SONGS October 2009 NRC Written Examination Senior Reactor Operator Answer Key

1.	А	26.	С	51.	А	76.	С
2.	В	27.	А	52.	D	77.	В
3.	В	28.	В	53.	D	78.	С
4.	А	29.	В	54.	А	79.	А
5.	D	30.	С	55.	С	80.	С
6.	А	31.	D	56.	D	81.	D
7.	А	32.	D	57.	А	82.	А
8.	D	33.	В	58.	С	83.	С
9.	В	34.	С	59.	D	84.	D
10.	В	35.	D	60.	С	85.	D
11.	D	36.	А	61.	А	86.	А
12.	С	37.	D	62.	В	87.	В
13.	А	38.	D	63.	В	88.	А
14.	D	39.	В	64.	D	89.	D
15.	С	40.	С	65.	D	90.	А
16.	А	41.	В	66.	А	91.	В
17.	В	42.	D	67.	D	92.	А
18.	С	43.	А	68.	В	93.	В
19.	А	44.	D	69.	С	94.	А
20.	С	45.	С	70.	D	95.	С
21.	В	46.	D	71.	В	96.	С
22.	С	47.	В	72.	А	97.	В
23.	В	48.	С	73.	А	98.	С
24.	В	49.	С	74.	В	99.	А
25.	С	50.	D	75.	С	100.	А

Answer Key Breakdown:

- A = 26
- B = 24
- C = 25
- D = 25

ES-401	SONGS Oct 2009 NRC Writ	Form	ES-401-5	
Examination Outline (Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
		Tier #	2	
		Group #	1	
		K/A #	003 G 2	2.4.11
		Importance Rating	4.0	

Reactor Coolant Pump System: Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures Proposed Question: Common 1

Which ONE (1) of the following is an entry condition listed in SO23-13-6, Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failure?

- A. Controlled Bleed-Off temperature is ABOVE normal.
- B. Individual seal cavity temperature is RISING during heatup.
- C. Controlled Bleed-Off header pressure is LOWERING.
- D. Individual seal cavity pressure is RISING during heatup.

Proposed Answer:

Explanation:

- A. Correct. As identified in SO23-13-6, Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failure Entry Conditions.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because increasing seal cavity temperatures could be an indication of a failure, however, this is not an Entry Condition for SO23-13-6.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because Controlled Bleed-Off header pressure increasing is an Entry Condition for a Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failure.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because rising seal cavity pressures could be considered an Entry Condition, however, not during a heatup as this would be an expected condition.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-13-6, Entry Conditions	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

А

ES-401	SO	NGS Oct 2009	NRC Writt	en Exam Works	heet	Form ES-401-5
Learning Objective: 94469 / 94468	INT			•	of the Reactor Co lized in the Read	2
Question Source:	Μ	ank # odified Bank # ew	_75538 (S	ee Comments)	(Note changes	or attach parent)
Question History:		Last NRC Exa	im <u>SC</u>	NGS 2000 (rep	laced Distractor	B)
e ,		Memory or Fu Comprehensio		6	X	
10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43				_		

Comments / Reference	e: From SO23-13-6 Entry Conditions	Revision # 5
NUCLEAR ORGANIZA UNITS 2 AND 3	TION ABNORMAL OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 5	S023-13-6 PAGE 2 OF 10
	REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL FAILURE	
PURPOSE		
	tions to mitigate the effects of a degraded CP support system.	or failed RCP, RCP
ENTRY CONDITIONS		
This event or indicat	is identified by one or more of the followi ions:	ng alarms
1. Ind ind	ividual RCP middle, upper, and vapor seal ca ications above or below normal.	avity pressure
	ividual RCP controlled bleed-off temperature mal.	e indications above
	ividual RCP controlled bleed-off flow indica mal.	ations above or below
4. RCF	controlled bleed-off header pressure increa	asing on PI-0215.
5. 568	57, RCP BLEED-OFF FLOW HI/LO.	
6. 568	58, RCP BLEED-OFF PRESSURE HI.	
7. 560	24, RCP POO1 SEAL PRESSURE HI/LO.	
8. 560	26, RCP POO3 SEAL PRESSURE HI/LO.	
9. 560	28, RCP POO4 SEAL PRESSURE HI/LO.	
10. 560	30, RCP POO2 SEAL PRESSURE HI/LO.	
Comments / Reference	e: SONGS Exam Bank #75538	Revision # N/A
Adified Distractor B Controlled Bleed-	from the following: Off relief valve temperature constant.	· ·

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	003	K1.10
	Importance Rating	3.0	

Reactor Coolant Pump System: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RCPs and the following systems: RCS

Proposed Question: Common 2

Given the following conditions with the Unit in MODE 5 with loops filled:

- Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature is 150°F.
- Steam Generator (SG) temperature is 260°F.
- No Reactor Coolant Pumps are running.
- The Pressurizer is solid.

Which ONE (1) of the following will result if the <u>FIRST</u> Reactor Coolant Pump is started with the conditions listed?

- A. Excessive core lift.
- B. An RCS pressure transient.
- C. Excessive RCP stator temperatures.
- D. Exceed RCS heatup limits.

Proposed Answer: B

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because core lift is a concern when starting the 4th Reactor Coolant Pump, however, in this condition the 1st RCP is being started.
- B. Correct. With RCS temperature less then the temperature listed in the Pressure Temperature Limits Report (PTLR) the Steam Generator to RCS ΔT must be less than 100°F. This prevents an overpressure transient on the RCS when the RCP is started and the RCS heats up.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because RCP motor current would be high, however, starting current would only be lowered if the RCP were started at a higher temperature.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because RCS temperature would rise, however, there is insufficient Steam Generator mass to exceed a heatup limit.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-3-1.7, L&S 2.1	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO23-5-1.03, Step 6.18.7	Comments / Reference
	Tech Spec LCO 3.4.7.4	
	SO23-5-1.3, L&S 4.1 and 4.2	

Proposed references to be provided during examination: <u>None</u>

Learnin 94469	ig Objec	tive: A	ANAL`	YZE normal and	abnormal operations	of the React	or Coolant System.
Questic	on Sourd	ce:	Ba	ink #			
			Мс	odified Bank #		(Note cha	nges or attach parent)
			Ne	ew .	Χ		
Questic	on Histo	ry:	L	ast NRC Exam			
Questic	on Cogn	itive Leve		lemory or Funda Comprehension o	mental Knowledge r Analysis	<u> </u>	
10 CFR	R Part 58	5 Content		5.41 <u>5, 14</u> 5.43			
Comme	ents / Re	eference:	From	n SO23-3-1.7, L&	S 2.1		Revision # 16
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3			OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 35 ATTACHMENT 16		SO23-3- PAGE 10	SO23-3-1.7 PAGE 100 OF 100	
		RCP OF	PERAT	ION LIMITATIONS	AND SPECIFICS (Con	tinued)	
1.0	REACT	OR COOL	ANT P	UMPS (Continued)		
		of DC Con	trol Po	AT integrity during a ower, the transforme posite Unit. (Ref. 2	an RCP overcurrent ever er breaker control power 2.1.4)	nt coincident wi source is nom	th a loss nally
1.24 The Reactivity Affecting activities in this procedure which involve only RCS temperature changes are already encompassed by the maintenance of shutdown margin requirements. Consequently, a Reactivity Brief is not required.						ıtdown	
2.0	REACT	OR COOL	ANT S	SYSTEM			
2.1 In the first few days after entering Shutdown Cooling conditions, the Steam Generators remain hotter than the RCS, which can cause a rapid re-pressurization of the RCS when starting an RCP. The T _{sat} values are used as a convenient way to obtain S/G temperatures by converting from S/G pressure. In the case of low pressures in the S/Gs while on Shutdown Cooling, the S/G temperatures may be substituted for the T _{sat} values used in Step 6.1.16 of the main body. The values used in the step are more conservative than those required in LCO 3.4.6, LCS 3.4.106, LCO 3.4.7, and LCS 3.4.107. (Ref. 2.2.1)					urization ht way to ow hay be		

Comments / Reference:	From SO23	-5-1.3, Step 6.18.7		Revision # 32
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATI UNITS 2 AND 3		GRATED OPERATING INSTRUCTION	SO23-5-1 PAGE 46	
6.0 <u>PROCEDURE</u> (C	ontinued)			PERF. BY
6.18 Enter Mo	ode 3		-	INITIALS
6.18.1	Requisite ste	ep completed: 6.17		
6.18.2	REVIEW the requirement	e heatup guidelines and plotting s of Attachments 8 and 10.		
		NOTE		
The remaining steps in	this section ma	ay be completed concurrently or in any c	order.	
	G	UIDELINE		
UNIT 2 ONLY: When the nominal 20°F/HR. (LS-	he RCS is >34 4.2)	0°F, <u>then</u> plant heatup rate is controlled	at a	
6.18.3	START a thi Reactor Coo already runn	rd RCP per SO23-3-1.7, Section for Sta blant Pump. [LS-9.1, LS-9.13] [Mark N/A iing.]	rting A \if	
6.18.4	CONTINUE	plant heatup to <500°F.		
.1	Log Mode	3 entry (RCS at 350°F):		
	DATE_	TIME		
6.18.5	ECS 3.3.113	FAS are INOPERABLE, <u>then</u> Review and 3.3.114. (Mark N/A if ATWS/DSS are operable.)		
6.18.6	INITIATE SC Generator P	023-5-1.3.1, Attachment for Turbine re-Roll Checklist.		
6.18.7	<u>When</u> RCS t 4th RCP per Reactor Coo	temperature is > 400°F, <u>then</u> START the · SO23-3-1.7, Section for Starting a vlant Pump.	e	

Commer	ts / Reference: From Tech Spec LCO 3.4.7.4	Amendment # 203
	RCS Loops — M	ODE 4 B 3.4.6
BASES	(continued)	
Note satis tem spec	e 2 requires that either of the following two conditions be fied before an RCP may be started with any RCS cold leg perature less than or equal to the LTOP enable temperature cified in the PTLR.	
a.	Pressurizer water volume is < 900 ft³; or	
b.	Secondary side water temperature in each SG is < 100°F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures.	
Sati: in th	sfying the above condition will preclude a large pressure surge e RCS when the RCP is started.	
RCF	DPERABLE RCS loop consists of at least one OPERABLE 9 and an SG that is OPERABLE and has the minimum water 1 specified in SR 3.4.6.2.	

ommei	nts / Rei	ference: From SO	D23-5-1.3, L&S 4.1 and 4.2	Revision # 32	
UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION			INTEGRATED OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 32 ATTACHMENT 12	SO23-5-1.3 PAGE 110 OF 119	
3.0	SAFE				
	3.1 <u>LIMIT</u> : Exiting a 10CFR50 Appendix R Action Statement by entering a non-applicable Mode prior to the end of the 60-day Action will allow for termination of the compensatory measures. However, reentry into an applicable Mode without restoring the specific component/feature to OPERABLE status will cause the Action Statement to resume at the point in the 60-day period when it was exited.				
	3.2 <u>LIMIT</u> : Steam Generator Pressure Indication Channels A and B are required for Safe Shutdown. (Tech. Spec. LCS 3.7.113-1)				
	3.3 Steam Generator Pressure Indication may still be used to me requirements while in bypass or tripped.			t Safe Shutdown	
	3.4 <u>When</u> requesting I&C to make "Live" Channel A <u>or</u> B Steam Generator Pressure Instruments, <u>then</u> any other "Live" pressure channel other than A <u>or</u> B will be simulated per the I&C procedure.				
4.0	RCS	IEATUP LIMITAT	TIONS		
	4.1	The RCS HEAT (this guideline is limit of 60°F/ho	'UP Administrative guideline is 50°F/hr. when To s more conservative than Tech. Spec. LCO 3.4.3 ur).	: ≥70°F 3 and LCS 3.4.103	
4.2 UNIT 2 ONLY: Due to a high rate of S/G tube failure, RCS nominal heatup is 20°F/HR when the RCS is >340°F. This is based on a theory that S/G sleeve collapse is caused by differential expansion rates between the sleeves and the tubes. When water is trapped in this gap, it causes deformation of the sleeve with resultant flow loss. This expansion rate is greater at higher temperatures. Consequently, controlling the heatup rate to a nominal 20°F/HR when the RCS is >340°F should reduce this failure rate. (AR 060102028)					

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	004 /	A2.25
	Importance Rating	3.8	

<u>Chemical and Volume Control System</u>: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Uncontrolled boration or dilution

Proposed Question: Common 3

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 2 is operating in MODE 1 with all systems aligned for normal automatic control when the following alarms are received:
 - 58A04 VCT LEVEL HI/LO.
 - 58A14 BORIC ACID PUMPS AUTO START FAILURE.
 - 58A06 BORIC ACID TO VCT FLOW HI/LO.
- All Reactor Coolant System parameters are stable at normal values.

Which ONE (1) of the following:

- 1.) Identifies the impact on the Chemical and Volume Control System?
- 2.) What action must be taken to mitigate the situation?
- A. 1.) LT-0226, VCT Level Transmitter has failed high and the Boric Acid Pumps have stopped to prevent over boration of the RCS.
 - 2.) Place FIC-0210Y, Boron Makeup Flow Controller in MANUAL to ensure boration remains secured.
- B. 1.) LT-0226, VCT Level Transmitter has failed low and the selected Boric Acid Pump failed to start.
 - 2.) Place HS-0210, Makeup Mode Selector in MANUAL to stop the uncontrolled dilution.
- C. 1.) LT-0227, VCT Level Transmitter has failed high and the Boric Acid Pumps have stopped to prevent over boration of the RCS.
 - 2.) Place FIC-0210Y, Boron Makeup Flow Controller in MANUAL to ensure boration remains secured.
- D. 1.) LT-0227, VCT Level Transmitter has failed low and the selected Boric Acid Pump failed to start.
 - 2.) Place HS-0210, Makeup Mode Selector in MANUAL to stop the uncontrolled dilution.

Proposed Answer:

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because the VCT HI / LO alarm would come in on a high failure of LT-0226 and it could be thought that a boration evolution would need to be stopped if in progress and placing FIC-0210Y in MANUAL would prevent normal boration.
- B. Correct. VCT Level transmitter LT-0226 failing low causes Auto Makeup to initiate to the VCT and the failure of the selected Boric Acid Pump to start results in the pump failure and low flow alarms and is an indication that the only makeup flow is a dilution.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because the VCT HI / LO alarm would come in on a high failure of LT-0227 and placing FIC-0210Y in MANUAL could prevent an advertent boration.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because the Makeup Mode Selector should be placed in MANUAL, however, the failure of transmitter LT-0227 causes the Charging Pump suction to shift from the VCT to the RWST.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-15-58.A, 58A04	_ Attached w/ Revision # See		
	SO23-15-58.A, 58A06	Comments / Reference		
	SO23-15-58.A, 58A14			
	SD-SO23-390, Sect 2.2.21 & Figure I-1			

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

В


Learning Objective: 102549		SCRIBE the configuration and operational characteristics of Chemical and me Control System components.					
Question Source:		Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)			
Question History:		Last NRC Exam					
Question Cognitive L	_evel:	Memory or Fundar Comprehension or	0	X			
10 CFR Part 55 Cont	tent:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43					

	omments / Reference: From SO23-15-58.A, 58A04							Revision # 10)	
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION ALARM RESPONSE INSTRUCTION SO23-15- UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 10 PAGE 14 ATTACHMENT 2										
58A04 V	CT L	EVEL HI/LO	0							
APPLICABILI	ΓY	PRIORITY	REFL	ASH	ASS		NS			
Modes 1-4		WHITE	N/	A		NONE				
INITIATING DEVICE		NOUN NAME	E	SETP	OINT	VALIDATION INSTRUMENT	PCS	S ID	LINK # U2/U3	
2(3)LSH-0226	2(3) High	MT-077 Level S	witch	HI 809	%	2(3)LI-0226B 2(3)LR-0226 2(3)LI-0226A	L226 L227		686/708	
2(3)LSL-0226	2(3) Low	MT-077 Level S	witch	LO 35	%	2(3)LI-0227				
1.0 <u>REQUIRE</u> 1.1 Pr										
2.0 <u>CORREC</u>	TIVE	I to Section 2.0	-							
2.0 <u>CORREC</u> SPECIFIC	TIVE /	<u>ACTIONS</u> : (Co	-		ECIFI	C CORRECTIVE A	CTION	15		
2.0 <u>CORREC</u> SPECIFIC <u>LEVEL LC</u> 2.3 VCT auto	TIVE / CAU	ACTIONS: (Co SES control failure	-	SP Ma	nually	C CORRECTIVE A	r SO23	3-3-2.		
2.0 <u>CORREC</u> SPECIFIC <u>LEVEL LC</u> 2.3 VCT auto (If VCT is	TIVE / CAU	ACTIONS: (Co SES control failure and no auto curred).	ntinued	SP Ma Se	nually ction fo	raise VCT level per	r SO23 Makeu	3-3-2. up Mo	de.	
2.0 <u>CORREC</u> SPECIFIC <u>LEVEL LC</u> 2.3 VCT auto (If VCT is makeup h	TIVE / CAU	ACTIONS: (Co SES control failure and no auto curred).	2.3	SP Ma Se <u>If</u> V ma	rnually ction f /CT le keup i	raise VCT level per or Manual Blended vel has dropped to 3	r SO23 Makeu 32%, <u>tl</u> er leve O23-3	3-3-2. up Mo <u>then</u> v el to n 3-1.10	ode. erify auto ormal . Section	
2.0 <u>CORREC</u> SPECIFIC <u>LEVEL LC</u> 2.3 VCT auto (If VCT is makeup h	TIVE / CAU	ACTIONS: (Co SES control failure and no auto curred).	2.3	SP Ma Se <u>If</u> V ma 2.4	/CT le /CT le keup i .1 R op fo	vaise VCT level per or Manual Blended vel has dropped to 3 is in progress. ESTORE Pressuriz perating band per S	r SO23 Makeu 32%, <u>ti</u> er leve O23-3 er Leve	3-3-2. up Mo then v el to n 3-1.10 el Cor evel, <u>t</u>	ode. erify auto ormal , Section ntrol. <u>then</u> refer	

