
Regulatory Docket File



Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. 4 Irving Place, New York, NY 10003



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March 4, 1974

- Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2 Facility Operating License DPR-26 AEC Docket No. 50-247
 - A.O.-4-2-8

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director Directorate of Licensing Office of Regulations U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

8110310591 74030

The following report is provided pursuant to the requirements of Section 6.12.2(a) of the Technical Specifications to Facility Operating License DPR-26.

Periodic surveillance test PT-M2, "Reactor Coolant Temperature Analog Channel Functional Test Δ T Overtemperature and Δ T Overpower", was performed on February 15/16, 1974 with Unit No. 2 in the cold shutdown condition. The limiting safety system settings of Channels II and IV of the Overtemperature Δ T Reactor Trip Circuitry were found to be below that required by Technical Specifications 2.3.1.B (4). Channels I and III were found to be operating correctly. Channels II and IV were recalibrated and tested satisfactorily.

These particular devices are part of a four channel reactor trip logic where activation of only two of the four bistables (one per channel) will produce a reactor trip signal. Since the Channel I and III bistables were found to be operating correctly, overtemperature Δ T would have caused a reactor trip to occur within the range prescribed by the Technical Specifications.

Presently, as the result of a study done on set point drift, our Nuclear Power Generation Department is replacing certain bistable components (capacitors), which are believed to be the likely cause of the drifts that have been experienced in the past few months. Mr. John F. O'Leary

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The new capacitors are being installed on a priority basis as discussed in our letter to you of January 25, 1974.

Safety implications of this set point drift are considered to be slight, since the reactor was in the cold shutdown condition and the remaining trip circuits would have provided core protection against DNB even if this had not been the case. The maximum error found would have resulted in the actual reactor ΔT exceeding the limit by not more than 0.10°F in achieving overtemperature ΔT trip.

Very truly yours,

Walter Stein

Walter Stein Manager, Nuclear Power Generation

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly