



**John C. Brons**  
Executive Vice President  
Nuclear Generation

October 3, 1989  
IPN-89-061

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Mail Station P1-137  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Attn: Document Control Desk

Subject: Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant  
Docket No. 50-286  
Generic Letter 89-04---Inservice Testing Program

- References:
1. NRC Generic Letter 89-04, "Guidance on Developing Acceptable Inservice Testing Programs."
  2. NYPA Letter, J. C. Brons to NRC, "Inservice Testing Program; Second 10-Year Interval," dated May 3, 1988 (IPN-88-016).
  3. NRC Letter, J. D. Neighbors to J. C. Brons, " Indian Point 3 Inservice Testing Program," dated November 16, 1988.

Dear Sir:

In response to Reference 1, the Authority has reviewed the Inservice Testing (IST) Program and implementing procedures for IP-3, against the 11 positions delineated in Reference 1. The results of this review are included in Attachment I. This letter eliminates the need for a meeting with the NRC staff on the Second 10 Year Program as discussed in Reference 3.

The Authority will revise and submit the IST Program by January 5, 1990 in accordance with the requirements of Reference 1 as discussed in Attachment 1. The Authority estimates that approximately 50% of the surveillance test procedures will be revised and several new procedures will be developed. These test procedures will be completed 6 months after the submittal of the revised Program. The acceptance criteria for the limiting values of full-stroke times for all power-operated valves in the Program and the criteria for leak rate testing will be evaluated and revised as required. The Authority will implement all testing requirements related to the revised Program by the end of the next refueling outage currently scheduled to start on October 1, 1990.

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Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this matter, please contact  
Mr. P. Kokolakis of my staff.

Very truly yours,



For John C. Brons

Executive Vice President  
Nuclear Generation

Encl.

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
475 Allendale Road  
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Resident Inspector's Office  
Indian Point 3  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
P.O. Box 337  
Buchanan, New York 10511

Mr. J. D. Neighbors, Sr. Project Manager  
Project Directorate I-1  
Division of Reactor Projects-I/II  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Mail Stop 14B2  
Washington, D.C. 20555

ATTACHMENT I

RESPONSE TO NRC GENERIC LETTER 89-04

GUIDANCE ON DEVELOPING ACCEPTABLE

INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAMS

NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY  
INDIAN POINT 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT  
DOCKET NO. 50-286  
DPR-64

ATTACHMENT I TO IPN 89-061GL Position 1:Full Flow Testing of Check ValvesNYPA Response:

In the IP-3 Program, for cases where the Authority is performing a full-stroke exercise of check valves using system flow, the flowrate through the subject valve will be measured or derived by physical measurement with an acceptance criteria that is equivalent to the maximum required accident condition flow through the valve.

GL Position 2:Alternative to Full Flow Testing of Check ValvesNYPA Response:

In the IP-3 Program, there are several instances where the Authority has determined that full flow testing of check valves is not practical and valve disassembly and inspection may also be impractical. For testing of the Safety Injection System check valves, full flow testing is impractical and disassembly and inspection of check valves would be extremely burdensome, time consuming and result in considerable hardship (e.g. excessive plant downtime and personnel radiation exposures) without any obvious gain in plant safety or reliability. In this case, the Authority will investigate alternate testing or inspection techniques that can effectively detect significant component degradation. Such methods may include state-of-the-art electronic non-obtrusive sensors, radiology, or remote visual inspection. The specific testing and inspection documentation will be provided in the revised IST Program. Where the Authority has determined that full flow testing of check valves is not practical, valve disassembly and inspection may be performed in lieu of flow testing along with partial valve stroking periodically and following reassembly, when practical. The specific testing and inspection plan will be provided in the revised IST Program. During valve testing by disassembly, valve internals will be inspected and exercised in accordance with Reference 1. Where specified in the revised IST Program, valve disassembly and inspection will be performed during refueling outages or other convenient times. The revised Program will include requests for relief whenever this option is used. For disassembly/inspection grouping, there are several cases where like valves in similar applications can be grouped as specified in Position 2. In those instances where use of this option is warranted, the guidelines given in Position 2 will be followed.

GL Position 3:Back flow Testing of Check ValvesNYPA Response:

The revised IST Program will identify all testing that is required for each check valve in the Program. Test procedures for back flow testing of check valves will be revised or developed to demonstrate that the valve is properly performing its safety function in the closed direction or that the valve is in the closed position.

GL Position 4:Pressure Isolation Valves (PIVs)NYPA Response:

All PIVs listed in the plant Technical Specifications will be listed in the revised IST Program as Category A or A/C valves. In addition, the Technical Specification requirements will be referenced in the revised Program. All Event V check valves are individually leak rate tested except for valves 857 A,G,Q,R,S,T,U and W High Head Safety Injection Check Valves. As stated in Relief Request VR-29 (Reference 2), there are no means of testing these valves individually. Therefore, the Authority takes the position that the valves act together as a single barrier with an additional valve, in series, tested as the second barrier. This configuration meets the intent of NRC Order of April 1981.

GL Position 5:Limiting Values of Full-Stroke Times for Power Operated ValvesNYPA Response:

The Authority will review the acceptance criteria for limiting values of full-stroke times for all power-operated valves in the Program that require stroke time measurements. Limiting values of full-stroke times and the test procedures will be revised accordingly.

GL Position 6:Stroke Time Measurements for Rapid-Acting ValvesNYPA Response:

In conjunction with the review of all power-operated valve stroke times to be performed in response to Position 5, if the Authority should identify some valves as "rapid-acting", the requirements of Position 6 will be instituted and documented by a request for relief in the revised IST Program.

GL Position 7:Testing Individual Control Rod Scram Valves In Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs)NYPA Response:

This position is not applicable to PWRs.

GL Position 8: Starting Point for Time Period in TS Statements

NYPA Response: The Authority is evaluating Position 8. The response to this position will be addressed in the revised IST Program.

GL Position 9: Pump Testing Using Minimum-Flow Return Line  
With or Without Flow Measuring Devices

NYPA Response: The IP-3 Program complies with this position with the exception of tests performed on the Containment Sump Recirculation Pumps. As stated in Relief Request PR-12 (Reference 2), there is no provision for measuring flowrate for these pumps and the addition of instrumentation to do so would be costly in resources and radiation exposure without any obvious gain in plant safety or the safety of the general public.

GL Position 10: Containment Isolation Valve Testing

NYPA Response: All valves designated as containment isolation valves are included in the IST Program as Category A or A/C valves. The IP-3 Program complies with the requirements of IWW-3426 and IWW 3427(a). The Authority will evaluate the need for requesting relief from the requirements of IWW-3427(b). If it is determined that such relief is warranted, a request for relief from the requirements of IWW-3427(b) will be included in the revised IST Program.

GL Position 11: IST Program Scope

NYPA Response: The scope of inservice testing contained in Position 11 of Reference 1, exceeds the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a. The Authority conducts inservice testing for pumps and valves under ASME Section X1 within the scope of 10 CFR 50.55a. Upon review of the current IP-3 Program, if the Authority determines additional components fall within the scope of 10 CFR 50.55a, these components will be added to the Program.

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September 27, 1989

DOCKET NO(S): 50-286

Mr. John C. Brons  
 Executive Vice President, Nuclear Generation  
 Power Authority of the State of New York  
 123 Main Street  
 White Plains, New York 10601

SUBJECT: POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK  
 INDIAN POINT 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

The following documents concerning our review of the subject facility are transmitted for your information:

✓	DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT	DATED
	Notice of Receipt of Application	
	Draft/Final Environmental Statement	
	Notice of Availability of Draft/Final Environmental Statement	
	Safety Evaluation Report, or Supplement No. _____	
	Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact	
	Notice of Issuance of Environmental Assessment	
	Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Facility Operating License or Amendment to Facility Operating License	
<b>X</b>	Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Conditions See Page(s) _____	<b>9/20/89</b>
	Exemption	
	Construction Permit No. CPPR- _____, Amendment No. _____	
	Facility Operating License No. _____, Amendment No. _____	
	Order	
	Monthly Operating Report for _____ transmitted by Letter	
	Annual/Semi-Annual Report: _____ transmitted by Letter	
	Other _____	

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:  
 As Stated

cc: See next page

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 CC

OFFICE▶	PDI-1						
SURNAME▶	CVogan CW						
DATE▶	9/27/89						

**Biweekly Notice Applications and Amendments to Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations**

**I. Background**

Pursuant to Public Law (P.L.) 97-415, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is publishing this regular biweekly notice. P.L. 97-415 revised section 189 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), to require the Commission to publish notice of any amendments issued, or proposed to be issued, under a new provision of section 189 of the Act. This provision grants the Commission the authority to issue and make immediately effective any amendment to an operating license upon a determination by the Commission that such amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a hearing from any person.

This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or proposed to be issued from August 25, 1989 through September 8, 1989. The last biweekly notice was published on September 6, 1989 (54 FR 37040).

**NOTICE OF CONSIDERATION OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE AND PROPOSED NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION DETERMINATION AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING**

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendments would not (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown below.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of publication of this notice will be considered in making any final determination. The Commission will not normally make a final determination unless it receives a request for a hearing.

Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Regulatory Publications Branch, Division of Freedom of

Information and Publications Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and should cite the publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be delivered to Room P-223, Phillips Building, 7820 Norfolk Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC. The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to intervene is discussed below.

By October 20, 1989 the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and petitions for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's "Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings" in 10 CFR Part 2. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of the Board up to fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in

the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above.

Not later than fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions which are sought to be litigated in the matter, and the bases for each contention set forth with reasonable specificity. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. A petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the amendment involves a significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the issuance of any amendment.

Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility, the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final determination will consider all public and State comments received before action is taken. Should the Commission take this action, it will publish a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will occur very infrequently.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, by the above date. Where petitions are filed during the last ten (10) days of the notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at 1-(800) 325-6000 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union operator should be given Datagram Identification Number 3737 and the following message addressed to (Project Director): petitioner's name and telephone number; date petition was mailed; plant name; and publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to the attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, that the petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).

For further details with respect to this action, see the application for amendment which is available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room for the particular facility involved.

**Carolina Power & Light Company, et al., Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2, Brunswick County, North Carolina**

*Date of application for amendments:* October 26, 1988, as supplemented March 30, 1989, June 13, 1989, and August 4, 1989.