Comments / Reference: From SO23-15-58.A, 58A06 Revision									
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION ALARM RESPONSE INSTRUCTION SO23-15-58.A UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 10 PAGE 19 OF 131 ATTACHMENT 2									
58A06 BORIC ACID TO VCT FLOW HI/LO									
APPLICABILITY	Y PRIORITY	REFLASH	ASS	OCIATED WINDO	WS				
Modes ALL	AMBER	N/A		58A14					
INITIATING DEVICE	NOUN NAME	SETP	OINT	VALIDATION INSTRUMENT	PCS ID	LINK # U2/U3			
2(3)FSHL-0210Y	Reactor Make Up Water-Boric Acid Make Up Flow Deviation Alarm	<u>+</u> 1 gpm controlle setpoint (100 sec Delay) ['	er : Time	2(3)FQI-0210Y	F210Y	688/710	-		
2(3) Rea 2.0 <u>CORRECTI</u>	nable to obtain requ FIC-210Y, <u>then</u> SE actor Coolant Syste <u>VE ACTIONS</u> :	CURE flow to m.	prevent	t unplanned boratio	on or dilu	peration of tion of the	1		
SPECIFIC (AUSES	51	YECIFIC	CORRECTIVE A	CHONS		+		
	NOTE: <u>If</u> in the manual make up mode, <u>then</u> the boric acid pump has to be manually started.								
2.1 Boric Acid F	oump not running	du	2.1 ENSURE that a Boric Acid Pump is running during make up per SO23-3-2.2, Makeup Operations.						
Controller fa 2(3)FV-021	0Y, Makeup Flow ails to control 0Y, Boric Acid charge Flow Contro	ol	 2.2 ENSURE 2(3)FIC-0210Y: Controller energized AUTO is selected "OOS" is not displayed on controller 2.2.1 <u>If</u> "OOS" is displayed on the controller, <u>then</u> notify the I&C Department to reprogram the controller. 						
	abled when 2(3)HS is in the DILUTE P		witch fo	r Demin Water and	d Boric Ad	cid Make Up	4		

Comments / Reference: From SO23-15-58.A, 58A14 Revisio							
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION ALARM RESPONSE INSTRUCTION SO23-15-58.A UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 10 ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 38 OF 131							
58A14	BORIC ACID PU	MPS AU	ITO STAR	T FAILURE			
APPLICABI	ITY PRIORITY	REFLA	SH ASSO		NS		
Modes Al	L WHITE	NO		58A46, 58A47			
INITIATING DEVICE	NOUN NAM	E	SETPOINT	VALIDATION INSTRUMENT	PCS ID	LINK # U2/U3	
2(3)PSL-0206 2(3)PSL-0208	2(3)P-175 Discharg 2(3)P-174 Discharg		85 PSIG 85 PSIG	NONE	NONE	696/718 697/719 698/720	
₩ 1.1 2.0 <u>CORRE</u>	CTIVE ACTIONS:	the make	up evolution p	per the in-use sec	tion of SO2	23-3-2.2.	1
SPECIF	IC CAUSES		IC CORREC	TIVE ACTIONS			
	Failure of the Selected 2.1 TRANSFER to the other BAMU Pump per SO23-2-19, Section for Rotation of Auxiliary Plant Equipment - Unit 2(3).						
3.0 <u>ASSOCI</u>	ATED RESPONSES:						
	POSITION 2(3)HS-02	10, Makeu	p Mode Seleo	ctor to AUTO.			
3.1						3.1.10, and	

mments / Reference: From SD-SO23-390, Page 53				
ON	SYSTEM DESCRIPTION REVISION 17	SD-S023-390 PAGE 53 OF 196		
D CHARGING				
(Continued)				
ents (Continued)				
Volume Control Tank ((Continued)	(VCT), 2(3)T-077 (Figures I	-1 & 13)		
Level Indication, 2(3	3)LI-0226A, Level Recorder,	2(3)LR-0226 on		
.1 2(3)L1-0226A is also 2(3)L-042.	provided on Evacuation Shu	tdown Panel		
	<pre>ID CHARGING (Continued) nents (Continued) Volume Control Tank ((Continued) Differential Pressure Level Indication, 2(3 2(3)CR-58, and contro 0.1 2(3)L1-0226A is also 2(3)L-042. D.2 Differential Pressure </pre>	ION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION REVISION 17 ID CHARGING (Continued) ments (Continued) Volume Control Tank (VCT), 2(3)T-077 (Figures I- (Continued) Differential Pressure Level Instruments provide Level Indication, 2(3)LI-0226A, Level Recorder, 2(3)CR-58, and controls for Automatic Makeup Sys 0.1 2(3)L1-0226A is also provided on Evacuation Shut		



Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	005 k	<5.03
	Importance Rating	2.9	

Residual Heat Removal System: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RHRS: Reactivity effects of RHR fill water

Proposed Question: Common 4

Given the following conditions during Refueling:

- Unit 3 is in MODE 6 and core re-load has been completed.
- While filling and venting a portion of the out-of-service Shutdown Cooling Train, an inadvertent dilution occurred.
- This lowered Refueling Cavity and RCS boron concentration from 2672 ppm to 2587 ppm.


Which ONE (1) of the following describes the indications observed as a result of this dilution?

- A. Slight rise in cavity level and a small rise in source range count rate.
- B. Slight rise in Core Exit Thermocouple temperature and a doubling in source range count rate.
- C. Small rise in dose rates around Shutdown Cooling Equipment and a small rise in source range count rate.
- D. Small drop in dose rates around Shutdown Cooling Equipment and a doubling in source range count rate.

Proposed Answer: A

- A. Correct. The only level change will be associated with the amount of water added and the count rate changes would be small given that the previously existing shutdown margin was > 5% (Keff ≤ .95) and the IBW would be about 105 ppm/% at BOL. There also would be no significant increase in N-16 gamma production to cause coolant dose rates to rise.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that the boron change was large enough to cause a doubling and cause an increase in nuclear heat, however, there would be no CET change until the Reactor was at the POAH.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that the change in core count rate would also be reflected in the coolant dose rate. There also would be no significant increase in N-16 gamma production to cause coolant dose rates to rise.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because dilution of the RCS could slightly reduce RCS specific activity and it could be thought that the boron change was large enough to cause a doubling.

ES-401	SONGS Oct 2009 NRC	C Written Exam Workshe	et Form ES-401-5
Technical Reference(s)	Operation Physics LP 2AO711, Pages	Summary, Fig 3.2-4 3 13 & 14	Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference
Proposed references to	be provided during exa	amination: None	
Learning Objective: 52680	-	•	II change with successive equal actor: Factor by which count
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	() X	Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Lev	el: Memory or Funda Comprehension o	mental Knowledge r Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Conter	nt: 55.41 <u>1, 5</u> 55.43		



Comme	nts / I	Refere	nce: From LP 2AO711, Page 13	Revision # 5-4
6.1.2	Inad	verten	t Dilution	
	.1	Proce	edure entry conditions:	
		.1.1	Unexplained rise in reactor power	
		.1.2	Unexplained rise in RCS temperature	
		.1.3	Unexpected lowering of RCS boron concentration	
		.1.4	Unexplained increase in count rate when reactor is shut down	
	.2		ti∨ely rapid boron dilution can occur if one of the wing conditions are present:	
		.2.1	Blended makeup to the VCT with BAMU pumps unavailable or the VCT Blend setpoints aren't properly set	
		.2.2	Placing an IX in service without being fully saturated to RCS boron concentration (or placing the deborating IX in service).	
		.2.3	Failure of Letdown Temperature controller to maintain temperature such that temperature decreases. This causes an increased affinity for boron absorption leading to a dilution.	
		.2.4	PMW system (pump/valve) failure	
	.3	Grad	lual boron dilutions	

Comments /	Refere	ence: Fro	m LP 2AO711, Page 14	Revision # 5-4
	.3.1		4-2 delineated 7 events had occurred one year period due to:	
		.3.1.1	Preparing demineralizers for service	
		.3.1.2	Routine boron dilution activities near full power	
	.3.2		Boron Dilutions during shutdown are of ar concern.	
		.3.2.1	RCS may be in a (reduced inventory) condition	
		.3.2.2	Plant activities increase methods/opportunity of diluting RCS.	
		.3.2.3	New fuel with higher enrichment.	
		.3.2.4	Safety systems may be disabled e.g. (RPS trips)	
.4	Actio	ns		
	.4.1	If Refuel	ling in Progress	
		.4.1.1	Suspend core alterations or positive reactivity additions	
		.4.1.2	If cavity is being filled, stop fill and verify Boron Concentration per requirements	

SONGS Oct 2009 NRC Written Exam Worksheet

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	005 ł	<2.01
	Importance Rating	3.0	

Residual Heat Removal System:Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: RHR pumpsProposed Question:Common 5

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 2 is at 100% power.
- Unit 3 is cooling down in MODE 4.
- 230 kV Switchyard is in a normal alignment.
- All 4160 VAC 1E Bus voltages have lowered to 3950 V.

After 30 seconds has elapsed, which ONE (1) of the following is the power supply to Unit 3 Shutdown Cooling Pump 3P016?


- A. Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 2XR2 via Bus 2A06.
- B. Emergency Diesel Generator 2G003 via Bus 2A06.
- C. Emergency Diesel Generator 3G003 via Bus 3A06.
- D. Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 3XR2 via Bus 3A06.


Proposed Answer: D

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer on the opposite Unit (2XR2) is the Preferred Power Source, however, when a degraded voltage exists on both Units (Switchyard in a normal alignment) this transfer would not take place.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because this power source would be available, however, it requires manual actions by the operator including operation of 50.54.X switches in the associated Switchgear Room. Additionally, Bus 3A06 EDG (3G003) would need to be INOPERABLE to take this action.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because had this condition lasted for longer than 110 seconds the Emergency Diesel Generator would be the source of power, however, power to Shutdown Cooling Pump 3P016 remains on the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer.
- D. Correct. This is the power supply to Shutdown Cooling Pump 3P016 until the degraded voltage condition lasts for longer than 110 seconds.

Technical Reference(s)		SD-SO23-120, Pag	je 109	_ Attached w/ Revision # See	
		SD-SO23-120, Figure III-1			Comments / Reference
		SD-SO23-120, Pag	je 154		
		SO23-15-63.C, 630	205		
Proposed references	to be	provided during exa	amination:	None	
Learning Objective: 79744	the C	IS, CSS, and SIS.	Include the	controls, fun	and remotely operated Valves of ction, location, and specific lies where applicable.
Question Source:		Bank # Modified Bank # New	>		Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:		Last NRC Exam			
Question Cognitive Level:		Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis		X	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:		55.41 <u>7, 8</u> 55.43			

Comments / Reference: From SD-SO23-120, Page 109 Revision # 19					
NUCLEAR ORGAN UNITS 2 AND 3	SD-SO23-120 GE 109 OF 181				
PART III 1E 4.16 k	V AND 480 V ELECTRICAL D	ISTRIBUTION SYSTEM			
2.0 DESCRIPTION	<u>ON</u> (Continued)				
2.1.4	General Control Scheme				
 A description of the automatic transfer capability that exists between the 4.16 kV 1E buses of each Unit is discussed below. For simplicity, this discussion covers only one load group (2A04). However, similar operations take place on the redundant load group and the load groups associated with the other unit. 					
 Bus 2A04 is normally supplied from Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (2XR1). If power from the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (2XR1) to bus 2A04 is lost, the following actions take place: 					
 The LOVS or SDVS (Sustained Degraded Voltage System) also sends a signal to start Diesel Generator 2G002. 					
4. After the residual voltage at bus 2A04 has decayed to approximately 25%, as detected by bus 2A04 residual voltage relays, the LOVS or SDVS signals the Unit 3 bus tie circuit breaker 3A04-16 to close provided bus 3A04 has normal voltage and is being powered from its respective Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 3XR1 or Unit Auxiliary Transformer 3XU1.					
 After 3A04-16 closes, Unit 2 bus tie circuit breaker 2A04-17 closes and bus 2A04 will be powered from Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 3XR1, through bus 3A04. 					
6. If bus 3A04 is not being supplied by Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 3XR1 as detected by Reserve Auxiliary Transformer breaker (3A04-18) not being closed or if bus 3A04 has no voltage, the transfer will not be permitted and bus tie breaker 3A04-16 will not close. Additionally an interlock prevents crosstie circuit breaker 3A04-16 from closing if the Unit 3 Diesel Generator (3G002) circuit breaker 3A04-13 is closed and the Diesel Generator from supplying two load groups and overloading the Diesel Generator, since the Diesel Generator is only rated to carry the loads associated with one load group. However, if Diesel Generator (3G002) is paralleled with the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (3XR1) during a periodic load test, a LOVS or SDVS at Bus 2A04 will initiate a transfer to Bus 3A04 and the Unit 3 Diesel Generator breaker 3A04-13 will be tripped.					





Comments / Refere	Comments / Reference: From SD-SO23-120, Page 154 Revision # 19						
PART III 1E 4.16 KV AND 480 V ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM							
3.0 OPERATIONS (Continued)							
3.3.6 Cross-Tie to the Opposite Unit's Diesel Generator (Continued)							
7. In this condition, to establish the cross-tie connection between bus 2A04 and bus 3A04, an operator must manually select 2HV-5054XA1 and 2HS-5054XB1 at Exposure Fire Isolation Panel 2L412 in the Unit 2 1E switchgear room at EI. 50' to the "50.54X" position. In the Unit 3 1E switchgear room, the operator must also manually select 3HS-5054XA1 and 3HS-5454XB1 at Exposure Fire Isolation Panel 3L412 to the "50.54X" position.							
8.	The following functions are achieved upon placing the 2HS-5 3HS-5454XB1, 3HS-5054XA1, and 3HS-5054SB1 in the "50, position:						

APPLIC	ABILITY	PRIORITY	REFLASH		ASSOCIATED WI	INDOWS		
Mode	s ALL	RED [1]	N/A	6	3C15, 63C21, 63C28, 630			
INITIATI DEVICE		NOUN NAME	SET	TPOINT	VALIDATION	PCS ID	LINK #	ĺ
27 Devi	e Under	voltage Devic	e N/A	1	2EI-1641	EY8183	1704	
	1.2.2 .1 .2	Relays (127 Notify the LCO 3.3.7, Notify Elec	D-1, 2, 3 CRS/SM and and INITIA trical Tes	& 4) t d the S ATE con st Depa	Cubicle) for tripped (ligh STA to review rrective acti artment.	t ILLUMINA Tech. Spe	ATED).	
	VOLTAGE	IS > 3796	and ≤ 4	154				1
egraded arallel conditio	Voltage with the n exists, e SDVS ti	enerator Outp Signal) circu preferred po then the Die ming relays t	ut breaken itry is de wer source sel Genera	efeated and on ator Ou	 If the Di confirmed deg utput breaker 	esel Gener raded volt must be c	rator is in tage opened to	
	1.2.3				ition exists. n annunciates		2 second	
	.1	Unload the	Diesel Ger	nerator	·.			

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	006	K5.07
	Importance Rating	2.7	

Emergency Core Cooling System: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to ECCS: Expected temperature levels in various locations of the RCS due to various plant conditions
Proposed Question:
Common 6

Given the following conditions:

- A Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) has occurred.
- The break location is a Reactor Coolant System Hot Leg.

Which ONE (1) of the following would be the result if the steps of SO23-12-11, EOI Supporting Attachments, Attachment 11, Simultaneous Hot/Cold Leg Injection were performed <u>immediately</u> following the LOCA diagnosis?

- A. Inadequate core cooling due to the loss of Safety Injection flow out the break.
- B. Safety Injection flow through the core would be stopped.
- C. Boration flow would be inadequate to maintain core SHUTDOWN MARGIN.
- D. High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps would reach run out conditions.

Proposed Answer: A

- A. Correct. Failure to wait two hours prior to initiating Simultaneous Hot/Cold Leg Injection would result in an Inadequate Core Cooling situation. This is due to the fluid injected at the Hot Leg getting entrained in the steam leaving the break in the early period of the LOCA.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because Safety Injection flow from the Hot Leg would be impeded due to steam leaving the core area, however, Cold Leg flow would still be ensured.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because performing Attachment 11 would result in effectively reducing the boration rate, however, boration flow would still exceed the minimum required to maintain SDM.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because under certain core conditions the HPSI Pumps can exceed runout. Attachment 11, Simultaneous Hot/Cold Leg Injection controls the flow rate through the Cold and Hot Leg Injection Valves to prevent this condition from occurring. This issue is addressed in SO23-12-11, Attachment 13.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-14-11, Attachment 11, Step 1a Bases	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO23-12-11, Attachment 11, Step 3 Caution	Comments / Reference
	SO23-14-11, Attachment 13, Bases	

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

U ,	Per the LOCA procedure SO23-12-3 DESCRIBE: The basis for each step, caution or note.					
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	75372	_ _ (Note changes or attach parent) _			
Question History:	Last NRC Exam					
Question Cognitive Leve	I: Memory or Fundamenta Comprehension or Analy	0	X			
10 CFR Part 55 Content	: 55.41 <u>5, 10</u> 55.43	_				

occurs.

