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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title: Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

Docket Number: (n/a)


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1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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4	568TH MEETING
5	ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
6	(ACRS)
7	+ + + +
8	THURSDAY
9	DECEMBER 3, 2009
10	+ + + +
11	ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND
12	+ + + +
13	The Advisory Committee met at the Nuclear
14	Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North, Room
15	T2B3, 11545 Rockville Pike, at 8:30 a.m., Mario
16	Bonaca, Chairman, presiding.
17	COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:
18	MARIO V. BONACA, Chairman
19	SAID I. ABDEL-KHALIK, Vice Chairman
20	J. SAM ARMIJO, Member-at-Large
21	GEORGE E. APOSTOLAKIS
22	SANJOY BANERJEE
23	DENNIS C. BLEY
24	CHARLES H. BROWN, JR.
25	MICHAEL CORRADINI
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1	COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT (Continued):
2	OTTO L. MAYNARD
3	HAROLD B. RAY
4	MICHAEL T. RYAN
5	WILLIAM J. SHACK
6	JOHN D. SIEBER
7	JOHN W. STETKAR
8	
9	NRC STAFF PRESENT:
10	BRIAN HOLIAN
11	RICHARD PLASSE
12	ANN MARIE STONE
13	DUC NGUYEN
14	SUNIL WEERAKKODY
15	STEVE LAUR
16	HARRY BARRETT
17	PAUL LAIN
18	ALEX KLEIN
19	DONNIE HARRISON
20	EDWIN HACKETT
21	JOHN MCKIRGAN
22	HANRY WAGAGE
23	ALLEN NOTAFRANCESCO
24	AMY CUBBAGE
25	ANTONIO DIAS
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14 DAN NAUS 15 WAYNE MARQUINO 16	12	TOM DOWNING	
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	5
1	TABLE OF CONTENTS
2	PAGE
3	
4	Opening Remarks by Chairman Mario Bonaca5
5	
6	License Renewal Application for Prairie Island
7	Nuclear Generating Plant Units 1 and 2:
8	
9	Remarks by Subcommittee Chairman
10	Briefing by NRC staff 11
11	Briefing by Prairie Island
12	
13	Draft Final Regulatory Guide 1.205 and Draft Final
14	Standard Review Plan Section 9.5.1.2:
15	
16	Remarks by Subcommittee Chairman
17	Briefing by NRC staff81
18	Briefing by Prairie Island
19	
20	Long-term Core Cooling Approach for the Economic
21	Simplified Boiling Water Reactor Design:
22	
23	Remarks by Subcommittee Chairman 141
24	Briefing by NRC staff142
25	
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	6
1	
2	TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
3	PAGE
4	
5	Draft Final Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide
6	1.151:
7	
8	Remarks by Subcommittee Chairman 175
9	Briefing by NRC Staff 178
10	
11	
12	Adjourn
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
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2	<u>PROCEEDINGS</u>
3	(8:29 a.m.)
4	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Good morning. The
5	meeting will now come to order.
6	This is the first day of the 568th meeting
7	of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards.
8	During today's meeting, the Committee will consider
9	the following:
10	License renewal application for the
11	Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plants, Units 1 and
12	2;
13	Draft final Regulatory Guide 1.205, "Risk-
14	informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection for
15	Existing Light-water Nuclear Power Plants," and draft
16	final Standard Review Plan, Section 9.5.1.2, "Risk-
17	informed Performance-based Fire Protection";
18	Long-term core cooling approach for the
19	economic simplified boiling water reactor design;
20	Draft final Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide
21	1.151, DG-1178, "Instrument Sensing Lines";
22	Subcommittee reports;
23	And preparation of ACRS reports.
24	Portions of the sessions related to long-
25	term cooling for the ABWR design may be closed to
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protect information that is proprietary to GEH.

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This meeting is being conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Peter Wen is the Designated Federal Official for the initial portion of the meeting.

I have received no written comment or 6 request for to make oral statements from members of 7 8 the public regarding today's sessions. There will be 9 several people from GEH on the phone bridgeline to listen to the discussion regarding long-term cooling 10 for the ESBWR design. At the introduction of the 11 12 meeting the phone will be placed in a listening in during presentation 13 mode the and committee discussions. 14

A transcript of portions of the meeting is being kept, and it is requested that the speakers use one of the microphones, identify themselves and speak with sufficient clarity and volume so that they can be readily heard.

I will begin with some items of current 20 Mr. Otto Maynard, who has been with the 21 interest. ACRS since January 30, 2006, will be leaving the 22 23 Committee at the end of his term, which expires on January 29, 2010. For the last four years, Mr. 24 25 numerous contributions Maynard made to the ACRS

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9 1 reviews specifically in the area of operating 2 experience, license renewal, and performance-based regulation. 3 He was also the first Chairman of the U.S. 4 5 ABWR Subcommittee. His valuable contributions, professionalism dedication and much 6 are very appreciated. His technical expertise and camaraderie 7 will be surely missed. 8 9 Thank you for your support in these four 10 years. 11 MEMBER MAYNARD: Okay. Thank you. 12 (Applause.) CHAIRMAN BONACA: Dr. John Flack has been 13 with the Agency for 27 years, of which about seven 14 years has been with the ACRS and ACNW. He is now 15 retiring at the end of December 2009. During his 16 tenure at the ACRS, he has provided outstanding 17 technical support to the committee in its review of 18 19 numerous matters, including safety culture and fuel cycle facilities. 20 21 Dr. Flack also expertly supported the ACNW in the areas of spent nuclear fuel pre-processing and 22 23 fabrication facilities, risk-informing nuclear materials, and waste processes, and the review of 24 25 long-term research activities. His education, hard **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

10 1 work, professionalism, attention to details and 2 willingness to accept additional responsibilities are 3 very much appreciated. 4 Thank you and good luck in continuing your 5 future endeavors. (Applause.) 6 CHAIRMAN BONACA: And then Mr. Michael 7 8 Lee, who has been with the ACRS and ACNW for about 9 nine years will be moving to the Office of Federal and 10 State of Materials and Environmental Monitoring Programs, FSME by late December 2009. 11 During his 12 tenure on the ACRS he provided technical support to the Committee in its review of several matters, 13 including the AP-1000 amendment, the associated COL 14 15 applications, and related seismic design issues. Previously Mr. Lee supported the ACNW in 16 the areas of low level radioactive waste management, 17 fuel transportation, and civil 18 spent engineering 19 issues for Yucca Mountain. His in depth knowledge of 20 the regulatory processes and technical support to the Committee reviewing several complex technical issues 21 are much appreciated. We wish h good luck on his 22 future endeavors. 23 (Applause.) 24 25 Okay. Finally, this is CHAIRMAN BONACA: **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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1 the end of the people leaving the ACRS. So before we 2 move on to the agenda, I would like to point out that there has been significant effort to build another 3 4 room which parallels this room. You're familiar with Officially it has not been used, and so we'll 5 that. use it, but what's going to happen, at 12:30 we're 6 7 going to have the ribbon cutting ceremony for that 8 room, and the Chairman of the Commission will come and 9 participate in the ribbon cutting. So if the meeting bumps into 12:30, we will just take a break at that 10 11 point and then come back after lunch or we'll decide 12 then depending on where we are with the agenda.

And this is the last point I have to make. We will move now to the items on the agenda, and the first one is the license renewal application for the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2, and Mr. Harold Ray is going to take us through the presentations by the licensee and the ACRS staff.

MEMBER RAY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As you say, we are going to review here the license renewal application of Prairie Island Units 1 and 2. The Subcommittee had the benefit of meeting with the Applicant and staff in July, July 7th meeting, and follow-up items from that meeting are listed in the schedule that's before you there either

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in the items to be touched upon in the Applicant presentation or in the subsequent staff presentation.

Let me just make one introductory comment about one of the SER open items now closed, but also a matter that was discussed at the Subcommittee that members of the Committee may want to follow more closely. This is a plant which has had intermittent leakage of borated within containment, water specifically during refueling outages when the refueling canal is flooded up. 10

The effort to locate and arrest 11 that 12 leakage and prevent it from continuing is part of the story, but the more interesting part of the story, I 13 believe is how the concern that may or may not exist 14 15 with regard to the consequences of that leakage have been addressed. A lot of discussion has gone on in 16 writing as well as in meetings about whether this 17 should or should not be a concern, but at the end of 18 19 the day, the matter is at least closed in the SER, as you'll hear, by measures that the Applicant 20 has committed to take that address the effects potentially 21 on the concrete, on the reinforcing steel, and on the 22 containment liner plate, each of those individually. 23

24 The program to monitor, of course, is 25 under structural monitoring program, as well as for

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13 1 the containment boundary, Section 11 program. So 2 that at least the focus of my attention has been on --3 and I know the staff has closed now the open item on 4 the basis of measures that the Applicant will be 5 address each of those three areas taking to of potential effects of this leakage. 6 There are several other items here listed. 7 8 I won't go into each of them because they'll be 9 touched upon as you see in the agenda. And with that I'll turn it over to Brian Holian to introduce the 10 staff and proceed. 11 12 MR. HOLIAN: Good. Thank you. Good morning. My name is Brian Holian. 13 I'm the Division Director for the Division of License 14 15 Renewal at NRR, and we are here to discuss Prairie Island today. 16 do brief 17 I'11 introductions, and the agenda is that the licensee will take the bulk of the 18 19 presentation and address the open items and their resolution, and then the staff will comment on them 20 also. 21 To my left is Mr. Rick Plasse. He has 22 been the project manager for Prairie Island the entire 23 will doing bulk of 24 time, and he be the the 25 presentation for the staff when we are up. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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To my right is Mr. Dave Wrona. He is the Branch Chief responsible for the Prairie Island and other reviews in license renewal.

4 Also in the audience there are other 5 Branch Chiefs and technical staff from NRR and the Division of License Renewal who you will hear from 6 with questions or in response to questions as needed. 7 8 I'd like to highlight Dr. Sam Lee, the Deputy in the 9 Division of License Renewal and also in from Region 3 today is the Branch Chief from the Division of Reactor 10 Safety, Ann Marie Stone right behind me. 11

12 One other item besides the open items I'd just like to comment on is Prairie Island was the 13 first plant that we had a Memorandum of Understanding 1415 with, with the Prairie Island Indian community to deal primarily with environmental issues. They had areas 16 of expertise and items like environmental 17 justice, archeology, and that has worked very well. 18 We have worked with them as kind of a cooperating agency 19 status, and in reviewing those items in a close 20 manner, and they were able to take the time to give us 21 data and information that they had. 22

23 So I just wanted to highlight that to the 24 Committee.

With that I will turn it over to Mark

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1	Schmel, Site Vice President for Prairie Island.
2	MR. SCHMEL: Thank you.
3	My name is Mark Schmel. I'm a Site Vice
4	President, Prairie Island. To my left is Mr. Gene
5	Eckholt. He is the license renewal project manager.
6	To my right is Steve Skoyen. He is the engineering
7	programs manager.
8	The license renewal project team and
9	subject matter experts are sprinkled throughout the
10	crowd here that can provide additional information
11	should we need it.
12	And we are here today to provide responses
13	to the follow-up issues identified during the
14	Subcommittee meetings and address questions in support
15	of license renewal.
16	The agenda, the site description, Mr.
17	Eckholt will carry us through that, and then we will
18	turn it over to the ACRS License Renewal Subcommittee
19	follow-up items, which will be handled both by Steve
20	and Gene, and then we'll open up to any questions at
21	the end. We will answer questions as they go along or
22	any way you would like to handle it.
23	So with that I'll turn it over to Mr.
24	Eckholt, and he will take us through the site
25	description.
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MR. ECKHOLT: Good morning. I'll provide 2 a little background information on the prevailing site 3 and the plant design. The other state's power company 4 in Minnesota is the plant owner, license holder, and 5 operator of the Prairie Island units. Northern States Power, Minnesota is a subsidiary of Xcel Energy. The 6 is physically located southeast the 7 plant of 8 Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area on the 9 Mississippi River. The construction permits for the two units 10 was issued in June of 1968. The operating licenses 11

were issued in August of 1973 for Unit 1 and October of 1974 for Unit 2, and of course, then those licenses expire 40 years later in 2013 and 2014.

The license renewal application to extend those licenses an additional 20 years was submitted in April of 2008.

A little design information on the plant. Both units are two-loop PWR units, 1,650 megawatts thermal, 575 megawatts electrical per unit. Westinghouse was the NSSS vendor. The architectural engineer was Pioneer Service and Engineering.

Cooling for the plant is provided through a once through cooling system from the Mississippi River. It is supplemented during the summer months by

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four mechanical draft cooking towers.

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The ultimate heat sink is the Mississippi River through what we call the cooling water system. You may be more familiar with the term "service water system."

6 Because containment is pertinent to the 7 cavity leakage and because the containment design is a 8 little unique for PWR, I'll spend just a couple of 9 minutes here describing the containment design. If 10 you'll bear with me for a second here, I'll get the 11 drawings.

12 Prairie Island uses a dual containment There is a steel vessel with a limited 13 design. leakage concrete shield building around it. There's 14about a five foot annulus around the sides between it. 15 The steel vessel provides the primary containment 16 The lower head is encased in 17 pressure boundary. concrete on both sides, as you can see in the drawing. 18

19 Because it is the primary pressure 20 boundary without any concrete backing it up for 21 support, the wall thickness is much thicker than most PWR vessels. The bottom head and side walls are an 22 23 inch and a half thick. The top dome is three-quarters of an inch. 24

MEMBER CORRADINI: What is the design

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18 1 pressure system? 2 MR. ECKHOLT: Richard? MR. PEARSON: The question is what is the 3 4 design pressure? 5 MEMBER CORRADINI: yes. MR. PEARSON: And it is about 46, 47 6 7 pounds psig. 8 MEMBER CORRADINI: Thank you. 9 MEMBER RAY: Identify yourself, please. 10 MR. PEARSON: Oh, excuse me. I'm Richard from Prairie Island, the License Renewal 11 Pearson 12 Group. MEMBER SHACK: What does limited leakage 13 14 mean? Maybe Richard can address 15 MR. ECKHOLT: that while he is there. 16 17 MR. PEARSON: The reactor containment vessel is, of course, very tight leakage, and that's 18 19 against which an integrated leak rate test is done. The shield building is limited leakage in that it's a 20 21 secondary type of containment. We actually under accident conditions have a system that draws a slight 22 23 vacuum on that annulus space, and so that any leakage that goes out of the shield building is going to come 24 25 instead of going out. **NEAL R. GROSS**

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19 The shield building has concrete block 2 shield walls for the equipment hatch opening. It also 3 has boundaries that go into the auxiliary building, 4 and those types of things then are maintained under 5 vacuum under accident condition. MEMBER SHACK: But there is no liner of 6 7 any sort? 8 MR. PEARSON: No, there is no liner of any 9 The shield building is strictly concrete. sort. The containment vessel is steel. 10 MEMBER CORRADINI: So just for the sake of 11 12 comparisons, so it's a similar design to Kewanee and Ginna? 13 PARTICIPANT: Correct. 14 Well, not Ginna, 15 MR. PEARSON: but Kewanee and Sorry Island are sister plants designed by 16 the same people. St. Lucie has a similar design. 17 Oh, they did a much thicker wall in order to reduce the 18 19 size of their containment. 20 MEMBER CORRADINI: Thank you. But maybe to follow on Bill's question 21 because I just assumed, under any sort of accident 22 conditions, you will have the primary comment. 23 The steel shell is your leakage barrier. 24 25 MR. PEARSON: The steel shell--**NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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1	MEMBER CORRADINI: for 10 CFR 100.
2	MR. PEARSON: That is correct.
3	MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay. Thank you.
4	MR. ECKHOLT: Any other questions?
5	The other thing to note is the containment
6	vessel wall is thicker around penetrations. That's
7	pertinent when we get to discussion of the ECCS sump,
8	the RHR pipes penetrant that contain the bare walls
9	about three and a half inches thick there. We will be
10	discussing that area shortly.
11	At this time we're going to move on to
12	address the follow-up items on the License Renewal
13	Subcommittee meeting. We'll be addressing four:
14	refueling cavity leakage, condensate storage, tank
15	examinations, and two items in the underground voltage
16	cables, manhole inspection interval, and the pact on
17	these conditions.
18	At this point I'd like to turn it over to
19	Steve Skoyen to discuss refueling cavity leakage.
20	MR. SKOYEN: With respect to the fuel
21	cavity leakage, I'm going to go over a brief history
22	of the issue or what caused and associated corrective
23	actions, monitoring and assessment actions that we
24	have been taking, the long-term aging management, and
25	evaluation of any potential degradation.
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We've experienced intermittent cavity leakage on both units sine the late 1980s. The estimated leak rate is one to two gallons per hour. That was based upon measurements that were taken prior to any mitigating actions.

Most commonly observed in the ECCS sump and the regenerative heat exchanger room; that room is located directly under a refueling cavity.

9 We've used several sealing methods in the First, we went with an insta-coat material, 10 past. 11 strippable coating. We later moved into using a 12 caulking material as we kind of focused in on where the leakage was coming from. Those were inconsistent 13 and were very dependent upon the completeness and the 14 15 quality of how they were applied.

As a result, the increased focus on longterm aging management of this issue and on the containment structure is it made it clear that we needed to have a permanent solution to this issue. Thereby we initiated a root cause in early 2009 to identify the cause as well as a permanent solution.

22 MEMBER CORRADINI: I think you said it, 23 but just to make sure I understand, so it is not 24 during operation. It's during refueling where you 25 filled the transfer region; is that correct?

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1	MR. SKOYEN: Only when the refueling
2	cavity is flooded.
3	MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay. Thank you.
4	MR. SKOYEN: Is it of concern.
5	MEMBER SIEBER: Do you use a removable
6	seal between the reactor vessel flange and the floor
7	of the cavity, right?
8	MR. SKOYEN: Yes, we do.
9	MEMBER SIEBER: And that's where the
10	leakage is?
11	MR. SKOYEN: No. The leakage that we're
12	concerned with is actually in the lower cavity.
13	MEMBER SIEBER: I'm sure you'll get to it.
14	MR. SKOYEN: Yes, we'll be discussing that
15	in detail.
16	The slide currently up on the screen
17	identifies the two locations where we commonly see
18	leakage if we are going to have that. They include
19	both the ECCS sump and the regen. heat exchanger room.
20	The path to the ECCS sump, once the water is
21	underneath the refueling cavity liner, can travel
22	through the construction joint between the floor of
23	the transfer pit and the wall behind the transfer to
24	the inner wall of the containment vessel.
25	Once it reaches that point, it can travel
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23 down horizontally between the containment vessel and the concrete. Once it is in this area, the thinnest point is the grout in the ECCS sump, and that's where we actually see the leakage if we're going to have it in that location. The path from the regenerative heat exchanger room, once the leakage gets under the liner

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9 concrete and then shows up when it seeps through the 10 ceiling and the walls in that particular room.

in that location, it can follow hairline cracks in the

11 MEMBER BANERJEE: Does the water coming into the ECCS sump carry any particles with it? 12

SKOYEN: We verified that it's 13 MR. refueling cavity water, but a boron concentration. 14 We 15 have also tested it for iron, and it is extremely low.

MEMBER BANERJEE: So there is no suspended 16 real particles or anything. 17

MR. SKOYEN: No.

MEMBER BANERJEE: It's just clean water, 19 correct? 20

MR. SKOYEN: Refueling cavity water.

22 MEMBER SHACK: Have you measured the pH of 23 that water?

24 MR. SKOYEN: Yes, we have. The most 25 2009 recent leakage that we had during our fall

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24 1 outage, the pH of the water that came through the ceiling in the regen. heat exchanger room was 8.56. 2 3 MEMBER BANERJEE: Was how much? 4 MEMBER SHACK: Say that one again. 5 MR. SKOYEN: Eight, point, five, six. (Laughter.) 6 MEMBER BANERJEE: It sounded like .56. 7 8 MR. SKOYEN: Oh, I'm sorry. I'm so sorry. 9 MEMBER CORRADINI: That the рΗ was measured at the leak. 10 11 MR. SKOYEN: Correct. MEMBER CORRADINI: What's the pH of the 12 water you have into the cavity that's leaking through 13 the path? 14 MR. SKOYEN: I believe that's closer to on 15 the order of five. 16 17 MR. DOWNING: Yes, that's correct. It's close to five. 18 MEMBER RAY: You have to stand up and 19 identify yourself, please. 20 MR. DOWNING: My name is Tom Downing. I 21 work at Prairie Island as the ISI engineer, and the pH 22 of the refueling cavity water, I believe, is in the 23 realm of five. 24 25 MR. SKOYEN: We completed our root cause **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

evaluations previously mentioned in april 2009. As a result of that root cause evaluation, we determined that the sources of the leakage were long in anchor bolts where they protrude through the floor embedment plates for the reactor vessel internal stance and the rod control cluster assembly change fixture, both on the floor of the lower cavity and in the transfer canal itself.

9 MEMBER CORRADINI: So I guess I'm not 10 familiar with your verbiage. So it's where you put 11 the stuff when you're refueling, not the support 12 directly, but it's all the lay-down support structure.

MR. SKOYEN: That is correct.

MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay. And the platingbetween the structure. Okay.

16 MR. ECKHOLT: We've got a drawing coming17 up that will show.

MR. SKOYEN: We reached that conclusion based upon a good correlation between ceiling in those areas and the absence of leakage, as well as an analysis of the design. That revealed that a seal well, which we'll show in a later slide, if that fails, an anchor bolt then could cause a leak where flow could go past an anchor bolt.

We also completed an evaluation of any

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potential degradation that could have occurred based upon the cavity leakage that has occurred over the years, and that concluded that the exposure of the containment vessel and structures to refueling cavity water has not had an adverse pact on their ability to meet design requirements.

7 What's shown on this slide is a typical 8 reactor vessel internal stand support as well as an 9 RCC change fixture support. The bolts which you'll 10 see coming up through there to attach those stands 11 actually come through the embedment plates.

The red material that you see in the picture is the caulk that we've been utilizing to seal between the nuts and between the embedment and base plates. That was a material that we put on at the beginning of the outage and then remove at the end of the outage.

18 MEMBER STETKAR: You mentioned earlier in 19 the questioning that you've had leakage this fall in 20 this year's outage also.

21 MR. SKOYEN: We'll be talking more about 22 that when we get a later slide.

MEMBER STETKAR: Thanks.

24 MR. SKOYEN: The original embedment plate 25 construction is show on this picture, and I'd like to

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point out the existing seal weld. If that failed, you can see that there is a direct path that can go then to the concrete underneath.

The two paths that it could take if the weld fails, one would be along the threads of the stud where it goes through the embedment plate. The other path would be between the embedment plate and the base plate.

Next slide.

fall 10 During the of 2009, took we 11 corrective actions based upon our root cause to 12 permanently fix these locations. We removed the existing nuts, replaced them with blind nuts. 13 The blind nuts were then seal welded to the base plate. 14 15 The seal weld was applied also between the base plate and the embedment plate. 16

To insure the quality integrity as well, we perform both a visual examination and a dye penetrant examination.

The finished plat, as an example, this is an internal stand support, and you can see the blind nut, the seal weld around the blind nuts, and then the seal weld between the base plate and the embedment plate.

The repair of the floor embedment plates

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28 1 has eliminated 95 to 97.5 percent of the leakage that 2 we had historically experienced. The ECS sump did not 3 show any leakage in salvage. So we know that, based upon that, we are confident that none of it reached 4 5 the actual containment vessel itself. We only observed minor leakage on the 6 7 ceiling of the regen. heat exchanger room. That 8 appeared after the cavity flooded for was 9 approximately 14 days, and is estimated to be .05 gallons per hour, or about seven drops per minute. 10 We believe that to be a different source 11 12 of leakage between the floor embedment plates, but we'll go further in a later slide. 13 MEMBER SIEBER: I have a question. In the 14 15 bolting ISI program, do you examine these bolts as part of that program? 16 17 MR. SKOYEN: These bolts are not part of the ISI program. 18 19 MEMBER SIEBER: With this repair you can't examine them. 20 MR. SKOYEN: That's correct. 21 MEMBER SIEBER: Typically you would shoot 22 UT down the center line of the bolt, the cracks and 23 the --24 25 MR. SKOYEN: It is some sort of a --**NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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1	MEMBER SIEBER: A probe now.
2	MR. SKOYEN: Correct, and to remove the
3	stands in the future. If that's necessary, we'll have
4	to remove the seal welds.
5	MEMBER SIEBER: Right. Thanks.
6	MEMBER CORRADINI: I'm sorry. You
7	answered Jack. So you're saying if necessary you can
8	go in and take out what you showed as a cross-section
9	and redo it.
10	MR. SKOYEN: That's correct.
11	MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay.
12	MR. SKOYEN: As mentioned previously, we
13	have no evidence of leakage having reached the
14	containment vessel itself or the steel pressure
15	vessel. We did not have any leakage in the ECCS sump
16	and noticed no wetness or indication coming through in
17	that area. That's been one of our more consistent
18	indicators of leakage.
19	There was no leakage at the intersection
20	of the transfer tube and containment vessel concrete.
21	Though we haven't seen leakage there in some time,
22	there is evidence that it has leaked there in the
23	past.
24	We also only experienced minor leakage
25	observed in the regen. heat exchanger room, and it was
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very responsive to cavity level. As soon as we lowered cavity level, the leakage essentially stopped, indicating that there wasn't probably enough pressure under the cavity liner to push it up and along the transfer tube.

We went into our fall 2009 outage with 6 7 some additional inspection and testing that we were 8 going to perform to further confirm that we understood 9 the cause of the leakage. We performed vacuum box 10 testing of the refueling cavity and liner plate in the 11 lower cavity, all of those seal welds and identified 12 no leakage. We also went approximately six feet up the walls in the lower cavity. 13

We performed NDE of the transfer tube welds. It did not identify any indications. That included both dye penetrant and visual inspection where we could not reach there to do the dye penetrant examination.

Additionally, we also did inspection of the lower cavity to look for any depressions or socked areas that would be indicative of a washout, and none were identified.

As a result of the continued leakage that we noticed in the regen. heat exchanger room, we performed some of the expanded inspections, and that

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included NDE of the liner plate, liner to floor embedment fillet welds. Those had been done previously, but it had been approximately ten years. So we wanted to validate that those welds still were good.

We did identify one porosity indications not believed to be a likely source of leakage because that's a multiple pass weld, and this was on the surface. That weld will, however, be repaired during our next Unit 1 refueling outage.

We also are evaluating the source of the 11 12 remaining Unit 1 leakage. We believe that it's likely to be the RCC guide box wall embedment plates. 13 We fixed the RCC change fixture flow embedment plates. 14 These are actually on the wall itself. The design is 15 very similar to the floor embedment plates, where a 16 bolt protrudes through the embedment plate where the 17 seal weld, if it fails, could be a path for leakage. 18

This had been an item that was identified in our root cause as a potential source of a leakage, but given the correlation that we had between ceiling of the embedment plates on the floor and the absence of leakage, it was not repaired during this Unit 1 outage.

Both of these areas are recognized as a

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1	vulnerability and will be repaired during our next
2	Unit 1 and Unit 2 refueling outages.
3	MEMBER SIEBER: Now, the materials of
4	these various embedment plates and support structures
5	that are attached to it, what is that material,
6	stainless?
7	MR. SKOYEN: The type
8	MR. DOWNING: Yes, my name is Tom Downing,
9	and I'm from the Prairie Island plant, and I
10	understand the question is what are the materials of
11	the embedment plates.
12	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, and the structures
13	attached to it.
14	MR. DOWNING: Right. All of the materials
15	in the refueling cavity, at least the liner, the
16	embedment plate, the anchor bolts are 300 series
17	stainless steel. My recollection is that they are 304
18	stainless steel.
19	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. Thank you.
20	MR. SKOYEN: We also are realizing the
21	existing RCE that we completed this past spring to
22	determine if there are any other potential leakage
23	sources and any additional inspections that we need to
24	undertake prior to our next Unit 1 and Unit 2
25	refueling outages.
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During our spring 2010 Unit 2 outage, we will be repairing the reactor vessel internal stance, RCCA change fixture for embedment plates, as we did with Unit 1 in the fall of this year. We will also be repairing the RCCA guide box for all embedment plates and performing an NDE of the embedment plate to liner welds at that location.

8 We will be performing a nondestructive 9 examination of the fuel transfer tube welds as we did in Unit 1, vacuum box testing of the refueling cavity 10 liner plate seam welds; again, the same thing we did 11 12 in Unit 1, and then also a nondestructive examination of the liner to flow embedment plate fill welds, and 13 then any other inspections or refers that result from 14 our evaluation revision. 15

From 2011 Unit 1 outage, we will 16 be preparing the RCCA guide box flow embedment plates. 17 We do recognize those as a possible source of leakage. 18 19 We'll be repairing the liner to flow embedment plate fillet weld porosity indication, and again, any other 20 inspections and repairs resulting from evaluation of 21 our unit, one experience this fall and anything that 22 comes out of our Unit 2 experience next spring. 23

We have monitored and assessed the impact over the years of the leakage that has occurred and

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what impact it could have. There have been multiple occasions we have removed the grout from the ECCS sump in both our Unit 1 and Unit 2. This was done prior to 2009 for both units. Grout was removed. The wall thickness measurements were at or above ASTM specifications, and we noted no corrosion of the containment vessel and no pitting.

8 This past fall we once again took the 9 grout out of the sump in Unit 1, and again, measured 10 the wall thickness. All readings were at or above 11 ASTM specifications, and no corrosion of the rebar or 12 containment vessel was noted.

13 MEMBER ARMIJO: Could you go back to that 14 figure that we looked upon that had a cross-section 15 and just explain what we're looking at there?

MR. SKOYEN: The pipe, the ECCS suction Ine, is for the RHR suction and you go on to emergency core installation. The sump itself is a concrete sump, and the lower elevation of containment that would collect the water in the event of a LOCA.

 21
 MEMBER ARMIJO: What does the blue

 22
 represent?

 23
 MR. SKOYEN: The blue represents the

24 grout.

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MEMBER ARMIJO: The group. That's what

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1	you removed?
2	MR. SKOYEN: That's correct.
3	MEMBER ARMIJO: Okay.
4	MR. SKOYEN: Not all of it. We removed a
5	section.
6	MEMBER ARMIJO: Okay, and then you did
7	inspection of the underlying material.
8	MR. SKOYEN: Steel containment vessel.
9	That's correct.
10	MR. ECKHOLT: Okay. There are pictures on
11	that, right?
12	MR. SKOYEN: Yes. And we didn't expect
13	it, but we did find rebar when we did the excavation
14	this past fall, which provided us the opportunity to
15	make an assessment of that as well. We didn't find
16	any degradation of the grout. The ribs on the rebar,
17	intact, and we didn't note any corrosion on the rebar.
18	The containment vessel itself was
19	mentioned previously. Wall thickness was at or above
20	specification, and we didn't observe any pitting as a
21	result of any corrosion. And we did not notice any
22	wet areas or leakage.
23	MEMBER ARMIJO: Why is rebar there? Why
24	isn't that just solid field containment?
25	MEMBER CORRADINI: It comes up from the
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1	concrete, I assume.
2	MR. SKOYEN: Correct.
3	MEMBER ARMIJO: Maybe I had better look at
4	that schedule.
5	MEMBER CORRADINI: When you got back to
6	the cross-sectional cartoon, I think that will help,
7	Sam.
8	MEMBER ARMIJO: Yeah, just show me what
9	we're looking at on that cross-section.
10	MEMBER SIEBER: That's the concrete.
11	MEMBER CORRADINI: The yellow is where?
12	That's, I guess, what
13	MEMBER ARMIJO: Yeah, that's
14	MR. ECKHOLT: I think the grout was taken
15	from alongside of the ECCS pipe.
16	MEMBER ARMIJO: Oh, okay. So there is
17	concrete around it.
18	MR. ECKHOLT: Correct.
19	MEMBER ARMIJO: All right.
20	MEMBER SIEBER: Now, this sump, have you
21	gone the GSI 191 sump strainer?
22	MR. SKOYEN: Yes, and that's the elbow you
23	see on top of the sump leads to the strainers
24	themselves.
25	MEMBER SIEBER: It looks like a pretty
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1	small sump.
2	MR. SKOYEN: It's fairly large.
3	MEMBER SIEBER: Oh, okay.
4	MR. SKOYEN: And the strainer capacity is
5	several hundred square feet.
6	MEMBER STETKAR: That's puny.
7	MEMBER BANERJEE: Very small, and you're
8	upgrading the strainers or
9	MEMBER SIEBER: No, he said they did it.
10	MR. SKOYEN: That's been completed.
11	MEMBER SIEBER: I wouldn't mind looking at
12	that from the details. Maybe staff in their submittal
13	has the description of what's been done along with
14	some drawings.
15	MEMBER SHACK: I'm quite comfortable with
16	the notion that what is good contact between the
17	concrete and the steel there's very little likelihood
18	of corrosion. I'm a little concerned that if you have
19	some sort of an open area where there's not good
20	contact between the water and the concrete, you could
21	have a bigger problem, and we certainly know there are
22	situations where the concrete hasn't filled everything
23	and you've left cavities.
24	There's a dominion report that had some
25	sort of bounding assumption that you would get .25
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38 1 inches of corrosion, and I just wonder what the 2 assumptions of that analysis were. 3 MR. SKOYEN: The assumptions of that 4 analysis were continually refreshed, borated water, in an area that the environment --5 MEMBER SHACK: What pН and 6 oxygen conditions? 7 8 MR. SKOYEN: Jeff. 9 MR. GORMAN: Jeff Gorman, Dominion 10 Engineering. The assumption was it is oxygenated, open 11 to the air, and neutral pH, around seven. 12 MEMBER SHACK: Around seven. 13 MR. GORMAN: That's very conservative at 14 15 an exposed surface. MEMBER SHACK: But it might not be so 16 conservative for an open area that was not in good 17 contact with the concrete, but 18 it's a bounding 19 calculation with the seven. MR. SKOYEN: Right, and we'll talk more 20 about what our expected degradation would be in a 21 later slide. 22 23 MEMBER RAY: So they've talked now about what has been done. What will come up is what's to be 24 25 done, which may be more interesting. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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39 MR. SKOYEN: We have also performed 1 2 ultrasound examinations of the containment vessel from the annulus, and those would be along the path that we 3 4 would have expected any leakage to have flowed. Unit 5 2 was last inspected in the fall of 2008, Unit 1 in 6 the fall of 2009. The areas that we examined were 7 from the transfer tube toward the ECCS sump, and then 8 above and behind the ECCS sump. The wall thickness at 9 all of those locations above ASTM was at or 10 specifications, and what you see on the projector is 11 the photograph from the annulus that allows us to 12 inspect from the back side to the inside of containment. 13 MEMBER ARMIJO: Which side is the steel? 14 15 MR. SKOYEN: This is steel right here. MEMBER ARMIJO: Steel on the right. 16 17 MR. SKOYEN: We do have several commitments for the next refueling outage, and each 18 19 unit following embedment plate repairs. We will be removing concrete from the sump below the actual 20 reactor vessel. That's the thinnest location, at the 21 lowest part of containment, and Pepco will be exposing 22 23 the containment vessel so that it can perform both a visual examination and ultrasonic examination 24 to 25 determine the thickness and validate our evaluation of

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potential degradation.

