



Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
4 Irving Place, New York, N Y 10003

REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY

October 20, 1977
Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
Docket No. 50-247
R.O.-77-2-24 (A)



Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

In accordance with the Technical Specifications of Facility Operating License No. DPR-26, the following confirms the notification of Mr. Donald Haverkamp of your office by Mr. John Makepeace of Consolidated Edison on October 19, 1977 of Reportable Occurrence R.O.-77-2-24 (A).

This occurrence is the type defined in Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 4, Section C.2.a(9).

During a continuing review of the electrical circuitry associated with the containment isolation valves, it was discovered that although the air ejector diversion line containment isolation valve circuitry meets the single failure criteria for most postulated conditions, the single failure criteria cannot be satisfied for a postulated short circuit or foreign voltage imposition in the control circuitry for these valves.

When the discrepancy in the wiring was determined, immediate action was taken to assure that these valves would remain closed. The control air to the valve operators was isolated and the valve operators were bled of any remaining control air. Additionally, the control switches for these valves in the Central Control Room were put in the "closed" position. Redundant protection against maloperation of these valves was thus assured should containment isolation be required.

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
In the event that radioactive contaminants were able to leak into the secondary steam system, an early warning of this situation would be provided by the radiation alarms on the air ejector discharge and/or the steam generator blowdown. If it becomes necessary, redirection of the exhaust flow from the air ejectors could then be accomplished by re-establishing control air and by operation of the control switches from the Central Control Room. In the event that a Phase A isolation signal is encountered, the valves will close automatically. An operator will also be dispatched to verify closure and to isolate the control air from the valves in order to further assure that they will not be inadvertently opened in the event of a short circuit or foreign voltage imposition in the valve's control circuitry.

An investigation is being initiated to determine what modifications of the electrical circuitry associated with these valves are necessary to resolve this deficiency.

Any additional information will be provided in the 14-day report required by Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 4.

Consolidated Edison believes that this report also satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21.

Very truly yours,



Eugene R. McGrath, Manager
Nuclear Power Generation
Department
Indian Point Station
Buchanan, New York 10511

cc: → Director (3 copies)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Director (2 copies)
Office of Management Information and
Program Control