Comments / Reference: From SO23-14-1	1, Attachment 11, Step 1a Bases Revision # 2
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3	EOI SUPPORT DOCUMENT SO23-14-11 REVISION 2 PAGE 108 OF 250 ATTACHMENT 1
EOI SUPPORTING ATTACHMI	ENTS BASES AND DEVIATIONS JUSTIFICATION
E	OI STEP BASES
4.0 BASES DESCRIPTION (Continued)
4.14 ATTACHMENT 11, SIMULTANEC	US HOT / COLD LEG INJECTION
Simultaneous injection into both he the precipitation of Boric Acid in the	t and cold legs is used as a flushing mechanism to prevent e Reactor Vessel.
system design features, there are t	on flow instrument design features, and Safety Injection four different Hot/Cold Leg Injection flowpaths within this can be defined by the existing RCS pressure and the number These flowpaths are:
1) Two HPSI pumps are ope	rating and RCS pressure is greater than 500 PSIA
2) Two HPSI pumps are ope	rating and RCS pressure is 500 PSIA or less
One HPSI pump is operat	ing and RCS pressure is greater than 500 PSIA
 One HPSI pump is operate 	ing and RCS pressure is 500 PSIA or less.
the Boric Acid is being concentrate	or Vessel ensures that fluid from the Reactor Vessel (where d) flows out of the break regardless of the break location and of borated water from the other side of the Reactor Vessel.
this attachment, as directed by FS- Injection. The realignment to hot/co	hours must have elapsed following SIAS initiation to initiate 25, MONITOR Need for Simultaneous Hot/Cold Leg old leg injection is unnecessary, and you will not even be into SDC is expected prior to 4 hour after SIAS initiation.
fluid injected into the hot leg may b possibly diverted from reaching the dropped sufficiently such that there injected into the hot leg. The actio	have elapsed since SIAS actuation. Prior to 2 hours, the e entrained in the steam being released from the break and Reactor Vessel. After 2 hours, Core decay heat has is insufficient steam velocity to entrain the fluid being n is taken no later than 4 hours after SIAS in order to ensure minated well before the potential for boron precipitation

		s / Reference: From SO			ERATING INSTRUCTION	Revision # 6 N SO23-12-11 ISS 2
JNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 6 ATTACHMENT 11			IT 11		PAGE 146 OF 278	
		EC	OI SUPPORTIN	G AT	TACHMENTS	
		SIMULTAN	IEOUS HOT /	со	LD LEG INJECTIO	N
	4	ACTION/EXPECTED RES	PONSE		RESPONSE NOT OBT	AINED
	VE	RIFY Entry Conditions:				
	a.	ENSURE time elapsed fi actuation – greater than 2 hours.	rom SIAS			
	b.	VERIFY FS-7, VERIFY S Criteria – NOT satisfied		b.	IF FS-7, VERIFY SI Th - met,	rottle/Stop Criteria
					OR	
					IF Injection valves THF SI Throttle/Stop criteria	ROTTLED to maintain
					THEN EXIT this attach	ment.
2	EN	SURE SDC Valves Close	ed:			
	a.	ENSURE SDC To LPSI Isolation valves - close				
		HV-9337 HV-9377 HV-9339 HV-9378.				
			c	AUT	ION	
	,	An operating HPSI Pump				ed pump run-out.
	VE	RIFY HPSI Operability:				
		VERIFY both trains of HI				

IUCLEAR ORGANIZATION INITS 2 AND 3	EOI SUPPORT DOCUME REVISION 2 ATTACHMENT 1	ENT SO23-14-11 PAGE 111 OF 250			
EOI SUPPORTING ATTAC	HMENTS BASES AND DEVIATIONS	JUSTIFICATION			
	EOI STEP BASES				
.0 BASES DESCRIPTION (Contin	nued)				
.15 ATTACHMENT 12, MINIMUM	REQUIRED SI FLOWRATES DURING	COLD LEG INJECTION			
required total LPSI flowrate tha Injection mode. The table was	nimum required HPSI flow per injection pa at will ensure the system design basis is r s done per injection point to better match sured at pump discharge common heade	met during the Cold Leg Control Board			
As a minimum, one HPSI Train (one HPSI Pump and its four injection valves), and one LPSI Train (one LPSI Pump and two injection valves), operating are required to meet the system design basis.					
Emergency Diesel Generator (lose one HPSI pump, one LPS two legs and HPSI is injecting discharge piping of one RCP w	vsis has shown that for a small break LOC (EDG) is most limiting. With the failure of I pump and two LPSI injection valves. The to four legs. The assumption is made that with an open injection path. Total flow to the PSI and approximately 50% of total LPSI.	one EDG, the plant will hus, LPSI is injecting to at the break is on the			
During a RAS Actuation the LF heat removal requirements at t	PSI pumps are secured. A single HPSI po the start of recirculation.	ump will meet the decay			
values were placed on a sprea	g the best estimate values for SI flow prov adsheet and scales changed to provide va jive operators more data points to evaluat	alues in 50 PSI			
	between this new SI flow table and the si conservative at each point to UFSAR tab				
.16 ATTACHMENT 13, MINIMUM INJECTION	REQUIRED HPSI FLOWRATES DURIN	G HOT / COLD LEG			
post-LOCA long-term cooling. Core flushing to avoid the prec	the Simultaneous Hot/Cold Leg Injection The table provides the flow required two cipitation of boric acid in the Core. Addition-LOCA and a maximum indicated flow of	hours post-LOCA for onal considerations are			

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	007 H	<4.01
	Importance Rating	3.3	

Pressurizer Relief / Quench Tank System: Knowledge of the PRTS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Quench tank cooling Proposed Question: Common 7

Given the following condition:

• Annunciator 50A21 - QUENCH TANK TEMP HI has just alarmed.

Which ONE (1) of the following alignments is used to cool the Quench Tank?

The Quench Tank is...

- A. drained to the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank and refilled with Primary Makeup Water.
- B. vented to the Waste Gas System while the contents cool to ambient temperature.
- C. drained to the Containment Sump and refilled with Primary Makeup Water.
- D. vented and drained to the Radwaste Primary Tank using the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Pumps.

Proposed Answer: A


Explanation:


- A. Correct. This is the guidance provided in Annunciator Response Procedure 50A21. There is no internal method used to cool the Quench Tank.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because this is the required action to address a high Quench Tank pressure, however, a high temperature requires drain and refill of the Quench Tank.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because the Primary Makeup Water Pump is used, however, the effluent is directed to the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank vice Containment Sump.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because this is where the coolant is pumped from the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank, however, this does not address the high temperature and cooling of the Quench Tank.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-15-50.A1, 50A21	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SD-SO23-360, Figure I-6	Comments / Reference
	SD-SO23-650, Figure 1	

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

ES-401	SONGS Oct 2009 NRC Written Exam Worksheet						orm ES-401-5	
Learning Objective: 94467 / 94465 DESCRIBE the configuration and operational characteristics of the Reactor Coolant System components. IDENTIFY Reactor Coolant System flowpaths, components and locations including being able to draw and label system diagrams.								
Question Source:	n Source: Bank # <u>127252</u> Modified Bank # New					(Note changes or attach parent)		
Question History:	Last NF	RC Exam						
Question Cognitive I	-	y or Fundam ehension or		Knowledge ⁄sis	<u> </u>			
10 CFR Part 55 Cor		3, 10						
Comments / Referen	ce: From SO23	8-15-50.A1,	50A2	1		Revisio	n # 8	
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION ALARM RESPONSE INSTRUCTION SO23-15-50.A1 UNITS 2 AND 3 ALARM RESPONSE INSTRUCTION PAGE 48 OF 64 ATTACHMENT 2 ATTACHMENT 2								
APPLICABILITY	PRIORITY	REFLASH	ASS	SOCIATED WINDO	WS			
Modes 1-4	WHITE	N/A		50A31				
INITIATING DEVICE	NOUN NAME	SETP	OINT	VALIDATION INSTRUMENT	PCS ID	LINK # U2/U3		
	2(3)TSH-0116 Quench Tank Temperature High 200°F 2(3)TI-0116 T116 631/653							
 1.0 <u>REQUIRED ACTIONS</u>: 1.1 Cool the Quench Tank by concurrently Draining the Quench Tank to the RCDT through HV-9101, <u>and Making Up through S2(3)1901MU321</u>. 1.1.1 Control Quench Tank pressure by Venting the Quench Tank to the Waste Gas System through 2(3)HV-9100. 								





Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	008	A2.04
	Importance Rating	3.3	

<u>Component Cooling Water System</u>: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCWS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: PRMS alarm

Proposed Question: Common 8

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

- All systems on <u>both</u> Units are aligned for <u>normal</u> MODE 1 conditions.
- Annunciator 57C50 PROCESS/EFFLUENT/AREA RADIATION HI has alarmed from high radiation on 2RE-7819, CCW Non-Critical Loop Radiation Monitor.

Which ONE (1) of the following:

- 1.) Identifies a possible cause for the alarm?
- 2.) What action will be taken to mitigate the situation?
- A. 1.) Waste Gas Compressor leakage into the Component Cooling Water System.
 2.) Swap Waste Gas Compressors and isolate the CCW supply and return valves to the Waste Gas Compressors.
- B. 1.) Radwaste Condensate Return Sample Cooler leakage into the Component Cooling Water System.
 - 2.) Have Chemistry secure any sampling through the Radwaste Condensate Return Sample Cooler.
- C. 1.) Control Element Drive Mechanism Cooler E404 leakage into the Component Cooling Water System.
 - 2.) Shift Control Element Drive Mechanism Cooling Fans and isolate the CCW supply and return to E404.
- D. 1.) Letdown Heat Exchanger leakage into the Component Cooling Water System.
 - 2.) Secure Letdown and Charging and isolate the CCW supply and return to the Letdown Heat Exchanger.

Proposed Answer: D

Explanation:

10 CFR Part 55 Content:


- A. Incorrect. Plausible because a Waste Gas Compressor can leak into CCW and the isolation actions are correct, however, the compressors are normally aligned to Unit 3 Non-Critical Loop.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because the Radwaste Condensate Return Sample Cooler can leak into CCW and the isolation actions are correct, however, the Radwaste Condensate Return Sample Cooler is normally aligned to Unit 3 Non-Critical Loop.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because E404 is supplied by the Unit 2 Non-Critical Loop and the isolation actions are correct, however, the cooler is a CCW to low pressure air heat exchanger and could not leak into the CCW System.
- D. Correct. The Letdown Heat Exchanger is a viable source based on pressure and activity potential and the actions are correct per SO23-13-7.


Technical Reference(s)	SO23-13-7, Step 9	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SD-SO23-400, Figures 3 & 4	Comments / Reference
	SD-SO23-400, Page 10	
Proposed references to b	e provided during examination: <u>No</u>	ne

	ANALYZE normal and abnormal operations of the CCW System.				
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)		
Question History:	Last NRC Exam				
Question Cognitive Le	evel: Memory or Fundam Comprehension or /	0	X		

55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43 _____

nment	ts / Reference: From S	5023-13-7, Step 9		Revision # 13
	AR ORGANIZATION 2 AND 3	ABNORMAL OPE REVISION 13	RATING INSTRUCTION	S023-13-7 PAGE 16 OF 110
	LOSS OF COMPON	ENT COOLING WATER	(CCW)/SALTWATER COO	DLING (SWC)
		OPERATOR	ACTIONS	
	ACTION/EXPECTED RE	SPONSE	RESPONSE NOT O	BTAINED
9	CCW High Activity			
🗆 a.	NOTIFY the 70' HP	Control Point.		
b.	CHECK system param	eters:		
	• CCW return temp	peratures		
	• CCW flow rates			
	 Pipe radiation hand-held radia 	levels (with ation detector)		
	At possible leak 1	ocations:		
	 E-062, Letdown TI-6295 and FI- TI-6389 and FI- 	-6294 (Loop A)		
	 Shutdown Coolin Exchangers TI-6332 and 2(3)FISL-6331 (TI-6251 and 2(3)FISL-6250 ((ME-003)		
	 Spent Fuel Pool Exchangers TI-6248 and FI- TI-6304 and FI- 	6297 (ME-005)		
	 AX-7546, Radwas Return sample of 			
□ c.	MONITOR RIC-7819, Radiation Monitor, trend.			
□ d.	DETERMINE the sour activity.			and tuda of laitant
	1) ISOLATE the lea	ik	d. EVALUATE the m <u>and</u> activity p	er S023-13-14.
	2) INITIATE necess	sary repairs.		
□ e.	GO TO Step 19.			





omments / Reference: From SD-SO23-4	00, Page 10 Revision # 18
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3	SYSTEM DESCRIPTION SD-S023-400 REVISION 18 PAGE 10 OF 70
2.0 DESCRIPTION (Continued)	
2.1 Main Flow Paths (See Figu	ure 1) (Continued)
	single failure of a Surge Tank Normal Makeup buld result in overpressurizing both trains of
	Monitor is installed to detect leakage of not the Component Cooling Water System.
	monitor monitors the radiation level of the in the return header of the Non-Critical Loop.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	008 G	2.4.46
	Importance Rating	4.2	

<u>Component Cooling Water System</u>: Emergency Procedures/Plan: Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with plant conditions

Proposed Question: Common 9

Given the following conditions with <u>both</u> Units operating at 100% power:

- Annunciator 64A26 CCW SURGE TANK TRAIN A LEVEL HI/LO is in alarm on <u>both</u> Units.
- The following Component Cooling Water (CCW) parameters are reported:
 - Unit 2 Train A Loop CCW Pump discharge pressure is 118 psig and CCW Surge Tank level is lowering.
 - Unit 3 Train A Loop CCW Pump discharge pressure is 113 psig and CCW Surge Tank level is rising.

Which ONE (1) of the following would cause these alarms and indications?

- A. Unit 2 and Unit 3 Train A CCW loops are cross-connected via Post Accident Cleanup Unit E370.
- B. Unit 2 and Unit 3 Train A CCW loops are cross-connected via Emergency Chiller E336.
- C. Unit 2 CCW Surge Tank fill valve is closed with a tube leak in the Unit 3 Letdown Heat Exchanger.
- D. Unit 3 CCW Surge Tank fill valve is closed with a tube leak in the Unit 2 Letdown Heat Exchanger.

Proposed Answer: B

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because it may be thought that the Spent Fuel Building CCW loads are common and may be swapped between Units similar to the Emergency Chiller, however, E370 is a Unit specific Train A load.
- B. Correct. Emergency Chiller E336 can be supplied from either Unit 2 or Unit 3 Train A CCW. There are no check valves and inter-unit leakage is a real potential.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because the pressure difference across the Unit 3 Letdown Heat Exchanger would cause a leak into CCW and Unit 3 level would rise, however, the fill valve being closed does not by itself explain Unit 2 level lowering.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because with or without a leak in the Letdown Heat Exchanger, the pressures listed would drive flow to the Unit 3 side causing the level transients described, however no cross-tie path is provided to explain this.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-13-7, Step 11a	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO23-2-17.1, Attachment 1	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

Learning Objective:	DESCRIBE the configuration and operational characteristics of CCW System
81028 / 81030	components.
	ANALYZE neuronal and apparently an another a of the CCW/ System

ANALYZE normal and abnormal operations of the CCW System.

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	135049	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundar Comprehension or	0	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7, 10</u> 55.43		

		R ORGANIZATION 2 AND 3	ABNORMAL REVISION		TIN	G INSTRUCTION	S023-13-7 PAGE 18 OF 110
		LOSS OF COMPONENT	COOLING W	ATER (CCW)/SALTWATER COOL	ING (SWC)
			OPERA	TOR AC	TI	ONS	
		ACTION/EXPECTED RESPO	NSE			RESPONSE NOT OBT	AINED
11		Cross Unit CCW Leakag	e				
⊐ a		VERIFY Emergency Chil Supply and Return Val recently realigned.		П	a.	ENSURE Emergency Supply and Retur aligned correctl Attachment for T Emergency Chille E-336 CCW Supply	n Valves are y per SO23-2-17, ransferring r E-335 and/or
☐ b. VERIFY Unit 3 supplying Unit 2 ☐ b and 3 Noncritical Loops in Radwaste.		b.	 ENSURE Unit 2 and 3 Noncritical Loops in Radwaste are aligned correctly for current plant 				
		 ENSURE CLOSED SA12 Radwaste Return He Crosstie. 	203MU100, eader Unit			conditions.	
П		 ENSURE CLOSED SA12 Radwaste Return He Crosstie. 					
□ c		REQUEST Maintenance E to evaluate cause of leakage.					
d		GO TO Step 19.					

Comme	nts / Reference: F	rom SO23-2-17.1, Attachme	ent 1		Revision # 15
	EAR ORGANIZATION 2 AND 3	N OPERATING INSTRUCTIO REVISION 15 ATTACHMENT 1	ON		23-2-17.1 GE 7 OF 119
2.0	PROCEDURE (Co	ontinued)			
<u>STEP</u>	NUMBER OF COMPONENT	NOUN NAME	<u>NOTE</u>	REQUIRED POSITION F	INITIALS PERF/ IND VER
2.1.7	SDC HX ME-004				
.1	2(3)HCV-6548	Shutdown Cooling Train A Heat Exchanger ME-004 CCW Supply Throttle Valve	/	LOCKED (A) 73/8 (7 ⁵ /8) TURNS OPEN_	
.2	2(3)HV-6501	Shutdown Cooling Train A Heat Exchanger ME-004 CCW Return Isolation Valve	/ [1]	CLOSED/ OPEN _	
.3	N/A	2(3)HV-6501 Auto/Manual Positioner [LS-2.7]		AUTO _	
.4	S2(3)2417MR171	Shutdown Cooling Train A HX ME-004 CCW Return Iso HV-6501 Inst Air Supply Block Valve		OPEN _	
2.1.8	Post Accident Cle	eanup Unit ME -370			
.1	S2(3)1203MU063	Fuel Handling Bldg Train A PACU ME-370 CCW Return Throttle Valve		LOCKED (A) 21/10 (2) TURNS OPEN_	
.2	S2(3)1203MU015	Fuel Handling Bldg Train A PACU ME-370 CCW Supply Isolation Valve		LOCKED (A) OPEN _	
.3	S2(3)1203MU087	Fuel Handling Bldg Train A PACU ME-370 CCW Return Isolation Valve		LOCKED (A) OPEN _	
1					

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	010	K3.02
	Importance Rating	4.0	

Pressurizer Pressure Control System: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the PZR PCS will have on the following: RPS

Proposed Question: Common 10

Given the following conditions at 100% power:

- HS-0100A, Pressurizer Pressure Channel Select Switch is selected to Channel X.
- PT-0100X, Pressurizer Pressure Control System pressure transmitter has failed low.

Assuming no operator actions, which ONE (1) of the following identifies the <u>FIRST</u> Reactor Protection System trip that will be actuated?

- A. Low Departure from Nuclear Boiling Ratio.
- B. High Pressurizer Pressure.
- C. High Local Power Density.
- D. Low Pressurizer Pressure.

Proposed Answer: B


Explanation:


- A. Incorrect. Plausible because a low Pressurizer pressure is associated with a low DNBR, however, when this pressure transmitter fails low it turns all Heaters on and Pressurizer pressure will rise.
- B. Correct. Failing this transmitter low energizes all Pressurizer Heaters, raising pressure until the high pressure trip setpoint is reached.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because low DNBR and high Local Power Density (LPD) trips are generated by Core Protection Calculators which have inputs including pressurizer pressure, however, pressure only affects DNBR trip setpoint, not LPD.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible if thought that the pressure transmitter failing low would cause a low Pressurizer pressure trip.


Technical Reference(s)	SD-SO23-360, Figure III-5	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO23-SO23-710, Figures 1 & 8	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

Learning Objective: DESCRIBE the response of the Plant Protection System to failures and alarms, including possible causes, effects on the system or overall plant, and operator 56622 actions to mitigate the effects. **Question Source:** Bank # 128108 (Note changes or attach parent) Modified Bank # New _____ Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis Х 55.41 _7_____ 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43







Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	012	<2.01
	Importance Rating	3.3	

<u>Reactor Protection System</u>: Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: RPS channels, components, and interconnections

Proposed Question: Common 11

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 2 is at 100% power.
- Pressurizer Level Control is selected to Channel X.
- Pressurizer Pressure Control is selected to Channel X.

If Vital 120 VAC Instrument Bus 2Y02 is deenergized, which ONE (1) of the following occurs?

A. All Pressurizer Proportional and Backup Heaters energize.

- B. A Reactor trip will occur.
- C. All three (3) Charging Pumps automatically start.
- D. Control Element Assembly Calculator #1 fails.

Proposed Answer: D

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because all Pressurizer Heaters will energize upon a loss of Vital 120 VAC Instrument Bus 2Y01 with Channel X in service.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because a Core Protection Calculator Auxiliary Trip will generate a Reactor trip, however, two channels are required. Only Channel B trips on the loss of Instrument Bus 2Y02.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because all Charging Pumps will start upon a loss of Vital 120 VAC Instrument Bus 2Y01 with Channel X in service.
- D. Correct. Loss of Vital 120 VAC Instrument Bus 2Y02 will cause Control Element Assembly Calculator #1 failure.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-13-18, Attachment 2	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

Learning Objective: DESCRIBE the operation of Pressurizer Level Control System components, 56418 instrumentation, controls and alarms including function, location, interlocks, capacity and power supplies where applicable.

