December 1, 2009

Mr. Jack M. Davis
Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer
Detroit Edison Company
Fermi 2 – 210 NOC
6400 North Dixie Highway
Newport, MI 48166

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION LETTER NO. 18 RELATED TO THE SRP SECTIONS 8.2, 9.2.1, 10.4.5, 11.4, 12.2, 12.3-12.4, AND 14.2 FOR THE FERMI 3 COMBINED LICENSE APPLICATION

Dear Mr. Davis:

By letter dated September 18, 2008, Detroit Edison Company (Detroit Edison) submitted for approval a combined license application pursuant to 10 CFR Part 52. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff is performing a detailed review of this application to enable the staff to reach a conclusion on the safety of the proposed application.

The NRC staff has identified that additional information is needed to continue portions of the review. The staff's request for additional information (RAI) is contained in the enclosure to this letter. To support the review schedule, you are requested to respond within 45 days of the date of this letter. If changes are needed to the safety analysis report, the staff requests that the RAI response include the proposed wording changes.

If you have any questions or comments concerning this matter, I can be reached at 301-415-8148 or by e-mail at Jerry.Hale@nrc.gov.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Jerry R. Hale, Project Manager
ESBWR/ABWR Projects Branch 1
Division of New Reactor Licensing
Office of New Reactors

Docket Nos. 052-033

eRAI Tracking Nos. 3823, 3868, 3900, 3960, 3962, 4037, 4038, and 4053

Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information

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Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information

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ADAMS Accession No. ML093350182 **NRO-002**

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DATE	10/21/09	11/2/09	10/30/09	11/25/09	11/25/09	11/30/09

***Approval captured electronically in the electronic RAI system.**

Request for Additional Information No. 3868 Revision 1

Fermi Unit 3
Detroit Edison
Docket No. 52-033
SRP Section: 08.02 - Offsite Power System

08.02-14

In RAI-08.02-4, the staff requested the applicant to discuss why the phenomenon of galloping conductors will not be accentuated in the corridor resulting in flashovers and structural damage to multiple transmission line conductors and hardware as a result of the common transmission line corridor used by Fermi for the three lines to the Milan substation. In response to the RAI, the applicant cited EPRI document No. 1010223, "Updating the EPRI Transmission Line Reference Book: Wind-Induced Conductor Motion ("The Orange Book")" and stated that "the frequency with which galloping occurs is closely related to environmental conditions, such as frequency of icing, smooth countered terrain with few large obstacle, and localized areas near lakes and rivers." The applicant also added that "no relationship to the number of transmission lines in a transmission corridor was identified in a search of industry operating experience."

Since all three transmission lines are routed through the corridor and, hence, exposed to the same environmental conditions, the applicant is requested to indicate whether any of the EPRI-evaluated environmental conditions could result in the galloping conductor phenomenon impacting multiple lines at the same time and result in complete loss of offsite power. The applicant is also requested to discuss their experience with this phenomenon at Units 1 and 2.

NOTE: This is a supplemental to the original RAI# 2168 that was issued in RAI Letter #6, ML091890740

08.02-15

In RAI 08.02-05, the staff asked the applicant to identify how the lightning protection mentioned in Section 8.2.2.1 and DCD Section 8.2.3 would be implemented for the transmission system and switchyard. The staff also requested that the applicant indicate how the lightning protection system would be periodically maintained and tested to assure functionality and effectiveness throughout the life of EF3. In their response, the applicant stated that the Fermi 3 lightning protection system would be designed in accordance with IEEE Standard 998-1996 (reaffirmed in 2002), "IEEE Guide for Direct Lightning Stroke Shielding of Substations." However, the response failed to indicate conformance with the guidance of RG 1.204, "Guidelines for Lightning Protection of Nuclear Power Plants."