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendments revise Technical Specifications (TS) Section 3/4.4.6, "Pressure/Temperature Limits", to modify the current TS wording, the Limiting Conditions for Operation, and Pressure/Temperature Limit Curves to make them consistent with the guidance contained in Generic Letter 88-11, "NRC Position on Radiation Embrittlement Of Reactor Vessel Materials And Its Impact

On Plant Operations," dated July 12, 1988. Repagination of TS Sections 3/4.4.6, 3/4.4.7, and 3/4.4.8, is included to accommodate the three additional pages resulting from this proposed amendment. Bases pages will also be changed accordingly.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazard consideration determination:* The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a no significant hazard consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c). A proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Currently TS Section 3.4.6.1 specifies reactor vessel shell temperature and reactor vessel pressure. The proposed change revises this wording to specify reactor coolant system temperature and pressure. The licensee provided a no significant hazards consideration analysis to support a no significant hazards consideration for this change as follows:

The change does not involve a significant hazards considerations for the following reasons:

1. Reactor coolant system temperature and pressure are currently utilized to comply with the requirements of TS Section 3/4.4.6 and have been evaluated to confirm that they are representative of the vessel shell temperature and vessel pressure. The proposed change is being requested to clarify the specification to preclude potential confusion. The reactor coolant system temperature, measured at the recirculation pump suction, is actually lower than that of the vessel shell during various phases of operation (i.e., reactor startup, operation, and immediately following reactor shutdown) because of the effects of gamma heating of the reactor vessel. Therefore, use of recirculation pump suction temperature is more conservative during these operational phases. Since the coolant system data is representative of the vessel shell temperature, the probability of a pressure boundary failure will remain the same and will provide the same limitations on the consequences of a pressure boundary failure. Based on this reasoning, CP&L has determined that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because the postulated accident scenario and accident initiators remain the

same. Moreover, the source of the data used to satisfy the requirements of TS Section 3/4.4.6 is representative of the reactor vessel shell temperature. The change in wording will have no impact on reactor coolant system operation and will not create the possibility of any new accident mode.

3. Revision of the wording to reflect the actual data source will clarify the specification. Since the reactor coolant system temperature (taken at the reactor recirculation pump suction) is representative of, and at times slightly more conservative than the reactor vessel shell temperature, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The proposed change replaces the present temperature/pressure limit curves contained in Figures 3.4.6.1-1 through 3.4.6.1-3 with five new curves. The new curves cover the same operational conditions as the previous curves (i.e., non-nuclear heatup, low power physics tests, cooldown following a shutdown, criticality and inservice hydrostatic tests) along with two additional curves for hydrostatic and leak tests. This results in three hydrostatic and leak test curves which cover testing operations at less than or equal to 8, 10, and 12 effective full power years (EFPY). The licensee's analyses of no significant hazards follows:

The change does not involve a significant hazards consideration for the following reasons:

1. The revised temperature/pressure limit curves are based on the most current regulatory requirements along with actual neutron flux/fluence data. These curves provide the necessary safety margin to assure structural integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. This safety margin is designed to preclude the probability of a pressure boundary failure. The consequences of a pressure boundary failure are not impacted by the proposed change. Since these curves are based on the most current regulatory guidance and fluence data, CP&L has determined that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The accidents analyzed in Chapter 15 of the Updated FSAR are not affected by the revised temperature/pressure limit curves. These curves are designed to provide fracture protection for the reactor coolant pressure boundary and do not create any new accident modes. Accident modes for the reactor coolant pressure boundary, due to nonductile failure, are well understood within the industry. The temperature/pressure limit curves merely provide the protection mechanisms to preclude such a failure. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Temperature/pressure limit curves are designed to provide a specific margin of safety. This margin is required to be at least as great as that specified in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III,

Appendix G, and Appendix G to 10CFR50. The revised curves are based on the latest NRC guidelines (Regulatory Guide 1.98, Rev. 2), along with the actual neutron flux/fluence data for the Brunswick Units. Thus, the revised curves provide a greater confidence level than the present curves. Based on this reasoning CP&L has determined that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The proposed change adds additional limiting conditions for operation to TS Section 3.4.6.1 for hydrostatic or leak testing and for the reactor vessel flange and head flange temperatures with the reactor vessel head bolting studs under tension. The licensee provided the following no significant hazards analysis.

The change does not involve a significant hazards consideration for the following reasons:

1. The proposed limiting conditions for operation provide added protection against the probability of a reactor coolant pressure boundary failure during hydrostatic and leak testing and during conditions when the vessel head bolting studs are under tension. The consequences of a reactor coolant pressure boundary failure are not affected by the additional operational constraints. Based on this reasoning, CP&L has determined that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The accidents analyzed in Chapter 15 of the Updated FSAR are not affected by the additional limiting conditions for operation. The additional operational constraints have been added to comply with the current regulation and provide added reactor coolant pressure boundary protection. As stated previously, accident modes for reactor coolant pressure boundary due to nonductile failure are well understood within the industry. The revised limiting conditions for operation merely provide an additional protection mechanism without creating any new accident modes. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. The additional limiting conditions for operation were added to assure adequate safety margins during hydrostatic and leak testing, and to place limits on the reactor vessel flange and head flange temperatures when the head bolting studs are under tension. These additional operational constraints provide added safety margin relative to the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix G. Based on this reasoning, CP&L has determined that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The proposed change repaginates TS Section 3/4.4.6, Section 3/4.4.7, and Section 3/4.4.8 to accommodate three additional pages. The licensee provided the following no significant hazards analysis.

The change does not involve a significant hazards consideration for the following reasons:

1. The proposed change is an administrative change to the Technical Specifications to prevent the need for adding subpages. Repagination is necessary to accommodate additional text and figures, and has no impact on the specification. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed change is purely administrative. It will provide numerical consistency of the pages within the specified TS Sections without creating any change to the technical content of the specifications. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. The proposed change is to an administrative change. There will be no impact on the specification as a result of this change. The change will merely provide numerical consistency of the pages in the specified sections, and will eliminate the need for using subpages. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The licensee has concluded that the proposed amendment meets the three standards in 10 CFR 50.92 and, therefore involves no significant hazards consideration.

The NRC staff has made a preliminary review of the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination and agrees with the licensee's analysis. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to determine that the requested amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:* University of North Carolina at Wilmington, William Madison Randall Library, 601 S. College Road, Wilmington, North Carolina 28403-3297.

*Attorney for licensee:* R. E. Jones, General Counsel, Carolina Power & Light Company, P.O. Box 1551, Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

*NRC Project Director:* Elinor G. Adensam

**Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company, Docket No. 50-213, Haddam Neck Plant, Middlesex County, Connecticut**

*Date of amendment request:* July 28, 1989

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment will remove cycle specific parameters from the Technical Specifications (TS) as recommended in Generic Letter 88-16, "Removal of Cycle-Specific Parameter Limits from Technical Specifications." In addition, in TS Section 3.1.3.5, fully withdrawn position has been redefined as 317 steps; in TS Section 3.4.1.4.1 some flexibility regarding RHR operation during heatup has been added because

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of problems during the last outage, and TS Section 34.9.1 has been clarified to allow the low temperature overpressure protection system to be isolated during performance of RCS hydrostatic and leak testing.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:*

The Commission has provided standards in 10 CFR 50.92(c) for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.92 Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company has reviewed the proposed Technical Specification and concluded that they do not involve a significant hazards consideration because the changes would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

**I. Generic Letter 88-16 Related Changes**

There are no design basis accidents impacted by the format change to relocate the cycle-specific parameter limits from the technical specifications to the Technical Report Supporting Cycle Operation (TRSCO). The Cycle 16 parameter limits are provided in the Core Operating Limits Section of the TRSCO. The Cycle 16 reload has affected some of the core physics parameters. These parameters were input to the design basis accident and transient analysis. The design basis LOCA and non-LOCA transients were evaluated to determine what impact resulted from the Cycle 16 reload core. As discussed in the TRSCO, there is little if any impact on the consequences of any design basis transients. In addition, neither the proposed technical specification changes nor the Cycle 16 reload affect the probability of occurrence of any design basis accidents. Therefore, these proposed changes are concluded to not result in a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accidents previously analyzed.

**II. Axial Offset/LHGR/DNB Parameters**

These proposed changes are clarifications of existing surveillance requirements. These changes have no impact on the operation of the Haddam Neck Plant. The axial offset surveillance cannot be accurately performed until a minimum of three days operation at 80% and the RCS flow rate surveillance cannot be accurately performed until achieving 100% power. Therefore, the proposed changes ensure that proper and accurate surveillance tests are performed. The linear heat generation rate (LHGR) surveillance as proposed ensures that the LHGR will not exceed

the initial conditions assumed for the LOCA analyses prior to performing the axial offset surveillance. As such, there is no impact on the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

**III. Control Rod Insertion Limits**

Changing the "all rods out" position from 320 steps to 317 steps does not impact the probability or consequences of any design basis accidents. The 317 step position is based on the interface between the fuel assemblies and the control rods. All the physical models used in the cycle design and determination of safety analysis input parameters assume that the "all rods out" position is 317 steps. No safety systems are affected by this change nor are any design basis events affected. This proposed change more precisely reflects the physical configuration in the core.

**IV. RCS Heatup/RCS Hydrostatic and Leak Testing**

The proposed changes allow the operating RHR pump to be deenergized during RCS heatup and allows the LTOPS to be isolated during the performance of RCS hydrostatic or leak testing. Clarifications to the testing, heatup, and cooldown curves are also included.

The proposed technical specification changes do not affect the probability of failure of the RHR or LTOP systems. The LTOPS is not required during the performance of a hydrostatic and/or leak test provided they are performed above 245° F and 235° F respectively, and a heatup rate less than or equal to 10 F/hour is maintained for one hour prior to and during the test.

The RHR system would purposely be taken out of service during an RCS heatup in MODE 5 with low decay heat by deenergizing the operating RHR pump. Shutting off the pump does not affect the probability of failure of that pump, nor does it affect the probability of failure of the remaining operable pump.

Overall, these proposed changes do not affect the probability or consequences of any design basis accidents nor do the changes increase the probability of a failure of a safety system or degrade the performance of a safety system below that assumed in the design basis analysis.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated

**I. Generic Letter 88-16 Related Changes**

There are no failure modes associated with the proposed technical specifications changes on the Cycle 16 reload. A review of the affected on-

LOCA and LOCA transients has demonstrated that the plant response has not been modified to the point where a new accident has been identified. Accordingly, these changes are concluded to not present the possibility for a new unanalyzed accident.

**II. Axial Offset/LGHR/DNB Parameters**

These changes provide clarifications and a correction of existing technical specifications to ensure that the surveillance requirements are effective and perform their intended function. There is no impact on plant operation or response. Therefore, it is concluded that these proposed changes do not present the possibility for a new unanalyzed accident.

**III. Control Rod Insertion Limits**

The proposed change redefines the "all rods out" position to more precisely reflect the physical relationship between the fuel and control rods. The plant response is not modified by this proposed change nor are there any new failure modes presented. The proposed change does not impact the probability of an accident to the point where it should be considered within the design basis.

**IV. RCS Heatup/RCS Hydrostatic and Leak Testing**

The plant response due to the proposed changes has not been modified to the point where it can be considered that a new accident has been defined. The hydrostatic and leak tests will continue to be performed above 245° F and 235° F respectively. Taking the RHR pump out of service in MODE 5 with low decay heat will allow a normal RCS heatup.