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We're performing an assessment of both concrete and then also performing petrographic examination of any removed concrete. If any water is found at that location when we remove the concrete, that will be evaluated as well.

We will also be removing concrete sample that has been wetted by borated water, leakage from the refueling cavity over a period of time. That concrete will be tested for compression strength, and we'll also undergo petrographic examination.

We also have a commitment for the next two consecutive refueling outages in each unit following our embedment plate repairs. We will be monitoring those areas that have previously exhibited leakage to confirm that the leakage has not recurred.

MR. ECKHOLT: And just to point out, these commitments will be completed prior to the period of extended operation.

20 MEMBER MAYNARD: Could you go back just a 21 minute? Exactly what concrete are you removing? It 22 says removal of concrete from sump below the reactor 23 vessel.

24 MR. ECKHOLT: You can see at the very 25 bottom of the drawing Sump C. You're going down

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41 through that location. That's the thinnest part of 1 2 the concrete. MR. SKOYEN: And that is between 15 and 18 3 4 inches of concrete that has to be removed. 5 MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. MEMBER RAY: So all of the debate about 6 7 what may or may not have happened is intended to be 8 verified here. SKOYEN: With respect to long-term 9 MR. 10 aging management, we're going to continue to manage 11 aging in the constrainment structure and the vessel 12 using the structure's monitoring program, as well as the ASME Section 11, Subsection IWE Program. 13 Any items that are found, of course, will 14 15 be put into our corrective action program for evaluation with new corrective actions being issued. 16 As mentioned previously, we have performed 17 a comprehensive evaluation of the potential 18 for 19 degradation. The steel containment vessel, the reinforced concrete, the evaluation concluded that any 20 potential corrosion of the containment vessel behind 21 the concrete in the areas that have been wetted by 22 refueling cavity water would be minor. 23 It also concluded that there has been no 24 25 significant effect on the reinforced concrete that has **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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42 been wetted by refueling cavity water. 1 MEMBER SIEBER: I would like to ask a 2 3 couple of questions. You can put it up. 4 MR. SKOYEN: Okay. G. 5 MEMBER SIEBER: Now, you get access, personnel access, in that very bottom sump under the 6 7 reactor vessel. Is there a hatch or some way in 8 there? 9 MR. SKOYEN: There is a hatch. often is 10 MEMBER SIEBER: How that inspected for leakage down there? 11 12 MR. SKOYEN: The Sump Charlie reactor vessel -- that's the name for it -- is gone into every 13 outage. 14 15 MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. What is the clearance between the vessel and the concrete along 16 the side wall? 17 MR. SKOYEN: The side wall? 18 19 MEMBER SIEBER: Yeah. MR. SKOYEN: The annulus area? 20 21 MEMBER SIEBER: Right. 22 MEMBER CORRADINI: Between the vessel and 23 that concrete right there. MEMBER SIEBER: What's the clearance 24 25 there? **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

43 MR. SKOYEN: I'll refer to Tom Downing to 1 2 answer that question. 3 MR. DOWNING: Hi. My name is Tom Downing, 4 ISI engineer at the Prairie Island plant. Ι 5 understand the question is how much clearance is there between the reactor vessel and the side wall. 6 7 Essentially there is no clearance. Actually there is 8 duct work for reactor vessel cooling that goes up 9 against the wall. So you can't really see between the reactor vessel. 10 The drawings indicate it's in the realm of 11 12 inches. You can see the side of the reactor vessel from up on the upper level of the refueling cavity 13 when you take the sand plug covers off and look down 14 15 there, but again, it's just some number of inches between the insulation on the reactor vessel and the 16 17 concrete. MEMBER So leakage from the 18 SIEBER: 19 refueling cavity sealed to the flange area of the vessel, you would not be able to see a major portion 20 of that pathway; is that correct? 21 Well, that leakage between 22 MR. DOWNING: the reactor vessel and the refueling cavity does make 23

25 watertight, and so it does come down the wall, and it

its way down into Sump C. That duct work is not

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collects in the sump.
MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. You're hoping that
it does.
MR. DOWNING: Well, every time we've had
leakage, a sample of covered leak or any other kind of
leak, the large majority of that water, and we believe
all the water, does make its way into that sump. We
do not believe that that is a source of refuel cavity
leakage that we see over in the ECCS sump, for
example.
MEMBER SIEBER: You don't have a neutron
shield tank, right?
MR. DOWNING: I'm sorry. Could you repeat
the question?
MEMBER SIEBER: You don't have a neutron
shield tank or do you have insulation on the outside
of the vessel?
MR. DOWNING: No, there is just stainless
steel insulation on the outside of the vessel.
MEMBER SIEBER: Okay. Thanks.
MR. SKOYEN: Just to summarize the
discussion, we have found no degradation of the
concrete or the steel containment vessel to date. The
evaluation of any potential degradation that could
have occurred indicates that it would be of low safety
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significance.

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We do understand the situation. We are continuing to evaluate that and are committed to eliminating the refueling cavity leakage on both of our units.

MR. SCHIMMEL: I guess I would like to just jump in here and restate what Steve just said. Prairie Island is committed to managing age-related issues during the period of extended operation, and we will go after corrective actions Steve outlayed (phonetic) within his presentation.

MR. SKOYEN: Gene?

At this point, if I can 13 MR. ECKHOLT: continue on, if there's no additional questions in 14 that area, with the other remaining follow-up items, 15 we'll start with the condensate storage 16 tank 17 examinations. During the Subcommittee meeting, -- you can see a slice of 18 members of the the 19 Subcommittee -- questioned our above-ground steel 20 tanks our commitment to ultrasonic program and 21 inspection of the bottom one of the three condensate storage tanks prior to the PEO. 22 The concern was 23 whether an inspection of only one tank would assure acceptability of all three tanks. 24

We took those comments to heart. We went

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back, looked at our program, and upon further evaluation we submitted a license renewal application change in August of this year, which revised the above-ground steel tanks program to include ultrasonic inspection of the bottom of all three condensate storage tanks prior to the PEO.

Next we'd like to talk about the two follow-up items related to underground medium voltage cables, the first being manhole inspection interval and the second, the impact of freeze/thaw conditions.

Again, during the Subcommittee meeting there was questions on the adequacy of our two-year inspection frequency for the manhole that's installed. That frequency is actually based on actually plant experience, and consistent with the GALL, the interval would never exceed two years.

We have one manhole in scope. We've done five inspections of that manhole sine September of 2007 and have found no signs of water intrusion or accumulation.

desiqn of the manhole precludes 21 The accumulation. A lot of picture here coming up next to 22 23 get a better idea. The floor of the manhole is a sand-gravel combination. The soil on the Prairie 24 25 Island site is very sandy. It drains very readily.

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47 The bottom of the manhole is approximately 1 2 ten feet above the water table, and the grade around 3 the manhole opening precludes significant water 4 intrusion. There is a crown that would keep 5 significant rain water from running in. Based the design it precludes 6 on 7 accumulation, and our experience to date based on five 8 previous inspections, we think a two-year inspection 9 frequency is sufficient. MEMBER MAYNARD: You think above the water 10 table, the normal water table, is that when the 11 12 Mississippi River is up at its highest? That would be the normal MR. ECKHOLT: 13 water table. Obviously the water table being that 14 close to the river would fluctuate with river level. 15 initiated a change to our 16 We have site flood 17 procedure, that if we reach a certain flood level, we will go initiate the inspection of the manhole to make 18 19 sure we haven't got water accumulating in case the 20 water table would have come up MEMBER MAYNARD: 21 And so you do have 22 provision in your inspection program for certain 23 conditions you would go out and inspect. MR. ECKHOLT: That's right. 24 25 MEMBER MAYNARD: It's not just on а **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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	48
1	straight periodic calendar time, here I go inspect?
2	MR. ECKHOLT: Right.
3	MEMBER MAYNARD: Okay.
4	MEMBER RYAN: What is that criteria?
5	MR. ECKHOLT: Joe.
6	MR. RUETHER: I'm Joe Ruether. Would you
7	repeat the question?
8	MEMBER RYAN: What's the criteria for that
9	inspection? Is it a certain water level relative to
10	the level of the cables? Is it a rise in the river
11	water? What's the dynamics of that?
12	MR. RUETHER: It would be a flood
13	condition where the water would raise the level of the
14	bottom of the pit.
15	MEMBER RYAN: I'm sorry. I didn't hear
16	you.
17	MR. RUETHER: It would be a flood
18	condition where the river would be at the level of the
19	bottom of the manhole.
20	MR. ECKHOLT: The criterion procedure, I
21	believe, is based on an actual river level.
22	MEMBER SIEBER: Right.
23	MEMBER RYAN: That corresponds to the
24	water being at the same level as the bottom of the
25	sump or the bottom of the concrete structure?
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	49
1	MR. SCHIMMEL: Joe, what he asked was what
2	kicks you in to go, I believe, to the inspection of a
3	sump based on some other parameter that you're
4	monitoring that says, "When I see this, I go do this."
5	What is that?
6	MR. RUETHER: It is an abnormal procedure
7	for flood. It's our flood procedure.
8	MR. ECKHOLT: And you would look at a
9	given river level which is defined in that.
10	MEMBER RYAN: Okay. So it 's the water
11	level in the river that kicks you into the procedure,
12	and you would correlate that with the water level in
13	this manhole access.
14	MR. RUETHER: That's correct.
15	MEMBER RYAN: Okay. What's the response
16	time between the two? The river can come up two feet.
17	How long does it take to reflect that change in
18	elevation in the sump?
19	MR. SCHIMMEL: If we don't know the
20	response to that, just say we don't know.
21	MR. RUETHER: I wouldn't know what the
22	response time would be.
23	MEMBER RYAN: I guess I'm just trying to
24	understand the kinetics of that. I mean, you might
25	initiate an inspection at a point where you haven't
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1	seen all of the river rise in the location. Do you
2	know what I mean? I'm just trying to understand that
3	a little bit.
4	MR. SCHIMMEL: Typically once we hit that
5	level on a procedure that would active the inspection,
6	we would go out pretty much on that shift and take a
7	look at the manhole.
8	MR. RUETHER: The action is actually based
9	on predicted level. We anticipate what the level is.
10	So this is a preparation. We're already prepared
11	before we get to that level.
12	MR. SCHIMMEL: I understand your question.
13	Your question is once you hit the conditions to go
14	look, how long does it take you to go look at that,
15	right?
16	MEMBER RYAN: Well, I'm sure that's fairly
17	quick. You might go look and say, "Oh, it's dry,"
18	come back in two weeks and it has responded more and
19	you're getting wet.
20	MR. SCHIMMEL: Fair point. Yeah.
21	MEMBER RYAN: So I'm just trying to
22	understand, you know. I mean, groundwater response
23	time I'm going to guess on the edge of the
24	Mississippi River could be
25	MEMBER SIEBER: Days.
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	51
1	MEMBER RYAN: days or weeks even
2	depending on the time of the year.
3	MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. You usually don't
4	have floods for weeks.
5	MEMBER RYAN: And this isn't just, you
6	know, a question for you all. I've been dissatisfied
7	with a lot of the generic answers about, well, we've
8	had a two-inch rain. So we went and looked at the
9	manholes. We did something and it was dry. So we're
10	okay.
11	Well, that's maybe not true because it may
12	be okay in two days after the rain, but two weeks
13	after the rain it could be flooded.
14	So without more sophisticated
15	understanding of the kinetics between the river and
16	the point of inspection and the time of inspection,
17	that's something to think about.
18	MR. SCHIMMEL: I understand. Fair
19	question.
20	MEMBER STETKAR: Gene.
21	MR. ECKHOLT: Yes.
22	MEMBER STETKAR: As I understand it, you
23	rerouted some cable so that this is the only manhole
24	that now contains cables that are in scope; is that
25	correct?
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	52
1	MR. ECKHOLT: That is correct.
2	MEMBER STETKAR: Do you know, could you
3	tell me what cables, in scope cables in particular,
4	are routed through this manhole, what systems, what
5	equipment?
6	MR. ECKHOLT: I'll let Joe answer that one
7	again.
8	MR. RUETHER: Joe Ruether.
9	These cables are 13.8 kV, and they're our
10	cooling tower source for our safeguard buses. It
11	basically has two off-site sources for safeguard
12	buses.
13	MEMBER BROWN: Are they independent off-
14	site sources?
15	MEMBER STETKAR: Are these the same
16	cables? You recorded cable failures due to water
17	intrusion in your response to Generic Letter 2007-01,
18	and two of those cables, if I read my notes correctly
19	here, were indeed 13.8 kV cooling tower supply cables.
20	Are these those cables?
21	MR. RUETHER: These are replacement
22	cables. We've dug a new trench and so this was
23	installed in 2005.
24	MEMBER STETKAR: This is a new manhole.
25	MR. RUETHER: This is a new manhole.
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MEMBER STETKAR: Oh, okay, okay, okay, 1 2 okay. Because I knew you had rerouted some of the 3 cables, and this is part of the rerouting path. 4 MR. RUETHER: That's correct. 5 MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. Thank you. MR. ECKHOLT: Is there another question? 6 MEMBER RYAN: One more question about the 7 8 environmental question. You say you're approximately 9 ten feet above the water table. What's the seasonal or annual fluctuation of the water table at this 10 location? 11 MR. ECKHOLT: I don't know. 12 MR. RUETHER: The river, this is behind 13 the pool for Lock and Dam No. 3. So it's pretty much 14 15 controlled by the dam. MEMBER RYAN: So the water level at this 16 location is not constant, no doubt, but is it one 17 foot, ten feet? 18 19 MR. SCHIMMEL: He's asking about what the fluctuation of the water level is. 20 MR. RUETHER: Ten feet would be a food 21 condition. 22 23 MR. SCHIMMEL: I guess our answer to this 24 don't know. Ιf you're asking about the is we 25 fluctuation in the pool level, it's 674, 674.5, is **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

what it's maintained at.

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MEMBER RYAN: Again, on all of these cable questions that have come up, you know, there's some source of like a river or a lake, and it changes, and there's a response to that at the location of interest either on the top of the manhole, in the cable chase, or wherever it might be.

8 What I'm trying to get a feel for is how 9 much does the water level change in the river affect the water here, and you know, in other circumstances 10 it's how much rainfall do you get at what rate over 11 12 what period of time and in what form, ice, snow, rain, and to cause the same kind of effects in 13 the collection point in the sump. 14

And those environmental variables to me really determine what kind of water condition you're going to look at here in the various circumstances.

18 MR. ECKHOLT: A ten-foot swing in
19 Mississippi River level is pretty significant.

MEMBER RYAN: That's a big deal, yeah.

MR. ECKHOLT: Yes.

22 MEMBER RYAN: It would be fairly close to 23 the saturated water level in the ground, would be 24 pretty much the same as in the river most of the time. 25 MR. SCHIMMEL: I don't believe we have the

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1	specifics that he's asking for.
2	MEMBER RYAN: That's okay. I think that's
3	helpful to understand that if you're really trying to
4	figure out is the inspection program adequate to see
5	those conditions where we know we'll have to take
6	action.
7	MEMBER MAYNARD: I'm at least glad to see
8	a program that is based on some parameter as opposed
9	to just a periodic
10	MEMBER RYAN: Yeah. It's very rare that
11	you're trying to tie it to the river water level.
12	That's very helpful, but the kinetics of it could be a
13	little bit complicated.
14	MEMBER STETKAR: Gene, I just want to make
15	sure I've got the history straight. You had some
16	cable failures. You rerouted the cables in question.
17	The manhole, the subject manhole that we're looking
18	at on the screen right now, is part of that new
19	routing path.
20	MR. ECKHOLT: That's correct.
21	MEMBER STETKAR: That's correct? And you
22	mentioned earlier that you had performed five
23	inspections since September of 2007 and discovered no
24	signs of water intrusion. That's of this manhole.
25	MR. ECKHOLT: That's correct.
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	56
1	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. Thanks.
2	MR. ECKHOLT: Any other questions?
3	(No response.)
4	MR. ECKHOLT: The last follow-up item is
5	there was a question asked during the subcommittee
6	meeting related to the possible impact of freeze/thaw
7	conditions on the aging of cable insulation. We
8	reviewed our operating experience with Prairie Island
9	to look for any evidence of accelerated cable
10	insulation aging related to freeze/thaw.
11	We also went to some additional
12	organizations. We went to the other Xcel Energy
13	nuclear site, the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant.
14	We talked to the Xcel Energy distribution folks,
15	which maintain extensive underground cable systems.
16	We talked with EPRI, and we also raised the question
17	with the NEI License Renewal Electrical Working Group.
18	And to all of that research and contacts
19	with outside organizations, we found no evidence, no
20	indication that freeze/thaw conditions have been
21	identified as the cause of cable insulation leading to
22	failure.
23	That's it. Any other questions?
24	CHAIRMAN BONACA: I have a question. You
25	mentioned that as we have seen the leakage before the
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57 1 repairs was one to two gallons per hour, and then you 2 told us that after the repair, the leakage in the ECCS sump was eliminated, and you had the leakage of 0.05 3 4 gallons per hour in the reactor refueling cavity. 5 MR. ECKHOLT: The regenerative heat 6 exchanger room. 7 CHAIRMAN BONACA: The question I had was 8 how much was the leakage in that room reduced. 9 MR. SKOYEN: On this particular unit, we 10 had not observed any leakage during the prior to 11 outages. 12 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay. Now, that may be because of 13 MR. SKOYEN: the location where actually leaking 14 it was is 15 difficult to access. It's in a lock tight red area. It's up on the mezzanine. So it's possible that it 16 17 could have been dripping at that same rate during the prior two outages, but we did not have any reports of 18 19 any leakage. 20 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yeah. I was trying to understand by my question whether, you know, the cure 21 that you have, I mean, in the room may not have been 22 completely stopping the leakage and the regenerative 23 room was affected and on target. It may not be a 24 25 complete stoppage, but you know, you seem to have **NEAL R. GROSS**

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identified the solution.

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MR. SKOYEN: We have eliminated 95, 97.5 percent of the leakage. We got the biggest single contributor by going out to the floor embedment plates. We do have a small source that remains that we'll continue to evaluate. We believe that it's likely that it's coming from the embedment plates on the --

9 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes, I understand. So 10 you're saying about 90 percent has been stopped even 11 for the regenerative exchanger room

MR. SKOYEN: I think that would be an accurate statement. We have been taking mitigating actions for several years. The estimate of one to two gallons per hour was taken several years ago prior to taking any mitigating action.

17 MEMBER MAYNARD: You said that the leakage 18 in that area was very sensitive to the level in the 19 refueling cavity.

MR. SKOYEN: Correct.

MEMBER MAYNARD: And what's the 21 approximate elevation of these wall mounts? 22 Are they 23 close to the water line, well below the water line? 24 MR. SKOYEN: They are up -- from the 25 bottom of the lower cavity up to the top one is in

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1 excess of 25 feet, and then there are different 2 elevations as you come down. I believe there's four 3 total. 4 MEMBER MAYNARD: You indicated that you 5 the pressure related by the water level thought changes, but it also could be the flaw that is just 6 7 close to the water level there, too, that you're 8 either covering or uncover it. 9 MR. SKOYEN: That's correct. 10 MEMBER ARMIJO: Have you looked at that as 11 a potential source? 12 MR. SKOYEN: At the? MEMBER ARMIJO: At, you know, the region 13 above the water level when the leak stops. 14 15 MR. SKOYEN: Yes, we have looked at, evaluated all of the penetrations on the cavity and in 16 17 the past have vacuum boxed -- Tom, correct me if I'm wrong -- the entire cavity. 18 19 MR. DOWNING: That's correct. 20 MEMBER ARMIJO: Okay. MEMBER STETKAR: I thought I heard you say 21 that you really didn't know whether there was leakage 22 23 in the heat exchanger room because nobody has been in there in a while. You discovered leakage this year. 24 25 Is it only because somebody had to go in there and do **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

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1	work, or did you actively go looking for it?
2	MR. SKOYEN: No, I was actively looking
3	for it when it was identified.
4	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.
5	MR. SKOYEN: And we knew that the ceiling
6	was a historical point of leakage. So rather than
7	inspecting it from the floor it's about 12, 14 feet
8	in the air we went up in the mezzanine area so that
9	we could get a close visual examination, and that's
10	when we identified.
11	MEMBER STETKAR: When you say the ceiling,
12	you mean that it would be the ceiling of the room, but
13	the bottom of the concrete area from the cavity,
14	right?
15	MR. SKOYEN: That is correct.
16	MEMBER RAY: Okay. The next case, Brian.
17	MR. HOLIAN: We'll just change places.
18	Once again, I introduced Rick Plasse, the
19	project manager for Prairie Island. That is Ann Marie
20	Stone to his right, and to his left is Kent Howard,
21	the project manager for Beaver Valley that we've just
22	completed who will be assisting with slides.
23	I'll turn it over to Rick to start the
24	presentation. Once again, on leakage, he'll cover a
25	little bit on the staff's review of that, and I just
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wanted to reiterate again, as Mr. Ray did at the beginning of this session, it is minor leakage that we've seen there, especially compared to some other plants that we've had. Indian Point that we had the Subcommittee meeting on recently had upwards from 40 gallons from the refueling cavity leakage.

However, that was caught, and they were very confident they had caught that in a sump type area right around the cavity and was routed down to containment. Prairie Island was a little different in that. It was -- I can't say the word --

PARTICIPANT: Circuitous

MR. HOLIAN: Thank you.

That kind of path, and the staff spent 14 15 some extra time just looking at any potential effects of that, and that's part of our effort at looking at 16 17 operating experience at individual plants and make sure we pull the strings on that. So I wanted to 18 19 credit some of the tech staff with those requests for additional information early on in the process that 20 caused us to look. 21

With that I'll turn it over to Rick
Plasse.
MR. PLASSE: Good morning. Yes, my name

24 MR. PLASSE: Good morning. Yes, my name 25 is Rick Plasse. I'm the project manager for Prairie

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Besides what Brian introduced, I'd like to just note a few of the staff and one of our contractors for the open items. On the waste gas tank I have Billy Rogers. He led the scoping and screening audit for the staff.

8 For the vessel internals program, I have Jim Medoff, who did the review of that item, and then 9 for the structural item I have in the audience Bryce 10 Lehman from the NRC staff, Abdul Sheikh from the NRC 11 12 staff, and we also have Dr. Dan Naus from Oak Ridge National Lab. He did some work with us with respect 13 to the concrete materials and structural engineering 14 15 aspects of our review.

I also have to my right Ann Marie Stone from the region, representing the region for the regional inspection, and I've got Kent as my colleague assisting me here with the slides.

I'll go for an overview of the staff review, the inspection that the region did, and items of interest which was requested by the ACRS in addition to the open items.

The staff review, as mentioned earlier, the SER with open items was issued June 4th. We had

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63 1 the Subcommittee on July 7th. We had 168 RAIs issued 2 through the process, and there 37 safety were commitments for both units as a result of the review. 3 4 The next slide. 5 Since the Subcommittee meeting, the staff 6 evaluated the additional information provided by 7 letters in May, which was on the VIP. June 5th, which 8 was waste gas; the 24th was on the reactor cavity 9 leakage; and then also on August 7th which we've 10 mentioned in the Applicant's presentation, and then there was additional follow-up on the PWR VIP 11 on 12 August 21st. The staff closed all three open items, and 13 the details of that were issued on October 16th, in 14the final SER, and the staff came to the determination 15 that the requirements of 54.29 alpha had been met. 16 Next slide. 17 The 71002 inspection that the 18 region 19 performed, they completed scoping and screening of the non-safety SSEs in the current 54 for an alpha two; 20 consisted of physical lock-downs of systems, verified 21 scoping and also noted material condition of the lock-22 23 downs. reviewed 24 They 24 of the 43 aging 25 management They reviewed the programs. program **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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64 documents, implementing procedures. They also did an entry at power in the Unit 1 containment and did a general view of the containment conditions, and in addition to that, they interviewed plant personnel as necessary as they did their review. They completed operating experience review. That consisted of system health reports; also the corrected action. They looked at all of the

corrective action reports associated with the 24 AMPs that they reviewed.

In addition, the inspection was observed 11 12 by the Prairie Island Indian community, Tribal Council The inspection conclusions, scoping of 13 President. non-safety SSEs and aging management programs 14 are 15 acceptable. Inspection results supported a conclusion of reasonable assurance that aging effects will be 16 managed and intended functions will be maintained. 17

18 MEMBER CORRADINI: I have just an 19 informational question. The fourth bullet, is that 20 under some agreement between the tribe and the state 21 or is that informal?

22 MR. PLASSE: As mentioned earlier, we had 23 a Memorandum of understanding.

24MEMBER CORRADINI: With the NRC and the25tribe?

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1	MR. PLASSE: Yes, right.
2	MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay. Excuse me.
3	MR. PLASSE: And as a courtesy
4	MEMBER CORRADINI: That's fine. I did not
5	understand. Thank you.
6	MR. PLASSE: Okay. On the next slide, the
7	staff, not only did we do a site aging management
8	program review in September of '08. WE also did in-
9	office reviews of the material. There were 43 amps
10	for this particular facility. Fourteen were new; 29
11	were existing; 22 were found to be consistent with the
12	GALL; nine were consistent with GALL with enhancement;
13	four were consistent with GALL with exception; and two
14	were plant specific AMPs.
15	With that, it resulted in three open
16	items, which is what the next three slides are. The
17	first one, on a reactive waste decay tank, initially
18	the waste gas decay tanks were not classified within
19	the scope of license renewal. The staff review
20	determined that they should be considered within the
21	scope of license renewal, and by letter dated June
22	5th, the Applicant stated the waste gas tanks had been
23	reclassified as in scope.
24	The staff reviewed that scope change,
25	including the drawings and additional equipment added
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for aging management review line items, and the staff found that the review was adequate and the changes were adequate, and the item was closed.

4 In addition there was an open item. On 5 May 12th, the Applicant made a change, submitting the PWR VIP as a ten-element program that was reviewed by 6 Staff completed the review of the new 7 the staff. 8 aging management program, and all of the associated 9 aging management review line items, and that item is 10 closed.

The third open item is what we basically talked about for the first portion of the meeting, was structurals monitoring program, the issue with the water seepage from the refuel cavity into the containment sumps.

staff closed that based 16 The on the 17 commitments made by the Applicant, and I'll just kind of speak a little bit about the commitments. 18 We've 19 kind of already been through them, but the Applicant committed to removing the concrete from the low point 20 in the containment Sump Charlie below the reactor and 21 performed UT on the vessel. The rebar concrete will 22 also be inspected during the excavation. 23 That is Commitment 41, and that addresses the staff's concern 24 25 about possible containment vessel degradation.

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67 The Applicant also committed to removing 1 2 test concrete from known wetted areas. The Applicant perform compression tests, 3 will as well as а 4 petrographic exam. That is Commitment 44, and this 5 addresses the staff's concern that the leakage may have caused concrete degradation. 6 Degradation identified from any of these 7 8 inspections will be entered into the corrective action 9 evaluated for impact program and on structural 10 integrity. With that I'll open at this time if you 11 12 have any further questions for the staff on this 13 issue. VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: Ι had 14 а I believe the Applicant stated that the pH 15 question. of the borated water in the refueling cavity is about 16 five, and the pH of the water collected is about 8.56. 17 How long does it take for borated water with a pH of 18 19 five in contact with concrete to reach a pH of 8.56? MR. PLASSE: Dr. Dan Naus will. 20 DR. NAUS: Dan Naus, Oak Ridge National 21 22 Laboratory. 23 did some literature search on We the effects of boric acid on concrete, and unfortunately 24 25 there is not a lot available, but what is available **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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indicates that it's not a problem. There are two references that cite this.

Generally you have a problem with acid in concrete when the pH is around three and a half or so and the pH of boric acid is on the order of four to five.

The other thing did is 7 we some calculations using a database at Oak Ridge, and this 8 9 indicated that the reaction was fairly slow, and it 10 would be a slowing as the process goes on because of the reaction product build-up, and you would not have 11 12 the continual refreshing of the calcium hydroxide.

The other thing it indicated, that the pH could be expected to be on the order of seven to eight. Now, the timing of this, I cannot give you an answer to that, but in the long term it would be seven to eight, would be our prediction. Of course, we couldn't model the kinetics, but that's the best we could do.

20 VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: I'm trying to get an idea about the residence time or the transit 21 time of any water leaking from the refueling cavity, 22 ultimately reaching location it 23 the where is collected, and by figuring out how long it takes for 24 25 the pH to change from eight to 8.56, that might give

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1	us an idea as to whether the proposed route for the
2	leakage is reasonable or not.
3	DR. NAUS: I can't comment on that.
4	VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: Does the
5	Applicant have any comment?
6	MR. DOWNING: Tom Downing.
7	The only thing I can add to this
8	THE REPORTER: Sir, just back off a little
9	bit.
10	MR. DOWNING: Oh, I'm sorry.
11	(Laughter.)
12	MR. DOWNING: And my name is Tom Downing,
13	Prairie Island.
14	The only thing I can add to the
15	discussion, that the time from we flood the cavity
16	until the time we've seen leakage in the ECCS sump has
17	ranged anywhere in the realm of four days to ten days.
18	This last outage we did not detect any leakage until
19	15 days after a pool flood, and it never even showed
20	up in the sump. It was just in the region room.
21	How much of that water was there and just
22	got pushed or how much actually came from the refuel
23	cavity and made its way all the way over I really
24	don't know.
25	VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: Okay. Thank
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MEMBER RAY: Could we ask the professor to come back here?

The commitment that the Applicant has made to examine the effects potentially on the concrete in question presumably will confirm the judgment that this is not likely to be a problem, but is there anything more to be said about that testing, how it should be done, how representative it might be?

It's compressive strength, I guess, for 10 the concrete as well as petrographic examination, 11 12 which I'm not sure what all it discloses, but presumably it looks at the integrity of the concrete 13 and the possibility that it was affected by the boric 14acid. But can you say anything more about the testing 15 and how -- because, you know, we're looking at this 16 from the standpoint of learning something about this 17 phenomenon that we don't presently know. 18

DR. NAUS: Yes. As you said, the compressive strength would given an indication if it has been deteriorated by the interaction of the acid and the constituents in the concrete.

23 On the petrographic examinations, there's 24 a number of tests they do to look and see if there's 25 any chemical reactions going on, if the aggregate or

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the cementitious materials have deteriorated. There's a general procedure, an ASTM procedure you would follow to see if there are any chemical reactions or other effects. There's a large number of things you can look at through these examination.

MEMBER RAY: We don't have any extant data, I guess. This will be new information pretty much, as I understand.

9 DR. NAUS: The only data that I have found, there's some information from the Paks plants, 10 which I believe is in Hungary. They had an area where 11 12 they had some leakage of borated water, and they took the concrete out and looked at it, and there was no 13 real indication of degradation. I would not expect 14 15 any degradation of the concrete in this case because of the intermittent nature and the low volume of the 16 17 fluid that's being--

Well, it's intermittent is a 18 MEMBER RAY: There may be concrete where it's not 19 hypothesis. intermittent conceivably because there is no drain 20 from the lowest point where it might accumulate. 21 So I think we assume it's intermittent. 22 We know it's 23 intermittent for much of the structure, but there may be some where it's not. 24

DR. NAUS: Right. I think when they

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1 remove the samples and do the test you'll have a much 2 better idea about the support, that nothing is 3 happening to the concrete itself. 4 MEMBER RAY: Thank you. 5 MR. HOLIAN: This is Brian Holian. Just to also interject here, you know, 6 7 we're starting to see containment or concrete issues, 8 you know, not only at some of the plants that we're 9 pulling the strings on, individually as the plants come in with operating experience, but also just the 10 staff is looking at, okay, what type of generic look 11 12 should we do as plants continue to age or as plant continue to look at, you know, potential life beyond 13 60 aspects. 14 So, you know, License Renewal is working 15 with a research user need that's in draft now that 16 still has us looking towards research for similar 17 looks and/or potential research effects 18 on on 19 concrete, that just being one of the items; you know, 20 cable aging, other issues that we're going to research for. 21 I just wanted to mention that. 22 MEMBER RAY: No, I think that's 23 Yeah. 24 great, Brian. Thank you. 25 Any other questions for the MR. PLASSE: **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

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(No response.)

