BEFORE THE UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

In the matter of	)	
	)	
POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK	)	Docket No. 50-286
	)	
Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant	)	

APPLICATION FOR AMENDMENT TO
OPERATING LICENSE

Pursuant to Section 50.90 of the regulations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) the Power Authority of the State of New York, as holder of Facility Operating License No. DPR-64, hereby applies for an Amendment to the Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A of this license.

This application seeks to amend Sections 3.5, 3.6 and 4.13 of Appendix A to the Operating License. The proposed changes are being submitted to include additional requirements on the containment vent and purge system. The proposed change is a result of the Authority's intention to continue utilizing the containment vent system to control containment pressure during normal operations.

The proposed changes to the Technical Specifications are presented in Attachment I to this application. The Safety Evaluation corresponding to this change is included in Attachment II.

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK

By _____
C. A. McNeill, Jr.
Senior Vice President
Nuclear Generation

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day of March 1985

_____
Notary Public

LINDA DELLA DONNA
NOTARY PUBLIC, State of New York
No. 60-6669985
Qualified in Westchester County
Term Expires March 30, 1986

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Enclosure 1 to IPN-85-10
Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Signal Override

NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY
Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant
Docket No. 50-286

As can be seen from the enclosed logic diagrams, the automatic closure of the containment vent and purge valves will be initiated upon the receipt of a high containment radiation signal, containment spray signal, or a safety injection (SI) signal by means of a containment isolation phase A signal. During normal operations, an initial ESF actuation signal cannot be blocked from the logic circuitry.

The containment spray contact AS1 will close when energized upon the receipt of two sets of two-out-of-three containment high-high pressure signals. The closure of the AS1 contact energizes the containment spray master relay S1 operate coil. This MG6 master relay is an electrically operated, mechanically latched, electrically reset relay. When energized the operate coil becomes mechanically latched in the operate position and will remain so until the master relay is reset. Actuation of the containment spray reset will result in the energizing of the S1 master relay reset coil, which disengages the mechanical latch, and the energizing of the containment spray reset relay CS-1R. The CS-1R contact will then open thereby blocking out the S1 master relay operate coil from further operation as long as the CS-1R relay remains energized. This intentional blocking out of the master relay operate coil, with the actuation signal still present, allows the operator to gain manual control of the safety system at the equipment level without an automatic re-actuation of the safety function which would interrupt the operator's planned evaluations of the plant conditions. However, the capability to manually re-actuate the safety function on a system or component level is available. The resetting of the containment spray signal is indicated by way of a status light located on the supervisory panel in the immediate vicinity of the containment spray reset button.

The resetting logic schemes for the SI signal and containment isolation phase A signal are consistent with that of the containment spray signal, except that the SI and containment isolation phase A logic circuitries each utilize two master relays due to the large amount of equipment involved in these functions. As the SI signal is an input to the containment isolation phase A logic, the plant emergency procedures requires that the SI signal be reset prior to containment isolation phase A signal reset. The SI master relay operate coil will be blocked out from further operation if the signal is reset and the SI actuation signal is still present. This resetting of the SI signal will be indicated by way of a status light on the supervisory panel in the immediate vicinity of the SI reset button. While the resetting of the SI signal eliminates the actuation signal to the containment isolation phase A MG6 master relay operating coil, the logic circuitry remains mechanically latched in the operate position until it is reset. As per procedure, the containment isolation phase A signal is to be reset only after the SI signal has been reset. A status light located on the supervisory panel in the immediate vicinity of the containment isolation phase A reset button indicates the resetting of this signal, while the SI signal is still present.

In order to preclude the blocking of the containment ventilation isolation signal, the containment ventilation isolation reset relay and its associated contact was removed from the logic circuitry. As a result of this modification, the containment ventilation isolation signal cannot be reset with the containment spray signal and/or containment isolation phase A signal still input to the containment ventilation isolation logic.

A high containment radiation signal cannot be overriden as it directly energizes the containment ventilation isolation slave relay VI-IX, whose associated contact is utilized directly in the valve actuation circuitry. Therefore, in order to re-open the vent and purge valves after containment ventilation isolation, this logic function must be reset and there must not be a high containment radiation condition. The vent and purge valves can then only be opened by the actuation of a permissive switch located in the control room and a remote switch in the valve circuitry.

In conclusion, an initial ESF actuation signal cannot be blocked from the logic circuitry during normal operations. However, in order for the reset portion of the logic circuitry to function as intended, that being to allow the operator to gain manual control of the safety system equipment with a continuously present safety system actuation signal, this signal can be blocked from the logic circuitry during the reset phase. Furthermore, the number of deliberate operator actions required to re-open the containment vent and purge valves render the possibility of an inadvertant ESF actuation signal block leading to a radioactive release via the containment vent and purge system to be extremely remote. Accordingly, the Authority considers that the existing status lights, located in the immediate vicinity of the respective reset pushbuttons, provide an appropriate indication of an ESF actuation signal block. Additionally, the annunciator panel status is such that an annunciator would be in a position remote to the reset pushbutton, thereby reducing the operator's awareness of an ESF actuation signal block.