The staff review of Section 8.1 of the DCD observed that the DCD endorses RG 1.204. Additionally, EF 3 FSAR Table 1.9-202, "Conformance with Regulatory Guides," shows that Fermi 3 conforms to the guidance of RG 1.204. Based on the above, discuss why the guidance of the IEEE standards endorsed by RG 1.204 is not applicable to Fermi 3 and provide justification for not using such guidance.

NOTE: This is a supplemental to the original RAI# 2168 that was issued in RAI Letter #6, ML091890740

08.02-16

In RAI 08.02-06, the staff requested that the applicant describe the periodic surveillance and maintenance tests that will be performed on the batteries and battery chargers located in the 345 kV switchyard, and the criteria established for battery replacement. Additionally the staff requested that the applicant describe the periodic surveillance and maintenance tests that will be performed on the circuit breakers, potential transformers, lightning arrestors, capacitive coupling voltage transformers, current transformers, protective relays, microwave channels, communication equipment, annunciator panels, security equipment, switchyard grounding system, and surge arrestors in the 345 kV switchyard.

In their response to the RAI, the applicant provided a more comprehensive listing of switchyard equipment and components that will be subjected to routine inspection and testing and the frequency at which each component will undergo such testing. The staff's review of the applicant's response observed that the applicant had not included in the listing provided lightning and surge arresters. Therefore, the staff requests that the applicant address the omitted items.

NOTE: This is a supplemental to the original RAI# 2168 that was issued in RAI Letter #6, ML091890740

08.02-17

In RAI 08.02-07, the staff requested that the applicant describe how low voltage power, control, and instrumentation cables that are expected to be partially or continuously submerged in manholes, trenches, and duct banks are specified and qualified. The staff also asked the applicant to provide the design features and/or in-situ monitoring programs that will be implemented to avoid or arrest the degradation of cable insulation from the effects of moisture. Include cables traversing the switchyard, as well as those from the switchyard to the EF3 unit.

In their response to the RAI, the applicant stated that periodic monitoring of cable insulation for underground medium voltage cable will be conducted to detect potential cable insulation degradation from moisture intrusion. The applicant also stated that medium voltage cables will be monitored in a manner similar to that described in the Fermi 2 Electrical Cable Monitoring Program based on the recommendations of the EPRI Cable Task Force. Experience from this program will be used to establish testing frequencies and to specify testing methods for medium voltage underground cables at Fermi 3. The NRC reviewed the Fermi 2 Electrical Cable Monitoring Program in conjunction with Detroit Edison' response to Generic Letter (GL) 2007-01 and found that the Fermi 2 response adequately addressed the concern in GL 2007-01 for power cables within the scope of 10 CFR 50.65. Regarding low voltage power, control or instrumentation cables in underground circuits, the applicant stated that they believed that a testing program was not necessary.

The staff's review of Detroit Edison response to Generic Letter (GL) 2007-01 found that the three failed cables they identified at Fermi 2 were low voltage (480VAC and 260 VDC) cables. Additionally, the staff noted that, for Fermi 2, Detroit Edison committed to inspecting, testing, and monitoring of all power cables, not the medium voltage cables only. Therefore, based on the operating experience with low voltage underground cables and the earlier commitment with Fermi 2, indicate why a program for inspecting, testing and monitoring low voltage underground power cables is not required for Fermi 3.

NOTE: This is a supplemental to the original RAI# 2168 that was issued in RAI Letter #6, ML091890740

Request for Additional Information No. 3900 Revision 1

Fermi Unit 3
Detroit Edison
Docket No. 52-033
SRP Section: 09.02.01 - Station Service Water System

09.02.01-1

Tier 1 of the ESBWR DCD Revision 6, Section 4.1, specifies as a COL interface requirement that the plant-specific Plant Service Water System (PSWS) be capable of removing 2.02×10^7 MJ (1.92×10^{10} BTU) over a period of seven days without active makeup and must ensure that PSWS have sufficient available net positive suction head at the pump suction (NPSH).