PLASSE: The next slide is MR. four bullets of the items of interest from the Subcommittee. The Applicant kind of addressed these, and I have people from the staff who did the final reviews for the final SER here.

8 The first item on the CST UT inspections, 9 originally they had UT bottom of one of the three CSTs 10 prior to PEO. By letter August 7th, they provided a 11 supplement based on the ACRS meeting and committed to 12 UT the bottom of all three CSTs prior to the PEO. The 13 staff found that acceptable.

The second item on the two-year frequency, 14 the Applicant addressed that. They did discuss the 15 flight inspection since September of '07. I've noted 16 two of those inspections were per the NRC request, one 17 18 in September of '08 during the aging management 19 program review by the staff and then one in January of 20 this year the region, during the regional by inspection. 21

Also, a follow-up question came up about exposure of electrical cables and direct buried cables to freeze/thaw resulting in an accelerated cable insulation aging mechanism. The staff did also do a

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74 1 review of that. Our electrical engineers requested 2 the operating experience review group at Headquarters 3 to do a search and were not able to come up with 4 anything to that phenomenon. 5 And then the last item that we --MEMBER RAY: Let's pause there for a 6 7 second for two reasons. One, whoever is controlling 8 the video, we need to get back to the slides that 9 you're using if we can do that. At least these videos 10 aren't --I'm sorry. 11 MR. PLASSE: It's Slide No. 12 10. Yes, thank you. Well, we'll 13 MEMBER RAY: use the hard copy until we can figure out why that 14 15 isn't doing what it's supposed to do. But the other point that interests 16 me similar to what the Applicant said, there's basically 17 an absence of information that's often not very 18 19 satisfying. I'm sure if Member Powers were here who raised this issue, he would be not fully satisfied. 20 Is there any information about what's the 21 design characteristics of the cable relative 22 to thermal cycling? And I'm just groping for something 23 here. 24 25 Mr. NGUYEN: My name is Duc Nguyen. I am **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

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1	the reviewer of the electrical.
2	The question about thermal cycling, the
3	design is typically design can handle up to, you
4	know, three or four times of the rated voltage. So
5	the total cycle is not a problem.
6	In addition, this cable energized all the
7	time, especially from the off-site power, and this
8	cable operates voltage, 13.8. But the rated voltage
9	is two or three times. So total cycle is not a
10	problem.
11	VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: Do we know
12	anything about the glass transition temperature, for
13	example, of the polymeric insulating material for
14	these cables?
15	MR. NGUYEN: Can you repeat your question
16	again, please?
17	VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: Do you know
18	anything about characteristics of the polymeric
19	material, for example, the glass transition
20	temperature?
21	MR. NGUYEN: Maybe the Applicant can
22	answer, but this is typical for EPR insulation cable,
23	and what we've seen on site is even if it's submerged
24	in water, some of the Applicants, they do the
25	operability test. It's the proper test. The long
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terms of more cable is the issue, but at this site, since they replaced the cable in 2005, this is brand new cable, and we didn't see any water accumulation in the manhole.

We take the walk down, and this is very high elevation. We did that at the audit. We take a look, and this cable is very easy to access to, and we didn't find any problem with the water.

And keep in mind, the inspection frequency it is event driven. It's not the exact interval. If you have water, then the GALL. We require them to do more inspections. So it is even driven. So the twoyear frequency is not the set interval.

MEMBER BROWN: This is Brian Holian.

15 We're not asking about the event frequency We're specifically asking about, you know, 16 aqain. kind of is there any inherent data that we have on the 17 strength of the cable, you know, for freeze/thaw, and 18 19 I don't know if the staff has that information. Ιf 20 the Applicant has it, you're invited to comment. Ιf not, the staff can try and get back to you on that 21 issue. 22

primarily 23 We looked at operating 24 experience. Ι agree that in the absence of 25 information that doesn't mean that we are not still

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concerned about the potential for an aging mechanism due to that. That's a similar issue we're going to go to research on also and see if we should be putting one-time inspections in place for this aspect. So that's in the future.

MEMBER ARMIJO: I'm surprised that 6 we 7 don't that freeze/thaw have a crisp answer to 8 question. I would think that the cable manufacturers 9 would address all of the environmental variables that 10 affect the performance of their cables the and 11 insulation, and so you know, we don't have a crisp answer. 12

Ι think the best 13 MEMBER RAY: Sam, information applicability 14 was presented by to 15 distribution centers because they have got enormous --MEMBER ARMIJO: It hasn't seemed to come 16 up as a problem. 17

MEMBER RAY: -- an enormous application.
MEMBER ARMIJO: Somewhere along the line
there's a reason it's not a problem, because somebody
has put it in a spec and made the right kind of
materials to take that kind of -MEMBER RAY: They do.

24 MEMBER BROWN: Sam, the EPR materials 25 typically acceleration age tested, and then they run a

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78 1 bunch of tests. You know, it's all based on the standard of Arrhenius stuff. I mean if you want to 2 you can either believe it or not believe it, but 3 4 that's what they do when they test it. 5 I also thought I heard you say that these cables were energized, and carrying current the whole 6 7 time. 8 MEMBER ARMIJO: I was going to ask that. 9 Could we put that on the --10 MEMBER BROWN: Is that what you said? These 11 cables are energized continuously so that they're drawing real power, real current? 12 I'm not as bad as I sound, Mike. 13 NGUYEN: Maybe the Applicant 14 MR. can confirm that. 15 MR. RUETHER. Jose Ruether. 16 These cables, the medium voltage 17 Yes. cables are 13-8, are energized all the time and do 18 19 carry current. Okay. Is it a half an amp 20 MEMBER BROWN: or is -- I mean, I presume these are pretty heavy 21 22 power cables relative. 23 Typically during the summer MR. RUETHER: time -- well I guess we're talking about when in 24 25 operation -- they would be carried in one bus of **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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safeguards, safety related equipment, which would include 40 volt loads that would be continuously running.

MEMBER BROWN: So there's a reasonable amount of current in the cables. I mean, once you have current running in them, they kind of stay heated, and you don't experience the same freeze/thaw phenomenon that you do as if they are de-energized and just sitting there. That's why I asked the question.

I mean, if it's not relevant.

MR. RUETHER: No, that's fine.

12 MEMBER MAYNARD: This may be an issue that is worth the staff doing some follow-up, but I don't 13 see it anything being unique to Prairie Island. 14 These 15 cables are not really even unique to nuclear power. There's an awful lot of industry experience with 16 17 cables like this that are exposed to freeze/thaw conditions and stuff. So I don't think there's any 18 19 immediate safety issue and there's nothing specific about Prairie Island. 20

21 MEMBER ARMIJO: That was not my point, 22 Otto. I Just thought that, you know, the operating 23 experience tells the tale. You know, these things 24 don't fail by that mechanism, and I just want to know 25 the reason, and my guess is that people are taking

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that into consideration when they designed and specified the materials.

CHAIRMAN BONACA: I don't think it's 3 4 specific to this plant. However, this issue is coming 5 back again and again. We are raising questions. We 6 don't get answers oftentimes, and yet there may be available answer 7 to the questions discussed we 8 specifically because the manufacturer probably does 9 testing and determines whether the requirements does 10 permit. It would be something that we should try to 11 get some better answers in the future.

12 MEMBER BROWN: Yes. I didn't disagree 13 with that. I was just trying to provide some 14 perspective. We should not be answering these 15 questions.

MEMBER RAY: It sounds like Brian has got a handle on it. We'll see what we see.

MR. PLASSE: Okay. The slide came back up. Before we get to that slide, I just want to make sure. I've covered everything I intended. Are there any other questions on any of these items or anything else that you have for the staff?

(No response.)

24 MR. PLASSE: In conclusion, as documented 25 in the final SER from October 16th, the staff has

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81 concluded there is reasonable assurance that 1 the 2 activities authorized by the renewed license will 3 continue to be conducted, and that the current 4 licensing basis at the requirements of 10 CFR 54.29 5 the staff's alpha have been met, and that's conclusion. 6 MEMBER RAY: Thank you. 7 8 I'm supposed to, I guess, invite any 9 further discussion among the Committee members at this We'll obviously be taking this up in the 10 time. context of a draft letter. 11 12 If not, it's one minute over, Mr. Chairman. 13 CHAIRMAN BONACA: All right. Thank you 14 very much for the presentation, and if there are no 15 further questions, we'll take a break. Get back at 16 10:15. 17 (Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off the record 18 19 at 10:01 a.m. and went back on the record 20 at 10:17 a.m.) CHAIRMAN BONACA: We will get back into 21 session. 22 23 And we have draft final Regulatory Guide 1.205, and Professor Apostolakis will take us through 24 25 the presentation. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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82

We met with the staff for three Subcommittee meetings in June, August, and the last one was in November 13th, and we discussed draft Regulatory Guide 1.205 and the associated standard review plan. During these meetings we had many, many comments back and forth.

9 The staff has been very responsive to the 10 questions of the Subcommittee. They made changes to 11 the documents as appropriate, and without any further 12 ado, I'll let them take over today and tell us what 13 the status of the two documents is, and I believe they 14 are requesting a letter. Even if they're not, there 15 is one.

(Laughter.)

MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So who is -- Sunil? MR. WEERAKKODY: Yes, sir. Thank you. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay.

20 MR. WEERAKKODY: My name is Sunil 21 Weerakkody. I'm the Deputy Director of Fire 22 Protection in NRR.

As George said, we are here today to present to you Reg. Guide 1.205, Revision 1, and the Standard Review Plan, and also talk about Standard

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Review Plan Section 9.5.1.2 and request your endorsement to issue them.

Just for the benefit of a few of the new 3 4 members here, to give a two-minute summary of the historical context. The Rule 805 or the risk informed 5 alternative to deterministic fire protection was 6 7 published in 2004. In 2005, we had two plants 8 volunteering to pilot the effort. Duke Energy 9 volunteered Oconee and Progress in Energy volunteered 10 Harris.

In 2006, we issued -- again some members 11 12 who are here today worked with them then -- we issued Revision 0 to Req. Guide 1.205. It was trouble even 13 at that time because Reg. Guide 1.205, you know, we 14 were bringing I would say many of the technologies or 15 subcultures, you know, fire protection and 16 PRA 17 together, and then we had some challenges with that.

And then in 2008, you know, two years after we published Rev. 0, we received the license amendment request from the two pilots. That was last year, mid-last year, and the staff has been working with the pilots as necessary to read those safety evaluation reports.

You know, with that background going into my first slide here, in 805 we have a comprehensive,

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coherent regulation that enables us to risk inform a major safety program at power plants, in this case fire protection. One of the things we found out, and this is kind of hindsight in some ways, that we really needed to go through the two pilots to understand the number of complexities that was beneath the surface.

There were a number of things that when we issued Rev. 0 of Reg. Guide 1.205 in 2006, we just did not have a good appreciation of simply because the reg. guide had not been piloted.

11 But you know, that stage is behind us. We 12 are presenting here today to you the Revision 1 of reg. guide, and the staff believes that the Revision 13 1, which has benefitted from the lessons learned from 14 15 the two pilots, is an improved and an additional quidance to facilitate compliance with 16 the fire protection requirements of NRC for the licensees, and 17 we believe that relatively Revision 1 provides a very 18 19 clear a consistent regulatory position with and respect to Rev. 0, again, due to the benefit of the 20 lessons learned from the pilot. 21

And one other thing we want to emphasize to the full Committee is it is fully vetted, meaning we have gone through a number of public meetings where we received and addressed stakeholder comments, you

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know, mostly the two pilots, a number of other plants who are (unintelligible), and George mentioned we had not one, not two, but three very should I say painful meetings or pleasurable meetings and received good feedback from the Subcommittee, and we incorporated a number of their comments.

What you have here, what we are presenting today, we have interoffice conference, OGC, Research, New Reactors, NRR. So we have an agency --

MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: It was pleasant.

11 MR. WEERAKKODY: Pleasant. We have a very 12 pleasant three meetings with the ACRS Subcommittee.

And you know, one final draft was, again, 13 shared with the public in September and October, and 14 15 then one final point that is not here, and we were very pleased at the Subcommittee. 16 The two pilot 17 plants who came in here, and both pilot plants mentioned to this Committee that in there also 18 19 Revision 1 provides a clear framework that could enable a good, stable future licensing basis for 20 plants through 805. 21

With that, let's go to my next slide. The objective here is to brief you, and we believe the guidance improves clarity and provides regulatory stability for both pilot plants and about 48 or about

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86 1 40-plus non-pilots who are awaiting issuance of this 2 req. guide, and we believe that issuance of this req. 3 quide is going to contribute to the regulatory 4 stability, and I am personally motivated to get an 5 approved endorsement because my boss who sits there has my request for leave, and he's only going to sign 6 7 it if I get this reg. guide out by the end of this 8 year. 9 MEMBER CORRADINI: You said leave or 10 vacation? MR. WEERAKKODY: Vacation. 11 It's a very earned vacation, but he's not going to sign it until 12 he sees a letter from this Committee saying the reg. 13 guide can be issued. So it is holiday season, you 14 know, and --15 (Laughter and simultaneous conversation.) 16 And what about the new 17 MEMBER BANERJEE: Is that like the 81,000 ESBWR or whatever? 18 plants? 19 None of these have been --20 MR. LAUR: The rule is not applicable. MR. WEERAKKODY: So with that, Steve Laur 21 has been our lead for this. 22 23 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Wait a minute. Let's understand this issue about the new plants. 24 IF I 25 build a plant tomorrow, I can choose to go with NFPA **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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1	805, right?
2	MR. LAUR: No. There is a Harry will
3	answer this.
4	MR. BARRETT: There is a Standard 806,
5	which is designed to be used with the newer plants,
6	and it gives the same risk informed ability to change
7	the licensing basis as 805, but the plants are
8	originally designed to 804, which is a deterministic
9	standard, and they only use the risk informed tools
10	once they get their license.
11	MR. LAIN: This is Paul Lain from the
12	staff.
13	I'd also like to add that in the '90s
14	there were a few SECYs that came out that actually
15	made the fire protection requirements much more
16	stringent for the new plants also. They want three-
17	hour basically separation between the
18	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So what would be my
19	baseline fire protection program for a plant I'm going
20	to start building tomorrow?
21	PARTICIPANT: Eight, oh, four.
22	MR. LAIN: That would be NFPA 804, and
23	then 806 would be utilized as a risk informed change
24	process. And 806 is actually not published yet. It
25	will be published probably spring of next
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1	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I still have to
2	change?
3	MR. LAIN: No, that's just if you need to
4	make changes, I would think going forward as a
5	process, but I think the new reactors are requiring
6	fire PRAs.
7	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Is that clear to
8	everyone?
9	MEMBER BANERJEE: No.
10	PARTICIPANTS: No.
11	MR. KLEIN: My name is Alex Klein. I'm
12	the Fire Protection Branch Chief in NRR.
13	Let me try and help clear this up if I
14	can. Paul Lain is exactly correct in terms of there
15	were a series of SECY papers that were sent out to the
16	Commission. Those SECY papers contained guidance for
17	licensees with respect to what fire protection
18	requirements and guidance were expected of licensees
19	who were building these new plants.
20	Those SECYs were, in turn, incorporated
21	into Reg. Guide 1.189, which is our deterministic side
22	of the fire protection guidance, if you will.
23	Licensees who are building these new plants are
24	following the guidance in Reg. Guide 1.189 and those
25	SECYs that Paul alluded to.
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Now, if a licensee or an applicant, if you will, in this case for these new reactors wishes to adopt a different approach, then they would have to propose that to the staff. There is nothing in Reg. Guide 1.189 right now that either endorses or mentions in any way Form NFPA 804 or NFPA 806, which is yet to be written.

8 So at some future date if a licensee wants 9 to adopt a different approach to what they've taken under Req. Guide 1.189 on the deterministic side, they 10 would have to come in and see the staff because we 11 12 have no rule right now that would provide that. So they would have to come in on an individual basis if 13 they wish to take a risk-informed performance-based 14 15 approach with their fire protection program moving forward. 16

Having said that, the SECYs recognize the 17 lessons of Appendix R, and the plants realize that 18 19 you're designing them basically from because now 20 scratch from day one. They recognize the need to separate your redundant trains. So my personal view 21 is that for licensees who are -- excuse me -- for 22 23 are designing these vendors who new plants are incorporating these lessons learned from the Browns 24 25 Ferry fire, from Appendix R days. So the need for a

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1	licensee to use a performance-based risk-informed
2	approach in my view point is diminished because they
3	have got it well separated.
4	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I think we're getting
5	off the subject here, but
6	MR. KLEIN: We are, yes.
7	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: if I build a new
8	reactor and I have a very detailed as much as I can
9	fire PRA, I can't use that to guide me in the design
10	of the plant?
11	MEMBER CORRADINI: The plant's design.
12	Their point is
13	MR. WEERAKKODY: They already have nowhere
14	impact. I can give you a very specific example.
15	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yeah?
16	MR. WEERAKKODY: Before the NRR and NRO
17	was split, we were in the ESBRW DCD, and there's a
18	statement there that was somewhat loose in the sense
19	that the word was something like they'll do separation
20	when practical, and we went back and said, no, that's
21	not how it should be written. The only areas in the
22	plant where you can accept, you know, separating the
23	two trends is containment and control room.
24	So I think what Alex said, and I fully
25	support it, one of their policies, they have this
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91 inform the design. 1 2 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But they cannot start with a goal for CDF from fire contributions and work 3 4 backwards. Like a performance-based --5 MR. WEERAKKODY: That is exactly correct, yes. 6 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: 7 ___ approach to 8 seismic risk. MR. WEERAKKODY: Yes, yes. 9 10 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: They cannot do it. MR. WEERAKKODY: Yes, that's correct. 11 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. 12 MEMBER BLEY: You can do it, but you still 13 14 have to --15 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: No, you have to go out and get approval if you do it. 16 MR. WEERAKKODY: Yes. 17 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: All right. Let's --18 19 MR. WEERAKKODY: Yeah. I just wanted to turn it over to Steve, and then Donnie Harrison is the 20 21 Branch Chief of PRA Branch, and Harry Barrett is a senior fire protection engineer and also the lead 22 project manager for the Harris license amendment 23 24 request. 25 So Steve. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

MR. LAUR: Okay. I'm going to address the standard review plan and Reg. Guide 1.205, and I just want to close out this other discussion. It's not a hole in our reg. guide. This regulation and the standard specifically are for existing plants. It's a bigger issue as Alex pointed out.

What I'd briefly like to cover is Okay. the framework of the SRP and the reg. guide. What is the motivation and the purpose of these revisions? In the case of the SRP, it's a brand new document. 10

itself, 9.5.1.2, which is 11 The SRP an 12 initial decimal compared to most of the SRPs, is consistent with the Reg. Guide 1.205, Revision 1, and 13 then talk about the comments and how we resolve them 14 for the reg. guide, and then a little bit about 15 stakeholder interaction, and I include not only the 16 public there, but also the ACRS Subcommittee, and I 17 look at it as three times not being painful, but I 18 19 mean, if you didn't like it, you wouldn't invite us 20 back.

(Laughter.)

MR. LAUR: Maybe we are a little bit slow on some of the comments, but we finally got the message.

I'll then open it up for questions, but of

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course, as usual, you can ask questions at any time.

Okay. To start off with the standard review plan, because I don't want to talk about it much unless you want to, basically NUREG-0800, the standard review plan, has a number of chapters and sections, and the existing 9.5.1 is deterministic for the most part.

8 So what we basically did was change that 9 to 9.5.1.1 and this new one is 9.5.1.2, which allows 10 you to, if you have a fire protection program that complies with 10 CFR 5048 alpha and bravo, which is 11 12 Appendix R, that's 9.5.1.1. If you want to do alpha and Charlie, which was the NFPA-05 risk-informed 13 performance-based, you do 9.5.1.2, and that's the 14 quidance for the staff how to review it. 15

We also have developed -- we're showing the slide off to the side -- an ER template that matches this content as well. That's still draft. It's what we're using to write the actual safety evaluations in the two final plans.

Next slide.

Basically, this is my last slide on this unless you have any questions. The format is a typical SRP format. It's consistent with the reg. guide, but the reg. guide has a whole lot more

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guidance to the licensee, one acceptable way of meeting our requirements, and this basically says make sure that the licensee has done that one acceptable way or they've justified any deviations.

5 One thing that is kind of unique that I 6 think is worth just mentioning, but we have an 7 attachment, and we might be the first one when this gets published to actually have this, but there's a 8 9 new office instruction that talks about the seconds reviews. When you first get something, is it complete 10 and sufficient for us to begin our review? 11

And we've actually included that in the SRP, a check list to say does it cover all the bases. So that it makes it clear to not only the reviewers, but the licensees who see this can make sure they have all of the elements covered.

Because of this being the mirror image and less detail than the reg. guide, I'm going to focus the presentation on the comment and resolution for the reg. guide, unless you have questions.

Okay. The framework for Revision 1 and the reg. guide in particular, 1.205, the industry developed a guidance document, NEI-0402, and the one we actually endorsed in our initial reg. guide was Revision 1 of that document. A year and a half ago,

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1 maybe two years ago, they came out with Revision 2 to 2 that document, the drivers, but that is what we are endorsing in this revision to our req. guide. 3 4 And so we put out Draft Guide 1218 I think 5 it was February or March, I think, March of this year for public comment; received the public comments and 6 resolved them; talked to the ACRS; had several more 7 8 public meetings; and that's what Sunil was talking 9 about when he says we think it's fully vetted. 10 We have heard and we have responded to the comments, all the comments, and we have incorporated 11 12 them where possible. Next slide .. 13 So why are we doing that? Well, one of 14 15 the things we need, when you embark on a pilot process, you know it's a learning process, and we set 16 17 up a frequently asked questions process as a way of formally documenting what are in effect interim staff 18 19 positions, interim staff guidance, and so that there's 20 some pedigree so the licensee and the pilots, in particular, have some confidence that it's not going 21 to change on them. 22 23 A number of those have been closed in between the time of the initial industry guidance and 24 25 the current industry guidance. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

We also have had a number of what they call pilot meetings where we meet with the two pilot plants, see how they're doing, review detailed information that you wouldn't normally review in a typical license amendment because it's a pilot to make sure we understand, you know, the nuts and bolts of what they're doing.

8 We also conducted regulatory audits about 9 the pilots earlier this year, January and February, I 10 believe, and saw first hand what they were doing and 11 had a modifier guidance.

12 So the bottom line is there have been a number of factors, including the culmination of these 13 changes into NEI-0402, that is causing us to revise 14 15 the req. guide, and that was always foreseen, and in fact, there will be a Rev. 3 -- excuse me -- a Rev. 2 16 17 to our regulatory guide to incorporate the remaining frequently asked questions and other nuances as we 18 19 learn more.

20 We don't expect those to be major. We 21 believe we captured the majority of the issues.

22 Okay. Most of the changes were to clarify 23 the guidance. In fact, one of the public comments 24 very recently at one of our meetings was, you know, 25 industry may not agree with going doing Path A instead

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of Path B, but they said whatever you do, make it clear which one you're saying is acceptable, and so we clarified the guidance.

4 In one major area there was missing 5 guidance, and I have another slide following this one, additional risk of certain recovery actions, but the 6 goal of all this is to foster full and scrutable 7 8 compliance. That is to say we don't want what 9 happened with Appendix R, where every time we turn around there's a special case that needs an exemption. 10

As most of you should be aware, this rule has built in provisions, performance-based aspects to eliminate the need for most exemptions you could think of.

Next slide.

So the additional guidance I was talking 16 about, the version we endorsed with the original reg. 17 18 guide of 0402 provided guidance that some previously 19 approved recovery actions did not require a risk On a closer reading of this NFPA-805 20 assessment. standard, which is incorporated into the rule so that 21 is rule language, 22 this it turns out that's not consistent with the rule. 23

The original reg. guide was very -- kind of danced all around this issue -- it was very I don't

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98 1 want to say "clever" because that would do the issue -- but basically it did not address this. There was a 2 3 hole in the guidance. So we've added the guidance. 4 We correct this omission, and based on all the 5 feedback, we believe we have а clear set of requirements for previously approved recovery actions. 6 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Do you think that 7 8 rule may be revised at some point in the future? 9 WEERAKKODY: This is what we have MR. 10 right now. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I understand that. 11 MR. WEERAKKODY: Yes. We may have a 12 revision coming, but what we're going to do is learn 13 some more by (unintelligible). 14 15 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Is it up to the staff to decide whether the proposed rule to revise the 16 17 rule? I think generally we would 18 MR. LAUR: 19 write a Commission paper. MR. WEERAKKODY: We would make a proposal 20 to the Commission, yes. 21 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: If there is a need. 22 23 MR. WEERAKKODY: Yes. 24 MR. LAUR: But about a year ago we were 25 talking about this rule, is this a fundamental flaw in **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

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1	the rule, and I think if you go back to Sunil's first
2	or second slide where he said this is a coherent, I
3	think we have learned a lot. This was very well
4	thought out. It's just that we were not careful.
5	It's complicated. We are not careful in reading all
6	of the various defined terms.
7	The rule probably does not need revision
8	unless you fundamentally disagree with this previously
9	approved recovery act.
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Well, I mean,
11	something that's previously approved, and then you
12	come back and you reopen the issue. It seems to me
13	it's not such a great idea. We have to live with that
14	now, but I just don't think that's a way to regulate.
15	MR. LAUR: We may have heard that opinion
16	on an other occasions.
17	MR. WEERAKKODY: WE are keeping that.
18	That also, I think, what Mark has directed me to do is
19	to let's keep learning from the two pilots as well as
20	a couple of non-pilots, and at some point in time if
21	we find that everyone could benefits with revision to
22	the rule, we'll make that proposal to the Commission,
23	and then the Commission, of course, has to go through
24	it.
25	MR. LAUR: Next slide.
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Okay. So the stakeholder comments. If you look through the documents that were sent to you, pretty voluminous, but what NEI did with their comments was pretty much repeat the entire reg. guide with comments wherever they have. So it was very comprehensive, and some of the other stakeholders did the same thing.

8 But they can be pretty much summarized 9 into five major areas. There's several comments that 10 had to do with fire PRA, and there are different 11 flavors of that. I've got them on the slides.

Comments on cumulative risk; there were some comments on a sample license condition. The reg. guide has a sample license condition that we expect licensees to use most of. Some of them are plant specific like which modifications you need, but other parts are expected to be used as is.

Risk of previous recovery actions, there were comments on that, and then the definition of primary control station, which is kind of interwoven with the recovery actions, but it's easier to discuss it separately.

Okay. So fire PRA, the first major heading under fire PRA was methods, and the reason is NFPA-805 says that the methods you use have to be

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acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction, which is us. They want us to clarify what that meant.

We were think the method that they used to apply it. The industry was concerned we were going to expand that to mean the entire PRA, how you build a PRA.

So we have limited the discussion of the 7 8 methods to the cause and effect relationship or 9 anything else associated with how you apply the PRA. 10 The other comments that don't limit the topical 11 reports. What we really meant there was generic. We 12 didn't mean topical reports per se. So that was easily to fix. So the way we respond to these, we 13 were able to incorporate most of their comments. 14

As far as a cause and effect relationship, we explicitly state that they may make changes without us having to approve a method if it falls into one of these three categories. The first one is a method that was used in the peer reviewed baseline fire PRA.

20 The second was if we have approved the 21 method, obviously they can use it.

And then the third one is we allow them to demonstrate that their method clearly bounds the risk impact.

The next area, the fire PRA had to do with

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the model itself. They said, well, the rule says the PRA model needs to match the as-built, as-operated and maintained plant, and they said, "Well, how often do we have to update it? Give us some guidance on model updates and upgrades, and also provide clear PRA submittal guidance. What do you need us to submit for you to approve this?"

8 I believe the original req. quide was 9 totally silent on this. What we tried to do in this 10 version is to say we've already determined that. Outside of fire protection, we've already determined 11 12 that risk informed applications, the PRA quality and the update and all of that stuff is Req. Guide 1.200. 13 That's it. They have submittal guidance in it. 14 Ιt 15 has quidance for updating, et cetera, through endorsing the ASME/ANSI PRA standard. 16

17 They also had comments that had to do with what risk processes are required when you use the fire 18 19 PRA, and in particular, the comments had to do with when does the plant change evaluation required; which 20 recovery actions require a risk assessment -- all of 21 that was previously approved -- and then we had said 22 all recovery actions require a risk assessment, and 23 they said, well, the rule doesn't really require that. 24 25 It just requires ones that are the success path, the

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credited success path for meeting the performance criteria.

So we modified the reg. guide. We discussed explicitly change evaluations and fire risk evaluations, and by the way, that's one of the areas where these things sound the same, but they're different sections in the rule. They have different purposes, and we didn't realize that until we got into the pilot process.

We provide additional guidance on how to 10 address the risk of previously approved recovery 11 12 and I'm going to talk about that actions, in a separate section, and then we did limit the scope, 13 basically put the rule language in there. 14 It's not 15 all recovery actions. It's recovery actions that meet the success path definition. 16

MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Well, again, I'd like 17 to draw the attention of members who were not at the 18 19 Subcommittee meetings and maybe get your views on We have received complaints of 20 that, Steve. the industry that the fire PRAs are consuming tremendous 21 amounts of resources, to the point where the industry 22 doesn't feel that they have anything left to do 23 anything else in the risk area. 24

And I'm wondering why that is. Is the

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	104
1	methodology evolving all the time or what is your
2	view, Steve? Do you agree with that, first of all?
3	MR. LAUR: Specifically about resources, I
4	believe what I've been told, yeah. I mean, we heard
5	numbers of how many millions more it's cost.
6	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Why is that so? I
7	mean, what is
8	MR. LAUR: My personal opinion is it's not
9	methods. It's scope, and the scope, we view the fire
10	PRA for both Harris and Oconee, and plus we went on
11	these other audits to look at the overall process, and
12	I don't remember from the November meeting when they
13	gave their presentation. They were talking about
14	thousands of scenarios. So unless previous studies
15	like the IPEEE where you might assume a room burns up
16	and then if that screens, you're done with that room.
17	If it doesn't screen, you go down to the next level.
18	They look at each individual source, and
19	if the source, if you can break it up into two heat
20	release rates, so each source has two potential fires,
21	one that may or may not impact the trays and one that
22	may burn them up. Okay?
23	So for every source in the room, they've
24	got two scenarios. Every room they've got multiple
25	sources, and then they have to consider the spurious
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actuation issue, which borders on intractable. I mean, if you think of (unintelligible) explosion, I mean, permutations and combinations of wires, now, what at least one of the pilots did was they just assumed spurious could happen if it's in the tray somewhere and let the cutsets drive them to go look at the wiring.

8 So that's exhaustive, but it still ends up 9 with large numbers of scenarios, large number of 10 tables. They mention something in -- I can't remember 11 -- their wiring, cable tray databases have tens of 12 thousands or hundreds of -- tens of thousands of 13 entries.

MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I don't understand why all of a sudden they're doing that. I mean, there have been fire PRAs in the past that didn't go through that. Did they find that these fire PRAs were not realistic? What is it that's driving this detail?

MR. LAUR: I believe it's the fire testing results that said hot shorts may not be non-critical. Now there were, as I recall anyway, there were assumptions in a lot of cases that certain types of hot shorts could not occur or were not likely.

24 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: That's also the 25 source issue. They have the sources and --

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	106
1	MR. BARRETT: There are a couple of things
2	driving that. I think one of them is that the NUREG-
3	6850, which combined with
4	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: efforts.
5	MR. BARRETT: Yeah, that was to be the
6	state of the art and put everything in one spot so
7	that everybody knew what the state of the art was.
8	That state of the art is basically
9	starting with your ignition sources, counting them up,
10	figuring out what the frequency is on an ignition
11	source basis and then building essentially a mini PRA
12	for each ignition source. That's the state of the
13	art. So that's what they did.
14	MEMBER STETKAR: As kind of a practitioner
15	who is even as we speak struggling with this issue,
16	the problem with NFPA NUREG-6850 is that it was
17	written by two sets of people. It was written by
18	people who were fire modelers who loved to look at
19	details of modeling fires, and it was written by
20	people who were electrical circuit analysts who loved
21	to look at details of electrical circuits. It was not
22	written by a PRA practitioner.
23	The PRA practice was sort of put over it
24	rather loosely. So what I've seen people doing, I
25	think part of the reason that the industry is spending
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107

as you mentioned, Harry, is trying to look at setting large numbers of very, very small fires and modeling them.

Other people are doing, as we heard from 6 the industry thousands of circuit analyses to look at 7 8 individual wires in individual cables, in individual 9 cable trays to determine electrically what would happen due to all possible combinations of 10 short circuits and faults to ground and all of that sort of 11 12 thing.

That's a huge amount of work. I think that the pilot programs, the experience form them will provide some insights about how to scope the analysis both in terms of what level of detail do you need to go into in the fire modeling, and what level of detail in the circuit analysis.

