8811A/B and 1SI8812A/B are Open for Six Minutes"**

**Braidwood Station**

**Engineering Change**

Company Name : EXELON GENERATION CO.,LLC  
EC Number : 0000378180 000  
Status/Date : MODIFIED 12/29/2009  
Facility : BRW BRAIDWOOD GENERATING STATION  
Type/Sub-type: EVAL MECH

Print Date: 12/30/2009



Page: 1

EC Title: ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE BACK FLOW FROM RWST TO ECCS  
RECIRCULATION SUMP WHILE 1SI8811A/B AND 1SI8812A/B  
ARE OPEN FOR SIX MINUTES

Mod Nbr : 0000378180      KW1: SR      KW2:      KW3:      KW4:      KW5:

Master EC	: N	Work Group	:	Temporary	:	N
Outage	: N	Alert Group	: DEM	Aprd Reqd Date	:	12/17/2009
WO Required	: N	Image Addr	:	Exp Insvc Date	:	
Adv Wk Appvd	:	Alt Ref.	:	Expires On	:	09/23/2012
Auto-Advance	: Y	Priority	: BH	Auto-Asbuild	:	N
Caveat Outst	:	Department	: 08952	Discipline	:	DEM
Resp Engr	: GIOVANNI	PANICI	:			
Location	:					

**Units**

<u>Fac</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Description</u>
BRW	01	UNIT ONE

**Systems**

<u>Fac</u>	<u>System</u>	<u>Description</u>
BRW	CV	CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL
BRW	RH	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL
BRW	SI	SAFETY INJECTION

**Engineering Change**

EC Number : 0000378180 000  
Status/Date : MODIFIED 12/29/2009  
Facility : BRW  
Type/Sub-type: EVAL MECH



Print Date: 12/30/2009



Page: 1

EC Title: ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE BACK FLOW FROM RWST TO ECCS  
RECIRCULATION SUMP WHILE 1SI8811A/B AND 1SI8812A/B  
ARE OPEN FOR SIX MINUTES

Mod Nbr : 0000378180 KW1: SR KW2: KW3: KW4: KW5:

Master EC : N Work Group : Temporary : N  
Outage : N Alert Group: DEM Aprd Reqd Date: 12/17/2009  
WO Required : N Image Addr : Exp Insvc Date:  
Adv Wk Appvd: Alt Ref. : Expires On : 09/23/2012  
Auto-Advance: Y Priority : BH Auto-Asbuild : N  
Caveat Outst: Department : 08952 Discipline : DEM  
Resp Engr : GIOVANNI PANICI  
Location :

<u>Milestone</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>PassPort</u>	<u>Name</u>		<u>Req By</u>
030-DAR CONCUR	12/11/2009	BRWUG	GOSNELL	JAMES	CANCELED
110-PREPARE EC	12/28/2009	BRZYP	PANICI	GIOVANNI	APPROVED
120-REVIEW EC	12/29/2009	BYRGO	BARAN	DAVID	APPROVED
Performed a detailed review of the complete EC.					
240-ITPR-OTHER	12/29/2009	BRWUG	GOSNELL	JAMES	APPROVED
Independent review by John Rommel See review comments for his comments.					
300-APPROVE EC	12/29/2009	BRWUG	GOSNELL	JAMES	APPROVED
900-ARCHIVE EC					CLOSED

**Units**

<u>Fac</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Description</u>
BRW	01	UNIT ONE

**Systems**

<u>Fac</u>	<u>System</u>	<u>Description</u>
BRW	SI	SAFETY INJECTION
BRW	CV	CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL
BRW	RH	RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL

**Planning/Scheduling Information**

Planning Start : Level of Effort:

<u>Planning Event</u>	<u>From Date</u>	<u>Thru Date</u>
100-PREP EVAL		

**Engineering Change**

EC Number : 0000378180 000  
Status/Date : MODIFIED 12/29/2009  
Facility : BRW  
Type/Sub-type: EVAL MECH



Print Date: 12/30/2009

**Exelon**<sup>™</sup>

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**Cross References**

<u>Ref.</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Sub-</u> <u>Number</u>	<u>Description</u>
AR	00987342		WATER IN ACTUATOR LIMIT SWITCH COMPARTMENT VAL
AR	00988980		NRC EXITED YELLOW FINDING FOR 1SI8811B FAILURE

**EC 378180 Revision 0**  
**Design Considerations Summary**

**4.1.4.1 Identify Basic SSC Functions**

The function of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) is to provide core cooling and negative reactivity to ensure that the reactor core is protected after any of the following accidents:

- a. Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA), coolant leakage greater than the capability of the normal charging system;
- b. Rod ejection accident;
- c. Loss of secondary coolant accident, including uncontrolled steam release or loss of feedwater; and
- d. Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR).

The addition of negative reactivity is designed primarily for the loss of secondary coolant accident where primary cooldown could add enough positive reactivity to achieve criticality and return to significant power.

The ECCS consists of three separate subsystems: centrifugal charging (CV) high head, Safety Injection (SI) (intermediate head), and Residual Heat Removal (RHR) (low head). Each subsystem consists of two redundant, 100% capacity trains. The Safety Injection accumulators are also part of the ECCS.

There are three phases of ECCS operation: injection, cold leg recirculation, and hot leg recirculation. In the injection phase, water is taken from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) and injected into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) through the cold legs. During the recirculation phase of LOCA recovery, RHR pump suction is transferred to the containment recirculation sump. The RHR pumps then supply the suction of the CV and SI pumps. Initially, recirculation is through the same paths as the injection phase, i.e., through the cold legs. After approximately 6.0 hours, the ECCS flow is shifted to the hot legs.

Switchover of the suction of the RH pumps from the RWST to the Containment Recirculation Sump is started when the RWST reaches the LO-2 water level, approximately 46.7%. The isolation valves for the recirculation sumps, 1SI8811A and 1SI8811B, open automatically and actions to switchover the suction of the CV and SI pumps to the discharge of the RH pumps are completed manually from the Main Control Room. These actions include isolating the RH pumps from the RWST by closing valves 1SI8812A and 1SI8812B after the flow path from the sumps has been verified. Following the opening of the 1SI8811A and B valves, a drain path to the recirculation sumps from the RWST exists until the 1SI8812A and 1SI8812B valves are isolated.

The objective of EC 378180 is to determine the flow rate from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) to the Containment Recirculation sumps (1A and 1B), post Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), during the time period the isolation valves for the RH pumps from the RWST are open (Valves 1SI8812A and 1SI8812B) and the isolation valves for the suction of the RH pumps from the Containment Recirculation sumps (Valves 1SI8811A and 1SI8811B) are partially open. The time period has been

**EC 378180 Revision 0**  
**Design Considerations Summary**

determined to be 6 minutes based on the time taken to close valves 1SI8812A and 1SI8812B in a simulator scenario. The RWST outflow and resulting RWST level data will be used in support of a Significance Determination Process to determine the safety impact of the failure of valve 1SI8811B to fully open (Reference Issue Report #934782).

**4.1.4.2 Identify Configuration Change safety classification.**

Although the activities to support a Significance Determination Process (SDP) are not required to be safety related, EC 378180 is treated as safety related.

**EC 378180 Revision 0**  
**Evaluation of RWST Backflow to the Containment Recirculation Sump**

**Background- ECCS System Operation:**

The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) is designed to cool the reactor core and provide shutdown capability following the initiation of one of four different accident conditions:

1. Pipe Break in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), which causes a discharge larger than what can be made up by the normal makeup system, up to and including the instantaneous circumferential break of the largest piping in the RCS.
2. Rupture of a control rod drive mechanism causing a rod cluster control assembly ejection accident.
3. Pipe breaks in the steam system, up to and including the instantaneous circumferential break of the largest pipe in the steam system.
4. A Steam Generator tube rupture

The ECCS is comprised of the following subsystems:

1. High Head Safety Injection – Two (2) Centrifugal Charging pumps
2. Medium Head Safety Injection – Two (2) Safety Injection pumps
3. Low Head Safety Injection – Two (2) Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps
4. Safety Injection Accumulators

There are three phases of operation for the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS): injection, cold leg recirculation, and hot leg recirculation. In the injection phase, all pumps take suction from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) and inject into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) through the cold legs. When the RWST level decreases to about 46.7%, the suction to the RHR pumps (A & B) is transferred to the containment recirculation sumps (A & B). Valves manipulations are then made so that the RHR pumps supply the suction of the CV and SI pumps. Initially, recirculation is through the same paths as the injection phase, i.e., through the cold legs. After approximately 6.0 hours, the ECCS flow is injected to the RCS hot legs.

Switchover of the suction of the RHR pumps from the RWST to the Containment Recirculation Sump is started when the RWST reaches the LO-2 water level, approximately 46.7%. The isolation valves for the recirculation sumps, 1SI8811A and 1SI8811B, open automatically and actions to switchover the suction of the CV and SI pumps to the discharge of the RH pumps are completed manually from the Main Control Room. These actions include isolating the RHR pumps from the RWST by closing valves 1SI8812A and 1SI8812B after the flow path from the sumps has been verified (Reference 2). Following the opening of the 1SI8811A and B valves, a drain path to the recirculation sumps from the RWST exists until the 1SI8812A and 1SI8812B valves are isolated.

**Reason for Evaluation/Scope:**

During scheduled surveillance testing on 06/24/2009, the Safety Injection system containment sump suction isolation valve (1SI8811B) was stroked open. The control

**EC 378180 Revision 0**  
**Evaluation of RWST Backflow to the Containment Recirculation Sump**

board indication showed dual indication and never indicated a full open condition. At the valve, observers saw an approximate 30-40% open condition. Upon further investigation, water was found in the valve actuator limit switch compartment and the actuator torque switch was severely corroded. Evidence indicated that water had entered the compartment through an electrical conduit penetration. The torque switch and limit switch components were replaced and the compartment and wiring were cleaned and dried. On 06/26/2009, the valve was tested and restored to operable status.

The NRC has identified a preliminary yellow finding for this event (Reference IR #988980). In response to the preliminary NRC finding, Braidwood applied the Significance Determination Process (SDP) to the above event in accordance with the guidance in procedure LS-AA-2002.

In support of the SDP activities, several scenarios have been evaluated for risk insights. In these scenarios, the isolation valves for both Containment Recirculation Sumps, 1SI8811A and 1SI811B, are assumed to fail to open fully. This evaluation determines the backflow from the RWST to the containment recirculation sumps during the selected scenarios. The results of this evaluation will be used in the risk insight analyses, BW-SDP-003.

**Detailed Evaluation:**

The details of the evaluation for the RWST backflow are provided in Sargent & Lundy Evaluation 2009-13491 (Reference 3, attached to this EC).

The evaluation uses the ECCS hydraulic model developed in Reference 4 to make a Best-estimate determination of the amount of water that would flow from the RWST to the containment sumps at Braidwood Unit 1 during a six minute period starting at the RWST LO-2 alarm during which the containment sump isolation valves, 1SI8811A and 1SI8811B, are both stuck in a partially open position while the 1SI8812A/B valves to the RWST are open. Separate runs are made to determine the sensitivity of the RWST backflow to the sump to changes to a number of selected parameters.

Boundary conditions from four different sump back flow scenarios are analyzed: 5.2 inch LOCA, 2 inch LOCA, 0.86 inch LOCA, and a Bleed and Feed LOCA. The scenario dependent boundary conditions are the RCS pressure, the Containment pressure, and the sump water level. ECCS Pumps flow rates have been determined using the flow coefficients of the ECCS throttle valves as determined using the results of the flow balance tests performed during the most recently completed Braidwood Unit 1 refueling outage, A1R14 and pump curves based on the most recent ASME Group A pump testing for the Braidwood Unit 1 SI, CV, and RH pumps.

The PIPE-FLO hydraulic model of the Braidwood ECCS systems is taken from Reference 4. This model documents the pipe lengths, diameters, schedules, elevations, fittings, and component resistances for the flow balance test and sump back flow

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**Evaluation of RWST Backflow to the Containment Recirculation Sump**

scenarios. The system line-ups for the flow balance test scenarios are also taken from Reference 4.

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**Evaluation of RWST Backflow to the Containment Recirculation Sump**

Sensitivity to Inputs:

Six cases are run to determine the sensitivity of the back flow rate to the containment sumps to changes to a number of inputs. The 5.2 inch LOCA scenario with the RWST at the LO-2 level is used as the base case. Each selected input is changed while the other inputs are maintained the same as in the base case. The six inputs that are varied are:

- RWST Level – The RWST level is increased by one foot.
- Primary System Pressure – The primary system pressure is increased by 10%
- Containment Pressure – The containment pressure is decreased by 10%
- C<sub>v</sub> of valves 1SI8811A/B – The C<sub>v</sub>s of the partially open containment sump isolation valves are increased by 1000
- ECCS pump curves – The pump curves of the SI, CV, and RH pumps are decreased by 3%.
- Pipe Resistance – The resistance of the most resistive pipe segments between the RWST and the containment sumps, 1SI82AA/BA and 1SI81AB/BB, are both decreased by eliminating one elbow.

The results of the six runs are given below:

	RWST Level + 1 ft	Primary System Pressure + 10%	Containment Pressure - 10%	1SI8811A/B C <sub>v</sub> + 1000	EC CS Pump Curve - 3%	Pipe Resistance - 1 elbow
Sump A Back Flow (gpm)	3012	2961	3289	2953	2976	3006
Sump B Back Flow (gpm)	3257	3204	3544	3194	3224	3255
Total Sump Back Flow (gpm)	6269	6165	6833	6147	6200	6261
Sump Back Flow – Increase Over Base Case (gpm)	156	52	720	34	87	148

The sensitivity cases demonstrate how sump flow is affected by changes to the various input parameters. Containment Pressure has the greatest effect; a 10% decrease in pressure resulted in 10.5% increase in sump flow. Through discussion with the PRA specialist, the variability of the output for the given changes in input does not make a significant difference in the overall conclusions since they result in changes that are a small fraction of the total lost inventory from the RWST and significant margin remains. The effect of input variations will be further dispositioned in the significance determination, BW-SDP-003.

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**Evaluation of RWST Backflow to the Containment Recirculation Sump**

**Conclusions/Findings:**

The results of the analyses, including the RWST backflow, for each of the scenario that was evaluated are provided in the tables below.

**5.2 Inch LOCA**

	At Lo-2 Alarm	After Three Minutes	After Six Minutes	Average Over Six Minutes
RWST Level (feet)	427.3	422.4	417.9	
Primary System Pressure (psia)	29	28.5	28	
Containment Pressure (psia)	19.2	19.15	19.1	
Sump Water Level (feet)	2	2.4	2.9	
RWST Flow (gpm)	13959	13100	12223	13091
Sump A Back Flow (gpm)	2933	2509	2069	2501
Sump B Back Flow (gpm)	3180	2738	2291	2735.5
Total Sump Flow (gpm)	6113	5247	4360	5236.5

**2 Inch LOCA**

	At Lo-2 Alarm	After Six Minutes	Average Over Six Minutes
RWST Level (feet)	427.3	417.9	
Primary System Pressure (psia)	115	111	
Containment Pressure (psia)	18.8	18.7	
Sump Water Level (feet)	1.5	2.4	
RWST Flow (gpm)	13962	12279	13120.5
Sump A Back Flow (gpm)	3977	3105	3541
Sump B Back Flow (gpm)	4227	3311	3769
Total Sump Flow (gpm)	8204	6416	7310

**0.86 Inch LOCA**

	At Lo-2 Alarm	After Six Minutes	Average Over Six Minutes
RWST Level (feet)	427.3	418.0	
Primary System Pressure (psia)	835	835	
Containment Pressure (psia)	17.3	17.3	
Sump Water Level (feet)	1.3	2.2	
RWST Flow (gpm)	13740	12117	12928.5
Sump A Back Flow (gpm)	6171	5383	5777
Sump B Back Flow (gpm)	6530	5697	6113.5
Total Sump Flow (gpm)	12701	11080	11890.5

**Feed and Bleed LOCA**

	At Lo-2 Alarm	After Six Minutes	Average Over Six Minutes
RWST Level (feet)	427.3	420.3	
Primary System Pressure (psia)	211	211	
Containment Pressure (psia)	25.7	25.6	
Sump Water Level (feet)	2	2.6	
RWST Flow (gpm)	10511	8858	9684.5
Sump A Back Flow (gpm)	4480	3677	4078.5
Sump B Back Flow (gpm)	4741	3892	4316.5
Total Sump Flow (gpm)	9221	7569	8395

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**Evaluation of RWST Backflow to the Containment Recirculation Sump**

**References:**

1. Issue Report #987342
2. Emergency Procedure 1BwEP ES-1.3 Revision 200
3. Sargent & Lundy Evaluation #2009-13491
4. Design Analysis #BRW-06-0016-M Revision 3

**Preparer:**     **Giovanni Panici**

**Date: 12-28-2009**

**Reviewer:**    **D. Baran**

**Date: 12-29-2009**

**Approver:**    **James Gosnell**

**Date: 12-29-2009**

Images of the text from Sargent & Lundy Evaluation #2009-13941 are provided in the pages that follow:

**EC 378180 Revision 0**  
**Evaluation of RWST Backflow to the Containment Recirculation Sump**

**Evaluation 2009-13491**  
**Analysis of RWST Back Flow to the Containment Sumps**

Exelon  
Braidwood Unit 1  
Safety Related  
No Unverified Assumptions  
Status: Approved

Prepared By: Anthony M. Ryan  
Anthony M. Ryan

Date: 12-23-09

Reviewed By: Jennifer N. Zalon  
Jennifer N. Zalon

Date: 12/23/09

Approved By: Robert J. Peterson  
Robert J. Peterson

Date: 12-23-09

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**Evaluation of RWST Backflow to the Containment Recirculation Sump**

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## Evaluation of RWST Backflow to the Containment Recirculation Sump

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### 1.0 Purpose

Revision 3 of Calculation BYR06-029 / BRW-06-0016-M, Reference 4.1, documents a hydraulic model of the Byron and Braidwood ECCS systems. The model is used in the calculation to analyze ECCS flow balance test and cold leg and hot leg recirculation scenarios.

The purpose of this evaluation is to use the hydraulic model developed in Reference 4.1 to make a best estimate determination of the amount of water that would flow from the RWST to the containment sumps at Braidwood Unit 1 during a six minute period starting at the RWST LO-2 alarm during which the containment sump isolation valves, 1SI8811A and 1SI8811B, are both stuck in a partially open position while the 1SI8812A/B valves to the RWST are simultaneously open. Boundary conditions from four different sump back flow scenarios are analyzed: 5.2 inch LOCA, 2 inch LOCA, 0.86 inch LOCA, and a Bleed and Feed LOCA. The scenario dependent boundary conditions are the RCS pressure, the Containment pressure, and the sump water level. The flow rates will be determined using the C<sub>v</sub>s of the ECCS throttle valves as determined using the results of the flow balance tests performed during the most recently completed Braidwood Unit 1 refueling outage, A1R14 and pump curves based on the most recent ASME Group A pump testing for the Braidwood Unit 1 SI, CV, and RH pumps. The ECCS throttle valves included in the flow balance tests are the SI to Cold Leg (1SI8822A-D) and CV to Cold Leg (1SI8810A-D) throttle valves.

### 2.0 Inputs

- 2.1 The PIPE-FLO hydraulic model of the Braidwood ECCS systems is taken from Reference 4.1. This model documents the pipe lengths, diameters, schedules, elevations, fittings, and component resistances for the flow balance test and sump back flow scenarios. The system line-ups for the flow balance test scenarios are also taken from Reference 4.1.
- 2.2 Data from the SI to cold leg and CV to cold leg flow balance tests from Braidwood Unit 1 refueling outage A1R14 is taken from Reference 4.2.

Table 2-1: A1R14 Flow Balance Test Data

Pump	RCS Cold Leg Flow (gpm)				RCP Seal Inj. or Miniflow (gpm)	Pump Discharge Pressure (psig)	Pump Suction Pressure (psig)
	Loop A	Loop B	Loop C	Loop D			
1A CV	116.5	116	116.1	116	80 (RCP seal)	840	18.4
1A SI	149.5	149.3	149.6	150.04	32 (Miniflow)	832	20.2

- 2.3 Data from the most recent ASME Group A pump testing for the Braidwood Unit 1 SI, CV, and RH pumps is taken from Reference 4.2.

Table 2-2: ASME Group A Pump Test Data

Pump	Flow Rate (gpm)	Differential Pressure (psid)
1A CV	193	2490
1B CV	195	2459
1A SI	45	1513
1B SI	44.5	1462.5
1A RH	633.8	185.8
1B RH	596	190.3

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- 2.4 The vendor pump curves for the Braidwood Unit 1 RH, SI, and CV pumps are taken from Sections 2.3.2, 2.3.4, and 2.3.5 of Reference 4.1.

Table 2-3: Vendor Pump Curves

RH A		RH B		SI A		SI B		CV A		CV B	
Flow (gpm)	Head (ft)										
0	455	0	455	0	3580	0	3600	0	5850	0	6000
1000	440	1000	432	50	3560	50	3580	100	5800	100	5900
2000	415	2000	400	150	3500	150	3500	175	5650	175	5700
2500	400	2500	390	250	3360	250	3360	250	5300	250	5300
3000	390	3000	380	350	3100	350	3160	325	4700	325	4600
3500	375	3500	365	450	2760	450	2850	400	3900	400	3800
4000	350	4000	345	550	2370	550	2450	475	2900	475	2800
4500	320	4500	315	655	1900	655	2020	550	1750	550	1600
5000	295	5000	280								

- 2.5 The system injection line-up used in the sump back flow scenarios are taken from highlighted P&IDs transmitted in Reference 4.4.
- 2.6 The RWST Level at the LO-2 alarm is 427.3 feet per Section 3 of Attachment A of Reference 4.7.
- 2.7 The RWST volume per foot of height is 8351.6 gallons per foot per Section 3 of Attachment A of Reference 4.7.
- 2.8 The flooded area of the containment floor conservatively used to minimize the containment flood height is 12114 ft<sup>2</sup> in Section 2.3.3 of Reference 4.8. With this area, the volume per foot of height of the containment floor is 90618.8 gallons per foot (12114 ft<sup>2</sup> \* 7.4805 gal/ft<sup>3</sup> = 90618.8 gal/ft).
- 2.9 The following flow rates are to be used in the analysis of the back flow from the RWST to the containment sumps per Reference 4.5.
- RCP Seal Injection Flow = 80 gpm for two CV pumps  
CV Miniflow Rate = 65 gpm for each CV pump  
Safety Injection Miniflow Rate = 30 gpm for each SI pump
- 2.10 The B train containment sump isolation valve, 1SI8811B, was determined to open 34.34 percent during surveillance testing per page 3 of Reference 4.9. The C<sub>v</sub> of the valve at this position is conservatively determined to be 6000 using the C<sub>v</sub> versus percent open graph from page 9 of Reference 4.9. The C<sub>v</sub> is maximized for this analysis to conservatively maximize back flow to the sump. Note that the C<sub>v</sub> used herein is greater (6000 vs. 5000) than that chosen in Reference 4.9 where a minimum C<sub>v</sub> was conservative.
- 2.11 The A train containment sump isolation valve, 1SI8811A, was determined to open 29.1 percent during surveillance testing per page 3 of Reference 4.10. The C<sub>v</sub> of the valve at this position is conservatively determined to be 5000 using the C<sub>v</sub> versus percent open graph from page 9 of Reference 4.10. The C<sub>v</sub> is maximized for this analysis to conservatively maximize back flow to the sump. Note that the C<sub>v</sub> used herein is greater (5000 vs. 4000) than that chosen in Reference 4.10 where a minimum C<sub>v</sub> was conservative.

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- 2.12 The primary system pressure, containment pressure, and initial sump water level for each of the four subject LOCA scenarios are provided in Reference 4.6 and documented in Table 2-4.

Table 2-4: LOCA Scenario Boundary Conditions

	Primary System Pressure (psia)	Containment Pressure (psia)	Containment Water Level <sup>1</sup> (feet)
5.2 Inch LOCA at LO-2 Alarm	29	19.2	2
5.2 Inch LOCA After Six Minutes	28	19.1	-
2 Inch LOCA at LO-2 Alarm	115	18.8	1.5
2 Inch LOCA After Six Minutes	111	18.7	-
0.86 Inch LOCA at LO-2 Alarm	835	17.3	1.3
0.86 Inch LOCA After Six Minutes	835	17.3	-
Bleed & Feed at LO-2 Alarm	211	25.7	2
Bleed & Feed After Six Minutes	211	25.6	-

Note 1: The containment water level is the water level above the containment floor. From Section 6.6.1 of Reference 4.1, the containment floor is at elevation 377.0 feet while the containment sump piping is at an elevation of 368.2 feet. Therefore, the level input into PIPE-FLO for the containment sumps is 8.8 feet (377-368.2=8.8) greater than the level shown in Table 2-4.

### 3.0 Assumptions

- 3.1 It is assumed that there has been no change in pump performance or system hydraulic resistance since the last flow balance and pump tests. This is consistent with Assumption 3.3.1 of Reference 4.1.
- 3.2 The assumptions found in Reference 4.1 that were used to create the hydraulic model are also assumed in this evaluation.
- 3.3 It is assumed that the change in density due to the range of RWST temperatures and boron concentrations present during the A1R14 flow balance tests has negligible impact on the determination of the throttle valve C<sub>v</sub>s. Consequently, Equation 1 does not account for the density ratio between actual and standard water temperatures.

### 4.0 References

- 4.1 BYR06-029 / BRW-06-0016-M, Revision 3, SI/RHR/CS/CV System Hydraulic Analysis In Support of GSI-191.
- 4.2 DIT-BRW-2009-0078, Revision 0, dated 11-30-09, and Rev. 1, dated 12-9-09, see Attachment A.
- 4.3 PIPE-FLO Version 8, Engineered Software Incorporated (S&L Program No. 03.7.100-8.0).
- 4.4 DIT-BRW-2009-0079, Revision 0, dated 12-4-09, see Attachment B.
- 4.5 DIT-BRW-2009-0080, Revision 0, dated 12-7-09, see Attachment C.
- 4.6 DIT-BRW-2009-0082, Revision 0, dated 12-8-09, see Attachment D.
- 4.7 SITH-1, Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Level Setpoints, Major Revision 7, up to and including Minor Revision 7A.

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- 4.8 SI-90-01, Minimum Containment Flood Level, Major Revision 9, up to and including Minor Rev. 9C.
- 4.9 EC#377204, Evaluate 1SI8811B Flow at Partial Opening.
- 4.10 EC#378112, Evaluate 1SI8811A Flow at Partial Opening.

### 5.0 Methodology

#### 5.1 Determination of $C_v$ s from A1R14

Four flow balance tests are done each refueling outage at Braidwood. Two of these are the CV to cold leg and the SI to cold leg tests. The results of these tests include the flow rate through each injection leg (A-D), the pump suction and discharge pressures, and the seal injection or miniflow flow rates if any. The results from the most recently completed refueling outage at Braidwood Unit 1, A1R14, are shown in Input 2.2.

To determine the  $C_v$ s of the throttle valves as they were set in A1R14, the results of the flow balance tests are used as inputs into modified versions of the corresponding flow balance test scenario models from Reference 4.1. Specifically, the pump suction and discharge pressures are set in the model for the pumps in operation during that test, the flow rate through each injection leg is set at a control valve representing the throttle valve for each leg, and the seal injection or miniflow flow rates are set as boundary condition demands.

One of the outputs from the flow balance test model is the pressure drop across each throttle valve needed to establish the flow measured in that test. These throttle valve pressure drops can be used in conjunction with their flow rates and Equation 1 to determine each of their  $C_v$ s.

$$C_v = \frac{Q}{\sqrt{\Delta P}} \quad \text{Equation 1}$$

where:  $C_v$  = valve flow coefficient  
 $Q$  = the valve flow (gpm)  
 $\Delta P$  = the valve pressure drop (psi)

#### 5.2 Modification of Vendor Pump Curves

To account for pump degradation or enhancement, the vendor curves for the RH, SI, and CV pumps (Input 2.4) are modified to agree with the latest ASME pump test results (Input 2.3). This is done by multiplying the pump curve developed head by a factor until it equals the developed head measured in the ASME test at the tested flow rate.

#### 5.3 Back Flow to the Containment Sumps From the RWST

The rate of flow from the RWST to the Containment Sumps is calculated for four LOCA scenarios using the hydraulic model developed in Reference 4.1. The back flow occurs during the transition from injection to recirculation mode when the sump isolation valves (1SI8811A/B) stall in a partially open position. The open flow paths are the injection mode paths from the RWST through the RH, SI, and CV pumps to the cold legs as documented in Reference 4.4 with the addition of the back flow path through 1SI8811A/B to the containment sumps. The analyzed back flow scenarios begin

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## Evaluation of RWST Backflow to the Containment Recirculation Sump

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when the RWST reaches the LO-2 level and end six minutes later. The boundary conditions which are changed for each scenario are the primary system pressure, the containment pressure, and the initial containment sump water level from Input 2.12. After six minutes, the RWST and containment sump water levels are iteratively adjusted using the average calculated flow rate over the six minute duration and their volume versus level relations documented in Inputs 2.7 and 2.8. The use of the average flow over the six minute duration is justified by running a case at three minutes for one of the LOCA scenarios and comparing the three minute results to the average from the six minute duration. The C<sub>v</sub>s of the partially open 1SI8811A/B valves are taken from Inputs 2.10 and 2.11.

### 5.4 Sensitivity to Inputs

In response to a request from Exelon, the sensitivity of the back flow rate to the containment sumps to changes in six inputs will be determined by running a set of sensitivity cases. These PIPE-FLO cases will be created by starting with the LOCA scenario with the largest break size and modifying one parameter per case.

### 5.5 Identification of Software

The hydraulic models are created using PIPE-FLO Ver. 8, Reference 4.3. PIPE-FLO is a computer code designed to perform steady-state analyses of single phase hydraulic systems.

Sargent & Lundy L.L.C. Software Configuration Control Details:

Controlled File Detail for PIPE-FLO (S&L Program No. 03.7.100-8.0)  
Type: 2 Status: O Effective Date: 09-21-2004

Controlled File Path: \\SNLVS5\SYS3\OPSS\PIP10080\

All computer runs are made on Sargent and Lundy L.L.C. PC No. ZD5955.

