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
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April 14, 1972

Indian Point No. 2 Docket No. 50-247

Dr. Peter A. Morris, Director Division of Reactor Licensing U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Dr. Morris



On Thursday, April 6, 1972, preparations were being made to perform a 2500 psig hydrostatic pressure test of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). Measures were being taken, as required by Section 3.1.B of the Technical Specifications, to increase the coolant temperature to 220°F prior to bringing system pressure above 500 psig.

At the time of the occurrence, all four reactor coolant pumps were in service. In addition, the Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) was in service and had been used to maintain the coolant temperature at 170°F. RCS pressure was being maintained at 422 psig by regulation of charging flow in conjunction with a letdown flow of about 80 gpm from the RHRS. The RCS and the RHRS were solidly filled with water.

At approximately 0516 hours, the one operating residual heat removal pump was shut down in order to allow the coolant temperature to increase to the prerequisite 220°F for the conduct of the hydrostatic pressure test.

Dr. Peter A. Morris

In anticipation of a pressure increase, as a result of shutting down the RHR pump, coolant pressure was being closely monitored. As expected, shutting down this pump caused the pressure to increase. The operator had been previously instructed that if this should occur, he was to increase letdown flow and thereby decrease coolant pressure to its normal operating value. In an attempt to respond as directed, he properly took the low pressure letdown control valve controller out of the automatic mode, but instead of manually increasing letdown flow to return coolant pressure to the normal operating value, the operator inadvertently closed the control valve instead of opening it. This action caused the coolant pressure to rapidly increase to approximately 680 psig, a value at which it remained for about two minites. RCS pressure was then reduced below the Technical Specification limit of 500 psig over a period of ten minutes.

The operator involved in the above incident has been thoroughly reinstructed in proper normal and emergency operation of the RCS low pressure letdown control system. In addition, all Shift Supervisors, Watch Foremen and Control Room Operators, including those in training, have been familiarized with the occurrence.

In our letter of February 28, 1972, we transmitted the results of our study conducted to determine the effect of similar pressure increases on the integrity of the reactor vessel. In light of those results, we do not consider the above described non-compliance with Technical Specification 3.B.l to be of significant consequence from a safety point of view.

Mr. G. Madsen of the Commission's Compliance Division was promptly informed of the occurrence discussed above. In addition, the Director of the Region I Compliance Division was provided with an initial written report, by telegram dated April 6, 1972, as required by Section 6.6.1.B of the facility Technical Specifications.

Dr. Peter A. Morris

April 14, 1972

The Chairman of our Nuclear Facilities Safety Committee was also informed of this event, including a description of its cause and the measures taken to prevent recurrence.

Very truly yours

Willin & buldulch

CONTROL NO: 2054

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Reactor Coolant System PressureSurge for Con

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1 - C. Miles, C-459, GT

(ANL/ORNL/BNWL)

9 - National Laboratories

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