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	127140	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	SONGS 2006	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundar Comprehension or	6	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7, 10</u> 55.43		

nme	nts / Reference: From SO	23-13-18, Attachment 2	Revision # 8
	AR ORGANIZATION 2 AND 3	ABNORMAL OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 8 ATTACHMENT 2	S023-13-18 PAGE 20 OF 33
.0	PROCEDURE (Continued) 2.2 EFFECTS AND ACTI	ONS ON LOSS OF VITAL BUS YO2. (Continue	ed)
	AFFECTED EQUIPMENT	INDICATIONS AND ASSOCIATED AC	TIONS
.7	Atmospheric Dump Valve/Controller: HV-8421/PIC-8421-2	 HV-8421, Atmospheric Dump Valve, F HV-8421, Atmospheric Dump Valve, m operated locally. 	
.8	Atmospheric Dump Valve/Controller: HV-8419/PIC-8419-1	 HV-8419, Atmospheric Dump Valve, w Pressure input but can be operated Controller in MANUAL using PIC-841 	from the
.9	EFAS Trip Paths 2 & 4 Valves: HV-4712 HV-4705 HV-4715 HV-4731 HV-4716	 Valves Open. The affected Unit is in a 4 hour A Statement (Tech. Spec. LCO 3.7.5) valves will not close on a MSIS si 	since these
.10	Status indicating lamps for both RPS (RTCB) Status Panels	 Extinguished (Control Room and Hal indication). 	lway
.11	RX Trip Paths 1 and 2 Actuated	 INITIATE local verification that R and 6 are OPEN. INITIATE local verification that R and 8 are CLOSED. 	
.12	Channel B CPC	• Tripped.	
.13	CEAC 1	• Failed.	
.14	PPS HI Log Power	 Tripped. 	

mme	ents / Referenc	e: From SC)23-1	3-18, Attachment 2	Revision # 8	
	EAR ORGANIZAT S 2 AND 3	ION	REV	ORMAL OPERATING INSTRUCTION ISION 8 ACHMENT 2	S023-13-18 PAGE 19 OF 33	
			LO	SS OF VITAL BUS YO2		
				CONTINUOUS USE		
.0	PREREQUISIT	ES				
	None.					
.0	PROCEDURE					
		Tech. Spe and 3.7.5.		mpacted LCO 3.4.9.b, 3.8.1, 3.8.	.2, 3.8.3, 3.8.7,	
	2.2 EFFEC	TS AND ACTI	ONS	ON LOSS OF VITAL BUS YO2.		
	2.2.1	Perfor	rm th	e following:		
	AFFECTED EQU	PMENT		INDICATIONS AND ASSOCIATED	ACTIONS	
.1	PPS B status extinguished			VERIFY protection system bistab on PPS Channels A and C ROMs.	les NOT TRIPPED	
.2	Channels 1-4 ESFAS Funct along the bo the ROM ext	ion lights		VERIFY all ESFAS function light on PPS Channels A, B, C, & D RO		
.3	Channel B Lu on CR56 ext			VERIFY Safety Channel indicatio input to PPS Channels A, C, and indicate that a Plant Protectio has been exceeded.	D do not	
.4	Charging Pur P-191, and I			Operate Charging Pumps as neces PZR level.	sary to control	T
5	PZR Pressure			ENSURE PZR Level Channel X is S	ELECTED.	
*	Level Contro	51	n.	If LIC-0110 is selected to setp transfer Pressurizer level setp S023-3-1.10, Attachment for Tra Pressurizer Level and Pressure	oint to LS1 per nsferring	
				<u>If</u> an ACTUAL Pressurizer LO-LO <u>then</u> ENSURE all heaters DE-ENER (AR 020900184)		
	Vital Bus In YOO2 de-ener			ENSURE S023-6-17, Attachment fo Vital Bus Y02 from the Alternat progress. (Tech. Spec. LCO 3.8	e Source, in	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	013	<6.01
	Importance Rating	2.7	

Engineered Safety Features Actuation System: Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the ESFAS: Sensors and detectors

Proposed Question: Common 12

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 2 is in MODE 1.
- PT-351A, Containment Narrow Range Pressure Transmitter has failed HIGH.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the effects on the Plant Protective System if a <u>second</u> Containment Narrow Range Pressure Transmitter failed HIGH?

- A. CIAS only actuates.
- B. CIAS, SIAS and CSAS actuate.
- C. CIAS, SIAS and CCAS actuate.
- D. CIAS, SIAS, CSAS and CCAS actuate.

Proposed Answer: C


Explanation:


- A. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that only low Pressurizer Pressure actuated SIAS and that CCAS and CSAS actuation require SIAS actuation.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that with high Containment pressure and SIAS that CSAS would actuate and that the CCAS required a 2/4 signal from the wide range Containment pressure transmitters.
- C. Correct. SIAS and CIAS will actuate on 2/4 narrow range Containment pressures at the high setpoint and when SIAS actuates then CCAS will actuate.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that with a failed high Containment pressure and SIAS, that CSAS and CCAS also would actuate however CSAS requires 2/4 from the wide range Containment pressure transmitters.

Technical Reference(s)	SD-SO23-720, Figure 1	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

ES-401	SO	NGS Oct 2009 NR	C Written Exam	Works	eet Form	ES-401-5
Learning Objective: 56627	instru		g function, locat	tion, de	n System components sign basis, interlocks, s licable.	
Question Source:		Bank # Modified Bank # New	X		(Note changes or atta	ch parent)
Question History:		Last NRC Exam				
Question Cognitive L	_evel:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o		dge	X	
10 CFR Part 55 Con	tent:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43				





Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	022	A1.04
	Importance Rating	3.2	

<u>Containment Cooling System</u>: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CCS controls including: Cooling water flow Proposed Question: Common 13

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 2 is in MODE 1.
- Train A Component Cooling Water System is in service with Train B Component Cooling Water System in standby.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the <u>normal</u> flowpath alignment of Component Cooling Water (CCW) to the Containment Emergency Cooling Units (ECU)?

- A. Train A ECU CCW Supply and Return Valves are open. Train B ECU CCW Supply and Return Valves are open.
- B. Train A ECU CCW Supply and Return Valves are open. Train B ECU CCW Supply and Return Valves are closed.
- C. Train A ECU CCW Supply Valves are closed and Return Valves are open. Train B ECU CCW Supply Valves are open and Return Valves are closed.
- D. Train A ECU CCW Supply Valves are open and Return Valves are closed. Train B ECU CCW Supply Valves are closed and Return Valves are open.

Proposed Answer: A

Explanation:

- A. Correct. This is the correct lineup for ECU cooling water flow when in MODE 1 with one Train of Component Cooling Water in operation. Supply and Return Valves on both Trains are open with CCW flow through the two (2) Train A ECUs.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because Train B CCW is in standby, however, at a minimum the Train B Inlet Valves would be open per L&S 5.7.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because the Train B alignment would be considered correct, however, with the Unit in MODE 1 the Train A ECU Supply Valves would also be open.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because the Train A Supply Valves are open and that is required, however, Train A Supply Valves must also be open.

Technical Reference	s) _	SO23-2-17, Sectior	n 6.1		Attached w/ Revision # See
	_	SO23-2-17, L&S 2.	18 and 5.7		Comments / Reference
Proposed references	to be	provided during exa	amination:	None	
		CRIBE the configura onents.	ation and op	erational c	haracteristics of CCW System
Question Source:		Bank # Modified Bank # New	>	ζ	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:		Last NRC Exam			
Question Cognitive Le	evel:	Memory or Fundar Comprehension or		wledge	X
10 CFR Part 55 Conte	ent:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43			

SERVICE IN TRAINS VALVES/ TRAIN VALVE/ SERVICE IN-SERVICE OPEN CLOSED OPEN	within 9 10045) low hav e ERENCE
INFORMATION USE 6.1.1 Change alignments in a sequence that maintains CCW flows of limits (between 5,000 gpm and 16,000 gpm) and ends with the preferred alignment as listed below: (AR 040101606, 06030)	within 9 10045) low hav e ERENCE
6.1.1 Change alignments in a sequence that maintains CCW flows vinits (between 5,000 gpm and 16,000 gpm) and ends with the preferred alignment as listed below: (AR 040101606, 06030	e 0045) ow have ERENCE
limits (between 5,000 gpm and 16,000 gpm) and ends with the preferred alignment as listed below: (AR 040101606, 06030 Image: Status of Status of Status of Status of TRAINS SERVICE Status of CCW TRAINS IN SERVICE Status of CCW TRAINS Status of CCW TRAINS Status of CCW TRAINS Status of TRAINS IN SERVICE Status of TRAINS IN SERVICE Status of TRAINS Status of TRAINS Status of CCW TRAINS Status of TR	e 0045) ow have ERENCE
SDC IN SERVICE NUMBER OF TRAINS IN SERVICE STATUS OF CCW TRAINS 2 ECU RETURN VALVES/ TRAIN 1 SDCHX OUTLET VALVE/ TRAIN NCL SUPPLY VALVE/ VALVE NCL SUPPLY VALVE NO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 NO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	ERENCE
SDC IN SERVICE OF TRAINS IN SERVICE STATUS OF CCW TRAINS ZECU RETURN VALVES/ TRAIN ISDENX OUTLET VALVE/ TRAIN NCL SUPPLY VALVE/ VALVE/ TRAIN NCL SUPPLY VALVE/ VALVE/ TRAIN NCL SUPPLY VALVE/ VALVE/ NO 1 IN-SERVICE TRAIN OPEN CLOSED OPEN NO 1 STANDBY OPEN CLOSED CLOSED L	
NO 1 TRAIN OPEN CLOSED OPEN L	[1]
	[1] S-2.15
NO 2	11121
NO 2 IN-SERVICE OPEN OPEN CLOSED L	[1] [2] S-2.15
YES 1	S-2.15
TRAIN OPEN OPEN CLOSED	5-2.15
YES 2 IN-SERVICE OPEN OPEN CLOSED	[2]
IN-SERVICE CLOSED OPEN OPEN	S-2.15
[1] Alternate alignments may be used for unavailable equipment. For example, 1 SDCHX Outlet Valve may be used in place of 2 ECU Return Valves on the Train supplying the NCL. Flow thru an ECU associated with an in service CCW Critical may be terminated/initiated to support maintenance activities (MOVATS, etc.) prov CCW Flow Limits (between 5,000 and 16,000 gpm) are maintained for the operati requirements at the time. (LS-2.16, LS-2.18)	Loop /ided

Comments / R	eference: From	SO23-2-17, L&S 2.18		Revision # 27
NUCLEAR O UNITS 2 ANI	RGANIZATION D3	OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 27 ATTACHMENT 9	SO23-2 PAGE 9	-17 98 OF 107
	<u>CCWSYST</u>	EM LIMITATIONS AND SPECIFICS (Continue	ed)	
2.0 SY ST	EM GUIDELINES	(Continued)		
2.16	CCW Train prefe	erred alignment is designed to provide the follo	wing:	
		system flow <u>and</u> pressure to minimize cross-tr are in service	ain leakage	e when
		5,000 gpm mini-flow protection flowpath for the I it inadvertently start	pump on t	he standby
		CW flow through the SDCHX < 7,600 gpm		
	• Maintains C	CVV Pump flow < 16,000 gpm (pump runout)		
	example, substit	ents that ensure these conditions are satisfied, uting 1 SDCHX Outlet Valve in place of 2 ECU ing the NCL ensures that flow thru the SDCHX	Return Va	veson
2.17	Train) is <u>NOT</u> all be significantly a parallel pumps fi	peration of CCW Pumps (i.e., two Pumps in ser owed for IST's. The numerical valves obtained altered, <u>and</u> invalid if two pumps are running in or short periods of time such as during pump tr , AR 071101081)	during an parallel. Ri	IST will unning
2.18	HX , or the NCL (Loop can support 2 of the following 3 loads: a p (includes SFP Cooling). Placing all three loads aximum flowrate to be exceeded (potential rund 1300045)	s on the Cri	tical Loop
	instr then the SO2 Retu	5500 and HV-6501, SDCHX CCW Outlet Valve ument air. <u>When</u> in the Preferred Alignment wi a loss of instrument air may cause CCW Pum Frain supplying the Non-Critical Loop. <u>If</u> this of 3-13-5, Loss of Instrument Air, will direct closir um Valve on the Train supplying the Non-Critica 070600872)	ith SDC se p runout to ccurs, <u>then</u> 1g one ECU	cured, occur on
Comments / R	eference: From	SO23-2-17, L&S 5.7		Revision # 27
NUCLEAR OF UNITS 2 AND		OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 27 ATTACHMENT 9 M LIMITATIONS AND SPECIFICS (Continued		17 33 OF 107
5.0 VALVI	E GUIDELINES (C		-	
5.7	Containment EC remain open in M corresponding EC Minimizing the di opened when red SDC flow balanci	J CCW Inlet Valves (HV-6366, HV-6368, HV-63 lodes 1, 2, 3, and 4 to minimize the differential CU Outlet Valve (HV-6367, HV-6369, HV-6371, fferential pressure across the outlet valve ensu juired. <u>If</u> an ECU supply valve is closed (for su ng, etc.), <u>then</u> the associated ECU is inoperabl I.4, Tech. Spec. 3.6.6.2 and Ref. 2.3.1.14)	pressure a HV-6373). res that it c rveillance t	cross the I an be esting,

SONGS Oct 2009 NRC Written Exam Worksheet

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	026	A4.01
	Importance Rating	4.5	

<u>Containment Spray System</u>: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: CSS controls Proposed Question: Common 14

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 3 is operating at 100% power in MODE 1.
- A spurious Containment Spray Actuation Signal has just initiated.

Which ONE (1) of the following occurs as a result of the Containment Spray Actuation Signal?

The Containment Spray Pumps...

- A. receive an Auto Start signal; SI Pumps and Containment Spray Pumps Mini-Flow Valves open.
- B. do <u>NOT</u> receive an Auto Start signal; RWST Outlet Valves open.
- C. receive an Auto Start signal; Containment Spray Header Isolation Valves open.
- D. do <u>NOT</u> receive an Auto Start signal; Containment Spray Header Isolation Valves open.

Proposed Answer: D

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible if thought that CSAS started the Containment Spray Pumps. The Safety Injection and Containment Spray Mini-Flow Valves open on an SIAS.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because the Containment Spray Pumps will not start, however, it is the Containment Spray Header Isolation Valves that open not the RWST Outlet Valves.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because the Containment Spray Header Isolation Valves will open, however, and SIAS is required to start the Containment Spray Pumps.
- D. Correct. Without any SIAS present the Containment Spray Pumps will not start. The Containment Spray Header Isolation Valves will open with a CSAS signal.

Technical Reference(s)	SD-SO23-740, Section 2.3.2	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SD-SO23-720, Section 2.1.2	Comments / Reference
	SD-SO23-720, Appendix D	
	SD-SO23-720, Figure 2C	_

ES-401	SONGS Oct 2009 NRC Written Exam Worksheet


Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

Learning Objective: DESCRIBE the instrumentation used to monitor the operation of the CSS and 79745 / 79749 SIS. Include the name, function, sensing points, normal values for the parameters being measured, and location of each instrument. DESCRIBE the integrated operation of the CSS, and SIS.

Comment	s / Reference: From SD-SO23-740, Section 2.3.2	Revision # 17
2.3.2	Containment Spray System	
	When a SIAS occurs the Containment Spray Pumps receive a start signal, with a ten (10) second time delay, and run on mini flow until needed. When Containment Pressure gets high enough, and a SIAS is present, a Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS) is activated. Upon receipt of a CSAS the Containment Spray Header Isolation valves open to provide flow to the containment spray nozzles. The CSAS also opens cooling water valves for the Heat Exchangers.	
	Upon receipt of a RAS, the suction of the spray pumps shifts to the Emergency Sump, RAS isolates minimum HPSI flows if Emergenc Sump HI-HI Level is coincident with RAS.	
2.3.2	Containment Spray System (Continued)	
	The pumps and major valves can be controlled remotely from the Control Room. The Spray Pumps can also be controlled for their ESF switchgear rooms, Fire Isolation Switches determine controlling location. The Spray Pumps have SIAS override feature System pressure, flow, temperature and level are provided in the Control Room for monitoring operation.	ure.

O23-720, Section 2.1.2	Revision # 8
WSSS ESFAS (Continued)	
ON SIGNAL (CSAS) (See Figures 1 &	2C)
System to remove heat and from the Containment atmo	iodine sphere in
High-High Containment Pre @14.0 psig, AND	ssure
A Safety Injection Actuat	ion Signal.
	ACTIVITY OF A PARTY OF
2/4 coincidence	١
6023-720, Section 2.1.2	Revision # 8
NSSS ESFAS (Continued)	§ 2C)
	NSSS ESFAS (Continued) ON SIGNAL (CSAS) (See Figures 1 & To activate the Containmen System to remove heat and from the Containment atmo the event of a LOCA or MS High-High Containment Pre @14.0 psig, AND A Safety Injection Actuat Containment Pressure Tran 2(3)PT-0352-1, -2, -3, -4 2/4 coincidence SO23-720, Section 2.1.2 NSSS ESFAS (Continued)

	APPENDIX D (per S023-3-2.22, Att. 9)				
	CONTAINMENT SPRAY ACTUATED (CSAS) EQUIPMENT	LIST			
EQUIPMENT CSAS NUMBER ESF DESCRIPTION TRAIN				FUNCTION	
2(3)HV-6501	Component Cooling Water from Shutdown Heat Exchanger, E-004		A	OPEN	
2(3)HV-9367	Shutdown Heat Exchanger to Containment Spray Header No. 1		A	OPEN	
2(3)P-012	Containment Spray Pump	(a)	Α	START	
2(3)HV-6500	Component Cooling Water from Shutdown Heat Exchanger, E-003		В	OPEN	
2(3)HV-9368	Shutdown Heat Exchanger to Containment Spray Header No. 2		В	OPEN	
2(3)P-013	Containment Spray Pump	(a)	В	START	



Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	026 /	42.01
	Importance Rating	2.7	

<u>Containment Spray System</u>: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CSS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Reflux boiling pressure spike when first going on recirculation

Proposed Question: Common 15

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 3 has experienced a Loss of Coolant Accident.
- All safety systems actuated as designed.
- The Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS) setpoint has been reached.
- The crew is preparing to perform SO23-12-11, EOI Supporting Attachments, Attachment 14, RAS Operation.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the affect that RAS operation has on plant parameters and the actions taken to ensure Critical Safety Functions are maintained?

- A. The suction pressure to the High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps will be greater and result in flow approaching runout. Throttle High Pressure Safety Injection Cold Leg Injection Valves to prevent runout.
- B. The suction pressure to the Containment Spray Pumps will be greater and result in flow approaching runout. Throttle the Containment Spray Flow Control Valves to prevent runout.
- C. The water being used is hotter and could result in rising Containment pressure. Verify Containment pressure is less than 14 psig or ensure proper Containment Spray actuation.
- D. The water being used is hotter and could result in rising core temperatures. Raise Safety Injection flow rate by restarting Low Pressure Safety Injection Pumps as required to restore subcooling.