### 5.6 Acceptance Criteria

The results of this evaluation are used as input into other evaluations and calculations. As such, there are no acceptance criteria for this evaluation.

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## Evaluation of RWST Backflow to the Containment Recirculation Sump

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### 6.3 Back Flow to the Containment Sumps From the RWST

Two PIPE-FLO cases are run for each of the four LOCA scenarios, one when the RWST is at the LO-2 level, the other six minutes later. An additional case is run for the 5.2 inch LOCA case at three minutes. The output from these files can be found in Attachment F. The flow paths for the 5.2 and 2 inch LOCA scenarios with all SI, CV, and RH pumps injecting are as documented in Attachment B. The flow paths in the 0.86 inch LOCA scenario has been modified to reflect the inability of the RH pumps to inject to primary system pressure of 835 psia. Similarly, the flow paths in the Bleed and Feed LOCA scenario have been modified to reflect no injection by the RH pumps. In this scenario, the primary system pressure of 211 psia is below the potential discharge head of the RH pumps which indicates a possibility of injection. However, the corresponding pump flow rate is low enough for the RH miniflow valves (RH610 and RH611) to open. Once the RH miniflow valves are open, the pump flow rate increases and its developed head decreases until injection is no longer possible.

The RWST and containment sump water levels are iteratively calculated using the average RWST flow rate over the six minute duration from Table 7-1 and Inputs 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8. For example in the last iteration, the six minute RWST level in the 5.2 inch LOCA scenario is 427.3 ft –  $(13091 \text{ gpm} * 6 \text{ min}) / 8351.6 \text{ gal/ft} = 417.9$  feet and the six minute containment sump water level in the 5.2 inch LOCA scenario is 2 ft +  $(13091 \text{ gpm} * 6 \text{ min}) / 90618.8 \text{ gal/ft} = 2.9$  feet. The use of the average RWST flow rate to adjust the water levels is justified with a PIPE-FLO case run at three minutes for the 5.2 inch LOCA scenario. As can be seen in Table 7-1, the calculated RWST flow at three minutes is only 9 gpm different from the average calculated for the six minute duration.

### 6.4 Sensitivity to Inputs

In response to a request from Exelon, six cases are run to determine the sensitivity of the back flow rate to the containment sumps to a set of inputs. The 5.2 inch LOCA scenario with the RWST at the LO-2 level is used as the base case. The six inputs that are varied are:

- RWST Level – The RWST level is increased by one foot.
- Primary System Pressure – The primary system pressure is increased by 10%
- Containment Pressure – The containment pressure is decreased by 10%
- $C_v$  of valves 1SI8811A/B – The  $C_v$ s of the partially open containment sump isolation valves are increased by 1000
- ECCS pump curves – The pump curves of the SI, CV, and RH pumps are artificially decreased by 3%. The pump curves in this case are adjusted without also repeating the flow balance test cases described in Section 5.1. This represents a scenario which is outside of the analyzed design basis as defined in Reference 4.1. See Assumption 3.1 of this evaluation and Assumption 3.3.1 in Reference 4.1.
- Pipe Resistance – The resistance of the most resistive pipe segments between the RWST and the containment sumps, 1SI82AA/BA and 1SI81AB/BB, are both decreased by eliminating one elbow.

The PIPE-FLO output can be found in Attachment H. The 3% degraded pump curves are in Attachment I.

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## Evaluation of RWST Backflow to the Containment Recirculation Sump

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### 7.0 Results

The back flow rates from the RWST to the Containment Sumps for the four LOCA scenarios can be found in Tables 7-1 through 7-4.

Table 7-1: 5.2 Inch LOCA

	At Lo-2 Alarm	After Three Minutes	After Six Minutes	Average Over Six Minutes
RWST Level (feet)	427.3	422.4	417.9	
Primary System Pressure (psia)	29	28.5	28	
Containment Pressure (psia)	19.2	19.15	19.1	
Sump Water Level (feet)	2	2.4	2.9	
RWST Flow (gpm)	13959	13100	12223	13091
Sump A Back Flow (gpm)	2933	2509	2069	2501
Sump B Back Flow (gpm)	3180	2738	2291	2735.5
Total Sump Flow (gpm)	6113	5247	4360	5236.5

Table 7-2: 2 Inch LOCA

	At Lo-2 Alarm	After Six Minutes	Average Over Six Minutes
RWST Level (feet)	427.3	417.9	
Primary System Pressure (psia)	115	111	
Containment Pressure (psia)	18.8	18.7	
Sump Water Level (feet)	1.5	2.4	
RWST Flow (gpm)	13962	12279	13120.5
Sump A Back Flow (gpm)	3977	3105	3541
Sump B Back Flow (gpm)	4227	3311	3769
Total Sump Flow (gpm)	8204	6416	7310

Table 7-3: 0.86 Inch LOCA

	At Lo-2 Alarm	After Six Minutes	Average Over Six Minutes
RWST Level (feet)	427.3	418.0	
Primary System Pressure (psia)	835	835	
Containment Pressure (psia)	17.3	17.3	
Sump Water Level (feet)	1.3	2.2	
RWST Flow (gpm)	13740	12117	12928.5
Sump A Back Flow (gpm)	6171	5383	5777
Sump B Back Flow (gpm)	6530	5697	6113.5
Total Sump Flow (gpm)	12701	11080	11890.5

Table 7-4: Bleed and Feed LOCA

	At Lo-2 Alarm	After Six Minutes	Average Over Six Minutes
RWST Level (feet)	427.3	420.3	
Primary System Pressure (psia)	211	211	
Containment Pressure (psia)	25.7	25.6	
Sump Water Level (feet)	2	2.6	
RWST Flow (gpm)	10511	8858	9684.5
Sump A Back Flow (gpm)	4480	3677	4078.5
Sump B Back Flow (gpm)	4741	3892	4316.5
Total Sump Flow (gpm)	9221	7569	8395

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## Evaluation of RWST Backflow to the Containment Recirculation Sump

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### 7.1 Sensitivity to Inputs

The results to the sensitivity cases can be found in Table 7-5. The base case results for the 5.2 inch LOCA scenario with the RWST at LO-2 level are in Table 7-1.

Table 7-5: Sensitivity to Inputs

	RWST Level +1 foot	Primary System Pressure +10%	Containment Pressure -10%	ISI8811A/B C <sub>v</sub> +1000	ECCS Pump Curve -3% <sup>1</sup>	Pipe Resistance - 1 elbow
RWST Level (feet)	428.3	427.3	427.3	427.3	427.3	427.3
Primary System Pressure (psia)	29	31.9	29	29	29	29
Containment Pressure (psia)	19.2	19.2	17.28	19.2	19.2	19.2
Sump Water Level (feet)	2	2	2	2	2	2
RWST Flow (gpm)	14115	13951	14644	13991	13936	14108
Sump A Back Flow (gpm)	3012	2961	3289	2953	2976	3006
Sump B Back Flow (gpm)	3257	3204	3544	3194	3224	3255
Total Sump Flow (gpm)	6269	6165	6833	6147	6200	6261
Sump Back Flow Increase Over Base Case (gpm)	156	52	720	34	87	148

1. Note that this case represents a scenario which is outside of the analyzed design basis as defined in Reference 4.1. See Section 6.4.

### 8.0 Attachments

Attachment A - DIT-BRW-2009-0078, Reference 4.2	A1-A3
Attachment B - DIT-BRW-2009-0079, Reference 4.4	B1-B15
Attachment C - DIT-BRW-2009-0080, Reference 4.5	C1-C1
Attachment D - DIT-BRW-2009-0082, Reference 4.6	D1-D1
Attachment E - PIPE-FLO Output - A1R14 FBT Cases	E1-E28
Attachment F - PIPE-FLO Output - Sump Back Flow Cases	F1-F126
Attachment G - Modified Pump Curves	G1-G6
Attachment H - PIPE-FLO Output - Sensitivity cases	H1-H60
Attachment I - 3% Degraded Pump Curves for Sensitivity Case	I1-I1

The embedded file of the entire Sargent & Lundy evaluation #2009-13491 is provided below:



2009-13491.pdf

# Evaluation 2009-13491

## Analysis of RWST Back Flow to the Containment Sumps

Exelon  
Braidwood Unit 1  
Safety Related  
No Unverified Assumptions  
Status: Approved

Prepared By: Anthony M. Ryan  
Anthony M. Ryan

Date: 12-23-09

Reviewed By: Jennifer N. Zalon  
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Date: 12/23/09

Approved By: Robert J. Peterson  
Robert J. Peterson

Date: 12-23-09

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## 1.0 Purpose

Revision 3 of Calculation BYR06-029 / BRW-06-0016-M, Reference 4.1, documents a hydraulic model of the Byron and Braidwood ECCS systems. The model is used in the calculation to analyze ECCS flow balance test and cold leg and hot leg recirculation scenarios.

The purpose of this evaluation is to use the hydraulic model developed in Reference 4.1 to make a best estimate determination of the amount of water that would flow from the RWST to the containment sumps at Braidwood Unit 1 during a six minute period starting at the RWST LO-2 alarm during which the containment sump isolation valves, 1SI8811A and 1SI8811B, are both stuck in a partially open position while the 1SI8812A/B valves to the RWST are simultaneously open. Boundary conditions from four different sump back flow scenarios are analyzed: 5.2 inch LOCA, 2 inch LOCA, 0.86 inch LOCA, and a Bleed and Feed LOCA. The scenario dependent boundary conditions are the RCS pressure, the Containment pressure, and the sump water level. The flow rates will be determined using the  $C_v$ s of the ECCS throttle valves as determined using the results of the flow balance tests performed during the most recently completed Braidwood Unit 1 refueling outage, A1R14 and pump curves based on the most recent ASME Group A pump testing for the Braidwood Unit 1 SI, CV, and RH pumps. The ECCS throttle valves included in the flow balance tests are the SI to Cold Leg (1SI8822A-D) and CV to Cold Leg (1SI8810A-D) throttle valves.

## 2.0 Inputs

- 2.1 The PIPE-FLO hydraulic model of the Braidwood ECCS systems is taken from Reference 4.1. This model documents the pipe lengths, diameters, schedules, elevations, fittings, and component resistances for the flow balance test and sump back flow scenarios. The system line-ups for the flow balance test scenarios are also taken from Reference 4.1.
- 2.2 Data from the SI to cold leg and CV to cold leg flow balance tests from Braidwood Unit 1 refueling outage A1R14 is taken from Reference 4.2.

Table 2-1: A1R14 Flow Balance Test Data

Pump	RCS Cold Leg Flow (gpm)				RCP Seal Inj. or Miniflow (gpm)	Pump Discharge Pressure (psig)	Pump Suction Pressure (psig)
	Loop A	Loop B	Loop C	Loop D			
1A CV	116.5	116	116.1	116	80 (RCP seal)	840	18.4
1A SI	149.5	149.3	149.6	150.04	32 (Miniflow)	832	20.2

- 2.3 Data from the most recent ASME Group A pump testing for the Braidwood Unit 1 SI, CV, and RH pumps is taken from Reference 4.2.

Table 2-2: ASME Group A Pump Test Data

Pump	Flow Rate (gpm)	Differential Pressure (psid)
1A CV	193	2490
1B CV	195	2459
1A SI	45	1513
1B SI	44.5	1462.5
1A RH	633.8	185.8
1B RH	596	190.3

- 2.4 The vendor pump curves for the Braidwood Unit 1 RH, SI, and CV pumps are taken from Sections 2.3.2, 2.3.4, and 2.3.5 of Reference 4.1.

Table 2-3: Vendor Pump Curves

RH A		RH B		SI A		SI B		CV A		CV B	
Flow (gpm)	Head (ft)										
0	455	0	455	0	3580	0	3600	0	5850	0	6000
1000	440	1000	432	50	3560	50	3580	100	5800	100	5900
2000	415	2000	400	150	3500	150	3500	175	5650	175	5700
2500	400	2500	390	250	3360	250	3360	250	5300	250	5300
3000	390	3000	380	350	3100	350	3160	325	4700	325	4600
3500	375	3500	365	450	2760	450	2850	400	3900	400	3800
4000	350	4000	345	550	2370	550	2450	475	2900	475	2800
4500	320	4500	315	655	1900	655	2020	550	1750	550	1600
5000	295	5000	280								

- 2.5 The system injection line-up used in the sump back flow scenarios are taken from highlighted P&IDs transmitted in Reference 4.4.
- 2.6 The RWST Level at the LO-2 alarm is 427.3 feet per Section 3 of Attachment A of Reference 4.7.
- 2.7 The RWST volume per foot of height is 8351.6 gallons per foot per Section 3 of Attachment A of Reference 4.7.
- 2.8 The flooded area of the containment floor conservatively used to minimize the containment flood height is 12114 ft<sup>2</sup> in Section 2.3.3 of Reference 4.8. With this area, the volume per foot of height of the containment floor is 90618.8 gallons per foot (12114 ft<sup>2</sup> \* 7.4805 gal/ft<sup>3</sup> = 90618.8 gal/ft).
- 2.9 The following flow rates are to be used in the analysis of the back flow from the RWST to the containment sumps per Reference 4.5.
- RCP Seal Injection Flow = 80 gpm for two CV pumps  
 CV Miniflow Rate = 65 gpm for each CV pump  
 Safety Injection Miniflow Rate = 30 gpm for each SI pump
- 2.10 The B train containment sump isolation valve, 1SI8811B, was determined to open 34.34 percent during surveillance testing per page 3 of Reference 4.9. The C<sub>v</sub> of the valve at this position is conservatively determined to be 6000 using the C<sub>v</sub> versus percent open graph from page 9 of Reference 4.9. The C<sub>v</sub> is maximized for this analysis to conservatively maximize back flow to the sump. Note that the C<sub>v</sub> used herein is greater (6000 vs. 5000) than that chosen in Reference 4.9 where a minimum C<sub>v</sub> was conservative.
- 2.11 The A train containment sump isolation valve, 1SI8811A, was determined to open 29.1 percent during surveillance testing per page 3 of Reference 4.10. The C<sub>v</sub> of the valve at this position is conservatively determined to be 5000 using the C<sub>v</sub> versus percent open graph from page 9 of Reference 4.10. The C<sub>v</sub> is maximized for this analysis to conservatively maximize back flow to the sump. Note that the C<sub>v</sub> used herein is greater (5000 vs. 4000) than that chosen in Reference 4.10 where a minimum C<sub>v</sub> was conservative.

- 2.12 The primary system pressure, containment pressure, and initial sump water level for each of the four subject LOCA scenarios are provided in Reference 4.6 and documented in Table 2-4.

Table 2-4: LOCA Scenario Boundary Conditions

	Primary System Pressure (psia)	Containment Pressure (psia)	Containment Water Level <sup>1</sup> (feet)
5.2 Inch LOCA at LO-2 Alarm	29	19.2	2
5.2 Inch LOCA After Six Minutes	28	19.1	-
2 Inch LOCA at LO-2 Alarm	115	18.8	1.5
2 Inch LOCA After Six Minutes	111	18.7	-
0.86 Inch LOCA at LO-2 Alarm	835	17.3	1.3
0.86 Inch LOCA After Six Minutes	835	17.3	-
Bleed & Feed at LO-2 Alarm	211	25.7	2
Bleed & Feed After Six Minutes	211	25.6	-

Note 1: The containment water level is the water level above the containment floor. From Section 6.6.1 of Reference 4.1, the containment floor is at elevation 377.0 feet while the containment sump piping is at an elevation of 368.2 feet. Therefore, the level input into PIPE-FLO for the containment sumps is 8.8 feet (377-368.2=8.8) greater than the level shown in Table 2-4.

### 3.0 Assumptions

- 3.1 It is assumed that there has been no change in pump performance or system hydraulic resistance since the last flow balance and pump tests. This is consistent with Assumption 3.3.1 of Reference 4.1
- 3.2 The assumptions found in Reference 4.1 that were used to create the hydraulic model are also assumed in this evaluation.
- 3.3 It is assumed that the change in density due to the range of RWST temperatures and boron concentrations present during the A1R14 flow balance tests has negligible impact on the determination of the throttle valve  $C_v$ s. Consequently, Equation 1 does not account for the density ratio between actual and standard water temperatures.

### 4.0 References

- 4.1 BYR06-029 / BRW-06-0016-M, Revision 3, SI/RHR/CS/CV System Hydraulic Analysis In Support of GSI-191.
- 4.2 DIT-BRW-2009-0078, Revision 0, dated 11-30-09, and Rev. 1, dated 12-9-09, see Attachment A.
- 4.3 PIPE-FLO Version 8, Engineered Software Incorporated (S&L Program No. 03.7.100-8.0).
- 4.4 DIT-BRW-2009-0079, Revision 0, dated 12-4-09, see Attachment B.
- 4.5 DIT-BRW-2009-0080, Revision 0, dated 12-7-09, see Attachment C.
- 4.6 DIT-BRW-2009-0082, Revision 0, dated 12-8-09, see Attachment D.
- 4.7 SITH-1, Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Level Setpoints, Major Revision 7, up to and including Minor Revision 7A.

- 4.8 SI-90-01, Minimum Containment Flood Level, Major Revision 9, up to and including Minor Rev. 9C.
- 4.9 EC#377204, Evaluate 1SI8811B Flow at Partial Opening.
- 4.10 EC#378112, Evaluate 1SI8811A Flow at Partial Opening.

## 5.0 **Methodology**

### 5.1 Determination of $C_v$ s from A1R14

Four flow balance tests are done each refueling outage at Braidwood. Two of these are the CV to cold leg and the SI to cold leg tests. The results of these tests include the flow rate through each injection leg (A-D), the pump suction and discharge pressures, and the seal injection or miniflow flow rates if any. The results from the most recently completed refueling outage at Braidwood Unit 1, A1R14, are shown in Input 2.2.

To determine the  $C_v$ s of the throttle valves as they were set in A1R14, the results of the flow balance tests are used as inputs into modified versions of the corresponding flow balance test scenario models from Reference 4.1. Specifically, the pump suction and discharge pressures are set in the model for the pumps in operation during that test, the flow rate through each injection leg is set at a control valve representing the throttle valve for each leg, and the seal injection or miniflow flow rates are set as boundary condition demands.

One of the outputs from the flow balance test model is the pressure drop across each throttle valve needed to establish the flow measured in that test. These throttle valve pressure drops can be used in conjunction with their flow rates and Equation 1 to determine each of their  $C_v$ s.

$$C_v = \frac{Q}{\sqrt{\Delta P}}$$

Equation 1

where:  $C_v$  = valve flow coefficient  
 $Q$  = the valve flow (gpm)  
 $\Delta P$  = the valve pressure drop (psi)

### 5.2 Modification of Vendor Pump Curves

To account for pump degradation or enhancement, the vendor curves for the RH, SI, and CV pumps (Input 2.4) are modified to agree with the latest ASME pump test results (Input 2.3). This is done by multiplying the pump curve developed head by a factor until it equals the developed head measured in the ASME test at the tested flow rate.

### 5.3 Back Flow to the Containment Sumps From the RWST

The rate of flow from the RWST to the Containment Sumps is calculated for four LOCA scenarios using the hydraulic model developed in Reference 4.1. The back flow occurs during the transition from injection to recirculation mode when the sump isolation valves (1SI8811A/B) stall in a partially open position. The open flow paths are the injection mode paths from the RWST through the RH, SI, and CV pumps to the cold legs as documented in Reference 4.4 with the addition of the back flow path through 1SI8811A/B to the containment sumps. The analyzed back flow scenarios begin

when the RWST reaches the LO-2 level and end six minutes later. The boundary conditions which are changed for each scenario are the primary system pressure, the containment pressure, and the initial containment sump water level from Input 2.12. After six minutes, the RWST and containment sump water levels are iteratively adjusted using the average calculated flow rate over the six minute duration and their volume versus level relations documented in Inputs 2.7 and 2.8. The use of the average flow over the six minute duration is justified by running a case at three minutes for one of the LOCA scenarios and comparing the three minute results to the average from the six minute duration. The  $C_v$ s of the partially open 1S18811A/B valves are taken from Inputs 2.10 and 2.11.

#### 5.4 Sensitivity to Inputs

In response to a request from Exelon, the sensitivity of the back flow rate to the containment sumps to changes in six inputs will be determined by running a set of sensitivity cases. These PIPE-FLO cases will be created by starting with the LOCA scenario with the largest break size and modifying one parameter per case.

#### 5.5 Identification of Software

The hydraulic models are created using PIPE-FLO Ver. 8, Reference 4.3. PIPE-FLO is a computer code designed to perform steady-state analyses of single phase hydraulic systems.

Sargent & Lundy L.L.C. Software Configuration Control Details:

Controlled File Detail for PIPE-FLO (S&L Program No. 03.7.100-8.0)  
Type: 2 Status: O Effective Date: 09-21-2004

Controlled File Path: \\SNLVS5\SYS3\OPS\$\PIP10080\

All computer runs are made on Sargent and Lundy L.L.C. PC No. ZD5955.

#### 5.6 Acceptance Criteria

The results of this evaluation are used as input into other evaluations and calculations. As such, there are no acceptance criteria for this evaluation.



### 6.3 Back Flow to the Containment Sumps From the RWST

Two PIPE-FLO cases are run for each of the four LOCA scenarios, one when the RWST is at the LO-2 level, the other six minutes later. An additional case is run for the 5.2 inch LOCA case at three minutes. The output from these files can be found in Attachment F. The flow paths for the 5.2 and 2 inch LOCA scenarios with all SI, CV, and RH pumps injecting are as documented in Attachment B. The flow paths in the 0.86 inch LOCA scenario has been modified to reflect the inability of the RH pumps to inject to primary system pressure of 835 psia. Similarly, the flow paths in the Bleed and Feed LOCA scenario have been modified to reflect no injection by the RH pumps. In this scenario, the primary system pressure of 211 psia is below the potential discharge head of the RH pumps which indicates a possibility of injection. However, the corresponding pump flow rate is low enough for the RH miniflow valves (RH610 and RH611) to open. Once the RH miniflow valves are open, the pump flow rate increases and its developed head decreases until injection is no longer possible.

The RWST and containment sump water levels are iteratively calculated using the average RWST flow rate over the six minute duration from Table 7-1 and Inputs 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8. For example in the last iteration, the six minute RWST level in the 5.2 inch LOCA scenario is  $427.3 \text{ ft} - (13091 \text{ gpm} * 6 \text{ min}) / 8351.6 \text{ gal/ft} = 417.9 \text{ feet}$  and the six minute containment sump water level in the 5.2 inch LOCA scenario is  $2 \text{ ft} + (13091 \text{ gpm} * 6 \text{ min}) / 90618.8 \text{ gal/ft} = 2.9 \text{ feet}$ . The use of the average RWST flow rate to adjust the water levels is justified with a PIPE-FLO case run at three minutes for the 5.2 inch LOCA scenario. As can be seen in Table 7-1, the calculated RWST flow at three minutes is only 9 gpm different from the average calculated for the six minute duration.

### 6.4 Sensitivity to Inputs

In response to a request from Exelon, six cases are run to determine the sensitivity of the back flow rate to the containment sumps to a set of inputs. The 5.2 inch LOCA scenario with the RWST at the LO-2 level is used as the base case. The six inputs that are varied are:

- RWST Level – The RWST level is increased by one foot.
- Primary System Pressure – The primary system pressure is increased by 10%
- Containment Pressure – The containment pressure is decreased by 10%
- $C_v$  of valves 1SI8811A/B – The  $C_v$ s of the partially open containment sump isolation valves are increased by 1000
- ECCS pump curves – The pump curves of the SI, CV, and RH pumps are artificially decreased by 3%. The pump curves in this case are adjusted without also repeating the flow balance test cases described in Section 5.1. This represents a scenario which is outside of the analyzed design basis as defined in Reference 4.1. See Assumption 3.1 of this evaluation and Assumption 3.3.1 in Reference 4.1.
- Pipe Resistance – The resistance of the most resistive pipe segments between the RWST and the containment sumps, 1SI82AA/BA and 1SI81AB/BB, are both decreased by eliminating one elbow.

The PIPE-FLO output can be found in Attachment H. The 3% degraded pump curves are in Attachment I.

## 7.0 Results

The back flow rates from the RWST to the Containment Sumps for the four LOCA scenarios can be found in Tables 7-1 through 7-4.

Table 7-1: 5.2 Inch LOCA

	At Lo-2 Alarm	After Three Minutes	After Six Minutes	Average Over Six Minutes
RWST Level (feet)	427.3	422.4	417.9	
Primary System Pressure (psia)	29	28.5	28	
Containment Pressure (psia)	19.2	19.15	19.1	
Sump Water Level (feet)	2	2.4	2.9	
RWST Flow (gpm)	13959	13100	12223	13091
Sump A Back Flow (gpm)	2933	2509	2069	2501
Sump B Back Flow (gpm)	3180	2738	2291	2735.5
Total Sump Flow (gpm)	6113	5247	4360	5236.5

Table 7-2: 2 Inch LOCA

	At Lo-2 Alarm	After Six Minutes	Average Over Six Minutes
RWST Level (feet)	427.3	417.9	
Primary System Pressure (psia)	115	111	
Containment Pressure (psia)	18.8	18.7	
Sump Water Level (feet)	1.5	2.4	
RWST Flow (gpm)	13962	12279	13120.5
Sump A Back Flow (gpm)	3977	3105	3541
Sump B Back Flow (gpm)	4227	3311	3769
Total Sump Flow (gpm)	8204	6416	7310

Table 7-3: 0.86 Inch LOCA

	At Lo-2 Alarm	After Six Minutes	Average Over Six Minutes
RWST Level (feet)	427.3	418.0	
Primary System Pressure (psia)	835	835	
Containment Pressure (psia)	17.3	17.3	
Sump Water Level (feet)	1.3	2.2	
RWST Flow (gpm)	13740	12117	12928.5
Sump A Back Flow (gpm)	6171	5383	5777
Sump B Back Flow (gpm)	6530	5697	6113.5
Total Sump Flow (gpm)	12701	11080	11890.5

Table 7-4: Bleed and Feed LOCA

	At Lo-2 Alarm	After Six Minutes	Average Over Six Minutes
RWST Level (feet)	427.3	420.3	
Primary System Pressure (psia)	211	211	
Containment Pressure (psia)	25.7	25.6	
Sump Water Level (feet)	2	2.6	
RWST Flow (gpm)	10511	8858	9684.5
Sump A Back Flow (gpm)	4480	3677	4078.5
Sump B Back Flow (gpm)	4741	3892	4316.5
Total Sump Flow (gpm)	9221	7569	8395

7.1 Sensitivity to Inputs

The results to the sensitivity cases can be found in Table 7-5. The base case results for the 5.2 inch LOCA scenario with the RWST at LO-2 level are in Table 7-1.

Table 7-5: Sensitivity to Inputs

	RWST Level +1 foot	Primary System Pressure +10%	Containment Pressure -10%	1SI8811A/B C <sub>v</sub> +1000	ECCS Pump Curve -3% <sup>1</sup>	Pipe Resistance - 1 elbow
RWST Level (feet)	428.3	427.3	427.3	427.3	427.3	427.3
Primary System Pressure (psia)	29	31.9	29	29	29	29
Containment Pressure (psia)	19.2	19.2	17.28	19.2	19.2	19.2
Sump Water Level (feet)	2	2	2	2	2	2
RWST Flow (gpm)	14115	13951	14644	13991	13936	14108
Sump A Back Flow (gpm)	3012	2961	3289	2953	2976	3006
Sump B Back Flow (gpm)	3257	3204	3544	3194	3224	3255
Total Sump Flow (gpm)	6269	6165	6833	6147	6200	6261
Sump Back Flow Increase Over Base Case (gpm)	156	52	720	34	87	148

1. Note that this case represents a scenario which is outside of the analyzed design basis as defined in Reference 4.1. See Section 6.4.