19 At the moment it's like 30 years ago in 20 the risk assessment business when you asked someone to build a model of 21 а reactor protection system. Somebody would go away for nine months because they 22 believed that they needed to model every little wire 23 connector and every little fault. We've learned a lot 24 25 in order to be able to streamline that process more

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	108
1	over 30 years, and I think fire risk assessment is now
2	in that throes.
3	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I understand that
4	NUREG-6850 is under revision now. There is a new
5	joint effort.
6	MR. LAUR: I think there's a supplement
7	planned.
8	MR. BARRETT: Yes, there are several
9	frequently asked questions that deal with 6850
10	methods, and both EPRI and RES are looking at looking
11	at putting out a combined report that combines those
12	and publishes this.
13	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: And maybe simplify it
14	a little bit and avoid some of that?
15	MR. BARRETT: Well, I think what they're
16	putting out is changes to the guidance where we found
17	that there was reasonable things that you could do to
18	either simplify or come up with easier methods.
19	MEMBER STETKAR: I don't get the sense
20	that there's going to be much change in the guidance
21	for how do you scope the problem. The sense that I
22	get is there's no guidance in some of the details
23	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Well, that seems to
24	be
25	MEMBER STETKAR: MEMBER STETKAR: rates
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	109
1	or guidance about how you do circuit analysis or
2	something like that, but it tends to be more
3	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Is it scoping the
4	issue though?
5	MEMBER STETKAR: I think it is. I think
6	it's how do you address the problem most efficiently
7	from a risk assessment potential, but I don't know how
8	you write guidance for that, George. That's the
9	problem
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Okay.
11	MEMBER BLEY: You can do it, but you still
12	have to
13	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: No, you have to go
14	out and get approval if you do it.
15	MR. WEERAKKODY: Yes.
16	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: All right. Let's
17	MR. WEERAKKODY: Yeah. I just wanted to
18	turn it over to Steve, and then Donnie Harrison is the
19	Branch Chief of PRA Branch, and Harry Barrett is a
20	senior fire protection engineer and also the lead
21	project manager for the Harris license amendment
22	request.
23	So Steve.
24	MEMBER BLEY: And we've got a problem here
25	that's a little different than we had when we were
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doing the same thing with the PRA. We just had a few of these studies going. We had time to digest and think about them, and it takes time. Yeah, the guys who did the pilots weren't coming up with ideas how to simplify. It's going to be another group working on it who do that, but here we're trying to do these all in a hurry, trying to get that learning how to simplify.

MR. BARRETT: 9 The pilots did try to end up 10 using simplified methods. For instance, at Harris one thing they did was they used the zone of influence 11 12 calculations to try to cut down the scope of the number of cables they had to look at 13 and say reasonably is this fire actually going to damage all 14 15 of the stuff in this room, and they went and they calculated a cone of fire damage right above the 16 source and tried to make that a simplistic approach 17 even though it's still hundreds of scenarios that they 18 19 had to look at. They tried to use tools that made that a lot faster. 20

But it's still the tunnel work. It's still a lot of manipulating of data and handling of different, you know, scenarios.

24 MEMBER STETKAR: It's a lot of work, and 25 unfortunately, the numbers drive the work. Back 20,

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15 years ago even, we were using conditional probabilities for shorts that are on the order of a factor of seven to ten times lower than is currently supported by the test data.

Well, those numbers allowed you to screen out many fire scenarios because the risk from those fire scenarios were low enough that you didn't need to do any further refinements. Now we have test data that don't support the numbers that we were using ten to 15 years ago. So it's more difficult to screen out those same identical scenarios.

I think the same thing is true now in the 12 People seem to believe that a lot of 13 fire modeling. the heat release rates are too high, but we don't have 14enough actual fire data to confirm that fact. 15 So we have now two competing concerns in terms of both fire 16 modeling and electrical modeling that are driving 17 numbers up and people don't like high numbers. 18 So 19 they're doing more work to refine the analyses to push the numbers down. 20

21 MEMBER BLEY: One thing that came up in 22 the Subcommittee, and this is the thing that really 23 helped doing some of the complicated stuff and the 24 rest of PRA, I think it was one of the pilot folks 25 that said some of the difficulty they have is a lot of

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this -- and it's new -- is manual work that perhaps could get automated, and if that happens that may reduce this lot, but again, that takes time and a program, and it won't be there in six months or a year. It will happen eventually when people are struggling with how to do this more efficiently.

7 MR. LAUR: Not to belabor it, but there's 8 one other point that I've noticed anyway since you 9 asked. think the utilities or licensees Ι are This is a rule where as before even if it's 10 worried. a 50.54(f) generic letter for IPEEEs, for example, 11 12 they realize this is the first major licensing application where this fire PRA is not only going to 13 inform things, but it's going to allow the inspectors 14 15 potentially to look at the fire PRA.

And so what we saw in a couple of our 16 audits was a reluctance even though NUREG 6850 says 17 you can refine the analysis, and even though a good 18 19 PRA or even fire modeling analysts would normally make some reasonable assumptions and say, well, this case, 20 this doesn't make sense. The geometry is such that, 21 the thinness or whatever; we found a reluctance to do 22 that because they were worried that this guidance was 23 somehow cast in concrete, and therefore, you will look 24 25 at every hot short. You will look at the heat release

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Reg. Guide 1.205 and I think that's key, George, is the enforcement and the deadlines. It just forces you into this kind of brute force, no holds barred kind of approach, as well as the numbers that John mentioned becoming more probable.

7 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I'm wondering though 8 if these licensees had a detailed determined events 9 PRA upon which they're building the fire PRA or by 10 doing the fire PRA they find there are holes in their 11 internal event baseline PRA so they're improving that, 12 too.

So it's not all fire related in otherwords. IT's not clear to me.

15 MR. HARRISON: This is maybe a small element with the internal events, but I would say it's 16 small, where plants are proposing modifications 17 to take credit in 805, and, therefore, they have to 18 19 reflect that modification in their internal events PRA as well, and I think Harris said that one of the great 20 benefits was the alternate reactor coolant pump sill 21 injection, and that benefit was predominantly in the 22 23 internal events realm.

24 So they had a model from there, 25 incorporate that model, and then use it in a fire PRA

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as well. So there's some of that that happens, but the majority is the fire issue, the multiple spurious operations, the fire modeling. That's really where the majority of the work is.

5 MR. LAUR: There was one case, one of the 6 pilots when we did our review that there was а 7 simplification in the internal events that was falling 8 for internal events, but was erroneous if you did the 9 file, and they had to go model some additional detail, 10 but I agree it was minor. Both of these plans had 11 already had relatively mature internal events models, 12 had been through peer review, had addressed or were rapidly trying to address all of their facts and 13 observations from the peer reviews of those. 14

15 This money you're talking about is the16 fire PRA.

I'd like to add one thing. 17 MR. BARRETT: In Oconee's case, much of the cable routing that they 18 19 did was also beneficial from high energy line break and tornado perspective, and I believe that's how 20 informed their PRA results for those events as well 21 because prior to working on the Appendix R. upgrade, 22 they didn't know where a lot of the cables were, and 23 so they went and traced those cables and looked at 24 25 which trays got damaged by high energy line breaks,

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and they actually were able to hone in on exactly what got damaged, and that ended up helping them get a much higher understanding for both tornadoes and for high energy line breaks exactly what w as happening as far as that goes.

6 So I think it has gone both ways. I think 7 it has helped a lot in the recent Oconee's case that 8 they went and found those cables, but that's more of a 9 cable issue than it is a PRA level of detail, but of 10 course, they can use that in the PRA to really look at 11 what specific damage has happened.

MEMBER BLEY: Of course there was one other thing that came up and maybe it's related to what you just said, Harry. I think it was Oconee, but one of the two showed what they spent and what they got back, and they gained a lot from doing this. I mean, it was areal payoff for them.

18 Now, not everybody would have that. So a19 lot of people were doing work.

MR. BARRETT: Actually both had that.

21 MEMBER BLEY: Did they both have it? I 22 couldn't remember.

23 MR. BARRETT: Harris gained a whole bunch 24 of risk decrease for the alternate seal injection, and 25 the PSW mod for Oconee is making huge benefits for

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116 turbine early fires, tornadoes, and other issues. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: One last thing. At the high level, do you think that it is worth it spending all of these resources on fire risk at the expense of other risk-informed initiatives? Is this really the most important issue we're facing? MR. WEERAKKODY: I can share with you, George, one of the statements that the executives had He said when he thought of going into 805, with me. he also considered the longer term investment in benefits. You know, if he sees his asset as something that could operate for another 40 years, maybe another 60 years, and there could be other issues emerging, such as, you know, aging of cables. So even though he is doing his part PRA and placing cables to look at this regulation, he sees other future benefits, and that drove him to support. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So you're saying it's okay MR. WEERAKKODY: I'm saying it's just one

20 MR. WEERAKKODY: I'm saying it's just one
21 exhibit. Others might say different.

22 MR. HARRISON: And I would add that doing 23 the fire PRA is going to enable other risk-informed 24 applications where the fire PRA would be beneficial, 25 in particular, Tech Spec Initiative 4(b), which is the

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1	risk management tech specs, needs a fire PRA to be
2	able to do that application. So the work they do here
3	will pay off in other applications.
4	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But it's almost like
5	it becomes part of the baseline PRA. Now that we have
6	the detail we need to do other things.
7	MR. HARRISON: Right. Now, we can do the
8	other applications.
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Let's move on, but,
10	John, did you want to say something?
11	MEMBER STETKAR: Just quickly, I'll come
12	back to the numbers issue. I think, again, in terms
13	of level of effort, a lot of the effort that people
14	are spending is in a desire to try to quantify
15	precisely how small the fire risk is. That's a very,
16	very difficult process.
17	Unfortunately, when people talk about risk
18	assessment these days, they want to put every single
19	number on the same footing and say, well, I have a
20	sequence from a fire that's 1.234 E to the minus 8th,
21	and I have something from internal events that's
22	something different. That's a lot of work if you want
23	to try to quantify precisely how small the fire risk
24	is.
25	I think must less effort and much more
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1 benefit comes from а less detailed fire risk 2 assessment to identify areas of vulnerability. You don't need to do a very detailed fire risk assessment 3 to show that there's a benefit from installing an 4 5 alternate seal injection path. You don't need to analyze thousands of circuits. You don't need to 6 7 analyze hundreds of different fire ignition sources 8 within a given room You only need to do that if you 9 want to try to quantify precisely how small the 10 numbers really are.

So I think in terms of your question about 11 12 is fire risk assessment beneficial, I think that you probably obtained 90 percent of the real risk benefit 13 by doing a relatively small amount of the work. 14 15 However, if you are then required for whatever reason to quantify precisely how small that fire risk is in 16 comparison with all other sources of risk, that's 17 where a huge amount of effort is. 18

CHAIRMAN BONACA: Then you come up withvery large numbers for fire contribution.

21 MEMBER STETKAR: If you compare that fire 22 contribution to the other contributions, that's right. 23 That's the problem. That's the problem

24 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But eventually you 25 will want to have some estimate of what the

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	119
1	contribution is. It may be in terms of taking care of
2	vulnerabilities you can do.
3	MEMBER STETKAR: Well, when you ask in
4	terms of are we spending effort, you know, that's an
5	agency
6	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: because you know,
7	you hear all of the resources are going to fire and
8	what is this and, you know, we can't do anything else.
9	You know, we have to pay some attention to that.
10	Anyway, let's come back to the regulatory
11	guide. Maybe, Steve, you can accelerate a little bit.
12	MR. LAUR: Okay. The comments said that
13	you have no basis for tracking cumulative risk, and to
14	do not evaluate them. We should not use Reg. Guide
15	1.174 evaluating the total change in risk associated
16	with 805, and we did not appropriate these comments
17	because there was clearly a paragraph in here that
18	says you have to consider the impact on cumulative
19	risk from changes, and the Reg. Guide 1.174 guidelines
20	are appropriate, not to dwell on this, but it is true,
21	and industry keeps saying this, that Reg. Guide 1.174
22	did not anticipate this rule, but the converse is not
23	true. This rule has in the appendix 1.174, it has a
24	regulatory analysis for the rulemaking, 1.174, and
25	that's how we do business.

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	120
1	There are already appropriate thresholds
2	that are reasonably small changes, and so we're using
3	it.
4	A sample license condition, the way we
5	word it, the industry was concerned it would preclude
6	self-approval during the period that when we grant
7	this license amendment until they're fully
8	implemented, and usually what that is is one or two or
9	more modifications that are part of the license
10	condition to be fully compliant during that time they
11	have to maintain their compensatory measures. They
12	want to go make changes.
13	Well, we were not intending to preclude
14	certain changes. We just didn't want them doing the
15	PRA, the fire PRA changes until the PRA matched plant.
16	So we have changed it to allow self-approval of
17	certain changes during that transition period.
18	Okay. Previously approved recovery
19	actions. The public comment was that if it was
20	previously approved, it should be deemed to meet the
21	deterministic requirements of the standard, and we did
22	not incorporate this comment because contrary to the
23	requirements of 805 where it specifically calls out
24	the reactions does not meet the deterministic
25	requirements.
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so what we basically say And if it's 2 previously approved, you still have to do the delta CDF and delta LERF because that's clearly in the 4 regulation. However, the acceptance criteria we apply 5 was previously approved is if it the previous approval. So we say you do not have to change that 6 unless, of course, this delta risk is so high that it 8 triggers either the cost of official backfit for an 9 adequate protection concern.

MEMBER STETKAR: Steve, for the benefit of 10 the other members who haven't sat through the three 11 12 previous meetings of the Subcommittee, and to make sure that I understand this slide, at the current 13 revision of the reg. guide, when I transition to NFP-14 805, I must quantify the fire risk including those 15 previously approved recovery actions; is that correct? 16 In other words I must --17 18 MR. LAUR: Above zero or are you talking 19 about what we have written out? 20 MEMBER STETKAR: Currently, right now, Rev. 1. 21 MR. LAUR: Rev. 1. 22 MEMBER STETKAR: The current version of 23 Rev. 1, what we are writing the letter on today. 24 25 When I transition, if I make the decision **NEAL R. GROSS**

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122 1 to transition to NFPA-805, I must quantify let me call it a baseline risk of my plant from fires, and that 2 baseline risk must quantify the contribution from 3 4 previously approved recovery actions; is that correct? 5 MR. LAUR: From a practical standpoint that's what everybody is doing, but as we discussed in 6 7 the Subcommittee meeting, licensee could а 8 theoretically apply deterministically with this rule 9 and never have even a fire PRA. MEMBER STETKAR: I'm talking about doing 10 In a particular location, if I'm going to 11 the fire. use the risk informed approach. 12 But the performance-based 13 MR. LAUR: approach in here has to do with the additional risk, 14 15 the delta risk of your proposed alternative to the term risk requirements. 16 17 MEMBER STETKAR: Yes. Now, let's say I quantify that, and if the differential risk compared 18 19 to a perfect plant, a plant that complies fully with the deterministic requirements, if that differential 20 risk right now exceeds the guidance in Reg. Guide 21 1.174, I am still okay for that location; is that 22 correct, because --23 MR. LAUR: For previously approved? Yes. 24 25 MEMBER STETKAR: Because it's a previously **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

	123
1	approved action.
2	MR. LAUR: Yes.
З	MEMBER STETKAR: But now I'm on record. I
4	know what that differential is, and I cannot take
5	credit for any other recovery actions in that
6	particular area that would further increase the risk;
7	is that right?
8	MR. LAUR: Right.
9	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.
10	MR. LAUR: What we're saying is that you
11	have already used up your margins.
12	MEMBER STETKAR: And even
13	MR. LAUR: Beyond.
14	MEMBER STETKAR: You could have even more
15	than used up your margin from a Reg. Guide 1.174
16	perspective, except that it's a previously approved
17	action, and the new baseline risk now going forward,
18	when I look at future risk informed applications,
19	changes to the fire protection program, that new risk
20	value becomes my new baseline risk.
21	MR. LAUR: You can basically start over,
22	yes.
23	MEMBER STETKAR: You start over. You re-
24	initialize things.
25	MR. LAUR: We find this license change to
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	124
1	be acceptable, and then you start over.
2	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: But then you can make
3	more changes that will be evaluated now with respect
4	to the new
5	MEMBER STETKAR: To the new baseline. You
6	just re-baseline your core damage frequency, your
7	risk.
8	MR. LAUR: Actually applying to the
9	current plan.
10	Okay. Well, that covers my last bullet on
11	this slide. So I guess unless you have questions.
12	Okay. The primary control station it's
13	a little cryptic. So let me see if I could paraphrase
14	the rule. Recovery actions is a defined term in this
15	standard, and if a recovery action, they are actions
16	taken outside the main control room or outside the
17	primary control station or stations that are necessary
18	to achieve the nuclear safety performance criteria,
19	which are defined in her, including repairs and
20	replacement or something like that.
21	Anyway, it's a nice definition, but this
22	idea of primary control station, that's not defined,
23	and depending on how you define it, you can as some of
24	the members pointed out during the Subcommittee, if
25	you define it not carefully, you could come up with
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So we have proposed a definition of primary control station in a draft guide, and we've revised it based on not only public comments, but also on the ACRS Subcommittee discussion. And so we have clarified it, and we have another slide that covers this.

Basically if you consider the main control 10 11 room, that's pretty obvious what that is. But when I say primary control station, what we're saying is if 12 you shift command and control from the main control 13 room to either a dedicated shutdown panel or panels or 14 15 an alternative shutdown panel, and those two are defined in Appendix R. 16 We're saying these are previously reviewed and approved by NRC. Then if it's 17 a dedicated shutdown strategy, those actions do not 18 count as recovery actions. 19

Basically what you're saying is you have two control schemes and if the fire happens to affect the main one, you can go to this abbreviated scheme to shut down.

24If it's the alternative shutdown, because25those are not dedicated, we have some further criteria

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in the reg. guide that if that becomes a permanent command and control, more than one piece of equipment, the adequate communications control indication, et cetera, then we can consider that to be a primary control station and, therefore, it's not a recovery action.

7 aside, the reason, Just as an in my opinion, the reason this caused so much angst among 8 9 the licensees was that in the Appendix R world you had 10 this 3G3 option that allows you to handle things like control rooms where all of the cables are and you have 11 12 to evacuate or do something else, and this standard does not address it that way. We thought that was 13 another part where the rule was not optimal, but after 14 15 thinking about it if you define primary control station in this way, you're basically saying you do 16 have an alternative, and it's allowed under here by 17 defining permanent control station that way. 18

MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: So I just want to understand that. Let's say command and control is with the main control room. Then the reason they want to do something using the dedicated shutdown path, just a specific thing, then that is considered the recovery actions.

MR. LAUR: Yes, because the main --

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1	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: The main control is.
2	MR. LAUR: And that little nuance actually
3	came up in one of our stakeholder meetings where the
4	industry said you're still ambiguous before we change
5	it to this.
6	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yeah.
7	MR. LAUR: And obviously they would prefer
8	something that was a little more lenient, but the
9	comment was whichever one you pick, you need to make
10	it clear what you're saying.
11	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Now, this rule and
12	the regulatory guide refers to previously approved
13	recovery actions. So this definition of recovery
14	actions was in place also, but the understanding was
15	that this is a recovery action five years ago when a
16	particular action was approved, or is it a new
17	definition?
18	MR. BARRETT: It's a new definition
19	because the old definition would have called it an
20	operator action, operator manual action.
21	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: And that's all.
22	MR. BARRETT: That's a different
23	phraseology. This is RAO-5 phraseology.
24	MR. LAUR: There are actually slightly
25	different yeah, there are different rules.
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	128
1	MR. BARRETT: Different rules, definitions
2	for Appendix R.
3	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: An what does that
4	mean? I mean, they were approved. Is it possible, in
5	other words, to have an action that is not considered
6	a recovery action now, but it was considered before
7	and vice versa?
8	MR. HARRISON: Yes. It would have been an
9	OMA.
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: What do you do? You
11	just go with a new definition.
12	MR. HARRISON: Yes.
13	MR. LAUR: Yes. A perfect example, and
14	what I think this rule was trying to do
15	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: You really like that.
16	You keep raising it.
17	(Laughter.)
18	MR. LAUR: I lost my train of thought.
19	An example where recovery action might
20	well, if you use an operator action of some sort to
21	compensate for barriers, separations, suppression and
22	detection, there are existing rules, not this rule
23	correct me if I'm wrong here but that requires an
24	exemption, and one of the two things from my
25	perspective that has caused people to want to shift
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129 over to 805, there's two issues. One is the spurious, the other one but is unapproved operator manual actions that people thought, well, you approved the exemption over here. This is the same thin, and they weren't the same thing. It requires an exemption. What this rule says is you don't need an exemption. Just tell us that the risk is sufficiently small and acceptable to the NRC. That's where this separation barrier, suppression and detection. The control and abandonment thing is a little trickier, and that's why we had to come up with this definition. So a plant could easily have something that they would have to request, wasn't approved; they would have to request an exemption in their Appendix R, and all they have to do is give us a delta risk. We evaluate it and conclude that it's okay. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I sometimes get the impression that a lot of these problems are of our own doing. Life would have been much simpler, it seems to me. qlobal MR. LAUR: That's а "our." Possibly. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: A global "our," yes.

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MEMBER RAY: Well, the problem, George, is 1 2 you have to live in compliance space like a few of us have done in our lives to realize that all of these 3 4 things that they're talking about become really, 5 really important. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I understand. Ι 6 7 understand. 8 MEMBER RAY: Most of the stuff we talk 9 about here nobody is going to hammer you over the head 10 if you take a different interpretation or something because we're not talking about something that's going 11 12 to be enforced the way this is. MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: The root cause of the 13 problem is NFPA 805. 14 15 (Laughter.) MEMBER RAY: The root cause of the problem 16 is applying rules on something that already exists 17 that wasn't designed --18 19 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Well, not the little paragraph that says do this risk evaluation for 20 recovery actions, should never have been approved, 21 but. 22 Well, to expand the definition 23 MR. LAUR: of "our," this is an industry consensus standard. 24 25 (Laughter.) **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: We have been impressed by those over the years. MEMBER STETKAR: Steve, just to make sure that I understand the recovery action, I've got it if I need to abandon the control room. We've even brought up the picture there.

If I have a fire in a -- let's say it's an 7 8 I&C cabinet room where I lose not all but some 9 controls from the control room. Let's say it's, you know, one half of one division because of the specific 10 cabinets that are involved. And I decide to go to the 11 12 alternate shutdown panel to operate the equipment from that division, but the remaining equipment is still 13 operable in the control room. 14

15 Is that action now a recovery action? MR. LAUR: Yes. 16 17 MEMBER STETKAR: It is. Thank you. MR. LAUR: And in fact, I think -- yes. 18

MEMBER STETKAR: Thank you.

(Laughter.)

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MEMBER STETKAR: Yes is good enough. 21 Ιt 22 was emphatic. It was crisp. Thank you.

MEMBER CORRADINI: 23 Let's move on. I am George for a short time. 24

> Okay. On a similar slide, MR. LAUR:

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131

there is a bullet. I don't think he read it verbatim, but there was one that said we had a lot of public meetings. We actually had a public meeting back a little over a year ago to basically say, hey, we've noticed some things about this reg. guide, and we put out some things about common control station. It doesn't look like a definition today. We put out things about the standard license condition needed to change and things like that.

10 So we've had a number of public meetings, 11 and then after one of our ACRS encounters, we had two 12 specifically to share the latest and greatest version 13 with the public and actually found out some additional 14 things where we weren't 100 percent clear.

The thing is from our perspective is we incorporated the vast majority of the comments. If something was, you know, one way or the other way and it had nothing to do with public safety, adequate protection, or the rule language, we went with the industry's suggestion.

The remaining hard spots are required by 21 regulation, and therefore, it's necessary to have that 22 guidance to foster the stability and the clarity. 23 The still 24 industry said they have some unresolved 25 So I didn't want to be, you know, too oneconcerns.

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sided here. They said, well, the guidance is still not fully vetted. We now have this new understanding with what fire risk evaluations means, but we haven't piloted it.

Now, I think you heard at the Subcommittee meeting that they started, and it turned out that it's virtually the same risk assessment they were doing before, maybe on a different set of items.

9 The same thing with the recovery actions. 10 We say, yes, you can limit it to just the success Well, that bring up a whole new issue. 11 pathways. 12 What's a success path? Okay. Well, that needs to be Industry is going to start working on 13 determined. that guidance. There will probably be a fact that 14 will end up being in the next revision. 15

But it's a big concept, but it's not major changes in the reg. guide. The reg. guide doesn't need a change as a result of that. And then after you transition to 805, from then on you're doing what's called plant change evaluation, and they said, "Well, we don't underhand. You don't focus on that very much. You just focus on this other thing."

Now, the answer to that is very simple. They have enough guidance in there. We have additional guidance. We endorsed it, but there was a

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little bit of angst there as well.

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2 And then at the last meeting on November 3 13th, both pilots presented I guess for an hour a 4 piece. At the end they said you should issue this 5 req. guide, and it was also said by some of the members at one of the public meetings we had before 6 7 that that even though the industry doesn't agree with 8 everything that we are doing, they understand why 9 we're doing it. They understand the compliance 10 issues, and they really need the stability that 11 issuing this will give them. 12 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: That's temporary stability, I assume. 13

MR. LAUR: They like stability.

MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: The results of someof these other issues.

MR. LAUR: And the FAQ process is still alive and well, and I can say that we always thought we'd do another revision, but I don't think it's going to be something we're adding guidance, you know, fix holes. I don't think that's going to happen again.

We also had -- I don't need to go to this slide. We were already talking.

We added a flow chart as a result of the members' comments. We fixed the primary control

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	135
1	station, I think, finally, and there was a number of
2	other changes that I didn't enumerate here, but that
3	resulted in the discussion. There was good
4	opportunity to flesh out some things. You get kind of
5	in a group think mode when you're all in the same
6	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: I think it's fair to
7	say that you gentlemen did not disagree with us on
8	anything; that you fought not to do something,
9	correct?
10	MR. LAUR: That we did not disagree with
11	you or did?
12	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: You did not disagree
13	with us.
14	MR. LAUR: Yeah, I think that would be
15	safe to say.
16	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: That's fair. No, I
17	mean, this is details.
18	MR. LAUR: Open for questions at any time
19	now.
20	Just to reiterate, we've incorporated
21	significant lessons learned from the pilots, which as
22	you know is the purpose of the pilot, and I think it
23	has been alluded to in a couple of the conversations.
24	We really I don't want to say we have the cart
25	before the horse, but we are kind of doing some things
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	136
1	in parallel that if you had enough time, if you didn't
2	have the enforcement, discretion issues and
3	everything, you would fully vet this through a pilot
4	process before you finalized the guidance.
5	But we're learning, and you know, we're
6	still trying to get it done.
7	We need to provide clear and consistent
8	guidance. AS I mentioned the compliance issues and
9	the stability, and fully consider the takeover
10	comments, including the public, the industry and the
11	ACRS.
12	So we'd like to request that we get the
13	endorsement so that we can publish this, and not that
14	it matters to me, but I would like to see him go on
15	his vacation.
16	MEMBER STETKAR: Steve, one small
17	question. It has been a little pet topic of mine in
18	the background, and I thought, you know, in our
19	November meeting you said you were going to consider
20	revising a bit Section C.3.3 of the reg. guide, and
21	that is at the moment Rev. 1 of Reg. Guide 1.205 fully
22	endorses NEI-0001, Revision 1 for circuit analysis
23	methods, and just for the record, NEI has updated NEI-
24	0001 to Revision 2, and in particular the methods of
25	treatment of multiple spurious actuations have been

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	137
1	updated substantially from Rev. 1.
2	And, indeed, Reg. Guide 1.189 endorses
3	NEI-0001 Rev. 2 methods. I thought in our November
4	meeting you said you were going to go back and
5	consider clarifying the endorsement in Reg. Guide
6	1.205 to limit the endorsement to only Section 3, I
7	think it is
8	MR. LAUR: Yes.
9	MEMBER STETKAR: of NEI-0001, which is the
10	basic circuit analysis, but not endorse Section 4 and
11	whatever the appendices are.
12	MR. LAUR: And, in fact, we went ahead and
13	made preliminary changes which they shared with staff
14	and I thought they shared with
15	MEMBER STETKAR: I haven't seen those.
16	PARTICIPANT: I haven't seen it either.
17	MR. LAUR: Okay.
18	MEMBER STETKAR: The only version that I
19	have is the same version that we saw in November.
20	MR. LAUR: What we did, there were five or
21	six suggested changes that we could make. Okay. One
22	of those was substantive, non-editorial, and we talked
23	to OGC, and they said, "No, if you want to put this
24	thing out for comment again, go through the whole
25	process." And so we didn't do that.
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But as far as changing the revision, we 1 2 now reference or will reference before we publish 3 this; we will reference Rev. 2 of 1.189, but the only 4 place we reference that is for --5 MEMBER STETKAR: NEI-0001. MR. LAUR: And Rev. 2 of the meltdown, and 6 7 the only place we reference 1.189 in here is for an 8 example of a good --9 MEMBER STETKAR: The deterministic stuff. 10 Yeah, yeah. Okay. 11 MR. LAUR: So we change the reference to that, and I think you mentioned that at the other 12 meeting before. 13 MEMBER STETKAR: That might have been. 14 15 MR. LAUR: And then we reference Chapter 3 of Revision 2 of NEI-0001. 16 17 MEMBER STETKAR: Chapter 3 of Revision -it doesn't make any difference. It's Chapter 3. 18 19 MR. LAUR: We did that. There's another place where there's a very complicated sentence which 20 we clarified slightly, but, no, these --21 MEMBER STETKAR: I've just been handed the 22 23 words. Thank you. These words are editorial in 24 MR. LAUR: 25 our opinion, minor editorial changes. They add **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

	139
1	clarity, but they're not substantive.
2	MEMBER STETKAR: They add clarity and they
3	bring everything into consistency between the two reg.
4	guides, which I think is important, and it clarifies
5	what part of NEI-0001 is actually being endorsed. And
6	this is good. Thanks.
7	MR. LAUR: I have the questions slide.
8	I'm just waiting to see if you have any questions.
9	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Had enough? Are
10	there any questions or comments from the members?
11	I'm really disturbed by all of this, not
12	what you're doing, but what is happening, you know ,
13	out there. The methodology seems to be in flux all
14	the time. Like what would happen, say, if three years
15	down the line we revise the rule? We take out all of
16	these references to recovery actions. Is that another
17	revolution that will upset everybody?
18	MR. HARRISON: I think philosophically
19	what that would do is those plants that have already
20	been approved would gain flexibility to have the
21	option to go back in. At that point they have a
22	licensing basis they can live with.
23	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Yeah.
24	MR. HARRISON: And if you remove things,
25	then they would gain flexibility.
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140 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: The other thing, 1 2 Donnie, is that, you know, had Subcommittee we 3 meetings and meetings where we have people there where you're sitting praising NUREG-5860, that this is, you 4 5 know, the best thing after sliced bread, and now we have, you know, all of these problems and EPRI, when 6 they were here, blasted it as if it was just the NRC 7 8 that did it. You know, where does that leave us? 9 And then they would say, well, gee, the 10 industry really is exhausting its resources, doing The whole thing, I think, needs to be 11 fire PRAs. 12 rethought, and you gentlemen will probably have some input to that because this situation is very, very 13 undesirable in my view. To do all of these things, 14 15 change the methodology; one day we have a great NUREG; the next day it's not. 16 17 Anyway, I guess, Mr. Chairman, we have reached the end of this section. 18 19 CHAIRMAN BONACA: You were fast. finished 20 MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: We 42 minutes early I would like the record to show. 21 Back to you, Mr. Chairman. 22 23 CHAIRMAN BONACA: First of all, let's thank you for the presentation, and second, we have a 24 25 lot of time. As you know, at 12:30 we have this **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

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	141
1	ribbon cutting ceremony with the Chairman coming down,
2	and so we have time for that.
3	The only thing I could advise and do now
4	in my judgment would be the Subcommittee reports.
5	PARTICIPANTS: We can go to lunch.
6	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Ribbon cutting
7	ceremony at 12:30. We can go to lunch.
8	PARTICIPANT: I mean, we will have cake
9	for the ribbon cutting ceremony.
10	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Or we can do what you
11	say.
12	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Let's break now. I was
13	told that the
14	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: If you want to do
15	that portion of the advanced, right?
16	MR. HACKETT: Yeah, I think that's correct.
17	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Mario, if you want to
18	do that, I can go over the Safety Culture Subcommittee
19	in five minutes.
20	CHAIRMAN BONACA: The trouble is that is
21	on the agenda.
22	MEMBER APOSTOLAKIS: Let's go to lunch.
23	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Let's take a break and
24	get back at 1:15.
25	(Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the meeting was
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recessed for lunch, to reconvene at 1:15 p.m.)