The failure mode of a low temperature, overpressurization event occurring below 315° F while the LTOPS is isolated, has already been analyzed. Limiting the heatup rate to less than or equal to 10 degrees F while the LTOPS is out of service addresses this potential. Therefore, these proposed changes do not create the potential for a new unanalyzed accident. There are no failure modes associated with taking the operating RHR pump out of service during an RCS heatup since the performance of the RHR system is not affected.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety

**I. Generic Letter 88-16 Related Changes**

The proposed changes to the technical specifications and the Cycle 16 reload have been evaluated for their impact on non-LOCA and LOCA design basis events. Since as previously stated there

is no impact on the consequences of the design basis events, therefore, it follows that there is no impact on the protective boundaries. There are no failure modes associated with the proposed changes or the Cycle 16 reload. Therefore, there is no impact on the margin of safety.

#### II. Axial Offset/LGHR/DNB Parameters

These proposed changes do not involve any failure modes or changes in plant operation or transient response. These changes are proposed to better ensure that operating limits are maintained. Therefore, there is no impact on the margin of safety.

#### III. Control Rod Insertion Limits

This proposed change has no impact on the protective boundaries of the plant. There are no failure modes associated with this change and there is no affect on the safety limits. This proposed change simply reflects the physical configuration in the core more precisely.

#### IV. RCS Heatup/RCS Hydrostatic and Leak Testing

The proposed changes do not impact the protective boundaries. Performance of a hydrostatic and/or leak test above 245° F or 235° F respectively while maintaining a heatup rate less than 10° F/hour one hour prior to and during the test assures that the margin of safety required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix G is maintained. Deenergizing the operating RHR pump in MODE 5 with low decay heat will result in a controlled RCS heatup without affecting the protective boundaries.

The NRC staff has reviewed this analysis and based on this review, it appears that the three standards are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the application for amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Russell Library, 123 Broad Street, Middletown, Connecticut 06457.

*Attorney for licensee:* Gerald Garfield, Esquire, Day, Berry & Howard, Counselors at Law, City Place, Hartford, Connecticut 06103-3499.

*NRC Project Director:* John F. Stolz

Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company, Docket No. 50-213, Haddam Neck Plant, Middlesex County, Connecticut

*Date of amendment request:* August 2, 1989

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed Technical Specification (TS) changes TS 3/4.5.1, "Emergency Core Cooling System - ECCS Subsystem - Tavg greater than or equal to 350° F;" to reflect the component configurations following the 1989 refueling outage

modifications to the ECCS to resolve single failure concerns. In addition TS Section 3/4.5.2, "Emergency Core Cooling System - ECCS Subsystem - Tavg less than 350° F," and TS Section 3/4.5.3, "Emergency Core Cooling System - pH Control System" have been renumbered to be consistent with Westinghouse Standard Technical Specification (WSTS) format.

#### *Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:*

The Commission has provided standards in 10 CFR 50.92(c) for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.92 Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company has reviewed the proposed Technical Specifications and concluded that they do not involve a significant hazards consideration because the changes would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The modifications to the ECCS will provide for redundant isolation of the HPSI miniflow during sump recirculation and will resolve single failure concerns in the chemical and volume control system (CVCS), RHR, HPSI, and LPSI systems. As such, these modifications will not adversely impact the consequences of design basis accidents because they do not change the ECCS delivery rates. The proposed changes to the ECCS surveillance requirements will provide added assurance that the ECCS modification will operate reliably. The physical improvements to ECCS will improve reliability and redundancy of the system, and as a result, will not adversely impact the probability or consequences of previously analyzed accidents.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

The proposed changes to the technical specifications ensure that the plant response is within the design basis. No new failure modes are introduced by these proposed technical specification requirements. The proposed changes improve ECCS reliability and redundancy.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety

The physical changes made to the plant that are reflected in these proposed technical specifications provide an enhancement to the protective boundaries by increasing redundancy and reliability. The surveillance requirements imposed by this proposed change also assure the reliability of these components. The proposed changes to the technical

specifications do not impact the safety limits for the protective boundaries. Therefore, the proposed change does not result in a reduction of any margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed this analysis and based on this review, it appears that the three standards are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the application for amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Russell Library, 123 Broad Street, Middletown, Connecticut 06457.

*Attorney for licensee:* Gerald Garfield, Esquire, Day, Berry & Howard, Counselors at Law, City Place, Hartford, Connecticut 06103-3499.

*NRC Project Director:* John F. Stolz

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Docket No. 50-247, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2, Westchester County, New York

*Date of amendment request:* June 12, 1989, as clarified July 11, 1989

*Brief description of amendment:* The proposed amendment would: (1) change the allowable out-of-service time in Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.B.2.c for inoperable containment spray system valves from 24 hours to 72 hours, (2) add TS 3.3.B.2.d for the spray additive tank and its associated piping, valves and eductors, and (3) add TS 3.7.B.5 permitting one of the battery chargers associated with station batteries 21, 22, 23 and 24 to be inoperable for up to 24 hours provided certain conditions are satisfied.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards considerations determination:* The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

#### *Containment Spray Valves*

The proposed change to TS 3.3.B.2.c would change the containment spray system valves' allowable out-of-service time from 24 hours to 72 hours. License Amendment No. 132 (issued June 29, 1988) changed the allowable out-of-service time for the containment spray pumps from 24 hours to 72 hours. Due to

an administrative error during the preparation of License Amendment No. 132, the allowable out-of-service time from these valves was not changed at that time. Therefore, the proposed change would make the allowable out-of-service time for these valves consistent with the allowable out-of-service time for the containment spray valves. Since the proposed change is an administrative change to the technical specifications to achieve consistency throughout the technical specifications (72 hour allowable out-of-service time for all equipment in the containment spray system), the proposed change meets Example (1) of the Commission's Examples of Amendments That Are Considered Not Likely To Involve Significant Hazards Considerations (51 FR 7751, dated March 6, 1986) and therefore the staff proposes that this proposed change will not involve a Significant Hazards Consideration.

*Spray Additive Tank*

The proposed addition of TS 3.3.B.2.d would permit reactor operation to continue for up to 72 hours with the spray additive tank and its associated piping, valves and eductors inoperable provided both containment spray pumps and the five fan cooler units are operable. In the absence of this proposed addition, TS 3.0.1 would be applied. TS 3.0.1 would require the unit to be in hot shutdown within 7 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours if the spray additive tank or its associated equipment are inoperable.

The licensee provided the following analysis of this proposed change and determined that this proposed change would not involve a Significant Hazards Consideration because operation of Indian Point Unit No 2 in accordance with this proposed change would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Since the Spray Additive Tank and its associated piping, valves and eductors are a passive system with the exception of its two isolation valves which are air operated, fail open, and installed in parallel; since these components deal only with accident mitigation; and since these components do not provide any sort of automatic initiation; there are no credible equipment failures that would initiate an accident. In addition, since the entire assembly is located outside containment, there are no credible failures attributable to this equipment that could directly affect the Reactor Coolant System. Thus, unavailability of the Spray Additive Tank would not significantly increase the probability of an accident previously evaluated.

With respect to a significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated, it is important to note that the

accident mitigation capabilities of the Spray Additive Tank are the removal of iodine from the containment atmosphere and the pH balancing of the recirculated water to prevent corrosion in a post-LOCA condition. In addressing the iodine removal capability of the Spray Additive Tank, a plant-specific PRA evaluation was conducted to determine the effects of a 72 hour LCO. The results of this evaluation determined that a 72 hour LCO showed an inconsequential increase in the public health risk. In addition, Section 1.1 of WCAP-11611 ("Methodology for Elimination of the Containment Spray Additive", March 1986) states:

"Analyses performed by Westinghouse, utilizing current NRC methodology (SRP 6.5.2, Revision 1) and combined with knowledge gained from many studies on the behavior of iodine in the post-LOCA environment, have demonstrated the relatively minor role of the spray additive in meeting the dose guidelines of 10 CFR 100. The proposed Revision 2 to SRP 6.5.2 goes even further in demonstrating this relatively minor role of the spray additive by eliminating its consideration."

As for pH balancing, it is also possible to add NaOH to the Boric Acid Batch Tank and then inject the solution via the normal Chemical and Volume Control System charging paths into the Reactor Coolant System. The solution would flow out the break that caused the LOCA, mix with water in the bottom of the containment and provide the necessary pH balance. This additional injection pathway methodology is already contained in our Emergency Operating Procedures (ES-1.3, "Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation") as the alternate method for assuring long term pH control. Finally, the proposed LCO has the same time limit as the Standard Technical Specifications' LCO. Thus, it is concluded that there is no significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Therefore, this proposed change to Technical Specification 3.3.B.2 does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change provides an LCO for the Spray Additive Tank that has the same time limit as the Standard Technical Specification' LCO. No physical changes to the Spray Additive Tank or its associated components are required with respect to this proposed LCO. Therefore, the proposed change to Technical Specification 3.3.B.2 does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The accident mitigation capabilities of the Spray Additive Tank are the removal of iodine from the containment atmosphere and the pH balancing of the recirculated water to prevent corrosion in a post-LOCA condition. As discussed above, a plant-specific PRA evaluation determined that a 72 hour LCO showed an inconsequential increase in the public health risk. Additionally, Section 1.1 of WCAP-11611 ("Methodology for Elimination

of the Containment Spray Additive", March 1986) concluded that the role of the spray additive in meeting the dose guidelines of 10CFR100 is relatively minor and that the proposed Revision 2 to SRP 6.5.2 goes even further in demonstrating this relatively minor role of the spray additive by eliminating its consideration.

As for pH balancing, alternative proceduralized paths exist to add NaOH to the Boric Acid Batch Tank and then inject the solution via the normal Chemical and Volume Control System charging paths into the Reactor Coolant System. The solution would flow out the break that caused the LOCA, mix with water in the bottom of the containment and provide the necessary pH balance. This injection path is not affected by the proposed change.

Therefore, the proposed change to Technical Specification 3.3.B.2 does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above discussion, the licensee determined that the proposed change to TS 3.3.B.2.d does not involve a Significant Hazards Consideration. The staff agrees with the licensee's analysis and proposes that this proposed change will not involve a Significant Hazards Consideration.

*Battery Chargers*

The proposed addition of TS 3.7.B.5 would permit reactor operation to continue for up to 24 hours with one battery charger inoperable provided the other three battery chargers and their associated batteries are operable and the affected battery is determined operable by performance of TS 4.6.C.1 within 1 hour and every 8 hours thereafter. In the absence of this proposed addition, TS 3.0.1 would be applied. TS 3.0.1 would require the unit to be in hot shutdown within 7 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours if one battery charger is inoperable.

