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March 23, 1981
IPN-81-21

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attention: Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 1
Division of Licensing

Subject: Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant
Docket No. 50-286

I. E. Bulletin No. 80-06
Reset of Engineered Safety Features Controls



Dear Sir:

The enclosed Attachment I addresses the clarification of the Power Authority's response (letter No. IPN-80-57, dated June 17, 1980), given to the I. E. Bulletin No. 80-06 "Reset of Engineered Safety Features Controls", for Item Three (3).

This response is given in accordance with our conference telephone call of March 2, 1981.

Very truly yours,

J. P. Bayne
Senior Vice President
Nuclear Generator

cc: Mr. T. Rebelowski
Resident Inspector
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ATTACHMENT I

I.E. BULLETIN NO. 80-06

RESET OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES CONTROLS

CLARIFICATION OF RESPONSE TO ITEM 3

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
INDIAN POINT 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
DOCKET NO. 50-286
MARCH 23 , 1981

ITEM 3

If any safety-related equipment does not remain in its emergency mode upon reset of an ESF signal at your facility, describe proposed system modifications, design change, or other corrective action planned to resolve the problem.

RESPONSE

The existing operating procedures require the operator to place the equipment in such a mode that the resetting action will not affect the ESF system operation.

CLARIFICATION

Plant Emergency Procedure, PEP-ES-1, Emergency Core Cooling System Actuation describes the actions which automatically occur when the engineered safeguards are automatically actuated. These actions are independent of the nature of the cause. Further, it tells the operator how to verify proper occurrences, remedy failures, and identify the accident. It also tells the operator what actions are required of him.

In paragraph 4.7, the requirements for re-establishing the auxiliary equipment are established for the operator. In part it states: "Prior to resetting the engineered safeguards signal, set the control switches as specified to prevent the valves or dampers from moving out of their required position when the engineered safeguards signal is reset.

1. Set the control switches for the Containment Fan Cooler units' bypass damper C to the close position (flow valves 1294, 1297, 1300, 1303 and 1306).
2. Set the control switches for the Containment Fan Cooler units' charcoal filter damper) to the open position (flow valves 1295, 1298, 1301, 1304 and 1307).
3. Set the control switches for the Containment Fan Cooler units' normal flow path inlet dampers A and 8 to the close position (flow valves 1293, 1296, 1299, 1302 and 1305).
4. Set the control switches for the Containment Fan Cooler units' service water bypass outlet temperature control valves to the open position (TCV-1104 and TVC-1105).
5. Have the NPO set the control switches for the service water flow control valves to the diesels (FCV-1176 and 1176A) to the open position. These switches are located in the Diesel Building.

6. Set the control switches for boron injection tank recirculation isolation valves 1851A and 1851B to the close position.

The positioning of the control switches specified in the above paragraph places the Containment Cooling Water Valves SOV-1170 and SOV-1171, the Diesel Generator Cooling Water Valves SOV-1276 and SOV-1276A, the Containment Recirculation Air Unit Dampers, and the Boron Injection Tank Recirculation Isolation Valves 1851A and 1851B in such a mode that the resetting action will not affect the Engineered Safeguard Features System operation."

CONTAINMENT SPRAY

Valves 876A (Train 1) and 876B (Train 2) open two (2) minutes after actuation of the Containment Spray System and will close upon system reset of the Containment Spray System. This item was identified in the response to the Commission on Electrical Override/Bypass Aspects of ESF on October 23, 1980, Letter Number IPN-80-95. This response also provided the proposed modification to the circuitry of Valves 876A and 876B to prevent the valves from changing position upon reset of the Containment Spray System. This modification will be installed during the next scheduled outage of sufficient duration to complete the modification.

EMERGENCY POWER

Plant Emergency Procedure No. PEP-ES-1, Emergency Core Cooling System Actuation, paragraph 4.7 cautions the operator about loading the Diesel Generators if they are supplying the 480 volt buses. In part it states, "Extreme care must be exercised while adding loads. The normal maximum rating of each emergency diesel generator is 1750 KW. The loading may be increased to 1950 KW if the Shift Supervisor so approves. Diesel loading is indicated on the safeguards panel. Refer to Table 1 for various emergency diesel generator load ratings while adding loads." In addition to the above cautions, this procedure will be revised to include an item that informs the operator that when the Engineered Safeguard Features Actuation Signal is reset the overcurrent and reverse power trip contacts are re-established in the trip circuitry of the Diesel Generators.

As a result of the engineering review performed on the Diesel Generator tripping circuits, the circuitry will be modified to ensure that upon reset of an Engineered Safeguards Features actuation signal the Generator Breaker will not trip if either an overcurrent or reverse power condition exists at time of reset. This modification will be installed during the next scheduled outage of sufficient duration to complete the modification.