Proposed Answer: C

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because suction pressure from the Containment Sump will be higher and result in higher flow. The action to throttle flow in this situation would be inappropriate.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because suction pressure from the Containment Sump will be higher and result in higher flow. The action to throttle flow in this situation would be inappropriate.
- C. Correct. The higher temperature of the SI cooling flow will result in RCS temperatures and Containment pressure rising. Attachment 14 attempts to reduce this affect by maximizing Containment Cooling but Floating Step 12 instructs the operator to verify Containment pressure less than 14 psig or ensure CSAS actuation.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because core temperatures will rise initially but after RAS the actions to restart LPSI would be inappropriate and jeopardize the available NPSH to the HPSI and Containment Spray Pumps.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-12-11, Attachment 14	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO23-12-11, Floating Step 12d	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

Learning Objective: DESCRIBE the operation of the Pumps, Tanks, and remotely operated valves of 79744 / 79749 DESCRIBE the operation of the Pumps, Tanks, and remotely operated valves of the CIS, CSS, and SIS. Include the controls, function, location, and specific features such as type, capacity, and power supplies where applicable. DESCRIBE the integrated operation of the CSS, and SIS.

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	0	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43		

		ts / Reference: From S				
_		AR ORGANIZATION 2 AND 3	EMERGENCY REVISION 6 ATTACHMEN		RAI	ING INSTRUCTION SO23-12-11 ISS PAGE 159 OF 278
		E		G AT	TAC	HMENTS
			RAS OPE	RA	тю	N
		ACTION/EXPECTED RE	SPONSE		RE	SPONSE NOT OBTAINED
1	VE	RIFY RAS Conditions E	stablished:			
	a.	VERIFY RWST level -	ess than 19%.	a.	со	NTINUE FS-20, MONITOR RWST Leve
2	VE	RIFY RAS Actuation:				
	a.	VERIFY Containment E level – greater than 18	Emergency Sump 3 feet 4 inches.	a.	1)	MONITOR Containment Emergency Sump level.
					2)	NOTIFY Shift Manager/Operations Leader.
					3)	MONITOR need for borated water flow from RWST.
	b.	ENSURE Containment Outlet valves – open:	Emergency Sump			
		<u>Train A</u> HV-9303 HV-9 HV-9305 HV-9	302			
	C.	ENSURE LPSI Pumps	 stopped. 			
	d.	ENSURE SI Pumps an Spray Pump Miniflow Is – closed:				
		<u>Train A</u> HV-9306 HV-9 HV-9307 HV-9	347			

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3	EMERGENCY OF REVISION 6 ATTACHMENT 14	PERATING INSTRUCTION	SO23-12-11 ISS 2 PAGE 160 OF 278		
	EOI SUPPORTING A	TTACHMENTS			
	RAS OPER	ATION			
ACTION/EXPECTED	RESPONSE	RESPONSE NOT OBTA	INED		
3 MAXIMIZE Containmen	t Cooling				
a. ENSURE CCAS – a	actuated.				
b. ENSURE available (Emergency Cooling					
E-399 E-	<u>ain B</u> 400 402				
c. ENSURE CCW valve Emergency Cooling					
HV-6370 HV HV-6371 HV HV-6366 HV	V-6369				
	 d. ENSURE available Containment Dome Air Circulating Fans – operating: 				
A-071 A-	r <u>ain B</u> 072 073				

nmer	nts / Reference: From SO23-12-7	11, Floating S	Step 12d	Revision # 6
	2 AND 3 REVIS	RGENCY OPE SION 6 CHMENT 2	ERATING INSTRUCTIO	N SO23-12-11 ISS 2 PAGE 30 OF 278
	EOI SUPP	ORTING AT	TACHMENTS	
	FLO	OATING S	TEPS	
	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	<u>E</u>	RESPONSE NOT OBT	AINED
S-12	MONITOR Containment Pressur	re		
Ар	plicability: 🗆 12-3, 🗖 12-5, 🗖 12	2-8, 🗖 12-9		
T		NOT	E]
	ESF actuation provides for specific v complete ESF actuation.	/alve closure e	even though AC power r	nay not be available for
a.	VERIFY Containment pressure – less than 3.4 PSIG	a.	ENSURE the following	g – actuated:
			SIAS CCAS CRIS CIAS	
b.	VERIFY Containment Area Radia Monitors – NOT alarming or trending to ala		ENSURE available Co HVAC – operating	ontainment Normal
C.	VERIFY Containment High Range	Area c.	1) ENSURE SIAS -	- actuated.
	Dediction Monitore reading		,	
	Radiation Monitors reading – less than 40R/HR.		2) REQUEST Shift I Leader to evaluat	
	J		2) REQUEST Shift I	te:
	J		 REQUEST Shift I Leader to evaluat a) CIAS actuati 	te:
d.	 less than 40R/HR. VERIFY Containment pressure 		 REQUEST Shift I Leader to evaluat a) CIAS actuati 	te: on ion for iodine removal.
d.	– less than 40R/HR.		 2) REQUEST Shift I Leader to evaluat a) CIAS actuati b) CSAS actuat 	te: on ion for iodine removal. – actuated. from Letdown Heat

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	039 /	44.01
	Importance Rating	2.9	

Main and Reheat Steam System: Ability to manually operate and / or monitor in the control room: Main steam supply valves Proposed Question: Common 16

Given the following conditions:

- Unit is in MODE 3 following a Reactor trip from 100% power.
- Containment pressure is 1.3 psig.
- Steam Generator E088 pressure is 720 psia.
- Steam Generator E089 pressure is 770 psia.
- RCS Tcold is 535°F.
- No operator actions have been taken post-trip.

Which ONE (1) of the following is the correct position for the listed valves?

- 1. HV-8204, Steam Generator E089 Main Steam Isolation Valve
- 2. HV-8205, Steam Generator E088 Main Steam Isolation Valve
- 3. HV-8421, Steam Generator E089 Atmospheric Dump Valve
- 4. HV-8423, Steam Bypass Control System Valve
 - A. 1. Closed
 - 2. Closed
 - 3. Closed
 - 4. Closed
 - B. 1. Closed
 - 2. Closed
 - 3. Closed
 - 4. Open
 - C. 1. Open
 - 2. Closed
 - 3. Closed
 - 4. Open
 - D. 1. Closed
 - 2. Open
 - 3. Open
 - 4. Open

А

Proposed Answer:

Explanation:

- A. Correct. This is the correct configuration given current SG pressure.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because valves would be aligned as such if an MSIS had not occurred.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because given system pressure, it could be thought that the MSIV on E089 is still open along with the SBCS Valve.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because the SBCS Valve should be open and it could be thought that the Atmospheric Dump Valve could also be open given system temperature. Position of HV-8205 is incorrect.

Technical Reference(s)	SD-SO23-720, Page 21	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

Learning Objective:IDENTIFY Main Steam System flowpaths, components, and locations including102427 / 102465being able to draw and label system diagrams.

DESCRIBE the configuration and operational characteristics of Main Steam	
System components.	

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	128014	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		_
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	mental Knowledge r Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

omments / Reference: From SD-SO23-72	20, Page 21 Revision # 8
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3	SYSTEM DESCRIPTION SD-S023-720 REVISION 8 PAGE 21 OF 101
2.0 <u>DESCRIPTION</u> (Continued)	
2.1 <u>System Overview</u> (Continued)	
2.1.2 General Control Scheme -	NSSS ESFAS (Continued)
.5 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION SIG	WAL (MSIS) (See Figure 1 & 2D) (Continued)
	Pressure indicates safety action is required y CLOSES all valves to both Steam Generators:
.5.2.1 Main Steam Isolati	on Valves (MSIVs),
.5.2.2 Main Feedwater Iso	olation Valves (FWIVs),
.5.2.3 Atmospheric Dump V	/alves (ADVs),
.5.2.4 Auxiliary Feedwate	er (AFW) Isolation Valves,
.5.2.5 S/G Blowdown Valve	es, and
.5.2.6 S/G Sample Valves.	
from the intact Steam actuation relays asso Steam Generator are u	edwater Actuation Signal (EFAS) is generated Generator, output contacts from the EFAS ociated with the EFAS logic for the intact used to block, at the equipment level, the actuation relay contacts.
	ontacts are then used to open appropriate se Auxiliary Feedwater to the intact Steam
.5.3.2 The operator may m require or for tes	nanually initiate the MSIS if plant conditions ting.

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Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	059 G	2.1.27
	Importance Rating	3.9	

 Main Feedwater System:
 Conduct of Operations:
 Knowledge of system purpose and/or function

 Proposed Question:
 Common 17

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 2 has tripped.
- Reactor Trip Override (RTO) actuated.

With NO operator action, which ONE (1) of the following identifies how the Main Feedwater Control System responds?

- A. Each Main Feedwater Regulating Valve positions to 5% open.
- B. Main Feedwater Pump speed lowers to 3600 rpm for 10 seconds.
- C. All Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves close.
- D. Each Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valve positions to 25% open.

Proposed Answer: B

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible if thought that Main Feedwater Regulating Valves did not fully close on an RTO. The 5% value refers to total Feedwater flow supply to the Steam Generators post-trip.
- B. Correct. This is the response of the Main Feedwater Pump following a Reactor Trip Override.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because the Feedwater Regulating Valves close, however, the Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves position to 50% open.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because the Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves will reposition, however, they go to 50% open.

Technical Reference(s)	LP 2XIR06, Section 6.3.3.2	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO23-9-6, Section 6.6 and 6.7	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

Learning Objective: DESCRIBE the operation of Feedwater Control System controls, including the name, function, interlocks, and location of each.

STATE the names of the systems interfacing with the Feedwater Control System and DESCRIBE the flowpath and purpose of each interconnection.

Question S	Source		Bank # Modified Bank #			(Note changes or attach parent)	
			New _	Х			
Question H	History	:	Last NRC Exam				
Question (Cogniti	ve Level:	Memory or Fundar Comprehension or		edge		
10 CFR Pa	art 55 (Content:	55.41 <u>4, 7</u> 55.43				
Comments	s / Refe	erence: Fro	om LP 2XIR06, Sec	tion 6.3.3.2		Revision # 2	
2XIR06 6.0 Less		DWATER C	ONTROL SYSTEMS			Activities	
.2	React	or Trip Override	e (RTO)				
	.2.1	Purpose of I overcooling	RTO Remove decay heat wi	thout			
	.2.2	Conditions t	hat will cause a 'RTO'				
		CED	tor tripped signal is receive MCS UV coils - Coils de-en r UV1 and UV3 or UV2 and	ergize			
		.2.2.1	1.1 RTO is in effect for of 10 sec.	a minimum	Typically it t	akes 10 to 15 minutes for RTO to clear.	
	.2.3	FWCS Res	ponse		Inputs 5% fi Controller (ow signal downstream of the Master [-4].	
		.2.3.1 Feed	Water Reg Valve goes Shu	ıt	Grounds ma	ain valve program input ("0" input at T-6)	
		.2.3.2 Feed	l Water Reg Bypass Valve g	goes to 50%	The 5% flow Controller C	feedwater flow signal to bypass valve. / signal is equivalent to 25% Master utput (i.e. 25% flow Demand). This 50% valve position.	
			l Pumps goto Minimum spe 0 rpm	ed	End result v	ve get ~5% of rated Feedwater flow.	

Comme	nts / Re	ference: Fro	om SO23-9-6, Section 6.6	Revision # 21	
	.EAR OF S 2 AND	RGANIZATIO	ON OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 21	SO23-9-6 PAGE 14 OF 55	
6.0	PROC	EDURE (Co	ntinued)		
	6.6	Feedwat	er Control System Operation	During a VALID RTO	
			REFERENCE USE		
		6.6.1	Validate the RTO, as follows:		I
		.1	VERIFY Main Feedwater Control Valves	s Close.	
		.2	VERIFY Bypass Feedwater Control Val	ves ramp to 50%.	
		.3	VERIFY controller BIAS is set to ZERO Feedwater Pump Speed Control Station		
		.4	VERIFY Feed Pump speeds begin ram 10 seconds and then modulate to contro approximately 100 psid. (LS-2.3, LS-2.4	ol Valve delta pressure at	
		.5	If the Steam Generator levels are not be then GO TO SO23-13-24, Feedwater C		I
		6.6.2	Reset the Valid RTO, as follows:		I
			CONTINUOUS USE		I
		.1	ENSURE controller BIAS is set to ZERO Feedwater Pump Speed Control Station		
	÷	.2	LOWER Master Controller (FIC-1111/FI 4% of actual S/G Level.	IC-1121) Setpoint to within	I
	*	.3	After the RTO has reset, then set the M (FIC-1111/FIC-1121), setpoint to 55% N the SRO Ops. Supv.	laster Controller, NR level, or as directed by	I
		.4	If the Steam Generator levels are not be DCS, <u>then</u> GO TO SO23-13-24, Feedw Malfunction.		

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	061	A1.02
	Importance Rating	3.3	

Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater System: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the AFW controls including: Steam generator pressure Proposed Question: Common 18

Given the following conditions:

- Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signals 1 and 2 (EFAS-1 & EFAS-2) have actuated following a trip from full power.
- A manual Main Steam Isolation Signal was actuated following reports of steam in the Turbine Building.
- Steam Generator E088 is at 750 psia and 15% narrow range level.
- Steam Generator E089 is at 795 psia and 18% narrow range level.

Under these conditions, which of the following Steam Generator(s) are being automatically fed by Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signals/Auxiliary Feedwater System?

- A. Only Steam Generator E088.
- B. Only Steam Generator E089.
- C. Both Steam Generators E088 and E089.
- D. Neither Steam Generator E088 nor E089.

Proposed Answer: C

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because E088 has the lower level, and is below the setpoint for Diverse Emergency Feed Actuation Signal, however, DEFAS is not applicable (needs ATWS, and no MSIS present) and both SG levels are below the 21% EFAS actuation setpoint.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because it may be thought that with MSIS present, only the SG with the higher pressure will be fed, however, SG pressures must be below 741 psia and the difference must be at least 125 psi.
- C. Correct. With EFAS-1 and 2 present, both SG pressures above 741 psia, and both SG levels below 21%, both SGs will be fed.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because if both SG pressures were below 741 psia (setpoint for MSIS), and pressures within 125 psia as listed, neither SG would be fed. However, the MSIS was manual and SG pressures are above 741 psi.

Technical Reference(s) _		SD-SO23-780, Pages 77 & 83		Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference	
Proposed references	s to be	provided during exa	amination: <u>None</u>		
Learning Objective: 52728 / 55262	Feed for the DESC Feed	water System, inclu e parameters being CRIBE the cause/eff	ding the name, fund measured and loca ect relationships as	ction, so ation of ssociate	e operation of the Auxiliary ensing points, normal values each instrument. ed with the following Auxiliary ct on EFAS components of an
Question Source:		Bank # Modified Bank # New	129830	(No	ote changes or attach parent)
Question History:		Last NRC Exam			
Question Cognitive L	evel:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	mental Knowledge r Analysis		x
10 CFR Part 55 Con	tent:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43			

mments / Refere	ence:	From SD-SO23-780, Page 77	Revision	# 10
NUCLEAR ORGANIZ UNITS 2 AND 3	ATION		SYSTEM DESCRIPTION SD-SO REVISION 10 PAGE 7	023-780 77 OF 123
2.0 DESCRIPTI	ON (C	ontinued)		
2.3		xiliary Feedwater Pump Disch 12, 4706 & 4705 (Continued)	arge Control Valves, 2(3)HV-	4713,
	.2.4	Valve can only be controlle	Switch in the LOCAL position d from its respective Motor ontrol and EFAS and MSIS aut	Control
	ev		lowing a Control Room fire o e from any spurious signal t or inhibit its operation.	
	.3.1		s normally in the REMOTE pos Switch in the LOCAL position nunciator, 57A14.	
		tuation of an MSIS automatic ntrol Valves, provided an EF	ally CLOSES the Pump Dischar AS is not present.	°ge
	.4.1		ceive an EFAS, the MSIS to t t level, allowing the Valve c.	
	.4.2		E-ENERGIZES both "CYCLING" a OPEN or CLOSE contacts in th the Valve.	
	.4.3	DE-ENERGIZING of both types Valve.	of relays automatically OPE	INS the
	.4.4		ycling Relays become RE-ENER ve.	RGIZED to
	.4.5	The Non-cycling Relays rema	in DE-ENERGIZED.	
	.4.6		uttons located on Auxiliary NERGIZE the Non-cycling Rela rolled normally.	
	Re	lays are DE-ENERGIZED), the	(and both Cycling and Non-o affected valve OVERRIDE push 2(3)CR-52, is not functiona	button
	.5.1	The OVERRIDE Pushbutton bec Signal has CLEARED.	omes functional only after t	the EFAS

Comments / Reference: From SD-SO23-780, Page 83 Revision # 10				
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION SYSTEM DESCRIPTI UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 10				
2.0 <u>DESCRIPTION</u>	Į (Continued)			
2.3.6	i Emergency Feedwater Actuation Sig	nal (Continued)		
.4 EFAS 1 Train A controls AC powered components and Train B controls DC powered components.				
.5 EFAS 2 Train A controls DC powered components and Train B controls AC powered components.				
.6	.6 An EFAS 1 is initiated and Auxiliary Feedwater de Generator #1, 2(3)E-089, if:			
	.6.1 The water level in Steam Ge level setpoint of 21% Narro pressure is above the MSIS operation), or	w Range and Steam	Generator #1	
	.6.2 The water level in Steam Ge level setpoint of 21% Narro pressure is below the MSIS Steam Generator #1 is at le Generator 2.	w Range, Steam Gen setpoint, and the	erator #1 pressure in	
.7	'Initiation of an EFAS 2 for Steam similar. (See Figures 14 & 15)	Generator #2, 2(3)E-088, is	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	061 I	<1.07
	Importance Rating	3.6	

<u>Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater System</u>: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the AFW and the following systems: Emergency water source **Proposed Question:** Common 19

Given the following conditions:

- A seismic event has occurred and T-120, Condensate Storage Tank has ruptured.
- Unit 2 has tripped and a Loss of Offsite Power has occurred.
- Annunciator 53B58 CONDENSATE TANK T-121 LEVEL HI / LO is in alarm.
- SO23-12-9, Functional Recovery Heat Removal Success Paths to provide makeup water to T-121, Condensate Storage Tank are being implemented.

With a REQUIRED cooldown rate of 110°F per hour to Shutdown Cooling System operation, which ONE (1) of the following is the <u>preferred</u> method for makeup to T-121, Condensate Storage Tank?

- A. Makeup from the Demineralized Water Storage Tanks using the bypass around the Level Control Valve.
- B. Directly from the hard-piped Fire Water Supply system.
- C. Semi-automatic makeup from the T-120 vault using the Condensate Transfer Pump.
- D. Cross-tie from Unit 3 Condensate Storage Tanks.