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	143
1	AFTERNOON SESSION
2	(1:14 p.m.)
3	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Let's go back into
4	session.
5	The next item on the agenda is long-term
6	cooling, core cooling approach for the economic
7	simplified boiling water reactor design, and Michael
8	Corradini will take us through his presentation.
9	MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay. Thank you, Mr.
10	Chairman.
11	So for the members, let me take a minute
12	to do a little bit of catch-up before I turn it over
13	to the staff. So as you all are aware, we've had a
14	large amount of activity reviewing the chapters, the
15	draft. I shouldn't say the draft chapters. The SERs
16	with open items. We've concluded that issued interim
17	letters.
18	In a separate SRM from the Commission,
19	dated May 8th, 2008, the Commission stated that the
20	ACRS should advise the staff and Commission on the
21	adequacy of design basis long-term core cooling
22	approach for each new reactor design based on its
23	review of the design certification. So that has been
24	a standing thing that we thought would be a good time
25	to begin here with ESBWR since we're coming into the
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1 hopefully end phase of the SERs with open items. And 2 it is actually timely, and we chose this time to do it 3 because two weeks ago we had a Subcommittee meeting 4 with the group that is our ESBWR Subcommittee where we 5 looked again at essentially long-term cooling, and I guess I define it at least easily as days, defined 6 anywhere from a few days to 30 days of cooling, and we 7 8 looked at the Applicant's calculations using TRACG, as 9 well as the audit calculations done by staff. And I thought this would be a good time to 10 get together to look at these and have the staff 11 12 present their view of where we are. We are not going to get a letter out of 13 this today because there are still some issues staff 14

is reviewing relative to the applicant. For example, vacuum breaker, performance, et cetera, et cetera. So at this point I would view this as a progress presentation to the full Committee, but the focus is to answer the SRM from the Commission.

20 So with that I'll turn it over to John 21 McKirgan. 22 MR. McKIRGAN: Thank you. Thank you.

I'm John McKirgan. I'm Chief of the Containment Systems Ventilation Branch II for NRO, and let me introduce my staff there. Hanry Wagage is the

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	145
1	lead reviewer for this activity, and let me just for
2	the sake of time, I'll just turn it over to Henry and
3	we can get started.
4	MR. WAGAGE: Hi. My name is Hanry Wagage.
5	I'm from Containment and Ventilation Branch of NRO.
6	We are here today to present design basis,
7	ESBWR containment long-term pressurization analysis.
8	I'll be presenting regulatory tied data applicable to
9	containment long-term cooling.
10	Allen Notafrancesco from the Office of
11	Regulatory Research will be presenting staff MELCOR
12	containment analysis.
13	Hossein Esmaili, also from Office of
14	Technical Research, is an analyst, and he will be
15	available to answer questions.
16	The Office of Regulatory Research with
17	Sandia National Laboratory through a contract for
18	analysis. Jack Tills, who is a consultant to Sandia
19	National Laboratory, supported this analysis. Jack
20	could be available during the presentation to answer
21	any questions through a phone line of needed.
22	Slide 2.
23	This is the project team and technical
24	teach
25	Next slide.
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These are the criteria for containment long-term cooling. 10 cfr 50.46(b)(5) is on long-term cooling of the reactor core after an accident. When cooling the core, energy is transferred from the core to the containment. Therefore, the continuity of cooling the core and it has be transferred from the containment. As such containment cooling is required to meet 10 CFR 50.46(b)(5).

9 GDC-38 on containment needs to be more 10 A system to remove heat from the reactor space. containment shall be provided. 11 The system safety 12 function shall be to reduce rapidly consistent with the function of other associated systems. 13 The containment pressure and temperature following a loss 14 15 of cooling accident and maintain them at acceptably low levels. 16

Staff looked at these two regular criteriafor this analysis.

19 ESBWR created the following systems to and after 20 mitigate containment pressurizes LOCA. 21 During the initial blow-down phase of an accident, suppression pool 22 steam is released to the when 23 (unintelligible). The -- cooling system condenses steam by heating and boiling water in the PCC tanks, 24 25 which are located outside the containment.

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Thus PCC redirects an area from containment to the outside. PCC does not need any operator actions or outside power to operate for three days following the LOCA. After three days, active intervention systems start, where the systems are PCC tank refill and PCC vent fans.

In addition, analysts credit passive autocatalytic recombiner systems after three days to remove any radiolyses (phonetic), gases which are hydrogen and oxygen produced in the core.

11 In determining acceptable containment 12 pressure and -- the long term to meet GDC-38, the staff used Commission's quidance in SRM to SECY 94-13 084. In SECY 94-084, staff proposed to the Commission 14 that for passive plants, safe shutdown conditions for 15 should be acceptable as stable 16 reactor shutdown 17 conditions. The Commission accepted the staff's recommendations. 18

19 The staff used GE-Hitachi's G Type containment analysis and staff's MELCOR analysis to 20 21 determine ESBWR compliance with GDC-38. ESBWR compliance with GDC-38 is pending upon resolution of 22 23 RAI 62.140, which is on long-term containment cooling. This shows G --24 25 MEMBER CORRADINI: Can I just interject

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1	and make sure everybody understands where we sit? So
2	where we sit is that the Applicant has submitted to
3	staff and they're reviewing a supplement, a final
4	supplement on these calculations where they were asked
5	to do a series of calculations with four fans, six
6	fans, three days, 30 days and a range of conditions.
7	Staff has it. They're still under review,
8	and this is kind of an interim on some of the results
9	we've seen from them and from the staff's audit.
10	MR. WAGAGE: Thank you.
11	This curve shows containment pressure
12	prediction as presented in the DCD Revision 6. We
13	have an open item, open RAI on the containment
14	pressurization analysis and the final figure may be
15	different.
16	I'm using this to illustrate how staff is
17	going to determine the plant's compliance with GDC-38.
18	We'll be talking later about how this compares with
19	staff's MELCOR containment analysis.
20	ESBWR mitigates the accident with
21	completely passive systems for three days following
22	the LOCA. During this time, containment pressure
23	continues to rise as you can see from this curve, but
24	stays below the containment design pressure. At three
25	days when active systems which are PCC pool refill and
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149 1 vent fans stop, the pressure rapidly drops and stays 2 below acceptably low level in the long term. 3 The containment pressure is sufficiently low to maintain safe shutdown conditions below 215.6 4 5 decrease Centigrade or 420 degrees Fahrenheit in the rear to core. Therefore, this containment pressure 6 would meet the intent of GDC-38. 7 8 As I noted, the staff determination is 9 pending on resolution of RAI 62.140. Next, Allen Notafrancesco will begin his 10 11 presentation. 12 MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: Okay. My responsibility was to provide the support for the 13 order calculations, and at the time -- I'm just going 14 15 to give you a little background -- considering this as an ESBWR, there's a tight coupling between the reactor 16 17 coolant system and the containment. So we selected the MELCOR code to be adapted to the unique features 18 19 of the ESBWR. The MELCOR code uses a state of the art 20 lump parameter approach. It has a fully integrated 21 22 system between the reactor coolant system and the containment, and in our assessment we focused on ESBWR 23 phenomena and performed targeted code assessments. 24 25 Because MELCOR has been categorized as a severe **NEAL R. GROSS**

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accident code, we had to go and do some key assessments to qualify and validate the code, that it does do thermal hydraulic DBA-type analysis.

Some of the models came from the CONTAIN code, which is also our licensing code for containment analysis, but it's restricted to containment phenomena. It doesn't deal with the reactor coolant system.

9 So what we did, we contracted with Sandia 10 National Laboratory. We did targeted assessments 11 related to the ESBWR. The various assessments were 12 PANDA and PUMA. Those are all different types of 13 assessments that were related to ESBWR.

The next slide is just to go over a quick overview of how I'm going to present this, is provide a quick background of the plant and our calculation approach; the MELCOR EWBWR model; and our long-term cooling calculation focusing on pressure.

There's two distinct parts or periods to the transient. There's the first three days, and then there's post three days out to 30 days, and I'll get into the different aspects of that.

Historically when we do containment audit analysis at the agency, we take a bounding approach in relationship to peak pressure and long-term pressure

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and temperature. When I say "bounding," we maximize the mass and energy into the containment which we assume is a closed system, and we minimize its transport of energy outside.

5 And some of the aspects we look at is looking at the worst pipe break, usually a large steam 6 line break or recirculation line break. We look at 7 8 the limiting single active failure. Our boundary 9 conditions could be extreme tech spec values. We're looking at pressure. We' probably use the upper bound 10 for peak initial pressure of, let's say, 16 psia. 11

12 Our modeling philosophy is when there's 13 modeling inaccuracy or uncertainties, we'll index 14 inherent biases to assure that we produce conservative 15 pressure calculations.

Now, this is just an overview of 16 the 17 the relationship of the wetwell, the GDCS ESBWR, pools. The key systems I want to know here are the 18 19 vents, the vents between the drywell main and suppression pool; the PCCS heat exchangers. Those are 20 the red dotted areas, and there's six of 21 those The main portion is a heat exchanger with 22 systems. two modules, and then there's a fan coupling between 23 the vent gas pipe to a pipe going to the GDCS pool. 24

The key concept of the long-term cooling

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is to take the decay heat from the core, which is transported by steam, to the PCCS heat exchangers and that upward pool with evaporate, and that's how it's going to control the pressure.

5 As part of our logical dissection of the 6 phenomenon, what I have here is the passive period, 7 which is a three-day period. Basically, I want you to 8 focus on the left side. The right side in the middle 9 is the specific phenomenon of processes. Then we have our validation and our MELCOR reference documentation, 10 11 but I just want to familiarize the key aspects of this 12 period is the blow-down period in which the large break is going to uncover the vents between the 13 drywell and the wetwell, and that slug of energy is 14 15 going to be absorbed in the suppression pool.

The pressure will eventually go down. The GDCS will refill the RPV; the recovery period; and then the long term is where the PCCS heat exchangers will be a dominant player.

Some of the key phenomenon in the ESBWR is the pressure will be dictated by what is going to happen in the wetwell, and some of the assumptions that heighten the wetwell is bypass leakage between the drywell and the wetwell, and the trickle of noncondensable gases from the drywell going to the

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PCCS which will tend to plug up the lower portion of the PCCS PIPING.

This slide is a similar slide as the 3 4 previous one, but it's for three days to 30 days. 5 This is when the fans are on. At that time the upper pool is somewhat uncovering the top portion of the 6 7 PCCS heat exchangers, and they're exposing tubes to 8 atmosphere instead of water, and then there's a refill 9 period, and then the fan is going to continue going and then it will stabilize out in the long term and 10 11 you'll see the plots.

Here's another breakdown of the ESBWR plan 12 which included the segmentation 13 in we of the portions nodalization of the different 14 of the 15 containment. The suppression pool is nodalized to maximize stratification; the same thing with the 16 17 wetwell gas space; and what you see here is you'll see vacuum breakers. There's vacuum breakers between the 18 19 wetwell and the drywell, and there's the drywell to wetwell bypass path. 20

And the next slide will break that down further. The MELCOR on the left side is the RPV nodalization. Basically, what we're using the model to -- besides blowing down the initial inventory of steam and water in the vessel -- we're trying to also

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boil water for the long term, and that's what we're doing here.

At the same time, we're assuming a radiolysis effect of water to supply some noncondensables that will eventually be a factor in degrading the PCCS a little bit.

middle slide 7 The is better а 8 representation of the wetwell break-up of the nodes. 9 What we're trying to do is maximize the energy input into the wetwell. The nodes are set that if the 10 vacuum breakers pop, they'll get more noncondensable 11 12 rich mixtures going back into the drywell. The right side is how we grouped the PCCS units. There are six 13 units so that we have a bank of two consolidated and a 14bank of four consolidated units that provide the 15 calculational efficiency that we need. 16

The next is the TRACG plant schematic. 17 Since they're using TRACG and one of the artifacts of 18 19 TRACG is their artificially nodalizing some of the drywell air space, and that's one of the issues we've 20 21 worked out with General Electric to try to induce more mixing because we've got to get the noncondensables to 22 23 the wetwell, which tends to drive up the overall if 24 system pressure, and have too much you 25 nodalization, you'll tend to trap. You'll trap

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noncondensables, and it's not a player in the pressurize.

3 The next slide is basically a listing 4 which Ι describe about suppression pool 5 stratification, wetwell gas stratification. We also modeled, and consistent with the GE model, is we 6 reduced a number of heat sinks that are modeled in the 7 -- we're not modeling all of the heat sinks in the 8 9 containment; just enough walls to connect with the wetwell and the wetwell connecting out to the reactor 10 11 building.

MEMBER SHACK: Can you just go back over that for a second on this nodalization with TRAC? Are you arguing that that's a less conservative one or there's something non-realistic about introducing the nodalization?

Doesn't it let them look at things like stratification and such? I would have thought it was a plus.

Well, not for the 20 MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: drywell because in the drywell the main issue is to 21 depends 22 try to get -it what you mean by stratification. If it's steam stratification, that's 23 a nonconservative assumption because then it would 24 25 push the noncondensables in the lower drywell.

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156 MEMBER CORRADINI: Т think Allen is 1 2 agreeing with you, but he's giving you his explanation 3 of why he agrees with you. He's looking in this DBA 4 calculation to give the upper bound on pressure all 5 the time, and --MEMBER SHACK: Yes, but he's just forcing 6 7 it that way. 8 MEMBER CORRADINI: Well, I mean, I'm 9 putting words in your mouth, Al, but let me say it differently. I think Bill was asking if they nodalize 10 it, and let's assume they do it right, that could 11 12 potentially take us more to a best estimate. But that's not your objective in the MELCOR calculation. 13 MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: No. 14 15 MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay. MEMBER SHACK: That answers my question. 16 MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: Just a sidebar. 17 In typical state of the art containment analysis, this is 18 19 really still one parameter. Some of this field code stuff or CFD is an emerging technology that lacks even 20 test data. 21 So --You're showing your 22 MEMBER CORRADINI: prejudice, but that's okay. 23 MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: Well, I'm showing 24 25 practicality. **NEAL R. GROSS**

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So and typically with any other BWR Mark 1 2 1, 2 or 3, the drywell is mixed, is assumed uniformly 3 mixed, and here we're just taking it to the next 4 level. So because in the early analysis we were 5 getting some trapping in the GDC airspace, and we tried to get around that by putting two flow pads to 6 induce counter-current flow and better mixing. 7 So 8 that's what we try to do. We go more to physics. 9 We're going to bias on a conservative end. So like I said, we reduce the heat sink 10 inventory. We are going out 30 days. So that puts 11 12 some conservative bias to that. There is PARs in this system. 13 PARs is autocatalytic recombiners. They're 14 passive not 15 credited in the first three days. They are credited three days on, and the way it's credited is that all 16 17 radiolysis shuts off. 18 MEMBER CORRADINI: Does that mean that 19 they're designed in such a manner that they have 20 enough capacity to more than account for whatever might be produced by conservative radiolysis? 21 Well, 22 MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: that's the 23 intent of what we see. GE hasn't designed it yet. So those are the assumptions. 24 25 If MEMBER ARMIJO: these things are **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

	158
1	passive, why aren't they credited during the first
2	phase?
3	MR. WAGAGE: Because they are not safe
4	related system. They are known to categorize as a
5	safe related system.
6	MEMBER ARMIJO: That comes from GE, to
7	decide it or not.
8	MR. WAGAGE: Yes, that's right. We
9	decided to create up to three days.
10	MEMBER CORRADINI: Does the Applicant want
11	to say anything at this point?
12	MR. MARQUINO: That's right. They are a
13	witness system. They are not safety related.
14	Therefore, we don't credit them before three days even
15	though realistically they would have some effect, but
16	we take no credit in the analysis for that.
17	MEMBER CORRADINI: How much energy do they
18	use? What's their power?
19	They require they have to be powered.
20	MR. MARQUINO: No, they're not.
21	MEMBER CORRADINI: They're not powered?
22	MR. MARQUINO: No.
23	MEMBER CORRADINI: So it's a catalyst
24	without any sort of heating of the catalytic surface.
25	MEMBER ARMIJO: The recombination starts
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	159
1	the
2	MEMBER CORRADINI: Right, but every
3	catalyst has some nice temperature that it likes to
4	cook at. So my question is it doesn't need to be
5	heated to any temperature.
6	MR. MARQUINO: No.
7	MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: It needs a minimum
8	threshold of hydrogen to get things started.
9	MEMBER CORRADINI: Which is what?
10	MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: Point, five percent or
11	something to that.
12	MEMBER CORRADINI: Thank you.
13	MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: Okay. And what we
14	see here is the bottom line drywell pressure trace
15	calculated by MELCOR. It's in log plot. We're going
16	out 30 days. The first 800 seconds is typically the
17	blow-down. The vent system, the main vent is open and
18	the pressure of the drywell is relieved through that
19	vent system and the energies going into the
20	suppression pool.
21	Then on the way in that sequence early on,
22	the DPV valves open up. They help the
23	depressurization of the core and then there's GDCS
24	flow, which is basically the pool at a higher
25	elevation, and that starts filling the RPV.
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The RPV will be filled, and the water will start to flow out the main steam line break. Steaming will be shut down for a while. That's why you see a dip around 800 to 1,000 seconds. Then the subcooling will be heating up and RPV steaming will start rapidly increasing.

At that time, the PCCS will start to be a player, and up to three days the pressure will slowly go up because of the effect of bypass leakage and the noncondensables fighting the resistance within the PCCS piping, at which time, at three days, the active systems will start to be drawn in.

MEMBER CORRADINI: They're credited atthat point. They're allowed to be credited.

MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: They're allowed to be credited.

17 The next plot is the first three Okay. days compared to TRACG. Overall we get a good match 18 19 with TRACG, considering have different we а independent code and a different pedigree. So we get 20 good results, which is good. 21

I discussed the passive portion, but the intervention period, PARs are credited. So radiolysis was shut down. There are six fans available, but four fans are working. One is assumed to be out on tech

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	161
1	spec, and one is assumed to fail. So that leaves two,
2	and that's why we have the banking of the PCCS as a
З	two and a four calculation. It's efficient that way.
4	And the upper pool refill will stop
5	because at the time of three days
6	MEMBER BROWN: Before you help me, you've
7	got bars on one graph and then kilopascals on the next
8	graph, and I don't know how to calibrate that.
9	MEMBER CORRADINI: Just divide multiple
10	bars by 100 and you've got kilopascals.
11	MEMBER BROWN: But how do you get that
12	into pounds per square inch?
13	MEMBER CORRADINI: We won't give you that.
14	PARTICIPANT: Fifteen.
15	MEMBER CORRADINI: Multiply by 14.5 bars.
16	MEMBER BROWN: Okay. So a bar is 14.7
17	psi?
18	MR. WAGAGE: A hundred kilobars is 14.5
19	psi.
20	MEMBER CORRADINI: Hundred kilopascals.
21	MR. WAGAGE: Hundred kilopascals.
22	MEMBER BROWN: I'm not understanding one
23	bar.
24	MEMBER STETKAR: One bar is 14.5 psi.
25	MEMBER CORRADINI: Write it down.
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	162
1	MEMBER STETKAR: The test is after class.
2	MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: The design pressure is
3	45 psig.
4	MEMBER BROWN: Okay, and how many
5	kilopascals per bar or the other way?
6	MR. WAGAGE: Hundred kilopascals per bar.
7	MEMBER BROWN: I see in here.
8	MS. CUBBAGE: It appears that Slide 16 and
9	17 have identical scales on the left but different
10	labeling.
11	MEMBER BROWN: Exactly. Thank you. I
12	didn't know what the weight was anyway, but the
13	numbers were just off by 100. Is that what you're
14	trying to tell me?
15	MS. CUBBAGE: Yes.
16	MEMBER BROWN: All right. Thank you.
17	I'm taking over now sine I have no idea
18	what you're talking about. Go ahead. You can
19	continue is what I'm telling you.
20	MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: Okay.
21	MEMBER BROWN: Mike gave me permission to
22	tell you to do that.
23	MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: In trying to calculate
24	post three days of the ESBWR long-term pressure, there
25	are some issues we had with GE that we're converging
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	163
1	on, and one of the issues was how the upper pool was
2	being refilled. In the DCD it is a constant 200 gpm,
3	and yet they provided some level control, and there's
4	a tray in the GCDS pool where the condensate and the
5	fan discharge is supposed to be designed, but it's not
6	designed. So we had some issues with them.
7	What this means is that it affects the
8	flow of fan, fan flow. Okay? These assumptions will
9	affect fan flow, and so we tried to get on the same
10	level.
11	Okay. The next slide will be helpful.
12	There you go.
13	It's our contention since they run a
14	condensate tray of ten inch head on the discharge, we
15	embedded it in our MELCOR code to provide that fan
16	head. We have a 200 gpm. So the upper pool keeps
17	increasing, and so our top curve, the red curve is
18	what we think is the actual audit calculation.
19	The blue curve is the curve that is in the
20	DCD, which provides a more optimistic fan flow or the
21	end product is the fan flow, which is the TRACG
22	calculation. So that is where RAI-140, Supplement 5
23	gets involved, is to try to reconcile the difference.
24	The green curve is a MELCOR calculation in
25	which we try to match the blue curve with the same
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164 1 assumptions. So that's why there's some difference 2 when say audit versus confirmatory here, but we 3 basically what you see here is the signature of the 4 profile for long-term cooling. 5 So the bottom line results -- what I'm trying to say here is that the passive period in the 6 7 first three days, we have a good match with TRACG and 8 we're generally satisfied with comparisons. 9 Our audit calculation with MELCOR, with 10 the proceed design calculation, we're still about 24 11 percent margin at 30 days. So that leads us to where 12 some soft areas trying to reconcile we have as ultimately how the TRACG calculations are documented 13 in the DCD, and that's where it needs to be pursued. 14 But basically we're confident we have a 15 good, conservative calculation in representing the 16 behavior of the ESBWR facility. 17 Do you want to see any more? 18 19 MEMBER CORRADINI: Questions by the Committee? 20 (No response.) 21 MEMBER CORRADINI: Mr. Chairman. 22 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Thank you very much. 23 When is the letter or whatever is due? 24 25 What is happening? **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

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	165
1	MEMBER CORRADINI: We're required by SECY
2	to get back a response on a per plant basis, and we're
3	the first ones up, and the deadline is April 2010. We
4	thought it would be reasonable since many of the folks
5	here were at the Subcommittee meeting two weeks ago to
6	inform the rest of the Committee as to essentially the
7	comparison between the staff's audit calculation and
8	the Applicant's calculation now that they've submitted
9	what we think is their final supplement for the long-
10	term containment cooling, long-term core cool.
11	MEMBER BANERJEE: Right, but there have
12	been many very detailed questions that were on the
13	table.
14	MEMBER CORRADINI: Those were all given to
15	us by our consultants, and we're going to look at
16	those as we proceed forward. All of those
17	questions
18	MEMBER BANERJEE: but they will have to be
19	resolved in some way or the other before the
20	MEMBER CORRADINI: Correct, correct. They
21	have to be resolved in some way or the other. I think
22	Dr well, we've got two sets, one from Dr. Wallis,
23	one from Dr. Kress. Dr. Kress' had if the
24	Committee wants, I can summarize.
25	Okay, but anyway, we got a series of two
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or three major issues from Dr. Kress. Dr. Wallis' could be summarized into four issues. One of the three was it's fairly lengthy because he analyzed Supplement 4 and came up with a range of questions. I'm not sure necessarily if he's happy with Supplement 5, but he is looking at it.

7 But think the issues Ι by our two 8 consultants in some sense overlay relative to fan 9 performance, containment cooling. The big one that's still out there is staff is still -- the only thing we 10 didn't bring up today, and it was my decision not for 11 12 them to do it, is staff is still evaluating the temperature and pressure sensors that are being used 13 with the vacuum breakers to determine any sort of out 14 15 of bounds leakage in isolation of the vacuum breakers, and that's still being analyzed in another -- I think 16 that's RAI-148 -- and they're looking at Applicant's 17 response to that now. 18

19But that is probably the big one that we20have reviewed by two weeks ago that has yet to be --

21 MEMBER BANERJEE: Well, the other issue 22 was the -- it may not be an issue -- was the LFL 23 limits at various points.

24 MEMBER CORRADINI: Right, correct. We 25 have yet to see any calculations by anybody to comment

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167 on them. 1 2 MEMBER BANERJEE: Right. It's only --3 MEMBER CORRADINI: It's a question. 4 MEMBER BANERJEE: It's a question. We are 5 asking for information. MEMBER CORRADINI: And we still have to 6 get something back. That's correct. 7 8 MEMBER BANERJEE: But would you want to have that resolved? 9 MEMBER CORRADINI: 10 We are not going to until all of those things are satisfactory to this 11 12 august body. MEMBER BANERJEE: Fine. 13 MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay? That's kind of 14 where we sit. 15 MEMBER BANERJEE: All right. 16 MEMBER BROWN: So there is no problem with 17 only having about three-tenths of a 30 18 ___ or 19 kilopascals? MEMBER CORRADINI: I'm going to ask you 20 21 how many psi that is. 22 MEMBER BROWN: Three --PARTICIPANT: Tenths. 23 MEMBER BROWN: No, it's three psi. So --24 25 PARTICIPANT: Four, but --**NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

	168
1	MEMBER BROWN: All right. Close enough.
2	MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay.
3	MEMBER BROWN: Out of all that, I mean,
4	that's five percent margin is okay or six percent
5	margin to the design limit.
6	MEMBER CORRADINI: You're asking me or
7	asking the staff?
8	MEMBER BROWN: Yes.
9	MEMBER CORRADINI: Ask the staff.
10	MEMBER BROWN: I don't know what's been
11	accepted in the past. That just seemed kind of close.
12	That's all.
13	MR. WAGAGE: Margins accepted in the past
14	is closer to the design pressure is just below the
15	the calculated pressure is just below the design value
16	for AP-1000 and AP-600. The calculated pressure is
17	based below the design value. It satisfies GDC-50,
18	which requires that LOCA the containment has to be
19	designed to accommodate LOCA generated containment
20	(unintelligible). As long as it stays below the
21	design value, it satisfies.
22	MEMBER BROWN: So it can be .0001 below it
23	and that's okay?
24	MR. WAGAGE: If the calculation is a
25	bounding value. If you don't believe that it is above
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	169
1	that, then it's acceptable.
2	MEMBER CORRADINI: I think the point kind
3	of goes back to Al's philosophy on this, is they
4	cautiously did the MELCOR audit to be bounding and
5	over estimate as best they could all the pressure
6	loading. Is that a fair statement?
7	MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: Sure.
8	MEMBER BROWN: So the bounding is supposed
9	to be more conservative.
10	MEMBER CORRADINI: Well, the bounding
11	essentially brings you closer to the margin, closer to
12	the design pressure. Excuse me.
13	MEMBER BLEY: The conservatism is also
14	built into the limit.
15	MEMBER CORRADINI: Yes, correct.
16	MEMBER BLEY: That's where the real
17	protection is.
18	MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: The overall capacity
19	is over 150 psi of the system.
20	MEMBER BROWN: I just want to concur, but
21	I mean
22	MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: It's not unique. I've
23	seen other plants come close to the design.
24	MEMBER CORRADINI: It's not uncommon in
25	containment analysis to have this as essentially a
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	170
1	pass. In current plants, given they use essentially
2	the same analysis technique that Al had indicated, a
3	conservative loading calculation compared to an
4	essentially design calculation, where there is margin
5	in the design calculation in the design limit.
6	Excuse me.
7	Is that a fair statement?
8	MR. WAGAGE: Could you repeat that again?
9	PARTICIPANTS: Yes.
10	MEMBER BANERJEE: Well, I think there are
11	aspects where the limit itself has a margin, but there
12	can be things which are unforeseen which would push
13	these pressures higher, of course.
14	MEMBER BROWN: That's why I don't like
15	being that close.
16	MEMBER BANERJEE: Yes, but these are very
17	bounding calculations.
18	MEMBER MAYNARD: You put the margin. I
19	mean, you have conservatism in the limit. The margin
20	of the calculation
21	MEMBER BROWN: Yeah, I understand what
22	you're saying.
23	MEMBER MAYNARD: If you're going to put a
24	delta in there, you don't need the conservatism in the
25	other.
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171 MEMBER BROWN: I understand. It's just I 1 2 don't know -- when you calculate the number, I don't know how much margin is in there. 3 4 MEMBER CORRADINI: Staff is not 5 comfortable with --MEMBER BROWN: -- and nobody made any 6 7 comments about how much margin there was in the line. 8 So we've been discussing how we don't like to exceed 9 various design pressures in other meetings and on 10 other projects, and so that one comes pretty darn 11 close, and that's why I asked the question, for 12 unknown unknowns. MS. CUBBAGE: And we also evaluate in 13 Chapter 19 spaces severe accident capability of the 14 15 containment as well. So this is the design basis limit here. 16 17 MEMBER BANERJEE: By analogy, Charlie, when you have peak clad temperature, sometimes in 18 19 these numbers it comes within degrees two or something. 20 MEMBER BROWN: I don't know. A transient, 21 short time, not going to do anything. 22 I understand 23 that point also. It's not sustained. MEMBER CORRADINI: Other questions? 24 25 Mr. Chairman, I still turn it back to you. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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MEMBER RAY: Well, wait a minute. I think we have a minute. Can I -- with the staff here, they may have something to day now. Eileen is not here.

MEMBER CORRADINI: Oh, you're going to talk to them about --

MEMBER RAY: I have the opportunity to have Sanjoy here, which is something I want to take advantage of.

