Carl L. Newman
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May 28, 1974

Re Indian Point Unit No. 2
AEC Docket No. 50-247
Facility Operating
License No. DPR-26

Mr. John F. O'Leary, Director
Directorate of Licensing
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Office of Regulations
Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. O'Leary

In accordance with Section 6.12.2(b) of the Technical Specifications of Facility Operating License No. DPR-26, we wish to inform you of an Unusual Event which was reported to the Region I Regulatory Operations Office on April 26, 1974.

On that date it was determined that the Containment Isolation Valves PCV-1229, PCV-1230, on the Steam Jet Air Ejector diversion line to the Containment Building were electrically wired such that they would close on a Phase B containment isolation signal rather than a Phase A signal. These valves are normally closed and only operate to an open position when high radiation in the air ejector discharge flow is detected on Radiation Monitor R-15. The discharge flow will then be redirected from the plant vent to the Unit No. 2 Containment Building. Should a Phase A isolation signal be initiated by high containment pressure (2 psi above normal), however, these two valves were designed to close and isolate this diversion line into containment. The error made in wiring these valves instead caused them to operate on a Phase B signal which is initiated by high-high containment pressure (30 psi above normal).

When the discrepancy in the wiring was determined, immediate action was taken to assure that these valves would remain closed. The control air to the valve operators was isolated and the valve operators were bled of any remaining control air. Additionally, the control switches for these valves in the Central Control Room were put in the "closed" position. Redundant protection against maloperation of these valves was thus assured should containment isolation be required.

In the unlikely event that radioactive contaminants were able to leak into the secondary steam system, an early warning of this situation would be provided by the radiation alarms on the steam

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generator blowdown. If it becomes necessary, redirection of the exhaust flow could then be accomplished by re-establishing control air and by operation of the control switches from the Central Control Room. In the event that a Phase A isolation signal is encountered, the valves will be immediately closed by an operator from the Central Control Room. An operator will also be dispatched to isolate the control air from the valves in order to further assure that they will not be inadvertently opened.

There are considered to be no safety implications associated with this Unusual Event. The valves would still have operated to a closed position following the worst case design basis accident. Pressure in the Containment Building will quickly increase above 30 psig and a Phase B isolation signal would be generated.

The modification package describing the rewiring changes has been prepared by Westinghouse and will be available in the field this week for the implementation of the modifications.

Very truly yours

John D. Foore

for Carl L. Newman
Vice President

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