The licensee provided the following analysis of this proposed change and determined that this proposed change would not involve a Significant Hazards Consideration because operation of Indian Point Unit No. 2 in accordance with this proposed change would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Upon loss of the Battery Charger, the associated Station Battery would supply power to the affected loads. Thus, a time period exists when the Battery Charger can be out of service and there would be no effect on plant operation nor any impact on the plant design basis because unaffected safety systems are still operable and the Battery Charger is not necessary to mitigate design basis accidents. Upon entering the proposed LCO the operators would be aware what loads are carried by the affected Station Battery and through the use of existing procedures inappropriate operator action due

to degraded voltage on the affected bus would be precluded. Thus, inavailability of the Battery Charger would not significantly increase the probability of an accident previously evaluated.

With respect to a significant increase in the consequences of an accident previously evaluated, the proposed LCO requires the other three Station Batteries be operable and that the surveillance under Technical Specification 4.6.C.1 be implemented frequently on the affected Station Battery to assure its continued operability. By more frequent monitoring of critical battery parameters, timely actions can be taken to assure Station Battery longevity. Under Technical Specification 3.7.B there is an existing LCO which allows one Station Battery to be inoperable for 24 hours providing all four Battery Chargers and the other three Station Batteries are operable. Under both the existing LCO for the Station Batteries and the proposed LCO for the Battery Chargers, the single active failure of a safety-related component, coincident with a Loss-Of-Offsite-Power (LOOP) would still be the most limiting accident condition. It has been determined that the existing LCO on the Station Batteries bounds the proposed LCO on the Battery Chargers. Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated remained unchanged.

Therefore, this proposed change to Technical Specification 3.7.B does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed LCO requires the other three Station Batteries be operable and that the surveillance under Technical Specification 4.6.C.1 be implemented frequently on the affected Station Battery to assure its continued operability. By more frequent monitoring of critical battery parameters, timely actions can be taken to assure Station Battery longevity. Under Technical Specification 3.7.B there is an existing LCO which allows one Station Battery to be inoperable for 24 hours providing all four Battery Chargers and the other three Station Batteries are operable. The existing LCO on the Station Batteries bounds the proposed LCO on the Battery Chargers because equipment that could lose power during a Loss-Of-Offsite-Power coincident with a postulated accident under the existing Station Battery LCO, would retain power under the proposed Battery Charger LCO.

Therefore, the proposed change to Technical Specification 3.7.B does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed LCO allows a Battery Charger to be inoperable, but also requires the other three Station Batteries be operable and that the surveillance under Technical Specification 4.6.C.1 be implemented frequently on the affected Station Battery to assure its continued operability. Under Technical Specification 3.7.B there is an

existing LCO which allows one Station Battery to be inoperable for 24 hours providing all four Battery Chargers and the other three Station Batteries are operable. Although the Battery Charger will now be allowed a limited out of service time of 24 hours maximum, this condition is bounded by the already allowed LCO on the Station Batteries because equipment that could lose power during a Loss-Of-Offsite-Power coincident with a postulated accident under the existing Station Battery LCO, would retain power under the proposed Battery Charger LCO.

Therefore, the proposed change to Technical Specification 3.7.B does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above discussion, the licensee determined that the proposed addition of TS 3.7.B.5 does not involve a Significant Hazards Consideration. The staff agrees with the licensee's analysis and proposes that this proposed change will not involve a Significant Hazards Consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:* White Plains Public Library, 100 Maritime Avenue, White Plains, New York, 10610.

*Attorney for licensee:* Brent L. Brandenburg, Esq., 4 Irving Place, New York, New York 10003

*NRC Project Director:* Robert A. Capra

**National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Plum Brook Station Docket No. 50-30, Plum Brook Reactor**

*Date of amendment request:* February 27, 1989 and June 22, 1989

*Description of amendment request:* The amendment would change portions of the licensee's organizational structure. The facility currently has a possession only license and is in protected safe storage awaiting decommissioning. All special nuclear material has been removed from the site.

The Aeropropulsion Facilities and Experiments Division would replace the Health Safety & Security Division as the division responsible to provide resources to maintain the Plum Brook Reactor in protected safe storage. As a result of this change, the Radiation Safety Officer would report to the Director of the Aeronautics Directorate in matters concerning radiation safety at the facility.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility

in accordance with a proposed amendment would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

(1) The proposed amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the organizational changes will not affect the protected safe storage mode the facility is in. Furthermore, the Technical Specification continue to require that NASA provides whatever resources are required to maintain the facility in a condition that poses no hazard to the general public or to the environment.

(2) The proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because the change only involves portions of the organizational structure; and does not physically alter any system or components, or the way the reactor is maintained in protected safe storage.

(3) The proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because there will be no change in the protected safe storage status of the facility or the resources committed to maintaining the facility in protected safe storage.

The staff has concluded that the requested changes meet the standards for no significant hazards consideration and, therefore, has made a proposed determination that the requested license amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:* N/A

*Attorney for licensee:* N/A  
*NRC Project Director:* Seymour H. Weiss

**Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Docket No. 50-245, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, New London County, Connecticut**

*Date of amendment request:* August 1, 1989 (Licensee letters B13289, B13297, B13298 and B13303)

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed change to the Technical Specifications reflects the changes requested by the NRC in Generic Letter 83-28 for containment water level, containment high range radiation monitors, containment pressure monitors, noble gas effluent monitors, post-accident sampling, and sampling and analysis of plant effluents. In

addition, Specification 3.7.A.3 will be changed to provide clarification of the action to be taken if primary containment integrity is not maintained and Specification 3.7.A.6 will be changed to clarify the limiting condition for operation of Section 3.7.A.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The licensee has reviewed the proposed changes, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.92, and has concluded and the NRC agrees, that they do not involve a significant hazards consideration in that these changes would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated.

The added and/or amended LCOs and Surveillance Requirements regarding Suppression Chamber Water Level ensure the availability of these systems and will have no impact on the initiation or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. These changes ensure that additional information is available to the operator for proper accident assessment. Therefore, the aforementioned changes do not increase the probability or consequences of a design basis accident nor do they affect the performance or failure probability of any safety system. The changes described above have no effect on the initiation, probability, or consequences of any previously evaluated accident scenario.

The added and/or amended LCOs and Surveillance Requirements regarding containment high range radiation monitors and containment pressure monitors ensure the availability of these monitoring systems and will have no impact on the initiation or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. These changes ensure that additional information is available to the operator for proper accident assessment. Therefore, the aforementioned changes do not increase the probability or consequences of a design basis accident nor do they affect the performance or failure probability of any safety system. The changes to the Technical Specifications 3.7.A.3 and 3.7.A.6 described above are administrative in nature and, as such, have no effect on the initiation, probability, or consequences of any previously evaluated accident scenario.

The added and/or amended LCOs and Surveillance Requirements regarding noble gas effluent monitors ensure the availability of these systems and will have no impact on the initiation or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The changes ensure that additional information is available to the operator for proper accident

assessment. Therefore, the aforementioned changes do not increase the probability or consequences of a design basis accident nor do they affect the performance or failure probability of any safety system. The changes to Technical Specifications described above have no effect on the initiation, probability, or consequences of any previously evaluated accident scenario.

The added and/or amended LOCs and Surveillance Requirements regarding sampling ensure the availability of the existing post-accident sampling and iodine monitoring systems and will have no impact on the initiation or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

These changes ensure that additional information is available to the operator for proper accident assessment. Therefore, the aforementioned changes do not increase the probability or consequences of a design basis accident nor do they affect the performance or failure probability of any safety system. The changes to the Technical Specifications described above have no effect on the initiation, probability, or consequences of any previously evaluated accident scenario.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

The Generic Letter 83-36 changes do not result in physical modification of the plant response or operator response to an accident, and no new failure modes are associated with these changes. Instrument drift factors were reviewed to ensure the instrumentation does not provide erroneous or conflicting information to the operator in any given situation. In addition, given the inherent characteristics of passive monitoring equipment, it has been determined that no new or different kind of accident has been created. The changes to Specifications 3.7.A.3 and 3.7.A.6 are for clarification purposes and will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident.

3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The Generic Letter 83-36 changes do not impact the consequences on the protective boundaries, and the basis for any Technical Specification is not changed because the instrumentation associated with these changes are passive by nature and do not in any way affect any safety-related equipment. Also, the bases for these proposed Technical Specifications are being revised to include information regarding these systems which serve to provide additional information to plant personnel during and following an accident. Therefore, there is no

reduction in the margin of safety associated with these changes.

The changes to Specifications 3.7.A.3 and 3.7.A.6 are for clarification purposes and will not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Waterford Public Library, 49 Rope Ferry Road, Waterford, Connecticut 06385.

*Attorney for licensee:* Gerald Garfield, Esquire, Day, Berry & Howard, Counselors at Law, City Place, Hartford, Connecticut 06103-3499.

*NRC Project Director:* John F. Stolz

Public Service Company of Colorado, Docket No. 50-267, Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station, Weld County, Colorado

*Date of amendment request:* July 14, 1989

*Description of amendment request:* This amendment request is for an upgraded Technical Specifications (TS) for the plant batteries. It reflects an improved TS as developed in the Fort St. Vrain TS Upgrade Program.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92(c). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) The possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The licensee provided an analysis that addressed the above three standards in the amendment application as follows:

PSC has evaluated the proposed amendment request for significant hazards consideration using the standards in Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.92. The proposed amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, since the proposed amendment would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The operation of the batteries, the Fort St. Vrain plant, and the plant safety systems are not being changed. The battery surveillances are being improved. The battery Service Discharge Test schedule has been established at 18 months in accordance with the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications and a Performance Discharge Test has been added in accordance with IEEE Standard 450-1987.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

No change is being made to the operation of the batteries, the Fort St. Vrain plant, or plant safety systems. The only changes being made are designed to improve the reliability of the batteries.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed changes are designed to improve the reliability of the batteries. The surveillances are in accordance with vendor recommendations and IEEE guidance.

Based on the above evaluation, it is concluded that operation of Fort St. Vrain in accordance with the proposed changes will involve no significant hazards consideration. PSC considers the proposed changes to be an improvement in the overall plant reliability and documentation as the new surveillances and testing requirements are designed to improve battery performance.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination. Based on the review and the above discussions, the staff proposes to determine that the proposed changes do not involve significant hazards considerations.

*Local Public Document Room*  
location: Greeley Public Library, City Complex Building, Greeley, Colorado

*Attorney for licensee:* J. K. Tarpey, Public Service Company Building, Room 900, 550 15th Street, Denver, Colorado 80202

*NRC Project Director:* Seymour H. Weiss

**Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation, Docket No. 50-244, R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Wayne County, New York**

*Date of amendment request:* August 30, 1989

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment would modify the Technical Specifications to reflect an administrative change in title from Vice President, Production and Engineering to Senior Vice President, Production and Engineering.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists (10 CFR 50.92(c)). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with a proposed amendment would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee addressed the above three standards in the amendment application. In regard to the three standards, the licensee provided the following analysis.

