Indian Point 3
Nuclear Power Plant
P.O. Box 215
Buchanan, New York 10511

914-736-8000

New York Power Authority

July 9, 1992
IP3-NRC-92-043

Docket No. 50-286
License No. DPR-64

Document Control Desk
Mail Station PI-137
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

The attached Licensee Event Report LER 92-007-00 is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73. This event is of the type defined in the requirements per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Very truly yours,

Joseph E. Russell
Resident Manager
Indian Point Three Nuclear Power Plant

jer/rb/rj
Attachment

cc: Mr. Thomas T. Martin
Regional Administrator
Region 1
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

INPO Records Center
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

9207170164 920709
PDR ADOCK 05000286
S PDR

IE22

NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/88

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Indian Point Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 6	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)
Loss of 31 Emergency Diesel Generator Auxiliaries Due to Breaker Trip

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
										0 5 0 0 0
0 6	1 0	9 2	9 2	0 0 7	0 0	0 7	0 9	9 2		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9): N

POWER LEVEL (10): 0 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: *(Check one or more of the following)* (11)

20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER *(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)*
20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (AREA CODE)
Richard Bystrak, Plant Engineer	9 1 4 7 3 6 8 1 2 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
X	E K	5 2	W 1 2 0	Y					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES *(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)*	NO				

ABSTRACT *(Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines)* (16)

On June 10, 1992 at 0019 hours with the plant shut down and the reactor defueled, 34 motor control center (MCC) supply breaker tripped on overcurrent. The loss of 34 MCC which supplies auxiliary loads, rendered 31 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) inoperable. 32 EDG was out of service for maintenance. Plant Technical Specifications require two diesels operable. A one hour report was made to the NRC pursuant to 10CFR50.72.b.i.B. The shift supervisor removed all loads from MCC 34 and reclosed the breaker; again the breaker tripped on overcurrent. Phase to phase and phase to ground resistance checks on the load side stabs were satisfactory. The shift supervisor substituted a breaker from a cubicle supplying non-essential loads. The breaker operated without incident. Testing performed immediately after MCC 34's failure indicated a faulty amptector. A spare breaker was subsequently installed in MCC 34's cubicle. The original MCC 34 breaker is being scheduled for refurbishment.

DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT

On June 10, 1992, at 0019 hours, with the plant shut down and the reactor defueled, 34 Motor Control Center (MCC) supply breaker tripped on overcurrent. The 34 MCC feeds a number of auxiliary loads to 31 emergency diesel generator (EDG) that support diesel generator operability (i.e., pre-lube pump, jacket water heaters). At the time, 32 EDG was out of service for maintenance.

The shift supervisor, suspecting a faulted load, had all loads stripped off MCC 34 and reclosed the breaker. The breaker again tripped on overcurrent. The breaker was racked out and removed from the cubicle. Phase to ground and phase to phase resistance checks were performed on the load side stabs; all phases were satisfactory. The shift supervisor substituted a breaker from MCC-35 and minimized loads on MCC-34. The breaker operated without incident and 31 EDG was made operable at 0100 hours.

This event placed the plant outside of Technical Specification 3.7.F.4 for 41 minutes. Under the existing plant conditions, technical specifications required two EDGs to be operable. A one hour report was made to the NRC pursuant to 10CFR50.72.b.i.B.

INVESTIGATION OF THE EVENT

Subsequent to restoring the safeguards loads on MCC 34, evaluation of MCC supply breaker 34 initially indicated erratic behavior of the breaker's amptector. The breaker tripped three times during testing for no apparent reason. Further testing of the breaker did not produce more trips and indicated that the amptector was performing normally. Breaker 34 is scheduled to be refurbished. A spare breaker was set up and the breaker in MCC 34's compartment was replaced. The MCC 35 breaker was returned to its proper cubicle.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

A faulty amptector in MCC 34 breaker is the cause of the overcurrent trip.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. MCC supply breaker 34 was replaced with a spare breaker. The breaker's amptector and current settings were adjusted accordingly.

2. MCC breaker 34 was tested.

3. Phase to phase and phase to ground resistance checks were done on the load side stabs of the breaker cubicle.

4. The faulted MCC 34 breaker is being scheduled for refurbishment prior to further use.

ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

This event is reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), the plant was operated in a condition prohibited by the facility's technical specifications. During the period of time between 0019 hours on June 10, 1992 and 0100 hours on June 10, 1992, a total of 41 minutes, only one EDG was available. The plant was shut down during this event and all fuel was being stored in the spent fuel pool.

All sources of offsite power were available. Due to the 52 day decay time for activated fuel discharges from the core the time to boil on loss of cooling was many times longer than the 41 minute period. At no time was the spent fuel pit cooling lost. At no time during this event was the health and safety of the public endangered.

Although inoperable by Technical Specfication definition, the diesel remained in automatic and would have responded to load demands throughout the duration of the event.

SECURING FROM THE EVENT

On June 10, 1992, at 0100 hours, power was restored to all safeguards loads. The plant remained in a shutdown condition. No similar LERs have been submitted.