

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
4 Irving Place, New York, N Y 10003
Telephone (212) 460-3819

June 15, 1977


Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
Docket No. 50-247

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Attached is a supplemental response for Indian Point
Unit No. 2 to IE Circular No. 76-06 concerning stress
corrosion cracking in safety - related piping at several
PWR plants.

Very truly yours,



William J. Cahill, Jr.
Vice President

Copy To: Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Division of Reactor Inspection Programs
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

8111070201 770615
PDR ADOCK 05000247
G PDR

210
R

ATTACHMENT 1

Indian Point Unit No. 2

Supplemental Response to IE Circular No. 76-06

As indicated in our original response to IE Circular No. 76-06 dated December 30, 1976, the only piping which could potentially be susceptible to the type of stress corrosion cracking discussed in the Circular is that portion of the containment spray injection piping not isolable from the containment spray rings.

Since initial plant operation, strict chemical control has been maintained over the source of supply for the containment spray system (i.e., the Refueling Water Storage Tank). A review of our chemical sampling records indicates that chlorides in the supply have consistently been less than 0.05 ppm.

Nevertheless, as committed to in our December 30, 1976 letter, a representative sample of welds in the appropriate portions of the containment spray injection piping was volumetrically examined during the recent April, 1977 steam generator inspection outage for Indian Point Unit No. 2. The ultrasonic examination of these lines yielded no indications of pipe degradation.

In summary, continued chemical sampling of the RWST water will assure that no significant amounts of chlorides are introduced into the system. The recent containment spray

pipng volumetric examination, which yielded no indications of pipe degradation, demonstrates that the containment spray injection piping has never been exposed to conditions which cause stress corrosion cracking and, therefore, confirms the acceptability of the present chemical sampling program.

It is concluded that no unusual conditions exist that could potentially affect the integrity of the containment spray injection piping, and no further special actions are contemplated.