

Indian Point 3  
Nuclear Power Plant  
P.O. Box 215  
Buchanan, New York 10511  
914 736.8001



**New York Power  
Authority**

John H. Garrity  
Resident Manager

May 28, 1993  
IPN-93-043

Docket No. 50-286  
License No. DPR-64

Document Control Desk  
Mail Station PI-137  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

The attached revised Licensee Event Report LER 93-004-01 is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73. This event is of the type defined in the requirements per 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B). No new commitments are being made by this submittal.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "JH Garrity".

John H. Garrity  
Resident Manager  
Indian Point Three Nuclear Power Plant

JHG/fp

cc: Mr. Thomas T. Martin  
Regional Administrator  
Region 1  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)  
Indian Point Unit 3

DOCKET NUMBER (2)  
05000286

PAGE (3)  
1 OF 4

TITLE (4)  
32 Auxiliary Boiler Feed Pump Inoperable due to Personnel Error

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
12	29	92	93	-- 004 --	01	05	28	93	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000

OPERATING MODE (9) N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 100	20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)			
	20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)			
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER			
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)			
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
	20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)					

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME James Comiotes, Licensing Manager	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (914) 736-8029
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
D	BA	0033	M302	Y					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On January 13, 1993, the Authority concluded that a failed microswitch on No.32 steam driven Auxiliary Boiler Feed Pump (ABFP) had rendered the pump inoperable from December 3, 1992 through December 29, 1992. This condition is prohibited by Indian Point 3 Technical Specification 3.4.C.1 and 2.

The causes of this event were a personnel error; the switch was not properly adjusted, and an inadequate surveillance test procedure; the surveillance test procedure did not verify that the microswitch had reset.

The Staff was trained and the surveillance tests have been revised to prevent recurrence.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION**

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Indian Point Unit 3	05000286	93	-- 04 --	01	2 OF 4

**DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT**

At 1310 on December 29, 1992, Operations department personnel declared No.32 ABFP inoperable because it failed surveillance test 3PT-M20A, "Surveillance and Inservice Test Auxiliary Boiler Feed Pump Functional Test." Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) Engineering personnel determined that the overspeed trip microswitch had failed because of over travel of the trip arm. This stressed the reset (flex) capability of the switch so that it would not remain reset when the reset push-button was released.

I&C technicians replaced the microswitch (Micro Switch Model No. 1 BZE6-RN2X1) and adjusted the travel of the trip arm.

**INVESTIGATION OF THE EVENT**

On October 30, 1992 the trip/reset microswitch on No. 32 ABFP was replaced. The original switch had failed due to age related fatigue. After the replacement, the I&C technicians attempted to adjust the switch even though they had no experience with this type of switch and found no relevant adjustment guidance in the vendor literature. I&C personnel should have instituted a change of scope to the work request which should have resulted in development of detailed written switch adjustment instructions. On October 31, 1992 the overspeed trip mechanism was satisfactorily retested. In November and December 1992, No. 32 ABFP was satisfactorily tested using the routine monthly surveillance test. On December 29 the monthly surveillance test was performed and No. 32 ABFP failed. Investigation revealed that the microswitch that was replaced two months earlier had failed.

An evaluation of the microswitch revealed that the failure mechanism was such that it could only have occurred during contact of the trip arm with the microswitch. The last time this occurred was when the trip was actuated at the completion of the last test (December 3, 1992). The failure of the microswitch remained undetected because the surveillance test procedures did not verify that the microswitch had reset.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Indian Point Unit 3	05000286	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3 OF 4
		93	-- 004 --	01	

**CAUSE OF THE EVENT**

A cause of the event was personnel error in judgement. I&C personnel improperly adjusted the microswitch on October 30, 1992. A second cause was that the surveillance test procedures, 3PT-M20A and 3PT-M20B, were inadequate. These procedures did not ensure that the as left condition of No.32 ABFP was ready for automatic operation.

**CORRECTIVE ACTIONS**

Corrective actions to prevent recurrence of this type of event are as follows:

All I&C and Maintenance department personnel who are qualified to perform this type of maintenance have been trained on this LER. This training emphasized attention to detail especially in maintenance activities which involve instruments, limit switches and devices which require adjustments;

The I&C department has revised Administrative Directive IC-AD-8, "Work Processing," to require that I&C technicians consult with their supervisor for additional direction when troubleshooting identifies the need to replace equipment and devices;

The procedure inadequacy has been addressed by revising the surveillance procedures, 3PT-M20A and B, "Surveillance and Inservice Test Auxiliary Boiler Feed Pump Functional Test," so that they verify automatic starting capability has been restored to No.32 ABFP at the completion of the functional test.

**ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT**

This event is reportable under section 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). The licensee shall report any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's technical specifications. Technical specification section 3.4.C.1 states "With one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, restore the pump to operable status within 72 hours or be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours." Technical specification section 3.4.C.2 states "With two auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, be in hot shutdown within 12 hours." Because the condition remained undetected the required compensatory actions were not taken.

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TEXT CONTINUATION**

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Indian Point Unit 3	05000286	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	4 OF 4
		93	-- 004 --	01	

**SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE**

This event had no effect on the health and safety of the general public. One ABFP was always operable to perform the heat removal function required in the Final Safety Analysis Report. The cumulative time a second ABFP was considered inoperable (either the pump inoperable or its emergency power source inoperable due to testing) was 71 hours and 22 minutes.

**SECURING FROM THE EVENT**

The overspeed trip microswitch was replaced, proper adjustments were made, and the appropriate surveillance tests were revised. The No.32 ABFP was declared operable at 2030 hours, on December 29, 1992.