


William J. Cahill, Jr.
Vice President

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
4 Irving Place, New York, N Y 10003
Telephone (212) 460-3819

December 16, 1976


Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
Docket No. 50-247
R.O. -76-2-23(A)

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region 1
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pa 19406



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

We transmit herewith Reportable Occurrence report R.O. -76-2-23(A). Three copies of this letter and the attachment are enclosed as required.



Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'William J. Cahill, Jr.'.

William J. Cahill, Jr.
Vice President

attach.
PK/mmg

Copy to: Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
ATTN: Dr. Ernst Volgenau, Director (40 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
ATTN: Mr. William G. McDonald, Director (3 copies)
Office of Management Information and
Program Control
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

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PDR ADOCK 05000247
S PDR

REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

0.-76-2-23(A)

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSEE NAME														LICENSE NUMBER										LICENSE TYPE					EVENT TYPE	
01	N	Y	I	P	S	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	4	1	1	1	1	0	1						
7	8	9	14	15	25	26	30	31	32																					
01		CONT		CATEGORY		REPORT TYPE		REPORT SOURCE		DOCKET NUMBER					EVENT DATE					REPORT DATE										
0	1	5	7	5	8	T	5	9	L	6	0	5	0	-	0	2	4	7	1	2	0	2	7	6	1	2	1	6	7	6
7	8	57	58	59	60	61	68	69	74	75	80																			

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02																										80
03																										80
04	SEE ATTACHED SHEET																									80
05																										80
06																										80

SYSTEM CODE			CAUSE CODE		COMPONENT CODE					PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER			VIOLATION		
0	7	9	S	D	B	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	9	9	9	N
7	8	9	10	11	12	17	43	44	46	47	48						

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08																										80
09	SEE ATTACHED SHEET																									80
10																										80

FACILITY STATUS			% POWER			OTHER STATUS			METHOD OF DISCOVERY			DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION											
1	1	1	G	0	0	0	NA	C	Engineering Analysis														
7	8	9	10	12	13	44	45	46	80														
FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED			CONTENT OF RELEASE			AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY			LOCATION OF RELEASE														
1	2	2	Z	Z	NA	NA	NA																
7	8	9	10	11	44	45	80																

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER			TYPE		DESCRIPTION	
1	3	0	0	0	Z	NA
7	8	9	11	12	13	80

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER			DESCRIPTION		
1	4	0	0	0	NA
7	8	9	11	12	80

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

15	NA																									80
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LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE		DESCRIPTION																								
1	6	Z	NA																							
7	8	9	10	80																						

PUBLICITY

17	NA																									80
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ADDITIONAL FACTORS

18	NA																									80
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19																										80
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NAME: Austin J. Decker II

PHONE: 914-739-8823

Event Description

During a review of the electrical circuitry associated with the containment ventilation isolation valves, it was discovered that although the valve circuitry meets the single failure criteria for most postulated conditions, the single failure criteria cannot be satisfied for a postulated short circuit or foreign voltage imposition in the control circuitry for these valves. Because all four containment purge isolation valves are controlled from the same electrical circuit, it is possible to provide a direct path to atmosphere under certain electrical fault conditions. The same condition exists with relation to the three containment pressure relief valves. Modification of these circuits was therefore accomplished to provide independent circuitry to one supply and one exhaust valve, and both pressure relief valves outside containment. This modification thus insures compliance with the single failure criteria for the containment ventilation system.

[R.O.-76-2-23(A)]

Cause Description

This event was the result of a condition caused by control circuitry design which provided for only one source of power to all four containment purge isolation valves, and only one source of power to all three containment pressure relief valves.