ATTACHMENT I TO IPN-88-007 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS RELATED TO MAIN STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES

> NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY INDIAN POINT 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-286 DPR-64

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Amendment No. K. Jo. 1

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3:4 STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM

Applicability

Applies to the operating status of the Steam and Power Conversion System.

<u>Objective</u>

To define conditions of the turbine cycle steam-relieving capacity. Auxiliary Feedwater System operation is necessary to ensure the capability to remove decay heat from the core.

Specification

- A. The reactor shall not be heated above 350°F unless the following conditions are met:
 - (1) A minimum ASME Code approved steam-relieving capability of twenty (20) main steam valves shall be operable (except for testing). With up to three of the five main steam line safety valves per steam generator inoperable, heat-up above 350°F and power operation is permissible provided:

a) Within four hours,

the inoperable valve(s) is restored to operable status.

or

the Power Range Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoint is reduced per Table 3.4-1.

- b) Otherwise the reactor shall be in hot shutdown within the next six hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.
- (2) Three out of three auxiliary feedwater pumps must be operable.
- (3) A minimum of 360,000 gallons of water in the condensate storage tank.
- (4) System piping and valves directly associated with the above components operable.
- (5) The main steam stop valves are operable and capable of closing in five seconds or less.
- (6) Two steam generators capable of performing their heat transfer function.
- (7) City water system piping and valves directly associated with providing backup supply to the auxiliary feedwater pumps are operable.

- B. Except as modified by D. below, if during power operations any of the conditions of 3.4-A above, except Items (1) & (2), cannot be met within 48 hours, the operator shall start to shutdown and cool the reactor below 350°F using normal operation procedures. If Item (2) cannot be met within 72 hours, the reactor shall be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours.
- C. The gross turbine-generator electrical output at all times shall be within the limitation of Figure 3.4-1 or Figure 3.4-2 for the application conditions of turbine overspeed setpoint, number of operable low pressure steam dump lines, and condenser back pressure as noted thereon.
- D. The reactor shall not be heated above 350°F unless both valves in the single auxiliary feedwater supply line from the Condensate Storage Tank are open. If, during power operations, it is discovered that one or both of the valves are closed, the following action shall be taken:
 - 1) Immediately place the auxiliary feedwater system in the manual mode,
 - 2) Within one hour either:
 - a) reopen the closed valve(s),

or

b) open the valves to the alternate city water supply,

and

3) Once a water supply has been restored, return the system to the automatic mode.

If the above action cannot be taken, then:

a) maintain the plant in a safe stable mode which minimizes the potential for a reactor trip,

and

b) continue efforts to restore water supply to the auxiliary feedwater system,

and

c) notify the NRC within 24 hours regarding planned corrective action.

3.4-2

<u>Basis</u>

A reactor shutdown from power requires removal of core decay heat. Immediate decay heat removal requirements are normally satisfied by the steam bypass to the condensers. Thereafter, core decay heat can be continuously dissipated via the steam bypass to the condenser as feedwater in the steam generator is converted to steam by heat absorption. Normally, the capability to feed the steam generators is provided by operation of the turbine cycle feedwater system.

The twenty main steam safety valves have a total combined rated capability of 15,108,000 lbs/hr. The total full power steam flow is 12,974,500 lbs/hr. Therefore, twenty (20) main steam safety valves will be able to relieve the total steam flow if necessary. The total relieving capacity of the twenty main steam line safety valves is 116% of the total secondary steam flow at 100% rated power (3025 Mwt). The specified valve lift settings and relieving capacities are in accordance with the requirements of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code, 1971 Edition. The operability of the twenty main steam line safety valves ensure that the secondary system pressure will be limited to within 110% of the design pressure of 1085 psig during the most severe anticipated system operational transient.

Startup and/or power operation with inoperable main steam line safety valves is allowable within the limitations of Table 3.4-1. Operation with less than five safety valves operable for each steam generator is permissible if the reactor power level is limited to the relief capacity of the remaining safety valves. This is accomplished by restricting the reactor power level such that the energy transfer to the most limiting steam generator is not greater than the available relief capacity in that steam generator. The reduction in reactor power level is achieved by reducing the power range neutron flux high setpoint. The reactor trip setpoint reductions are derived on the following basis:

$$SP = (X) - (Y) (V) \times (109)$$

X

Where:

where.	
SP =	Reduced reactor trip setpoint in percent of rated power
V =	number of inoperable safety valves per steam line (most
	limiting steam generator).
(109)=	Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoint for (4)
	loop operation
X =	Total relieving capacity of all safety valves per steam
	line (3,777,000 lbs/hr).

Y = Maximum relieving capacity of any one safety valve (823,000 lbs/hr).

3.4-3

In the unlikely event of complete loss of electrical power to the station, decay heat removal would continue to be assured by the availability of either the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump or one of the two motor-driven auxiliary steam generator feedwater pumps and steam discharge to the atmosphere via the main steam safety valves and atmospheric relief valves. One motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump can supply sufficient feedwater for removal of decay heat from the plant. The minimum amount of water in the condensate storage tank is the amount needed for 24 hours at hot shutdown. When the condensate storage supply is exhausted, city water will be used.

Two steam generators capable of performing their heat transfer function will provide sufficient heat removal capability to remove core decay heat after a reactor shutdown.

The limitations placed on turbine-generator electrical output due to conditions of turbine overspeed setpoint, number of operable steam dump lines, and condenser back pressure are established to assure that turbine overspeed (during conditions of loss of plant load) will be within the design overspeed value considered in the turbine missile analysis. ⁽²⁾ In the preparation of Figures 3.4-1 and 3.4-2, the specified number of operable L.P. steam dump lines is shown as one (1) greater than the minimum number required to act during a plant trip. The limitations on electrical output, as indicated in Figures 3.4-1 and 3.4-2, thus consider the required performance of the L.P. Steam Dump System in the event of a single failure for any given number of operable dump lines.