




Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
4 Irving Place, New York, NY 10003

October 9, 1974

Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
AEC Docket No. 50-247
A.O. 4-2-32

Regulatory File Cy.

Mr. Edson G. Case, Acting Director
Directorate of Licensing
Office of Regulation
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D.C. 20545




Dear Mr. Case:

In accordance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications to Facility Operation License DPR-26, the attached report of an Abnormal Occurrence is submitted.

Walter Stein *By RWS*
Walter Stein, Manager
Nuclear Power Generation

Copy to: Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Regulatory Operations



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- 1) Report Number: 50-247/4-2-32
- 2a) Report Date: October 9, 1974
- 2b) Occurrence Date: September 27, 1974
- 3) Facility: Indian Point Unit No. 2
- 4) Investigation of Occurrence:

This abnormal occurrence is the type defined by Technical Specification 1.8.b and relates to finding the safety injection accumulators to contain less than the amount of borated water required by the Technical Specifications.

- 5) Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

At the time of the occurrence, the unit was operating at approximately 80% of rated power.

- 6) Description of Occurrence:

The Unit No. 2 accumulator volumes were checked at the request of the AEC on September 26, 1974 by sending plant personnel into the Containment Building and obtaining direct measurements of the accumulator dimensions. It was found, based on these measurements, that the established operating levels for the accumulators were approximately 27 ft³ (about 4.5 inches) high relative to Technical Specification requirements. Immediate action was taken to reduce these levels to within the specified range.

A check on certain of the measurements was made on October 4, 1974, while the unit was in the cold shutdown condition, and it was found that an incorrect benchmark had been used and that in fact the accumulator levels were approximately 15 ft³ (or about 2.5 inches) low rather than 27 ft³ high.

- 7) Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The original design calculation of accumulator volumes was high by about 15 ft³ with regard to the volume of water recommended operating level would yield. Our determination of the exact normal volume of water was initially high by seven inches because the wrong benchmark was used in measuring water level.

8) Analysis of the Occurrence:

Lowering the level in the four accumulators on September 27, 1974 represented a reduction of about 170 ft³ in the amount of borated water contained in the accumulators. This volume was more than compensated for by the boric acid solution in the ten inch pipes connecting the accumulators to the Reactor Coolant System. Though the boric acid in this piping would be injected into the reactor coolant pipes in the event of loss of system pressure, their volume had not been included in the calculation performed to determine the minimum necessary accumulator level. The volume of boric acid solution required for prompt, passive injection indicated by analysis to meet the Technical Specification objective was therefore available.

In light of the above, the safety implications of this occurrence are considered to be slight.

9) Corrective Action:

The reactor is presently in a cold shutdown condition and prior to startup of the unit, proper level in the accumulators will be assured.

10) Failure Data:

Not Applicable

11) Notification:

An initial report of this occurrence was provided the Region 1 Regulatory Operations Office by telephone on September 27, 1974, followed by a facsimile letter dated the same day. A second telephone report was made on October 4, 1974, regarding our initial error in the volume calculation.