

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
4 Irving Place, New York, N Y 10003
Telephone (212) 460-3819

April 21, 1980

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
Docket No. 50-247

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pa. 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

This letter completes our response to IE Bulletin No. 79-17 and Revision 1 thereto, regarding the potential for stress corrosion cracking in stainless steel safety-related piping systems that could contain stagnant, oxygenated, borated water. The final inspection work required by item 2b of IE Bulletin 79-17 Rev. 1 has been completed and the results are presented below.

A 10% sample of all normally accessible stainless steel pipe welds greater than 2 1/2 in. in diameter, identified as potentially containing stagnant oxygenated borated water, was inspected. The sample size was selected to provide a representative sample by pipe size (dia.) and wall thickness. The major portion of welds selected for examination was in systems required to function in the emergency core cooling mode. The examination program focused on non-insulated piping runs, both horizontal and vertical.

Ultrasonic examination procedures were in accordance with ASME B&PV Code Section XI, Appendix III of the Winter 1975 addenda, except that all signal responses were subject to evaluation. The ability

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of these ultrasonic examination procedures to detect the presence of stress corrosion cracking was demonstrated using an actual sample of welded austenitic stainless steel pipe containing intergranular stress corrosion cracks. This sample, owned by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), was made available to Consolidated Edison through Southwest Research Institute.


Pipe welds, 0.250 inch wall thickness and less, were subject to visual and liquid penetrant surface examinations. The examination procedures were in accordance with the applicable portions of ASME B&PV code Section V and XI.

Results of the above examinations, as well as previous examinations, yielded no indications of cracking or stress corrosion.

The information provided herein, together with the information previously provided in response to the subject bulletins, demonstrates the integrity of Indian Point Unit No. 2 stainless steel safety-related piping with respect to stress corrosion in potentially stagnant, oxygenated, borated water systems. Details of these inspections are available at the plant site for review by your inspectors.

Should you or your staff have any questions, please contact us.

Very truly yours,



William J. Cahill, Jr.
Vice President

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Division of Reactor Operations Inspection
Washington, D. C. 20555

Mr. T. Rebelowski, Resident Inspector
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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