8.0 **Attachments**

Attachment A - DIT-BRW-2009-0078, Reference 4.2	A1-A3
Attachment B - DIT-BRW-2009-0079, Reference 4.4	B1-B15
Attachment C - DIT-BRW-2009-0080, Reference 4.5	C1-C1
Attachment D - DIT-BRW-2009-0082, Reference 4.6	D1-D1
Attachment E – PIPE-FLO Output – A1R14 FBT Cases	E1-E28
Attachment F – PIPE-FLO Output – Sump Back Flow Cases	F1-F126
Attachment G – Modified Pump Curves	G1-G6
Attachment H – PIPE-FLO Output – Sensitivity cases	H1-H60
Attachment I – 3% Degraded Pump Curves for Sensitivity Case	I1-I1

### Design Information Transmittal

<b>DIT #</b>	<u>DIT-BRW-2009-0078, Rev. 0</u>	<b>Page 1 of 2</b>
	<u>Braidwood Units 1</u>	
<b>To:</b>	<u>R. Peterson</u>	
<b>Organization:</b>	<u>Sargent &amp; Lundy Engineers</u>	
<b>Address/Location:</b>	<u>Chicago, IL</u>	
<b>Status of Information:</b>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Verified <input type="checkbox"/> Unverified	
For Unverified DITs, include the Method and Schedule of Verification in the "Description of Information."		
List Action Tracking # assigned for verification of "Unverified" information: NA		
<b>Description of Information:</b> **This information is safety related**		
This transmittal provides the following:		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Results of the ECCS flow balance test to the Reactor Coolant System Cold Legs for the Braidwood Unit 1 Charging and Safety Injection Pumps during the A1R13 Refueling Outage.</li><li>2. Results from the latest ASME Group A Testing for the Braidwood Unit 1 Charging Pumps, Safety Injection Pumps and Residual Heat Removal Pumps</li></ol>		
<b>Purpose of Issuance:</b> This data is to support the evaluation of the impact of the partial opening of valve 1S18811B on the ECCS injection flows post accident.		
<b>Limitations:</b> This information is applicable only to Braidwood U-1.		
<b>References (Source of Information):</b>		
As given in the body of this transmittal.		
<b>Reviewed:</b>	<u>Giovanni Panicci</u> Printed Name / Signature	<b>Date:</b> <u>11-30-2009</u>
<b>Approved:</b>	<u>J Gosnell</u> Printed Name / Signature	<b>Date:</b> <u>11-30-09</u>
<b>Distribution:</b> Original - NDIR File		

**AIR13 ECCS Flow Testing**

Pump	RCS Cold Leg Flow (gpm)				RCP Seal Inj. or Miniflow (gpm)	Pump Discharge P (psig)	Pump Suction P (psig)
	Loop A	Loop B	Loop C	Loop D			
1A CV	116.5	116	116.1	116	80 (RCP seal)	840	18.4
1B CV	113.4	113.1	113.4	112.8	80 (RCP seal)	800	17.7
1A SI	149.5	149.3	149.6	150.04	32 (Miniflow)	832	20.2
1B SI	148.4	148.2	148.3	149.0	32 (Miniflow)	824	20.5

**References:**

1. Work Order #1224520 (1A and 1B CV Pumps)
2. Work Order #1224521 (1A and 1B SI Pumps)

**ASME Group A Testing**

Pump	Flow Rate (gpm)	Differential Pressure (psid)	Reference Work Order
1A CV	193	2490	01233429
1B CV	195	2459	01247868
1A SI	45	1513	01234771
1B SI	44.5	1462.5	01244058
1A RH	633.8	185.8	01243061
1B RH	596	190.3	01234770

### Design Information Transmittal

<b>DIT #</b>	<u>DIT-BRW-2009-0078, Rev. 1</u>	<b>Page 1 of 1</b>
	<u>Braidwood Units 1</u>	
<b>To:</b>	<u>R. Peterson</u>	
<b>Organization:</b>	<u>Sargent &amp; Lundy Engineers</u>	
<b>Address/Location:</b>	<u>Chicago, IL</u>	
<b>Status of Information:</b>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Verified <input type="checkbox"/> Unverified	
	For Unverified DITs, include the Method and Schedule of Verification in the "Description of Information."	
	List Action Tracking # assigned for verification of "Unverified" information: NA	
<b>Description of Information:</b>	<b>**This information is safety related**</b>	
	This transmittal complements transmittal #DIT-BRW-2009-0078 Revision 0.	
	Revision 0 to #DIT-BRW-2009-0078 noted incorrectly that the ECCS flow balance test data is from Refueling Outage A1R13.	
	The ECCS flow balance test data that is provided in DIT-BRW-2009-0078 Revision 0 was taken during testing that was performed during Refueling Outage A1R14.	
<b>Purpose of Issuance:</b>	This data is to support the evaluation of the impact of the partial opening of valve 1S18811B on the ECCS injection flows post accident.	
<b>Limitations:</b>	This information is applicable only to Braidwood U-1.	
<b>References (Source of Information):</b>	See #DIT-BRW-2009-0078 Revision 0.	
<b>Reviewed:</b>	<u>Giovanni Panici/ <i>Giovanni Panici</i></u> Printed Name / Signature	<b>Date:</b> <u>12-9-09</u>
<b>Approved:</b>	<u>James Gosnell/ <i>James Gosnell</i></u> Printed Name / Signature	<b>Date:</b> <u>12-9-09</u>
<b>Distribution:</b>	Original – NDI File	

### Design Information Transmittal


<b>DIT #</b>	DIT-BRW-2009-0079	Rev. 0	Page 1 of 15
	Braidwood Unit 1		
<b>To:</b>	Robert Peterson		
<b>Organization:</b>	Sargent & Lundy		
<b>Address/Location:</b>	via email		
<b>Status of Information:</b>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Verified <input type="checkbox"/> Unverified		
For Unverified DITs, include the Method and Schedule of Verification in the "Description of Information." List Action Tracking # assigned for verification of "Unverified" information: <u>N/A</u>			
<b>Description of Information:</b> **This information is safety related**  The information provided in this transmittal provides marked up Piping and Instrument Diagrams to show the ECCS injection flow paths that will be in service during the injection phase of a LOCA. These marked drawings do not include ancillary paths such as: 1. Seal injection flow that will take RWST water and inject into the RCP seals (RCS) during the 6 minute period under consideration. 2. Normal charging flow path which is isolated during ECCS injection. 3. CV mini flow which is isolated at the LO-2. 4. RH mini flow that is recycled back to the RH pump suction after going through the Hx. 5. SI mini flow continues to return some water to the RWST during the 6 minute interval being analyzed.			
<b>Purpose of Issuance:</b> Provide documented input for analysis to determine how much water flows from the RWST to the ECCS sumps in containment during a postulated 6 minute interval when the 1SI8811A/B and 1SI8812A/B are all open.			
<b>Limitations:</b> This information is applicable to Braidwood, Unit 1.			
<b>References (Source of Information):</b> As given on the attached pages.			
<b>Prepared :</b>	Ken Radke <i>Ken Radke</i> Printed Name / Signature	Date:	12/4/09
<b>Approved (Br):</b>	James Gosnell/ <i>James Gosnell</i> Printed Name / Signature	Date:	12-4-09
<b>Distribution:</b> Original - NDIR File			





# ISI/SPT COLOR CODED DRAWINGS

Attachment B



NOTES:  
 \* LOCATE SUCTION STABILIZER AS CLOSE TO PUMP SUCTION AS POSSIBLE.  
 \* LOCATE PULSATION DAMPER AS CLOSE TO PUMP DISCHARGE AS POSSIBLE.  
 FOR NOTES SEE DWG. M-64 SHT. 1 OF 8


NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED ITEMS ARE SHOWN ON THIS DRAWING (FOR SAFETY CLASSIFICATION SEE PIPING, EQUIPMENT, VALVE, OR INSTRUMENT LISTS.)

DIAGRAM OF CHEMICAL & VOLUME CONTROL & BORON THERMAL REGENERATION

REV	DATE	BY	CHKD	APP'D	PURPOSE	FILE
AN	11-25-09	[Signature]	[Signature]	[Signature]	L-2739 FOR RECORD (DRN-PAID-2196)	
AT	11-25-09	[Signature]	[Signature]	[Signature]	L-2739 FOR RECORD (DRN-PAID 3265)	
AZ	11-25-09	[Signature]	[Signature]	[Signature]	L-2739 FOR INSTAL. (ICV 11-14, ICV 11-17 & DRN-PAID 2137)	
BA	11-25-09	[Signature]	[Signature]	[Signature]	L-2739 FOR RECORD (ICV 11-22, 25)	
BB	11-25-09	[Signature]	[Signature]	[Signature]	L-2739 FOR RECORD (SUBSYSTEM BOUNDARY UPDATE) & (UNSOLICITED COMMENTS)	
BC	11-25-09	[Signature]	[Signature]	[Signature]	L-2739 FOR RECORD	

DATE	FOR RECORD, DCR 988117 (COLOR CODED) LISTS ADDED	DRN	TAK	OPC
SCALE	1:1	SCALE	1:1	SCALE
DATE	11/25/09	DATE	11/25/09	DATE
BY	ICV	BY	ICV	BY
CHKD	[Signature]	CHKD	[Signature]	CHKD
APP'D	[Signature]	APP'D	[Signature]	APP'D
Chicago Illinois Braidwood Station 20				
				M-64
				SHEET NO 3A
				CRITICAL CONTROL ROOM DRAWING

# ISI/SPT COLOR CODED DRAWINGS




REV	DATE	DESCRIPTION	PREP	REV	APPR
1	11/25/09	FOR RECORD, EC 350400	EDSF	EDSF	EDSF

<b>Exelon</b> NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT IS SHOWN ON THIS DRAWING		SCALE: NONE DATE: 11/27/09 DRAWN BY: L133 CHK BY: 13046	SHEET NUMBER: 4B SIZE: F M05
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# ISI/SPT COLOR CODED DRAWINGS



NOTE:  
FOR NOTES SEE DWG. M-61-A) OF 6

REV	DATE	DESCRIPTION	PREP.	CHKD.	APPV.
AI	EDSF	FOR RECORD, EC 308141	EDSF	EDSF	EDSF
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---	---	---	---	---	---
---	---	---	---	---	---

DIAGRAM OF  
SAFETY INJECTION

SCALE: NONE  
DATE: 10/19/78  
DRAWN BY: E133  
CHKD BY: C400


M-61  
SHEET NUMBER: 2  
SIZE: F M05

**Exelon** NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT IS SHOWN ON THIS DRAWING

Developed Section 29 Date: 1

CRITICAL CONTROL ROOM DRAWING

# ISI/SPT COLOR CODED DRAWINGS



NOTE:  
SEE DRAWING M-60-1A FOR NOTES.

NO.	DATE	DESCRIPTION	PREP.	REV.	APP.
01	04/11/87	FOR RECORD, DCR PART 17	CLJ	TAK	DPC
02	09/23/88	COLOR CODED ISI LAYERS ADDED FOR RECORD, DCR PARTS 18-20 (AS-BUILT)	OP	ETH	BAH
03	03-12-91	FOR RECORD, DCR PART 24 (UPDATED TO BOUNDARIES ONLY)	MES	DAC	MJS
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**Exelon**  
Nuclear Safety Related Equipment is Shown on this Drawing


SCALE: NONE  
DATE: 08/04/83  
DRAWN BY: CM2  
CHK BY: 0848

**M-60**  
SHEET NUMBER: 1B  
SIZE: F M05

FOR SAFETY CLASSIFICATION SEE PIPING, EQUIPMENT, VALVE, OR INSTRUMENT LISTS.

CRITICAL CONTROL ROOM DRAWING

# ISI/SPT COLOR CODED DRAWINGS



FOR NOTES  
SEE M-60 SH. 1 OF 7


REV	DATE	DESCRIPTION	PREP.	EDW.	APPR.
BC	03-12-09	FOR RECORD, DCR 999724 (UPDATED) (SI EXAMINER ONLY)	MES	DJC	MAF
AT	09/25/08	FOR RECORD, DCR 999803	AS	GTH	BA
BA	12/11/00	FOR RECORD-INSERT OF TO 9571 (FOR 999803, ECH 999804)	GTH	MS	FW
RS	04/24/00	FOR RECORD, T/O 99999934, DPIC P29-1-02-065, OCH 999999	JOS	RUP	ELW

<b>Exelon</b>		NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT IS SHOWN ON THIS DRAWING	SCALE: NONE
Brookwood Station Unit 1	DATE: 07/23/75	M-60	
	DRAWN BY: CS&J	SHEET NUMBER: 2	SIZE: F M05
	ORD. BY: 1840	CRITICAL CONTROL ROOM DRAWING	

FOR SAFETY CLASSIFICATION SEE PIPING, EQUIPMENT, VALVE, OR INSTRUMENT LISTS.

# ISI/SPT COLOR CODED DRAWINGS



NOTE: FOR NOTES SEE DWG. M-60-3-7.16F7

REV	DATE	DESCRIPTION	APP'D	REV'D	APP'D
01	03-12-94	FOR RECORD, DCR 940724 (UPDATED BY 940724)	MSB	BAF	BAF
02	16/18/91	FOR RECORD, DCR 910525A, 910525B, 910525C, 910525D, 910525E, 910525F, 910525G, 910525H, 910525I, 910525J, 910525K, 910525L, 910525M, 910525N, 910525O, 910525P, 910525Q, 910525R, 910525S, 910525T, 910525U, 910525V, 910525W, 910525X, 910525Y, 910525Z	BAF	BAF	BAF
03	04/24/99	FOR RECORD, T/SJ 990903A, 990903B, 990903C, 990903D, 990903E, 990903F, 990903G, 990903H, 990903I, 990903J, 990903K, 990903L, 990903M, 990903N, 990903O, 990903P, 990903Q, 990903R, 990903S, 990903T, 990903U, 990903V, 990903W, 990903X, 990903Y, 990903Z	JCB	BAF	BAF

DIAGRAM OF REACTOR COOLANT LOOP-3 UNIT 1

SCALE: 1/8"=1'-0"

DATE: 11/23/79

DRAWN BY: CSK

CHECKED BY: JCB

DATE: 11/23/79

SHEET NUMBER: 3


SIZE: F

M-60

CRITICAL CONTROL ROOM DRAWING

FOR SAFETY CLASSIFICATION SEE PIPING, EQUIPMENT, VALVE, OR INSTRUMENT LISTS.

# ISI/SPT COLOR CODED DRAWINGS



Notes:  
1. SEE ONE M-60 SHEET 7 FOR NOTES.


REV	DATE	DESCRIPTION	PREP	REVL	APPR
08	03-12-81	FOR RECORD, DCR 100724 (UPDATED) (SI) BOUNDARIES ONLY	MES	DAC	MJS
09	09/23/96	FOR RECORD, DCR 980308 AS-BUILT	DP	GTH	BA
0C	12/11/96	FOR RECORD-INCORP. OF TO 1511 (DCR RECORD, ECH 0000000)	GTH	RS	FW
0D	04/24/98	FOR RECORD, T/O# 0000000000, DMC FOR 1-01-98, DCR 000000	JOS	RMP	RAW

<b>Exelon</b> Nuclear Station 28 Unit 1		NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT IS SHOWN ON THIS DRAWING	SCALE: NONE DATE: 07/23/09 DRAWN BY: GSK CDR BY: 1204
M-60		SHEET NUMBER: 4	SIZE: F M05

FOR SAFETY CLASSIFICATION SEE PIPING, EQUIPMENT, VALVE, DR INSTRUMENT LISTS.

# ISI/SPT COLOR CODED DRAWINGS



- NOTES:**
- DELETED
  - FLOW METERING ORIFICE TO VERIFY FLOW DURING PREOPERATIONAL TESTING.
  - SPUD PIECE FOR INSTALLATION OF STRAINER DURING PREOPERATIONAL FLUSHING. LOCATE AS CLOSE TO PUMP AS POSSIBLE. TEMPORARY STRAINERS HAVE SPECIALITY ITEM NUMBERS. ISI020A, ISI020B
  - LOCATE FLOW INDICATOR OUTSIDE OF SAFETY INJECTION PUMP ROOMS.
  - FLOW RESTRICTION FOR SAFETY CLASS 1A TO 1B TRANSITION TYPICAL FLOW RESTRICTOR.



- DEPENDENT ON THE SIZE OF THE PROCESS LINE, NOTE 49, 49 OR 50 ON DRG. 538 MAY BE SUBSTITUTED FOR THE ABOVE DETAIL.
- PIPING SCHEDULE 40 MUST BE ADHERED TO DUE TO SAFETY ANALYSIS FLOW REQUIREMENT.
  - LOCATE VALVES AS CLOSE TOGETHER AS POSSIBLE.
  - LOCATE CONNECTION CLOSE TO TANK.
  - PIPE FRICATION TAPS FOR FLOW MEASUREMENT LOCATE TAPS 2" APART.
  - HEAT TRACE LINE ALL THE WAY TO TANK.
  - PIPE MUST BE ABOVE NORMAL WATER LEVEL.
  - CONTAMINATION PENETRATION NOT REQUIRED. GUARD PIPE BURIED IN CONCRETE AND WELDED AT EITHER END TO SUMP LINER AND VALVE ENCLOSED.

- VALVES INTERLOCKED TO PREVENT OPENING OF IS1011 UNLESS IS1012 IS CLOSED
- A/E SUPPLY.
- LOOP TO EXTEND 12" BELOW AND ABOVE OVERFLOW NOZZLE TOTAL LINE LENGTH INCLUDING LOOP TO BE AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE.
- BACK PANEL MOUNTED.
- MINI FLOW ORIFICE SUPPLIED BY PUMP VENDOR.
- LOCATE CONNECTION CLOSE TO CORRESPONDING BORDON INJECTION TANK ISOLATION VALVES.
- BLIND FLANGES NORMALLY INSTALLED. SPUD PIECES TO BE INSTALLED DURING ACCUMULATOR DRAINING. DRY AFTER DEPRESSURIZATION.
- CLASS AND DESIGN TABLE CHANGE TO BE MADE AT TANK NOZZLE.
- VALVE IS PER PIPING DESIGN TABLE 3400B.
- SEE DRG. M-62-2 FOR SAFETY INJECTION PUMP VENT PIPING.

- 1/4" SCH. 80 PIPE
- BORDON INJECTION TANK IS1007 IS NO LONGER REQ'D BUT IS TO REMAIN INSTALLED.
- POWER LOCK OUT SHALL BE IN EFFECT DURING ALL NORMAL OPERATING MODES. POWER SHALL BE RECONNECTED ONLY WHEN SUCH POWER RESTORATION IS SPECIFICALLY ALLOWED BY PLANT OPERATING PROCEDURES OR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
- HYDROTEST SHALL BE BASED ON A DESIGN PRESSURE OF 150 PSIG.
- PIPING AND COMPONENTS BETWEEN ISOLATION VALVES IS1002A, IS1002B, IS1003 AND CHECK VALVES IS1002A, IS1002B ARE QUALIFIED FOR DESIGN PRESSURE OF 1825 PSIG.

28. LEAK OFF LINE HAS BEEN CUT & CAPPED.  
29. A FULL BORE ORIFICE PLATE IS INSTALLED AT THIS LOCATION. SEE ISOMETRIC DRAWINGS FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.

REV	DATE	DESCRIPTION	PROP.	REV.	APPV.
01	08/04/05	FOR RECORD, TC 388141	EDSF	EDSF	EDSF


DIAGRAM OF SAFETY INJECTION UNIT 1

**Exelon** NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT IS SHOWN ON THIS DRAWING

SCALE: NONE  
DATE: 08/04/05  
DRAWN BY: E133  
CHK BY: E134

**M-61**  
SHEET NUMBER: 1A SIZE: F M05  
CRITICAL CONTROL ROOM DRAWING

# ISI/SPT COLOR CODED DRAWINGS




REV	DATE	DESCRIPTION	PREP	REV	APPR
01	10/19/79	FOR RECORD, (E 34403)	EDSF	EDSF	EDSF


  

<b>Exelon</b> NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT IS SHOWN ON THIS DRAWING		SCALE: NONE DATE: 10/19/79 DRAWN BY: E133 ENG BY: 1349	<b>M-61</b> SHEET NUMBER: 3 SIZE: F M05
CRITICAL CONTROL ROOM DRAWING			

# ISI/SPT COLOR CODED DRAWINGS



# ISI/SPT COLOR CODED DRAWINGS



FOR NOTES SEE DWG. M-61 SHEET 1A.

REV	DATE	DESCRIPTION	PREP.	CHKD.	APPV.
1	11/25/09	FOR RECORD: EC 364553	EDSF	EDSF	EDSF


<b>Exelon</b> NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT IS SHOWN ON THIS DRAWING NUCLEAR Brookwood Station, Unit 1		SCALE: NONE DATE: 11/19/09 DRAWN BY: CJS CHKD BY: SHH	<b>M-61</b> SHEET NUMBER: 5 SIZE: F (8.5x11)
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DIAGRAM OF SAFETY INJECTION UNIT 1

CRITICAL CONTROL ROOM DRAWING





# ISI/SPT COLOR CODED DRAWINGS



### Design Information Transmittal

<b>DIT #</b>	<b>DIT-BRW-2009-0080</b> Braidwood Unit 1	<b>Rev. 0</b>	<b>Page 1 of 1</b>
<b>To:</b>	R. Peterson		
<b>Organization:</b>	Sargent & Lundy Engineers		
<b>Address/Location:</b>	Chicago, IL		
<b>Status of Information:</b>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Verified <input type="checkbox"/> Unverified For Unverified DITs, include the Method and Schedule of Verification in the "Description of Information." List Action Tracking # assigned for verification of "Unverified" information: NA		
<b>Description of Information:</b>	**This information is safety related** This transmittal provides the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <u>RCP Seal Injection Flow – 80 gpm for 2 CV pumps</u> The flow rate is set at a minimum of 80 gpm in accordance with the ECCS Flow Balance procedure, with one Charging (CV) pump in operation and the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) depressurized (Reference 1). Using this value for two CV pump operation is conservative as it reduces the pump flow from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) which increases the gravity flow from the RWST to the Containment Recirculation Sump.</li> <li>• <u>CV Miniflow Rate – 65 gpm for each CV pump</u> This flow path is isolated when the RCS pressure decreases below a pre-determined setpoint (Reference 2). The miniflow is recirculated to the outlet of the Volume Control Tank and to the suction of the CV pumps. Thus, this flow does not affect the pump flow from the RWST. In addition, more flow thru the pump results in a lower developed head and a lower injection flow rate. The 65 gpm is the flow that is measured during the ASME quarterly tests for the CV pumps (Reference 2). The recirculated flow is expected to have a negligible effect on the flow to the sumps from the RWST.</li> <li>• <u>Safety Injection Miniflow Rate – 30 gpm for each SI pump</u> The Safety Injection (SI) pumps' miniflow rate during the ECCS Flow testing procedures is recorded to be about 30 gpm (Reference 3). Based on a review of the system configuration, the majority of the pressure drop in the recirculation lines is due to the miniflow orifice. Thus, the total miniflow rate with two (2) SI pumps in operation is expected to be near 60 gpm.</li> </ul>		
<b>Purpose of Issuance:</b>	This data will be used to evaluate the RWST gravity flow to the Containment Recirculation Sump. This is in support of the evaluation of the impact of the partial opening of valve 1S18811B on the ECCS injection flows post accident.		
<b>Limitations:</b>	This information is applicable to Braidwood U-1 and it is valid only in support of the activities for the Significance Determination Process related to the failure of valve 1S18811B to open fully.		
<b>References (Source of Information):</b>	1. WO #1060662 2. Design Information Transmittal #DIT-BRW-2009-0070 Rev. 0 3. Design Information Transmittal #DIT-BRW-2009-0078 rev. 0		
<b>Reviewed:</b>	Giovanni Panici/ Printed Name / Signature	<i>Giovanni Panici</i> Signature	Date: 12-7-2009
<b>Approved:</b>	J Gosnell/ Printed Name / Signature	<i>James S. Gosnell</i> Signature	Date: 12-7-09
<b>Distribution:</b>	Original – NDIT File		

Design Information Transmittal

<b>DIT #</b>	DIT-BRW-2009-0082	Rev. 0	Page 1 of 1																									
	Braidwood Unit 1																											
<b>To:</b>	Robert Peterson																											
<b>Organization:</b>	Sargent & Lundy																											
<b>Address/Location:</b>	via email																											
<b>Status of Information:</b>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Verified <input type="checkbox"/> Unverified																											
	For Unverified DITs, include the Method and Schedule of Verification in the "Description of Information." List Action Tracking # assigned for verification of "Unverified" information: N/A																											
<b>Description of Information:</b>	<b>**This information is NOT safety related**</b> The information provided in this transmittal provides inputs for RWST-to-ECCS sump flow modeling.																											
	<table style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td></td> <td colspan="2" style="text-align:center;">5.2 Inch LOCA</td> <td colspan="2" style="text-align:center;">2 Inch LOCA</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td style="text-align:center;">At Lo-2 Alarm</td> <td style="text-align:center;">After Six Minutes</td> <td style="text-align:center;">At Lo-2 Alarm</td> <td style="text-align:center;">After Six Minutes</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Primary System Pressure (psia)</td> <td style="text-align:center;">29</td> <td style="text-align:center;">28</td> <td style="text-align:center;">115</td> <td style="text-align:center;">111</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Containment Pressure (psia)</td> <td style="text-align:center;">19.2</td> <td style="text-align:center;">19.1</td> <td style="text-align:center;">18.8</td> <td style="text-align:center;">18.7</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Sump Water Level (feet)</td> <td style="text-align:center;">2</td> <td style="text-align:center;">2.9</td> <td style="text-align:center;">1.5</td> <td style="text-align:center;">2.4</td> </tr> </table>				5.2 Inch LOCA		2 Inch LOCA			At Lo-2 Alarm	After Six Minutes	At Lo-2 Alarm	After Six Minutes	Primary System Pressure (psia)	29	28	115	111	Containment Pressure (psia)	19.2	19.1	18.8	18.7	Sump Water Level (feet)	2	2.9	1.5	2.4
	5.2 Inch LOCA		2 Inch LOCA																									
	At Lo-2 Alarm	After Six Minutes	At Lo-2 Alarm	After Six Minutes																								
Primary System Pressure (psia)	29	28	115	111																								
Containment Pressure (psia)	19.2	19.1	18.8	18.7																								
Sump Water Level (feet)	2	2.9	1.5	2.4																								
	<table style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td></td> <td colspan="2" style="text-align:center;">0.86" LOCA</td> <td colspan="2" style="text-align:center;">Bleed &amp; Feed</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td style="text-align:center;">At Lo-2 Alarm</td> <td style="text-align:center;">After Six Minutes</td> <td style="text-align:center;">At Lo-2 Alarm</td> <td style="text-align:center;">After Six Minutes</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Primary System Pressure (psia)</td> <td style="text-align:center;">835</td> <td style="text-align:center;">835</td> <td style="text-align:center;">211</td> <td style="text-align:center;">211</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Containment Pressure (psia)</td> <td style="text-align:center;">17.3</td> <td style="text-align:center;">17.3</td> <td style="text-align:center;">25.7</td> <td style="text-align:center;">25.6</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Sump Water Level (feet)</td> <td style="text-align:center;">1.3</td> <td style="text-align:center;">2.2</td> <td style="text-align:center;">2</td> <td style="text-align:center;">2.6</td> </tr> </table>				0.86" LOCA		Bleed & Feed			At Lo-2 Alarm	After Six Minutes	At Lo-2 Alarm	After Six Minutes	Primary System Pressure (psia)	835	835	211	211	Containment Pressure (psia)	17.3	17.3	25.7	25.6	Sump Water Level (feet)	1.3	2.2	2	2.6
	0.86" LOCA		Bleed & Feed																									
	At Lo-2 Alarm	After Six Minutes	At Lo-2 Alarm	After Six Minutes																								
Primary System Pressure (psia)	835	835	211	211																								
Containment Pressure (psia)	17.3	17.3	25.7	25.6																								
Sump Water Level (feet)	1.3	2.2	2	2.6																								
<b>Purpose of Issuance:</b>	Provide documented input for analysis to determine how much water flows from the RWST to the ECCS sumps in containment during a postulated 6 minute interval when the 1SI8811A/B and 1SI8812A/B are all open.																											
<b>Limitations:</b>	This information is applicable to Braidwood, Unit 1.																											
<b>References (Source of Information):</b>	MAAP CASES: BBSDP08, BBSDP14, BB0009b																											
<b>Prepared :</b>	Roy Linthicum/ 	<b>Date:</b>	12/8/09																									
	<small>Printed Name / Signature</small>																											
<b>Approved (Br):</b>	James Gosnell/ 	<b>Date:</b>	12-8-09																									
	<small>Printed Name / Signature</small>																											
<b>Distribution:</b>	Original - NDIT File																											































Item ID	Item Name	Quantity	Unit	Material	Material Description	Material Code	Material Unit	Material Price	Material Total	Material Code	Material Unit	Material Price	Material Total	Material Code	Material Unit	Material Price	Material Total	Material Code	Material Unit	Material Price	Material Total
C8009441	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	35.96	0.4	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	1918	0.0004	0.0014					
C8009442	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	36.72	0.34	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	1904	0.0278	0.0100					
C8009443	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	37.48	0.29	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	1725	0.0274	0.0100					
C8009444	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	38.24	0.24	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	1402	0.0269	0.0100					
C8009445	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	39.00	0.19	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	1121	0.0264	0.0100					
C8009446	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	39.76	0.14	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	1234	0.0259	0.0100					
C8009447	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	40.52	0.09	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	1795	0.0254	0.0100					
C8009448	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	41.28	0.04	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	1678	0.0249	0.0100					
C8009449	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	42.04	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	1561	0.0244	0.0100					
C8009450	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	42.80	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	1444	0.0239	0.0100					
C8009451	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	43.56	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	1327	0.0234	0.0100					
C8009452	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	44.32	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	1210	0.0229	0.0100					
C8009453	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	45.08	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	1093	0.0224	0.0100					
C8009454	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	45.84	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	976	0.0219	0.0100					
C8009455	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	46.60	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	859	0.0214	0.0100					
C8009456	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	47.36	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	742	0.0209	0.0100					
C8009457	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	48.12	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	625	0.0204	0.0100					
C8009458	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	48.88	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	508	0.0199	0.0100					
C8009459	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	49.64	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	391	0.0194	0.0100					
C8009460	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	50.40	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	274	0.0189	0.0100					
C8009461	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	51.16	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	157	0.0184	0.0100					
C8009462	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	51.92	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	40	0.0179	0.0100					
C8009463	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	52.68	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0174	0.0100					
C8009464	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	53.44	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0169	0.0100					
C8009465	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	54.20	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0164	0.0100					
C8009466	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	54.96	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0159	0.0100					
C8009467	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	55.72	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0154	0.0100					
C8009468	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	56.48	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0149	0.0100					
C8009469	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	57.24	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0144	0.0100					
C8009470	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	58.00	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0139	0.0100					
C8009471	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	58.76	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0134	0.0100					
C8009472	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	59.52	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0129	0.0100					
C8009473	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	60.28	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0124	0.0100					
C8009474	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	61.04	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0119	0.0100					
C8009475	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	61.80	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0114	0.0100					
C8009476	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	62.56	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0109	0.0100					
C8009477	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	63.32	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0104	0.0100					
C8009478	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	64.08	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0099	0.0100					
C8009479	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	64.84	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0094	0.0100					
C8009480	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	65.60	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0089	0.0100					
C8009481	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	66.36	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0084	0.0100					
C8009482	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	67.12	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0079	0.0100					
C8009483	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	67.88	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0074	0.0100					
C8009484	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	68.64	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0069	0.0100					
C8009485	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	69.40	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0064	0.0100					
C8009486	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	70.16	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0059	0.0100					
C8009487	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	70.92	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0054	0.0100					
C8009488	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	71.68	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0049	0.0100					
C8009489	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	72.44	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0044	0.0100					
C8009490	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	73.20	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0039	0.0100					
C8009491	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	73.96	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0034	0.0100					
C8009492	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	74.72	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0029	0.0100					
C8009493	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	75.48	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0024	0.0100					
C8009494	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	76.24	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0019	0.0100					
C8009495	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	77.00	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0014	0.0100					
C8009496	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	77.76	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0009	0.0100					
C8009497	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	78.52	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0004	0.0100					
C8009498	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	79.28	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0000	0.0100					
C8009499	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	80.04	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0000	0.0100					
C8009500	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	80.80	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0000	0.0100					
C8009501	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	81.56	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0000	0.0100					
C8009502	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	82.32	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0000	0.0100					
C8009503	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	83.08	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0000	0.0100					
C8009504	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	83.84	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0000	0.0100					
C8009505	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	84.60	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0000	0.0100					
C8009506	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	85.36	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0000	0.0100					
C8009507	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	86.12	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0000	0.0100					
C8009508	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	86.88	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0000	0.0100					
C8009509	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	87.64	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0000	0.0100					
C8009510	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	88.40	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0000	0.0100					
C8009511	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	89.16	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0000	0.0100					
C8009512	Base Sch 40 Pipe	3.6	0	89.92	0.00	0	0	N	-N1020	-N1020	6.000	0	0	0	0.0000	0.010					