(1) Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed revision does not involve the physical modification of the plant or plant equipment. This modification to the Technical Specifications is administrative in nature and affects no analyses or responses of the plant to accident conditions.

(2) Use of the modified specification would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed revision to the Technical Specifications does not involve a physical modification to the plant that could result in the creation of an accident not previously analyzed.

(3) Use of the modified specification would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed revision does not alter the licensee's commitment to maintaining the management organization that contributes to the safe operation and maintenance of the plant.

The staff has reviewed the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination analysis. Based upon this review, the staff agrees with the licensee's analysis. Therefore, based on its review, the staff proposes to determine that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room*  
location: Rochester Public Library, 115 South Avenue, Rochester, New York 14610

*Attorney for licensee:* Harry Voigt, Esquire, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae, 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, NW., Suite 1100, Washington, DC 20036  
*NRC Project Director:* Richard H. Wessman

**Toledo Edison Company and The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Docket No. 50-346, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, Ottawa County, Ohio**

*Date of amendment request:* June 12, 1989 as supplemented August 11, 1989.

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment requests that certain surveillance requirements for the emergency diesel generators in the Davis-Besse Technical Specifications be revised from an inspection interval of 18 months to a maximum inspection interval of 30 months. The surveillances require that each emergency diesel generator be inspected by procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations. The

proposed increased inspection interval has been reviewed and concurred in by the emergency diesel generator's manufacturer. The proposed change would also delete the applicability of the extension provisions of Specification 4.0.2 from the surveillance.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists (10 CFR 50.92(c)). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with a proposed amendment would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee addressed the above three standards in the amendment application. In regard to the three standards, the licensee provided the following analysis.

The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the diesel generators are standby equipment which do not contribute to the occurrence of an accident. Extension of the surveillance frequency from 18 months to a maximum of 30 months does not change either the diesel-generator function or its operation. The proposal to increase monitoring of certain diesel-generator parameters will serve to identify adverse operating trends. The ability of the diesel-generators to respond and operate as required will not be degraded as concurred with by the manufacturer of the diesel-generators.

The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated since the diesel-generators cannot initiate an accident and no hardware changes are being made. On matters related to nuclear safety, all accidents are bounded by previous analysis and no new malfunctions are involved.

The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety since the assumptions in the licensee's Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) remain unchanged and the diesel-generators will continue to perform their function. Past experience with this class of equipment, the demonstrated reliability of the diesel-generators at Davis-Besse, and the

increased trending of the diesel-generator operating parameters to identify adverse operating trends will provide reasonable assurance that there will not be any significant degradation in diesel-generator reliability.

The staff has reviewed and agrees with the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination analysis. Therefore, based on its review, the staff proposes to determine that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room*  
*Location:* University of Toledo Library, Documents Department, 2801 Bancroft Avenue, Toledo, Ohio 43608.

*Attorney for licensee:* Gerald Charnoff, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

*NRC Project Director:* John N. Hannon  
**Toledo Edison Company and The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Docket No. 50-348, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1, Ottawa County, Ohio**

*Date of amendment request:* June 16, 1989 as revised August 21, 1989

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment would involve relocating the values of cycle-specific limits from the Technical Specifications to a new document entitled Core Operating Limits Report in accordance with NRC Generic Letter 88-16. The requirements to meet these limits and the associated Action Statements if limits are not met would be retained in the Technical Specifications.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The Commission has provided standards in 10 CFR 50.92(c) for determining whether a significant hazard exists. A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee has reviewed the proposed changes in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.92 and has determined that the request does not involve a significant hazard consideration.

The proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration because the operation of the Davis-

Besse Nuclear Power Station in accordance with these changes would:

1. Not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because there have been no hardware changes or design modifications which would affect the probability or the consequences of an accident. Dose consequences are unchanged. The relocation of the core operating limits to a new document does not affect the methodology of limit determination and is, therefore, an administrative change only.

2. Not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because there will be no hardware changes or design modifications which would create the possibility of a new accident.

3. Not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety because the operating limits will be determined using the same methodology as in previous core operating limit calculations.

The NRC staff has reviewed and agrees with the licensee's evaluation. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the proposed amendment involves no significant hazard consideration.

*Local Public Document Room*  
*Location:* University of Toledo Library, Documents Department, 2801 Bancroft Avenue, Toledo, Ohio 43608.

*Attorney for licensee:* Gerald Charnoff, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

*NRC Project Director:* John N. Hannon  
**Union Electric Company, Docket No. 50-483, Callaway Plant, Unit 1, Callaway County, Missouri**

*Date of amendment request:* August 2, 1989

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment would revise Technical Specification 3/4.3.3, Radiation Monitoring for Plant Operations, by increasing the permitted period of inoperability for one channel of the control room air intake monitors and the fuel building atmosphere monitors from 1 hour to 72 hours.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists as stated in 10 CFR 50.92. A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with a proposed amendment would not (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously

evaluated; (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee has provided the following analysis of no significant hazards considerations using the Commission's standards.

The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. In the proposed change, when a radiation monitor is allowed to be taken out of service, redundant operable radiation monitors are still in service. The monitors that remain in service provide the same signal to the same equipment and at the same setpoint as the monitor that is removed from service. The additional allowed outage time associated with this change is insignificant when compared to the probability of an event which requires actuation, coincident with a failure of the remaining operable detector. The proposed change does not affect the ability of the monitors to perform their intended safety function. Additionally, the current technical specifications allows one of the two safety trains of either system to be out of service for 7 days.

The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. There are no new failure modes or mechanisms associated with the proposed change. This change does not involve any modification in the operational limits or physical design of the involved systems. The change merely allows an extended time period for the diagnosis and repair of radiation monitoring systems, thus reducing the excessive use of the emergency exhaust systems for the control room and fuel building.

The proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. This change does not affect any technical specification margin of safety. This change allows appropriate actions commensurate with the significance of the monitor malfunction, provided the malfunction does not affect the capability of the monitors to perform their safety function.

Based on the previous discussions, the licensee concluded that the proposed amendment request does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; does not involve a reduction in the required margin of safety. The

staff has reviewed the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination and agrees with the licensee's analysis.

The staff, therefore, proposes to determine that the licensee's request does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Callaway County Public Library, 710 Court Street, Fulton, Missouri 65251 and the John M. Olin Library, Washington University, Skinker and Lindell Boulevards, St. Louis, Missouri 63130.

*Attorney for licensee:* Gerald Charnoff, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

*NRC Project Director:* John N. Hannon

Wisconsin Public Service Corporation, Docket No. 50-305, Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant, Kewaunee County, Wisconsin

*Date of amendment request:* July 14, 1989

*Description of amendment request:* The proposed amendment would revise the Technical Specifications (TS) to allow reduction of the frequency of turbine valve testing. An evaluation performed by Westinghouse Electric Corporation for the Westinghouse Owners Group Turbine Valve Test Frequency (TVTF) evaluation subgroup (WCAP-11525) provides justification for the proposed change.

The specific TS change proposed would include the following: (1) a replacement of the monthly surveillance requirement for turbine governor and stop valves with the variable surveillance frequency requirement consistent with WCAP-11525, not to exceed one year; (2) removal of the operational limitation waiver for the monthly surveillance on Table TS 4.1-3.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The Commission has provided standards (10 CFR 50.92(c)) for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists. A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

In regard to the proposed amendment, the licensee has determined the following:

1. The proposed amendment will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The referenced analysis as reported in WCAP-11525 provides an evaluation of the probability of turbine missile ejection for the purpose of justifying a reduction in the frequency of turbine valve testing. In a letter to Westinghouse Electric Corporation dated February 2, 1987 (C E Rossi, USNRC to J A Martin, Westinghouse), the commission established acceptable criteria for the probability of generating a turbine missile from an unfavorably oriented turbine (acceptable probability of missile generation [less than]  $1.0 \times 10^{-9}$ ). The evaluation in WCAP-11525 shows that the probability of a missile ejection incident for turbine valve test intervals of up to one year is significantly less than the established acceptance criteria. The small change in the probability of generating a turbine missile with longer turbine valve testing intervals does not represent a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed amendment will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed.

The proposed amendment decreases the frequency at which turbine valves are tested. The proposed amendment does not change the kind, number, or type of overspeed protection components available. Changing the frequency of turbine valve testing does not result in a significant change in the failure rate or change failure modes for the turbine valves. Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed.

3. The proposed amendment will not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

As noted above and as shown in WCAP-11525, this change to the Kewaunee Technical Specifications will not result in a significant reduction in the margin of safety for missile ejection. The probability of missile ejection remains acceptably small and within guidelines established by the NRC Staff.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's determination related to no significant hazards consideration and concurs with its finding.

On this basis, the Commission proposes to determine that the proposed amendment involves no significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:* University of Wisconsin Library Learning Center, 2420 Nicolet Drive, Green Bay, Wisconsin 54301.

*Attorney for licensee:* David Baker, Esq., Foley and Lardner, P.O. Box 2193 Orlando, Florida 31082.

*NRC Project Director:* John N. Hannon.

Wisconsin Electric Power Company, Docket No. 50-301, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 2, Town of Two Creeks, Manitowoc County, Wisconsin

*Date of amendment request:* August 8, 1989 as modified August 31, 1989.

*Description of amendment request:* The amendment would alter Technical Specification (TS) Table 15.3.1-2, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 2 Reactor Vessel Surveillance Capsule Removal Schedule, to change the capsule removal dates for capsules "P" and "S". The proposed change would accelerate the removal of the "S" capsule to the fall of 1990 and delay the removal of the "P" capsule until the fall of 1996. In addition, the bases section would be changed to reflect Point Beach's participation in the Babcock and Wilcox Master Integrated Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The Commission has provided standards in 10 CFR 50.92 for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists. A proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident previously evaluated; (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The proposed revisions to the surveillance capsule removal schedule are required to reflect flux reductions underway and Point Beach's participation in the BWOG's Master Integrated Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program. The revised surveillance capsule withdrawal schedule will provide reactor vessel materials data more representative of that predicted at End of Life (EOL) and 150% EOL. These changes also are required to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, and ASTM E185-82. The proposed changes to the surveillance capsule withdrawal schedule would have no bearing on the probability or consequences of an accident previously identified since it involves only a schedular change necessary to keep Point Beach in compliance with the regulations and does not involve any physical change or modification to the plant or associated facilities. For the same reason, the proposed changes cannot create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident than any accident previously identified.

Furthermore, the proposed changes do not involve a reduction in the margin of safety. Based on the above information, the staff proposes to determine that the proposed change to the TS does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Joseph P. Mann Library, 1516 Sixteenth Street, Two Rivers, Wisconsin.