Proposed Answer: A

- A. Correct. Normal automatic makeup valves fail closed and require actions to manually align the bypass valves.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because it is an available method, however, it would be the least preferred method of refill.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because under certain conditions the T-120 vault could be aligned to the Condensate Transfer Pump, however, it is not the preferred method in this condition.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because a cross-tie is available from the Unit 3 Condensate Storage Tanks, however, this piping will divert water to the Unit 2 Hotwell not to T-121.

Technical Reference(s	s) SO23-12-9, Succe	ss Path HR-1, Step 10	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO23-15-53.B, 53	B58	Comments / Reference
	SD-SO23-320, Pag	ge 4	
Proposed references t	to be provided during ex	amination: <u>None</u>	
č ,	Per the Functional Reco each step, caution or no	5 1	12-9 DESCRIBE: The basis for
Question Source:	Bank #		
	Modified Bank #		(Note changes or attach parent)
	New	X	
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Le	evel: Memory or Funda Comprehension of	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Conte	ent: 55.41 <u>5, 10</u> 55.43		

mments / Reference: From SO2	23-12-9, HR-1, Step 1	0		Revision # 25		
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY OP UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 25 ATTACHMENT FR				PERATING INSTRUCTION SO23-12-9 ISS 2 PAGE 158 OF 274 R-5		
	FUNCTIONAL REC	ov	ERY	/		
R	ECOVERY - HEAT	RE	MO	/AL		
Success Pa	th Actions: HR-1, S	G/G	wit	h no ECCS		
ACTION/EXPECTED RES	PONSE	RES	SPO	NSE NOT OBTAINED		
10 VERIFY and MAINTAIN Con Inventory:	densate					
a. INITIATE or CONTINUE MONITOR Condensate I						
 INITIATE or CONTINUE T-121, Condensate Stora least one source: (listed in preferred order) 	age Tank from at	1)	SO DE CO	required cooldown rate from D23-12-11, Attachment 16, ETERMINE TIME UNTIL SHUTDOWN DOLING REQUIRED less than 100°F/HR,		
 Demineralized Wate 	r Storage Tanks:			EN RAISE S/G steaming rate		
T-266 T-267 T-268				D GO TO step 10c.		
OR 2) Gravity feed from T- Storage Tank:		2)	SO: DE CO	equired cooldown rate from 23-12-11, Attachment 16, TERMINE TIME UNTIL SHUTDOWN OLING REQUIRED greater than 100°F/HR,		
CLOSE - 1414M			THEN			
OPEN – 1305M OPEN – 1414M			a)	ENSURE Diesel Firewater Pump – operating.		
OR 3) Crosstie to other Uni	it.		b)	IF Firewater aligned to AFW System by step 7,		
(SO23-9-5, CONDENSATE STORAGE AND TRANSFER)				THEN GO TO step 11.		
			C)	UNLOCK and CLOSE 1305MU082, Firewater to CST cross-connect drain valve.		
			d)	OBTAIN key number 71 from NOA.		
			e)	UNLOCK and OPEN 1305MU474, Firewater Supply to CST valve.		
			f)	GO TO step 11.		

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UCLEAR ORGA		TION ALAF	RM RES	PONSEINS			Revision #
UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 16 PAGE 131 OF 138 ATTACHMENT 2							
3 B5 8 C	OND	ENSATE T	ANK '	[120 LEV	EL HI/LO		
APPLICABILI	ΓY	PRIORITY	REFL	ASH AS		ows	
Modes ALL		WHITE	N/	A	NONE		
INITIATING DEVICE		NOUN NAME	:	SETPOINT	VALIDATION INSTRUMENT	PCS ID	LINK# U2/U3
2(3)LSHL-4358 2(3)MT-120, Condens Storage Tank, Level Switch HI/LO [RSMI]				HI 98.3% LO 86.2%	2(3)LI-4357A 2(3)LI-4357B 2(3)LI-4357C	NONE	1044/1055
D <u>REQUIRE</u> 1.1 Pr D <u>CORREC</u>	oceed	I to Section 2.0					
SPECIFIC	CAU	SES		Specific C	ORRECTIVE ACT	IONS	
LOW LEVEL 2.1 Verify 2(3)MT-120, Condensate Storage Tank, Auto makeup aligned per SO23-9-5, Section for Aligning Automatic Makeup to MT-120 using LV-4358. 2.1.1 If level continues to lower, then perform SO23-9-5, Attachment for Filling Condensate Storage Tank MT-120.							

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION ALARM RESPONSE INSTRUCTION S023-15-53.B UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 16 PAGE 132 OF 138 ATTACHMENT 2						
53B58 CONDENSATE TANK T120 LEVEL HI/LO (Continued)						
2.0 <u>CORRECTIVE ACTIONS</u> : (Continued)						
SPECIFIC CAUSES SPECIFIC CORRECTIVE ACTIONS						
LOW LEVEL (Continued) (at MCC BC), LV-4358 will fail Closed, isolating Automatic and Semi-automatic make-up to MT-120.						
2.2 Auto makeup failure 2.2 Isolate Auto makeup and fill per SO23-9-5, Attachment for Filling Condensate Storage Tank MT-120.						
2.3 System leak 2.3 Isolate the leak.						
 2.4 Inventory Diversion 2.4 Verify non-safety related makeup connections, e.g., Condenser makeup and BPS Sluice Water have not spuriously actuated as a result of a seismic event thereby diverting inventory from 2(3)MT-120. 						
HIGH LEVEL						
2.5 Auto makeup failure 2.5 CLOSE S2(3)1417MU225, 2(3)LV-4358 Inlet Isolation Valve.						
2.6 Excessive Condenser Drawoff 2.6 Consider disabling Drawoff and using Overboarding to maintain Hotwell levels, as follows:						
2.6.1 Deactivate 2(3)LV-3245, Condenser Draw Off Valve, by depressing DISABLE (HS-3245).						
2.6.2 Overboard the Hotwells per SO23-9-9.						

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION	SD-S023-320
REVISION 13	PAGE 4 OF 30

- 2.0 DESCRIPTION
 - 2.1 System Overview
 - 2.1.1 Main Flow Path (See Figure 1)
 - .1 The Condensate Storage and Transfer Systems supplies the water through the use of two Condensate Storage Tank 2(3)T-120 and 2(3)T-121. 2(3)T-121 is a Seismic Category I Tank and is used solely for providing water to the Auxiliary Feedwater Systems for plant cooldown. 2(3)T-120 is a Seismic Category II Tank enclosed with a Seismic Category I retaining wall and is the primary source of makeup for 2(3)T-121. 2(3)T-121 can receive water by Transfer Pump, gravity feed or from the 2(3)T-120 Sump if the Tank is damaged. Also 2(3)T-120 is the normal source of makeup for the Secondary System.

Comme	ents /	Reference: From SD-SO23-320, Page 4		Revision # 13
NUCLEA UNITS		CANIZATION 0 3	SYSTEM DESCRIPTION REVISION 13	
2.0	DESC	RIPTION		
	2.1	<u>System Overview</u>		
		2.1.1 Main Flow Path (See Figure 1)		
		.1 The Condensate Storage and Tra through the use of two Condens 2(3)T-121. 2(3)T-121 is a Sei solely for providing water to for plant cooldown. 2(3)T-120 enclosed with a Seismic Catego primary source of makeup for 2 water by Transfer Pump, gravit if the Tank is damaged. Also makeup for the Secondary Syste	ate Storage Tank 24 smic Category I Tar the Auxiliary Feedw is a Seismic Category I retaining wall 2(3)T-121. 2(3)T-12 2y feed or from the 2(3)T-120 is the no	(3)T-120 and hk and is used vater Systems gory II Tank and is the 21 can receive 2(3)T-120 Sump

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	062 H	<3.02
	Importance Rating	4.1	

<u>AC Electrical Distribution System</u>: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the AC distribution system will have on the following: Emergency diesel generator **Proposed Question:** Common 20

Given the following conditions on Units 2 and 3:

- Low voltage alarms on Buses 2A04, 2A06, 3A04 and 3A06 are annunciating.
- All 1E Bus voltages are approximately 3750 VAC.
- No SIAS actuation is present on either Unit.
- All other equipment is OPERABLE.

Which ONE (1) of the following identifies how the Voltage Protection Circuits respond on Unit 2?

Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generators...

A. will start; Unit 3 energizes Buses 2A04 and 2A06 via Bus Tie Breakers.

- B. remain off; Unit 3 energizes Buses 2A04 and 2A06 via Bus Tie Breakers.
- C. will start; 2G002 energizes Bus 2A04 and 2G003 energizes Bus 2A06.
- D. remain off; Unit 2 continues to supply Buses 2A04 and 2A06.

Proposed Answer: C

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because plausible because the EDGs will start, however, with a LOVS signal present the Preferred Source of power to the Unit 2 Buses is the Emergency Diesel.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because under normal conditions the preferred source of power to the Unit 2 Buses is unit 3, however, a Loss of Voltage Signal (LOVS) will start the Emergency Diesel.
- C. Correct. Given the conditions listed, the EDGs will start and power their respective 1E Buses.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because if voltage had remained above 3796 VAC <u>and</u> < two minutes had expired (SDVS) the EDGs would not start and 1E Buses would remained energized from Unit 2.</p>

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-15-63.B, 63B05	Attached w/ Revision # See	
	SD-SO23-120, Page 109	Comments / Reference	

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

ES-401	SO	NGS Oct 2009 NRC	eet Form ES-401-5			
Learning Objective: 53492 / 52795	(EDG EXPL	ZE normal and abnormal operations of the Emergency Diesel Generators) System. IN the interfaces between the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) and other plant systems.				
Question Source:		Bank # Modified Bank # New	112931	(Note changes or attach parent)	
Question History:		Last NRC Exam				
Question Cognitive Level:		Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis			X	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:		55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43				

UCLEAR OF NITS 2 3B05		REV	SION 13 ACHMENT 2	EINSTRUCTION	SC PA	2-15-63.B GE 16 OF 134	
	BILITY	PRIORITY	REFLASH	ASSOCIATED W	INDOWS		
Modes /	ALL	RED [1]	N/A	63B15,63B25, 63B35,630			
INITIATING DEVICE	NC	UN NAME	SETPOINT	VALIDATION INSTRUMENT	PCSID	LINK#	
127 Device	Underv	voltage Device	N/A	2EI-1662	EY8180	1827	:
.0 <u>REQU</u>	IRED AC	TIONS:	•		• • • •		•
1.1	Notify th	ie Unit 2 Contro	l Room of the	low voltage alarm.			
1.2	Verify v	oltage indicatio	n and perform	the following:			
	1.2.1	are still ope	ntrol Room vol erating, <u>then</u> a (AR 03100089	tage indication is los C-A Phase PT failur 4-2)	st, <u>and</u> load re may hav	S e	
	VOLT	AGE IS > 41	54				
	1.2.2	Locally ins (127D-1, 2	pect 2A0421 (F , 3 & 4) tripped	PT Cubicle) for any I (light ILLUMINATE	Degraded \ D).	/oltage Relays	
.1 Notify the CRS/SM and the STA to review Tech. Spec. LCO 3.3.7, and initiate corrective actions, as required.					.CO 3.3.7 , and		
	.2	-	-	nerate a notification	to investig	ate/repair.	Ι
	VOLT	AGE IS > 379	96 and <u><</u> 41	54			
Voltage Sign power source Output break	al) circuiti e, <u>and</u> cor ær must b	ry is defeated. nfirmed degrad	<u>If</u> the Diesel G ed voltage con low the SDVS	E d, <u>then</u> the SDVS (S enerator is in parall dition exists, <u>then</u> th timing relays to auto	el with the p ie Diesel G	preferred	
	1.2.3		Grid Voltage c when alarm a	ondition exists. (110 nnunciates.)) <u>+</u> 22 seco	nd	
	.1	Unload the	Diesel Genera	ator.			
	.2	Ensure Op	en Diesel Gen	erator Output Break	er 2A0413.		

INTERING AND ALARM RESPONSE INSTRUCTION S02-19						Revision	13 # 13
UNIT		RGANIZATI	REMS	M RESPONSE SION 13 CHMENT 2	EINSTRUCTION	SO2-15-63.B PAGE 17 OF 134	
63BO	5 2A04	VOLTAGE	LO (Continue	d)			
1.0 REQUIRED ACTIONS: (Continued)				ued)			
		VOLTA	GE IS <u><</u> 379	6			
		1.2.4	LOVS condi	tion exists.			
.1 <u>If</u> 2MG-002, Diesel Generator, is running <u>and</u> 2A0 immediately energized, <u>then</u> STOP 2MG-002, Die selecting 2HS-1767-1, Maintenance Lockout Swite					ator, is running <u>and</u> 2A04 (<u>en</u> STOP 2MG-002 , Diese intenance Lockout Switch	can not be I Generator by , to Lockout.	
	1.2.5 <u>If</u> a B-C Phase PT failure occurred, <u>then</u> 2A04 sync circuit will not available. (AR 031000894-2)					circuit will not be	
	.1 Declare 2G002 INOPERABLE.						
	1.3 Initiate SO23-13-4.						
	1.4	<u>lf</u> 2AD4 be a1E4 kV		ergized, <u>then</u> l	mplement SO23-13-26, At	tachment for Loss of	f
2.0		RECTIVE AC	TIONS:				
	SPEC	CIFIC CAU SI	ES	SPE	ECIFIC CORRECTIVE AC	TIONS]
							1
2.1	Reser failure	ve Aux Tran 9 of Bus Low	nsformer relays ∕Voltage Trans	swith 2.1 sfer	Refer to applicable Re Transformer. Protectio 63C11,63C21 or 63C3	n Trip ARP 63C01,	-
2.1 2.2	failure Trip o	e of Bus Low f 2A0413, 2/	nsformer relays Voltage Trans A0417, 2A0418 pply Breakers	sfer	Transformer. Protectio	n Trip ARP 63C01, 31.	-
	failure Trip o 2AD41	e of Bus Low f 2A0413, 2/ 19, 2A04 Su	Voltage Trans	sfer 3 or 2.2	Transformer, Protectio 63C11,63C21 or 63C3 Refer to SO23-6-9, Se	n Trip ARP 63C01, 31. ction for 4 k∨ Bus o Diesel Generator	

Comments / Referer	Comments / Reference: From SD-SO23-120, Page 109 Re					
NUCLEAR ORGAN UNITS 2 AND 3	IZATION	SYSTEM DESCRIPTION REVISION 19 PA	SD-SO23-120 GE 109 OF 181			
PART III 1E 4.16 kV AND 480 V ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM						
2.0 DESCRIPTION	ON (Continued)					
2.1.4	General Control Scheme					
1.	discussion covers only one lo	it is discussed below. For sin ad group (2A04). However, s redundant load group and the	nplicity, this imilar			
2.	Bus 2A04 is normally supplie (2XR1). If power from the Re 2A04 is lost, the following act	eserve Auxiliary Transformer (
3.	The LOVS or SDVS (Sustain signal to start Diesel Generat) also sends a			
4.	signals the Unit 3 bus tie circl 3A04 has normal voltage and	ous 2A04 has decayed to appr dual voltage relays, the LOVS uit breaker 3A04-16 to close p I is being powered from its res er 3XR1 or Unit Auxiliary Trans	or SDVŠ rovided bus pective			
5.	After 3A04-16 closes, Unit 2 bus 2A04 will be powered fro through bus 3A04.	bus tie circuit breaker 2A04-17 m Reserve Auxiliary Transforr				
6.	being closed or if bus 3A04 h permitted and bus tie breaker interlock prevents crosstie cir 3 Diesel Generator (3G002) (Diesel Generator is supplying the Diesel Generator from su Diesel Generator, since the D loads associated with one loa (3G002) is paralleled with the during a periodic load test, a	lied by Reserve Auxiliary Tran iary Transformer breaker (3A) as no voltage, the transfer wil r 3A04-16 will not close. Addir cuit breaker 3A04-16 from clo circuit breaker 3A04-13 is clos g its designated load group. T pplying two load groups and o Diesel Generator is only rated ad group. However, if Diesel O Reserve Auxiliary Transforme LOVS or SDVS at Bus 2A04 o Unit 3 Diesel Generator break	04-18) not I not be tionally an sing if the Unit ed and the his prevents overloading the to carry the Generator er (3XR1) will initiate a			

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	063 K4.02	
	Importance Rating	3.9	

 DC Electrical Distribution System:
 Knowledge of DC electrical system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Breaker interlocks, permissives, bypasses and cross-ties

 Proposed Question:
 Common 21

With Unit 2 in MODE 1, which ONE (1) of the following describes the allowable lineup of B022, Swing Battery Charger?

- A. Supply 1E DC Bus D1.
- B. Supply Non-1E DC Bus D5.
- C. Cross-tie 1E DC Buses D2 and D4.
- D. Cross-tie 1E DC Buses D2 and Non-1E DC Bus D5.

Proposed Answer: B


Explanation:


- A. Incorrect. Plausible if thought that that the odd numbered DC buses were the ones supplied by Swing Charger B022, however, Swing Charger B022 supplies the even-numbered buses and DC Bus D5.
- B. Correct. Swing Charger B022 supplies the even-numbered Buses and Non-1E DC Bus D5.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because these Buses can be cross-tied, however, there is a KIRK Key interlock between these two breakers preventing the Swing Battery Charger from supplying both Buses.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because both Buses are supplied from the Swing Battery Charger, however, there is a KIRK Key interlock between these breakers preventing the Swing Battery Charger from supplying both Buses.

Technical Reference(s)	SD-SO23-140, Figure I-1	Attached w/ Revision # See	
	SO23-6-15, Attachment 17	Comments / Reference	

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

Learning Objective: IDENTIFY Non-IE 120 VAC and 125 VDC Power Supply System flowpaths, 80702 / 80707 components, and locations including being able to draw and label system diagrams. EXPLAIN the interfaces between the Non-IE 120 VAC and 125 VDC Power Supply System and other plant systems.





Comments / Reference: From	Comments / Reference: From SO23-6-15, Attachment 17 Revisio					
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3	OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 29 ATTACHMENT 17	SO23-6-15 PAGE 106 OF	- 122			
B022, SWING BATTERY CHARGER, OPERATIONS						
	CONTINUOUS USE					
OBJECTIVE						
Provide direction on placing B022, Swing Battery Charger, in service to DC Bus D2, D4, D5, or D2 or D4 Battery Bank (whether initially connected to the DC Bus or not). In order to prevent overloading the Diesel Generator, loads on MCC BS are restricted prior to energizing B022. B022 is connected to the Bus and/or Battery and the Dedicated Battery Charger is disconnected.						
Provide direction on removing B022, Swing Battery Charger, from DC Bus D2, D4, D5, or D2 or D4 Battery Bank (whether connected to the DC Bus or not). The Dedicated Battery Charger will be placed in service, including Closing the Associated Battery Breaker if Open, and B022 will be removed from service.						
UNIT MODE	DATE	TIME				

SONGS Oct 2009 NRC Written Exam Worksheet

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	064 I	<2.02
	Importance Rating	2.8	

Emergency Diesel Generator System: Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Fuel oil pumps Proposed Question: Common 22

Which ONE (1) of the following is the power supply to Emergency Diesel Generator 2G003 Fuel Oil Priming Pumps?


