

Indian Point 3
Nuclear Power Plant
P.O. Box 215
Buchanan, New York 10511
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August 8, 1991
IP3-91-045

Docket No. 50-286
License No. DPR-64

Document Control Desk
Mail Station PI-137
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

The attached Licensee Event Report LER 91-008-00 is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73. This event is of the type defined in the requirements per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vi).

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Joe Russell'.

Joseph Russell
Resident Manager
Indian Point Three Nuclear Power Plant

DC/rj
Attachment

cc: Mr. Thomas T. Martin
Regional Administrator
Region 1
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Indian Point Unit 3										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 6										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 4		
TITLE (4) Cable Separation Barrier Construction Installation Inadequacies																						
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)					REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)											
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES						DOCKET NUMBER(S)							
0 7	1 0	9 1	9 1	0 0 8	0 0 0	0 8	0 8	9 1							0 5 0 0 0							
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 8: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																				
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.402(b)					20.405(c)					50.73(a)(2)(iv)					73.71(b)					
1 0 0		20.405(a)(1)(i)					50.38(c)(1)					X 50.73(a)(2)(v)					73.71(c)					
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)					50.38(c)(2)					50.73(a)(2)(vii)					OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)					
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)					50.73(a)(2)(i)					50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)										
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)					50.73(a)(2)(ii)					50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)										
		20.405(a)(1)(v)					50.73(a)(2)(iii)					50.73(a)(2)(x)										
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																						
NAME										TELEPHONE NUMBER												
Dennis Celentano, Licensing Coordinator										AREA CODE		9 1 4 7 1 3 1 6 1 8 1 0 3 1 3										
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																						
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC												
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)					MONTH	DAY	YEAR					
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										NO												

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On July 10, 1991, with the unit operating at 100% power, it was identified that some of the electrical cable trays for redundant safeguards equipment did not conform to the separation criteria as described in the Indian Point Unit 3 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). During original plant construction some cable trays and barriers were not installed as specified on the drawings. An engineering assessment to verify the installation of barriers as described on plant drawings was performed for all areas except for the vapor containment building, which will be performed during the scheduled April, 1992 refueling outage. Based on the engineering assessment, some barriers have been and are being installed.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/88

FACILITY NAME (1) Indian Point Unit 3	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 6	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT

On July 3, 1991, with the unit operating at 100% power, an NRC resident inspector questioned a cable tray configuration. On July 10, 1991, engineering determined the trays contained redundant safety equipment cables, and that the configuration did not meet the design defined in the Indian Point 3 Final Safety Analysis Report Section 8.4., Cable and Penetration Separation. An engineering safety evaluation justified continued plant operation for the as built tray configuration. Engineering continued the assessment for all plant cable trays outside the containment building to verify cable separation barriers were installed as described on drawings. Based on the assessment, the actions listed on Attachment I were taken.

INVESTIGATION OF THE EVENT

Engineering determined that the cable trays identified by the inspection contained redundant safety equipment cables and did not meet the required separation criteria. Separation of channels is established throughout the plant by the use of separate trays or conduits. In addition, whenever a heavy power tray is located less than three (3) feet beneath any tray of a different channel, a transite or marinite fire barrier is installed between the trays. A vertical barrier is installed where trays of different channels are installed less than one (1) foot apart, horizontally. Additionally, a horizontal barrier is installed where trays (other than heavy power) are installed less than one (1) foot beneath any tray of a different channel.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

This event was caused by installation inadequacies during original plant construction.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 386A's) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

An engineering assessment to verify the installation of barriers as described on plant drawings was performed for all areas except the vapor containment, which will be performed during the scheduled April, 1992 refueling outage. Based on the engineering assessment specific action was taken as indicated on Attachment I.

ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

This event is reportable under 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (vi) as a discovery of construction inadequacies. If additional inadequacies are identified during further assessments, revisions to this document will be forwarded.

SECURING FROM THE EVENT

An engineering assessment to verify the installation of barriers as described on plant drawings was performed for all areas except the vapor containment, which will be performed during the scheduled April 1992 refueling outage. The actions listed on Attachment I were taken for redundant safety equipment cables not meeting the separation criteria. A total of four barriers have been installed (with eight planned) based upon the engineering assessment.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

ATTACHMENT ICable Separation Findings

<u>Item Number</u>	<u>Equipment Description</u>	<u>Action</u>
1	Auxiliary Boiler Feed Pumps Nos. 31 and 33 instrumentation and control cables	<ul style="list-style-type: none">o Identified barrier not installed as per drawing - 7/10/91o commenced modification to install barrier - 7/10/91o Justification For Continued Operation - 7/10/91o Barrier planned to be installed by 8/10/91
2	Residual Heat Removal Pumps Nos. 31 and 32 power cables	<ul style="list-style-type: none">o Identified barrier not installed as per drawing - 7/29/91o Commenced installation of barrier - 7/29/91o Barrier installed - 8/1/91o Identified redundant cables - 8/2/91o One hour report to NRC - 8/2/91