*Attorney for licensee:* Gerald Charnoff, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

*NRC Project Director:* John N. Hannon.

**Yankee-Rowe Nuclear Power Corporation, Docket No. 50-029, Yankee-Rowe Nuclear Power Station, Boston, Massachusetts**

*Date of amendment request:* August 31, 1989

*Description of amendment request:*

The proposed amendment will incorporate into the Technical Specifications of Yankee Nuclear Power Station (YNPS) new operability and surveillance requirements for equipment installed to meet the criteria of Item II.F.1-1 of NUREG-0737, for the monitoring of noble gas in plant effluent, and to include the Main Steam Line Monitors.

*Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:* The Commission has provided standards for determining whether a significant hazards consideration exists (10 CFR 50.92(c)). A proposed amendment to an operating license for a facility involves no significant hazards considerations if operation of the facility in accordance with a proposed amendment would not: (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The licensee has evaluated the proposed amendment against the standards in 10 CFR 50.92 and has determined the following:

This change is requested in order to add requirements for the noble gas effluent monitoring equipment installed to meet the requirements for NUREG-0737, Item II.F.1-1. This change incorporates the operability and surveillance requirements for the approved equipment in conformance with Technical Specifications provided by the staff in Generic Letter 83-37. As such, this proposed change would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. This change

incorporates equipment used to assess plant conditions and designed to function during accident conditions. The installed equipment has been determined to conform to staff criteria. This change will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. This change is administrative in nature and incorporates limitations and surveillances modeled from staff guidance, the implementation of which will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident. The installed equipment is in response to the requirements of NUREG-0737.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As a new Technical Specification, there is no reduction in a margin of safety. The noble gas monitors are utilized to assess plant conditions, during and following an accident. These monitors are operable in Modes 1 through 4, but are not required for safe shutdown of the plant. In case of failure of the monitor, appropriate actions to be taken in a reasonable period of time have been delineated in accordance with staff criteria.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's no significant hazards consideration determination and agrees with the licensee's analysis. Based on this review, the staff therefore determines that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

*Local Public Document Room Location:* Brooks Memorial Library, 224 Main Street, Brattleboro, Vermont 05301.

*Attorney for Licensee:* John A. Ritscher, Ropes and Gray, 225 Franklin Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02110.

*NRC Project Director:* Richard H. Wessman

#### **NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE**

During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice, the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has determined for each of these amendments that the application complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment.

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License and Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination and Opportunity for Hearing in connection with these actions was published in the **Federal Register** as indicated. No request for a hearing or

petition for leave to intervene was filed following this notice.

Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in 10 CFR 51.12(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment, it is so indicated.

For further details with respect to the action see (1) the applications for amendments, (2) the amendments, and (3) the Commission's related letters, **Safety Evaluations and/or Environmental Assessments** as indicated. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document rooms for the particular facilities involved. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Reactor Projects.

**Arkansas Power & Light Company, Docket No. 50-313, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1, Pope County, Arkansas**

*Date of amendment request:* June 13, 1989

*Brief description of amendment:* The proposed amendment added a note to the Technical Specifications (TS) to clarify the meaning of TS 3.4.1.4 regarding the turbine driven emergency feedwater (EFW) pump operability determination prior to heating the reactor coolant system above 280° F.

*Date of issuance:* August 31, 1989

*Effective date:* August 31, 1989

*Amendment No.:* 125

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-51.* Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* July 26, 1989 (54 FR 31099) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 31, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Tomlinson Library, Arkansas Tech University, Russellville, Arkansas 72801

**Carolina Power & Light Company, Docket No. 50-281, H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2, Darlington County, South Carolina**

*Date of application for amendment:* April 27, 1989

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment adds surveillance requirements for testing of the molded case circuit breakers associated with the auxiliary feedwater valve V2-16A and service water system valve VG-16C.

*Date of issuance:* September 5, 1989

*Effective date:* September 5, 1989

*Amendment No. 123*

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-23.* Amendment revises the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal*

*Register:* June 14, 1989 (54 FR 25370) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 5, 1989

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room*

*location:* Hartsville Memorial Library, Home and Fifth Avenues, Hartsville, South Carolina 29535

**Carolina Power & Light Company, et al, Docket No. 50-480, Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Wake and Chatham Counties, North Carolina**

*Date of application for amendment:* April 11, 1989, as supplemented June 29, 1989.

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment would revise Technical Specification (TS) 5.3.1 by increasing the maximum allowed enrichment of stored fuel to 5.0 weight percent U-235 from 4.2 weight percent U-235. An additional requirement for storage would also be added to TS 5.6.1 to require that a maximum core geometry k-infinity for PWR fuel assemblies be less than or equal to 1.470 at 68° F. The amendment also contains an administrative correction for duplicate numbering in TS Section 5.6.1.

*Date of issuance:* August 31, 1989

*Effective date:* August 31, 1989

*Amendment No. 12*

*Facility Operating License No. NPF-63.* Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal*

*Register:* June 14, 1989 (54 FR 25370) The June 29, 1989, letter provided clarifying information that did not change the initial determination of no significant hazards consideration as published in the Federal Register.

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 31, 1989

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room*

*location:* Cameron Village Regional Library, 1930 Clark Avenue, Raleigh, North Carolina 27605.

**Commonwealth Edison Company, Docket Nos. 50-454 and 50-455, Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, Ogle County, Illinois**

*Date of application for amendments:* April 7, 1989

*Brief description of amendments:* These amendments revise the Technical Specifications to remove two motor-operated valves from Tables 3.8-2a and 3.8-2b.

*Date of issuance:* August 30, 1989

*Effective date:* August 30, 1989

*Amendment Nos.: 33, 33*

*Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-37 and NPF-66.* The amendments revised the Technical Specification.

*Date of initial notice in Federal*

*Register:* June 14, 1989 (54 FR 25371) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 30, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No.

*Local Public Document Room*

*location:* Rockford Public Library, 215 N. Wyman Street, Rockford, Illinois 61101.

**Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company, Docket No. 50-213, Haddam Neck Plant, Middlesex County, Connecticut**

*Date of application for amendment:* April 21, 1989.

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment revises and combines Technical Specification (TS) Section 3.6, "Core Cooling Systems," Section 3.7, "Minimum Water Volume and Boron Concentration in the Refueling Water Storage Tank," and Section 4.3, "Core Cooling Systems - Periodic Testing" into a new Technical Specification Section 3.6 titled "Emergency Core Cooling Systems." The amendment changes the custom TS format to Westinghouse Standard Technical Specification (WSTS) format.

*Date of Issuance:* September 5, 1989

*Effective date:* September 5, 1989

*Amendment No.: 121*

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-61.* Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal*

*Register:* May 31, 1989 (54 FR 23309) The Commission's related evaluation of this amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 5, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No.

*Local Public Document Room*

*location:* Russell Library, 123 Broad Street, Middletown, Connecticut 06457.

**Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company, Docket No. 50-213, Haddam Neck Plant, Middlesex County, Connecticut; Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al, Docket Nos. 50-240, 50-336 and 50-423, Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3, New London County, Connecticut:**

*Date of application for amendment:* May 25, 1989

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendments change the Technical Specifications (TS) as follows: (1) Sections 6.10.2.m (Haddam Neck, Millstone Unit Nos. 1 and 2) and 6.10.3 (Millstone Unit No. 3) are being added to the Records Retention section. This section requires lifetime retention of records of reviews performed for changes made to the Radiological Effluent Monitoring and Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (REMOCM) and the Process Control Program (PCP) and (2) Sections 6.17 (Haddam Neck), 6.15 (Millstone Unit Nos. 1 and 2), and 6.13 (Millstone Unit No. 3) are being changed to simplify the administrative controls for making changes to the Radiological Effluent Monitoring Manual (REMM).

*Date of Issuance:* September 7, 1989

*Effective date:* September 7, 1989

*Amendment Nos.: 122, 24, 143, 40*

*Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-61, DPR-21, DPR-65 and NPF-49.* Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal*

*Register:* July 26, 1989 (54 FR 31104) The Commission's related evaluation of this amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 7, 1989

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No.

*Local Public Document Room*

*location:* Russell Library, 123 Broad Street, Middletown, Connecticut 06457, and Waterford Public Library, 49 Rope Ferry Road, Waterford, Connecticut 06385.

**Duquesne Light Company, Docket No. 50-412, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2, Shippingport, Pennsylvania**

*Date of application for amendment:* June 22, 1989

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment raises the maximum allowed service water (river water) temperature from 86° F to 89° F. The amendment also revises a number of requirements associated with this change.

*Date of issuance:* August 30, 1989

*Effective date:* August 30, 1989

*Amendment No. 20*

*Facility Operating License No. NPF-73.* Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

**Date of initial notice in Federal Register:** July 26, 1989 (54 FR 31105) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 30, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

**Local Public Document Room location:** B. F. Jones Memorial Library, 663 Franklin Avenue, Aliquippa, Pennsylvania 15001.

**Florida Power Corporation, et al., Docket No. 50-302, Crystal River Unit No. 3 Nuclear Generating Plant, Citrus County, Florida**

**Date of application for amendment:** December 23, 1988, as supplemented July 12, 1989

**Brief description of amendment:** The amendment allows for the storage of fuel up to 4.5% of enrichment in both the dry fuel storage racks and storage pool A.

**Date of issuance:** August 31, 1989

**Effective date:** August 31, 1989

**Amendment No.:** 119

**Facility Operating License No. DPR-72.** Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

**Date of initial notice in Federal Register:** February 8, 1989 (54 FR 6194) The July 12, 1989 letter provided supplemental information which did not change the staff's initial determination of no significant hazards considerations.

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in an Environmental Assessment dated August 22, 1989, and in a Safety Evaluation dated August 31, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No.

**Local Public Document Room location:** Crystal River Public Library, 668 N.W. First Avenue, Crystal River, Florida 32629

**GPU Nuclear Corporation, et al., Docket No. 50-289, Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania**

**Date of application for amendment:** June 13, 1989

**Brief description of amendment:** Removes list of containment penetration valves to be leak tested from the Technical Specifications and makes other administrative changes related to 10 CFR 50 Appendix J.

**Date of Issuance:** August 31, 1989

**Effective date:** August 31, 1989

**Amendment No.:** 151

**Facility Operating License No. DPR-50.** Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

**Date of initial notice in Federal Register:** July 26, 1989 (54 FR 31106) The Commission's related evaluation of this

amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 31, 1989

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No.

**Local Public Document Room location:** Government Publications Section, State Library of Pennsylvania, Walnut Street and Commonwealth Avenue, Box 1601, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17105.

**Louisiana Power and Light Company, Docket No. 50-382, Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana**

**Date of amendment request:** June 12, 1989

**Brief description of amendment:** The amendment revised the Technical Specifications by increasing the quarterly channel calibrations to monthly on the waste gas holdup system explosive gas monitoring system.