- A. 125 VDC to Panel 2D1-P1
- B. MCC 2BJ
- C. 125 VDC to Panel 2L-161
- D. MCC 2BQ


Proposed Answer: C

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because DC Panel 2D1P1 is an ESF panel, however, it is powered from the Train A side.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because MCC 2BJ is powered from Bus 2B06 which can be supplied from EDG G003.
- C. Correct. The Fuel Oil Priming Pumps power supply for EDG 2G003 is DC Panel L-161. The Main Fuel Oil Pumps are engine driven.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because MCC 2BQ is powered from Bus 2B04 which can be supplied from EDG 2G002.

Technical Reference	(s) SD-SO23-750, Pag	Attached w/ Revision # See	
	SD-SO23-750, Figu	Comments / Reference	
	SD-SO23-140, Fig	ure I-2A	
Proposed references	to be provided during ex	amination: None	
Learning Objective: 73305	DESCRIBE the configuration Diesel Generator Electric	•	characteristics of Emergency ents.
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank #		(Note changes or attach parent)
	New	Х	_ 、 、 、 、 、
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		

Compr		•	or Fundamental Kr ension or Analysis	•			
Comments / F	Reference: Fro	m SD-SO	23-750, Page 88		Revision # 16		
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3				SYSTEM DESCRIPTION SD- REVISION 16 PAG	-S023-750 GE 88 OF 177		
PART III	FUEL OIL SYSTE	м					
2.0 DESCI	RIPTION (Conti	nued)					
2.3	Detailed Con	trol Sche	me				
2.4	Com 2.2	ponent De .6).		art III, Section 2.1.2) II, Section 2.2.1 to Se			
	COMPON	IENT	MCC BREAKER	R LOCATI	ON		
	DG Fuel Oil	Transfer	Pump:				
	P09	5	BD24	G002 Room; 3	30'Elev		
	P093	3	BD23	G002 Room; 3	30' Elev		
	P094	4	BH09	G003 Room; 3	30' Elev		
	P09	5	BH08	G003 Room; 3	30' Elev		
	Motor Enclosure Heaters for Fuel Oil Transfer Pump:						
	P09	5	BD18	G002 Room; 3	30' Elev		
	P093	3	BD18	G002 Room;	30' Elev		
	P094	4	BH03	G003 Room; 3	30' Elev		
	P09	5	BH03	G003 Room; 3	30' Elev		
	COMPONENT 2 (3)		LOCAL DIESE CONTROL PANI	A CONTRACT OF A	ON		
	Fuel Primin	g Pump su	pplied with 125 V	DC Power			
	P49	1	L-160	G002 Room; 3	30' Elev		
	P49)	L-160	G002 Room; 3	30' Elev		
	P49:	3	L-161	G003 Room; 3	30' Elev		
	P492	2	L-161	G003 Room; 3	30' Elev		





Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	064 /	42.08
	Importance Rating	2.7	

Emergency Diesel Generator System: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the EDG system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Consequences of opening / closing breaker between buses (VARS, out of phase, voltage) Proposed Question: Common 23

Given the following conditions:

- Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 3G002 is being paralleled to 1E Bus 3A04 which is aligned to the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer.
- 3G002 Output Breaker is closed with EDG voltage greater than 1E Bus 3A04 voltage.

Which ONE (1) of the following:

- 1.) Identifies the impact on the Emergency Diesel Generator?
- 2.) What action must be taken?
- A. 1.) EDG VAR meter will move in the negative (-) VAR (BUCK) direction.
 2.) ADJUST Voltage Regulator to establish a positive VAR load (+0.1 to +0.5 MVARS).
- B. 1.) EDG VAR meter will move in the positive (+) VAR (BOOST) direction.
 - 2.) ADJUST Voltage Regulator to establish a positive VAR load (+0.1 to +0.5 MVARS).
- C. 1.) EDG VAR meter will move in the negative (-) VAR (BUCK) direction.
 2.) ADJUST Voltage Regulator to establish a negative VAR load (-0.1 to -0.5 MVARS).
- D. 1.) EDG VAR meter will move in the positive (+) VAR (BOOST) direction.
 2.) ADJUST Voltage Regulator to establish a negative VAR load (-0.1 to -0.5 MVARS).

Proposed Answer: B

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because this would be the correct action if generator voltage were lower than Bus 3A04 voltage when the breaker was closed and it was desired to establish a positive VAR load.
- B. Correct. With EDG voltage greater than bus voltage when the breaker is closed, a positive VAR load will be "supplied out" the Emergency Diesel Generator (known at SONGS as BOOST). Because Diesel voltage is significant kindling greater than bus voltage, the Voltage Control Switch is adjusted to decrease generator terminal voltage and establish the VAR load specified.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible if thought that this would be the correct action if generator voltage were lower than Bus 3A04 voltage when the breaker was closed and that it was desirable to establish a negative VAR load.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because the VAR meter will move in the positive direction, however, adjusting the Voltage Control Switch in this fashion will cause more VARs to be "absorbed into" the Generator.

Technical Reference(s)		SO23-2-13, Attachment 2, Step 2.6			Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference	
Proposed references	s to be	provided during exa	amination:	None		
Learning Objective: 56392 / 56520	SYN	ITOR the operation CHRONIZE a Diese 3-3-3.23.			s per SO23-2-13. Bus per SO23-2-13 or	
Question Source:		Bank # Modified Bank # New)	(Note changes or attach parent)	
Question History:		Last NRC Exam				
Question Cognitive Level:		Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis			X	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:		55.41 <u>5</u> 55.43				

mmer	nts / Re	eference: Fror	m SO23-2-13, Attachment 2, S	Step 2.6	Revision # 37		
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3			OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 37 ATTACHMENT 2		SO23-2-13 PAGE 36 OF 175		
2.0	PROC	PROCEDURE (Continued)					
2.6	Paral	leling a Dies	el Supplied Isochronous Bu	is to the RAT: (ા	_S-6.6)		
f	2.6.1	Ensure the affected Switchgear Room is clear of all unnecessary personnel and maintain it clear until after the Diesel is paralleled to the 4kV bus.					
	2.6.2	Verify that the associated Reserve Auxiliary Transformer is energized and available to pick up the load.					
	2.6.3	PLACE Synchronization Master Control switch to ON.					
	2.6.4	DEPRESS the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer XR1(XR2) FDR BKR A0418 (A0618) SYNC Pushbutton.					
	2.6.5	Using HS-1669-1(HS-1648-2), VOLTAGE REGULATOR, MATCH incoming and running voltages at the synchroscope.					
	2.6.6	Using HS-1671-1(HS-1650-2), GOVERNOR CONTROL, ADJUST D/G SPEED so that the synchroscope is <i>moving slowly in the clockwise direction</i> .					
			NOTE				
	orevent a ne 4kV bi		ondition, the Diesel should have a mir	nimum load applied in	nmediately after being paralleled		
	2.6.7	When the Synchroscope is within "3 minutes" of the straight up position, then CLOSE the Reserve Auxiliary Transformer Breaker. (LS-6.8)					
	2.6.8	RAISE LOAD on the Diesel to approximately 1.2 MW by depressing HS-1671-1(HS-1650-2), GOVERNOR CONTROL.					
	2.6.9	VERIFY ILLUMINATED HS-1671-1(HS-1650-2), GOVERNOR CONTROL DROOP IN light.					
	2.6.10	0 MAINTAIN VARS between 0.1 to 0.5 MVARS positive by adjusting the D/G Voltage Regulator using HS-1669-1 (HS-1648-2), VOLTAGE REGULATOR.					

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	073 A1.01	
	Importance Rating	3.2	

<u>Process Radiation Monitoring System</u>: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PRM system controls including: Radiation levels Proposed Question: Common 24

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 3 is in MODE 6.
- Irradiated fuel movement is in progress.
- A spent fuel assembly is damaged while being transported to the spent fuel racks.
- RE-7822 and RE-7823, Fuel Handling Building (FHB) Air Exhaust Process Radiation Monitors high alarms have actuated.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the resulting ventilation alignment and effect on radiation levels?

Fuel Handling Building normal...

- A. supply fan trips, normal exhaust fan remains running, and PACUs align to lower radiation levels.
- B. supply and exhaust fans trip and PACUs align to lower radiation levels.
- C. supply fan remains on, normal exhaust fan trips and radiation levels lower.
- D. supply and exhaust fans trip, and radiation levels remain the same.

Proposed Answer: B

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because this condition would create a negative pressure inside the FHB and radiation levels do lower because the PACUs are aligned, however, this alignment would allow a radioactive release.
- B. Correct. With a Process Radiation Monitor high alarm the normal supply and exhaust fans will trip and PACUs will take suction from the FHB atmosphere and discharge back into the FHB to lower radiation level.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because this flowpath would suspend the release to atmosphere and adding air to the Fuel Handling Building could dilute the atmosphere, however, both of these fans trip.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because the normal supply and exhaust fans will trip, however, the PACUs are aligned to reduce radiation level.


Technical Reference(s)	SD-SO23-435, Page 22	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SD-SO23-435, Figure 1	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

Learning Objective: 81409 / 81410	Buildi INTE	ng HVAC System c	omponents.	characteristics of Fuel Handling zed in the Fuel Handling Building
Question Source:		Bank # Modified Bank # New	127549	_ (Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:		Last NRC Exam	SONGS 2006	
Question Cognitive L	.evel:	Memory or Fundar Comprehension or	0	X
10 CFR Part 55 Cont	tent:	55.41 <u>7, 8</u> 55.43		

ommer	nts / Referenc	e: From SD-SO23-43	5, Page 22	Revision # 3
NUCLEAR UNITS 2	ORGANIZATION AND 3	4	SYSTEM DESCRIPT REVISION 3	TION SD-S023-435 PAGE 22 OF 35
3.0 <u>0</u>	PERATIONS (Co	ontinued)		
3.3	Emergency ()perations		
	3.3.1 Fuel	Handling Building Is	olation	
	"A mo ac Pa ir ir 2("E ac	A" radiation monitor onitor 2(3)RE-7823G2 ctivity level, or a l anel, 2(3)L103, or Vi nitiating signal. A nitiated from 2(3)CR6 (3)HS-7823A2 for Trai Bypass" it does not p ctuation due to loss	lling Isolation Signal is ini 2(3)RE-7822G1, or train "B" reaches an alarm state. Hig oss of power to the Radiatio tal Bus 2(3)YO1 or 2(3)YO2 w manual Fuel Handling Isolati 0 by depressing 2(3)HS-7822A n B. If the Radiation Monit prevent a manual FHIS actuati of power to the Vital Bus, A te Display Unit (RDU).	radiation gh gaseous on Monitoring will produce the ion Signal can be Al for Train A or tor is in ion or an auto
			Handling Isolation Signal (lation Dampers go closed to	
	.2.1	High airborne radia Dampers ONLY.	tion sensed by RE7822 CLOSES	5 the TRAIN A
	.2.2	High airborne radia Dampers ONLY.	tion sensed by RE7822 CLOSES	5 the TRAIN B
	.2.3		on ensures that a single fail m being isolated upon receip	
	th	ne rad monitors to ob	e in service (Supply and Exh tain a representative sample they are not OPERABLE.	
	Ha 2 (A Tr Bu Ha C1	andling Building supp (3)HV-9846, 2(3)HV-98 and 2(3)HV-9844, 2(3 rain B will close, wh uilding Normal Ventil andling Isolation Sig leanup Units 2(3)E-37	Handling Isolation Signal, ly and exhaust isolation dan 347, 2(3)HV-9847B and 2(3)HV- 9HV-9845B, 2(3)HV-9545C and sich, in turn will stop the F ation Supply and Exhaust Far anal will also start the Post 0 and 2(3)E-371, and open th ampers 2(3)HV-9850 and 2(3)HV	mpers, -9847C for Train 2(3)HV-9845 for Fuel Handling hs. The Fuel t-Accident heir

Form ES-401-5



Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	076	44.02
	Importance Rating	2.6	

<u>Service Water System</u>: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: SWS valves Proposed Question: Common 25

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the operation of the Train A Saltwater Cooling Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve (HV-6497)?

The Train A Saltwater Cooling Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve (HV-6497)	
when Saltwater Cooling Pump P-307 is auto started and	when SWC
Pump P-307 is stopped.	

- A. must be manually opened will automatically close
- B. will automatically open will automatically close
- C. will automatically open must be manually closed
- D. must be manually opened must be manually closed

Proposed Answer: C

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because the valve could be manually opened upon SWC Pump auto start, however, there is no automatic closure associated with this valve.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because the valve will automatically open upon SWC Pump auto start, however, there is no automatic closure associated with this valve.
- C. Correct. The CCW/SWC Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve will automatically open when the SWC Pump is started but must be manually closed to avoid an unacceptable failure mode.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because the valve must be manually closed upon SWC Pump start, however, there is no requirement for the valve to be manually opened.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-2-8, L&S 4.8	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

60306 / 60307 Syste	em.		ed in the Salt Water Cooling the Salt Water Cooling System.
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	127289	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	mental Knowledge r Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

SONGS Oct 2009 NRC Written Exam Worksheet

ES-401

Form ES-401-5

omme	ents / R	eference: From S	6023-2-8, L&S 4.8	Revision # 30	
	.EAR O S 2 ANI	RGANIZATION 03	OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 30 ATTACHMENT 10	SO23-2-8 PAGE 64 OF 67	
3.0	BUN	IPING SWC P	UMPS		
	3.1	3.1 When a SWC Pump is uncoupled, then it may be bumped for rotation, or run uncoupled, as required, to support maintenance activities. If the Kirk Key interlock has been defeated to allow the start, then the start button will need to be held for five seconds for the pump to start. The SWC Train remains operable during this evolution. (AR 021000323)			
4.0	SWC	SYSTEM OF	ERATION		
	4.1		et temperature approaches 95°F, <u>or</u> Sa SRO Operations Supervisor should be		
	4.2	operable, <u>then</u> available to man circuitry can cau	discharge path to the Circulating Wate ower to Gate No. 6 shall be removed, nually position Gate No. 6. Otherwise, use gate closure and inoperability of bo UFSAR Section 9.2.1.3.C)	or an Operator should be a single failure in the gate	
	4.3	Indication of blo	ckage to the SWC Discharge to Outfal	II:	
		 Saltwater (Cooling discharge pressure > 22.5 psig	1	
		CCW HX E	-001(E-002) Differential Pressure < 3	psid	
		Saltwater (Cooling Flow drops below 12,000 gpm		
	4.4		ow will be < 3500 gpm (i.e., in support ould be notified of the low flow operatin		
	4.5	Standby (e.g., C the CCW Heat I	Exchanger Auto Vent valve is isolated CCW HX Auto Vent Valve has failed Op Exchanger should be manually vented turned to Service.	pen), <u>then</u> the saltwater side of	
	4.6	saltwater side o	Standby CCW/SWC Loop occurs, <u>and</u> f the CCW Heat Exchanger is isolated d be performed.		
	4.7	temperature is t	changer heat transfer efficiency is que rending up), <u>then</u> this may indicate air lue to a failed closed CCW HX Auto Ve	fouling of the CCW HX	
	4.8		Exchanger Outlet Valves (HV6495/HV Pump. However, they do not automa ilure mode.		

ES-401	SONGS Oct 2009 NRC Writte	Form	ES-401-5	
Examination Outline (Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
		Tier #	2	
		Group #	1	
		K/A #	076 G 2	2.1.25
		Importance Rating	3.9	

<u>Service Water System</u>: Conduct of Operations: Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc. Proposed Question: Common 26

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 2 has been in MODE 1 for 7 days following a 40 day Refueling Outage.
- Spent Fuel Pool temperature is 92°F.
- Spent Fuel Pool level is 26 feet 4 inches.
- Component Cooling Water/Salt Water Cooling (CCW/SWC) Heat Exchanger E001 differential pressure is 10 psid.
- Salt Water Cooling injection temperature is 70°F.

Referring to SO23-2-8, Salt Water Cooling System Operation, Attachment 4, which ONE (1) of the following is the minimum required flow of CCW/SWC Heat Exchanger E001?

Minimum required flow is approximately...

A. 15,900 gpm.


- B. 16,800 gpm.
- C. 17,200 gpm.
- D. 17,900 gpm.


Proposed Answer: C


- A. Incorrect. Plausible because with the Normal Curve and 9 psid is referenced, the required resultant flow would be 16,600 gpm.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because if the wrong (reverse flow) Normal Curve is used instead of the proper Normal Curve, the required resultant flow would be 16,800 gpm.
- C. Correct. Due to the time after the beginning of the Refueling Outage being greater than 45 days, the proper curve to use is the Normal Curve for normal system alignment (not reverse flowing). With 10 psid, the curve arrives at 17,200 gpm.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because if the Alternate Curve is used the required resultant flow would be 17,900 gpm.


ES-401 S	SONGS Oct 2009 NRC \	Written Exam Workshee	et Form ES-401-5
Technical Reference(s)	SO23-2-8, Attachmer	nt 4	Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference
Proposed references to	be provided during exan	nination: <u>SO23-2-8, A</u>	ttachment 4
Learning Objective: 60305 / 60307	DESCRIBE the config		al characteristics of Salt Water
	ANALYZE normal an System.	d abnormal operations	of the Salt Water Cooling
Question Source:	Bank #		
	Modified Bank #	()	Note changes or attach parent)
	New	X	
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Leve	el: Memory or Fundame	ental Knowledge	
	Comprehension or A	Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content	:: 55.41 <u>5, 10</u> 55.43		

Comments /	Reference	e: From SO23-2-8, Attachment 4		Revision # 30
NUCLEAR UNITS 2 A	organiza [:] ND 3	TION OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 30 ATTACHMENT 4	SO23-2-8 PAGE 43 OF	67
2.0 <u>PR</u>	OCEDURE ((continued)		
2.2	Deterr	mine which curve to use in Modes 1	1-4	
	2.2.1	If <u>all</u> of the following are true, <u>then</u> use the a	pplicable Normal Curv	e:
		 Spent Fuel Pool level is ≥ 26' 		
		 Spent Fuel Pool Temperature is ≤ 95°F 		
		• Time elapsed since the start of the last r	refueling outage is <u>></u> 4	5 days
	2.2.2	If any of the following are true, then use the	applicable Alternate C	urve:
		 Spent Fuel Pool level is < 26' 		
		Spent Fuel Pool Temperature is > 95°F		
		• Time elapsed since the start of the last r	refueling outage is < 45	days
2.3	Deterr	mine which curve to use in Modes 5	5-6	
	2.3.1	Use the applicable Normal Curve. (There a Modes 5 and 6.)	re no restrictions in	









Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	078	K1.02
	Importance Rating	2.7	

Instrument Air System: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the IAS and the following systems: Service air

Proposed Question: Common 27

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power with the Instrument Air system aligned for normal operations.
- Subsequently, an air leak upstream of the Instrument Air Dryers occurs.
- Instrument Air header pressure lowered to 85 psig and is currently 87 psig and steady.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the current status of the Instrument Air System?