Sheet No.	Sheet Title	Change Number	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
Sheet No. 100	Sheet Title	Change Number	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100





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-H771		34.8	424.2	377.5		

















Item	Material	Quantity	Unit	Description	Price	Amount	Notes
Item 100	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	10mm	1.20	1.20	
Item 101	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	12mm	1.50	1.50	
Item 102	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	14mm	1.80	1.80	
Item 103	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	16mm	2.20	2.20	
Item 104	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	18mm	2.60	2.60	
Item 105	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	20mm	3.00	3.00	
Item 106	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	22mm	3.40	3.40	
Item 107	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	25mm	4.00	4.00	
Item 108	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	28mm	4.60	4.60	
Item 109	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	32mm	5.40	5.40	
Item 110	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	36mm	6.20	6.20	
Item 111	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	40mm	7.00	7.00	
Item 112	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	45mm	7.80	7.80	
Item 113	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	50mm	8.60	8.60	
Item 114	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	56mm	9.40	9.40	
Item 115	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	63mm	10.20	10.20	
Item 116	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	70mm	11.00	11.00	
Item 117	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	78mm	11.80	11.80	
Item 118	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	86mm	12.60	12.60	
Item 119	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	95mm	13.40	13.40	
Item 120	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	105mm	14.20	14.20	
Item 121	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	115mm	15.00	15.00	
Item 122	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	125mm	15.80	15.80	
Item 123	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	135mm	16.60	16.60	
Item 124	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	145mm	17.40	17.40	
Item 125	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	155mm	18.20	18.20	
Item 126	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	165mm	19.00	19.00	
Item 127	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	175mm	19.80	19.80	
Item 128	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	185mm	20.60	20.60	
Item 129	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	195mm	21.40	21.40	
Item 130	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	205mm	22.20	22.20	
Item 131	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	215mm	23.00	23.00	
Item 132	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	225mm	23.80	23.80	
Item 133	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	235mm	24.60	24.60	
Item 134	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	245mm	25.40	25.40	
Item 135	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	255mm	26.20	26.20	
Item 136	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	265mm	27.00	27.00	
Item 137	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	275mm	27.80	27.80	
Item 138	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	285mm	28.60	28.60	
Item 139	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	295mm	29.40	29.40	
Item 140	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	305mm	30.20	30.20	
Item 141	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	315mm	31.00	31.00	
Item 142	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	325mm	31.80	31.80	
Item 143	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	335mm	32.60	32.60	
Item 144	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	345mm	33.40	33.40	
Item 145	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	355mm	34.20	34.20	
Item 146	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	365mm	35.00	35.00	
Item 147	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	375mm	35.80	35.80	
Item 148	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	385mm	36.60	36.60	
Item 149	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	395mm	37.40	37.40	
Item 150	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	405mm	38.20	38.20	
Item 151	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	415mm	39.00	39.00	
Item 152	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	425mm	39.80	39.80	
Item 153	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	435mm	40.60	40.60	
Item 154	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	445mm	41.40	41.40	
Item 155	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	455mm	42.20	42.20	
Item 156	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	465mm	43.00	43.00	
Item 157	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	475mm	43.80	43.80	
Item 158	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	485mm	44.60	44.60	
Item 159	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	495mm	45.40	45.40	
Item 160	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	505mm	46.20	46.20	
Item 161	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	515mm	47.00	47.00	
Item 162	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	525mm	47.80	47.80	
Item 163	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	535mm	48.60	48.60	
Item 164	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	545mm	49.40	49.40	
Item 165	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	555mm	50.20	50.20	
Item 166	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	565mm	51.00	51.00	
Item 167	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	575mm	51.80	51.80	
Item 168	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	585mm	52.60	52.60	
Item 169	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	595mm	53.40	53.40	
Item 170	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	605mm	54.20	54.20	
Item 171	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	615mm	55.00	55.00	
Item 172	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	625mm	55.80	55.80	
Item 173	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	635mm	56.60	56.60	
Item 174	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	645mm	57.40	57.40	
Item 175	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	655mm	58.20	58.20	
Item 176	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	665mm	59.00	59.00	
Item 177	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	675mm	59.80	59.80	
Item 178	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	685mm	60.60	60.60	
Item 179	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	695mm	61.40	61.40	
Item 180	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	705mm	62.20	62.20	
Item 181	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	715mm	63.00	63.00	
Item 182	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	725mm	63.80	63.80	
Item 183	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	735mm	64.60	64.60	
Item 184	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	745mm	65.40	65.40	
Item 185	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	755mm	66.20	66.20	
Item 186	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	765mm	67.00	67.00	
Item 187	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	775mm	67.80	67.80	
Item 188	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	785mm	68.60	68.60	
Item 189	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	795mm	69.40	69.40	
Item 190	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	805mm	70.20	70.20	
Item 191	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	815mm	71.00	71.00	
Item 192	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	825mm	71.80	71.80	
Item 193	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	835mm	72.60	72.60	
Item 194	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	845mm	73.40	73.40	
Item 195	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	855mm	74.20	74.20	
Item 196	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	865mm	75.00	75.00	
Item 197	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	875mm	75.80	75.80	
Item 198	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	885mm	76.60	76.60	
Item 199	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	895mm	77.40	77.40	
Item 200	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	905mm	78.20	78.20	
Item 201	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	915mm	79.00	79.00	
Item 202	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	925mm	79.80	79.80	
Item 203	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	935mm	80.60	80.60	
Item 204	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	945mm	81.40	81.40	
Item 205	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	955mm	82.20	82.20	
Item 206	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	965mm	83.00	83.00	
Item 207	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	975mm	83.80	83.80	
Item 208	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	985mm	84.60	84.60	
Item 209	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	995mm	85.40	85.40	
Item 210	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1005mm	86.20	86.20	
Item 211	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1015mm	87.00	87.00	
Item 212	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1025mm	87.80	87.80	
Item 213	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1035mm	88.60	88.60	
Item 214	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1045mm	89.40	89.40	
Item 215	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1055mm	90.20	90.20	
Item 216	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1065mm	91.00	91.00	
Item 217	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1075mm	91.80	91.80	
Item 218	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1085mm	92.60	92.60	
Item 219	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1095mm	93.40	93.40	
Item 220	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1105mm	94.20	94.20	
Item 221	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1115mm	95.00	95.00	
Item 222	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1125mm	95.80	95.80	
Item 223	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1135mm	96.60	96.60	
Item 224	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1145mm	97.40	97.40	
Item 225	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1155mm	98.20	98.20	
Item 226	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1165mm	99.00	99.00	
Item 227	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1175mm	99.80	99.80	
Item 228	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1185mm	100.60	100.60	
Item 229	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1195mm	101.40	101.40	
Item 230	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1205mm	102.20	102.20	
Item 231	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1215mm	103.00	103.00	
Item 232	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1225mm	103.80	103.80	
Item 233	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1235mm	104.60	104.60	
Item 234	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1245mm	105.40	105.40	
Item 235	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1255mm	106.20	106.20	
Item 236	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1265mm	107.00	107.00	
Item 237	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1275mm	107.80	107.80	
Item 238	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1285mm	108.60	108.60	
Item 239	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1295mm	109.40	109.40	
Item 240	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1305mm	110.20	110.20	
Item 241	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1315mm	111.00	111.00	
Item 242	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1325mm	111.80	111.80	
Item 243	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1335mm	112.60	112.60	
Item 244	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1345mm	113.40	113.40	
Item 245	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1355mm	114.20	114.20	
Item 246	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1365mm	115.00	115.00	
Item 247	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1375mm	115.80	115.80	
Item 248	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1385mm	116.60	116.60	
Item 249	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1395mm	117.40	117.40	
Item 250	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1405mm	118.20	118.20	
Item 251	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1415mm	119.00	119.00	
Item 252	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1425mm	119.80	119.80	
Item 253	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1435mm	120.60	120.60	
Item 254	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1445mm	121.40	121.40	
Item 255	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1455mm	122.20	122.20	
Item 256	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1465mm	123.00	123.00	
Item 257	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1475mm	123.80	123.80	
Item 258	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1485mm	124.60	124.60	
Item 259	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1495mm	125.40	125.40	
Item 260	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1505mm	126.20	126.20	
Item 261	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1515mm	127.00	127.00	
Item 262	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1525mm	127.80	127.80	
Item 263	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1535mm	128.60	128.60	
Item 264	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1545mm	129.40	129.40	
Item 265	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1555mm	130.20	130.20	
Item 266	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1565mm	131.00	131.00	
Item 267	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1575mm	131.80	131.80	
Item 268	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1585mm	132.60	132.60	
Item 269	Steel Reinforcing Bar	1.00	kg	1595mm	133.40	133.40	



Node ID	Node Name	Parent Node	Order	Level
12.1	12.1	12.1	1	1
12.2	12.2	12.1	2	1
12.3	12.3	12.1	3	1
12.4	12.4	12.1	4	1
12.5	12.5	12.1	5	1
12.6	12.6	12.1	6	1
12.7	12.7	12.1	7	1
12.8	12.8	12.1	8	1
12.9	12.9	12.1	9	1
12.10	12.10	12.1	10	1
12.11	12.11	12.1	11	1
12.12	12.12	12.1	12	1
12.13	12.13	12.1	13	1
12.14	12.14	12.1	14	1
12.15	12.15	12.1	15	1
12.16	12.16	12.1	16	1
12.17	12.17	12.1	17	1
12.18	12.18	12.1	18	1
12.19	12.19	12.1	19	1
12.20	12.20	12.1	20	1
12.21	12.21	12.1	21	1
12.22	12.22	12.1	22	1
12.23	12.23	12.1	23	1
12.24	12.24	12.1	24	1
12.25	12.25	12.1	25	1
12.26	12.26	12.1	26	1
12.27	12.27	12.1	27	1
12.28	12.28	12.1	28	1
12.29	12.29	12.1	29	1
12.30	12.30	12.1	30	1
12.31	12.31	12.1	31	1
12.32	12.32	12.1	32	1
12.33	12.33	12.1	33	1
12.34	12.34	12.1	34	1
12.35	12.35	12.1	35	1
12.36	12.36	12.1	36	1
12.37	12.37	12.1	37	1
12.38	12.38	12.1	38	1
12.39	12.39	12.1	39	1
12.40	12.40	12.1	40	1
12.41	12.41	12.1	41	1
12.42	12.42	12.1	42	1
12.43	12.43	12.1	43	1
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12.45	12.45	12.1	45	1
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12.49	12.49	12.1	49	1
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12.68	12.68	12.1	68	1
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12.71	12.71	12.1	71	1
12.72	12.72	12.1	72	1
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12.78	12.78	12.1	78	1
12.79	12.79	12.1	79	1
12.80	12.80	12.1	80	1
12.81	12.81	12.1	81	1
12.82	12.82	12.1	82	1
12.83	12.83	12.1	83	1
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12.85	12.85	12.1	85	1
12.86	12.86	12.1	86	1
12.87	12.87	12.1	87	1
12.88	12.88	12.1	88	1
12.89	12.89	12.1	89	1
12.90	12.90	12.1	90	1
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12.92	12.92	12.1	92	1
12.93	12.93	12.1	93	1
12.94	12.94	12.1	94	1
12.95	12.95	12.1	95	1
12.96	12.96	12.1	96	1
12.97	12.97	12.1	97	1
12.98	12.98	12.1	98	1
12.99	12.99	12.1	99	1
13.00	13.00	12.1	100	1





-N1400	190.4	364.8	390.5
-N1401	22.81	367.1	379
-N1402	26.18	367.3	349.8
-N1403	21.9	364.8	378.2
-N1404	26.8	361.8	349.8
-N1405	23.87	362.8	349.8
-N1406	34.72	366.8	344.2
-N1407	34.41	361.8	367.2
-N1408	34.88	360.5	367.4
-N1409	47.18	357.1	349.8
-N1410	48.81	491.4	413.5
-N1411	78.26	531	389.9
-N1412	82.24	498.5	389.5
-N1413	80.82	439.8	391.7
-N1414	89.9	575.8	376
-N1415	87.4	567.7	367
-N1416	82.35	564.7	417
-N1417	82.35	481	413
-N1418	81.73	427.9	386.4
-N1419	79.86	528.4	346.8
-N1420	82.21	428.5	386
-N1421	80.57	480.7	346.8
-N1422	1007	2709	413.1
-N1423	21.71	428	389.8
-N1424	1007	2709	413.1
-N1425	1007	2709	413.1
-N1426	1007	2709	413.1
-N1427	34.88	452.8	378.3
-N1428	34.88	452.8	378.3
-N1429	37.9	459.7	386.5
-N1430	34.39	451.7	378.3
-N1431	34.39	451.7	378.3
-N1432	1571	3452	377.3
-N1433	164	384.8	378
-N1434	27.7	401.1	386
-N1435	1207	341.2	377.8
-N1436	104	364.8	378
-N1437	104	364.8	378
-N1438	27.7	428	386
-N1439	1207	379	377.3
-N1440	1385	3010	383
-N1441	1385	356	386
-N1442	1374	3536	426.2
-N1443	84.82	423.8	371.8
-N1444	88.23	423.8	386.4
-N1445	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1446	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1447	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1448	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1449	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1450	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1451	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1452	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1453	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1454	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1455	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1456	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1457	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1458	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1459	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1460	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1461	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1462	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1463	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1464	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1465	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1466	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1467	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1468	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1469	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1470	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1471	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1472	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1473	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1474	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1475	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1476	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1477	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1478	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1479	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1480	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1481	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1482	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1483	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1484	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1485	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1486	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1487	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1488	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1489	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1490	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1491	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1492	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1493	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1494	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1495	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1496	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1497	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1498	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1499	88.23	423.8	371.8
-N1500	88.23	423.8	371.8

Task List	Surface Pressure	Level	Status	Flow	Pressure	Ordn	Elev
Accumulator Tank A	1000	0	0	0	1020	2709	428.7
Accumulator Tank B	1000	0	0	0	1020	2709	428.8
Accumulator Tank C	1000	0	0	0	1020	2709	428.9
Accumulator Tank D	1000	0	0	0	1020	2709	429.0
Core Reactor Pump A	19.2	10.8	7803	23.87	389.4	368.2	368.2
Core Reactor Pump B	19.2	10.8	3189	23.87	389.4	368.2	368.2
Refueling Water Storage Tank	14.7	33.3	13656	28.09	427.3	384	384

Component List	Component Type	Flow	Pressure	Status	Ordn	Elev
-N1500	Flow in	0	152.4	0	675.3	368.8
-N1501	Flow in	0	150.2	0	674.5	369.3
-N1502	Flow out	0	134	0	3629	368.8
-N1503	Flow out	20	135	0	3624	368.8
-N1504	Flow in	0	37.25	0	427.8	370.4
-N1505	Flow in	136	36.48	0	427.9	372.8
-N1506	Flow out	60	1780	0	4478	388.8
-N1507	Flow out	60	1780	0	4478	389.8
-N1508	Flow out	0	1774	0	4462	378.4
-N1509	Flow out	0	1774	0	4462	378.4
A15010	Supply	3.802	55	0	868.7	573.4
A15011	Supply	3.801	55	0	868.8	573.4
A15012	Supply	3.771	55	0	868.1	573.4
A15013	Supply	3.771	55	0	868.1	573.4
A15014	Supply	3.589	55	0	868.8	573.2
A15015	Supply	3.587	55	0	868.1	573.4
A15016	Supply	3.586	55	0	868.7	573.4
A15017	Supply	3.586	55	0	868.8	573.2
A15018	Supply	3.728	55	0	868.1	573.4
A15019	Supply	2.728	55	0	868.7	573.4



























Node	Flow	Pressure	Flow	Pressure	Flow	Pressure	Flow	Pressure
-H450	100	364	364	364				
-H451	27.19	360.3	379					
-H452	34.26	362.3	349.9					
-H453	21.69	361.9	379.7					
-H454	22.88	361.9	349.9					
-H455	22.44	361.3	349.9					
-H456	34.86	361.5	344.3					
-H457		362	362					
-H458	24.81	360.3	367.4					
-H459	63.79	363.4	368					
-H460	17.31	357.1	371.5					
-H461	46.18	400.4	417.5					
-H462	72.46	427.1	388.5					
-H463	8.82	499.8	388.5					
-H464	26.12	477.4	381.7					
-H465	107.1	376	376					
-H466	63.82	343.9	347					
-H467	91.83	353.2	417					
-H468	41.86	479.9	374.5					
-H469	31.23	426.7	386.4					
-H470	79.46	427.9	344.5					
-H471	31.71	427.4	388					
-H472	89.13	429.7	344.5					
-H473	1007	2708	413.1					
-H474	26.72	429.6	348.8					
-H475	1007	2708	413.1					
-H476	1007	2708	413.1					
-H477	1007	2708	413.1					
-H478	22.79	419	378.3					
-H479	32.73	418	378.3					
-H480	36.86	419.9	366.4					
-H481	35.94	418.7	366.5					
-H482	32.46	417.4	376.3					
-H483	36.42	418.7	366.4					
-H484	32.46	417.4	376.3					
-H485	1329	3388	377.5					
-H486	103.7	361	378					
-H487	103.7	361	378					
-H488	27.7	428.9	396					
-H489	124	3408	377.5					
-H490	103.7	361	378					
-H491	103.7	361	378					
-H492	27.7	428.9	396					
-H493	112	3268	377.5					
-H494	1360	3388	380					
-H495	128	3261	380					
-H496	1277	3381	429.2					
-H497	20.7	418.2	377.5					
-H498	36.06	418.9	366.4					
-H499	34.84	418.1	372.5					
-H500	34.45	418.2	372.5					
-H501	34.43	418.3	378.5					
-H502	34.36	418.3	372.5					
-H503		366.4						
-H504	34.26	417.8	372.5					
-H505	34.26	418.8	372.5					
-H506	1792	4480	389.6					
-H507	1777	4451	371.5					
-H508	1782	4480	389.6					
-H509	1782	4454	371.5					
-H510	1778	4453	371.5					
-H511	1778	4453	371.5					
-H512	1742	4387	388.5					
-H513	1731	4370	387.5					
-H514	1729	4384	388.5					
-H515	1738	4383	388.5					
-H516	1686	4282	395					
-H517	1628	4150	428					
-H518	1680	4340	385					
-H519	1624	4151	382.4					
-H520	1673	4233	382.4					
-H521	1625	428.2	385					
-H522	1611	4119	423.2					
-H523	1645	4278	423.2					
-H524	30.37	429.9	385					
-H525	1641	4150	385.9					
-H526	1644	3887	385.9					
-H527	30.39	429.7	385					
-H528	162	3887	413					
-H529	963.3	3880	413					
-H530	162	429.2	383					
-H531	1773	4448	378.4					
-H532	1771	4448	382.9					
-H533	1771	4448	382.9					
-H534	103.3	361	379					
-H535	85.94	361.2	367					
-H536	85.39	360.8	367					
-H537	117	358	348					
-H538		378						
-H539	1507	1378	383					
-H540	1778	4441	378.9					
-H541	888.7	2958	412.9					
-H542	179	777.3	367					
-H543	179	777.3	367					
-H544	1524	2748	413					
-H545	201.2	841	413					
-H546	201.2	841.7	413					
-H547	1073	3832	382.4					
-H548	229.4	879.9	382.9					
-H549	229.4	879.9	382.9					
-H550	1844	3880	385.9					
-H551	1842	781.5	385.9					
-H552	184.1	784.2	387.5					
-H553	179	3202	414.5					
-H554	831	2204	414.5					
-H555	820.3	2207	414.5					
-H556	421.3	425.2	414.5					
-H557	1286	3278	381.4					
-H558	882	2288	381.4					
-H559	881.3	2287	381.4					
-H560	76.77	825.1	381.4					
-H561	76.72	825	381.4					
-H562	821.3	825.1	414.5					
-H563	1238	3243	414.9					
-H564	848.8	2245	414.9					
-H565	843.8	2238	414.9					
-H566	823.2	825.6	414.9					
-H567	82.47	825.5	414.9					
-H568	1205	3291	387					
-H569	899.9	2281	387					
-H570	879.9	2280	387					
-H571	81.54	849.9	387					
-H572	881.88	849.4	387					
-H573	102.5	844	380.7					
-H574	102.5	844	380.7					
-H575	102.5	844	380.7					
-H576	102.5	844	380.7					
-H577	102.5	844	380.7					
-H578	102.5	844	380.7					
-H579	102.5	844	380.7					
-H580	102.5	844	380.7					
-H581	102.5	844	380.7					
-H582	102.5	844	380.7					
-H583	102.5	844	380.7					
-H584	102.5	844	380.7					
-H585	102.5	844	380.7					
-H586	102.5	844	380.7					
-H587	102.5	844	380.7					
-H588	102.5	844	380.7					
-H589	102.5	844	380.7					
-H590	102.5	844	380.7					
-H591	102.5	844	380.7					
-H592	102.5	844	380.7					
-H593	102.5	844	380.7					
-H594	102.5	844	380.7					
-H595	102.5	844	380.7					
-H596	102.5	844	380.7					
-H597	102.5	844	380.7					
-H598	102.5	844	380.7					
-H599	102.5	844	380.7					
-H600	102.5	844	380.7					
-H601	102.5	844	380.7					
-H602	102.5	844	380.7					
-H603	102.5	844	380.7					
-H604	102.5	844	380.7					
-H605	102.5	844	380.7					
-H606	102.5	844	380.7					
-H607	102.5	844	380.7					
-H608	102.5	844	380.7					
-H609	102.5	844	380.7					
-H610	102.5	844	380.7					
-H611	102.5	844	380.7					
-H612	102.5	844	380.7					
-H613	102.5	844	380.7					
-H614	102.5	844	380.7					
-H615	102.5	844	380.7					
-H616	102.5	844	380.7					
-H617	102.5	844	380.7					
-H618	102.5	844	380.7					
-H619	102.5	844	380.7					
-H620	102.5	844	380.7					
-H621	102.5	844	380.7					
-H622	102.5	844	380.7					
-H623	102.5	844	380.7					
-H624	102.5	844	380.7					
-H625	102.5	844	380.7					
-H626	102.5	844	380.7					
-H627	102.5	844	380.7					
-H628	102.5	844	380.7					
-H629	102.5	844	380.7					
-H630	102.5	844	380.7					
-H631	102.5	844	380.7					
-H632	102.5	844	380.7					
-H633	102.5	844	380.7					
-H634	102.5	844	380.7					
-H635	102.5	844	380.7					
-H636	102.5	844	380.7					
-H637	102.5	844	380.7					
-H638	102.5	844	380.7					
-H639	102.5	844	380.7					
-H640	102.5	844	380.7					
-H641	102.5	844	380.7					
-H642	102.5	844	380.7					
-H643	102.5	844	380.7					
-H644	102.5	844	380.7					
-H645	102.5	844	38					





















Node List	Station	Pressure	Depth	Flow
-N001	1218	875.5	428	
-N002	88.42	875.5	874.3	
-N003	80.1	880.4	350.1	
-N004	33.84	880.8	348.3	
-N005	28.88	879.5	349.8	
-N006	17.9	875.5	344.3	
-N007	13.8	875.5	344.3	
-N008	18.1	875.5	348.3	
-N009	13.1	875.5	360	
-N010	18	875.5	394.8	
-N011	22.48	875.5	447.2	
-N012	18.18	874.8	453.5	
-N013	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N014	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N015	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N016	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N017	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N018	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N019	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N020	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N021	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N022	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N023	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N024	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N025	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N026	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N027	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N028	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N029	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N030	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N031	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N032	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N033	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N034	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N035	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N036	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N037	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N038	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N039	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N040	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N041	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N042	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N043	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N044	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N045	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N046	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N047	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N048	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N049	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N050	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N051	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N052	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N053	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N054	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N055	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N056	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N057	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N058	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N059	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N060	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N061	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N062	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N063	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N064	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N065	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N066	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N067	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N068	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N069	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N070	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N071	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N072	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N073	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N074	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N075	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N076	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N077	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N078	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N079	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N080	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N081	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N082	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N083	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N084	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N085	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N086	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N087	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N088	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N089	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N090	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N091	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N092	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N093	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N094	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N095	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N096	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N097	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N098	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N099	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N100	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N101	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N102	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N103	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N104	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N105	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N106	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N107	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N108	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N109	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N110	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N111	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N112	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N113	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N114	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N115	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N116	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N117	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N118	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N119	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N120	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N121	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N122	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N123	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N124	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N125	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N126	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N127	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N128	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N129	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N130	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N131	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N132	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N133	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N134	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N135	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N136	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N137	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N138	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N139	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N140	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N141	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N142	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N143	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N144	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N145	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N146	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N147	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N148	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N149	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N150	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N151	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N152	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N153	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N154	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N155	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N156	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N157	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N158	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N159	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N160	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N161	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N162	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N163	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N164	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N165	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N166	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N167	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N168	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N169	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N170	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N171	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N172	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N173	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N174	82.2	875.7	453.5	
-N175	82.2	875.7	453.5	



























Node No.	Node Name	Node Type	Node Value	Node Unit	Node Description
12.18	12.18	12.18	675.5	438	
12.19	12.19	12.19	675.5	438	
12.20	12.20	12.20	675.5	438	
12.21	12.21	12.21	675.5	438	
12.22	12.22	12.22	675.5	438	
12.23	12.23	12.23	675.5	438	
12.24	12.24	12.24	675.5	438	
12.25	12.25	12.25	675.5	438	
12.26	12.26	12.26	675.5	438	
12.27	12.27	12.27	675.5	438	
12.28	12.28	12.28	675.5	438	
12.29	12.29	12.29	675.5	438	
12.30	12.30	12.30	675.5	438	
12.31	12.31	12.31	675.5	438	
12.32	12.32	12.32	675.5	438	
12.33	12.33	12.33	675.5	438	
12.34	12.34	12.34	675.5	438	
12.35	12.35	12.35	675.5	438	
12.36	12.36	12.36	675.5	438	
12.37	12.37	12.37	675.5	438	
12.38	12.38	12.38	675.5	438	
12.39	12.39	12.39	675.5	438	
12.40	12.40	12.40	675.5	438	
12.41	12.41	12.41	675.5	438	
12.42	12.42	12.42	675.5	438	
12.43	12.43	12.43	675.5	438	
12.44	12.44	12.44	675.5	438	
12.45	12.45	12.45	675.5	438	
12.46	12.46	12.46	675.5	438	
12.47	12.47	12.47	675.5	438	
12.48	12.48	12.48	675.5	438	
12.49	12.49	12.49	675.5	438	
12.50	12.50	12.50	675.5	438	
12.51	12.51	12.51	675.5	438	
12.52	12.52	12.52	675.5	438	
12.53	12.53	12.53	675.5	438	
12.54	12.54	12.54	675.5	438	
12.55	12.55	12.55	675.5	438	
12.56	12.56	12.56	675.5	438	
12.57	12.57	12.57	675.5	438	
12.58	12.58	12.58	675.5	438	
12.59	12.59	12.59	675.5	438	
12.60	12.60	12.60	675.5	438	
12.61	12.61	12.61	675.5	438	
12.62	12.62	12.62	675.5	438	
12.63	12.63	12.63	675.5	438	
12.64	12.64	12.64	675.5	438	
12.65	12.65	12.65	675.5	438	
12.66	12.66	12.66	675.5	438	
12.67	12.67	12.67	675.5	438	
12.68	12.68	12.68	675.5	438	
12.69	12.69	12.69	675.5	438	
12.70	12.70	12.70	675.5	438	
12.71	12.71	12.71	675.5	438	
12.72	12.72	12.72	675.5	438	
12.73	12.73	12.73	675.5	438	
12.74	12.74	12.74	675.5	438	
12.75	12.75	12.75	675.5	438	
12.76	12.76	12.76	675.5	438	
12.77	12.77	12.77	675.5	438	
12.78	12.78	12.78	675.5	438	
12.79	12.79	12.79	675.5	438	
12.80	12.80	12.80	675.5	438	
12.81	12.81	12.81	675.5	438	
12.82	12.82	12.82	675.5	438	
12.83	12.83	12.83	675.5	438	
12.84	12.84	12.84	675.5	438	
12.85	12.85	12.85	675.5	438	
12.86	12.86	12.86	675.5	438	
12.87	12.87	12.87	675.5	438	
12.88	12.88	12.88	675.5	438	
12.89	12.89	12.89	675.5	438	
12.90	12.90	12.90	675.5	438	
12.91	12.91	12.91	675.5	438	
12.92	12.92	12.92	675.5	438	
12.93	12.93	12.93	675.5	438	
12.94	12.94	12.94	675.5	438	
12.95	12.95	12.95	675.5	438	
12.96	12.96	12.96	675.5	438	
12.97	12.97	12.97	675.5	438	
12.98	12.98	12.98	675.5	438	
12.99	12.99	12.99	675.5	438	
13.00	13.00	13.00	675.5	438	