**Date of issuance:** August 29, 1989

**Effective date:** August 29, 1989

**Amendment No.:** 56

**Facility Operating License No. NPF-38.** Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

**Date of initial notice in Federal Register:** July 12, 1989 (54 FR 29406) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 29, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No.

**Local Public Document Room location:** University of New Orleans Library, Louisiana Collection, Lakefront, New Orleans, Louisiana 70122.

**Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Docket No. 50-220, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1, Oswego County, New York**

**Date of application for amendment:** April 25, 1989, as supplemented June 16, 1989

**Brief description of amendment:** This amendment revised the Technical Specifications which contain cycle-specific parameter limits by replacing the values of those limits with a reference to a Core Operating Limits Report for the values of those limits. These changes are in accordance with Generic Letter 88-16. The licensee's June 16, 1989 submittal amended the April 25, 1989 submittal. However, the changes did not change the intent of the original submittal and were more conservative. Specifically, revisions to pages 11 and 64 were deleted because changes to the Linear Heat Generation Rate (LHGR) parameters were not included in Generic Letter 88-16. Therefore, the current Specification remains in place. In addition, the submittal made editorial changes to include the words "latest

approved revision" for referenced documents. This clarifies that only NRC approved documents are used. Section 6.9.2.f was also reformatted. In addition, the words "its supplements and revisions" were deleted from the definition of the Core Operating Limits Report. Because the changes did not change the intent of the original submittal and were made only to clarify the intent, the action was not renoticed.

**Date of issuance:** August 21, 1989

**Effective date:** August 21, 1989

**Amendment No.:** 109

**Facility Operating License No. DPR-63.** Amendment revises the Technical Specifications.

**Date of initial notice in Federal Register:** May 31, 1989 (54 FR 23317) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 21, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

**Local Public Document Room location:** Reference and Documents Department, Penfield Library, State University of New York, Oswego, New York 13126.

**Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al., Docket No. 50-423, Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, New London County, Connecticut**

**Date of application for amendment:** April 20, 1989

**Brief description of amendment:** The amendment changes the Millstone Unit 3 Technical Specifications (TS) to allow storage of fuel with an enrichment of up to 5.0 nominal weight percent U-235 as follows: (1) Section 1.0, "Definitions," is changed by adding new TS 1.40 and 1.41 to define the fuel regional storage pattern, (2) A new TS 3/4.9.13 "Spent Fuel Pool - Reactivity," is added to limit the fuel  $K_{eff}$  to less than or equal to .95, (3) A new TS 3/4.9.14, "Spent Fuel Pool - Storage Pattern," is added to implement the fuel storage pattern, (4) TS 5.6.1.1, "Criticality" is changed and expanded to address the storage of fuel utilizing a regional storage system, and (5) A new TS 5.6.3, "Capacity" is added to address the use of cell blocking devices in the storage of fuel. In addition to the above, TS 5.6.1.2, is deleted.

**Date of issuance:** August 29, 1989

**Effective date:** August 29, 1989

**Amendment No.:** 39

**Facility Operating License No. NPF-49.** Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

**Date of initial notice in Federal Register:** May 17, 1989 (54 FR 21313) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 29, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Waterford Public Library, 40 Rope Ferry Road, Waterford, Connecticut 06385.

**Pennsylvania Power and Light Company, Docket No. 58-300**  
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 2, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania

*Date of application for amendment:* June 19, 1989

*Brief description of amendment:* One-time change to Technical Specification section 4.0.2.b extending combined three consecutive surveillance intervals limit.

*Date of issuance:* August 28, 1989

*Effective date:* August 28, 1989

*Amendment No.:* 57

*Facility Operating License No. NPF-22.* This amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* July 26, 1989 (54 FR 31112) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 28, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room location:* Osterhout Free Library, Reference Department, 71 South Franklin Street, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania 18701.

**Philadelphia Electric Company, Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Delmarva Power and Light Company, and Atlantic City Electric Company, Docket Nos. 58-277 and 58-278, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3, York County, Pennsylvania**

*Date of application for amendments:* December 28, 1988

*Brief description of amendments:* These amendments revised the minimum count rate required on the source range monitors for refueling.

*Date of issuance:* August 28, 1989

*Effective date:* August 28, 1989

*Amendments Nos.:* 147 and 149

*Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56:* Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* June 28, 1989 (54 FR 27232) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 28, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room location:* Government Publications Section, State Library of Pennsylvania, Education Building, Commonwealth and Walnut Streets, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17126

**Power Authority of The State of New York, Docket No. 58-286, Indian Point Unit No. 3, Westchester County, New York**

*Date of application for amendment:* August 16, 1988

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment revises the Technical Specifications to conform to the Standard Technical Specifications related to Monthly Operating Reports including the reporting of relief and safety valve challenges on a monthly rather than an annual basis.

*Date of issuance:* September 5, 1989

*Effective date:* September 5, 1989

*Amendment No.:* 88

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-64:* Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* November 16, 1988 (53 FR 46159) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 5, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room location:* White Plains Public Library, 100 Martine Avenue, White Plains, New York, 10610.

**Power Authority of the State of New York, Docket No. 50-333, James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Oswego County, New York**

*Date of application for amendment:* April 24, 1988.

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment identifies the high pressure water fire protection system boundary as the hose station riser isolation valve and removes the reference that the valves are located near water flow alarms.

*Date of issuance:* September 5, 1989

*Effective date:* September 5, 1989

*Amendment No.:* 135

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-59:* Amendment revised the Technical Specification.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* June 14, 1988 (54 FR 25375) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 5, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room location:* Penfield Library, State University College of Oswego, Oswego, New York.

**Power Authority of the State of New York, Docket No. 50-333, James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Oswego County, New York**

*Date of application for amendment:* May 19, 1989

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment corrects certain errors in Tables 4.1-1, 4.1-2 and 4.2-1.

*Date of issuance:* September 5, 1989

*Effective date:* September 5, 1989

*Amendment No.:* 136

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-59:* Amendment revised the Technical Specification.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* June 28, 1989 (54 FR 27232) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 5, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room location:* Penfield Library, State University College of Oswego, Oswego, New York.

**Power Authority of the State of New York, Docket No. 50-333, James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant, Oswego County, New York**

*Date of application for amendment:* May 19, 1989

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment replaces organization charts in Section 6 with more general organizational requirements.

*Date of issuance:* September 7, 1989

*Effective date:* September 7, 1989

*Amendment No.:* 137

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-59:* Amendment revised the Technical Specification.

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* June 28, 1989 (54 FR 27237) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 7, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room location:* Penfield Library, State University College of Oswego, Oswego, New York.

**Public Service Company of Colorado, Docket No. 50-267, Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station, Platteville, Colorado**

*Date of amendment request:* June 9, 1989

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment effectively requires reactor shutdown after June 30, 1990 (Reactor power is limited to 2 percent of full power.)

*Date of issuance:* August 30, 1989

*Effective date:* August 30, 1989

**Amendment No. 72**

**Facility Operating License No. DPR-34.** Amendment revised the license.

**Date of initial notice in Federal Register:** July 26, 1989 (54 FR 31118) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 30, 1989.

**No significant hazards consideration comments received:** No.

**Local Public Document Room location:** Greeley Public Library, City Complex Building, Greeley, Colorado

**Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Docket No. 50-354, Hope Creek Generating Station, Salem County, New Jersey**

**Date of application for amendment:** June 6, 1989

**Brief description of amendment:** The amendment request increased the hydrostatic test pressure for containment isolation valves provided with a water seal from the suppression pool, clearly defined as-left penetration leakage for these same valves, and deleted an incorrect cross-reference.

**Date of issuance:** August 28, 1989

**Effective date:** Upon the date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days of the date of issuance.

**Amendment No. 32**

**Facility Operating License No. NPF-57.** This amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

**Date of initial notice in Federal Register:** July 26, 1989 (54 FR 31118) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 28, 1989

**No significant hazards consideration comments received:** No

**Local Public Document Room location:** Pennsville Public Library, 190 S. Broadway, Pennsville, New Jersey 08070

**Public Service Electric & Gas Company, Docket Nos. 50-272 and 50-311, Salem Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Salem County, New Jersey**

**Date of application for amendments:** September 12, 1988 and supplemented on March 3, 1989 and June 8, 1989. The March 3, 1989 supplemental letter provided revised pages to correct administrative errors in the original submittal and the Index. The June 8, 1989 supplemental letter clarified the action statements.

**Brief description of amendments:** Added Technical Specifications for reactor vessel head vents in accordance with the requirements of Generic Letter 83-37, NUREG-0737 Technical Specifications, dated November 1, 1983.

**Date of issuance:** August 28, 1989

**Effective date:** Units 1 and 2 As of the date of issuance and implemented within 45 days of the date of issuance.

**Amendment Nos. 101 and 78**

**Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75.** These amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

**Date of initial notice in Federal Register:** February 22, 1989 (54 FR 7645) and July 26, 1989 (54 FR 31119) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendments is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 28, 1989.

**No significant hazards consideration comments received:** No

**Local Public Document Room location:** Salem Free Public Library, 112 West Broadway, Salem, New Jersey 08079

**Southern California Edison Company, et al., Docket No. 50-206, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 1, San Diego County, California**

**Date of application for amendment:** April 11, 1989

**Brief description of amendment:** The amendment reissues the Technical Specifications in their entirety.

**Date of issuance:** August 21, 1989

**Effective date:** This license amendment is effective the date of issuance and must be fully implemented no later than 30 days from date of issuance.

**Amendment No. 130**

**Provisional Operating License No. DPR-13.** Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

**Date of initial notice in Federal Register:** May 3, 1989 (54 FR 18961). The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 21, 1989.

**No significant hazards consideration comments received:** No comments.

**Local Public Document Room location:** General Library, University of California, Post Office Box 19557, Irvine, California 92713.

**System Energy Resources, Inc., et al., Docket No. 50-416, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Claiborne County, Mississippi**

**Date of application for amendment:** December 2, 1988

**Brief description of amendment:** The proposed amendment changes Technical Specification 3/4.9.6.3, Fuel Handling Platform, by adding surveillance requirements for a second auxiliary hoist and by changing the name of the original auxiliary hoist to "monorail auxiliary hoist".

**Date of issuance:** August 31, 1989

**Effective date:** August 31, 1989

**Amendment No. 61**

**Facility Operating License No. NPF-29.** This amendment revises the Technical Specifications.

**Date of initial notice in Federal Register:** February 1, 1989 (54 FR 5169) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 31, 1989

**No significant hazards consideration comments received:** No

**Local Public Document Room location:** Hinds Junior College, McLendon Library, Raymond, Mississippi 39154

**System Energy Resources, Inc., et al., Docket No. 50-416, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Claiborne County, Mississippi**

**Date of application for amendment:** December 18, 1988, as revised February 24, 1989.

**Brief description of amendment:** The amendment changes the Technical Specifications (TS) by deleting TS 3/4.3.10, Neutron Flux Monitoring Instrumentation, and modifying TS 3/4.4.1, Recirculation System. Figure 3.4.1.1-1, Power Flow Operating Map, is changed to redefine flow stability regions. TS 3/4.4.1 is changed to reflect the redefined regions of Figure 3.4.1.1-1. The Bases for TS 3/4.3.10 and TS 3/4.4.1 are changed to reflect the changes in these TS.