9 At the same time you were having your meeting, we were having an AP-1000 meeting on the same 10 subject, and Mike started off by referring to this May 11 8th he called it a staff SRM. 12 The position that was taken in that meeting both by the applicant and by 13 Eileen was that on the long-term cooling issue, on the 14amendment, which this May 8th letter doesn't speak to 15 an amendment; it only speaks to certifications and the 16 17 COLS; that it may be resolved as part of the amendment, which we all know we're busily working to 18 19 complete, or it may not, in which case it will be addressed after the amendment is done. 20

I at that time didn't know about this May 8th memo. So I'm bringing it up here now. The discussion at the AP-1000 meeting basically said we're giving you this briefing for information purposes, but you don't -- at least now I'm using my own words --

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173 1 you don't need to figure out now how you're going to 2 resolve all of your questions, and we haven't even 3 heard the staff's questions yet, before the expected 4 closure of the amendment to the AP-1000. It may be 5 So relax, which is a different picture after that. than we have here that Mike has given us based on this 6 May 8th memo. 7 8 So I guess I would just say I am not sure 9 whether this May 8th memo is intended to apply to the AP-1000 amendment or not. 10 11 MEMBER CORRADINI: Harold wants an exception. 12 MEMBER RAY: But if it is, 13 that's a different view or a different outlook than we got in 14 15 the meeting that was going on at the same time his meeting was going on. 16 Specifically then the question is, well, 17 are we going to have to, in fact, conform the AP-1000 18 19 amendment approval to this injunction that the ACRS advise on the adequacy of the design basis of long-20 term core cooling approach for each here it says new 21 reactor design. AP-1000 in some people's minds is a 22 new reactor design in the form of the amendment. 23 But leaving that aside, in any event, the 24 25 point is that it's not clear that we're on the track **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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174 to resolve this. I understand ESBWR is, and I would 1 2 just --MEMBER CORRADINI: 3 Don't assume that. 4 We're on a track to report something. 5 To, yes, resolve what the MEMBER RAY: ACRS' response is to this request. That's what I 6 meant by resolve it. 7 8 We're not necessarily on that track in the 9 AP-1000, and I just want to make that clear. 10 MEMBER BANERJEE: Well, we will respond if 11 asked to. MR. DIAS: Will comment at a later time. 12 Every model has to answer to that. 13 Now, wait. MEMBER RAY: 14 I just got 15 through saying this speaks to design certifications and to COLs. It does not speak to amendments to 16 design certification. 17 MEMBER BANERJEE: Is that just the fine 18 19 point of the wording or --20 MEMBER RAY: I am. I became a lawyer long after I was an engineer. I'm just telling you --21 I'm just telling you it 22 PARTICIPANT: seems like a design served to me. 23 MEMBER RAY: I understand that, but if the 24 25 point is going to be, well, we've got news for you. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

	175
1	You are going to have to take a position on long-term
2	cooling on the AP-1000, then I've got news for the
3	staff, and that is they had better get us something to
4	chew on more than the briefing we got from the
5	Applicant in the last Subcommittee meeting.
6	MEMBER BANERJEE: Well, to be fair,
7	Harold, I think we left it open as to whether it was
8	possible to do or not before we had resolved the issue
9	for the current LWRs.
10	MEMBER RAY: After you were gone, we had a
11	rather lengthy discussion of this, Sanjoy, and we
12	absolutely explicitly said we are not currently
13	planning, and I say all of this because you know what
14	is going to happen tomorrow. We're going to have a
15	discussion where who knows; it could come up. So I
16	just want to
17	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Well, we will pick it up
18	again, this issue, when we have this report.
19	MEMBER RAY: That's fine. I just raised
20	it here now because of the conjunction with what was
21	being discussed.
22	MEMBER CORRADINI: Harold and I had a side
23	conversation about it, but I think it's fair to say
24	that kind of at least this AP-1000 since I was at his
25	meeting the second day or at one of the days when this
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1 started to be brought up, it really is not fish nor 2 fowl. So if you take it by the letter of the law, it 3 doesn't apply, but it seems to me by the spirit of it, 4 it's going to have to be addressed in some manner, and 5 so far what we've heard in his Subcommittee is not enough to address it. 6 MEMBER RAY: Thank you. 7 8 MS. CUBBAGE: I'll take that back for the 9 other part of our Licensing Division to chew on, but I would just offer my impression, not having been here 10 for the previous meeting, that I think you would only 11 12 be addressing it to the extent it was part of the amendment. 13 MEMBER RAY: Well, but it is inevitably a 14 15 part of the amendment in that it is, you know -- you mean to the extent that resolution of GSI-161 is part 16 of the amendment. 17 MS. CUBBAGE: Right. 18 19 MEMBER RAY: Well, that is right. In 20 other words, the Applicant has to bring in а resolution, b ut if you were at the meeting that I'm 21 referring to and the Chairman wants me to stop now, 22 but the point is if you were there, you would think 23 maybe we were being presented with a resolution. 24 25 MEMBER BANERJEE: They seem to want a **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

	177
1	resolution.
2	MEMBER RAY: That is right.
3	MS. CUBBAGE: To the extent that it's open
4	as part of the amendment, then yes, but if it 's
5	issues that have resolution and are not being
6	reopened, then that's a different story.
7	MEMBER RAY: Well, we understand. We are
8	just trying to look ahead.
9	MS. CUBBAGE: I understand, but I'll take
10	it back.
11	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Are you sure?
12	MEMBER CORRADINI: I'm in charge of a
13	boiler. We've gone astray.
14	MEMBER RAY: I waited. I didn't say a
15	thing.
16	MEMBER CORRADINI: I know. I was just
17	teasing with you.
18	CHAIRMAN BONACA: With that, I want to
19	think the presenters. That was a good presentation,
20	and at this stage we are one hour and 20 minutes ahead
21	of time. So I think we should take one letter and
22	read it through. We need you around for recording
23	additional meeting we have at 3:30, but we will do the
24	letter now off the record.
25	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off the record
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	178
1	at 2:30 p.m. and went back on the record
2	at 3:31 p.m.)
3	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Let's go back into
4	session.
5	We have now a presentation on Reg. Guide
6	1.151, and Otto Maynard will take us through the
7	presentation.
8	MEMBER MAYNARD: All right. Thank you.
9	CHAIRMAN BONACA: The last one?
10	MEMBER MAYNARD: Yes, it is. Thank you,
11	Mr. Chairman.
12	(Laughter.)
13	MEMBER MAYNARD: Either way, whatever,
14	yes, this is the last one.
15	The subject of this is Reg. Guide 1.151,
16	Rev. 1. That's on instrument sensing lines. Rev. 0
17	of this reg. guide was issued early in the 1980s, and
18	subsequent to the issuance of Rev. 0, there have been
19	a number of operating industry events, operating
20	experience where trapped and evolved gases and other
21	things have caused inaccurate instrument readings.
22	So the NRC has addressed some of these
23	through a combination of information notices and
24	bulletins. The industry has made some modifications
25	and changes in the way they're doing business.
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	179
1	In addition, there has been an industry
2	standard that's been revised and developed to address
3	a number of these things.
4	So the NRC has prepared Revision 1 to
5	Reg. Guide 1.151 to incorporate a number of these
6	things, update the guidance not only for the existing
7	plant, but also to make sure for new plant designs
8	that they have the latest guidance.
9	The copy that we received in our status
10	report is not the latest copy. It's very close, but
11	it did not incorporate some of the public comments.
12	The latest rev. incorporates some of the comments from
13	the public.
14	So Zena has passed around what you have.
15	The hard copy in front of you is the latest Rev. 1 to
16	Reg. Guide 1.151.
17	During our Subcommittee on this a couple
18	of days ago, the major topic of discussion really
19	centered around staff position four relative to the
20	trapped and evolved gases, and it's really a question
21	of whether or not the staff was taking exception to or
22	endorsing the standard relative to this area, and so
23	that's one of the specific things that we'll be
24	talking about today.
25	So with that, I'll turn it over to Mr.
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180 1 Nguyen and proceed with the presentation. 2 MR. KHOI NGUYEN: Thank you. Good afternoon. 3 My name is Khoi Nguyen, Digital I&C Branch, Division of Engineering, Office of 4 5 Research. the presentation Т will qo over of 6 7 proposed Revision 1 of Reg. Guide 1.151, Instrument 8 Sensing Lines. For some of the changes, we update the 9 endorsement of ANSI standard 67.02.01, 1999, with one exception, that for the portion associated with the 10 sample lines it's out of the scope of the reg. guide 11 12 which only covers the instrument sensing lines. also updated reference to IEEE 13 We Standard 603, 1991, and we endorsed IEEE Standard 622, 14 1987's version, to cover the filings associated with 15 heat tracing system used for freeze protection. 16 Because we update the endorsement of the 17 ANSI standards, we removed the supplemental guidance 18 19 previously in the Rev. 0 of the reg. guide. It's now covered by ANSI standard and IEEE Standard 622. 20 So we will go over the changes to the 21 (unintelligible). In Position 1, besides removing the 22 23 supplemental guidance, we exclude the standardized portion in the ANSI standard from the endorsement. 24 25 Position clarify the isolation 2, we **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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181 requirements, which is excluded from ANSI standard as 1 2 it applied to sensing lines and entertaining the 3 containment boundary. 4 In Position 3, besides removing the 5 supplemental guidance, we endorse IEEE Standard 622, as I mentioned earlier for heat tracing systems. 6 Now, I go to the interesting Position 4. 7 8 We provided the guidance not covered in ANSI standard 9 for sensing lines, taking into account lessons learned from the measurement errors due to the evolution of 10 this (unintelligible) gases. 11 Position 5, we deleted to remove 12 the supplemental guidance. 13 And Position 6, we deleted to remove the 14 disclaimer associated with the previous version of the 15 ANSI standards which are no longer applicable. 16 The benefits of updating the reg. guide is 17 to enhance the reactor safety by, one, addressing the 18 19 most current ANSI standard and IEEE standards on the safety system endorsed by the NRC, and the second is 20 to addressing the operational events in which evolved 21 gas in station lines have affected measure of water 22 level and provide guidance to prevent events. 23 In the previous Subcommittee meeting, we 24 25 had the comments on Position 4. We appreciate the

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comment, and we come back to review the ANSI standard, and what we found was the standard particular provide guidance to prevent the trapped gas and evolved gas. It also recognized the problem with the instrument errors due to the depressurization, but it will no further provide any guidance.

So we believe that we still need Position 8 4 to supplement the guidance for our ANSI standard, but we need to change the language to affect the concerns from the Subcommittee members. 10

I will go to the -- here is what we found. 11 12 I said to put in here Section 5.1.2(n) in ANSI standard, which recognizes the inaccuracy in the water 13 level, as I said earlier. It is just warning -- it 14 just like recognize the problem and warning that the 15 problems shall be considered, but it doesn't provide 16 17 any quidance.

So here is the current regulatory Position 18 19 have in the proposed draft one. We presented 4. We the Subcommittee, and the second bullet is the 20 to proposed change to the Position 4, in which we add to 21 Even though the guidance in the ANSI 22 clarify. standard is adequate, but it is not sufficient enough 23 to cover the trapped gas. So we would like to change 24 25 the language to in addition to the design guidance

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provided by ANSI standard for insuring sensing lines. should be made Provisions to (a) determine the trapped evolved potential impacts of qases in issuance sensing line during or following depressurization event and need to mitigate such impacts as long as the associate measures are required for monitoring the plant or for operating the service system.

9 VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: What do you 10 mean by "as long as"? Do you mean if and only if? I 11 mean, what if somebody does it for everything?

MR. KHOI NGUYEN: Well, if we don't need these indications for operating the service system, we have another means to operating the plant, and the safety significance is low. It's not -- I don't want to say it's not important, but it's not significant to be considered.

So if these instruments are the only instruments to use to operate the plant during or following any nuclear incident, and then this will be considered.

22 MEMBER STETKAR: This reg. guide applies 23 for current operating reactors and new operating 24 reactors.

MEMBER MAYNARD: Okay. No.

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	184
1	MEMBER STETKAR: Does it?
2	MEMBER MAYNARD: Well, the current
3	operating reactors could commit to this if they want
4	to. They're not required to commit to this rev.
5	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay, all right.
6	MEMBER MAYNARD: So it's only if they make
7	certain changes that require them to or that they do
8	voluntarily.
9	MEMBER STETKAR: Does this apply though to
10	all new reactors?
11	Where I was getting to is the difference
12	between RTNSS and safety systems, which is a little
13	bit supporting what Said was mentioning. So does this
14	reg. guide apply to new reactors that are coming on
15	line?
16	MR. KHOI NGUYEN: This reg. guide is
17	supposed to apply to both the new reactor designs, but
18	the old designs of existing operating plants can
19	choose to follow if they want to.
20	MEMBER MAYNARD: I kind of read this
21	statement and I'm glad we're in this discussion
22	as saying that it has you have to take this into
23	account basically for the duration or for whenever
24	you're counting on the system, whenever you're
25	crediting this indication for whatever actions.
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	185
1	MEMBER STETKAR: The problem is it says
2	safety systems, which for example in some of the new
З	passive plant designs is a relatively small inventory
4	of the systems. If I were a licensee, I would say a
5	RTNSS system is not a safety system.
6	MEMBER ARMIJO: John, it says for
7	monitoring the plant or for operating the safety
8	system. It doesn't say for monitoring the plant's
9	safety systems.
10	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay.
11	MEMBER ARMIJO: I see it broader, but I
12	don't know if that's what the staff intends.
13	MEMBER SIEBER: If it would show up in
14	your emergency procedures.
15	MR. NOTAFRANCESCO: That's what the staff
16	intends, is more in the plant is broader and then to
17	operating the service system, the two purposes.
18	MEMBER SIEBER: It would show up in your
19	emergency procedures. Then you would have to
20	VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: I guess I'd
21	feel more comfortable if you were to replace "as long
22	as" with the word "when."
23	MEMBER BROWN: When do you have instrument
24	systems that you don't use for monitoring the plant,
25	is there an example of one?
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	186
1	MEMBER STETKAR: I was more concerned
2	about the phrase "safety system."
3	MEMBER BROWN: No, I understand that.
4	MEMBER STETKAR: Are we restricting this
5	to a relatively small subset of equipment in the new
6	plant designs?
7	MEMBER BROWN: Yeah, and I was addressing
8	the other piece of that where it says just if you're
9	going to use the measurement for monitoring the plant,
10	and I'm trying to picture in my mind a measurement or
11	monitoring readouts that aren't used for monitoring.
12	They all monitor. Otherwise you don't have a choice.
13	It's very broad.
14	MEMBER STETKAR: The flip side could be
15	interpreted as this could apply to everything.
16	MEMBER BROWN: Yes, which I don't
17	necessarily disagree with maybe, but it's not a
18	backfit. I mean, they excluded it from backfit, and
19	if it's a new point, you ought to be designing it to
20	be right I mean, who wants an instrument that may be
21	wrong?
22	MEMBER MAYNARD: Well, I think this is
23	covering it by saying that when it's required for
24	monitoring or for actuation of controlled synthesis.
25	MEMBER BLEY: I agree because I don't know
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187 1 what would be excluded. 2 MEMBER ARMIJO: Yeah. Well, it's 3 everything. MEMBER SIEBER: Well, I would interpret it 4 5 as anything that's called out in an EOP. MEMBER BROWN: That's an interpretation. 6 I wouldn't. I mean what about normal operating 7 8 procedures? You're monitoring something and it's 9 wrong. 10 MEMBER SIEBER: Yeah, but you aren't going to have a big pressure transient for your normal 11 12 operation. MEMBER BROWN: I don't know. 13 Is a big down-power maneuver just because you lose a load 14 15 somewhere? Is that a --MEMBER SIEBER: Down-power make 16 the 17 pressure go up. 18 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Well, we have a few 19 interpretations here. We had better --20 MEMBER BROWN: That's a nuance. Ι wouldn't interpret it that way. Monitoring is 21 monitoring regardless of the conditions of the plant. 22 23 MEMBER ARMIJO: And it's not limited to safety systems the way it's written. 24 25 MEMBER BROWN: You're right. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

	188
1	MEMBER SIEBER: You're right.
2	MEMBER ARMIJO: And it doesn't matter. as
3	long as that's the staff's intent that it's not
4	VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: But you know,
5	does this become overly burdensome then?
6	MEMBER BROWN: Well, it's not a backfit.
7	It says it does not intend to improve any imposition
8	or backfit in connection with this issuance. So
9	operating plant today don't have
10	MEMBER SHACK: But it still could be a
11	burden for a new plant.
12	MEMBER MAYNARD: I think the operative
13	word there is when it's required for monitoring. That
14	takes care of whether safety or whether it's RTNS or
15	whatever, but if it's required for monitoring, you're
16	going to want it to work. So I don't see if it were a
17	burden
18	MEMBER BLEY: I don't think it's a burden
19	in a new design.
20	(Simultaneous conversation.)
21	MEMBER ARMIJO: I think it's pretty broad
22	when you need it, and it's not limited to safety
23	systems.
24	MEMBER BROWN: I guess I can live with the
25	way it is.
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1 MEMBER SIEBER: Well, I don't	want
2 MEMBER STETKAR: A new pla	nt you can
3 design it right. Would you love to wa	lk into the
4 plant and know that some of your stuff m	ay not read
5 right, but you don't know when exactly?	Yeah, that's
6 really a great way.	
7 MEMBER SIEBER: Well, I don	n't want to
8 stray away from the idea of noncondensable	e gases, but
9 do you worry about flashing in reference l	ike when you
10 get a big pressure decrease?	
11 MEMBER BROWN: In some cases y	ou would.
12 MEMBER SIEBER: Yeah, but t	his doesn't
13 talk about it. It talks about nonconder	sables. It
14 doesn't talk about flashing.	
15 MEMBER BROWN: Well, that's tr	le.
16 MEMBER SIEBER: And flashing is	1
17 MEMBER SHACK: Well, trapp	ed, evolved
18 gases, when it flashes it's on on gas.	
19 MEMBER BROWN: No, you can get	flashing if
20 you have pressurization. The saturation,	depending on
21 the saturation temperature of the water,	we got that
22 in steam generator reference lines in	
23 MEMBER SIEBER: Absolutely.	
24 MEMBER BROWN: as w	ell as in
25 pressurizer lines or pressurizers. So	we had to
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190 actually incorporate futures to prevent that from 1 2 happening so that we maintained satisfactory level indications. 3 4 So we had a reservoir that had, you know, 5 a condensing pot, whatever you want to call it, and then there was a little reservoir lip to allow it to 6 7 drain over, and it was a lot of --8 MEMBER BLEY: Just a point. This refers 9 to the GDCs. They're laid out on the previous page. GDC-13 is to provide an monitor variables and systems 10 over their anticipated ranges for normal operation or 11 12 anticipated operational occurrences and for accidents. It's for everything. It's the whole thing. 13 MEMBER BROWN: Yeah. Well, okay. 14 That's 15 good. MEMBER BLEY: And that's on the previous 16 17 page. MEMBER BROWN: Yeah, I didn't go back and 18 19 read all of that after the work you've done. 20 MEMBER SIEBER: flashing in the But reference lake does occur. 21 22 MEMBER BROWN: Absolutely. And it can give you 23 MEMBER SIEBER: significant differences between the actual level and 24 25 the indicated level, and I don't see that here. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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	191
1	VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: Well, you can
2	insert the words "PAR flashing" after "evolved gases."
3	MEMBER SIEBER: Yeah, we could put it, but
4	it doesn't say it now.
5	MEMBER BROWN: Flashing is not evolved
6	gases. There is a difference. I agree with you, but
7	if you don't have a big transient type plant, it was
8	very relative to the naval nuclear plants because as
9	you noticed very rapid transients are required.
10	MEMBER SIEBER: That's one of the reasons
11	why you don't
12	MEMBER BROWN: Everybody used to have
13	rapid transients.
14	MEMBER SIEBER: One of the reasons why you
15	never seek insulation on a reference like piping in a
16	plant, there's nothing in any of this that talks about
17	that. You may want to think about adding something to
18	that effect.
19	MR. KHOI NGUYEN: You want to add the
20	last
21	MEMBER SIEBER: Because it's condensable,
22	but at the time that that it occurs, it's dead.
23	MR. KHOI NGUYEN: Okay. I will add
24	flashing after it give off the ashes.
25	MEMBER SIEBER: Okay.
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	192
1	MEMBER BROWN: Or trapped.
2	MEMBER SIEBER: And/or Flashing.
3	MR. KHOI NGUYEN: Okay.
4	MEMBER MAYNARD: Okay.
5	VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: And you're
6	going to replace "as long as" with something else?
7	MEMBER MAYNARD: What had you suggested,
8	Said?
9	VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: "During."
10	No, "such impacts when."
11	MEMBER BROWN: As opposed to "as long as"
12	use "when"?
13	VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: Right.
14	MEMBER BROWN: When required.
15	VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: Okay.
16	MEMBER BROWN: When associated measure.
17	VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: When the
18	associated measure.
19	MR. KHOI NGUYEN: I will replace "as long
20	as" with "when" and adding "for flashing" after log
21	ashes (phonetic).
22	MEMBER BROWN: Right.
23	MR. KHOI NGUYEN: Anything else?
24	MEMBER MAYNARD: Anything else on this
25	position statement?
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MEMBER ARMIJO: That's clear now, although flashing is not discussed in the text. I don't think it's even mentioned.

MR. KHOI NGUYEN: It is here. In the discussion we didn't mention flashing.

MEMBER SHACK: As long as it is in the 7 position.

8 MEMBER MAYNARD: Okay. Let's go on. We 9 may want to come back to this because I am -- flashing is important, but we're also adding something that 10 11 hasn't been discussed. I may want to come back to 12 that subject here and just talk about that a little bit more. I'm not saying it's not important, but have 13 we really considered all of the implications or is 14 15 that covered someplace else or whatever?

hate to kind of toss something 16 in Т 17 without some consideration of what potential. So let's go ahead with the presentation here. 18

19 MR. KHOI NGUYEN: Okay. I will highlight some of the public comments and resolution. One of 20 the comments is the trap guys (phonetic) mention about 21 filled 22 the potential of evolved gas in water instrument sensing lines, but doesn't provide any 23 method acceptable to implement the directive. 24

And we have revised Position 4 to provide

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that the method, and we also think that we don't have to provide the specific mitigation method, depends on sensing line design.

For the global BWR plants, as previously explained this problem, the discussion section already mentioned the acceptable method for the staff and other design of the sensing line may be applying other approaches, and (unintelligible) normally don't provide the specific design.

Another comment is in number seven, the 10 reg. guide is needed for dealing with noncondensable 11 12 gases, and we believe that it's not necessary to have provide quidance 13 another req. quide to for noncondensable The instrument 14 gases. arrow for 15 sensing lines due to the noncondensable gas should be addressed in this reg. guide for intimate (phonetic) 16 sensing lines. 17

18 MEMBER ARMIJO: But you address several 19 phenomena.

20 MR. KHOI NGUYEN: Right, right. So we 21 believe that there's no need for another reg. guide 22 for noncondensable gases.

And this is a back-up slide showing the backfill system installed to prevent a noncondensable gas (unintelligible). In some occasion there's a

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operator errors, either mistakenly or seen patently close this isolation valves. The pressure build up in the line and cause the narrowing instrument indication of the wire. We have the water levels, and some of the designs have been modified to avoid this problem, and there are some procedures in some plants have been modified to mitigate the problems.

8 MEMBER STETKAR: Khoi, I'm going to come 9 I'm reading words in what we have in front back now. In the introduction, the introduction 10 of us here. says, "This guide describes a method staff of the NRC 11 12 considers acceptable for us in complying with the agency's regulations with respect to design 13 and installation of safety related instrument sensing 14 15 lines in nuclear power plants."

regulatory position, 16 the it also Tn reiterates the fact that it applies for safety related 17 instrument sensing lines. So now I'm not sure how 18 19 broadly this regulatory guide applies, other than referencing GDC-13, which seems to be more broadly 20 applicable than simply safety related lines. 21

Could you expand on whether the reg. guide applies to only safety related instrument lines or does it apply to instrument lines that are necessary for monitoring plant response regardless of whether

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	196
1	they are safety related or not?
2	MR. KHOI NGUYEN: I think the scope of the
3	reg. guide to cover the safety related instrument
4	sensing lines.
5	MEMBER STETKAR: Okay. Then I'll go back
6	to my written question.
7	MEMBER MAYNARD: A number of these may not
8	be safety indications, but they're safety related from
9	a pressure boundary standpoint and those are still
10	covered in this.
11	MEMBER STETKAR: They have to remain
12	intact from a pressure boundary. They don't have to
13	work.
14	MEMBER BLEY: Read their definition of
15	safety related. There are three pieces to it. It
16	refers to those SSCs necessary to insure integrity of
17	the pressure boundary, one.
18	Two, to show the capability to shut down
19	the reactor in safe shutdown.
20	And, three, to prevent or mitigate
21	consequences of accidents that could result in off-
22	site releases.
23	I think their definition
24	MEMBER BROWN: That still doesn't say
25	normal operation.
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197 MEMBER BLEY: It doesn't, but it refers to 1 2 GDC-13, which is about normal operation. That's why we're confused. 3 4 MEMBER STETKAR: See, evolving gases in a 5 sensing line does not compromise maintaining the 6 integrity of that sensing line as a pressure boundary. MEMBER SIEBER: Right. 7 8 MEMBER STETKAR: The instrumentation 9 probably might be useless, but it certainly doesn't compromise that safety related function 10 MEMBER MAYNARD: But it has to be taken 11 into account if it's required for monitoring or for 12 operation of your safety systems. 13 MEMBER STETKAR: Well, but 14 then my 15 question comes back to the RTNSS. Does this req. guide not apply for new reactors to systems that are 16 defined as RTNSS, recognizing that the instrument 17 lines must maintain their safety related pressure 18 19 boundary function regardless of whether they're safety related or not, whether the instrumentation function 20 is safety related, pressure level, temperature, that 21 type of thing 22 23 MR. KHOI NGUYEN: I think this reg. guide that applied to the separate instrument sensing lines 24 25 which cover in three definition in the safety related **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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in the introduction section here, as you mentioned earlier, to insure the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and the ability to shut down the reactor and maintain in safe shutdown condition and to prevent or mitigate the consequences or accident.

7 MEMBER STETKAR: let me ask you a specific 8 question. Then if I think of -- without getting into 9 a specific reactor design, a low pressure cooling 10 system that has a pressure interlock such that you can't start that system unless reactor pressure is 11 12 lower than some limit, whatever. This low pressure cooling system is not a safety related low pressure 13 cooling system. It's a RTNSS system. The instrument 14 15 legs are, indeed, connected to the reactor coolant So obviously they must maintain pressure 16 system. 17 integrity.

Does this reg. guide require that that pressure sensing function of that instrument must work properly during a rapid depressurization event?

21MR. KHOI NGUYEN:I don't think it's22required.

23 MEMBER STETKAR: Do you follow me?
 24 MEMBER MAYNARD: I'm trying to think.
 25 From where I read this--

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1	MEMBER STETKAR: GDC-13 seems to.
2	MEMBER MAYNARD: But if it's a system
3	that's going to automatically come on, that's one
4	thing. If it's up to if you're using the
5	indication to decide whether to bring that system on
6	or not
7	MEMBER STETKAR: Or can prevent it from
8	coming on if it's actually a pressure interlock. It
9	might prevent that system from working regardless of
10	whether it's automatically or manually initiated, if
11	it's actually a low pressure interlock for opening a
12	valve or starting a pump or something like that.
13	MR. KHOI NGUYEN: If the instrument
14	sensing line doesn't work properly, it prevents the
15	low pressure
16	MEMBER STETKAR: Yeah, but if it's sensing
17	an abnormally high pressure for some reason, it would
18	prevent that system from operating.
19	MR. KHOI NGUYEN: So you want to question
20	if it's
21	MEMBER STETKAR: My question is: would
22	that type of instrument I've given you a specific
23	example of a type of instrument that is, the
24	instrument itself, the function is a non-safety
25	related instrumentation function because it provides
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an interlock for a system that is not a safety related system. The sensing line itself may declare that the structure of the sensing line may be classified as a reactor coolant system pressure boundary function, safety related reactor coolant system pressure boundary function, because it's actually connected to the reactor vessel or the primary system somehow.

8 So I'm not disagreeing that that's a 9 safety related function, but that has nothing to do 10 with the operability of the actual pressure instrument 11 that's providing the interlock for operation of this 12 non-safety system. Now, in this particular plant, 13 that non-safety system is classified as RTNSS.

MEMBER SIEBER: Which is really a safetysystem.

MEMBER STETKAR: Well, no, it's not asafety system. It's a non-safety system.

PARTICIPANT: Important to safety.

MEMBER STETKAR: It's important to safety,but it's not a designated safety system.

21 So the question is for that particular 22 system and that particular instrumentation, is that 23 instrumentation required to meet --

24 MEMBER MAYNARD: Is that instrument line 25 safety related?

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1	MEMBER SIEBER: Not required.
2	MEMBER STETKAR: For pressure retention in
3	the primary system, it is. It must remain intact.
4	MEMBER MAYNARD: But their definition just
5	says is it safe, right?
6	MS. ABDULLAHI: Relied up.
7	MEMBER SHACK: Again, that's assured by
8	designing it through a proper code.
9	MEMBER STETKAR: That's right. The
10	instrument doesn't have to work to meet that.
11	MEMBER MAYNARD: But the ability of this
12	reg. guide for considering the consequences of trapped
13	or evolved gases is for safety related sensing lines.
14	It doesn't say safety.
15	MEMBER STETKAR: But the instrument has to
16	work.
17	MEMBER MAYNARD: I understand, but this
18	guide says that for safety related instrument sensing
19	lines, even if it's only safety related for pressure
20	boundary retention, the reg. guide the way I read it
21	is saying that you have to consider the effects of
22	evolved gases, of trapped gases.
23	MEMBER ARMIJO: By that reading, you
24	would
25	MEMBER STETKAR: By that reading, that's a
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202 1 stretch. 2 MEMBER STETKAR: By that reading you cover 3 RTNSS. 4 MEMBER STETKAR: By that reading --5 MEMBER ARMIJO: -- everything connected to the primary pressure boundary. 6 7 MEMBER SIEBER: That's not the way they 8 interpret that. 9 MEMBER STETKAR: it is а matter of 10 interpretation. 11 MEMBER SIEBER: An architect-engineer would say, just like a coolant pump, it's the pressure 12 boundary that counts. 13 MEMBER MAYNARD: You would have to address 14 15 it by the req. guide and also the industry standard that says it's safety related. You've got to make a 16 decision as to whether you have to deal with evolved 17 gases or not. 18 19 VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: But if you are having difficulty understanding the scope of this 20 reg. guide, then the people to whom this is meant to 21 provide guidance will have 22 an equal amount of difficulty 23 MR. KHOI NGUYEN: I think the reg. guide 24 25 applied to the instrument sensing line, safety related **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

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by definition, instrument sensing line. If that pressure boundary or safety related function or not, I think if it's by definition it's classified safety related, is applied to this reg. guide.

5 MEMBER BROWN: It seems to me a safety 6 related instrument also applies for trying to maintain 7 the plant in a normal configuration in which it's 8 supposed to be as opposed to being someplace where 9 you, because of the inaccuracies, you're not where 10 you're supposed to be.

So I mean, a sensing line is more than just mitigating, more than just shutting it down and maintaining a safe shutdown condition or to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents. In other words, you want to make sure your plant is operating where it's supposed to be during normal operations as well.

18 That doesn't say that explicitly. You 19 just kind of have to read it all into that.

20 VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: I mean, one 21 reading of this would be that any instrument line 22 connected to the primary pressure boundary falls under 23 this reg. guide, any.

24 MEMBER STETKAR: And some other aligns 25 might be.

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204 VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: Right. 1 2 Regardless of what it's being used for. 3 MR. KHOI NGUYEN: That is correct. 4 MEMBER ARMIJO: Can you think of any stuff 5 that wouldn't be connected, that could get into that kind of problem. 6 MEMBER STETKAR: I would have to think 7 8 pretty quickly here. 9 MEMBER RAY: Refueling water level 10 monitor, for example. It has got nothing to do with 11 operating the plant. It's connected to the pressure boundary. 12 Yes, you're right or a 13 MEMBER STETKAR: cold pressurizer level tap. 14 15 MEMBER RAY: But this seems like it doesn't sound like the right conversation. 16 MR. KHOI NGUYEN: Well, the evolved gas is 17 just one issue of the reg. guide. It is not --18 19 MEMBER ARMIJO: Trace heating issues or --MR. KHOI NGUYEN: 20 Right. That's main issue involved with the instrument sensing line and 21 the evolved gas was added in this reg. guide, and it's 22 not an error, but we added it as a result of some of 23 the reactor events, but this reg. guide calls for more 24 25 than the evolved gas. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

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MEMBER MAYNARD: I'm not concerned about 1 2 the scope for the existing plant design. This is 3 basically a revision to a reg. guide that's been in 4 used for a long time. What I have a little less 5 confidence in is in trying to figure out whether the new designs, if there's something a little bit odd 6 there. 7 8 But as far as the scope for the existing 9 plants and stuff, they've been using this reg. guide 10 all along. MEMBER STETKAR: Well, the new plants are 11 12 doing everything that they can to minimize the number of things that they classify as safety related, and 13 they are --14 15 MEMBER MAYNARD: But I'm not sure that this really relieves them from having to take --16 17 MEMBER STETKAR: I'm not sure either because they're very careful about defining. 18 I've 19 seen in some of the DCDs very careful wording that

says this instrument line is safety related for a 20 pressure retention function, but the instrument itself 21 is not safety related. I've seen that. 22

But again, I think the 23 MEMBER MAYNARD: primary concern here is does somebody want to -- are 24 25 attached to the RCS. Let's kind of go back around

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206 1 here and get -- first of all, do you have anymore to 2 present? 3 MR. KHOI NGUYEN: That's all I have. 4 MEMBER MAYNARD: Okay. We'll come back to 5 this item again. I want to go back a little bit to the flashing issue. You know, changing wording in 6 this to clarification, I don't have a real issue with. 7 8 If we're adding a new concept that hasn't been, then It may have to 9 I consider that a significant change. 10 go back out for comment again. I'm not sure what the process within the NRC would be. 11 So I think we need to talk about that a 12 little bit and also get the staff's opinion on that, 13 and flashing is a little bit more than 14 just an 15 editorial. Is that adding a new requirement. VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: 16 I think, you know, if that is the case then we should point that 17 out in the letter and say that the staff should 18 19 evaluate this issue and determine whether or not that should be added and should be considered in req. 20 Position 4. 21 22 MEMBER BANERJEE: Understand this flashing business. It means that the pressure must drop below 23 24 the saturation pressure. 25 MEMBER SIEBER: That's right. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

	207
1	MEMBER BANERJEE: In some region.
2	MEMBER SIEBER: That's right.
3	MEMBER BANERJEE: And that happens despite
4	of the gravity head.
5	MEMBER BROWN: Yeah, look at the picture.
6	That's a real situation. That's the way they look,
7	and if you have a fairly rapid transient, you
8	depressurize in that condensing cup and flash and the
9	head goes down, and you get an inaccurate reference.
10	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, it's loaded with
11	bubbles. So the weight of it is less than it would be
12	if it were solid.
13	MEMBER BROWN: Bubbles are different. It
14	just depends on where your level of temperature and
15	pressure and saturation temperature occurs.
16	MEMBER BLEY: John raised a point that
17	came up in the Subcommittee meeting. When we first
18	started talking about evolved gases, we were talking
19	condensable/noncondensable gases. I think by the end
20	they said it also applied to the vapor itself. If it
21	does, it covers flashing.
22	MEMBER SHACK: Evolved gas is steam.
23	MEMBER SIEBER: It doesn't say this.
24	MEMBER BLEY: That was sort of my
25	interpretation.
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208 MEMBER SHACK: But I thought that's where 1 2 the discussion ended up a couple of days ago in our 3 meeting. 4 MEMBER BANERJEE: That's not a precise way 5 to say it. MEMBER SHACK: It's not a precise way. 6 MEMBER BANERJEE: You need to be more 7 8 precise. 9 SIEBER: Well, the reg. MEMBER guide 10 doesn't say it, and that's what we're writing about. 11 It says noncondensable. 12 MEMBER ARMIJO: I thought the evolved gases were supposed to be sort of dissolved gases and 13 resulting from chemical reaction. Something like that 14 was in there. 15 MR. KHOI NGUYEN: That's in the glossary 16 17 section. (Simultaneous conversation.) 18 19 MEMBER SIEBER: Steam is not a dissolved 20 gas. MEMBER BANERJEE: It's a vapor. It's not 21 22 a gas. 23 MEMBER SHACK: The question, evolved gas is necessarily a dissolved gas. 24 25 MEMBER SIEBER: Yes. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

	209
1	(Simultaneous conversation.)
2	MEMBER ARMIJO: Maybe our letter just
3	really has to say something. Either that or we say
4	flashing treated properly used somewhere else.
5	VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: The term
6	"evolved gases" as defined in the glossary does not
7	include flashing.
8	(Simultaneous conversation.)
9	MEMBER ARMIJO: Some sort of chemical
10	reaction starts fizzing out of something or just pure
11	dissolved gases.
12	MEMBER SIEBER: It could be absorbed. It
13	would be change in solubility.
14	(Simultaneous conversation.)
15	MEMBER MAYNARD: But let me ask the staff
16	on the timing of this. Is there any specific
17	deadline, like that has to be out before some plant
18	what's the deadline? What's the urgency on this? Is
19	there any deadlines that we're coming up to on
20	issuance of this?
21	MR. KHOI NGUYEN: I'm not aware of any
22	urgency on issuing this reg. guide.
23	MEMBER MAYNARD: Okay. I'd like to have
24	some of your thoughts on the flashing aspect. You've
25	heard the discussion. We're talking about the new
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concept could be considered significant change to this. Do you have any views on that? Are we wrong or are we --

MR. KHOI NGUYEN: Well, I don't know. The flashing having covered by an other documents, any reg. guides, any regulation?