-H040	151.1	702.3	366.6
-H041	22.56	361.2	379.8
-H042	26.74	361.2	368.9
-H050	27.22	366.3	376.2
-H051	33.58	360.9	349.9
-H052	34.74	360.7	344.3
-H053	34.89	360.9	357.4
-H054	142.9	360.3	369.5
-H055	123.1	372.3	421.5
-H056	118.8	369.4	417.5
-H057	138	377.2	359.5
-H058	124.4	362	360.7
-H059	116.1	326.4	347
-H060	154.5	367.6	375
-H061	142	367.9	367
-H062	119.9	364.3	417
-H063	118.7	353.2	412
-H064	117.4	326.1	386.4
-H065	105.5	379.6	366.9
-H066	117.7	326.4	364.5
-H067	108.7	3709	413.1
-H068	118.8	326.2	368.4
-H069	108.7	3709	413.3
-H070	102.7	3709	413.3
-H071	108.7	3709	413.3
-H072	48.71	422.8	376.3
-H073	36.7	421.9	376.3
-H074	48.87	437.5	366.4
-H075	37.85	425.5	366.5
-H076	34.45	437	376.3
-H077	36.43	421.9	366.4
-H078	34.45	437	376.3
-H079	131	342.9	377.5
-H080	144	302.3	376
-H081	154.8	302.3	376
-H082	117.1	302.3	368
-H083	134	343.2	377.5
-H084	144.8	302.3	376
-H085	134	302.3	376
-H086	117.1	302.3	368
-H087	132	322.2	356
-H088	110.0	320	353
-H089	110.0	319	350
-H090	109	330	429.2
-H091	24.82	421.4	377.5
-H092	36.27	425.5	368.4
-H093	26.76	425.5	372.5
-H094	36.38	422.7	372.5
-H095	22.38	423	376.3
-H096	36.49	422.9	372.6
-H097	-	366.4	-
-H098	36.18	422.2	372.6
-H099	22.49	422.9	372.5
-H100	107	451.9	369.6
-H101	102	451.1	371.5
-H102	107	451.9	369.6
-H103	106	451.5	371.5
-H104	104	451.5	371.5
-H105	104	451.5	371.5
-H106	108	448	366.3
-H107	108	442	367.3
-H108	106	442	366.5
-H109	106	446	366.3
-H110	114	429	366
-H111	108	425	429.1
-H112	108	437	365
-H113	105	420	362.4
-H114	112	326.9	322.4
-H115	118	418	325
-H116	164	418	422.2
-H117	101	291.4	422.2
-H118	116.8	326.4	365
-H119	101	427.1	365.6
-H120	114	287.7	355.9
-H121	116.8	326.3	363
-H122	106	406	412
-H123	109	276.2	413
-H124	116.8	326.3	363
-H125	109	406	378.4
-H126	107	408	342.8
-H127	108	406	363.6
-H128	106	408	366.4
-H129	164.4	362.3	376
-H130	144.1	361.6	367
-H131	138	347.5	363
-H132	-	376	-
-H133	119	361	363
-H134	101	407	376.8
-H135	106	279.1	412.9
-H136	266.2	365.4	367
-H137	266.2	365.3	367
-H138	167.9	368.8	413
-H139	261.8	101	413
-H140	261.4	100	413
-H141	121	2046	342.4
-H142	201.1	106	382.9
-H143	201.1	106	366.9
-H144	113	287.5	365.6
-H145	261.2	877	367.3
-H146	261.2	877	367.3
-H147	124	2228	414.5
-H148	866.3	2186	414.5
-H149	866.3	2186	414.5
-H150	137.1	368.2	414.5
-H151	109	3208	381.4
-H152	114.4	2449	381.4
-H153	91.4	3463	381.4
-H154	118.8	366.9	381.4
-H155	118.8	366.9	381.4
-H156	118.8	366.9	381.4
-H157	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H158	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H159	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H160	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H161	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H162	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H163	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H164	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H165	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H166	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H167	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H168	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H169	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H170	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H171	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H172	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H173	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H174	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H175	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H176	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H177	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H178	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H179	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H180	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H181	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H182	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H183	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H184	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H185	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H186	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H187	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H188	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H189	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H190	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H191	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H192	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H193	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H194	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H195	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H196	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H197	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H198	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H199	127.1	366.9	381.4
-H200	127.1	366.9	381.4

Task List	Surface Pressure	Level	Status	Flow	Pressure	Grade	Dev
Ann-Pumper Tank A	1000	0	0	0	1000	2700	428.1
Ann-Pumper Tank B	1000	0	0	0	1000	2709	428.3
Ann-Pumper Tank C	1000	0	0	0	1000	2709	428.6
Ann-Pumper Tank D	1000	0	0	0	1000	2709	428.5
Com. Res. Tank A	18.0	18.3	387	27.25	388	362	362
Com. Res. Tank B	18.0	18.3	4227	27.25	388	362.2	362
Refueling Water Storage Tank	14.7	23.3	13662	28.98	427.3	364	364

Demanded Line	Demanded Type	Flow	Pressure	Status	Grade	Dev
-H040	Flow in	0	152.4	876.8	366.6	
-H041	Flow in	0	156.7	814.5	363.5	
-H042	Flow in	0	134.1	344.1	366.6	
-H043	Flow in	30	134	344	366.6	
-H044	Flow in	0	21.36	422.8	376.3	
-H045	Flow in	190	36.49	422.8	372.5	
-H046	Flow in	60	419	426	368.9	
-H047	Flow out	60	1810	429	369.9	
-H048	Flow out	0	180	413	367.9	
-H049	Flow out	0	179	408	378.4	
-H050	Flow out	60	181	407	376.8	
A1001	Supply	3.803	55	667.7	374.4	
A1002	Supply	3.501	55	669.4	376.3	
A1003	Supply	3.791	55	669.1	375.4	
A1004	Supply	3.791	55	669.1	375.4	
A1005	Supply	3.508	55	669.0	376.3	
A1006	Supply	3.801	55	669.0	374.4	
A1007	Supply	3.88	55	668.7	374.4	
A1008	Supply	3.109	55	668.8	375.3	
A1009	Supply	3.728	55	669.1	375.8	
A1010	Supply	3.728	55	669.1	375.8	

A10211	Bay	3.87	55	552.8	575.3
A10212	Bay	3.88	55	552.7	575.4
A10213	Bay	3.89	55	552.6	575.5
A10214	Bay	3.90	55	552.5	575.6
A10215	Bay	3.91	55	552.4	575.7
A10216	Bay	3.92	55	552.3	575.8
A10217	Bay	3.93	55	552.2	575.9
A10218	Bay	3.94	55	552.1	576.0
A10219	Bay	3.95	55	552.0	576.1
A10220	Bay	3.96	55	551.9	576.2
A10221	Bay	3.97	55	551.8	576.3
A10222	Bay	3.98	55	551.7	576.4
A10223	Bay	3.99	55	551.6	576.5
A10224	Bay	4.00	55	551.5	576.6
A10225	Bay	4.01	55	551.4	576.7
A10226	Bay	4.02	55	551.3	576.8
A10227	Bay	4.03	55	551.2	576.9
A10228	Bay	4.04	55	551.1	577.0
A10229	Bay	4.05	55	551.0	577.1
A10230	Bay	4.06	55	550.9	577.2
A10231	Bay	4.07	55	550.8	577.3
A10232	Bay	4.08	55	550.7	577.4
A10233	Bay	4.09	55	550.6	577.5
A10234	Bay	4.10	55	550.5	577.6
A10235	Bay	4.11	55	550.4	577.7
A10236	Bay	4.12	55	550.3	577.8
A10237	Bay	4.13	55	550.2	577.9
A10238	Bay	4.14	55	550.1	578.0
A10239	Bay	4.15	55	550.0	578.1
A10240	Bay	4.16	55	549.9	578.2
A10241	Bay	4.17	55	549.8	578.3
A10242	Bay	4.18	55	549.7	578.4
A10243	Bay	4.19	55	549.6	578.5
A10244	Bay	4.20	55	549.5	578.6
A10245	Bay	4.21	55	549.4	578.7
A10246	Bay	4.22	55	549.3	578.8
A10247	Bay	4.23	55	549.2	578.9
A10248	Bay	4.24	55	549.1	579.0
A10249	Bay	4.25	55	549.0	579.1
A10250	Bay	4.26	55	548.9	579.2
A10251	Bay	4.27	55	548.8	579.3
A10252	Bay	4.28	55	548.7	579.4
A10253	Bay	4.29	55	548.6	579.5
A10254	Bay	4.30	55	548.5	579.6
A10255	Bay	4.31	55	548.4	579.7
A10256	Bay	4.32	55	548.3	579.8
A10257	Bay	4.33	55	548.2	579.9
A10258	Bay	4.34	55	548.1	580.0
A10259	Bay	4.35	55	548.0	580.1
A10260	Bay	4.36	55	547.9	580.2
A10261	Bay	4.37	55	547.8	580.3
A10262	Bay	4.38	55	547.7	580.4
A10263	Bay	4.39	55	547.6	580.5
A10264	Bay	4.40	55	547.5	580.6
A10265	Bay	4.41	55	547.4	580.7
A10266	Bay	4.42	55	547.3	580.8
A10267	Bay	4.43	55	547.2	580.9
A10268	Bay	4.44	55	547.1	581.0
A10269	Bay	4.45	55	547.0	581.1
A10270	Bay	4.46	55	546.9	581.2
A10271	Bay	4.47	55	546.8	581.3
A10272	Bay	4.48	55	546.7	581.4
A10273	Bay	4.49	55	546.6	581.5
A10274	Bay	4.50	55	546.5	581.6
A10275	Bay	4.51	55	546.4	581.7
A10276	Bay	4.52	55	546.3	581.8
A10277	Bay	4.53	55	546.2	581.9
A10278	Bay	4.54	55	546.1	582.0
A10279	Bay	4.55	55	546.0	582.1
A10280	Bay	4.56	55	545.9	582.2
A10281	Bay	4.57	55	545.8	582.3
A10282	Bay	4.58	55	545.7	582.4
A10283	Bay	4.59	55	545.6	582.5
A10284	Bay	4.60	55	545.5	582.6
A10285	Bay	4.61	55	545.4	582.7
A10286	Bay	4.62	55	545.3	582.8
A10287	Bay	4.63	55	545.2	582.9
A10288	Bay	4.64	55	545.1	583.0
A10289	Bay	4.65	55	545.0	583.1
A10290	Bay	4.66	55	544.9	583.2
A10291	Bay	4.67	55	544.8	583.3
A10292	Bay	4.68	55	544.7	583.4
A10293	Bay	4.69	55	544.6	583.5
A10294	Bay	4.70	55	544.5	583.6
A10295	Bay	4.71	55	544.4	583.7
A10296	Bay	4.72	55	544.3	583.8
A10297	Bay	4.73	55	544.2	583.9
A10298	Bay	4.74	55	544.1	584.0
A10299	Bay	4.75	55	544.0	584.1
A10300	Bay	4.76	55	543.9	584.2
A10301	Bay	4.77	55	543.8	584.3
A10302	Bay	4.78	55	543.7	584.4
A10303	Bay	4.79	55	543.6	584.5
A10304	Bay	4.80	55	543.5	584.6
A10305	Bay	4.81	55	543.4	584.7
A10306	Bay	4.82	55	543.3	584.8
A10307	Bay	4.83	55	543.2	584.9
A10308	Bay	4.84	55	543.1	585.0
A10309	Bay	4.85	55	543.0	585.1
A10310	Bay	4.86	55	542.9	585.2
A10311	Bay	4.87	55	542.8	585.3



Item	Flow	Status	HL	SP	Vel Pressure	Outlet Pressure	Hot Elev	Outlet Elev
820475	Water	4.272	55	822.3	588			
820476	Water	4.271	55	822.2	588			
820477	Water	4.271	55	822.1	588			
820478	Water	4.27	55	822	588			
820479	Water	4.27	55	821.9	588			
820480	Water	4.27	55	821.8	588			
820481	Water	4.27	55	821.7	588			
820482	Water	4.27	55	821.6	588			
820483	Water	4.27	55	821.5	588			
820484	Water	4.27	55	821.4	588			
820485	Water	4.27	55	821.3	588			
820486	Water	4.27	55	821.2	588			
820487	Water	4.27	55	821.1	588			
820488	Water	4.27	55	821	588			
820489	Water	4.27	55	820.9	588			
820490	Water	4.27	55	820.8	588			
820491	Water	4.27	55	820.7	588			
820492	Water	4.27	55	820.6	588			
820493	Water	4.27	55	820.5	588			
820494	Water	4.27	55	820.4	588			
820495	Water	4.27	55	820.3	588			
820496	Water	4.27	55	820.2	588			
820497	Water	4.27	55	820.1	588			
820498	Water	4.27	55	820	588			
820499	Water	4.27	55	819.9	588			
820500	Water	4.27	55	819.8	588			
820501	Water	4.27	55	819.7	588			
820502	Water	4.27	55	819.6	588			
820503	Water	4.27	55	819.5	588			
820504	Water	4.27	55	819.4	588			
820505	Water	4.27	55	819.3	588			
820506	Water	4.27	55	819.2	588			
820507	Water	4.27	55	819.1	588			
820508	Water	4.27	55	819	588			
820509	Water	4.27	55	818.9	588			
820510	Water	4.27	55	818.8	588			
820511	Water	4.27	55	818.7	588			
820512	Water	4.27	55	818.6	588			
820513	Water	4.27	55	818.5	588			
820514	Water	4.27	55	818.4	588			
820515	Water	4.27	55	818.3	588			
820516	Water	4.27	55	818.2	588			
820517	Water	4.27	55	818.1	588			
820518	Water	4.27	55	818	588			
820519	Water	4.27	55	817.9	588			
820520	Water	4.27	55	817.8	588			
820521	Water	4.27	55	817.7	588			
820522	Water	4.27	55	817.6	588			
820523	Water	4.27	55	817.5	588			
820524	Water	4.27	55	817.4	588			
820525	Water	4.27	55	817.3	588			
820526	Water	4.27	55	817.2	588			
820527	Water	4.27	55	817.1	588			
820528	Water	4.27	55	817	588			
820529	Water	4.27	55	816.9	588			
820530	Water	4.27	55	816.8	588			
820531	Water	4.27	55	816.7	588			
820532	Water	4.27	55	816.6	588			
820533	Water	4.27	55	816.5	588			
820534	Water	4.27	55	816.4	588			
820535	Water	4.27	55	816.3	588			
820536	Water	4.27	55	816.2	588			
820537	Water	4.27	55	816.1	588			
820538	Water	4.27	55	816	588			
820539	Water	4.27	55	815.9	588			
820540	Water	4.27	55	815.8	588			
820541	Water	4.27	55	815.7	588			
820542	Water	4.27	55	815.6	588			
820543	Water	4.27	55	815.5	588			
820544	Water	4.27	55	815.4	588			
820545	Water	4.27	55	815.3	588			
820546	Water	4.27	55	815.2	588			
820547	Water	4.27	55	815.1	588			
820548	Water	4.27	55	815	588			
820549	Water	4.27	55	814.9	588			
820550	Water	4.27	55	814.8	588			
820551	Water	4.27	55	814.7	588			
820552	Water	4.27	55	814.6	588			
820553	Water	4.27	55	814.5	588			
820554	Water	4.27	55	814.4	588			
820555	Water	4.27	55	814.3	588			
820556	Water	4.27	55	814.2	588			
820557	Water	4.27	55	814.1	588			
820558	Water	4.27	55	814	588			
820559	Water	4.27	55	813.9	588			
820560	Water	4.27	55	813.8	588			
820561	Water	4.27	55	813.7	588			
820562	Water	4.27	55	813.6	588			
820563	Water	4.27	55	813.5	588			
820564	Water	4.27	55	813.4	588			
820565	Water	4.27	55	813.3	588			
820566	Water	4.27	55	813.2	588			
820567	Water	4.27	55	813.1	588			
820568	Water	4.27	55	813	588			
820569	Water	4.27	55	812.9	588			
820570	Water	4.27	55	812.8	588			
820571	Water	4.27	55	812.7	588			
820572	Water	4.27	55	812.6	588			
820573	Water	4.27	55	812.5	588			
820574	Water	4.27	55	812.4	588			
820575	Water	4.27	55	812.3	588			
820576	Water	4.27	55	812.2	588			
820577	Water	4.27	55	812.1	588			
820578	Water	4.27	55	812	588			
820579	Water	4.27	55	811.9	588			
820580	Water	4.27	55	811.8	588			
820581	Water	4.27	55	811.7	588			
820582	Water	4.27	55	811.6	588			
820583	Water	4.27	55	811.5	588			
820584	Water	4.27	55	811.4	588			
820585	Water	4.27	55	811.3	588			
820586	Water	4.27	55	811.2	588			
820587	Water	4.27	55	811.1	588			
820588	Water	4.27	55	811	588			
820589	Water	4.27	55	810.9	588			
820590	Water	4.27	55	810.8	588			
820591	Water	4.27	55	810.7	588			
820592	Water	4.27	55	810.6	588			
820593	Water	4.27	55	810.5	588			
820594	Water	4.27	55	810.4	588			
820595	Water	4.27	55	810.3	588			
820596	Water	4.27	55	810.2	588			
820597	Water	4.27	55	810.1	588			
820598	Water	4.27	55	810	588			
820599	Water	4.27	55	809.9	588			
820600	Water	4.27	55	809.8	588			
820601	Water	4.27	55	809.7	588			
820602	Water	4.27	55	809.6	588			
820603	Water	4.27	55	809.5	588			
820604	Water	4.27	55	809.4	588			
820605	Water	4.27	55	809.3	588			
820606	Water	4.27	55	809.2	588			
820607	Water	4.27	55	809.1	588			
820608	Water	4.27	55	809	588			
820609	Water	4.27	55	808.9	588			
820610	Water	4.27	55	808.8	588			
820611	Water	4.27	55	808.7	588			
820612	Water	4.27	55	808.6	588			
820613	Water	4.27	55	808.5	588			
820614	Water	4.27	55	808.4	588			
820615	Water	4.27	55	808.3	588			
820616	Water	4.27	55	808.2	588			
820617	Water	4.27	55	808.1	588			
820618	Water	4.27	55	808	588			
820619	Water	4.27	55	807.9	588			
820620	Water	4.27	55	807.8	588			
820621	Water	4.27	55	807.7	588			
820622	Water	4.27	55	807.6	588			
820623	Water	4.27	55	807.5	588			
820624	Water	4.27	55	807.4	588			
820625	Water	4.27	55	807.3	588			
820626	Water	4.27	55	807.2	588			
820627	Water	4.27	55	807.1	588			
820628	Water	4.27	55	807	588			
820629	Water	4.27	55	806.9	588			
820630	Water	4.27	55	806.8	588			
820631	Water	4.27	55	806.7	588			
820632	Water	4.27	55	806.6	588			
820633	Water	4.27	55	806.5	588			
820634	Water	4.27	55	806.4	588			
820635	Water	4.27	55	806.3	588			
820636	Water	4.27	55	806.2	588			
820637	Water	4.27	55	806.1	588			
820638	Water	4.27	55	806	588			
820639	Water	4.27	55	805.9	588			
820640	Water	4.27	55	805.8	588			
820641	Water	4.27	55	805.7	588			
820642	Water	4.27	55	805.6	588			
820643	Water	4.27	55	805.5	588			
820644	Water	4.27	55	805.4	588			
820645	Water	4.27	55	805.3	588			
820646	Water	4.27	55	805.2	588			
820647	Water	4.27	55	805.1	588			
820648	Water	4.27	55	805	588			
820649	Water	4.27	55	804.9	588			
820650	Water	4.27	55	804.8	588			
820651	Water	4.27	55	804.7	588			
820652	Water	4.27	55	804.6	588			
820653	Water	4.27	55	804.5</				





Item	Material	Quantity	Unit	Price	Amount	Notes
0202L01	Steel Bolt (1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L02	Steel Bolt (3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L03	Steel Bolt (1")	3	0	0	0	
0202L04	Steel Bolt (1 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L05	Steel Bolt (1 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L06	Steel Bolt (1 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L07	Steel Bolt (2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L08	Steel Bolt (2 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L09	Steel Bolt (2 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L10	Steel Bolt (2 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L11	Steel Bolt (3")	3	0	0	0	
0202L12	Steel Bolt (3 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L13	Steel Bolt (3 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L14	Steel Bolt (3 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L15	Steel Bolt (4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L16	Steel Bolt (4 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L17	Steel Bolt (4 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L18	Steel Bolt (4 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L19	Steel Bolt (5")	3	0	0	0	
0202L20	Steel Bolt (5 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L21	Steel Bolt (5 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L22	Steel Bolt (5 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L23	Steel Bolt (6")	3	0	0	0	
0202L24	Steel Bolt (6 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L25	Steel Bolt (6 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L26	Steel Bolt (6 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L27	Steel Bolt (7")	3	0	0	0	
0202L28	Steel Bolt (7 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L29	Steel Bolt (7 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L30	Steel Bolt (7 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L31	Steel Bolt (8")	3	0	0	0	
0202L32	Steel Bolt (8 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L33	Steel Bolt (8 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L34	Steel Bolt (8 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L35	Steel Bolt (9")	3	0	0	0	
0202L36	Steel Bolt (9 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L37	Steel Bolt (9 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L38	Steel Bolt (9 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L39	Steel Bolt (10")	3	0	0	0	
0202L40	Steel Bolt (10 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L41	Steel Bolt (10 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L42	Steel Bolt (10 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L43	Steel Bolt (11")	3	0	0	0	
0202L44	Steel Bolt (11 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L45	Steel Bolt (11 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L46	Steel Bolt (11 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L47	Steel Bolt (12")	3	0	0	0	
0202L48	Steel Bolt (12 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L49	Steel Bolt (12 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L50	Steel Bolt (12 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L51	Steel Bolt (13")	3	0	0	0	
0202L52	Steel Bolt (13 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L53	Steel Bolt (13 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L54	Steel Bolt (13 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L55	Steel Bolt (14")	3	0	0	0	
0202L56	Steel Bolt (14 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L57	Steel Bolt (14 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L58	Steel Bolt (14 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L59	Steel Bolt (15")	3	0	0	0	
0202L60	Steel Bolt (15 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L61	Steel Bolt (15 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L62	Steel Bolt (15 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L63	Steel Bolt (16")	3	0	0	0	
0202L64	Steel Bolt (16 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L65	Steel Bolt (16 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L66	Steel Bolt (16 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L67	Steel Bolt (17")	3	0	0	0	
0202L68	Steel Bolt (17 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L69	Steel Bolt (17 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L70	Steel Bolt (17 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L71	Steel Bolt (18")	3	0	0	0	
0202L72	Steel Bolt (18 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L73	Steel Bolt (18 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L74	Steel Bolt (18 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L75	Steel Bolt (19")	3	0	0	0	
0202L76	Steel Bolt (19 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L77	Steel Bolt (19 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L78	Steel Bolt (19 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L79	Steel Bolt (20")	3	0	0	0	
0202L80	Steel Bolt (20 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L81	Steel Bolt (20 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L82	Steel Bolt (20 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L83	Steel Bolt (21")	3	0	0	0	
0202L84	Steel Bolt (21 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L85	Steel Bolt (21 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L86	Steel Bolt (21 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L87	Steel Bolt (22")	3	0	0	0	
0202L88	Steel Bolt (22 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L89	Steel Bolt (22 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L90	Steel Bolt (22 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L91	Steel Bolt (23")	3	0	0	0	
0202L92	Steel Bolt (23 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L93	Steel Bolt (23 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L94	Steel Bolt (23 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L95	Steel Bolt (24")	3	0	0	0	
0202L96	Steel Bolt (24 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L97	Steel Bolt (24 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L98	Steel Bolt (24 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L99	Steel Bolt (25")	3	0	0	0	
0202L100	Steel Bolt (25 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L101	Steel Bolt (25 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L102	Steel Bolt (25 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L103	Steel Bolt (26")	3	0	0	0	
0202L104	Steel Bolt (26 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L105	Steel Bolt (26 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L106	Steel Bolt (26 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L107	Steel Bolt (27")	3	0	0	0	
0202L108	Steel Bolt (27 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L109	Steel Bolt (27 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L110	Steel Bolt (27 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L111	Steel Bolt (28")	3	0	0	0	
0202L112	Steel Bolt (28 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L113	Steel Bolt (28 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L114	Steel Bolt (28 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L115	Steel Bolt (29")	3	0	0	0	
0202L116	Steel Bolt (29 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L117	Steel Bolt (29 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L118	Steel Bolt (29 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L119	Steel Bolt (30")	3	0	0	0	
0202L120	Steel Bolt (30 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L121	Steel Bolt (30 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L122	Steel Bolt (30 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L123	Steel Bolt (31")	3	0	0	0	
0202L124	Steel Bolt (31 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L125	Steel Bolt (31 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L126	Steel Bolt (31 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L127	Steel Bolt (32")	3	0	0	0	
0202L128	Steel Bolt (32 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L129	Steel Bolt (32 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L130	Steel Bolt (32 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L131	Steel Bolt (33")	3	0	0	0	
0202L132	Steel Bolt (33 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L133	Steel Bolt (33 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L134	Steel Bolt (33 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L135	Steel Bolt (34")	3	0	0	0	
0202L136	Steel Bolt (34 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L137	Steel Bolt (34 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L138	Steel Bolt (34 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L139	Steel Bolt (35")	3	0	0	0	
0202L140	Steel Bolt (35 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L141	Steel Bolt (35 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L142	Steel Bolt (35 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L143	Steel Bolt (36")	3	0	0	0	
0202L144	Steel Bolt (36 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L145	Steel Bolt (36 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L146	Steel Bolt (36 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L147	Steel Bolt (37")	3	0	0	0	
0202L148	Steel Bolt (37 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L149	Steel Bolt (37 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L150	Steel Bolt (37 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L151	Steel Bolt (38")	3	0	0	0	
0202L152	Steel Bolt (38 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L153	Steel Bolt (38 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L154	Steel Bolt (38 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L155	Steel Bolt (39")	3	0	0	0	
0202L156	Steel Bolt (39 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L157	Steel Bolt (39 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L158	Steel Bolt (39 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L159	Steel Bolt (40")	3	0	0	0	
0202L160	Steel Bolt (40 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L161	Steel Bolt (40 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L162	Steel Bolt (40 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L163	Steel Bolt (41")	3	0	0	0	
0202L164	Steel Bolt (41 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L165	Steel Bolt (41 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L166	Steel Bolt (41 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L167	Steel Bolt (42")	3	0	0	0	
0202L168	Steel Bolt (42 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L169	Steel Bolt (42 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L170	Steel Bolt (42 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L171	Steel Bolt (43")	3	0	0	0	
0202L172	Steel Bolt (43 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L173	Steel Bolt (43 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L174	Steel Bolt (43 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L175	Steel Bolt (44")	3	0	0	0	
0202L176	Steel Bolt (44 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L177	Steel Bolt (44 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L178	Steel Bolt (44 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L179	Steel Bolt (45")	3	0	0	0	
0202L180	Steel Bolt (45 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L181	Steel Bolt (45 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L182	Steel Bolt (45 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L183	Steel Bolt (46")	3	0	0	0	
0202L184	Steel Bolt (46 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L185	Steel Bolt (46 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L186	Steel Bolt (46 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L187	Steel Bolt (47")	3	0	0	0	
0202L188	Steel Bolt (47 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L189	Steel Bolt (47 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L190	Steel Bolt (47 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L191	Steel Bolt (48")	3	0	0	0	
0202L192	Steel Bolt (48 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L193	Steel Bolt (48 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L194	Steel Bolt (48 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L195	Steel Bolt (49")	3	0	0	0	
0202L196	Steel Bolt (49 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L197	Steel Bolt (49 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L198	Steel Bolt (49 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L199	Steel Bolt (50")	3	0	0	0	
0202L200	Steel Bolt (50 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L201	Steel Bolt (50 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L202	Steel Bolt (50 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L203	Steel Bolt (51")	3	0	0	0	
0202L204	Steel Bolt (51 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L205	Steel Bolt (51 1/2")	3	0	0	0	
0202L206	Steel Bolt (51 3/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L207	Steel Bolt (52")	3	0	0	0	
0202L208	Steel Bolt (52 1/4")	3	0	0	0	
0202L209	Steel Bolt (52 1/2")</					









Node Lvl	Status	Pressure	Grade	Elev
-N001		32.8	479.5	429
-N002		38.2	479.5	413.2
-N003		29.86	380.2	355.1
-N004		37.78	380.2	348.3
-N005		36.22	380.2	349.8
-N006		37.8	479.5	344.3
-N007		37.8	479.5	344.2
-N008		36.5	479.5	344.3
-N009		35	479.5	350
-N010		35	479.5	354.8
-N011		32.86	479.5	347.2
-N012		30.2	479.5	343.5
-N013		30.2	479.5	343.5
-N014		30.2	479.7	343.5
-N015		30.2	479.7	343.5
-N016		30.22	479.7	343.5
-N017		30.22	479.7	343.5
-N018		30.22	479.7	343.5
-N019		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N020		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N021		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N022		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N023		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N024		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N025		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N026		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N027		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N028		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N029		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N030		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N031		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N032		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N033		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N034		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N035		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N036		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N037		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N038		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N039		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N040		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N041		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N042		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N043		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N044		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N045		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N046		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N047		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N048		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N049		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N050		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N051		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N052		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N053		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N054		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N055		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N056		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N057		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N058		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N059		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N060		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N061		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N062		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N063		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N064		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N065		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N066		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N067		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N068		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N069		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N070		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N071		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N072		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N073		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N074		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N075		30.24	479.8	343.5
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-N092		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N093		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N094		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N095		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N096		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N097		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N098		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N099		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N100		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N101		30.24	479.8	343.5
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-N172		30.24	479.8	343.5
-N173		30.24	479.8	343.5





Node	Flow	Pressure	Head	Flow	Pressure	Head
-N040	148.8	886.9	386.5			
-N041	27.28	886.2	376			
-N042	24.26	287.2	349.9			
-N043	20.89	381.1	374.2			
-N044	20.35	381.1	348.8			
-N045	21.17	381.8	349.9			
-N046	34.54	380.2	344.3			
-N047			321.4			
-N048	24.81	380.2	351.4			
-N049	4.61	878.8	389.9			
-N050	118.9	886.1	421.5			
-N051	124.4	886.5	411.9			
-N052	136	878.2	389.9			
-N053	129.1	884.3	389.9			
-N054	121.1	811.2	397.2			
-N055	181.7	887	375			
-N056	189.7	878.2	367			
-N057	112.3	888.8	417			
-N058	112.2	845.1	417			
-N059	112.4	818.8	388.8			
-N060	117.8	888.8	384.5			
-N061	117.7	817.3	388			
-N062	128.3	848.7	384.5			
-N063	181	2778	418.1			
-N064	112.8	815.8	389.9			
-N065	189.7	2778	413.3			
-N066	189.7	2778	413.3			
-N067	30.88	414	378.1			
-N068	30.87	414	378.1			
-N069	30.84	411.9	384.4			
-N070	30.22	411.7	388.6			
-N071	30.72	413.4	378.1			
-N072	30.7	417.7	388.6			
-N073	30.72	413.4	378.1			
-N074	122.7	381.5	377.5			
-N075	122.3	886.5	378			
-N076	129.7	818.8	388			
-N077	123.1	384	377.5			
-N078	122.3	886.5	378			
-N079	129.7	818.8	388			
-N080	125	341.1	377.5			
-N081	121	3384	385			
-N082	130.7	3370	388			
-N083	121	3357	428.2			
-N084	30.82	415	377.5			
-N085	30.54	411.9	384.4			
-N086	30.88	415	372.5			
-N087	30.88	414.1	372.5			
-N088	32.88	414.4	378.1			
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-N200	32.78	414.4	378.1			