**Date of issuance:** August 31, 1989

**Effective date:** August 31, 1989

**Amendment No. 62**

**Facility Operating License No. NPF-29.** This amendment revises the Technical Specifications.

**Date of initial notice in Federal Register:** May 31, 1989 (54 FR 23324) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 31, 1989

**No significant hazards consideration comments received:** No

**Local Public Document Room location:** Hinds Junior College, McLendon Library, Raymond, Mississippi 39154

**Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation, Docket No. 50-271, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Vernon, Vermont**

**Date of application for amendment:** February 2, 1989

**Brief description of amendment:** This amendment modifies the Technical Specifications on Primary Containment Isolation Valve Testing in the Head Spray Subsystem of Residual Heat Removal System.

**Date of issuance:** September 7, 1989

**Effective date:** September 7, 1989

**Amendment No. 115**

**Facility Operating License No. DPR-28. Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.**

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* July 28, 1989 (54 FR 31120) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 7, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room location:* Brooks Memorial Library, 224 Main Street, Brattleboro, Vermont 05301.

**Virginia Electric and Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-280 and 50-281, Surry Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Surry County, Virginia.**

*Date of application for amendments:* April 6, 1989

*Brief description of amendments:* These amendments add requirements to perform full flow testing of the inside recirculation spray pumps (IRSPs) each refueling outage. In addition, the amendments require a visual inspection of the containment sumps each refueling outage and after major maintenance of the IRSP to verify sump component integrity and the absence of foreign debris.

The licensee's request to change the dry rotation testing on the IRSPs from monthly to quarterly was also requested in an earlier amendment application and was approved in Amendment Nos. 128 and 128 dated May 24, 1989.

*Date of issuance:* August 28, 1989

*Effective date:* August 28, 1989

*Amendment Nos. 132 & 132*

*Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37: Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.*

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* May 17, 1989 (54 FR 2317) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 28, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room location:* Swem Library, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia 23185

**Yankee Atomic Electric Company, Docket No. 50-029, Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Franklin County, Massachusetts**

*Date of application for amendment:* October 21, 1988 and as supplemented on November 22, 1988

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment modifies two descriptions within the Technical Specification, Section 2, Bases, to be consistent with present safety analysis and to remove the operability requirement associated

with the High Pressurizer Water Level instrument.

*Date of issuance:* August 31, 1989

*Effective date:* August 31, 1989

*Amendment No.:* 123

**Facility Operating License No. DPR-28: Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.**

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* December 14, 1988 (53 FR 50336) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated August 31, 1989

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room location:* Greenfield Community College, 1 College Drive, Greenfield, Massachusetts 01301

**Yankee Atomic Electric Company, Docket No. 50-029, Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Franklin County, Massachusetts**

*Date of application for amendment:* March 11, 1988

*Brief description of amendment:* The amendment modifies the Technical Specifications by removing the onsite and offsite facility organization charts from Section 6.0.

*Date of issuance:* September 7, 1989

*Effective date:* September 7, 1989

*Amendment No.:* 124

**Facility Operating License No. DPR-28: Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.**

*Date of initial notice in Federal Register:* April 6, 1988 (53 FR 11379) The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment is contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 7, 1989.

*No significant hazards consideration comments received:* No

*Local Public Document Room location:* Greenfield Community College, 1 College Drive, Greenfield, Massachusetts 01301.

**NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE AND FINAL DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HEARING (EXIGENT OR EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES)**

During the period since publication of the last biweekly notice, the Commission has issued the following amendments. The Commission has determined for each of these amendments that the application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations.

The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment.

Because of exigent or emergency circumstances associated with the date the amendment was needed, there was not time for the Commission to publish, for public comment before issuance, its usual 30-day Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment and Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination and Opportunity for a Hearing. For exigent circumstances, the Commission has either issued a Federal Register notice providing opportunity for public comment or has used local media to provide notice to the public in the area surrounding a licensee's facility of the licensee's application and of the Commission's proposed determination of no significant hazards consideration. The Commission has provided a reasonable opportunity for the public to comment, using its best efforts to make available to the public means of communication for the public to respond quickly, and in the case of telephone comments, the comments have been recorded or transcribed as appropriate and the licensee has been informed of the public comments.

In circumstances where failure to act in a timely way would have resulted, for example, in derating or shutdown of a nuclear power plant or in prevention of either resumption of operation or of increase in power output up to the plant's licensed power level, the Commission may not have had an opportunity to provide for public comment on its no significant hazards determination. In such case, the license amendment has been issued without opportunity for comment. If there has been some time for public comment but less than 30 days, the Commission may provide an opportunity for public comment. If comments have been requested, it is so stated. In either event, the State has been consulted by telephone whenever possible.

Under its regulations, the Commission may issue and make an amendment immediately effective, notwithstanding the pendency before it of a request for a hearing from any person, in advance of the holding and completion of any required hearing, where it has determined that no significant hazards consideration is involved.

The Commission has applied the standards of 10 CFR 50.92 and has made a final determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The basis for this determination is contained in the

documents related to this action. Accordingly, the amendments have been issued and made effective as indicated.

Unless otherwise indicated, the Commission has determined that these amendments satisfy the criteria for categorical exclusion in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared for these amendments. If the Commission has prepared an environmental assessment under the special circumstances provision in 10 CFR 51.12(b) and has made a determination based on that assessment, it is so indicated.

For further details with respect to the action see (1) the application for amendment, (2) the amendment to Facility Operating License, and (3) the Commission's related letter, Safety Evaluation and/or Environmental Assessment, as indicated. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the local public document room for the particular facility involved.

A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Reactor Projects.

The Commission is also offering an opportunity for a hearing with respect to the issuance of the amendments. By October 20, 1989, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and petitions for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's "Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings" in 10 CFR Part 2. If a request for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition and the Secretary or the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding and how that interest may be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition

should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following factors: (1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of the Board up to fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy the specificity requirements described above.

Not later than fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing conference scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions which are sought to be litigated in the matter, and the bases for each contention set forth with reasonable specificity. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under consideration. A petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.

Since the Commission has made a final determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, if a hearing is requested, it will not stay the effectiveness of the amendment. Any hearing held would take place while the amendment is in effect.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, by the above date. Where petitions are filed during the last ten (10) days of the notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform the

Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at 1-(800) 328-6900 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union operator should be given Datagram Identification Number 3737 and the following message addressed to (Project Director): petitioner's name and telephone number; date petition was mailed; plant name; and publication date and page number of this Federal Register notice. A copy of the petition should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to the attorney for the licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding officer or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, that the petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).

Commonwealth Edison Company,  
Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-285, Quad  
Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1  
and 2, Rock Island County, Illinois

*Date of application for amendments:*  
August 28, 1989

*Description of amendments request:*  
These amendments will permit the "B" Loop of the RHR heat exchanger on each unit to be fed from the RHR "C" and "D" service water pumps from Unit 1 via the cross-tie line until November 1, 1989.

*Date of issuance:* September 1, 1989

*Effective date:* September 1, 1989

*Amendment No.:* 119, 115

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-29 and DPR-30:* Amendments revised the Technical Specifications.

*Public comments requested as to proposed no significant hazards consideration:* No

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment, finding of emergency circumstances, final determination of no significant hazards consideration are contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 1, 1989.

*Attorney for licensee:* Michael Miller, Esq., Sidley and Austin, One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois 60603.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Dixon Public Library, 221 Hennepin Avenue, Dixon Illinois 61021.

*NRC Acting Project Director:* Paul C. Shamanaki

**Indiana Michigan Power Company,  
Docket No. 50-315 Donald C. Cook  
Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 1 Berrien  
County, Michigan**

*Date of application for amendment:*  
September 1, 1989

*Brief description of amendment:* This amendment would modify TS 3/4.7.8 (snubbers) such that functional testing of a snubber installed on the pressurizer spray line may be delayed until the next time the unit is brought to Mode 5, or in conjunction with the ice condenser, ice basket surveillance, whichever occurs first.

*Date of issuance:* September 6, 1989

*Effective date:* September 6, 1989

*Amendment No.:* 128

*Facility Operating License No. DPR-58.* Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

*Public comments requested as to proposed no significant hazards consideration.* No.

The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment, finding of emergency circumstances, and final determination of no significant hazards consideration are contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 6, 1989.

*Attorney for licensee:* Gerald Charnoff, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, NW., Washington, DC 20037.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Maude Preston Palenske Memorial Library, 500 Market Street, St. Joseph, Michigan 49085.

*NRC Project Director:* John O. Thoma, Acting

**Washington Public Power Supply  
System, et al., Docket No. 50-397,  
Nuclear Project, No. 2, Benton County,  
Washington**

*Date of application for amendment:*  
September 8, 1989

*Brief description of amendment:* This amendment revises Technical Specification Table 3.3.1-2, "Reactor Protection System Response Times," by changing the response time for Functional Unit 2.b Flow Biased Simulated Thermal Power - Upscale. Prior to the amendment request, the response time specified for this parameter was to be less than or equal to 0.09 seconds with a footnote which declared that this limit is "not including simulated thermal power time constant, 6 27 1 seconds." As amended, the limit for the parameter is 6 27 1 seconds and the footnote reads: "Including simulated thermal power time constant."

*Date of issuance:* September 8, 1989

*Effective date:* This license

amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

*Amendment No.:* 73

*Facility Operating License No. NPF-21:* Amendment revised the Technical Specifications.

*Public Comment requested as to proposed no significant hazards consideration:* No. The Commission's related evaluation of the amendment, finding of emergency circumstances, consultation with the State of Washington, and final determination of no significant hazards consideration are contained in a Safety Evaluation dated September 8, 1989.

*Attorneys for licensee:* Nicholas S. Reynolds, Esq., Bishop, Cook, Purcell Reynolds, 1400 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20005-3502 and Mr. G. E. Doupe, Esq., Washington Public Power Supply System, P.O. Box 968, 3000 George Washington Way, Richland, Washington 99352.

*Local Public Document Room location:* Richland City Library, Swift and Northgate Streets, Richland, Washington 99352.

*NRC Project Director:* George Knighton

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 13th day of September 1989.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Gus C. Lainas,

*Acting Director, Division of Reactor Projects-  
I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation*  
[Doc. 89-22077 Filed 9-19-89; 8:45 am]

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