

Indian Point 3
Nuclear Power Plant
P.O. Box 215
Buchanan, New York 10511
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**New York Power
Authority**

William A. Josiger
Resident Manager

August 21, 1987
WAJ-87-048Z
MPC-87-084B

Docket No. 50-286
License No. DPR-64

Mr. William F. Kane, Director
Division of Reactor Projects
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

SUBJECT: Cycle 5/6 Refueling Outage
Work Activities Status

Dear Mr. Kane:

During the course of the Safety System Outage Modification Inspection, the need to complete additional work activities during the Cycle 5/6 refueling outage was identified. The Authority has taken an aggressive approach toward resolving these work items.

We have documented in the attachment to this letter a summary of the work activities which you and your staff are interested.

We are currently scheduled to begin heating the plant for return to operation on or about August 22, 1987.

Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. M. Cass of my staff.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "W. A. Josiger".

William A. Josiger
Resident Manager
Indian Point Unit 3 Nuclear Power Plant

WAJ-MPC:lg

Attachment

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cc: Document Control Desk (original)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Resident Inspector's Office
Indian Point 3
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
P.O. Box 337
Buchanan, NY 10511

ATTACHMENT

Status of Cycle 5/6 Refueling Outage Work
Associated with the Safety System Outage
Modification Inspection

1. The Authority performed an alignment and flow balance test on the Service Water System essential header. This test, ENG-281, was conducted on August 11 and 12. During the test, various valves were throttled to provide the proper flow distribution throughout the system including the safety related loads on the essential header.
2. Data taken during the performance of ENG-281 has been provided to our consultant and utilized to benchmark and revise the analytical model of the Service Water System. This effort has been completed.
3. The Authority has completed modifications to the Diesel Generator Service Water outlet flow control valves. These modifications eliminated all automatic actuation features for these valves and established a fixed Service Water flow rate through the Diesel Generator jacket water and lube oil coolers which conforms with the cooling demands of the diesels during emergency operations. The positions of these valves were established and set during the conduct of the Service Water Flow Test, ENG-281.
4. The Service Water System flow test, ENG-281, also demonstrated the response of the Service Water System essential header to a simulated Loss-of-Coolant Accident and its attendant Service Water flow demands. This portion of the test included the effects of a loss of instrument air on the flow control systems of all components supplied by the essential header. This portion of the test confirmed that the Containment Fan Cooler Units Service Water flow requirements are achieved.
5. The Authority has drafted revisions to the appropriate Emergency Operating Procedures to ensure proper operation of the Service Water System non-essential header during the transition to the recirculation phase following a loss-of-coolant accident. These procedure changes are designed to minimize the potential for pump run out on the non-essential header during the process of realigning the Service Water System for long term post LOCA cooling. All EOP's are scheduled to be reviewed by the Plant Operating Review Committee prior to heatup.

6. Alarm Response Procedure ARP-5 has been revised to reflect the appropriate Service Water flow requirements for the Fan Cooler Units. Operating procedure SOP-RW-6, Fan Cooler Unit Flow, has been eliminated. The provisions of this procedure, including future manipulations of the Fan Cooler Unit Service Water outlet valves, will be performed in accordance with a performance test which will ensure the proper Service Water flow balance between the Fan Cooler Units.
7. The 480v power cable terminations for seven safety related motors have been rebuilt. The splices for the five (5) Fan Cooler Unit motors and two (2) Residual Heat Removal Pump Motors have been made up using procedures and material which provide for a qualified splice. The splices for the two (2) Recirculation Pump motors will be rebuilt prior to exceeding cold shutdown. The appropriate qualification documentation for these splice designs will be on file to support plant heatup.
8. All standard Vulkene SIS cable subject to a harsh environment had been previously replaced with appropriately qualified cable or qualified for the environment in which it must operate. With respect to this concern, a field walkdown identified only one installation utilizing standard Vulkene cable involving four short pieces of wire. The harsh environment which this cable could be subject to is not LOCA induced. The cable could be exposed to elevated temperature and humidity for a short duration. The qualification of the cable for this particular installation has been established.
9. The environmental qualification for low voltage splices and RTV-7403 field installations has been established and is on file at the plant. Records which document the construction of low voltage splices and link the field splice to appropriate qualification documents have been reorganized and enhanced. The Authority has confirmed the acceptability of the RTV-7403 installations at Indian Point 3 through tests and has identified independent qualification documentation supporting installations at the plant. The environmental qualification of the No. 32 Residual Heat Removal pump motor, which was installed during the current outage, has been established. The documentation which includes the results of a material history search for the motor will be on file at the plant to support heatup.
10. A field walkdown of the equipment on the Environmental Qualification Master List has been completed. Discrepancies in equipment installation and condition were identified, documented, and classified. Those discrepancies which could potentially impact the qualification of the environmentally qualified equipment have been corrected. Details of the discrepancies identified during the field walkdown and the associated corrective actions are documented and available for review by the Resident Inspector.