
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. 4 Irving Place, New York, N Y 10003
Telephone (212) 460-3819



June 27, 1973

Re Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. Indian Point Unit No. 2 AEC Docket No. 50-247



Directorate of Licensing U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Washington, D. C. 20545

Dear Mr. Kniel

In response to your letter of March 30, 1973, we have completed a review of the control circuits of all safety-related equipment at Indian Point Unit No. 2.

The results of the review for Indian Point Unit No. 2 are as follows: No circuits were found to have interlocking which would render redundant safeguards components inoperable because another component had been disabled. Various modes of tests, operation, and failure were considered as being the reason for the disabling of any one component, in order to assure that the loss of this one component, regardless of the reason, would not leave the plant with less than minimum safequards. Particular attention was paid to switchgear and motor starter auxiliary contacts that interlock in safequards circuits for various control and sequencing functions. The operation of these auxiliary contacts in all breaker positions, including the test and racked-out position, was considered. In all cases, it was found that when a component was disabled, its auxiliary contacts were not interlocked in other circuits in such a way that the disabling of this component would render redundant safequards circuits inoperable to the extent of preventing minimum safeguards action.

Within the context of the foregoing, control circuits considered important for plant safety were reviewed in the following areas:

Engineered Safety Features

- 1. Safety Injection System
- 2. Containment Spray System
- 3. Containment Air Recirculation, Cooling and Filtration System
- 4. Hydrogen Recombination System

Mr. Karl Kniel -2- June 26, 1973
Atomic Energy Commission

Re Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
Indian Point Unit No. 2
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Auxiliary and Emergency Systems

- 1. Chemical and Volume Control System
- 2. Component Cooling System
- 4. Residual Heat Removal System
- 4. Service Water System
- 5. Boric Acid Heat Tracing
- 6. Auxiliary Feedwater Systems
- 7. Diesel-Generators and Auxiliaries
- 8. Diesel-Generator Building Ventilation
- 9. Instrument Air System
- 10: Tunnel Ventilation

Consolidated Edison has a procedure which requires that whenever part of a redundant system is removed from service, the portion remaining in service is functionally tested immediately after the disabling of the affected portion and, if possible, before disabling of the affected portion. Such action shall be recorded in the Watch Foreman's log.

Very truly yours

enc. md William J. Cahill, Jr. Vice President

Copy to James P. O'Reilly, Director Regulatory Operations Region 1 U. S. Atomic Energy Commission 970 Broad Street Newark, N. J. 07102