Part 10 of the Fermi-3 COL application, Section 2.4.2, proposes the Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) specifying a cooling tower basin water inventory requirement as a way of demonstrating that the heat removal capability specified by the DCD has been satisfied. While the water inventory is an important factor that must be addressed by the ITAAC, the staff found the water inventory alone is not sufficient to demonstrate that the cooling towers are capable of dissipating the specified heat load. The capability of cooling towers to dissipate heat is dependent upon a number of "other factors" that should be taken into consideration, such as cooling tower design attributes; the capability to satisfy the PSWS pump minimum NPSH requirements (Question 09.02.01-2) for the most limiting cooling tower basin water level, temperature, and flow conditions; the maximum allowed PSWS water supply temperature; and the most limiting meteorological assumptions that pertain to the site. The capability analyses for the cooling tower need take these factors into consideration (including margin for expected degradation and operating flexibility), and confirmatory testing are usually necessary in order to adequately demonstrate that cooling tower performance satisfies the specified heat removal requirement. In addition, the extent and basis for using the combined normal power heat sink (NPHS) and auxiliary heat sink (AHS) cooling tower basin inventories for Trains A and B need to be addressed.

The applicant is requested to address the above "other factors" such that the specified cooling tower performance capability is adequately demonstrated for both defense-in-depth and regulatory treatment of non-safety systems (RTNSS) functions, and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and ITAAC need to be revised accordingly to describe the plant licensing basis in this regard.

09.02.01-2

Tier 1 of the ESBWR DCD Revision 6, Section 4.1, specifies a COL interface requirement that the plant-specific Plant Service Water System (PSWS) must have sufficient available net positive suction head at the pump suction (NPSH). The Fermi-3 FSAR and ITAAC need to be revised to address the NPSH interface requirement.

09.02.01-3

In response to COL Information Item 9.2.1-1-A, "Material Selection," the applicant proposes to use fiberglass reinforced polyester pipe (FRPP) in locations where the Plant Service Water System (PSWS) pipe is buried to preclude long-term corrosion. The review criteria specified by the SRP relative to pipe failure is based on the use of metal pipe. In order to assure that the use of nonmetallic pipe will not adversely impact safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) or those that satisfy the

RTNSS criteria, the following additional information needs to be reflected in the applicable sections of the FSAR and plant-specific ITAAC as appropriate:

a) The criteria and limitations for using FRPP.

b) An evaluation of the impact of using FRPP on PSWS reliability and availability assumptions, especially during seismic events and water hammer transients that can occur.

c) Describe how operating experience, where as buried fiberglass materials have been utilized in a similar application such as water service with similar piping size, pressure and temperatures, will be addressed in the selection of the buried fiberglass materials.

d) Describe if ASME B31.1 "Non-mandatory Appendix III, Rules for Non-metallic Piping and Piping Lines with Nonmetals," will be utilized for the fiberglass design and installation, In addition, describe any material standard/classification, for example American Society for Testing and Materials or American Water Works Association that better defines the piping and fitting standards to be utilized.

e) Describe the quality assurance requirement in the RTNSS environment, and provide details of the buried fiberglass application including the following:

- piping size, wall thickness, and piping lengths
- design and operating pressure and temperature
- location with respect to high traffic areas and if it will be necessary to sleeve the fiberglass for protection
- material handling and storage, installation, qualification and testing
- programs for the piping and fittings related to installation personnel
- in-service inspection and accessibility
- details of initial cyclic pressure testing plus hold times
- information to support FRP seismic design acceptability as seismic category NS for RTNSS piping applications.

09.02.01-4

DCD Tier 2 COL Information Item 9.2.1-1-A, "Material Selection," indicates that the applicant needs to specify plant-specific Plant Service Water System (PSWS) material selections based on water quality analysis in order to preclude long-term corrosion and fouling. In Fermi-3 FSAR EF3 COL 9.2.1-1-A, the applicant in response to this COL Information Item only addressed material selection for buried piping but did not provide material specifications for any other parts of the PSWS, including those for the cooling towers [normal power heat sink (NPHS)/auxiliary heat sink (AHS) and related components. Additional information is needed to specify and explain the material selections that pertain to the rest of the PSWS.