Node	Flow	Pressure	Head	Flow	Pressure	Head
-N201	32.78	414.4	378.1			
-N202	32.78	414.4	378.1			
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-N248	32.78	414.4	378.1			
-N249	32.78	414.4	378.1			
-N250	32.78	414.4	378.1			

Node	Flow	Pressure	Head	Flow	Pressure	Head
-N251	32.78	414.4	378.1			
-N252	32.78	414.4	378.1			
-N253	32.78	414.4	378.1			
-N254	32.78	414.4	378.1		</	





























A1001	Survey	3 507	55	500 6	570.3
A1002	Survey	3 508	55	500 7	570.4
A1003	Survey	3 509	55	500 8	570.5
A1004	Survey	3 510	55	500 9	570.6
A1005	Survey	3 511	55	500 10	570.7
A1006	Survey	3 512	55	500 11	570.8
A1007	Survey	3 513	55	500 12	570.9
A1008	Survey	3 514	55	500 13	571.0
A1009	Survey	3 515	55	500 14	571.1
A1010	Survey	3 516	55	500 15	571.2
A1011	Survey	3 517	55	500 16	571.3
A1012	Survey	3 518	55	500 17	571.4
A1013	Survey	3 519	55	500 18	571.5
A1014	Survey	3 520	55	500 19	571.6
A1015	Survey	3 521	55	500 20	571.7
A1016	Survey	3 522	55	500 21	571.8
A1017	Survey	3 523	55	500 22	571.9
A1018	Survey	3 524	55	500 23	572.0
A1019	Survey	3 525	55	500 24	572.1
A1020	Survey	3 526	55	500 25	572.2
A1021	Survey	3 527	55	500 26	572.3
A1022	Survey	3 528	55	500 27	572.4
A1023	Survey	3 529	55	500 28	572.5
A1024	Survey	3 530	55	500 29	572.6
A1025	Survey	3 531	55	500 30	572.7
A1026	Survey	3 532	55	500 31	572.8
A1027	Survey	3 533	55	500 32	572.9
A1028	Survey	3 534	55	500 33	573.0
A1029	Survey	3 535	55	500 34	573.1
A1030	Survey	3 536	55	500 35	573.2
A1031	Survey	3 537	55	500 36	573.3
A1032	Survey	3 538	55	500 37	573.4
A1033	Survey	3 539	55	500 38	573.5
A1034	Survey	3 540	55	500 39	573.6
A1035	Survey	3 541	55	500 40	573.7
A1036	Survey	3 542	55	500 41	573.8
A1037	Survey	3 543	55	500 42	573.9
A1038	Survey	3 544	55	500 43	574.0
A1039	Survey	3 545	55	500 44	574.1
A1040	Survey	3 546	55	500 45	574.2
A1041	Survey	3 547	55	500 46	574.3
A1042	Survey	3 548	55	500 47	574.4
A1043	Survey	3 549	55	500 48	574.5
A1044	Survey	3 550	55	500 49	574.6
A1045	Survey	3 551	55	500 50	574.7
A1046	Survey	3 552	55	500 51	574.8
A1047	Survey	3 553	55	500 52	574.9
A1048	Survey	3 554	55	500 53	575.0
A1049	Survey	3 555	55	500 54	575.1
A1050	Survey	3 556	55	500 55	575.2
A1051	Survey	3 557	55	500 56	575.3
A1052	Survey	3 558	55	500 57	575.4
A1053	Survey	3 559	55	500 58	575.5
A1054	Survey	3 560	55	500 59	575.6
A1055	Survey	3 561	55	500 60	575.7
A1056	Survey	3 562	55	500 61	575.8
A1057	Survey	3 563	55	500 62	575.9
A1058	Survey	3 564	55	500 63	576.0
A1059	Survey	3 565	55	500 64	576.1
A1060	Survey	3 566	55	500 65	576.2
A1061	Survey	3 567	55	500 66	576.3
A1062	Survey	3 568	55	500 67	576.4
A1063	Survey	3 569	55	500 68	576.5
A1064	Survey	3 570	55	500 69	576.6
A1065	Survey	3 571	55	500 70	576.7
A1066	Survey	3 572	55	500 71	576.8
A1067	Survey	3 573	55	500 72	576.9
A1068	Survey	3 574	55	500 73	577.0
A1069	Survey	3 575	55	500 74	577.1
A1070	Survey	3 576	55	500 75	577.2
A1071	Survey	3 577	55	500 76	577.3
A1072	Survey	3 578	55	500 77	577.4
A1073	Survey	3 579	55	500 78	577.5
A1074	Survey	3 580	55	500 79	577.6
A1075	Survey	3 581	55	500 80	577.7
A1076	Survey	3 582	55	500 81	577.8
A1077	Survey	3 583	55	500 82	577.9
A1078	Survey	3 584	55	500 83	578.0
A1079	Survey	3 585	55	500 84	578.1
A1080	Survey	3 586	55	500 85	578.2
A1081	Survey	3 587	55	500 86	578.3
A1082	Survey	3 588	55	500 87	578.4
A1083	Survey	3 589	55	500 88	578.5
A1084	Survey	3 590	55	500 89	578.6
A1085	Survey	3 591	55	500 90	578.7
A1086	Survey	3 592	55	500 91	578.8
A1087	Survey	3 593	55	500 92	578.9
A1088	Survey	3 594	55	500 93	579.0
A1089	Survey	3 595	55	500 94	579.1
A1090	Survey	3 596	55	500 95	579.2
A1091	Survey	3 597	55	500 96	579.3
A1092	Survey	3 598	55	500 97	579.4
A1093	Survey	3 599	55	500 98	579.5
A1094	Survey	3 600	55	500 99	579.6
A1095	Survey	3 601	55	500 100	579.7
A1096	Survey	3 602	55	500 101	579.8
A1097	Survey	3 603	55	500 102	579.9
A1098	Survey	3 604	55	500 103	580.0
A1099	Survey	3 605	55	500 104	580.1
A1100	Survey	3 606	55	500 105	580.2
A1101	Survey	3 607	55	500 106	580.3
A1102	Survey	3 608	55	500 107	580.4
A1103	Survey	3 609	55	500 108	580.5
A1104	Survey	3 610	55	500 109	580.6
A1105	Survey	3 611	55	500 110	580.7
A1106	Survey	3 612	55	500 111	580.8
A1107	Survey	3 613	55	500 112	580.9
A1108	Survey	3 614	55	500 113	581.0
A1109	Survey	3 615	55	500 114	581.1
A1110	Survey	3 616	55	500 115	581.2
A1111	Survey	3 617	55	500 116	581.3
A1112	Survey	3 618	55	500 117	581.4
A1113	Survey	3 619	55	500 118	581.5
A1114	Survey	3 620	55	500 119	581.6
A1115	Survey	3 621	55	500 120	581.7
A1116	Survey	3 622	55	500 121	581.8
A1117	Survey	3 623	55	500 122	581.9
A1118	Survey	3 624	55	500 123	582.0
A1119	Survey	3 625	55	500 124	582.1
A1120	Survey	3 626	55	500 125	582.2
A1121	Survey	3 627	55	500 126	582.3
A1122	Survey	3 628	55	500 127	582.4
A1123	Survey	3 629	55	500 128	582.5
A1124	Survey	3 630	55	500 129	582.6
A1125	Survey	3 631	55	500 130	582.7
A1126	Survey	3 632	55	500 131	582.8
A1127	Survey	3 633	55	500 132	582.9
A1128	Survey	3 634	55	500 133	583.0
A1129	Survey	3 635	55	500 134	583.1
A1130	Survey	3 636	55	500 135	583.2
A1131	Survey	3 637	55	500 136	583.3
A1132	Survey	3 638	55	500 137	583.4
A1133	Survey	3 639	55	500 138	583.5
A1134	Survey	3 640	55	500 139	583.6
A1135	Survey	3 641	55	500 140	583.7
A1136	Survey	3 642	55	500 141	583.8
A1137	Survey	3 643	55	500 142	583.9
A1138	Survey	3 644	55	500 143	584.0
A1139	Survey	3 645	55	500 144	584.1
A1140	Survey	3 646	55	500 145	584.2
A1141	Survey	3 647	55	500 146	584.3
A1142	Survey	3 648	55	500 147	584.4
A1143	Survey	3 649	55	500 148	584.5
A1144	Survey	3 650	55	500 149	584.6
A1145	Survey	3 651	55	500 150	584.7
A1146	Survey	3 652	55	500 151	584.8
A1147	Survey	3 653	55	500 152	584.9
A1148	Survey	3 654	55	500 153	585.0
A1149	Survey	3 655	55	500 154	585.1
A1150	Survey	3 656	55	500 155	585.2
A1151	Survey	3 657	55	500 156	585.3
A1152	Survey	3 658	55	500 157	585.4
A1153	Survey	3 659	55	500 158	585.5
A1154	Survey	3 660	55	500 159	585.6
A1155	Survey	3 661	55	500 160	585.7
A1156	Survey	3 662	55	500 161	585.8
A1157	Survey	3 663	55	500 162	585.9
A1158	Survey	3 664	55	500 163	586.0
A1159	Survey	3 665	55	500 164	586.1
A1160	Survey	3 666	55	500 165	586.2
A1161	Survey	3 667	55	500 166	586.3
A1162	Survey	3 668	55	500 167	586.4
A1163	Survey	3 669	55	500 168	586.5
A1164	Survey	3 670	55	500 169	586.6
A1165	Survey	3 671	55	500 170	586.7
A1166	Survey	3 672	55	500 171	586.8
A1167	Survey	3 673	55	500 172	586.9
A1168	Survey	3 674	55	500 173	587.0
A1169	Survey	3 675	55	500 174	587.1
A1170	Survey	3 676	55	500 175	587.2
A1171	Survey	3 677	55	500 176	587.3
A1172	Survey	3 678	55	500 177	587.4
A1173	Survey	3 679	55	500 178	587.5
A1174	Survey	3 680	55	500 179	587.6
A1175	Survey	3 681	55	500 180	587.7
A1176	Survey	3 682	55	500 181	587.8
A1177	Survey	3 683	55	500 182	587.9
A1178	Survey	3 684	55	500 183	588.0
A1179	Survey	3 685	55	500 184	588.1
A1180	Survey	3 686	55	500 185	588.2
A1181	Survey	3 687	55	500 186	588.3
A1182	Survey	3 688	55	500 187	588.4
A1183	Survey	3 689	55	500 188	588.5
A1184	Survey	3 690	55	500 189	588.6
A1185	Survey	3 691	55	500 190	588.7
A1186	Survey	3 692	55	500 191	588.8
A1187	Survey	3 693	55	500 192	588.9
A1188	Survey	3 694	55	500 193	589.0
A1189	Survey	3 695	55	500 194	589.1
A1190	Survey	3 696	55	500 195	589.2
A1191	Survey	3 697	55	500 196	589.3
A1192	Survey	3 698	55	500 197	589.4
A1193	Survey	3 699	55	500 198	589.5
A1194	Survey	3 700	55	500 199	589.6
A1195	Survey	3 701	55	500 200	589.7
A1196	Survey	3 702	55	500 201	589.8
A1197	Survey	3 703	55	500 202	589.9
A1198	Survey	3 704	55	500 203	590.0
A1199	Survey	3 705	55	500 204	590.1
A1200	Survey	3 706	55	500 205	590.2
A1201	Survey	3 707	55	500 206	590.3
A1202	Survey	3 708	55	500 207	590.4
A1203	Survey	3 709	55	500 208	590.5
A1204	Survey	3 710	55	500 209	590.6
A1205	Survey	3 711	55	500 210	590.7
A1206	Survey	3 712	55	500 211	590.8
A1207	Survey	3 713	55	500 212	590.9
A1208	Survey	3 714	55	500 213	591.0
A1209	Survey	3 715	55	500 214	591.1
A1210	Survey	3 716	55	500 215	591.2
A1211	Survey	3 717	55	500 216	591.3
A1212	Survey	3 718	55	500 217	591.4
A1213					

























Node	Flow	Pressure	Grade	Dir
-N0400	18.99	361.1	366.6	
-N0401	21.24	360.9	376.9	
-N0402	24.21	360.2	348.9	
-N0403	25.33	362.2	378.2	
-N0404	25.98	362.2	348.9	
-N0405	27.75	361.7	349.9	
-N0406	30.99	360.2	344.3	
-N0407	34.44	361.1	367.4	
-N0408	37.4	361.1	369.3	
-N0409	1.823	361.1	421.5	
-N0410	855.6	2292	413.5	
-N0411	15.4	361.1	368.6	
-N0412	835.6	2292	369.5	
-N0413	15.48	361.1	367.7	
-N0414	15.98	361.1	367.9	
-N0415	824.8	2292	417	
-N0416	827	2292	369.4	
-N0417	17.56	361.1	364.9	
-N0418	827.2	2292	369	
-N0419	838.8	2292	364.5	
-N0420	837	2292	413.1	
-N0421	836.4	2292	369.8	
-N0422	1807	2709	413.3	
-N0423	1807	2709	413.3	
-N0424	1807	2709	413.3	
-N0425	31.33	414.8	376.3	
-N0426	31.32	414.8	376.3	
-N0427	30.94	413.4	368.5	
-N0428	31.21	414.8	376.3	
-N0429	30.26	414.2	368.4	
-N0430	31.21	414.8	376.3	
-N0431	14.17	362.3	377.6	
-N0432	20.37	361.1	378	
-N0433	20.37	361.1	378	
-N0434	14.18	362.6	377.5	
-N0435	20.37	361.1	378	
-N0436	20.37	361.1	378	
-N0437	14.18	362.1	377.5	
-N0438	1408	3600	363	
-N0439	1408	3601	362	
-N0440	1408	3600	420.2	
-N0441	36.86	413.2	377.5	
-N0442	36.86	413.2	368.5	
-N0443	33.13	413.2	377.5	
-N0444	36.86	413.2	377.5	
-N0445	36.86	413.2	377.5	
-N0446	33.81	414.7	376.5	
-N0447	32.84	414.7	376.5	
-N0448	32.84	414.7	376.5	
-N0449	32.84	414.7	376.5	
-N0450	32.84	414.7	376.5	
-N0451	32.84	414.7	376.5	
-N0452	32.84	414.7	376.5	
-N0453	32.84	414.7	376.5	
-N0454	32.84	414.7	376.5	
-N0455	32.84	414.7	376.5	
-N0456	32.84	414.7	376.5	
-N0457	32.84	414.7	376.5	
-N0458	32.84	414.7	376.5	
-N0459	32.84	414.7	376.5	
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-N0467	32.84	414.7	376.5	
-N0468	32.84	414.7	376.5	
-N0469	32.84	414.7	376.5	
-N0470	32.84	414.7	376.5	
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-N0473	32.84	414.7	376.5	
-N0474	32.84	414.7	376.5	
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-N0646	32.84	414.7	376.5	
-N0647	32.84	414.7	376.5	
-N0648	32.84	414.7	3	







PROJECT: 2009-13491  
SHEET: 100 OF 100  
DATE: 10/20/09 10:03

DESIGNER: J. B. ...  
CHECKER: ...  
SCALE: ...

CALCULATION

UNIT: ...  
TEMPERATURE: ...  
DENSITY: ...  
GRAVITY: ...

Table with columns: Pipe Size, Material, Length, Friction Loss, Velocity, etc. It contains a detailed list of pipe segments and their associated hydraulic calculations.



















-4540	24.22	498.5	386.5
-4541	24.21	411.4	378
-4542	41.28	411.4	348.8
-4543	27.71	488.5	378.2
-4544	48.37	488.5	348.8
-4545	48.31	488.5	348.8
-4546	—	—	387.3
-4547	43.88	411.4	344.3
-4548	—	—	387.4
-4549	22.81	488.5	387.4
-4550	22.81	488.5	388.5
-4551	9.108	488.5	421.5
-4552	28.7	488.5	411.5
-4553	22.83	488.5	388.5
-4554	27.7	487.9	388.5
-4555	21.8	487.4	381.7
-4556	21.8	488.5	378
-4557	24.01	488.5	387
-4558	11.05	488.5	417
-4559	208	487.5	417
-4560	21.8	487.4	388.4
-4561	21.8	488.5	388.5
-4562	21.8	487.4	388
-4563	21.8	487.4	384.5
-4564	1887	2788	413.1
-4565	1887	487.4	388.4
-4566	1887	2788	413.1
-4567	1887	2788	413.1
-4568	28.38	421.1	378.3
-4569	38.28	421.1	378.3
-4570	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4571	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4572	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4573	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4574	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4575	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4576	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4577	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4578	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4579	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4580	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4581	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4582	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4583	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4584	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4585	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4586	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4587	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4588	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4589	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4590	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4591	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4592	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4593	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4594	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4595	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4596	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4597	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4598	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4599	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4600	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4601	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4602	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4603	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4604	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4605	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4606	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4607	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4608	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4609	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4610	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4611	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4612	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4613	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4614	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4615	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4616	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4617	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4618	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4619	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4620	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4621	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4622	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4623	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4624	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4625	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4626	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4627	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4628	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4629	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4630	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4631	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4632	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4633	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4634	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4635	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4636	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4637	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4638	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4639	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4640	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4641	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4642	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4643	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4644	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4645	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4646	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4647	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4648	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4649	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4650	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4651	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4652	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4653	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4654	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4655	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4656	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4657	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4658	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4659	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4660	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4661	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4662	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4663	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4664	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4665	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4666	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4667	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4668	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4669	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4670	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4671	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4672	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4673	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4674	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4675	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4676	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4677	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4678	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4679	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4680	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4681	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4682	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4683	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4684	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4685	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4686	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4687	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4688	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4689	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4690	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4691	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4692	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4693	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4694	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4695	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4696	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4697	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4698	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4699	38.28	421.1	384.4
-4700	38.28	421.1	384.4

Node List	Static Pressure	Level	Static	Flow	Pressure	Grade	Elev
Accumulator Tank A	1000	0	0	0	1900	2700	428.7
Accumulator Tank B	1000	0	0	0	1900	2700	428.6
Accumulator Tank C	1000	0	0	0	1900	2700	428.6
Accumulator Tank D	1000	0	0	0	1900	2700	428.5
Con. Reservoir Pump A	25.7	10.8	4480	30.25	404.0	384.2	384.2
Con. Reservoir Pump B	25.7	10.8	4781	30.25	404.5	384.7	384.7
Relating Water Storage Tank	14.7	33.3	10011	28.08	427.3	384	384

Demand List	Demand Type	Flow	Pressure	Static	Grade	Elev
-4530	Flow in	0	182.4	875.3	388.8	—
-4531	Flow in	0	182.4	875.3	388.5	—
-4532	Flow out	30	1384	3488	388.8	—
-4533	Flow out	30	1384	3488	388.8	—
-4534	Flow in	0	38.06	424.3	378.5	—
-4535	Flow in	0	31.18	441.1	377.5	—
-4536	Flow out	60	1828	4308	388.8	—
-4537	Flow out	60	1828	4308	388.8	—
-4538	Flow out	0	1833	4377	387.8	—
-4539	Flow out	60	1827	4372	378.4	—
-4540	Flow out	60	1828	4371	378.4	—
A1001	Sump	3.883	66	888.7	573.4	—
A1002	Sump	2.187	66	888.4	578.2	—
A1003	Sump	3.731	66	888.1	673.8	—
A1004	Sump	2.731	66	888.1	678.6	—
A1005	Sump	3.588	66	888.6	678.5	—
A1006	Sump	3.181	66	888.7	678.4	—
A1007	Sump	3.85	66	888.7	678.4	—
A1008	Sump	3.538	66	888.6	678.2	—
A1009	Sump	3.728	66	888.1	678.8	—
A1010	Sump	2.728	66	888.1	678.8	—

















Item	Material	Quantity	Unit	Price	Amount	Notes
RF0001	Steel Bolt (1/2")	1	EA	0.05	0.05	
RF0002	Steel Bolt (3/4")	1	EA	0.10	0.10	
RF0003	Steel Bolt (1")	1	EA	0.15	0.15	
RF0004	Steel Bolt (1 1/2")	1	EA	0.20	0.20	
RF0005	Steel Bolt (2")	1	EA	0.30	0.30	
RF0006	Steel Bolt (2 1/2")	1	EA	0.40	0.40	
RF0007	Steel Bolt (3")	1	EA	0.50	0.50	
RF0008	Steel Bolt (3 1/2")	1	EA	0.60	0.60	
RF0009	Steel Bolt (4")	1	EA	0.70	0.70	
RF0010	Steel Bolt (4 1/2")	1	EA	0.80	0.80	
RF0011	Steel Bolt (5")	1	EA	0.90	0.90	
RF0012	Steel Bolt (5 1/2")	1	EA	1.00	1.00	
RF0013	Steel Bolt (6")	1	EA	1.10	1.10	
RF0014	Steel Bolt (6 1/2")	1	EA	1.20	1.20	
RF0015	Steel Bolt (7")	1	EA	1.30	1.30	
RF0016	Steel Bolt (7 1/2")	1	EA	1.40	1.40	
RF0017	Steel Bolt (8")	1	EA	1.50	1.50	
RF0018	Steel Bolt (8 1/2")	1	EA	1.60	1.60	
RF0019	Steel Bolt (9")	1	EA	1.70	1.70	
RF0020	Steel Bolt (9 1/2")	1	EA	1.80	1.80	
RF0021	Steel Bolt (10")	1	EA	1.90	1.90	
RF0022	Steel Bolt (10 1/2")	1	EA	2.00	2.00	
RF0023	Steel Bolt (11")	1	EA	2.10	2.10	
RF0024	Steel Bolt (11 1/2")	1	EA	2.20	2.20	
RF0025	Steel Bolt (12")	1	EA	2.30	2.30	
RF0026	Steel Bolt (12 1/2")	1	EA	2.40	2.40	
RF0027	Steel Bolt (13")	1	EA	2.50	2.50	
RF0028	Steel Bolt (13 1/2")	1	EA	2.60	2.60	
RF0029	Steel Bolt (14")	1	EA	2.70	2.70	
RF0030	Steel Bolt (14 1/2")	1	EA	2.80	2.80	
RF0031	Steel Bolt (15")	1	EA	2.90	2.90	
RF0032	Steel Bolt (15 1/2")	1	EA	3.00	3.00	
RF0033	Steel Bolt (16")	1	EA	3.10	3.10	
RF0034	Steel Bolt (16 1/2")	1	EA	3.20	3.20	
RF0035	Steel Bolt (17")	1	EA	3.30	3.30	
RF0036	Steel Bolt (17 1/2")	1	EA	3.40	3.40	
RF0037	Steel Bolt (18")	1	EA	3.50	3.50	
RF0038	Steel Bolt (18 1/2")	1	EA	3.60	3.60	
RF0039	Steel Bolt (19")	1	EA	3.70	3.70	
RF0040	Steel Bolt (19 1/2")	1	EA	3.80	3.80	
RF0041	Steel Bolt (20")	1	EA	3.90	3.90	
RF0042	Steel Bolt (20 1/2")	1	EA	4.00	4.00	
RF0043	Steel Bolt (21")	1	EA	4.10	4.10	
RF0044	Steel Bolt (21 1/2")	1	EA	4.20	4.20	
RF0045	Steel Bolt (22")	1	EA	4.30	4.30	
RF0046	Steel Bolt (22 1/2")	1	EA	4.40	4.40	
RF0047	Steel Bolt (23")	1	EA	4.50	4.50	
RF0048	Steel Bolt (23 1/2")	1	EA	4.60	4.60	
RF0049	Steel Bolt (24")	1	EA	4.70	4.70	
RF0050	Steel Bolt (24 1/2")	1	EA	4.80	4.80	
RF0051	Steel Bolt (25")	1	EA	4.90	4.90	
RF0052	Steel Bolt (25 1/2")	1	EA	5.00	5.00	
RF0053	Steel Bolt (26")	1	EA	5.10	5.10	
RF0054	Steel Bolt (26 1/2")	1	EA	5.20	5.20	
RF0055	Steel Bolt (27")	1	EA	5.30	5.30	
RF0056	Steel Bolt (27 1/2")	1	EA	5.40	5.40	
RF0057	Steel Bolt (28")	1	EA	5.50	5.50	
RF0058	Steel Bolt (28 1/2")	1	EA	5.60	5.60	
RF0059	Steel Bolt (29")	1	EA	5.70	5.70	
RF0060	Steel Bolt (29 1/2")	1	EA	5.80	5.80	
RF0061	Steel Bolt (30")	1	EA	5.90	5.90	
RF0062	Steel Bolt (30 1/2")	1	EA	6.00	6.00	
RF0063	Steel Bolt (31")	1	EA	6.10	6.10	
RF0064	Steel Bolt (31 1/2")	1	EA	6.20	6.20	
RF0065	Steel Bolt (32")	1	EA	6.30	6.30	
RF0066	Steel Bolt (32 1/2")	1	EA	6.40	6.40	
RF0067	Steel Bolt (33")	1	EA	6.50	6.50	
RF0068	Steel Bolt (33 1/2")	1	EA	6.60	6.60	
RF0069	Steel Bolt (34")	1	EA	6.70	6.70	
RF0070	Steel Bolt (34 1/2")	1	EA	6.80	6.80	
RF0071	Steel Bolt (35")	1	EA	6.90	6.90	
RF0072	Steel Bolt (35 1/2")	1	EA	7.00	7.00	
RF0073	Steel Bolt (36")	1	EA	7.10	7.10	
RF0074	Steel Bolt (36 1/2")	1	EA	7.20	7.20	
RF0075	Steel Bolt (37")	1	EA	7.30	7.30	
RF0076	Steel Bolt (37 1/2")	1	EA	7.40	7.40	
RF0077	Steel Bolt (38")	1	EA	7.50	7.50	
RF0078	Steel Bolt (38 1/2")	1	EA	7.60	7.60	
RF0079	Steel Bolt (39")	1	EA	7.70	7.70	
RF0080	Steel Bolt (39 1/2")	1	EA	7.80	7.80	
RF0081	Steel Bolt (40")	1	EA	7.90	7.90	
RF0082	Steel Bolt (40 1/2")	1	EA	8.00	8.00	
RF0083	Steel Bolt (41")	1	EA	8.10	8.10	
RF0084	Steel Bolt (41 1/2")	1	EA	8.20	8.20	
RF0085	Steel Bolt (42")	1	EA	8.30	8.30	
RF0086	Steel Bolt (42 1/2")	1	EA	8.40	8.40	
RF0087	Steel Bolt (43")	1	EA	8.50	8.50	
RF0088	Steel Bolt (43 1/2")	1	EA	8.60	8.60	
RF0089	Steel Bolt (44")	1	EA	8.70	8.70	
RF0090	Steel Bolt (44 1/2")	1	EA	8.80	8.80	
RF0091	Steel Bolt (45")	1	EA	8.90	8.90	
RF0092	Steel Bolt (45 1/2")	1	EA	9.00	9.00	
RF0093	Steel Bolt (46")	1	EA	9.10	9.10	
RF0094	Steel Bolt (46 1/2")	1	EA	9.20	9.20	
RF0095	Steel Bolt (47")	1	EA	9.30	9.30	
RF0096	Steel Bolt (47 1/2")	1	EA	9.40	9.40	
RF0097	Steel Bolt (48")	1	EA	9.50	9.50	
RF0098	Steel Bolt (48 1/2")	1	EA	9.60	9.60	
RF0099	Steel Bolt (49")	1	EA	9.70	9.70	
RF0100	Steel Bolt (49 1/2")	1	EA	9.80	9.80	
RF0101	Steel Bolt (50")	1	EA	9.90	9.90	
RF0102	Steel Bolt (50 1/2")	1	EA	10.00	10.00	
RF0103	Steel Bolt (51")	1	EA	10.10	10.10	
RF0104	Steel Bolt (51 1/2")	1	EA	10.20	10.20	
RF0105	Steel Bolt (52")	1	EA	10.30	10.30	
RF0106	Steel Bolt (52 1/2")	1	EA	10.40	10.40	
RF0107	Steel Bolt (53")	1	EA	10.50	10.50	
RF0108	Steel Bolt (53 1/2")	1	EA	10.60	10.60	
RF0109	Steel Bolt (54")	1	EA	10.70	10.70	
RF0110	Steel Bolt (54 1/2")	1	EA	10.80	10.80	
RF0111	Steel Bolt (55")	1	EA	10.90	10.90	
RF0112	Steel Bolt (55 1/2")	1	EA	11.00	11.00	
RF0113	Steel Bolt (56")	1	EA	11.10	11.10	
RF0114	Steel Bolt (56 1/2")	1	EA	11.20	11.20	
RF0115	Steel Bolt (57")	1	EA	11.30	11.30	
RF0116	Steel Bolt (57 1/2")	1	EA	11.40	11.40	
RF0117	Steel Bolt (58")	1	EA	11.50	11.50	
RF0118	Steel Bolt (58 1/2")	1	EA	11.60	11.60	
RF0119	Steel Bolt (59")	1	EA	11.70	11.70	
RF0120	Steel Bolt (59 1/2")	1	EA	11.80	11.80	
RF0121	Steel Bolt (60")	1	EA	11.90	11.90	
RF0122	Steel Bolt (60 1/2")	1	EA	12.00	12.00	
RF0123	Steel Bolt (61")	1	EA	12.10	12.10	
RF0124	Steel Bolt (61 1/2")	1	EA	12.20	12.20	
RF0125	Steel Bolt (62")	1	EA	12.30	12.30	
RF0126	Steel Bolt (62 1/2")	1	EA	12.40	12.40	
RF0127	Steel Bolt (63")	1	EA	12.50	12.50	
RF0128	Steel Bolt (63 1/2")	1	EA	12.60	12.60	
RF0129	Steel Bolt (64")	1	EA	12.70	12.70	
RF0130	Steel Bolt (64 1/2")	1	EA	12.80	12.80	
RF0131	Steel Bolt (65")	1	EA	12.90	12.90	
RF0132	Steel Bolt (65 1/2")	1	EA	13.00	13.00	
RF0133	Steel Bolt (66")	1	EA	13.10	13.10	
RF0134	Steel Bolt (66 1/2")	1	EA	13.20	13.20	
RF0135	Steel Bolt (67")	1	EA	13.30	13.30	
RF0136	Steel Bolt (67 1/2")	1	EA	13.40	13.40	
RF0137	Steel Bolt (68")	1	EA	13.50	13.50	
RF0138	Steel Bolt (68 1/2")	1	EA	13.60	13.60	
RF0139	Steel Bolt (69")	1	EA	13.70	13.70	
RF0140	Steel Bolt (69 1/2")	1	EA	13.80	13.80	
RF0141	Steel Bolt (70")	1	EA	13.90	13.90	
RF0142	Steel Bolt (70 1/2")	1	EA	14.00	14.00	
RF0143	Steel Bolt (71")	1	EA	14.10	14.10	
RF0144	Steel Bolt (71 1/2")	1	EA	14.20	14.20	
RF0145	Steel Bolt (72")	1	EA	14.30	14.30	
RF0146	Steel Bolt (72 1/2")	1	EA	14.40	14.40	
RF0147	Steel Bolt (73")	1	EA	14.50	14.50	
RF0148	Steel Bolt (73 1/2")	1	EA	14.60	14.60	
RF0149	Steel Bolt (74")	1	EA	14.70	14.70	
RF0150	Steel Bolt (74 1/2")	1	EA	14.80	14.80	
RF0151	Steel Bolt (75")	1	EA	14.90	14.90	
RF0152	Steel Bolt (75 1/2")	1	EA	15.00	15.00	
RF0153	Steel Bolt (76")	1	EA	15.10	15.10	
RF0154	Steel Bolt (76 1/2")	1	EA	15.20	15.20	
RF0155	Steel Bolt (77")	1	EA	15.30	15.30	
RF0156	Steel Bolt (77 1/2")	1	EA	15.40	15.40	
RF0157	Steel Bolt (78")	1	EA	15.50	15.50	
RF0158	Steel Bolt (78 1/2")	1	EA	15.60	15.60	
RF0159	Steel Bolt (79")	1	EA	15.70	15.70	
RF0160	Steel Bolt (79 1/2")	1	EA	15.80	15.80	
RF0161	Steel Bolt (80")	1	EA	15.90	15.90	
RF0162	Steel Bolt (80 1/2")	1	EA	16.00	16.00	
RF0163	Steel Bolt (81")	1	EA	16.10	16.10	
RF0164	Steel Bolt (81 1/2")	1	EA	16.20	16.20	
RF0165	Steel Bolt (82")	1	EA	16.30	16.30	
RF0166	Steel Bolt (82 1/2")	1	EA	16.40	16.40	
RF0167	Steel Bolt (83")	1	EA	16.50	16.50	
RF0168	Steel Bolt (83 1/2")	1	EA	16.60	16.60	
RF0169	Steel Bolt (84")	1	EA	16.70	16.70	
RF0170	Steel Bolt (84 1/2")	1	EA	16.80	16.80	
RF0171	Steel Bolt (85")	1	EA	16.90	16.90	
RF0172	Steel Bolt (85 1/2")	1	EA	17.00	17.00	
RF0173	Steel Bolt (86")	1	EA	17.10	17.10	
RF0174	Steel Bolt (86 1/2")	1	EA	17.20	17.20	
RF0175	Steel Bolt (87")	1	EA	17.30	17.30	
RF0176	Steel Bolt (87 1/2")	1	EA	17.40	17.40	
RF0177	Steel Bolt (88")	1	EA	17.50	17.50	
RF0178	Steel Bolt (88 1/2")	1	EA	17.60	17.60	
RF0179	Steel Bolt (89")	1	EA	17.70	17.70	
RF0180	Steel Bolt (89 1/2")	1	EA	17.80	17.80	
RF0181	Steel Bolt (90")	1	EA	17.90	17.90	
RF0182	Steel Bolt (90 1/2")	1	EA	18.00	18.00	
RF0183	Steel Bolt (91")	1	EA	18.10	18.10	
RF0184	Steel Bolt (91 1/2")	1	EA	18.20	18.20	
RF0185	Steel Bolt (92")	1	EA	18.30	18.30	
RF0186	Steel Bolt (92 1/2")	1	EA	18.40	18.40	
RF0187	Steel Bolt (93")	1	EA	18.50	18.50	
RF0188	Steel Bolt (93 1/2")	1	EA	18.60	18.60	
RF0189	Steel Bolt (94")	1	EA	18.70	18.70	
RF0190	Steel Bolt (94 1/2")	1	EA	18.80	18.80	
RF0191	Steel Bolt (95")	1	EA	18.90	18.90	
RF0192	Steel Bolt (95 1/2")	1	EA	19.00	19.00	
RF0193	Steel Bolt (96")	1	EA	19.10	19.10	
RF0194	Steel Bolt (96 1/2")	1	EA	19.20	19.20	
RF0195	Steel Bolt (97")	1	EA	19.30	19.30	
RF0196	Steel Bolt (97 1/2")	1	EA	19.40	19.40	
RF0197	Steel Bolt (98")	1	EA			



Node No.	Node Name	Pressure	Grade	Elev
10001	121.6	875.5	478	
10002	121.6	875.5	478	
10003	121.6	875.5	478	
10004	121.6	875.5	478	
10005	121.6	875.5	478	
10006	121.6	875.5	478	
10007	121.6	875.5	478	
10008	121.6	875.5	478	
10009	121.6	875.5	478	
10010	121.6	875.5	478	
10011	121.6	875.5	478	
10012	121.6	875.5	478	
10013	121.6	875.5	478	
10014	121.6	875.5	478	
10015	121.6	875.5	478	
10016	121.6	875.5	478	
10017	121.6	875.5	478	
10018	121.6	875.5	478	
10019	121.6	875.5	478	
10020	121.6	875.5	478	
10021	121.6	875.5	478	
10022	121.6	875.5	478	
10023	121.6	875.5	478	
10024	121.6	875.5	478	
10025	121.6	875.5	478	
10026	121.6	875.5	478	
10027	121.6	875.5	478	
10028	121.6	875.5	478	
10029	121.6	875.5	478	
10030	121.6	875.5	478	
10031	121.6	875.5	478	
10032	121.6	875.5	478	
10033	121.6	875.5	478	
10034	121.6	875.5	478	
10035	121.6	875.5	478	
10036	121.6	875.5	478	
10037	121.6	875.5	478	
10038	121.6	875.5	478	
10039	121.6	875.5	478	
10040	121.6	875.5	478	
10041	121.6	875.5	478	
10042	121.6	875.5	478	
10043	121.6	875.5	478	
10044	121.6	875.5	478	
10045	121.6	875.5	478	
10046	121.6	875.5	478	
10047	121.6	875.5	478	
10048	121.6	875.5	478	
10049	121.6	875.5	478	
10050	121.6	875.5	478	
10051	121.6	875.5	478	
10052	121.6	875.5	478	
10053	121.6	875.5	478	
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10058	121.6	875.5	478	
10059	121.6	875.5	478	
10060	121.6	875.5	478	
10061	121.6	875.5	478	
10062	121.6	875.5	478	
10063	121.6	875.5	478	
10064	121.6	875.5	478	
10065	121.6	875.5	478	
10066	121.6	875.5	478	
10067	121.6	875.5	478	
10068	121.6	875.5	478	
10069	121.6	875.5	478	
10070	121.6	875.5	478	
10071	121.6	875.5	478	
10072	121.6	875.5	478	
10073	121.6	875.5	478	
10074	121.6	875.5	478	
10075	121.6	875.5	478	
10076	121.6	875.5	478	
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10079	121.6	875.5	478	
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10086	121.6	875.5	478	
10087	121.6	875.5	478	
10088	121.6	875.5	478	
10089	121.6	875.5	478	
10090	121.6	875.5	478	
10091	121.6	875.5	478	
10092	121.6	875.5	478	
10093	121.6	875.5	478	
10094	121.6	875.5	478	
10095	121.6	875.5	478	
10096	121.6	875.5	478	
10097	121.6	875.5	478	
10098	121.6	875.5	478	
10099	121.6	875.5	478	
10100	121.6	875.5	478	





-H4540	23.81	407.8	360.5
-H4541	27.89	409.9	379
-H4542	44.44	409.9	344.9
-H4543	27.18	408.1	378.2
-H4544	28.85	408.1	344.9
-H4545	38.74	407.9	349.9
-H4546	—	—	362.3
-H4547	42.86	409.9	344.9
-H4548	—	—	367.4
-H4549	22.26	407.8	367.4
-H4550	22.81	407.8	368.5
-H4551	8.88	407.8	427.5
-H4552	29.97	407	417.5
-H4553	22.21	437.2	385.5
-H4554	27.77	447.9	389.9
-H4555	21.16	447.4	391.7
-H4556	23.79	437.6	378
-H4557	23.56	437.6	387
-H4558	19.83	437.6	417
-H4559	20.9	447.9	417
-H4560	7.9	447.4	348
-H4561	34.87	437.8	384.5
-H4562	27.2	447.4	388
-H4563	21.6	447.4	384.5
-H4564	10.27	2709	413.1
-H4565	27.14	447.4	388.6
-H4566	10.07	2709	413.3
-H4567	10.07	2709	413.3
-H4568	10.07	2709	413.3
-H4569	32.86	417.7	376.3
-H4570	32.87	417.7	376.3
-H4571	32.86	418.8	366.4
-H4572	32.86	418.8	366.5
-H4573	32.33	417.7	376.3
-H4574	32.34	418.9	366.4
-H4575	32.33	417.7	376.3
-H4576	13.99	3443	377.9
-H4577	27.48	407.8	378
-H4578	27.48	407.8	378
-H4579	27.48	407.8	378
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-H4612	27.48	407.8	378
-H4613	27.48	407.8	378
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-H4623	27.48	407.8	378
-H4624	27.48	407.8	378
-H4625	27.48	407.8	378
-H4626	27.48	407.8	378
-H4627	27.48	407.8	378
-H4628	27.48	407.8	378
-H4629	27.48	407.8	378
-H4630	27.48	407.8	378
-H4631	27.48	407.8	378
-H4632	27.48	407.8	378
-H4633	27.48	407.8	378
-H4634	27.48	407.8	378
-H4635	27.48	407.8	378
-H4636	27.48	407.8	378
-H4637	27.48	407.8	378
-H4638	27.48	407.8	378
-H4639	27.48	407.8	378
-H4640	27.48	407.8	378
-H4641	27.48	407.8	378
-H4642	27.48	407.8	378
-H4643	27.48	407.8	378
-H4644	27.48	407.8	378
-H4645	27.48	407.8	378
-H4646	27.48	407.8	378
-H4647	27.48	407.8	378
-H4648	27.48	407.8	378
-H4649	27.48	407.8	378
-H4650	27.48	407.8	378
-H4651	27.48	407.8	378
-H4652	27.48	407.8	378
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-H4654	27.48	407.8	378
-H4655	27.48	407.8	378
-H4656	27.48	407.8	378
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-H4662	27.48	407.8	378
-H4663	27.48	407.8	378
-H4664	27.48	407.8	378
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-H4672	27.48	407.8	378
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-H4679	27.48	407.8	378
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-H4683	27.48	407.8	378
-H4684	27.48	407.8	378
-H4685	27.48	407.8	378
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-H4736	27.48	407.8	378
-H4737	27.48	407.8	378
-H4738	27.48	407.8	378
-H4739	27.48	407.8	378
-H4740	27.48	407.8	378
-H4741	27.48	407.8	378
-H4742	27.48	407.8	378
-H4743	27.48	407.8	378
-H4744	27.48	407.8	378

Node List	Surface Pressure	Level	Base	Flow	Pressure	Grade	Elev
Accumulator Tank A	1000	0	—	0	1000	2709	429.4
Accumulator Tank B	1000	0	0	0	1000	2709	429.4
Accumulator Tank C	1000	0	0	0	1000	2709	429.4
Accumulator Tank D	1000	0	0	0	1000	2709	429.4
Conc. Resour. Pump A	25.8	11.4	3477	30.52	30.52	404.9	360.7
Conc. Resour. Pump B	25.8	11.4	3392	30.52	30.52	404.9	360.7
Relating Water Storage Tank	14.7	22.5	8309	29.08	29.08	420.3	364

Element List	Element Type	Flow	Pressure	Base	Grade	Elev
-H4540	Flow in	0	152.4	878.9	356.8	—
-H4541	Flow in	0	152.4	878.9	356.8	—
-H4542	Flow out	30	150.1	3480	366.6	—
-H4543	Flow out	30	150.1	3480	366.6	—
-H4544	Flow in	0	30.37	418.1	375.5	—
-H4545	Flow in	0	34.41	418.1	375.5	—
-H4546	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4547	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4548	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4549	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4550	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4551	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4552	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4553	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4554	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4555	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4556	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4557	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4558	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4559	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4560	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4561	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4562	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4563	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4564	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4565	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4566	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4567	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4568	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4569	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4570	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4571	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4572	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4573	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4574	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4575	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4576	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4577	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4578	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4579	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4580	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—
-H4581	Flow out	63	150	4585	369.9	—



ANP12	Appty	5.182	55	588.0	582.3
ANP13	Appty	5.181	55	588.0	582.3
ANP14	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP15	Appty	5.188	55	588.0	582.3
ANP16	Appty	5.185	55	588.0	582.3
ANP17	Appty	5.174	55	588.0	582.3
ANP18	Appty	5.187	55	588.0	582.3
ANP19	Appty	5.185	55	588.0	582.3
ANP20	Appty	5.173	55	588.0	582.3
ANP21	Appty	5.184	55	588.0	582.3
ANP22	Appty	5.184	55	588.0	582.3
ANP23	Appty	5.181	55	588.0	582.3
ANP24	Appty	5.183	55	588.0	582.3
ANP25	Appty	5.182	55	588.0	582.3
ANP26	Appty	5.182	55	588.0	582.3
ANP27	Appty	5.181	55	588.0	582.3
ANP28	Appty	5.181	55	588.0	582.3
ANP29	Appty	5.179	55	588.0	582.3
ANP30	Appty	5.181	55	588.0	582.3
ANP31	Appty	5.181	55	588.0	582.3
ANP32	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP33	Appty	5.18	55	588.0	582.3
ANP34	Appty	5.18	55	588.0	582.3
ANP35	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP36	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP37	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP38	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP39	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP40	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP41	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP42	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP43	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP44	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP45	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP46	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP47	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP48	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP49	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP50	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP51	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP52	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP53	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP54	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP55	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP56	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP57	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP58	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP59	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP60	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP61	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP62	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP63	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP64	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP65	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP66	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP67	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP68	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP69	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP70	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP71	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP72	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP73	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP74	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP75	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP76	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP77	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP78	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP79	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP80	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP81	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP82	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP83	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP84	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP85	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP86	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP87	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP88	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP89	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP90	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP91	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP92	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP93	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP94	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP95	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP96	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP97	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP98	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP99	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3
ANP100	Appty	5.178	55	588.0	582.3




**SI A**

	Work Order	Flow (gpm)	dP (psi)	head (ft)
Braidwood U1	1234771	45	1513	3491.54

Braidwood SI 1A Vendor Curve

flow (gpm)	head (ft)	modified curve
0	3580	3509.2
50	3560	3489.6
150	3500	3430.8
250	3360	3293.5
350	3100	3038.7
450	2760	2705.4
550	2370	2323.1
655	1900	1862.4

Group A		45	3491.54
	x		0.9
			3491.538
			0.00
			0.980219




SI B

	Work Order	Flow (gpm)	dP (psi)	head (ft)
Braidwood U1	1244058	44.5	1462.5	3375.00

Braidwood SI 1B Vendor Curve  
flow (gpm) head (ft) modified curve

0	3600	3391.8
50	3580	3372.9
150	3500	3297.6
250	3360	3165.7
350	3160	2977.2
450	2850	2685.2
550	2450	2308.3
655	2020	1903.2

Group A		44.5	3375
	x		0.89
			3375
			0
			0.942158




**CV A**

	Work Order	Flow (gpm)	dP (psi)	head (ft)
Braidwood U1	1233429	193	2490	5746.15

**Braidwood Cv 1A Vendor Curve**

flow (gpm)	head (ft)	modified curve
0	5850	6039.3
100	5800	5987.7
175	5650	5832.9
250	5300	5471.5
325	4700	4852.1
400	3900	4026.2
475	2900	2993.9
550	1750	1806.6

Group A		193	5746.15
	x		0.24
			5746.154
			0
			1.032367




**CV B**

	Work Order	Flow (gpm)	dP (psi)	head (ft)
Braidwood U1	1247868	195	2459	5674.62

**Braidwood CV 1B Vendor Curve**

flow (gpm)	head (ft)	modified curve
0	6000	6087.2
100	5900	5985.7
175	5700	5782.8
250	5300	5377.0
325	4600	4666.8
400	3800	3855.2
475	2800	2840.7
550	1600	1623.3

Group A		195	5674.615
	x		0.266667
			5674.615
			0
			1.014532




**RHR 1A**

	Work Order	Flow (gpm)	dP (psi)	head (ft)
Braidwood U1	1243061	633.80	185.80	428.77

**Braidwood RH 1A Vendor Curve**

flow (gpm)	head (ft)	modified curve
0	455	437.9
1000	440	423.5
2000	415	399.4
2500	400	385.0
3000	390	375.4
3500	375	360.9
4000	350	336.9
4500	320	308.0
5000	295	283.9

Group A		633.8	428.7692
	x		0.6338
			428.7692
			0
			0.96246




**RHR 1B**

	Work Order	Flow (gpm)	dP (psi)	head (ft)
Braidwood U1	1234770	596.00	190.30	439.15

**Braidwood RH 1B Vendor Curve**

flow (gpm)	head (ft)	modified curve
0	455	452.8
1000	432	429.9
2000	400	398.1
2500	390	388.1
3000	380	378.2
3500	365	363.2
4000	345	343.3
4500	315	313.5
5000	280	278.6

Group A		596.00	439.1538
	x		0.596
			439.1538
			0
			0.995155



Line	Description	Quantity	Unit	Price	Total
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Table with multiple columns and rows, containing various data points and text. The table is oriented vertically on the page. The content is largely illegible due to the high resolution and orientation of the scan. It appears to be a detailed data table or ledger.









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Table with multiple columns and rows, containing dense text and numerical data. The table is oriented vertically on the page.

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[The page contains approximately 25 vertical columns of extremely faint, illegible text, likely representing a table or list of data.]

Table with multiple columns and rows, containing various alphanumeric characters and symbols. The text is highly distorted and appears to be a corrupted or low-quality scan of a document. The content is illegible due to the quality of the image.











Table with multiple columns and rows, containing dense text and numerical data. The table is oriented vertically on the page. The columns are labeled with various identifiers and the rows contain detailed information.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[The page contains approximately 15 columns of extremely faint, illegible text, likely representing a table or a list of data points. The text is too light to be transcribed accurately.]

Table with multiple columns and rows, containing various data points and text. The text is largely illegible due to extreme blurring and low resolution. The table appears to have several columns, possibly representing different categories or metrics, and many rows of data. Some faint text is visible, such as "Attachment H" at the top center and page numbers at the top corners.











Table with multiple columns and rows, containing dense data. The table is oriented vertically on the page. The columns are labeled with various codes and identifiers, and the rows contain corresponding data values. The text is very small and difficult to read due to the high density and orientation.

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[Illegible text block]



[The page contains approximately 15 columns of extremely faint, illegible text, likely representing a table or a list of data points. The text is too light to be transcribed accurately.]

Table with multiple columns and rows, containing various alphanumeric characters and symbols. The text is highly distorted and appears to be a scan of a document with significant noise or corruption. The content is illegible due to the quality of the scan.



.....







Table with multiple columns and rows, containing dense data. The table is oriented vertically on the page. The columns are labeled with various identifiers and the rows contain numerical and alphanumeric data. The text is very small and difficult to read in detail.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[The following text is extremely faint and illegible due to low contrast and scan quality. It appears to be a list or table of contents with multiple columns and rows of text.]

Table with multiple columns and rows, containing various alphanumeric characters and symbols. The text is largely illegible due to extreme blurring and low resolution. The table appears to be a data list or ledger with several columns of varying widths and content.











Table with multiple columns and rows, containing dense data. The table is oriented vertically on the page. The columns are labeled with various identifiers and the rows contain numerical and alphanumeric data. The text is very small and difficult to read, but the structure appears to be a standard data table.

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The table consists of approximately 10 columns and 100 rows of data. The text within the cells is extremely small and dense, making it completely illegible. The table appears to be a detailed ledger or record-keeping document.

Table with multiple columns and rows, containing various alphanumeric characters and symbols. The text is largely illegible due to extreme blurring and low resolution. The table appears to be a data list or index with several columns of varying lengths.

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**Braidwood SI 1A Vendor Curve**

flow (gpm)	modified curve	-3%
0	3509.2	3403.9
50	3489.6	3384.9
150	3430.8	3327.8
250	3293.5	3194.7
350	3038.7	2947.5
450	2705.4	2624.2
550	2323.1	2253.4
655	1862.4	1806.5

**Braidwood SI 1B Vendor Curve**

flow (gpm)	modified curve	-3%
0.0	3391.8	3290.0
50.0	3372.9	3271.7
150.0	3297.6	3198.6
250.0	3165.7	3070.7
350.0	2977.2	2887.9
450.0	2685.2	2604.6
550.0	2308.3	2239.0
655.0	1903.2	1846.1

**Braidwood Cv 1A Vendor Curve**

flow (gpm)	modified curve	-3%
0	6039.3	5858.2
100	5987.7	5808.1
175	5832.9	5657.9
250	5471.5	5307.4
325	4852.1	4706.6
400	4026.2	3905.4
475	2993.9	2904.0
550	1806.6	1752.4

**Braidwood CV 1B Vendor Curve**

flow (gpm)	modified curve	-3%
0.0	6087.2	5904.6
100.0	5985.7	5806.2
175.0	5782.8	5609.3
250.0	5377.0	5215.7
325.0	4666.8	4526.8
400.0	3855.2	3739.6
475.0	2840.7	2755.5
550.0	1623.3	1574.6

**Braidwood RH 1A Vendor Curve**

flow (gpm)	modified curve	-3%
0	437.9	424.8
1000	423.5	410.8
2000	399.4	387.4
2500	385.0	373.4
3000	375.4	364.1
3500	360.9	350.1
4000	336.9	326.8
4500	308.0	298.7
5000	283.9	275.4

**Braidwood RH 1B Vendor Curve**

flow (gpm)	modified curve	-3%
0.0	452.8	439.2
1000.0	429.9	417.0
2000.0	398.1	386.1
2500.0	388.1	376.5
3000.0	378.2	366.8
3500.0	363.2	352.3
4000.0	343.3	333.0
4500.0	313.5	304.1
5000.0	278.6	270.3

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3000.0	378.2	366.8
3500.0	363.2	352.3
4000.0	343.3	333.0
4500.0	313.5	304.1
5000.0	278.6	270.3

See embedded documents for ITPR reviewer comments and resolution:



RE Evaluation  
2009-13491.msg



RE RWST Back  
Flow.msg



RE Evaluation  
2009-13491 - unsigne

**Tamayo-Santolin, Tina M.:(GenCo-Nuc)**

---

**From:** Baran, David A.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 23, 2009 10:53 AM  
**To:** Gosnell, James S.:(GenCo-Nuc); Rommel, John C.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Subject:** RE: Evaluation 2009-13491

Jim,

The S&L document is good.

Based on my conversations with John Rommel (as recently as yesterday) he would be expecting a statement in either EC 378180, or in Roy's SDP documentation, to the effect:

A sensitivity analysis was performed for critical input parameters and assumptions used in S&L Evaluation 2009-13491. Conservative variations in the critical parameters were applied for the 5.2 inch LOCA scenario with the RWST at the Lo-2 level and the results can be applied to the other accident scenarios investigated. This analysis determined that back flows to the containment sump and overall RWST outflow increased by less than 500 gpm for the combined additive effects of conservative increases in RWST level, primary system pressure, and Cv for the 1SI8811 valves and conservative reductions in ECCS pump performance and back flow path pipe resistance. A reduction in containment pressure from 19.2 psia to 17.28 psia (10%) resulted in a 720 gpm increase in back flow to the sump. It should be noted that this represents a significant variation in the parameter on a gauge pressure basis and much smaller variations in containment pressure around the 4.5 psig value in the SDP analysis is more realistic.

On a square root sum of the squares basis, the resulting increase in sump back flow would be 759 gpm for conservative variations in all critical parameters. This result would be much less for more realistic variations in containment pressure around the 4.5 psig value assumed in the analysis. An increase in sump back flow in excess of 1000 gpm would potentially impact the conclusions of the Significance Determination Process. Therefore, the combined effects in variations of all the critical parameters in the sump back flow analysis would not change the conclusions reached in the Significance Determination Process performed under AR XXXXXX.

You will need Roy's input on this and you don't have to use my wording. John is looking for a statement that the assumptions and variations are realistic and that the results support the conclusions of the SDP.

Dave

---

**From:** Gosnell, James S.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 23, 2009 9:16 AM  
**To:** Baran, David A.:(GenCo-Nuc); Rommel, John C.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Subject:** FW: Evaluation 2009-13491

The sensitivity analysis is included. Need comments by 1100.

---

**From:** ANTHONY.M.RYAN@sargentlundy.com [mailto:ANTHONY.M.RYAN@sargentlundy.com]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, December 22, 2009 1:14 PM  
**To:** Gosnell, James S.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Cc:** ROBERT.J.PETERSON@sargentlundy.com  
**Subject:** Evaluation 2009-13491

Jim,

Here is a pdf of the main body of the evaluation including the results of the sensitivity runs. Our review is complete and we are ready to sign. Do you want us to put signatures on the cover sheet or should we expect more comments?

12/30/2009

Tony

**Tamayo-Santolin, Tina M.:(GenCo-Nuc)**

---

**From:** Rommel, John C.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 17, 2009 3:17 PM  
**To:** Gosnell, James S.:(GenCo-Nuc); Baran, David A.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Cc:** Gustafson, David L.:(GenCo-Nuc); Smith, Michael J.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Subject:** RE: RWST Back Flow

My comment still remains the same, what is the impact of reasonable changes in your critical parameter inputs on the final conclusions of the PRA analysis. I believe this needs to be addressed somewhere.

---

**From:** Gosnell, James S.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 17, 2009 3:04 PM  
**To:** Baran, David A.:(GenCo-Nuc); Rommel, John C.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Cc:** Gustafson, David L.:(GenCo-Nuc); Smith, Michael J.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Subject:** RE: RWST Back Flow

There is no way we can make such statements for each assumption without sensitivity runs. Either withdraw the comment or we will have to pay for more analysis.

---

**From:** Baran, David A.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 17, 2009 12:24 PM  
**To:** Gosnell, James S.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Cc:** Rommel, John C.:(GenCo-Nuc); Gustafson, David L.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Subject:** FW: RWST Back Flow

Jim,

Here are my recommendation to address the sensitivity comment from John Rommel:

1. Accept the S&L document as is with no further case runs or calculations.
2. Have Giovanni Panici document in the EC 378180 EVAL DETAILS that this is a "best estimate" evaluation that is sensitive to RWST level, S18811 valve position, RCS pressure, Containment Sump level, etc. Qualitatively make a conclusion (for each assumption) based on the input from Erin below that any small variations in the S&L evaluation due to these assumptions have been bounded by conservative assumptions in the SDP. For example, we can probably say that for a 10% variation in S18811 valve position that the Cv and corresponding K value changed insignificantly, or RWST level uncertainties applied in the same direction over the 6 minute interval will have little impact on the calculated average flows, etc.

I discussed this with John Rommel and he is agreement with this. This will permit finishing up with S&L and allow you to control the approval of the EC with your guys.

Dave

---

**From:** Mark T. Cursey [mailto:MTCursey@erineng.com]  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 17, 2009 8:50 AM  
**To:** Linthicum, Roy R.:(GenCo-Nuc); Baran, David A.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Cc:** Jeff R. Gabor; Don E. Macleod  
**Subject:** RE: RWST Back Flow

I believe that the results from the S&L calc will have little impact if the output was to change by a "few" percent. We used a flow that was conservative for most cases due to the slight variation in the final cases we ran from the base cases we gave to S&L. In the TH Appendix this is documented and should account for any under-predicting of flow if there was

12/30/2009

any. We also extended the draindown timing from 6 to 7 minutes which used the average flow from the S&L calc for the 6 minute period. The flow would actually reduce over that last minute due to reduced RWST level. I believe that the sum of the conservative inputs is greater than any "small" change from the S&L calc.

Mark

---

**From:** roy.linthicum@exeloncorp.com [mailto:roy.linthicum@exeloncorp.com]  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 17, 2009 9:14 AM  
**To:** david.baran@exeloncorp.com  
**Cc:** Mark T. Cursey; Jeff R. Gabor; Don E. Macleod  
**Subject:** RE: RWST Back Flow

Dave,

I believe the answer is a small change (a few percent) won't have any impact, but it depends on what you mean by small

Roy

---

**From:** Baran, David A.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 16, 2009 4:08 PM  
**To:** Linthicum, Roy R.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Subject:** RWST Back Flow

Roy,

An item I was asked to follow-up on is the sensitivity of the results of the SDP to the output of the evaluation performed by S&L. For example, will a small variation in the output of the S&L calc impact the results of the SDP??

Thanks,

Dave

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**Tamayo-Santolin, Tina M.:(GenCo-Nuc)**

---

**From:** Rommel, John C.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Sent:** Wednesday, December 16, 2009 10:14 AM  
**To:** ANTHONY.M.RYAN@sargentlundy.com; Gosnell, James S.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Cc:** Baran, David A.:(GenCo-Nuc); ROBERT.J.PETERSON@sargentlundy.com; Panici, Giovanni:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Subject:** RE: Evaluation 2009-13491 - unsigned

I understand the RWST level issue, still unclear on the sensitivities. I have no feel how minor changes in critical input assumptions influence Roy's final conclusion. This may require input from Roy to help make this clear and what needs to be included.

