





Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
4 Irving Place, New York, NY 10003



March 15, 1974

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
A.E.C. Docket No. 50-247
Operating License DPR-26
A.O. 4-2-10

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Regulatory Operations, Region I
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406



Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

In accordance with the requirements of Section 6.12.2(a) of the Technical Specifications of Facility Operating License No. DPR-26, the following report is submitted:

In the course of performing periodic surveillance test PT-R13 "Safety Injection System Test" a discrepancy was identified where following the actuation of the safeguards logic, valves 876A and 876B (sodium hydroxide tank discharge valves) did not open. An investigation conducted to determine the cause revealed that the valve relays, which are actuated by the separate safeguards logics, were incorrectly cross wired across the two D.C. buses. The two relays were rewired and retested satisfactorily.

At the time of the occurrence, the reactor was in the cold shutdown condition. In addition, although the valves did not operate as a result of the safeguards initiation signal they were still operable in that they could be opened by the operator using individual valve control switches.

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PDR

Mr. James P. O'Reilly

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March 15, 1974

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Mr. Anthony Fasano of your office was informed of this occurrence by Mr. John M. Makepeace on March 15, 1974.

Very truly yours,

Walter Stein

Walter Stein, Manager
Nuclear Power Generation
Department

cc: Mr. John F. O'Leary —