09.02.01-5

Tier 2 of the DCD, Section 9.2.1.6, "COL Information," specifies in part that the COL applicant needs to establish provisions to preclude long-term corrosion and fouling based on site water quality analysis. The FSAR does not explain what specific vulnerabilities are considered to be pertinent based upon operational experience that applies and why chemical treatment alone is sufficient for addressing these vulnerabilities. Chemical treatment is a common practice and suitable for addressing service water system corrosion and fouling problems to some extent, but it is usually implemented as part of a more

comprehensive program (or collection of programs) to address service water system vulnerabilities. For example, considerations for precluding long-term corrosion and fouling of service water systems typically include: (i) establishing a program of surveillance and control techniques (such as chemical treatment) to prevent flow blockage problems due to bio-fouling; (ii) establishing a routine inspection and maintenance program to assure that corrosion, erosion, protective coating failure, silting, bio-fouling and others that are applicable cannot degrade defense-in-depth and RTNSS cooling functions that are credited; and (iii) establishing a test program to verify (initially and periodically) the heat transfer capability of heat exchangers that are important to safety has not degraded over time.

Additional information needs to be included in the FSAR to: a) describe corrosion and fouling mechanisms and vulnerabilities that are anticipated based on industry operating experience and the plant-specific location, and b) describe programmatic controls that will be implemented to address these considerations and to assure that PSWS performance (including NPHS and AHS cooling towers) will not degrade over time.

09.02.01-6

FSAR Table 9.2-201 provides supplemental plant-specific information that specifies a basin reserve storage capacity of 9.08×10^3 m^3 (2.4 million gallons). This capacity is less than the capacity of 2.6 million gallons being specified in the RCOL (North Anna, Unit 3). The FSAR does not have any discussion on how the value was established. The applicant is requested to discuss how the water capacity of 2.4 million gallons was established including the assumptions and methodology being used.

09.02.01-7

Tier 2 of the DCD, Section 9.2.1.2, indicates that the heat rejection facilities are dependent upon actual site conditions and provides conceptual design information (CDI) for the standard plant design. Section 9.2.1.2 of the Fermi-3 FSAR replaced the CDI with plant-specific information (EF3 CDI), indicating that the heat rejection facility for Fermi 3 consists of natural draft and mechanical draft cooling towers.

In order for the NRC to determine if the cooling towers are capable of performing their defense-in-depth and RTNSS functions, the Fermi-3 CDI needs to include cooling tower design attributes that are credited (such as minimum number of fans needed); the minimum net positive suction head (NPSH) requirement for the PSWS pumps and available margin based on the most limiting cooling tower basin water level, temperature, and flow conditions; the maximum allowed PSWS water supply temperature; the most limiting meteorological assumptions that pertain to the site for determining: (a) heat dissipation capability, and (b) water inventory requirements; and cooling tower performance considerations related to proximity of structures and other cooling towers. The Fermi-3 CDI also needs to describe plant-specific vulnerabilities and degradation mechanisms that are anticipated based on operational experience and site location, potential impacts of postulated cooling tower failures and other interactions on safety-related SSCs, and how these considerations are addressed. In addition to explaining bounding conditions and limiting assumptions, the Fermi-3 CDI needs to describe programmatic controls being implemented to assure that the functional capability of the cooling towers will be maintained over the life of the plant.

09.02.01-8

Section 9.2.1.2 (under Operation) specifies that during operation, PSWS flow is directed either to the normal power heat sink (NPHS) cooling tower or the auxiliary heat sink (AHS) cooling tower where heat removed from the RCCWS and TCCWS is rejected. During this mode of operation using NPHS, the NPHS basin provides makeup to the AHS basin. During the mode of operation using AHS, makeup to the AHS basin is provided from the Station Water System (SWS).