7 MEMBER SIEBER: I think Charlie would 8 agree with me that an instrument designer, that's one 9 of the fundamental things for all of the instruments, 10 and you try to get enough distance away from the 11 vessels that you're measuring the level on so that you 12 don't get radiated heat in there, that the reference leg is much lower in temperature, and then you can 13 calculate how much pressure drop will cause 14 the 15 reference leg to flash, and good instrument designers will do that, but if it isn't written down that 16 you 17 do it, you know, you could get an instrument designer that got all seasons. 18

MEMBER MAYNARD: Well, it is something that is incorporated in the design, but I know we have certainly talked about it in the industry. I think the question is is it needed in this reg. guide.

MEMBER SIEBER: Or is it covered somewhere else.

MEMBER BLEY: And one place it is not

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211 1 covered is in the referenced ANSI standard. It isn't 2 mentioned. 3 MEMBER SIEBER: And the question is should 4 it be covered, and I think it should. I think you 5 should at least say it. MEMBER STETKAR: But it might be very easy 6 7 to comply with because it's normal practice, but if 8 you don't say it --9 MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, right. Everything in 10 the --PARTICIPANT: This is not a sensing line 11 12 issue. 13 MEMBER SIEBER: -- pressure vessel is normal practice, but until you write it down it's not 14 code. 15 MEMBER BLEY: You know, there are two 16 things on it. It isn't really a sensing line issue. 17 It's the design of the reference leg, not the sensing 18 19 line. This is about sensing lines from the standards. So there's somewhere, there must be somewhere else 20 where the instrument design is --21 MEMBER SIEBER: The reference leg is a 22 sensing line. 23 24 MEMBER BLEY: Yes, but that is not the 25 sensing line, and this is a reg. guide on sensing **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

212 1 line. The referenced ANSI standard is --2 MEMBER BROWN: Oh, no, no, no. MEMBER BLEY: The referenced ANSI standard 3 4 is on sensing lines. There's probably another reg. 5 guide and certainly another ANSI standard that tells you how to design that instrument. 6 MEMBER SIEBER: The reference leg is a 7 8 sensing line. 9 PARTICIPANT: I think you are straining this one too fine. 10 MEMBER BLEY: I don't think so. I'd bet a 11 12 lot that there is a standard on it. MEMBER SIEBER: I'll bet you 50 cents. 13 (Laughter.) 14 15 VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: I mean, if we're talking about noncondensable gas accumulation in 16 the reference leg, then you know --17 18 MEMBER BLEY: Of the head. 19 VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: Right. So it's included. 20 21 MEMBER MAYNARD: There other are This about 22 requirements. is the design and 23 installation of the instrument lines. There's other regulations that require that the indications that you 24 25 use would have to be --**NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

	213
1	(Simultaneous conversation.)
2	MR. KHOI NGUYEN: The main reason I'm
3	sorry.
4	MEMBER SIEBER: So why do we need to talk
5	about noncondensables here?
6	MR. KHOI NGUYEN: Yeah, the main reason we
7	want to add the noncondensable gas here, because we
8	have several
9	MEMBER SIEBER: It's op. experience.
10	MR. KHOI NGUYEN: events and we have
11	several NRC information notices putting out there, but
12	no formal writing or information to provide.
13	MEMBER MAYNARD: Okay. The standard does
14	address that for the evolved gases. It doesn't really
15	address flashing, but it does address that you have to
16	design and consider evolved gases.
17	MR. KHOI NGUYEN: Right. It recognized
18	the problem and warning that the industry should
19	consider the issue, but they didn't mention about
20	flashing.
21	MEMBER ARMIJO: Silent on flashing.
22	MEMBER SIEBER: Actually the BWR Owners
23	Group fix helps the flashing situation, injecting cold
24	CRD water into the bottom of that leg, but that's not
25	the reason why they put it in. They put it in for
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noncondensable.

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MEMBER RAY: You know, this says here
operational events have occurred in which evolved
gases and instrument lines have affected measuring
water levels in operating nuclear power plants. That
would imply we're not talking about flashing.

it But then the NRC issued says 8 information notice umpty-ump to alert licensees to level indications 9 potential inaccuracies in water during and after rapid depressurization events, which 10 makes it sound like we are talking about flashing. 11

12 MEMBER SIEBER: All we have to do is read 13 it and see.

MEMBER RAY: I am reading it.

MEMBER SIEBER: No, but you have to read the information notice.

17 MEMBER RAY: I understand, but that's what 18 they said about it here anyway.

MEMBER SIEBER: Yes, but what doesn'thelp. That's just a reference.

21 MEMBER RAY: Well, my point, Jack, was 22 that they seem to be mixing up noncondensable gases 23 with rapid depressurization events.

24VICECHAIRMANABDEL-KHALIK:The25noncondensable gases come about as a result of rapid

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215 1 depressurization. 2 MEMBER RAY: Well, it could be, but it can I don't know how you can separate 3 also ___ an 4 inaccuracy due to rapid depressurization because 5 noncondensable gases are evolved from flashing. I mean, it doesn't really seem to go hand in glove to 6 7 me. 8 MEMBER ARMIJO: I don't know of any 9 chemical reaction in at least a boiler that happens when you depressurize. 10 MEMBER SIEBER: You have dissolved oxygen. 11 12 You have --MEMBER ARMIJO: No, I'm talking about the 13 other part, not dissolved gas. I'm talking just 14 15 chemical. The glossary says four chemical reactions, right? What chemical reactions occur when you 16 17 depressurize a PWR? MEMBER SIEBER: Radiolysis. 18 19 MEMBER ARMIJO: That's not a chemical reaction. 20 MEMBER BANERJEE: Well, it is a chemical 21 reaction. 22 23 MEMBER SIEBER: Sure it is. MEMBER MAYNARD: Let's see where we're at 24 25 with this. One of the things that is causing a lot of **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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was that perhaps this should be separated out and there should be a different reg guide for that aspect of it.

You know, just taking a look at it, it sounds to me like if we're going to include the noncondensable gases in this, it sounds like the Committee is going to want more discussion on that. I'm getting the sense that we wouldn't necessarily be comfortable with issuing it the way it is with all the discussion that we've had.

MEMBER SIEBER: You're going to have topostpone your retirement.

(Laughter.)

18 MEMBER MAYNARD: That's not going to 19 happen.

You know, there's a couple options. One, we could bring this back. We could -- there was all this discussion. You know, have an additional Subcommittee meeting and then bring it back again. We could separate out the noncondensable

We could separate out the noncondensable gases and just endorse the later version of the reg.

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217 guide and recommend that a separate guidance be 1 developed on the noncondensable gases, on the evolved 2 gases. 3 4 I'm not sure we're getting anyplace. I 5 don't here a discussion that's kind of bringing us to a consensus that what's here is something that we 6 would be comfortable with. I don't know. 7 MEMBER SIEBER: What would the staff like 8 9 to do? 10 MEMBER ARMIJO: I got the message the 11 staff's intent was that this reg. guide would address 12 all the issues related to instrument sensing line inaccuracies, whether it's trace heating, evolved 13 gases, but they didn't mention flashing. So if it's 14 15 intended to be complete, it should include, address the flashing issue. It should have a little bit of 16 discussion in the reg. guide if that's the intention. 17 If it's adequately covered in some other 18 reg. guide, which I don't know, maybe it's okay, but 19 right now it seems --20 MEMBER SIEBER: Actually, what Otto said 21 leads us to the answer. The question is: what does 22 the staff want to do? 23 Noncondensable gases 24 is issue. an 25 Flashing is an issue. Do you want it all on one reg. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701

218 1 guide? Do you want to work on another reg. guide, or 2 can you find in the regulation where flashing is 3 addressed? 4 So there's three options. The staff 5 really should be telling us how they want to deal with it, and we should fashion our recommendation to 6 7 accommodate that. And lacking a staff response, we'd 8 say put flashing into this one. 9 MR. SYDNOR: My name is Russ Sydnor. I'm 10 the Branch Chief for the Digital I&C Branch in the Office of Research. 11 And I at the Subcommittee also. 12 was Actually this is sort of a new issue that didn't 13 really come up at the subcommittee, but I think the 14 15 intent is to address any issue that affects instrument accuracy as a result of rapid depressurization no 16 17 matter what the phenomenon is. So I think there's wording clarifications 18 19 that we can work on for the reg. guide, but I think that's the intent here, and there is not enough -- we 20 through all of the information notices, 21 went 22 bulletins, generic letters. They primarily describe the events. They did not produce designs to resolve a 23 universal set of events for this. The closest that 24 25 came to that was the BWR Owners Group came up with a

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design using the cRD system.

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2 even that had problems after But they there were further information installed it. 3 So 4 notices dealing with the design problems of the fix. 5 So the purpose of the reg. guide wasn't to specify design criteria and as really almost an infinite set 6 7 of that depending on how you design the systems, but I 8 think it is important to put a position in here. Ιt 9 sounds like it needs some careful clarification.

I think flashing was a good addition. We can go back and read the information notices again.
I'm not sure that some of those didn't actually talk about that.

MEMBER STETKAR: Well, in the glossary,define what an evolved gas is.

16 MR. SYDNOR: That's almost a dictionary 17 definition in the glossary.

MEMBER SIEBER: Let me make a comment on 18 19 what you said from an operator's viewpoint. The 20 operator looking at the instrument response can't tell the difference between noncondensable gases coming out 21 and flashing, except if it's flashing 22 that will recover after a few minutes or an hour, however long 23 it takes to cool the reference leg back down. 24

MEMBER BROWN: Well, it may well be that

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1 noncondensables, if they depending on the -- they may 2 vent out after a period. MEMBER SIEBER: Well, they may go into 3 4 the --5 MEMBER BROWN: They may go back into the 6 system itself. MEMBER BLEY: That is why the backfill was 7 8 to clear the noncondensables and make sure they had a 9 path. And it also keeps it cold. 10 MEMBER SIEBER: MEMBER SHACK: I mean, it could be that 11 12 the designers have been successful dealing with the flashing. So there is no problems with it. 13 MEMBER BROWN: Yeah, I think, Bill, that's 14 15 probably more the case. MEMBER SIEBER: Then they can say that and 16 say, "I'm perfect already." 17 MEMBER BROWN: 18 If you read what they 19 said --20 MEMBER ARMIJO: You can mention it and it's no problem. 21 BROWN: This is 22 MEMBER based on experience, and I think what Bill said is more closer 23 to the truth because, you know, I go back 40 years 24 25 with the issue of flashing and need for condensing pot **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

220

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1	and keep the reference leg sub-cooled, and all of that
2	has been known forever.
3	But the problem that is discussed here
4	repeatedly is noncondensable gases, and I think they
5	just got stuck on that and didn't
6	MEMBER BLEY: Well, the events. The
7	statement that it should be sort of dealt with here is
8	probably
9	MEMBER SIEBER: I sort of agree with the
10	staff suggestion that they work the words a little
11	bit, and that would solve the problem for me.
12	VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: Why don't we,
13	as a part of any recommendation that we would make in
14	our letter, recommend that they expand the proposed
15	regulatory Position 4 to address the effect of
16	flashing as a result of rapid depressurization?
17	MEMBER BROWN: Because it is
18	indistinguishable in terms of its potential and effect
19	from noncondensable gases.
20	MR. KHOI NGUYEN: Now, if we want to add
21	flashing into this reg. guide, I don't think we just
22	simply to add the wording in the Position 4. We need
23	to add a paragraph in the discussion section because
24	if we don't introduce it and we said
25	MEMBER MAYNARD: Well, I'm feeling
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	222
1	uncomfortable with just adding a word.
2	MR. KHOI NGUYEN: I understand.
3	MEMBER MAYNARD: I'm trying to write
4	something on the fly here, and so I'm kind of looking
5	at what's the next step. I believe the staff needs to
6	go back after this discussion and give it some
7	thought, see where the right place to put this is, and
8	then come back.
9	I feel uncomfortable with us endorsing
10	something as saying do so, modify it, and then issue
11	it.
12	MEMBER BANERJEE: But, Otto, we do write
13	letters where we endorse something conditional on
14	fixing something.
15	MEMBER STETKAR: Well, but I think Otto
16	has got another point.
17	MEMBER MAYNARD: Typically, see, we were
18	close to doing that on this. They had proposed some
19	additional wording. Typically we have seen what they
20	plan to do, and we put that conditional incorporating,
21	you know, what they discussed or whatever, and we
22	don't really have something here, I mean, a proposed
23	wording or anything.
24	MEMBER BANERJEE: Yeah. What you're
25	saying is we would need to review that again.
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	223
1	MEMBER MAYNARD: I believe so.
2	MEMBER SHACK: Well, I am more concerned
3	about your other concern, that you might have to send
4	this out to comment again.
5	MEMBER MAYNARD: Yeah, because I do think
6	this is a substantial change, even though I kind of
7	believe with Harold that this is
8	MEMBER RAY: It depends on the size of the
9	transient and whether you want to keep the reference
10	leg from flashing under all conditions. I mean, I can
11	think of reasons why people would be concerned about
12	just sticking
13	MEMBER SIEBER: Well, it would take a big
14	change to get it to fly.
15	MEMBER MAYNARD: And it certainly depends
16	on how it ends up getting worded in the reg. guide as
17	to whether this becomes something that's really
18	essentially a new requirement or is essentially what's
19	already been done. I think there are some potential
20	legal issues as to what has to be done and stuff
21	there.
22	No, I agree, Sanjoy. We have a number of
23	cases of approve something contingent upon a change,
24	but it has usually been a change that we've already
25	been briefed on and agreed. We've only agreed with
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	224
1	the concept here, but not really what the specifics
2	are, and without knowing what the impact is.
3	MEMBER BANERJEE: Well, it could be also
4	that industry is already doing this, but as we haven't
5	done a due diligence on what they're doing right now.
6	So maybe what you're saying is the staff should go
7	back, see what industry is doing, see if there's
8	anything that needs to be added. Maybe there is
9	nothing that needs to be added.
10	MEMBER SIEBER: Well
11	MEMBER BANERJEE: Maybe they're already
12	taking care of these problems.
13	MEMBER SIEBER: if they're taking care
14	of it, there's no harm in saying you should
15	MEMBER RAY: Take care of it.
16	MEMBER MAYNARD: Well, but it depends on
17	how you say to take care of it. If you say to take
18	care of it the way you've been doing it, that's one
19	thing, but if you say take care of it in this way and
20	that's different
21	(Simultaneous conversation.)
22	MEMBER SIEBER: I wouldn't want to
23	MEMBER MAYNARD: Unintended consequences
24	is kind of what I
25	MEMBER SIEBER: I wouldn't want to come
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	225
1	out with a position that says you shall have zero
2	flashing because I think that is not going to really
3	work, but I think you should be within the error band
4	for the safety analysis you're doing that relies on
5	that signal.
6	MEMBER BROWN: You can do that by the
7	design of a condensing process, a flashing program.
8	MEMBER SIEBER: You can get close.
9	MEMBER BROWN: Within the band is what I'm
10	talking about.
11	MEMBER SIEBER: Right.
12	MEMBER MAYNARD: Here's kind of where I'm
13	standing on this right now.
14	MEMBER SIEBER: It's standard size and
15	distance and temperature.
16	MEMBER MAYNARD: I would recommend that
17	the staff go back, take a look at this, and I think
18	either have another Subcommittee meeting or another
19	full Committee meeting, come back with some proposed
20	wording.
21	PARTICIPANT: I wouldn't think we need a
22	Subcommittee.
23	CHAIRMAN BONACA: But do we need to write
24	a brief letter outlining this issue so that
25	MEMBER MAYNARD: My recommendation would
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226 1 be no, we wait until they come back with something proposed, but I'm kind of biased. 2 (Laughter.) 3 4 MEMBER MAYNARD: I have a reason for that. 5 VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: We need to document this by saying this reg. guide should not be 6 issued until such-and-such issue has been addressed. 7 8 MEMBER SIEBER: Until the wording is 9 changed. Until these issues are 10 MEMBER BROWN: resolved. 11 12 CHAIRMAN BONACA: It would have to be a comprehensive letter at this point. Just a hold in 13 the statement that says, you know, we could not 14 proceed further. We don't believe that the reg. guide 15 should be issued until these issues are clarified. 16 Now, we talked about a 17 MEMBER MAYNARD: couple of things. Is it just adding the flashing --18 19 MEMBER ARMIJO: I have one more. MEMBER MAYNARD: -- or do we still have an 20 21 issue with the scope? MEMBER STETKAR: I am still concerned 22 23 about the scope only because I've read too many things that are very carefully worded to say that this 24 25 line safety related instrument is for pressure **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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retention, but the instrument is not safety related, and the question is what is the intent of this reg. guide. If the intent, recognizing the new reactor designs with RTNSS systems, if the intent is still to focus solely on the operability of only safety related instrumentation, then we should be aware of that. If the intent is broader in the sense of the words that are quoted from GDC-13 to insure the operability of instrumentation that's required to monitor plant status and cope with a broad range of

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10 monitor plant status and cope with a broad range of 11 abnormal events, then it can't be necessarily related 12 to only safety related instrumentation.

MEMBER ARMIJO: But you can read it that way though, John. You can read it that way, the current wording.

> MEMBER STETKAR: That it's broader? MEMBER ARMIJO: Yeah.

18 MEMBER STETKAR: And I can also read it 19 very narrowly.

20 MEMBER MAYNARD: I think you can have a 21 statement in there that states just to consider --22 MEMBER STETKAR: And I don't know the 23 intent.

24 MEMBER MAYNARD: -- basically you're 25 taking into account that a number of the newer plants

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	228
1	are relying less on safety systems and more on RTNSS
2	systems, and make sure that there's not something left
3	out of scope that would be necessary in this.
4	MEMBER BLEY: Except in a few of the new
5	designs, one that I can think of, the exact treatment
6	for RTNSS I don't think has all been worked out. So
7	can you guys speak to whether this was intended to
8	talk to RTNSS?
9	VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: No, we can't.
10	MR. SYDNOR: No, I can't.
11	VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: So a
12	clarification would be necessary.
13	MEMBER MAYNARD: So it would basically be
14	that and the flashing.
15	MEMBER ARMIJO: I just want to add another
16	thing. I don't understand in the glossary they talk
17	about evolved gases being the stuff coming out of
18	solution. I understand that, but I don't know why
19	what chemical reaction is
20	MEMBER SIEBER: It's dissolved gas. Any
21	time you have water
22	MEMBER ARMIJO: But I understand. That's
23	a solubility issue. I'm talking about chemical
24	reaction. Should chemical reaction
25	(Simultaneous conversation.)
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229 MEMBER ARMIJO: Maybe it should be taken 2 out of this glossary then. 3 MEMBER MAYNARD: Does it hurt having it in 4 there? 5 I think it is MEMBER ARMIJO: Yeah, because what chemical reaction are you supposed to 6 work on? 7 8 MEMBER BANERJEE: Radiolysis. 9 MEMBER ARMIJO: Then say radiolysis. 10 Don't say chemical reaction. MEMBER BANERJEE: Well, they might just be 11 covering their --12 ARMIJO: Ι don't 13 MEMBER know how radiolysis changes when you depressurize. 14 Radiolysis is a chemical 15 MEMBER BANERJEE: reaction, and there could be something which is beyond 16 radiolysis. 17 MEMBER ARMIJO: Like what? 18 19 MEMBER BANERJEE: I can't think of it. (Laughter.) 20 MEMBER ARMIJO: I know dissolved gases. 21 That I can understand. 22 23 Maybe MEMBER BLEY: they're covering themselves for the future in case we add something. 24 25 MEMBER SIEBER: What chemical did they add **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

	230
1	to BWR boiler water?
2	MEMBER ARMIJO: I'll tell you if you
3	depressurize a boiler it doesn't start
4	MEMBER SIEBER: Hopefully nothing.
5	(Simultaneous conversation.)
6	MEMBER MAYNARD: I think the main things
7	we need to focus on here is on the scope of the RTNSS
8	and also on the flashing, getting that added in
9	in the proper way there. I think the staff can
10	consider comments on the definition there, and we can
11	move forward.
12	Does anybody have any other items or
13	discussion here?
14	Let me go back to the staff and see if
15	there's anything. We've confused ourselves. Have we
16	confused you any?
17	MR. SYDNOR: No, I think we understand the
18	two key issues here. Just real quickly, I believe we
19	added the definition, and it is pretty much a
20	dictionary definition for evolved gas due to a public
21	comment on what an evolved gas was, if I recall right.
22	MEMBER ARMIJO: But it shouldn't raise an
23	issue that doesn't exist. If there is a chemical
24	reaction, you know, it's possible in a
25	MR. SYDNOR: On the other hand, one could
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
	231
1	argue that the NRC doesn't have the authority to
2	change dictionary definitions.
З	MEMBER MAYNARD: Well, also you don't know
4	what new designs and new processes may come up.
5	Personally I don't have a problem with it being there.
6	I don't see where it hurts anything. If you can't
7	think of any chemical reaction, fine, but in the
8	future who knows what we may be using in some of these
9	reactors?
10	MEMBER BROWN: Change the word "evolved"
11	to "dissolved," and take out the word "chemical."
12	MEMBER ARMIJO: Dissolved gases.
13	MR. KHOI NGUYEN: I have a question.
14	MEMBER MAYNARD: Go ahead.
15	MR. KHOI NGUYEN: I have a question for
16	the Committee. I don't have the basis to know if
17	there's other documentation or reg. guides or any
18	rules to cover the flashing, but if I find one, is
19	that okay to reference to it?
20	MEMBER MAYNARD: Oh, yes.
21	MR. KHOI NGUYEN: And then we don't have
22	to go back for public comments. That's the ways way.
23	MEMBER MAYNARD: First of all, we're not
24	saying you have to go out for public comment. We're
25	saying that that may be a consequence of some of the
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	232
1	things. That's up to the staff to figure out and work
2	out whether you have to do that or don't have to do
3	that.
4	MR. KHOI NGUYEN: Because I think adding
5	the flashing is expanding the scope, and I don't know
6	if we need to send it out again for public comments.
7	MEMBER MAYNARD: And, again, that's for
8	the staff to decide whether they have to do that or
9	not, not for us. I think if you find that there's
10	another requirement and can just reference that
11	requirement in this reg. guide, I think the Committee
12	would be satisfied with that.
13	MEMBER BANERJEE: Yeah, it could well be
14	that there is something which tells you how to deal
15	with flashing.
16	MEMBER ARMIJO: That's my guess.
17	MEMBER BANERJEE: Yeah. If there is, then
18	just reference it.
19	MEMBER MAYNARD: So again, going back to
20	if there are several things out there that address it,
21	that's fine. The intent of this reg. guide was to
22	address any inaccuracies due to
23	(Simultaneous conversation.)
24	MEMBER MAYNARD: gases that are formed.
25	Then it's good to go ahead and identify those and
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233 1 reference that works someplace else. 2 Okay. Anything else from the staff? 3 (No response.) 4 MEMBER MAYNARD: Anything else from the 5 members? MEMBER BANERJEE: Are we writing a letter 6 or not? 7 8 MEMBER MAYNARD: We will discuss that 9 again, I think, later. I do have a boilerplate part of a letter put together. We can take a look and see 10 whether it adds any value to send it out with adding a 11 12 few things or whether we have the staff come back to 13 us. VICE CHAIRMAN ABDEL-KHALIK: Well, we have 14 15 specific recommendations that this req. guide should not be issued until these two issues that we've 16 identified are addressed. 17 MEMBER MAYNARD: Yes, all right. I think 18 19 we're probably going to write one again. I always 20 hold out hope. 21 (Laughter.) MEMBER BANERJEE: We want a final letter 22 from your group. 23 PARTICIPANT: They want to torture you, is 24 25 what they want to do. **NEAL R. GROSS** COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

	234
1	(Laughter.)
2	MEMBER MAYNARD: John, did you have
3	something? Okay.
4	With that I'm going to quickly turn it
5	back to you, Mr. Chairman.
6	CHAIRMAN BONACA: All right. I think we
7	are ahead of time again, which is great, and we are
8	due for a break, if you would like that, and then we
9	can come back and have one subcommittee report.
10	That's the one on the AP-1000.
11	MEMBER BROWN: A Subcommittee report?
12	CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes. We'll do it after
13	the break.
14	MEMBER BROWN: All right.
15	CHAIRMAN BONACA: So let's take a break
16	until 5:05.
17	We will close the record.
18	(Whereupon, at 4:42 p.m., the Committee
19	meeting was adjourned.)
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Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant ACRS License Renewal Meeting December 3, 2009





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Introductions

- Mark Schimmel Site Vice President
- Gene Eckholt License Renewal Project Manager
- Steve Skoyen Engineering Programs Manager
- License Renewal Project Team and Subject Matter Experts



Agenda

- Site Description
- ACRS LR Subcommittee Follow-Up Items

Questions



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Plant Owner, License Holder and Operator

- Northern States Power Company Minnesota
- Subsidiary of Xcel Energy
- Location
 - SE of Minneapolis-Saint Paul, MN
 - On Mississippi River



- Construction Permits Issued June 1968
- Operating Licenses
 - Unit 1
 - Issued August 1973
 - Expires August 2013
 - Unit 2
 - Issued October 1974
 - Expires October 2014

• LRA Submitted – April 2008



• Two 2 - Loop PWR Units

- 1650 MW_t
- 575 MW_e (Gross) per Unit
- Westinghouse NSSS
- Pioneer Service & Engineering -Architect/Engineer
- Once-Through Cooling Supplemented with Four Forced Draft Cooling Towers (Seasonal)
- Ultimate Heat Sink is Mississippi River via Cooling Water System



• Dual Containment Design

- Steel Containment Vessel Within Limited Leakage Concrete Shield Building (5 Foot Annulus)
- Steel Containment Vessel
 - Provides Primary Containment
 - Lower Head Encased in Concrete
 - 1-1/2 inch Thick Bottom Head, 1-1/2 inch Thick Shell, 3/4 inch Thick Top Head
 - 3-1/2 inch Thick at ECCS Sump Penetrations



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ACRS LR Subcommittee Follow-Up Items


- Refueling Cavity Leakage
- Condensate Storage Tank Examinations
- Underground Medium Voltage Cables
 - Manhole Inspection Interval
 - Impact of Freeze/Thaw Conditions



Refueling Cavity Leakage Leakage History

- Intermittent Refueling Cavity Leakage in Both Units Since Late 1980s
- Estimated Leak Rate of 1-2 Gallons per Hour
- Observed in ECCS Sump and Regenerative Heat Exchanger Room
- Sealing Methods Used to Mitigate Leakage Were not Consistently Effective
- Root Cause Performed in Early 2009 to Identify Permanent Solution






Refueling Cavity Leakage Root Cause Evaluation

- Root Cause Evaluation Completed in April 2009
- Sources of Leakage were Determined to be Floor Embedment Plates for Reactor Vessel Internals Stands and Rod Control Cluster Assembly (RCCA) Change Fixture
- Exposure of Containment Vessel and Structures to Refueling Cavity Water Has Not Had an Adverse Impact on Their Ability to Meet Design Requirements



Refueling Cavity Leakage Root Cause Evaluation

Typical Reactor Vessel Internals Stand Support



Typical RCCA Change Fixture Support






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Refueling Cavity Leakage Root Cause Evaluation

Original Embedment Plate Configuration




Refueling Cavity Leakage Fall 2009 Unit 1 Repairs

- Reactor Vessel Internals Stands and RCCA Change Fixture Embedment Plates Repaired
 - Existing Nuts Removed
 - Replaced with Blind Nuts
 - Blind Nuts Seal Welded to Baseplate
 - Seal Weld Applied Between Baseplate and Embedment Plate
 - Welds Examined by NDE



Refueling Cavity Leakage Fall 2009 Unit 1 Repairs

Repaired Embedment Plate Configuration



Refueling Cavity Leakage Fall 2009 Unit 1 Repairs





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Refueling Cavity Leakage Fall 2009 Unit 1 Repair Results

- Repair of Floor Embedment Plates Eliminated that Leakage Source
- ECCS Sump
 - No Evidence of Leakage
- Minor Leakage Observed on Ceiling of Regenerative Heat Exchanger Room
 - Appeared After Cavity Flooded 14 Days
 - Estimated to be 0.05 Gallons per Hour





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Refueling Cavity Leakage Fall 2009 Unit 1 Repair Results

- No Evidence Leakage Reached Containment Vessel
 - No Leakage Through Wall in ECCS Sump
 - No Leakage at Intersection of Transfer Tube and Containment Vessel Concrete
 - Minor Leakage Observed in Regenerative Heat Exchanger Room





Refueling Cavity Leakage Fall 2009 Unit 1 Testing and Inspection

- Original Scope of Testing and Inspection
 - Vacuum Box Testing of Refueling Cavity Liner Plate Seam Welds - No Leakage Identified
 - NDE of Fuel Transfer Tube Welds No Indications
- Expanded Inspections in Response to Remaining Leakage
 - NDE of Liner to Floor Embedment Plate Fillet Welds
 - One Porosity Indication
 - Will be Repaired During Next Unit 1 Refueling Outage



Refueling Cavity Leakage Evaluation of Remaining Unit 1 Leakage

- Evaluation of Source of Remaining Unit 1 Leakage
 - RCCA Guide Box Wall Embedment Plates
 - Design Similar to Floor Embedment Plates
 - Will be Repaired During Next Unit 1 and 2 Refueling Outages
 - Evaluation of Other Potential Leakage Sources
 - Will Identify any Additional Inspections and Repairs Prior to Next Unit 1 and Unit 2 Refueling Outages



Refueling Cavity Leakage 2010 Unit 2 Corrective Actions

- Repair of Reactor Vessel Internals Stands and RCCA Change Fixture Floor Embedment Plates
- Repair of RCCA Guide Box Wall Embedment Plates
- NDE of Fuel Transfer Tube Welds
- Vacuum Box Testing of Refueling Cavity Liner Plate Seam Welds
- NDE of Liner to Floor Embedment Plate Fillet Welds
- Other Inspections and Repairs Resulting From Evaluation of 2009 Unit 1 Leakage



Refueling Cavity Leakage 2011 Unit 1 Corrective Actions

- Repair of RCCA Guide Box Wall Embedment Plates
- Repair of Liner to Floor Embedment Plate Fillet Weld Porosity Indication
- Other Inspections and Repairs Resulting From Evaluation of 2009 Unit 1 and 2010 Unit 2 Repair Results



Refueling Cavity Leakage Monitoring and Assessment

- Ultrasonic and Visual Examinations of Containment Vessel Through ECCS Sump Wall
 - Unit 1 and 2 (Prior to 2009)
 - Grout Removed
 - Wall Thickness at or Above ASTM Specifications
 - No Corrosion of Containment Vessel
 - Unit 1 (Fall 2009)
 - Grout Removed
 - Wall Thickness at or Above ASTM Specifications
 - No Corrosion of Rebar or Containment Vessel








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Refueling Cavity Leakage Monitoring and Assessment





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Refueling Cavity Leakage Monitoring and Assessment

- Ultrasonic Examination of the Containment Vessel from the Annulus
 - Unit 2 (2008) and Unit 1 (2009)
 - Examined Areas:
 - From Transfer Tube Toward ECCS Sump
 - Above and Behind ECCS Sump

Wall Thickness at or Above ASTM Specifications



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Refueling Cavity Leakage Monitoring and Assessment – Commitments

- Commitments for Next Refueling Outage in Each Unit Following Embedment Plate Repairs
 - Removal of Concrete from Sump Below Reactor Vessel to Expose Containment Vessel
 - Inspect (VT and UT) Containment Vessel
 - Assessment of Exposed Concrete
 - Petrographic Examination of Removed Concrete
 - Removal of Concrete Sample Wetted by Borated Water Leakage from Refueling Cavity
 - Concrete will be Tested For Compression Strength and will Undergo Petrographic Examination





Refueling Cavity Leakage Monitoring and Assessment – Commitments

- Commitment for Next Two Consecutive Refueling Outages in Each Unit Following Embedment Plate Repairs
 - Monitor Areas Previously Exhibiting Leakage to Confirm That Leakage has not Recurred



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Refueling Cavity Leakage Long Term Aging Management

- Continue to Manage Aging of the Containment Structures and Vessel Using the Structures Monitoring Program and ASME Section XI, Subsection IWE Program
- Utilize Corrective Action Program for Evaluation and Correction of New Issues



Refueling Cavity Leakage Evaluation of Potential Degradation

 The Potential for Degradation of the Steel Containment Vessel and Reinforced Concrete (Concrete/Rebar) was Evaluated

• Evaluation Concluded:

- Any Potential Corrosion of the Containment Vessel Behind Concrete in Areas Wetted by Refueling Cavity Water Would be Minor
- No Significant Effect on Reinforced Concrete That Has Been Wetted by Refueling Cavity Water



Refueling Cavity Leakage

- In Summary,
 - No Degradation Found to Date
 - Evaluation of Potential Degradation Indicates Low Safety Significance
 - Committed to Eliminate Refueling Cavity Leakage



ACRS LR Subcommittee Follow-Up Items

Condensate Storage Tank Examinations



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Condensate Storage Tank Examinations

- Aboveground Steel Tanks Program Included UT Inspection of the Bottom of 1 of the 3 Condensate Storage Tanks Prior to PEO
- ACRS LR Subcommittee Questioned Whether an Inspection of Only 1 Tank Would Assure Acceptability of all 3 Tanks
- LRA Change Submitted on August 7, 2009 Which Revised the Aboveground Steel Tanks Program to Include UT Inspection of the Bottom of all 3 Condensate Storage Tanks Prior to PEO



ACRS LR Subcommittee Follow-Up Items

Underground Medium Voltage Cables Manhole Inspection Interval Impact of Freeze/Thaw Conditions



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Underground Medium Voltage Cables Manhole Inspection Interval

- ACRS LR Subcommittee Questioned Adequacy of Two Year Manhole Inspection Frequency
- Inspection Frequency is Based on Actual Plant Experience, but not to Exceed Every Two Years
- Consistent with GALL XI.E3
- One Manhole in Scope of License Renewal
- Five Inspections Since September 2007 Have Shown no Signs of Water Intrusion or Accumulation



Underground Medium Voltage Cables Manhole Inspection Interval

- Design Precludes Water Accumulation
 - Floor of Gravel and Sand
 - Approximately Ten Feet Above Water Table
 - Grade Around Manhole Precludes Significant Rain Water Intrusion
- Based on Manhole Design and Actual Plant Experience, Two Year Inspection Frequency is Considered Sufficient



Underground Medium Voltage Cables Manhole Inspection Interval






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Underground Medium Voltage Cables Impact of Freeze/Thaw Conditions

- Prairie Island Operating Experience was Reviewed for Evidence of Accelerated Cable Insulation Aging Related to Freeze/Thaw Conditions
- The Following Organizations were also Contacted:
 - Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
 - Xcel Energy Distribution
 - EPRI
 - NEI License Renewal Electrical Working Group
- Accelerated Cable Insulation Aging Related to Freeze/Thaw Conditions has not Been Identified as an Issue



Questions?







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Supporting Slides



RESPONSIBLE BY NATURE™






Leak Paths



ECCS Sump Showing Grout



Shield Building Annulus





RESPONSIBLE BY NATURE"



Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2

License Renewal Safety Evaluation Report

December 3, 2009 Richard Plasse, Project Manager Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation



Overview

- NRC Staff Review
- License Renewal Inspections
- Items of Interest



NRC Staff Review

- Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items was issued June 4, 2009
- 168 Requests for Additional Information Issued
- 37 Applicant Commitments (Unit 1)
- 37 Applicant Commitments (Unit 2)



NRC Staff Review (cont.)

- Applicant submitted additional information by letters dated 5/12/09, 6/5/09, 6/24/09, 8/7/09, and 8/21/09 to address open items
- Staff closed all 3 open items
- SER issued on October 16, 2009
- Staff determined that the requirements of 10 CFR 54.29(a) have been met



71002 Inspection

- 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2) Scoping & Screening Non-Safety SSCs
- Reviewed 24 of 43 Aging Management Programs
- Operating Experience Review
- Inspection Observed by the Prairie Island Indian Community Tribal Council President
- Inspection Conclusions
 - Scoping of non-safety SSCs and Aging Management Programs are acceptable
 - Inspection results support a conclusion of reasonable assurance that aging effects will be managed and intended functions will be maintained



Section 3: Aging Management Review Results

Section 3.0.3 – Aging Management Programs (AMPs)

	Plant-Specific	Consistent with GALL	With Exception	With Enhancement	With Exception and Enhancement
Existing	1	11	2	9	6
New	1	11	2	0	0



Section 2: Structures and Components Subject to Aging Management Review

Section 2.1: Scoping and Screening Methodology

- Open Item 2.1.4.1.2-1
 - Radioactive waste gas decay tank
 - UFSAR Section 14.5.3.1 describes the tank as safety related
 - Staff determined that this system should be within scope of LR in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a)(1)(iii)
 - Applicant added to scope, item is closed



Section 3: Aging Management Review Results

Section 3.0.3.1.21: PWR Vessel Internals Program

- Open Item 3.0.3.1.21-1
 - On May 12, 2009, the applicant submitted an amended PWR Vessel Internals Program
 - Staff completed review of new AMP and associated aging management review line items
 - This item is closed



Section 3: Aging Management Review Results

Section 3.0.3.2.17: Structures Monitoring Program

- Open Item 3.0.3.2.17-1
 - Issue with water seepage from the refueling cavity into the containment sumps
- Root Cause
 - In April 2009, the applicant determined that welds in two embeds in the refueling cavity floor were the source of leakage
- Applicant committed to:
 - Permanently repair refueling cavity leakage
 - Remove concrete and UT the containment vessel at a low point in containment
 - Inspect exposed rebar for degradation
 - Remove and test concrete from wetted area
- Based on commitments this item is closed



ACRS Items of Interest

- Condensate Storage Tank UT Inspections
- Medium Voltage Cable Manhole Inspections
- Exposure of Electrical Cables and Direct-Buried Cables to Freeze/Thaw Cycles
- Refueling Cavity Water Leakage



The staff has concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the activities authorized by the renewed license will continue to be conducted in accordance with the CLB and that the requirements of 10 CFR 54.29(a) have been met. Sunil Weerakkody, PhD Deputy Director, Fire Protection Division of Risk Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Regulatory Guide 1.205, Revision 1 Standard Review Plan Section 9.5.1.2

> Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards December 3, 2009

Overview

- 10 CFR 50.48(c) and NFPA 805, 2001 edition
 - Comprehensive and coherent regulation
 - Complex needed pilot applications in order to fully understand nuances
- Regulatory Guide 1.205, Revision 1
 - Improved and additional guidance to facilitate compliance
 - Clear and consistent Regulatory Positions
 - Fully vetted:
 - Stakeholder comments received and considered
 - ACRS members' input (June 1, August 18, November 13, 2009)
 - Office concurrence received (NRR, NRO, RES, OGC)
 - Final draft shared with public (September 10, October 29, 2009)

Briefing Objectives

- Receive ACRS endorsement:
 - Issue RG 1.205, Rev. 1
 - Issue SRP 9.5.1.2 (new section)
- This guidance improves clarity and provides regulatory stability for both pilot plants and nonpilot plants
- ✓ Issuance of RG 1.205, Rev. 1, and SRP 9.5.1.2 at this time fosters clarity and regulatory stability

Steven Laur Senior Level Advisor Division of Risk Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Regulatory Guide 1.205, Revision 1 Standard Review Plan Section 9.5.1.2

> Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards December 3, 2009

Discussion Topics

- SRP and RG Framework
- Motivation and Purpose of Revisions
- SRP 9.5.1.2 Guidance Consistent with DG-1218
- Resolution of Comments on Revised RG
- Stakeholder Interaction
 - Public
 - ACRS Reliability and PRA Subcommittee
- Questions

Standard Review Plan Framework



SRP 9.5.1.2: "Risk-informed, Performance-based Fire Protection Program"

Standard Review Plan 9.5.1.2

Guidance to NRC staff is consistent with RG 1.205, Rev. 1*


Follows general SRP format:

- I. AREAS OF REVIEW
- II. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
- III. REVIEW PROCEDURE
- IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS
- V. IMPLEMENTATION
- VI. REFERENCES

Attachment 1 – Risk-Informed/Performance-Based Fire Protection Program LAR Acceptance Review Matrix

* Therefore, this presentation will focus on RG 1.205

RG 1.205 Revision 1 Framework



DG-1218: "Risk-informed, Performance-based Fire Protection Program for Existing Light-water Nuclear Power Plants"

Motivation for Revision 1

- Drivers for the revision to RG 1.205
 - NEI 04-02, Revision 2
 - Closed FAQs after NEI 04-02 revision
 - Ongoing pilot plant meetings
 - Pilot plant license amendment request review, including regulatory audits at both Oconee and Harris
- Most of the changes were needed to:
 - Clarify guidance; e.g., plant change versus fire risk evaluations
 - Add missing guidance additional risk of certain recovery actions (next slide)
- The goal is to foster full and scrutable compliance with the new regulation

Purpose of Additional Guidance

- NEI 04-02 provided guidance that some previously approved recovery actions did not require a risk assessment per NFPA 805 Chapter 4.
- This guidance is inconsistent with NFPA 805 Sections 4.2.3.1 and 4.2.4.2.
- The original RG did not provide guidance in this area – Revision 1 corrects that omission.

Stakeholder Comment Topics

- Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)
- Cumulative Risk
- Sample License Condition
- Risk of Previously-Approved Recovery Actions (RAs)
- Primary Control Station

Fire PRA

- Public Comments on Fire PRA Methods
 - Clarify how to meet the NFPA 805 requirement that methods be "acceptable to the AHJ"
 - Limit discussion of fire PRA methods to the "cause/effect" relationship
 - Do not limit methods to those in "topical reports"

Fire PRA (cont'd)

- NRC Response Fire PRA Methods
 - Most of the public comments in this area were incorporated.
 - The guidance was clarified such that licensee may model cause/effect relationship with methods:
 - That have been used in the peer-reviewed baseline PRA;
 - That have been endorsed by NRC through a license amendment or NRC approval of generic methods specifically for use in NFPA 805 risk assessments; or,
 - That have been demonstrated to bound the risk impact.

Fire PRA (cont'd)

- Public Comments on Fire PRA Model
 - Provide guidance on fire PRA model updates and upgrades after transition
 - Provide clear fire PRA submittal guidance
- NRC Response Fire PRA Model
 - Updated RG Section 4.3 to reference RG 1.200 and the ASME/ANS PRA Standard which contains the suggested guidance

Fire PRA (cont'd)

- Public Comments on Required Risk Assessments
 - Clarify when plant change evaluations are required
 - Clarify which recovery actions need risk assessment
 - Limit scope of recovery actions to "success path"
- NRC Response Required Risk Assessments
 - RG revised to discuss both plant change evaluations and fire risk evaluations explicitly
 - Additional guidance provided regarding previously approved recovery actions (later slides)
 - Scope of risk evaluations limited to match NFPA 805 §4.2.3.1

Cumulative Risk

- Public Comments
 - There is no valid basis to track cumulative risk
 - Do not evaluate the total change in risk associated with implementation of NFPA 805 using RG 1.174

NRC Response

- Comments not incorporated
- NFPA 805 requires consideration of cumulative risk
- RG 1.174 guidelines are appropriate when the fire risk performance-based approach is used

Sample License Condition

- Public Comment
 - The transition license conditions would preclude selfapproval of changes before full implementation
- NRC Response
 - RG changed to allow self approval, during the transition period, of changes that have no more than a minimal risk increase

Previously Approved RAs

- Public Comment
 - Previously approved recovery actions should be deemed to meet the deterministic requirements of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.3

Previously Approved RAs (cont'd)


NRC Response


- Comment not incorporated because such guidance would be contrary to the requirements in NFPA 805
- Additional risk (ΔCDF; ΔLERF) of certain recovery actions must be evaluated
- The risk is acceptable based on previous approval*
- This additional risk is considered when evaluating the acceptability of other, proposed risk contributions when using the performance-based approach

*Unless circumstances indicate that a backfit under 10 CFR 50.109 is warranted on an adequate protection or cost-beneficial safety improvement basis.

Primary Control Station


- Public Comment
 - The benefit of defining *primary control station* is not evident
- ACRS Subcommittee Discussion
 - Draft definition of primary control station could lead to undesired classification of recovery actions
- NRC Response
 - Clarified the definition of primary control station to allow "carry over" (subject to certain conditions) of approved manual actions (next slide)





Dedicated Shutdown Panel[†] actions are not recovery actions when command and control is shifted from the MCR

Control Room actions are not recovery actions



Alternative Shutdown[†] actions are not recovery actions when control is shifted from the MCR provided:

- •Primary command & control
- •Requisite controls, indications, & communications
- •Multiple components controlled from location

[†] As defined in Appendix R III.G.3 and NRC-approved

Public Meeting Interaction

- The NRC staff incorporated the majority of stakeholder comments
- Remaining regulatory positions are necessary to foster clarity and regulatory stability
- Industry expressed unresolved concerns:
 - Guidance not fully vetted (e.g., fire risk evaluations)
 - Recovery Actions (e.g., definition of "success path")
 - Post-Transition Change Evaluation Process (RG focuses on detailed risk evaluation)

Public Meeting Interaction (cont'd)

- Members of industry, including both pilot plant licensees, agreed that RG 1.205, Rev. 1 should be issued ASAP to contribute to NFPA 805 regulatory stability
- NRC will continue to utilize the FAQ process to further refine implementation details

ACRS Subcommittee Interaction

- Changes were made based on feedback from members of the Reliability and PRA Subcommittee
 - Incorporated a flow chart to clarify how the risk of previously-approved recovery actions should be considered
 - Incorporated the comments received from the ACRS subcommittee with regard to simplifying the definition of "primary control station"
 - Made several changes to clarify intent of the guidance

Conclusion

- Regulatory Guide 1.205, Revision 1 and SRP 9.5.1.2
 - Incorporate the significant lessons from the pilot plants
 - Provide clear and consistent guidance to facilitate compliance with a comprehensive and complex regulation
 - Fully considered stakeholder comments
 - majority of comments were incorporated into the final drafts
 - a few stakeholder comments were not incorporated because of requirements in the rule
- Issuance of RG 1.205, Rev. 1, and SRP 9.5.1.2 at this time fosters clarity and regulatory stability
- The staff requests the ACRS endorse issuance of these two documents







4.2.3.1 One success path of required cables and equipment to achieve and maintain the nuclear safety performance criteria without the use of recovery actions shall be protected by the requirements specified in either 4.2.3.2, 4.2.3.3, or 4.2.3.4, as applicable. Use of recovery actions to demonstrate availability of a success path for the nuclear safety performance criteria automatically shall imply use of the performance-based approach as outlined in 4.2.4.

4.2.4* Performance-Based Approach. When the use of recovery actions has resulted in the use of this approach, the additional risk presented by their use shall be evaluated.

When the fire modeling or other engineering analysis, including the use of recovery actions for nuclear safety analysis, is used, the approach described in 4.2.4.1 shall be used.

When fire risk evaluation is used, the approach described in 4.2.4.2 shall be used.

4.2.4.1 Use of Fire Modeling The approach in 4.2.4.1.1 through 4.2.4.1.6 shall be used.

RISK OF RECOVERY ACTIONS IN NFPA 805

4.2.4.2 Use of Fire Risk Evaluation. Use of fire risk evaluation for the performance-based approach shall consist of an integrated assessment of the acceptability of risk, defense-in-depth, and safety margins.

The evaluation process shall compare the risk associated with implementation of the deterministic requirements with the proposed alternative.

The difference in risk between the two approaches shall meet the risk acceptance criteria described in 2.4.4.1

The fire risk shall be calculated using the approach described in 2.4.3.

2.4.3* Fire Risk Evaluations.

The PSA methods, tools, and data ... for the performance-based valuation of fire protection features (*see 4.2.4.2*) or ... the change analysis described in 2.4.4 shall conform with ... 2.4.3.1 through 2.4.3.3.

2.4.4.1* Risk Acceptance Criteria. The change in public health risk from any plant change shall be acceptable to the AHJ. CDF and LERF shall be used to determine the acceptability of the change.

Fire PRA – Quality

- Fire PRA technical adequacy 2 aspects
 - Underlying PRA (i.e., the baseline model)
 - Analyses, assumptions, and approximations to map the causeeffect relationship associated with the application
- Method for addressing
 - Baseline PRA conform to the peer review and self assessment processes in RG 1.200 (PRA Standard)
 - Fire Risk assessments describe the specific modeling of each cause-effect relationship associated with the application
- Submittal guidance
 - Submit documentation described in Section 4.2 of RG 1.200
 - Generally accept Capability Category (CC) II for FPRA
 - Justify use of CC I for specific supporting requirements
 - Evaluate whether parts of the FPRA need to meet CC III

Fire Risk Evaluations

- Two similar (but different) risk evaluations in NFPA 805
 - Fire Risk Evaluations
 - Demonstrate adequacy of an alternate to the deterministic criteria
 - Each fire area (as applicable) and total plant fire risk change
 - Plant Change Evaluations
 - Changes to the "previously approved Fire Protection Program"
 - Cumulative risk must be considered
 - Cumulative risk calculation starts at implementation of NFPA 805 (including all necessary modifications)
 - Baseline for evaluating the cumulative affect of changes to the fire protection program is based on the fire risk at the point of implementation of NFPA 805

Enhanced Sample License Condition


- Allow non-risk informed changes to the fire protection program that have no more than a minimal risk impact
 - Consistent with intent of NEI 04-02, Revision 2
 - Allow screening per process approved in the NFPA 805 license amendment
- Incorporated information regarding *functional* equivalency and adequate for the hazard (FAQ-06-0008) into the sample license condition (from §3.2.4)

Recovery Actions


Definition: "Activities to achieve the nuclear safety performance criteria that take place outside of the main control room or outside of the primary control station(s) for the equipment being operated including the replacement or modification of components"

(NFPA 805 §1.6.52)


Recovery Actions in NFPA 805




Application of RG 1.174 to NRC Staff Review <u>During Transition</u> (by Fire Area)



Case 1: Additional Risk of Previously-Approved Recovery Actions is Within RG 1.174



Case 2: Additional Risk of Previously-Approved Recovery Actions Exceeds RG 1.174



Clarified Definition of Primary Control Station

- RG 1.205, Rev. 1 defines "primary control station" (details on next slide)
- The definition recognizes that NRC-approved Appendix R III.G.3 approaches should "carry over" to NFPA 805 if certain criteria are met
- The staff incorporated the comments received from the ACRS subcommittee with regard to simplifying the definition

SRP REVIEW PROCEDURE (Section III)

- 1 PROGRAMMATIC REVIEW OF LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST
- 2 FUNDAMENTAL FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM ELEMENTS AND MINIMUM DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
- 3 NUCLEAR SAFETY PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
- 4 RADIOACTIVE RELEASE PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
- 5 RISK ASSESSMENTS AND PLANT CHANGE EVALUATIONS
- 6 MONITORING PROGRAM
- 7 PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION, CONFIGURATION CONTROL, AND QUALITY ASSURANCE

Pilot plant Safety Evaluation Reports will follow this same general outline.



United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Protecting People and the Environment

Presentation to the ACRS

Design Basis ESBWR Containment Long-Term Pressure Analysis

Presented by

Hanry A. Wagage, NRO/DSRA/SBCV Allen Notafrancesco, RES/DSA/FSTB Hossein Esmaili, RES/DSA/FSTB

December 3, 2009

Project and Technical Review Team


- Project Managers
 - Ilka Berrios, Chapter 6 Project Manager
 - Amy Cubbage, ESBWR Lead Project Manager
- Technical Reviewers
 - Hanry Wagage, NRO/DSRA/SBCV Lead Reviewer
 - Allen Notafrancesco, RES/DSA/FSTB
 - Hossein Esmaili, RES/DSA/FSTB
 - Jack Tills, Consultant, JTA Inc.

Regulatory Criteria

- 10 CFR 50.46(b)(5)—Long-term cooling
- GDC 38—Containment heat removal

GDC 38–Containment Heat Removal

- Systems credited:
 - Suppression pool
 - Passive containment cooling system (PCCS)
 - Credited after 3 days:
 - PCC tank refill
 - PCC vent fans
 - Passive autocatalytic recombiner system
- SRM to SECY 94-084 cold shutdown (93.3 °C (200 °F)) versus safe shutdown (215.6 °C (420 °F))
- TRACG and MELCOR analysis
- ESBWR compliance with GDC 38 is under review



Containment pressure for MSLB bounding case (DCD Figure 6.2-14e1)

MELCOR Code

Uses state-of-the-art plant analysis approach

Fully integrated analysis (includes the RCS)

Focused on ESBWR related phenomena

Performed targeted code assessments

Presentation Outline


- Background
 - Plant Overview
 - Calculational Approach
- MELCOR ESBWR Plant Model
- MELCOR DBA calculation for ESBWR Long-term Containment Cooling (peak pressure)
 - Passive Period (0 to 72 hours)
 - Intervention Period (72 to 720 hours)

Containment Audit Analysis

Design Basis Analysis (DBA)- Peak Containment Pressure

- Bounding approach, i.e., maximize mass/energy into containment & minimize rate of energy removal
 - Worst postulated LOCA; large RCS pipe breaks
 - Limiting single active failure
 - Extreme plant Tech. Spec. limits, e.g., upper P(init.)
- Containment Phenomena Modeling
 - Models inaccuracies/uncertainties should reflect an inherent conservative "bias" in relation to the key figureof-merit

Schematic of ESBWR containment (DCD Figure 6.2-15)



MELCOR ESBWR Assessment (Passive Period)

Three Accident Phases

- Blowdown
- GDCS draindown and recovery
- Long-term

Event:	Validation type	MELCOR References	
Phenomena/Process	(Code-to-Code)	[Related]	
Modeling	(Integral Effects Test – IET)	[]	
Modeling	(Separate Effects Test – SET)		
Blowdown:	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	l.	
Break & Main vent clearing	Code-to-Code	ESBWR Performance Study	
Wetwell pressurization	GE TRACG (ESBWR break	Report(1)	
	discharge)/GE Analytical Model	Presentation to MCAP(2) on	
	(Grand Gulf licensing)	Mark III type blowdowns	
GDCS:			
Drywell mixing/purging	IET – ISP-42:	PANDA Report (3)	
Vacuum breaker operation	Phase A – PCCS start-up	Presentation to CSARP (4) on	
PCCS start-up	Phase B – GDCS Discharge	PANDA Modeling and	
GDCS draindown	IET – GE Tests, P-Series P1	Calculations for ISP42	
RPV Quenching and Steaming			
Long-term:			
PCCS	SET – PANTHERS PCC/MIT/UCB	PANDA Report(3)	
degradation/noncondensables	(Note: PANTHERS is a	PANTHERS Analysis Appendix	
	prototypical component test of	[CONTAIN MIT & UCB Single	
	PCC unit; whereas, MIT/UCB	tube (5), CONTAIN PANTHERS	
	tests are single tube tests)	Rpt (6)]	
PCCS "bounding"	IET – ISP-42	PANDA Report (3)	
	Phase C – Long-term decay		
	heat removal		
	Phase D – Overloaded PCCS		
	IET – P1	4	
PCCS venting	IET – ISP-42/P8	4	
PCCS tank boil-down/reflooding	IET – P8		
	SET – PANTHERS	4	
DW trapping & distribution	IET – ISP-42		
noncondensables	Phase E – Release of hidden air		
	IET P7 (helium)	4	
Wetwell Pool Interface HMT	IET – ISP-42: Phases A-E		
Wetwell wall heat and mass	SET – Dehbi tests (MIT), IET –	MELCOR CVTR Report &	
transfer (HMTA)	CVTR	Appendices (7)	
Bypass leakage	Code-to-Code, analytic assess		


Dominant phenomena For maximum pressure Prediction

MELCOR ESBWR Assessment (Intervention Period)

- Early Transient Fans on
- Stabilization Upper pool
- Late Transient Fan flow


Event:	Validation type	MELCOR References	
Phenomena/Process Modeling	(Code-to-Code) (Integral Effects Test – IET) (Separate Effects Test – SET)	[Related]	
Early Transient (72 - 76 hrs.)	:		
Fan head/flow variation	(TRACG Semiscale pump) TRACG/MELCOR comparison	Simulate TRACG input w fan curve (constant flow at present)	
Vacuum breaker actuation	IET-ISP-42	PANDA Report (3) w	
PCC efficiency (low M ₂)	Phase A – PCCS start-up	Appendices (PANTHERS)	
Gas mixing and transport in upper DW	Phase B – GDCS Discharge Phase E – Air injection SET (PANTHERS) SET (UCB/MIT single tube)	PÂNTHERS IC Draft Report [CONTAIN PANTHERS] Report; SBWR PCCS Assessment Report]	
	_	_	
DW/WW reverse bypass flow	(TRACG/MELCOR analytic	MELCOR Audit Report	
	comparisons)	(passive period)	
Gas trapping	IET-ISP-42	PANDA Report (3)	
	Phase A – PCCS start-up	MELCOR Interim Audit	
	Phase E – Air injection	Report	
	P-series (P7 - He injection)		
Stabilization (3 – 7 days):			
PCC efficiency (intermediate	SET (PANTHERS)	PANDA Report (3) w	
M _a)	SET (UCB/MIT single tube)	Appendices (PANTHERS) [SBWR PCCS Assessment Report (1994)]	
Re-circulation flow/conc. (DW – PCC – GDCS)	IET – T2.1/T2.2 PANDA (PCC – DW)		
WW wall H&M transfer	Uchida/Dehbi	CVTR Report (SAND2008- 1224)	
WW pool H&M transfer			
DW/WW reverse bypass flow	(TRACG/MELCOR analytic comparison)	MELCOR Audit Report (passive period)	
PCC pool reflood	(TRACG/MELCOR analytic comparison)	MELCOR Intervention Report	
Late Transient (Post 7 days):	OFT (DANITHEDO)	Come of above	
PCC efficiency (high Ma)	SET (PANTHERS) SET (UCB/MIT single tube)	Same as above	
WW wall H&M transfer	Uchida/Dehbi	CVTR Report (SAND2008- 1224)	
WW pool H&M transfer			
DW/WW reverse bypass flow	Same as above	Same as above	

MELCOR ESBWR Plant Model




MELCOR ESBWR Plant Model (cont.)

RPV



^{2/4} Units

TRACG Plant Model




December 3, 2009

Audit Modeling Specifications (Passive Period)


- Wetwell pressurization controls containment pressure
- Need to maximize gas transfer to Wetwell for max short and long-term pressure
- Need to account for DW-WW leakage (2 cm2)

Model Biases [ESBWR NEDC-33083P-A & DCD Rev 4, Table 6A-1]				
Process	Bounding methodology			
Suppression pool stratification	Horizontal pool pathways below main top			
	vent artificially closed after main vents			
	close following blowdown			
Wetwell gas space stratification	High resistance added to top level vertical			
	pathways to restriction vertical circulation			
	of bypass steam entering at the top of the			
	wetwell gas space			
Reduced heat sinks	All equipment/piping and drywell			
	structures not connected to wetwell			
	neglected; only wetwell concrete modeled			
Circulation of GDCS/drywell gases	Dual pathway connection between			
	GDCS/upper drywell			
No PARs modeled	Include continuous radiolytic gas			
	generation			
Model Biases [MELCOR additions]				
No drywell trapping of gas	Single volume drywell			
Main vent clearing	Conservative pathway inertia lengths*			

MELCOR Audit Calculation (MSLB)




MELCOR Audit Calculation (MSLB)



MELCOR Audit Calculation (MSLB)

- Passive Period
 - Dominant phenomena Core radiolysis causing PCCS NC gas bounding and bypass leakage of steam from DW to WW
- Intervention Period
 - PARs credited (shutting off radiolysis)
 - DW recirculation fans (4 of 6 functioning)
 - Upper pool refill (constant 200 gpm)

Intervention Period Audit Analysis



IC/PCC/Expansion pool refill refill at fixed rate = 200 gpm (with no level control anticipated, except for over-flow situation)

• Tray in GDCS

maintain vent submergence of 10 inches*a* start of intervention period and throughout


	Level Control	Constant 10" submergence	Codes
Confirmatory (DCD rev. 6)	Yes	No	TRACG & MELCOR
Audit	No	Yes	MELCOR

DCD Rev6 TRACG Plant Model

December 3, 2009

ACRS Meeting

Intervention Period Calculation



DCD Rev 6 (TRACG)

- pool level control (variant procedure)
- fan vent with varying submergence (variant design)

Confirmatory Calculation

MELCOR ESBWR plant with level control without GDCS pool tray

ESBWR Containment Audit Summary

- Maximum MELCOR containment pressure at end of passive period compares well with TRACG
- MELCOR predicted audit pressure, based on ESBWR design/operation, during the late intervention period (with GDCS pool tray function and without PCC/IC/Expansion pool refill management) is flat with ~ 24% margin at 30 days (720 hours)
- MELCOR and TRACG intervention period pressure trends are similar when design/operation parameters are similarly modeled



United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Protecting People and the Environment

Revision of RG 1.151 "Instrument Sensing Lines"

Khoi Nguyen Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research





- Current regulatory guide (Revision 0) has not been updated since July 1983
- Current standard reference ANSI/ISA-S67.02-1980
- A number of reactor events occurring between 1973 and 1983 led to supplementary guidance in Revision 0 of RG 1.151 for concerns not addressed in ANSI/ISA S67.02-1980
- In the updated ANSI/ISA-67.02.01-1999, ISA combines ANSI/ISA S67.02-1980 with ANSI/ISA-67.10 (ISA standard for sample-line piping and tubing) and incorporates NRC guidance from RG 1.151 Rev. 0
- Public comment period for Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1178 ended on February 06, 2009



Summary of Changes

- Updates the endorsement to ANSI/ISA-67.02.01-1999 excluding the portions associated with sample lines.
- ➢ Updates reference to IEEE Std 603-1991.
- Endorses IEEE Std 622-1987 which contains requirements for the proper design of heat tracing systems used for freeze protection and to prevent crystallization of concentrated chemical solutions (such as boric acid).
- Removes supplemental guidance now covered by ANSI/ISA-67.02.01-1999 and IEEE Std 622-1987.



Position 1:

- Removes the supplemental guidance (now covered by ANSI/ISA-67.02.01-1999_Clause 5.4).
- Excludes the sample line portions of ANSI/ISA-67.02.01-1999 from the endorsement.

Position 2:

- Removes the supplemental guidance (now covered by ANSI/ISA-67.02.01-1999_Table 1 & Figure 1a).
- Clarifies the isolation requirement (excluded from ANSI/ISA-67.02.01-1999) as it applies to sensing lines penetrating containment boundary.



Position 3:

- Removes the supplemental guidance (now covered by ANSI/ISA-67.02.01-1999_Table 1 & Figure 2a).
- endorses IEEE Std 622-1987 as an acceptable method for design of heat tracing systems used for freeze protection and to prevent crystallization of concentrated chemical solutions

\succ Position 4:

- Removes the supplemental guidance (now covered by ANSI/ISA-67.02.01-1999_Clause 5.2.1 and IEEE Std 622-1987_Clause 4.1.3)
- Provides guidance not covered in ANSI/ISA-67.02.01-1999 for sensing lines taking into account lessons learned from measurement errors due to the evolution of dissolved non-condensable gases.



- Position 5: deleted to remove the supplemental guidance (now covered by IEEE Std 622-1987_Clause 5.2.2.4)
- Position 6: deleted to remove the disclaimer associated with ANSI/ISA-S67.02-1980



- Enhances reactor safety by
 - addressing the most current ANSI/ISA and IEEE standards on safety systems endorsed by the NRC and
 - addressing operational events in which evolved gases in sensing lines have affected measured water levels and provide guidance to prevent such events.



BACKUP Indication inaccuracies covered by ANSI/ISA-S67.02.01-1999

> ANSI/ISA-S67.02.01-1999 Section 5.2.1n states:

"Potential inaccuracies in water level indication during and after rapid depressurization events have been identified as industry concerns and shall be considered. Inaccuracies result from noncondensable gases collecting in the condensate pot (chamber) of instrument reference legs and migrating down the reference leg."

ANSI/ISA-S67.02.01-1999 recognizes the potential indication inaccuracies during and after rapid depressurization events but provides no specific guidance.



BACKUP (Cont.) Proposed Changes to Position 4 Based on ACRS Subcommittee Comment

Current Regulatory Position 4:

Provisions should be made to mitigate the potential effects of trapped, evolved gases in sensing lines during or following depressurization events as long as the associated measurements are required for monitoring the plant or for operating the safety system. This position is based on GDC 13, GDC 21, GDC 22, and 10 CFR 50.55a(h).

Proposed Regulatory Position 4:

In addition to the design guidance provided by ANSI/ISA-67.02.01-1999 for instrument sensing lines, provisions should be made to (a) determine the potential impacts of trapped, evolved gases in instrument sensing lines during or following depressurization events and (b) to mitigate such impacts, as long as the associated measurements are required for monitoring the plant or for operating the safety system. This position is based on GDC 13, GDC 21, GDC 22, and 10 CFR 50.55a(h).



BACKUP (Cont.) Highlights of Public Comments and Resolutions

Comment: In the discussion section, Draft guide DG-1178 describes the potential for dissolved gas in water filled instrument sensing lines to come out of solution under certain circumstances, adversely affecting the accuracy and reliability of level measurements. It further notes that some actions taken to prevent the condition have been deficient. Regulatory position 4 directs that the provision shall be made to mitigate this problem, but DG-1178 does not include description of a method acceptable to the

NRC to implement the directive.

<u>Resolution:</u> A specific mitigation method depends on the sensing line design. For the group of BWR plants that have previously experienced this problem, reference to a particular resolution that was accepted by the staff is included in the discussion section. Other designs of sensing lines may require other approaches. As regulatory guides do not specify the design, the regulatory guidance should not dictate one approach over another.



BACKUP (Cont.) Highlights of Public Comments and Resolutions

 Comment: a separate Regulatory Guide is needed for dealing with the non-condensable gasses issue. The Regulatory Guide should incorporate the results of the analyses conducted by the BWROG as well as 15 years of BWR plants operating experience with the backfill modification in service. Combining guidance for two issues (design and non-condensable gas) into one Regulatory Guide will not serve as the best guidance.

<u>Resolution:</u> The inclusion of design provisions for mitigating trapped gas in sensing lines is consistent with the objective of this regulatory guide to provide regulatory guidance on design and installation of safety-related instrument sensing lines. A separate regulatory guide is not required.



BACKUP (Cont.) RWL Reference Leg Backfill

