Previous Report Date Update Report LICENSEE EVENT REPORT /02/77 R.O. -77-2-24 (A) CONTROL BLOCK: [PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION] LICENSEE **EVENT** NAME LICENSE NUMBER TYPE YII - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 P 0 0 1 1 | REPORT EVENT DATE REPORT DATE DOCKET NUMBER T L 0 |5 | -|0|2|4 7 1 111 7 7 0 | 0 1 9 1 |0|3|1|0|8|0| 69 **EVENT DESCRIPTION** 0 2 7 8 9 80 03 7 8 9 80 04 SEE ATTACHED SHEET 80 05 8 9 80 06 80 PRIME COMPONENT CAUSE COMPONENT CODE CODE COMPONENT CODE SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER VIOLATION SID B ZZZZZZ | Z | |Z | 9 | 9 | N 48 CAUSE DESCRIPTION 0 B 7 8 80 0 9 SEE ATTACHED SHEET 8 80 10 80 FACILITY METHOD OF STATUS % POWER OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 11 E 1 0 0 C NA Engineering Analysis 80 FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED CONTENT OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE 1 2 Z Z NA 10 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION Z 00 0 12 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION 0 0 11 12 80 PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 1 5 NA LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY DESCRIPTION **PUBLICITY** 80 ADDITIONAL FACTORS 18 NA 80 19 8 9 8003170297 PHONE: 914-739-8823 John M. Makepeace NAME:_

GPO

Event Description

During a continuing review of the electrical circuitry, associated with the containment isolation valves, it was discovered that although the air ejector diversion line containment isolation valve circuitry meets the single failure criterion for most postulated conditions, the single failure criterion cannot be satisfied for a postulated short circuit or foreign voltage imposition in the control circuitry for these valves.

When the discrepancy in the wiring was determined, immediate action was taken to assure that these valves would remain closed. The control air to the valve operators was isolated and the valve operators were bled of any remaining control air. Additionally, the control switch for these valves in the Central Control Room was put in the "closed" position. Redundant protection against maloperation of these valves was thus assured should containment isolation be required.

In the event that radioactive contaminants leaked into the secondary steam system, an early warning of this situation would have been provided by the radiation alarms on the air ejector discharge and/or the steam generator blowdown. The exhaust flow from the air ejectors would not have been redirected to containment and these valves would have remained closed during any period when containment isolation was required.

The electrical circuitry associated with these valves was modified during the 1980 Turbine Inspection Outage to insure the single failure criterion is satisfied for all postulated conditions. These valves have now been returned to their normal operating mode.

Cause Description

This event was the result of a condition caused by control circuitry design which provided for only one source of power to the air ejector diversion line containment isolation valves.