In reviewing the above supplemental information, it is not clear to the staff what the different "modes" of power operation are. This is especially confusing because the term "mode" has a specific meaning in the Technical Specifications, and specific modes of power operation are not assigned for when the NPHS or the AHS should be used. The applicant is asked to revise the FSAR to eliminate this confusion and to better explain when the NPHS vs. AHS will be used for various operating, transient, and accident conditions.

09.02.01-9

Although the initial plant test program specified by Tier 2 of the DCD for PSWS is incorporated by reference, the test program does not verify that performance of the PSWS (including NPHS/AHS) satisfies design specifications for the various configurations and heat loads. The applicant is requested to provide additional information to describe how the design capability of the PSWS will be verified by initial plant test program.

Request for Additional Information No. 3823 Revision 1

Fermi Unit 3
Detroit Edison
Docket No. 52-033
SRP Section: 10.04.05 - Circulating Water System

10.04.05-1

In FSAR Section 10.4.5.2.1, “General Description,” the applicant described that the circulating water system (CWS) consists of one natural draft cooling tower (NDCT). Also, in FSAR Section 10.4.5.8, “Normal Power Heat Sink,” the applicant described that the site-specific NDCT is located at least a distance equal to its height away from Seismic Category (SC) I and II structures. Therefore, any structural failure of the cooling tower would not affect or damage safety-related structures, systems, or components (SSCs). Further, in FSAR Revision 1 mark-ups, the applicant described that the NDCT is relocated and is much closure to Fermi 3 power block structures than previous location. Additionally, a new Section 10.4.5.6, “Flood Protection,” has been added to Revision 1, where the applicant provided few details regarding the site grading and stated that the NDCT is located lower that the power block structures. Therefore, the applicant stated that there are no potential flooding concerns to the power block structures from a failure in the CWS (including the NDCT basin) in the yard.

According to the Standard Review Plan (SRP), Section 10.4.5, “Circulating Water System,” SRP Acceptance Criteria, the requirements of General Design Criteria 4 (GDC 4) are met when the CWS design includes provisions to accommodate the effects of discharging water that may result from a failure of a component or piping in the CWS. The NRC staff reviewed the information provided by the applicant in Revision 0 and Revision 1 (mark-up) of the FSAR. The staff also reviewed the GDC 4 and the SRP guidance with respect to flooding due to failure of the CWS structures or components. Failure of the cooling tower or CWS piping (including the yard piping) could be potential sources for flooding. Therefore, the staff requests that the applicant provide additional details regarding the Fermi 3 site grading and drainage systems to ensure that the discharge water due to a failure of the tower or the CWS piping will flow away from and not effect the safety-related systems or equipment that are located in the SC I and SC II structures.

Request for Additional Information No. 4053 Revision 1

Fermi Unit 3
Detroit Edison
Docket No. 52-033
SRP Section: 11.04 - Solid Waste Management System

11.04-2 Supplement 1

In your response to RAI 11.04-2, dated April 8, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML090680443), you stated in part:

"Detroit Edison is developing clarifying information to respond to this RAI. This information will be provided in a future submission of the COLA."

As of November 19, 2009, the staff responsible for review of your response was unaware of the schedule for development of the clarifying information referred to in your response.

Please provide a schedule for when the staff may expect a complete response, and include a consideration of recent developments relevant to the original request, including but not limited to how your response will be affected by recent changes to the design source term as described in Revision 6 to the ESBWR Tier 2 FSAR.

