Con Edison
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
4 Irving Place, New York, N Y 10003

March 5, 1974

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
Facility Operating License
DPR-26
AEC Docket No. 50-247
A.O.-4-2-9

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing
Office of Regulations
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. O'Leary:

The following report is provided pursuant to the requirements of Section 6.12.2(a) of the Technical Specifications to Facility Operating License DPR-26.

In the course of performing periodic surveillance test PT-M11 "Steam Line Pressure Analog Channel Functional Test" on February 22, 1974, an inadvertent safety injection signal was generated which, by design, caused the accumulator discharge stop valves to open. At the time of the occurrence, the reactor was in the cold shutdown condition with the Residual Heat Removal System in service and a reactor coolant pressure and temperature of 150 psig and 115^{0}F respectively. Since the reactor coolant system was being operated in the solid mode, opening the accumulator valves pressurized the system to about 560 psig which was slightly in excess of the Technical Specification limit of 500 psig for indicated temperatures at or below 220^{0}F. The pressure was promptly reduced below the 500 psig limit by operator action.

The inadvertent safety injection signal occurred when the electrical technician placed bistable device 429C in protection Channel II in the trip position in accordance with the approved test procedure. This particular bistable, along with 419F and 439D, provide inputs to a two out of three logic for steam break protection for the main steam line from No. 24 nuclear steam generator upstream of the main steam isolation valve MS-1. We believe that bistable device 419F in protection Channel IV was not properly restored to the untripped mode upon completion of its test thus iniating a safety injection signal from the associated two out of

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Central files

March 15, 1974

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
A.E.C. Docket No. 50-247
Operating License DPR-26
A.O. 4-2-10

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Regulatory Operations, Region I
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

In accordance with the requirements of Section 6.12.2(a) of the Technical Specifications of Facility Operating License No. DPR-26, the following report is submitted:

> In the course of performing periodic surveillance test PT-R13 "Safety Injection System Test" a discrepancy was identified where following the actuation of the safeguards logic, valves 876A and 876B (sodium hydroxide tank discharge valves) did not open. An investigation conducted to determine the cause revealed that the valve relays, which are actuated by the separate safeguards logics, were incorrectly cross wired across the two D.C. buses. The two relays were rewired and retested satisfactorily.
>
> At the time of the occurrence, the reactor was in the cold shutdown condition. In addition, although the valves did not operate as a result of the safeguards initiation signal they were still operable in that they could be opened by the operator using individual valve control switches.

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Mr. Anthony Fasano of your office was informed of this occurrence by Mr. John M. Makepeace on March 15, 1974.

Very truly yours,

Walter Stein

Walter Stein, Manager
Nuclear Power Generation
Department

cc: Mr. John F. O'Leary

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three logic when 429C was placed in the trip position. The trip status lamps for both bistables were observed illuminated immediately after the safety injection signal.

There are considered to be no safety implications to this occurrence. There was no damage incurred to any system or component nor was there any reason to expect any as a result of a pressure transient of this magnitude. The pressure limitation of 500 psig at coolant temperatures of less than 220^{0}F is imposed only as a means of insuring additional conservatism in the application of fracture toughness concepts and includes the effects of fast neutron exposure which would occur over a two year period of operation. In light of the minimal amount that the limit was exceeded, and the fact that the reactor vessel has been exposed to only a small fraction of the neutron irradiation assumed, it is considered that the safety of the facility was not compromised by this occurrence.

Very truly yours,

Walter Stein

Walter Stein
Manager - Nuclear Power
Generation

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly