UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
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P. A. Morris, Director, DRL
THRU: D. R. Muller, Chief, PWR Projects Branch #1, DRL

FORTHCOMING ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING WITH CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC., INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT NO. 2

Date of Meeting:	Tuesday, September 15, 1970
Time:	Staff: 9 a.m. Applicant: 10 a.m.
Location:	Room 1046, 1717 H Street
Purpose:	ACRS Subcommittee Meeting. (See attached agenda).
Groups Participating:	ACRS (D. Okrent, et al) CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY (W. Cahill, et al) AEC/DRL (D. Muller, K. Kniel, M. McCoy)

M. A. McCoy

M. A. McCoy, Reactor Engineer
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AGENDA

INDIAN POINT 2 SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING

A. The following have been identified for discussion with the Regulatory Staff:

1. Are there any reservations on the ECCS design or is it considered permanently acceptable?

2. How is it proposed to approach ATWS for Indian Point 2? How will the acceptability of a peak pressure of about 4000 psi be established? Does DRL agree with the material submitted by Con Ed on ATWS? What is the current review schedule with regard to ATWS on Indian Point 2?

3. What accidents in addition to the fuel handling accident are considered more probable and therefore require lower calculated doses? What is considered an acceptable dose for such accidents?

4. What resolution has been made of the question of a single MO valve in the accumulator discharge line?

5. Are the iodine removal rates now being calculated less conservative than those used previously? If so, are there requirements which had been put on previously reviewed plants which will not longer be considered necessary?

6. Is there any question about the ability of the operators to perform effectively following a major accident, from the standpoint of expected control room doses?

7. How has REG assured itself that Indian Point 2 will meet the General Design Criterion requiring that fuel near end of life can withstand anticipated transients?

8. Has DRL reviewed maintenance procedures with an eye toward minimizing systematic failures?

9. Why has DRL established different requirements on availability of fixed in-core neutron detectors for Oconee 1 and Indian Point 2?

10. Is there an approach to monitoring the continued integrity of the containment strength members and leakage barrier (for example, the separate leakage testing and tendon surveillance in prestressed containment)? If not, why?

B. The following have been identified for discussion with Con Ed:

1. ECCS.

2. ATWS.

3. Turbine overspeed; earthquake effect on turbines.

4. Fuel handling accidents.

5. The ability of high burnup fuel to withstand anticipated transients.

6. Adequacy of Xe oscillation experiments: why are those planned sufficient?

7. In-core instrumentation/thermocouples/computer availability/Tech. Spec. requirements.

8. Tech. Spec. requirements on leak detection.

9. General Tech. Specs.

10. In-service vibration monitoring by acoustic, nuclear or mechanical means.

11. Basis for control of cleaning solutions, dye penetrants, etc.

12. Maintenance procedures and systematic failures.

Other subjects of interest to the Subcommittee may also be discussed.