For example:

What if the stuck valves were 5% further open, would it make a difference in Roy's answer. What if RCS pressure is 10 psi lower, what if level is off by 3 inches, what if the frictional losses in piping to sump were really 10% lower.. If plenty of margin to concern in Roy's analysis, then likely not an issue, but if Roy's analysis is close to acceptance criteria needs to be looked at more closely.

---

**From:** ANTHONY.M.RYAN@sargentlundy.com [mailto:ANTHONY.M.RYAN@sargentlundy.com]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, December 15, 2009 3:52 PM  
**To:** Gosnell, James S.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Cc:** Baran, David A.:(GenCo-Nuc); Rommel, John C.:(GenCo-Nuc); ROBERT.J.PETERSON@sargentlundy.com; Panici, Giovanni:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Subject:** RE: Evaluation 2009-13491 - unsigned

Jim,

I have added to pages 8 and 10 to address the two comments below. After I have heard that these incorporations are satisfactory, I will get signatures for the cover page.

Tony

**From:** <james.gosnell@exeloncorp.com>  
**To:** <ANTHONY.M.RYAN@sargentlundy.com>, <ROBERT.J.PETERSON@sargentlundy.com>  
**Cc:** <david.gustafson@exeloncorp.com>, <michael.smith@exeloncorp.com>, <roy.linthicum@exeloncorp.com>, <john.rommel@exeloncorp.com>, <david.baran@exeloncorp.com>  
**Date:** 12/14/2009 01:09 PM  
**Subject:** RE: Evaluation 2009-13491 - unsigned

---

John Rommel, Dave Baran and I met today to discuss the remaining comments. There are only 2 that need to be incorporated into the S&L product. None of the comments require re-analysis or revision to the math. The numbers stay the same.

12/30/2009

- Add some discussion about the sensitivity of the results to the various inputs. How sensitive is sump flow to RWST level for example. (pipe config, containment pressure etc are some others)
- Add some explanation of how RWST level is calculated at t=6. Some discussion of the methodology of the calc. so the reader knows the approach.

This should be the last of it. Jim

**From:** Baran, David A.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Sent:** Saturday, December 12, 2009 7:15 AM  
**To:** Linthicum, Roy R.:(GenCo-Nuc); Gosnell, James S.:(GenCo-Nuc); Rommel, John C.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Cc:** Gustafson, David L.:(GenCo-Nuc); Smith, Michael J.:(GenCo-Nuc); 'ANTHONY.M.RYAN@sargentlundy.com'; 'ROBERT.J.PETERSON@sargentlundy.com'  
**Subject:** RE: Evaluation 2009-13491 - unsigned

All,

I inputted all the data from the evaluation into the Mathcad file I created over Thanksgiving. This file assumes that RWST outflow versus level is linear over two data points and is the same methodology I used in BRW-97-0337-M ten years ago. All of Tony's data agrees to the decimal point that at 6 minutes, the level is where he says it is for each event. I attached the 5.2 inch LOCA file in text format as an example.

This proves that his numbers are correct. I think to satisfy the comments from the reviewers, the discussion on methodology needs to be clearer and no additional analytical effort is necessary.

Dave

**From:** Linthicum, Roy R.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Sent:** Fri 12/11/2009 6:53 PM  
**To:** Gosnell, James S.:(GenCo-Nuc); Baran, David A.:(GenCo-Nuc); Rommel, John C.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Cc:** Gustafson, David L.:(GenCo-Nuc); Smith, Michael J.:(GenCo-Nuc); 'ANTHONY.M.RYAN@sargentlundy.com'; 'ROBERT.J.PETERSON@sargentlundy.com'  
**Subject:** RE: Evaluation 2009-13491 - unsigned  
 Jim is correct. We want real levels so we can understand what is happening and take it into account. The flow rates are the real outputs from S&L that we are using as inputs.

**From:** Gosnell, James S.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Sent:** Friday, December 11, 2009 4:07 PM  
**To:** Baran, David A.:(GenCo-Nuc); Rommel, John C.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Cc:** Gustafson, David L.:(GenCo-Nuc); Smith, Michael J.:(GenCo-Nuc); 'ANTHONY.M.RYAN@sargentlundy.com'; 'ROBERT.J.PETERSON@sargentlundy.com'; Linthicum, Roy R.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Subject:** RE: Evaluation 2009-13491 - unsigned  
 RWST level is an absolutely critical input since it determines driving head but it is not the output of the S&L analysis. John's comment was related to measurement uncertainty and as I explained, this was not a design basis type calc. Roy specifically asked that we not use uncertainty and use realistic inputs. The purpose of the analysis is to determine flow to the sump which in turn can be used to determine lost inventory and reduction in RWST level. The determination of the remaining time is made outside the S&L analysis. The S&L methodology of iterating the calc once seems to provide realistic numbers since the flow calculated at the 3 minute mark were only 9 gpm different from the average.

12/30/2009

I'm not sure what changes are being advocated by the comment other than to call the RWST level a critical input parameter.

Due to the ongoing discussion here, I have directed S&L to hold final approval signatures to at least Monday.

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**From:** Baran, David A.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Sent:** Friday, December 11, 2009 3:49 PM  
**To:** Gosnell, James S.:(GenCo-Nuc); Rommel, John C.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Cc:** Gustafson, David L.:(GenCo-Nuc); Smith, Michael J.:(GenCo-Nuc); 'ANTHONY.M.RYAN@sargentlundy.com'; 'ROBERT.J.PETERSON@sargentlundy.com'; Linthicum, Roy R.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Subject:** RE: Evaluation 2009-13491 - unsigned

Jim,

I agree with John. I think the critical parameter is RWST level at the end of 6 minutes to ensure that there is sufficient time for operators to complete the actions in 1BwEP ES-1.3 prior to reaching the RWST Empty limit of 9%. I assumed that flow was calculated at 427.3', then there was a projected level in which flows were calculated, then the average RWST outflow was used to determine a level at 6 minutes. The flows for validation run at the mid point level after 3 minutes should be close to the average.

Dave

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**From:** Gosnell, James S.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Sent:** Friday, December 11, 2009 3:09 PM  
**To:** Rommel, John C.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Cc:** Gustafson, David L.:(GenCo-Nuc); Baran, David A.:(GenCo-Nuc); Smith, Michael J.:(GenCo-Nuc); ANTHONY.M.RYAN@sargentlundy.com; ROBERT.J.PETERSON@sargentlundy.com; Linthicum, Roy R.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Subject:** RE: Evaluation 2009-13491 - unsigned

See below

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**From:** Rommel, John C.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Sent:** Friday, December 11, 2009 1:54 PM  
**To:** Gosnell, James S.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Cc:** Gustafson, David L.:(GenCo-Nuc); Baran, David A.:(GenCo-Nuc); Smith, Michael J.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Subject:** RE: Evaluation 2009-13491 - unsigned

1. I thought the purpose of the calculation was to calculate the new level in the RWST after 6 minutes, not to determine how much flow to the containment sumps Roy is using one to determine the other. If we subtract the water that went to the sump we can determine how much RWST level is lost to the sump. The purpose is to quantify the flow to the sump.

2. Critical parameters for this analysis appear to be:

Note: I recognize that there are no acceptance criteria to this document, so it makes it hard to understand available margin questions. When I speak of conclusions below, I refer to the final overall conclusions of the combined analyses and not the effect on this particular EC.

12/30/2009

- starting RWST level
  - i. you used a low level alarm which seems reasonable, but nothing is discussed regarding uncertainty or tolerances – will that impact conclusions – why or why not Good question, this analysis was specifically requested to be a realistic estimate of flow, not a design basis calculation. This is what the PRA folks requested for input. Therefore, some reasonable conservatisms were kept but minimized. We purposely did not include measurement uncertainty.
- piping resistances
  - i. you make a big point to have model match plant data for CV and SI lines with injection valves Cv adjustment, but nothing seems to be done to match the RH line or the lines to the containment sumps. Is there a reason? Does it make any difference in your conclusions? S&L looked at the critical line between the RWST and the ECCS sump and validated its configuration closely matched the plant. The 12 inch line in the path was the part that contained most of the head loss.
- pump performance
  - i. you used a reasonable approach to model these – no comments other than impact of measurement uncertainty on your conclusions Correct, as stated above, this analysis was a realistic estimate of actual system performance.
- Boundary conditions
  - i. You have references that transmit the RCS pressure, Containment pressure and sump levels. It is not clear to me where these came from and why they are the right ones for this analysis. My read on the results is that it did not matter much as the level changes in the RWST are about the same for each case. My comment would be to ensure that these conditions are the right ones. What if they are change slightly, how sensitive are the conclusions to these assumptions? The inputs came from PRA thermal hydraulic modeling for each specific accident case. They came from the PRA folks and they are the end user of the output. We did perform some sensitivity analysis but not on all the inputs.
- CVs of partial open valves
  - i. This seems to be a very key assumption. How sensitive are the conclusions to this input? What happens if the valves are really 5 or 10% further open? Will your conclusions change? Actually, the Cv of the 8811s has a very small impact on the overall system resistance, about 2%. If the valve is open a bit more there will be very little change in flow. The dominant resistance comes from the tees and 12" line in the system therefore changes in valve position or Cv are not going to have a great effect on the results.

3. Not sure on the timing and which outage is which at Braidwood, so for the Cv for the injection valves, does it need to include any degrading impacts due to the problems we have had with these valves? I think you are referring to the throttle valves. The 8811B failed to stroke open in June of 2009 and previously stroked successfully on 9-20-07. During the Unit 1 outage in the spring of 2009, we replaced one of the throttle valve cages and biased all the throttle valves low in the flow range. The degradation mechanisms; corrosion and loss of brazing material should have made most of their impact during the first cycle that they were installed. There is therefore, some overlay in the conditions. Higher pump flows have the effect of lowering flow to the sumps but obviously there is more overall flow out of the RWST. The CV pumps were about 30-40 gpm higher overall and the SI pumps were in the same range. Admittedly we did not consider this to be a big effect and it partially offset by the 30 gpm per SI pump that is recirculated back to the RWST through the pump miniflow lines. The analysis considers to be lost inventory. The flow to the sump analysis is still valid because as I stated above, lower pump flows will result in higher sump flows and since Roy (PRA) is taking the sump flow as their input to determine lost inventory, the calculation is still conservative. This was a conscience decision.

4. There needs to be some discussion/math to show how you determined that RWST level after 3 or 6 minutes. Is not that the key out put of the analysis? The key output is the inventory lost to the ECCS sump. The average flow was used to calculate the actual t=6 RWST level and the calc was iterated once. Inputs 2.7 provides gallons per foot of RWST.

5. Is there a simple way to show the results are reasonable - can we compare against some plant measured data? What about a previous analysis? Simple hand calculations? What gives me confidence that the added piping model and its implementation is appropriate? Seems to me that a simple hand calculation with no flows to pumps can be compared against a PIPE FLO run with no pumps flows that would give me confidence that the modeling is correct. We did perform one run with no pump on, S&L performed model testing and verification before running the individual cases. They also did perform one hand calc to validate reasonableness.

Please comment on the answers provided here. I can capture your comments and these answers in the reviewer comments panel of the EC.

Any questions or further clarification let me know

12/30/2009

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**From:** Gosnell, James S.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Sent:** Friday, December 11, 2009 12:12 PM  
**To:** Rommel, John C.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Cc:** Gustafson, David L.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Subject:** FW: Evaluation 2009-13491 - unsigned

This just came in, John, any ETA?

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**From:** ANTHONY.M.RYAN@sargentlundy.com [mailto:ANTHONY.M.RYAN@sargentlundy.com]  
**Sent:** Friday, December 11, 2009 11:43 AM  
**To:** Gosnell, James S.:(GenCo-Nuc)  
**Cc:** Baran, David A.:(GenCo-Nuc); DINESH.C.PATEL@sargentlundy.com; ROBERT.J.PETERSON@sargentlundy.com; Panici, Giovanni:(GenCo-Nuc); Linthicum, Roy R.:(GenCo-Nuc); Behringer, Thomas J.  
**Subject:** Evaluation 2009-13491 - unsigned

Jim,

Attached is a pdf of the unsigned copy of evaluation 2009-13491, Analysis of RWST Back Flow to the Containment Sumps. The entire evaluation including all PIPEFLO models can be found on the S&L ftp server at the following address.

<ftp://slftp1.sargentlundy.com/pub/anyone/AMR/>

This copy incorporates all of the Exelon comments. If you agree that all comments have been incorporated, we will sign and send you the approved evaluation.

Tony

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**Engineering Change**

EC Number : 0000378180 000  
Facility : BRW  
Type/Sub-type: EVAL MECH

Print Date: 12/30/2009

**Exelon**<sup>SM</sup>

Page: 1

**Attributes**

Attribute Sub-category: DAR

<u>Attribute Name</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>PassPort</u>	<u>Date</u>
CC-AA-102 ATT 1,7,8	COMPLETE	BRZYP	12/11/2009

**ATTACHMENT 1**  
**Design Attribute Review (DAR)**  
**Page 1 of 7**

Engineering Change Number: EC 378180 Revision 0

**IDENTIFY** THE APPLICABILITY OF THE FOLLOWING TO THE DESIGN CHANGE. **WHEN** A TOPIC IS DETERMINED TO BE APPLICABLE, **THEN PLACE** THE APPLICABLE TOPIC INFORMATION IN THE DESIGN CHANGE. **IF** THE INFORMATION IS INSTALLATION-RELATED, **THEN PLACE** THIS INFORMATION IN THE INSTALLER INSTRUCTIONS (ATTACHMENT C IN CC-AA-103). **IF NOT** INSTALLATION-RELATED, **THEN PLACE** THE TOPIC INFORMATION IN A SEGREGATED DESIGN CONSIDERATION SECTION, OR WITHIN THE DOCUMENTATION REQUIRED BY THE PROCEDURES GOVERNING A PARTICULAR ATTRIBUTE. OPTIONAL FIELDS "TRACKING OF ACTION" AND "REFERENCES" ARE AVAILABLE FOR NOTATION BY THE PREPARER **IF DESIRED** TO ASSIST THE PREPARER IN MANAGING THE ACTIVITY.

Section	Design Change Attribute	Applicable	Tracking of Action	References
4.1.4.1.	IDENTIFY Basic SSC Functions	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		See Design Considerations Summary (DCS)
4.1.4.2.	IDENTIFY Configuration Change safety classification.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		See DCS
4.1.4.3.	IDENTIFY Seismic Classification of the SSC.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.5.	PROVIDE the performance requirements and design conditions (including margin) of the SSC needed to evaluate the change from the existing to the modified systems, structures, or components.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.6.	DETERMINE the design requirements necessary to facilitate periodic surveillance testing and acceptance testing that is necessary for the Configuration Change being considered.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.7.	DETERMINE the Codes, Standards, and Regulatory Requirements applicable to the Configuration Change.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.8.	IDENTIFY PWR Sump GL 2004-02 Program impacts Braidwood, Byron, and TMI only	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.9.	DETERMINE changes required to existing Design Analysis or new parameters that require new calculations or calculation revisions that are used to assess the acceptability of a system or a component function in meeting various physical requirements.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.10.	If Redundancy, Diversity and Separation requirements are identified or affected, then REVIEW the original design basis as well as any subsequent modifications.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.11.	IDENTIFY any Failure Effects requirements. (See Attachment 12)	<input type="checkbox"/>		

**ATTACHMENT 1**  
**Design Attribute Review (DAR)**  
**Page 2 of 7**

Section	Design Change Attribute	Applicable	Tracking of action	References
4.1.12.	IDENTIFY Fire Protection and Appendix R Safe Shutdown requirements, by using the "Screening for Approved Fire Protection Program (AFPP) Impact", Attachment 2.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.13.	DETERMINE any <u>Material requirements</u> , such as material grade, product form, compatibility with existing or other new materials, galvanic interaction between dissimilar metals, special welding material requirements, critical properties, performance characteristics, alternative materials as well as any <u>Material Suitability requirements</u> such as compatibility, electrical insulation properties, protective coating, corrosion resistance, mechanical insulation etc. necessary for the Configuration Change.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.14.	Determine environmental conditions and impacts.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.15.	DETERMINE if Environmental Qualification (EQ) of equipment is affected. (see Attachment 3)	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.16.	REVIEW the Operating Experience databases through the INPO Internet Site or equivalent in accordance with LS-AA-115:	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.17.	DETERMINE if the configuration change may affect the existing Equipment Performance Information Exchange (EPIX) database.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.18.	DETERMINE if the Configuration Change may affect the existing Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Mitigating System Performance Index (MSPI) Basis Document PRA content, and shutdown risk models by using the screening checklist in Attachment 4.	<input type="checkbox"/>		

**ATTACHMENT 1**  
**Design Attribute Review (DAR)**  
**Page 3 of 7**

Section	Design Change Attribute	Applicable	Tracking of action	References
4.1.19.	EVALUATE if System Operational Requirements have changed.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.20.	IDENTIFY any Human Factors requirements.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.21.	IDENTIFY procedure changes per direction in Attachment 9.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.22.	IDENTIFY any changes or additional training requirements for various departments, per direction in Attachment 9.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.23.	CONSIDER the functional and physical system interface requirements, including the affect of cumulative tolerances between the subject system or component and adjacent or related support systems, structures, and components that may have been affected by the Configuration Change.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.24.	DETERMINE specialized layout and arrangement requirements, such as protection from normal vehicle traffic flow, or physical location preferences that minimize plant operating requirements for both the structures and systems being modified, and adjacent equipment and that avoid susceptibility for water hammer and gas accumulation.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.25.	DETERMINE if the Radiation Protection/ALARA programs are affected by review of changes that affect any of the following during normal or post accident conditions: Radiation sources; changes affecting controlled radiation areas; primary coolant fluid systems (Cobalt Materials); contaminated systems; radiation monitoring systems; HVAC Systems which could transport airborne contaminants; change or alter shielding. (see Attachment 5)	<input type="checkbox"/>		

**ATTACHMENT 1**  
**Design Attribute Review (DAR)**  
**Page 4 of 7**

Section	Design Change Attribute	Applicable	Tracking of action	References
4.1.26.	DETERMINE the need for walkdowns to look at accessibility to the work area(s) and any special installation considerations that need to be addressed during design development.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.27.	DETERMINE Accessibility for maintenance, repair and In-Service Inspection (ISI) and In-Service Testing (IST), and the conditions under which these activities will be performed.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.28.	DETERMINE handling, storage, cleaning, and shipping requirements, as well as transportability requirements for items which require special handling during transit from supplier to site, from site to vendor (for repair), or from site receiving to final placement in the plant.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.29.	DETERMINE the effect of the Configuration Change on existing Emergency Plan or environmental and discharge monitoring that are used to prevent undue risk to public health and safety.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.30.	DETERMINE Industrial Safety requirements such as restricting the use of dangerous materials, hazardous chemicals, escape provisions from enclosures, pertinent OSHA requirements, and grounding of electrical systems.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.31.	DETERMINE impact on nuclear fuel, core components, core design, reactivity management, criticality control and accountability of nuclear materials as well as transient and / or accident analysis, by using Attachment 6.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.32.	DETERMINE Load Path requirements for installation, removal, and repair of equipment and replacement of major components.	<input type="checkbox"/>		

**ATTACHMENT 1**  
**Design Attribute Review (DAR)**  
**Page 5 of 7**

Section	Design Change Attribute	Applicable	Tracking of action	References
4.1.33.	IDENTIFY Mechanical System Characteristics where design limits are placed on the mechanical properties of a system or components.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.34.	IDENTIFY Chemistry requirements where limits are placed on the chemical properties of a system or component based upon safety, reliability, ALARA, economics, or other considerations.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.35.	IDENTIFY Electrical requirements where limits are placed on the electrical properties of a system or component.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.36.	IDENTIFY Instrument and Control requirements, including digital technology requirements.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.37.	IDENTIFY Security requirements such as site monitoring, alarm systems, vehicle barrier systems, security and security lighting.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.38.	IDENTIFY Civil/Structural requirements where design limits are placed on the structural properties of a SSC such as equipment foundations and component supports.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.39.	If the Configuration Change adds, relocates, or alters Seismic Category I mechanical and/or electrical components then ENSURE that the Seismic Dynamic Qualification (SD/Q) of the components has been addressed per CC-AA-320-001.	<input type="checkbox"/>		

**ATTACHMENT 1**  
**Design Attribute Review (DAR)**  
**Page 6 of 7**

Section	Design Change Attribute	Applicable	Tracking of action	References
4.1.40.	DETERMINE Personnel Requirements and Limitations such as the need for trade specialists and engineering experts as well as support personnel, such as Radiation Chemistry technicians, welding technicians with special expertise, use of specific contractor or station procedures for installation or the need for mock-ups for training, installation, or operation.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.41.	LIST special procedures and installation specifications that apply, but are not part of the normal installation procedural direction.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.42.	DETERMINE Interfacing Department impact of the Configuration Change, such as Operations, Plant Engineering, Training (including Plant Simulator), Maintenance, Reactor Engineering, Radiation Protection and others. (see Attachments 10A through 10H)	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.43.	CONSIDER impact on active License Renewal Projects.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.44.	REVIEW the proposed changes for conformance with requirements of any applicable Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited (NEIL) Insurance Standard, or other appropriate insurance standards.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.45.	A comprehensive single point vulnerability (SPV) review of the configuration change shall be performed to ensure the configuration change does not add the potential to cause an unplanned reactor SCRAM.	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.46.	Impact on Steam Generator Replacement Projects (PWR only, see Attachment 13)	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.1.47.	IDENTIFY changes to the plant, both permanent and temporary, that potentially impact the switchyard or the interconnected transmission system. Communication and coordination of these plant changes with the applicable transmission entities is a requirement of the mandatory NERC Reliability Standards.	<input type="checkbox"/>		

**ATTACHMENT 1**  
**Design Attribute Review (DAR)**

Page 7 of 7

<b>Section</b>	<b>Design Change Attribute</b>	<b>Applicable</b>	<b>Tracking of action</b>	<b>References</b>
4.4.	Configuration Control Activities- Use of Attachment 7	<input type="checkbox"/>		
4.5.	Determination of Program Impact - Use of Attachment 8	<input type="checkbox"/>		

CC-AA-102 Attachment 7 - Checklist of Configuration Activities			
Engineering Change Number:			Rev:
Req'd	Prior To Operation	Configuration Activity	
Procedure		Related Tracking info	EC Install Attribute
	*	Update Tech Spec or license (if affected, DBdb applies)	
	LS-AA-101	Amendment No:	CONF: TECH SPEC
		Update Tech Spec Bases	
	LS-AA-101-1000		
	As Required by LS-AA-107	UFSAR Change Notice (if affected, DBdb applies)	
	LS-AA-107	Change Request No:	CONF: UFSAR CHANGE NOTICE
		Technical Requirement Manual	
	Plant Specific	List on ADL	CONF: TECH REQMT MANUAL
		Design Bases Database Requirements	
	CC-AA-207	DBdb Input Form	CONF: DB DATABASE INPUT
		Update Design Bases Topical Reports and System Documents	
	CC-AA-207	List on ADL	
	*	Update of Critical Control Room Drawings	
	CC-AA-103, -104, -112, NF-AA-101	List on ADL	CONF: CCRD HUNG
		Additional Walkdown (s)	
	CC-AA-106-1001	Place walkdown form in package	CONF: DESIGNERS WALKDOWN
		Affected Equipment List (AEL) or Component Record List (PIMs) (CM-6)	
	Plant Specific		CONF: EQUIP DATA (NON RTC UPD)
		Update set point and calibration database (IISCP in MAROG)	
	Plant Specific		
		Electrical Load Monitoring (ELMS)	
	Plant Specific	ADL & ELMS Input form	CONF: ELMS INPUT

<b>CC-AA-102 Attachment 7 - Checklist of Configuration Activities</b>		
		Cable Management Database (raceway and conduit) program (SLICE)
Plant Specific	ADL & Slice Input form	CONF: SLICE INPUT
	*	Update of Nuclear Fuels/Corporate Engineering Safety Analysis Accident Analysis (See Attachment 10G)
Attachment 10G		CONF: NUCLEAR FUELS ACC ANLS
		Plant Barriers Affected
Plant Specific		CONF: BARRIER PROGRAM
	*	Offsite Dose Calc Manual
CY-AA-170-300		CONF: ODCM
		Update VETIP Manuals
CC-AA-204		CONF: VETIP MANUALS
		Update Fire Protection Documentation Package and Appendix R
CC-AA-209	Change Request No:	CONF: FPR CHANGE REQUEST
	*	Update Use of Locks on Valves
OP-AA-108-103	Proc on ADL; Equip Data AEL	
	*	Equipment Tagging & Labeling (CM-6)
OP-AA-116-101	Label Request	CONF: EQUIP TAGS/LABELS
		Address Open Operability Determinations
OP-AA-108-115		CONF: OPEN OPERABILITY DETERMINATION
		Update or Create Equipment Bill of Material
SM-AA-300	BOM End Use Analysis	CONF: EQUIP BOM
		Plant Simulator Change Required?
Contact Site Simulator Coordinator		CONF: SIMULATOR CHANGES

CC-AA-102 Attachment 7 - Checklist of Configuration Activities		
		Functional Equipment Group (FEG) Update
MA-AA-716-210		CONF: FEG UPDATE (D046)
		Clearance and Tagging Program (C/O Models Updated)
Operations		CONF: TAG OUT C/O MODEL CHANGE
		Equipment PMT Requirements (D041)
Plant Specific		CONF: EQUIP PMT CHANGES (D041)
		Other items
		CONF: MISC
		Emergency Response Data System Data Point Library Update (ERDS)
EP-AA-123 or EP-OC-123 for Oyster Creek	Notify NRC within 30 days of change to library files	CONF: ERDS
		Update Cyber Security Assessment Database
CC-AA-215		CONF: CYBER SECURITY
		List of equipment being replaced to Site Supply Chain Manager
SM-AC-4006		

Notes:

“\*” Indicates that it must be completed prior to operation if the activity is required.

Track completion via EC ADL/AEL (if ADL/AEL is applicable) or EC INSTALL Attribute.

**CC-AA-102 Attachment 8 - Checklist for Programs Impact    CC-AA-102 Rev 18**

**Engineering Change Number:** \_\_\_\_\_ **Rev:** \_\_\_\_\_

<b>Req'd</b>	<b>Prior to Operation</b>	<b>Program Activities</b>	
<b>Procedure</b>		<b>Related Tracking info</b>	<b>EC Install Attribute</b>
	* If Tech Spec	Predefine Surveillance Program	
	Plant Specific		PROG: PREDEFINES (SURV, PM)
		Performance Centered Maintenance (PCM) Program	
	MA-AA-716-210		PROG: PREDEFINES (SURV, PM)
		Create or Revise PCM Template	
	MA-AA-716-210-1001		PROG: PCM TEMPLATE
		Maintenance Rule Program	
	ER-AA-310		PROG: M/R PROGRAM
		Instrument Calibration as part of Predefine Surveillance Program	
	Plant Specific		PROG: INSTR SURVEILLANCE
		Check Valve PM Program	
	ER-AA-400-1001		PROG: CHECK VALVE PM
		MOV Program	
	ER-AA-302		PROG: MOV
		AOV Program	
	ER-AA-410		PROG: AOV
		EQ Program	
	CC-AA-203		PROG: EQ
		ASME Section XI or O&M IST Program	
	ER-AA-321		PROG: IST
		ASME Section XI or O&M ISI Program	
	ER-AA-330		PROG: ISI (ASME XI)
		Boric Acid Corrosion Control (BACC) Program (PWR only)	
	ER-AP-331		
		BWR Reactor Internals/IVVI (BWR only)	
	ER-AB-331		
		ASME III Code and Auth. Nuclear Inspector/In-service Inspector Review	
	Plant Specific		PROG: ASME CODE / ANII REVIEW

**CC-AA-102 Attachment 8 - Checklist for Programs Impact    CC-AA-102 Rev 18**

		B&PV Inspection Program (including State Boiler Inspector Notification) (IDNS)
	Plant Specific	PROG: IDNS VESSEL/RV TEST
		ASME VIII Relief Valve Testing (part of IDNS Requirements)
	Plant Specific	PROG: IDNS VESSEL/RV TEST
		Non ASME Piping & Comp Support Inservice Inspection Program
	Plant Specific	PROG: ISI (NON ASME)
		Other Programs that may be Tech Spec required but plant specific
	Plant Specific	PROG: MISC
		Flow Accelerated Corrosion Program
	ER-AA-430	PROG: FAC (FLOW ACC CORROSION)
		Fatigue and Transient Monitoring Program
	ER-AA-470	PROG: FATIG & TRANS MON
		Lead Shielding Program
	Plant Specific	PROG: LEAD SHIELDING
		Update & Maintenance of EPIX (formerly NPRDS)
	ER-AA-2020	PROG: EPIX
	*	Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP)/Severe Accident Management (SAM) Program
	Plant Specific	PROG: EOP/SAM
		GL-89-13 Program for Heat Exchangers and Piping
	ER-AA-340	PROG: GL 89-13 HX
		Environmental Review
	EN-AA-103	PROG: ENVIRON SERV NOTIFIED
		Steam Generator Program
	ER-AP-420	PROG: STEAM GENERATOR

<b>CC-AA-102 Attachment 8 - Checklist for Programs Impact CC-AA-102 Rev 18</b>		
		PRA URE Completion, MSPI Basis Document and PRA Model Update
Section 4.1.18 of CC-AA-102		PROG: PRA MODEL
		Containment Coatings Program
CC-AA-205 and ER-AA-330-008		PROG: CONTAINMENT COATINGS
		Appendix J of 10CFR50
ER-AA-380		
		Thermal Performance
ER-AA-510		PROG: THERMAL PERFORMANCE
		Emergency Preparedness (EP) Programs
EP-AA-120		
		Buried Piping and Raw Water Corrosion Program
ER-AA-5400		
		Cyber Security Program
CC-AA-213		PROG: CYBER SECURITY
		BOP HX Program
ER-AA-340-2000		
		Control Room Envelope (CRE) Habitability Program
ER-AA-390		
		Lubricants Program
MA-AA-716-006		

**Notes:**

“\*” indicates that it must be completed prior to operation if the activity is required.

Track completion via EC ADL (if ADL is applicable) or EC INSTALL Attribute.