Request for Additional Information No. 4037 Revision 1

Fermi Unit 3
Detroit Edison
Docket No. 52-033
SRP Section: 12.02 - Radiation Sources

12.02-5

Question 1:

FSAR Subsection 12.2.2.2 presents compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix I, 10 CFR 20 Appendix B, and 10 CFR 20.1301 and 20.1302 based on the airborne release quantities in ESBWR DCD Revision 5 Table 12.2-16, “Annual Airborne Releases for Offsite Dose Evaluations (MBq).” ESBWR DCD Revision 6 presented revised annual airborne releases, showing higher release quantities of iodine isotopes. This change requires reevaluation of offsite doses presented in FSAR Subsection 12.2.2.2. Accordingly, provide an updated offsite dose evaluation and demonstrate compliance with the applicable regulations.

Question 2:

FSAR Subsection 12.2.2.4 presents compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix I, 10 CFR 20 Appendix B, and 10 CFR 20.1301 and 20.1302 based on liquid effluent release quantities in ESBWR DCD Revision 5 Table 12.2-19b, “Average Annual Liquid Releases.” ESBWR DCD Revision 6, presented revised annual liquid effluent releases. This change requires reevaluation of offsite doses presented in FSAR Subsection 12.2.2.4. Accordingly, provide an updated offsite liquid effluent dose evaluations and demonstrate compliance with the applicable regulations.

Request for Additional Information No. 4038 Revision 1

Fermi Unit 3
Detroit Edison
Docket No. 52-033
SRP Section: 12.03-12.04 - Radiation Protection Design Features

12.03-12.04-4

Question 1:

ESBWR DCD Revision 6 revised Section 12.3 and adds Subsection 12.3.1.5, "Minimization of Contamination and Radioactive Waste Generation." This subsection eliminated the need for Section 12.6, and the ESBWR DCD Revision 5 Section 12.6 was deleted as part of Revision 6. Subsection 12.3.1.5 added COL Item 12.3-4-A:

"The COL Applicant will address the operational and post-construction objectives of Regulatory Guide 4.21 (COL 12.3-4-A)."

Question 2:

DCD Revision 6 also removed COL 12.3-3-H, and consolidated those considerations with COL Item 12.5-3-A:

"The COL Applicant will provide a description of the operational radiation protection program to the level of detail provided in Regulatory Guide 1.206. The radiation protection program will consider special shielding features (such as lead blankets, lead curtains, etc.) and include a description of access controls to Very High Radiation Areas (Subsections 12.3.1.3 and 12.5.3)."

Accordingly, please provide updates of affected FSAR sections and demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 20.1406. In preparing your response, please address the specific COL Items noted above.

Request for Additional Information No. 3960 Revision 1

Fermi Unit 3
Detroit Edison
Docket No. 52-033
SRP Section: 14.02 - Initial Plant Test Program - Design Certification and New License Applicants

14.02-2

In response to RAI 14.02-03 Dominion added Appendix 14AA to the FSAR Tier 2 for North Anna Unit 3 (NA3) COL Application (R-COLA). Detroit Edison in the NRC3-09-0005 letter (dated September 30, 2009) agreed with the R-COLA response of NA3 as a standard and included an almost identical Appendix 14AA in Revision 1 of the Fermi 3 (EF3) COL Application (S-COLA). In Section 14AA.2.2.1, "Startup Group Manager," both NA3 and EF3 included a bullet stating the Startup Group Manager would act as the chairman of the JTG. In Figure 14AA-201 in the box "Manager in charge of Startup Group" EF3 labeled this manager as a "JTG Member," while NA3 again labeled the "Manager in charge of Startup Group" as the Chairman. The staff requests that EF3 clarify the difference.

Request for Additional Information No. 3962 Revision 1

Fermi Unit 3
Detroit Edison
Docket No. 52-033
SRP Section: 14.02 - Initial Plant Test Program - Design Certification and New License Applicants

14.02-3

In FSAR Tier 2, Section 14.2.10, "COL Information," the fourth item, 14.2-4-H, "Test Program Schedule and Sequence," is labeled "EF3 COL 14.2-4-H" and states the item is addressed in Section 14.2.7. However, in Section 14.2.7 the COL Item is labeled "STD COL 14.2-3-H." The staff requests this discrepancy to be corrected.