POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

10 COLUMBUS CIRCLE

NEW YORK, N. Y. 10019

(212) 397-6200

TRUSTEES

JOHNS DYSON
CHAIRMAN

GEORGEL INGALLS
VICE CHAIRMAN

RICHARDAM, FLYNN

ROBERT MILLONZI

FREDERICK R. CHARK



November 26, 1980 IPN-80-112

GEORGE T. BERRY
PRESIDENT & CHIEF
OPERATING OFFICER

JOHN W. BOSTON

EXECUTIVE VICE

PRESIDENT & DIRECTOR

OF POWER OPERATIONS

JOSEPH R. SCHMIEDER EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT & CHIEF ENGINEER

LEROY W. SINCLAIR
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
& CHIEF FINANCIAL
OFFICER

THOMAS R. FREY
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT
& GENERAL COUNSEL

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Attention: Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief

Operating Reactors Branch No. 1

Division of Licensing

Subject:

Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant

Docket No. 50-286

Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFWS)

Minimum Flow Requirements

Dear Sir:

The purpose of this letter is to respond to your October 9, 1980 letter regarding minimum flow requirements for the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFWS). Your letter requested that the Authority demonstrate by analyses that an AFWS flow rate of 300 gpm will adequately remove decay heat and meet applicable criteria. Alternatively, minimum AFWS flow could be increased to 400 gpm by installing J-tubes on the feedring and resetting the throttle position of the flow control valves.

As the result of a program to determine the causes of a November 13, 1973 feedwater-hammer incident, and to avert further similar incidents, J-tubes have already been installed on the Indian Point Unit 3 steam generator feedrings. These modifications were detailed in Consolidated Edison's March 12 and August 30, 1974 submittals to the NRC. Furthermore, in accordance with the Westinghouse Technical Bulletin NSD-TB-79-8, the installation of J-tubes obviates the need for procedural controls of AFW flow rates and permits timely recovery of SG water levels during transients.

The Authority will, therefore, increase the preset throttled position of the AFWS flow control valves to deliver 400 gpm total to at least two intact steam generators assuming the worst case single active failure. This increased flow rate will decrease the

A001

possibility of water hammer since the feedring will be less likely to become uncovered. It will also eliminate the need for operator action except in cases when the feedring becomes uncovered and appears it will remain uncovered for more than five minutes. This increased flowrate supports the Authority's August 11, 1980 AFWS analyses.

It is anticipated that these changes will be completed during the next outage.

Very truly yours,

J. P. Bayne

Senior Vice President Nuclear Generation

6. M. Wilverding

cc: Mr. T. Rebelowski Resident Inspector

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

P. O. Box 38

Buchanan, N. Y. 10511