- A. Three (3) Instrument Air Compressors are running fully loaded. Service Air is maintaining Instrument Air via a pressure control valve.
- B. Two (2) Instrument Air Compressors are running fully loaded. Nitrogen Backup is maintaining Instrument Air via a pressure control valve.
- C. One (1) Instrument Air Compressor is running fully loaded. Two (2) Instrument Air Compressors are running half loaded. Nitrogen Backup <u>and</u> Service Air is maintaining Instrument Air via pressure control valves.
- D. Two (2) Instrument Air Compressors are running fully loaded. One (1) Instrument Air Compressor is running half loaded. Nitrogen Backup <u>and</u> Service Air is maintaining Instrument Air via pressure control valves and Instrument Air to Containment has closed.

Proposed Answer: A

- A. Correct. Lowering of Instrument Air header pressure to 85 psig caused all three Instrument Air Compressors to run fully loaded. The Service Air Pressure Control Valve opens at 88 psig.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because at least two Instrument Air Compressors are running fully loaded, however, the Instrument Air header would have to drop to 83 psig for Nitrogen Backup to actuate.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because three Instrument Air Compressors are running, however, they would all be at full load. Nitrogen Backup would not be in service because Instrument Air Header pressure did not drop low enough.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because three Instrument Air Compressors are running, however, they would all be at full load. Nitrogen Backup would not be in service because Instrument Air Header pressure did not drop low enough. Instrument Air to Containment is isolated for a different reason.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-13-5, Attachme	ent 6, L&S 1.2	Attached w/ Revision # See		
	SO23-1-1, Attachmer	nt 22, L&S 2.1	Comments / Reference		
_	SO2-15-61.C, 61C19				
Proposed references to be	provided during exar	nination: <u>None</u>)		
Learning Objective: 72865 / 72866	DESCRIBE the config and Respiratory & Se	• ·	characteristics of Instrument onents.		
-	INTERPRET instrumentation and controls utilized in the Instrument and Respiratory & Service Air Systems.				
Question Source:	Bank #				
	Modified Bank # New	127082	(No	ote changes or attach parent)	
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	SONGS 2005	A		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundam Comprehension or <i>i</i>	•	e	X	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7, 10</u> 55.43				

omments /	Reference: From	SO23-13-5, Attachment 6, L&S 2.1	Revision # 7
NUCLEAR OR JNITS 2 AN	GANIZATION D 3	ABNORMAL OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 7 ATTACHMENT 6	S023-13-5 PAGE 32 OF 34
	LOSS OF I	NSTRUMENT AIR LIMITATIONS AND SPECIFIC	<u>s</u>
Instrumen	se understanding t Air event cause	of actions when responding to and mit ed by a large leak. Since an Instrumer argeted L&Ss are not used, to prevent u 0675-1)	nt Air leak
.0 Gen	eral Informat	tion	
1.1	different ways. affected Unit. unaffected Unit Unit which may should not see affected, this	rument Air due to a leak involves both The Unit that has the active leak is The Unit without the active leak is of This convention is used to distingu have serious problems due to the leak any serious effects. While in reality distinction accounts for the fact that elying on backup Nitrogen.	called the alled the ish between the from the Unit that both Units are
1.2	there is ≥ 1.5 separation, agg lower header pr at 88 psig and continue to fal supplying the h supplying each two headers has 83 psig, the ex isolating that then recover to	Air Compressors cannot maintain header inch hole in the system (e.g., line by pregate of smaller leaks, etc.). That ressure enough to start the backup RSAS supply the Instrument Air header. How 1 to 83 psig and backup Low Pressure N meader. The Nitrogen header splits int Unit (see Attachment 5). Near this sp an excess flow check valve. As press ccess flow check valve to the affected Unit from Nitrogen. Backup Nitrogen h 83 psig, and the unaffected Unit will a, terminating the effects of the event	reak, joint size leak will Air Compressors ever, pressure will itrogen will begin o two headers, one lit, each of the ure drops below Unit will close, eader pressure will be supplied by

UCLEAR NITS 2			OPERATING I REVISION 19 ATTACHMENT ITATIONS AN		S023-1-1 PAGE 112 OF 116 (Continued)
	DRMAL OPER 1 The Instr selected	ument Air C	ompressors	are started	RS and loaded in the sequence anel 2/3L-102:
PANEL 2/3L-102		PSL			SET POINT
CONTRO	OL SWITCHES	C-001	C-001 C-002		SET FOINT
LEAD	50% loaded 100% loaded	PSL-5348A	PSL-5350A	PSL-5352A	106 to 110 psig 102 to 106 psig
	50% loaded 100% loaded	PSL-5348B	PSL-5350B	PSL-5352B	98 to 102 psig 94 to 98 psig
LAG 1	100% Toaded				00 to 01 and -
LAG 1 LAG 2	50% loaded 100% loaded	PSL-5348C	PSL-5350C	PSL-5352C	90 to 94 psig 86 to 90 psig

NUCLE	AR ORGANI		: From SO2- N	ALARM REVISI	RESPONSE	INSTRUCTION		D2-15-61.C AGE 44 OF 54	sion # 6
610	19 IN:	ST A	IR HEADE	ER PR	ESS L	D			
A	PLICABILI	ΤY	PRIORITY	REFL	ASH .	ASSOCIATED WIN	DOWS		
	Modes ALL	-	AMBER	N	0	NONE			
	TIATING DEVICE		NOUN NAME		SETPOIN	T VALIDATION INSTRUMENT	PCS ID	LINK # U2	
2PSL	-5342		rument Air H sure Switch		75 PSIG	2PI-5344A	NONE	1638	
2PSL	-5378		rument Air H sure Switch		75 PSIG				Ι
2.0	CORRECTI SPECIFIC				SPECIFI	CORRECTIVE ACT	IONS		
	NONE				NONE				:
3.0	ASSOCIAT	ED RES	SPANSES						
	NONE	<u> </u>							I
		TORY A	ACTIONS:						-
4.0	<u>COMPENSA</u>								I
4.0	COMPENSA Device N	UMBER			SPECIFI	COMPENSATORY A	CTIONS		
		A, Ins er Pre		4.1	Monitor	COMPENSATORY A Instrument Air nce per shift.		essure at	
	DEYICE N 2PI-5344 Air Head	A, Ins er Pre		4.1	Monitor	Instrument Air		essure at	

Comments / Reference: From SONGS Exam Bank #127082	Revision 10/20/06
Given the following conditions:	
 Unit 2 is operating at 100% power with the Instrument Air system aligned for operations. 	or normal
 Subsequently, a valid Instrument Air Header Pressure Low alarm is receive leak. 	d, due to an air
 Instrument Air header pressure is currently 87 psig and steady. 	
Which ONE (1) of the following correctly describes the current status of the Instrum	nent Air System?
A. Three Instrument Air Compressors are running fully loaded. Nitrogen backup is maintaining Instrument Air via a pressure control valve.	
B. Three Instrument Air Compressors are running fully loaded. Service Air is maintaining Instrument Air via a pressure control valve.	
C. Two Instrument Air Compressors are running fully loaded. One Instrument Air Compressor is running half loaded. Nitrogen backup is maintaining Instrument Air via a pressure control valve.	
 D. <u>Two Instrument Air Compressors are running fully loaded.</u> <u>One Instrument Air Compressor is running half loaded.</u> Service Air is maintaining Instrument Air via a pressure control valve. 	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	103 /	A3.01
	Importance Rating	3.9	

<u>Containment System</u>: Ability to monitor automatic operation of the containment system, including: Containment isolation Proposed Question: Common 28

Which ONE (1) of the following valves receives a CLOSE signal on a Containment Isolation Actuation Signal?

- A. Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Valves.
- B. Containment Sump Pump Discharge Isolation Valves.
- C. Main Steam Valves to P140, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump.
- D. Blended Makeup to Volume Control Tank Isolation Valves.

Proposed Answer: B

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because these valves could allow contamination to escape Containment during a tube rupture, however, these valves are closed on an MSIS.
- B. Correct. These valves are isolated on a CIAS.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because the Main Steam Isolation Valves are closed on a CIAS, however, these valves are not closed until an MSIS is received.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because this interfaces with Letdown, however, it is closed on an SIAS.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-3-2.22, Attachr	nents 4, 11, and 17	Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference		
Proposed references to be	provided during exam	nination: <u>None</u>			
Learning Objective: 79743	DESCRIBE the flowpaths and major components of the CIS, CSS, and SIS utilized for normal and emergency operations.				
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	() X	Note changes or attach parent)		
Question History:	Last NRC Exam				
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundame Comprehension or A		<u>X</u>		

ES-401	SON	IGS Oct 2009 NRC Written Exa	m Wor	ksheet	Form ES-401-5
10 CFR Pa		55.41 <u>7, 9</u> 55.43			
Comments	s / Reference: Fro	m SO23-3-2.22, Attachment 17			Revision # 16
NUCLEA UNITS 2.	R ORGANIZATION AND 3	OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 16 ATTACHMENT 7		SO23-3 PAGE7	3-2.22 73 OF 146
2.0 <u>PRC</u>	<u>DCEDURE</u> (Continue	ed)			
2.	3 VERIFY CIAS	Train B component actuation at C	R-57 : (0	Continued)	
STEP	NUMBER OF COMPONENT	NOUN NAME	<u>NOT</u>	REQUIRED E <u>POSITION</u>	
2.3.17	HV-7806	Containment Rad Mon Tr B Inlet Isolation	[1][2]	CLOSED	
2.3.18	HV-9900	Containment Chill Water Inlet Isolation	[1][2]	CLOSED	
2.3.19	HV-5686	Containment Fire Water Isolation	[1][2]	CLOSED	
2.3.20	HV-7513	RCDT T-012 Drain Isolation	[1][2]	CLOSED	
2.3.21	HV-7258	Containment Waste Gas Vent Header Isolation Valve	[1][2]	CLOSED	
2.3.22	HV-5804	Containment Sump Pump Discharg Isolation	;e [1][2]	CLOSED	
2.3.23	HV-7800	Containment Rad Mon Tr A Inlet Isolation	[1][2]	CLOSED	
2.3.24	HV-7805	Containment Rad Mon Tr B Outlet Isolation	[1][2]	CLOSED	
2.3.25	HV-9971	Containment Normal Chilled Water Isolation		CLOSED	
2.3.26	HV-9821	Containment Mini Purge Supply Isolation		CLOSED	
2.3.27	HV-9824	Containment Mini Purge Exhaust Isolation		CLOSED	
2.3.28	HV-5434	SIT Nitrogen Supply Isolation	[1][2]	CLOSED	

Commen	ts / Reference: Fron	n SO23-3-2.22, Attachment 11			Revision # 16
NUCLE UNITS	AR ORGANIZATION 2 AND 3	OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 16 ATTACHMENT 11		SO23-3 PAGE	3-2.22 86 OF 146
2.0	PROCEDURE (Contir	nued)			
	2.2 ENSURE MSI	S Train A/B component actuation on t	CR-52:		
<u>STEP</u>	NUMBER OF COMPONENT	NOUNNAME	<u>NOTE</u>	REQUIRED	PERF. BY INITIALS
2.2.1	HV-4048	S/G E-088 Main Feedwater Isolation Valve		CLOSED	
2.2.2	HV-8205	S/G E-088 Main Steam Isolation Va	lve	CLOSED	
2.2.3	HV-4052	S/G E-089 Main Feedwater Isolation ∀alve		CLOSED	
2.2.4	HV-8204	S/G E-089 Main Steam Isolation Va	lve	CLOSED	
	2.3 ENSURE MSIS	Train A component actuation on CR	-52:		
<u>STEP</u>	NUMBER OF COMPONENT	NOUNNAME	<u>NOTE</u>	REQUIRED	PERF. BY INITIALS
2.3.1	HV-8419	S/G E-088 Atmospheric Dump Valve	[1]	CLOSED	
2.3.2	HV-8203	MSI∨ H∨-8205 Bypass Valve	[1]	CLOSED	
2.3.3	HV-4054	S/G E-088 Blowdown Isolation Valve	[1]	CLOSED	
2.3.4	HV-4058	S/G E-088 Water Sample Isolation Valve	[1]	CLOSED	
2.3.5	HV-8201	Main Steam to P-140 Isolation	[1][2]	CLOSED	

Comments	s / Reference:	From SO23-3-2.22, Attachment 4			Revision # 16	
NUCLEAF UNITS 27	R ORGANIZATIO AND 3	DN OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 16 ATTACHMENT 4		SO23-3 PAGE 4	-2.22 4 OF 146	
2.0 <u>PRO</u>	CEDURE (Cont	in ued)				
2.4 VERIFY SIAS/CCAS Train A component actuation at CR-57: (Continued)						
STEP	NUMBER OF COMPONENT	NOUN NAME	<u>NOTE</u>	REQUIRED POSITION	PERF. BY INITIALS	
2.5.37	HV-6202	P-307 Discharge Valve (N/A if P-112 running)		OPEN		
2.5.38	HV-6378	P-307 Bearing Water Supply Valve (N/A if P-112 running)		OPEN		
2.5.39	TV-0221	L/D to Regen HX E-063 Isolation	[2]	CLOSED		
2.5.40	HV-9205	Regen to L/D HX Isolation	[2][3]	CLOSED		
2.5.41	HV-9236	P-174 to T-071 Recirc.		CLOSED		
2.5.42	HV-9231	P-175 to T-072 Recirc.		CLOSED		
2.5.43	FV-9253	Blended Makeup to VCT Isolation		CLOSED		

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	2	
	K/A #	002	K5.01
	Importance Rating	3.2	

<u>Reactor Coolant System</u>: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RCS: Basic heat transfer concepts

Proposed Question: Common 29

Given the following condition:

• During an outage, chemical cleaning is performed on Steam Generator tubes, and no tubes in either Steam Generator are plugged.

Given the same 100% Reactor power level before <u>and</u> after the outage, which ONE (1) of the following will be observed?

- A. Turbine Governor Valves will be more OPEN than before the outage.
- B. Turbine Governor Valves will be more CLOSED than before the outage.

C. Steam Generator ΔT will be LARGER than before the outage.

D. Steam Generator ΔT will be the SAME AS before the outage.

Proposed Answer: B

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible if thought that cleaning of the Steam Generator tubes caused the U in $Q = UA\Delta T$ to increase. In this case, the ΔT will be smaller and the Turbine Governor Valves would have to be opened further for the same power level.
- B. Correct. Given the conditions listed, the Turbine Governor Valves will be more closed than before the outage at 100% power.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible given the equation $Q = UA\Delta T$. If U decreases then ΔT will be larger, however, cleaning the tubes causes U to increase and the ΔT will decrease.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible given the equation $Q = UA\Delta T$. If U increases then A would have to decrease to maintain ΔT constant. Since cleaning the tubes causes U to increase without any associated change in A the ΔT needs to decrease.

LF UTITIZZ, FAGE 55	Attached w/ Revision # See
	Comments / Reference
	LP 0HT122, Page 33

Proposed references to be provided during examination: <u>None</u>

ES-401	SONGS Oct 2009 NRC	heet Form ES-401-5	
Learning Objective: 53321		LATE and/or PREDIC	r, and selected heat exchanger CT changes in heat transfer rate atures.
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Leve	el: Memory or Fundam Comprehension or A	•	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content	t: 55.41 <u>5</u> 55.43		

Comments / Reference: From LP 0HT122, Page 33 Revision # 1-2

The value of U decreases as heat exchanger tube surfaces become fouled. This occurs because the effective thermal conductivity of the tubes is decreased and because the effective thickness of the tubes increases due to the foreign material which attaches itself to the tubes. An accepted method to monitor heat exchanger operation is to monitor changes in UA:

$UA = Q / \Delta T$

When the value of UA has decreased below its minimum acceptable (design) value, the heat exchanger is removed from service and cleaned.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	2	
	K/A #	015 A2.05	
	Importance Rating	3.3	

<u>Nuclear Instrumentation System</u>: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the NIS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Core void formation

Proposed Question: Common 30

Given the following conditions:

- A Loss of Coolant Accident is in progress.
- Core Exit Saturation Margin is 10°F superheat.

Which ONE (1) of the following:

- 1.) Explains the reason for the indicated response(s) of the Source Range Nuclear Instruments if excessive voids are formed in the core due to inadequate core cooling?
- 2.) What action must be taken to mitigate the situation?
- A. 1.) Count rates would LOWER due to more moderation within the core causing LESS fast leakage.
 - 2.) Raise Steam Generator feeding rate.
- B. 1.) Count rates would LOWER due to less moderation within the core causing MORE fast leakage.
 - 2.) Open Pressurizer Vent Valves to restore Pressurizer level so that heaters can be energized.
- C. 1.) Count rates would RISE due to less moderation within the core causing MORE fast leakage.
 - 2.) Raise Steam Generator steaming rate.

С

- D. 1.) Count rates would RISE due to more moderation within the core inserting positive reactivity to increase the shutdown power level.
 - 2.) Lower Reactor Coolant System pressure to inject the Safety Injection Tanks.

Proposed Answer:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because the action to take is correct, however, voiding causes a reduction in moderation and an increase in fast neutron leakage.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because most of the reason for voiding is correct, however, this action would only be taken if an excessive Core Exit Saturation Margin existed.
- C. Correct. This is the correct reason for voiding and the correct action to perform per Attachment 5.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because this action is performed during an extended Station Blackout and count rate does rise, however, it is due to less moderation and more fast neutron leakage.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-12-11, FS-10		Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO23-12-11, Attachn	nent 5	Comments / Reference
_	LP 2LC750, Page 44		
Proposed references to be	provided during exar	mination: None	
Learning Objective: 53354			trumentation to changes in d core conditions: Excore Nuclear
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundam Comprehension or <i>i</i>	•	<u> </u>
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>5, 10</u> 55.43		

Comments / Reference: From SO23-12-11, FS-10						Revision # 6
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGEN UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION ATTACHM			PER/	λT	ING INSTRUCTION SO23-12 PAGE 28	
	EOI SUPPORTI	NG A	ΓTΑ	Cŀ	IMENTS	
	FLOATI	NG S	STE	Ρ	S	
	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE		RES	SP	ONSE NOT OBTAINED	
FS-10	ELIMINATE Voids (Continued)					
g.	RE-EVALUATE RCS voiding per FS-9, VERIFY RCS Free of Voids.	g	. 1))	REQUEST Shift Manager/Ope Leader to evaluate opening R Vessel Head Vent or PZR Ver non-condensable gases per S REACTOR COOLANT GAS V SYSTEM.	eactor nt to remove 3023-3-2.33,
			2))	GO TO step a.	
h.	RESTORE Core Exit Saturation Margin optimum range per Attachment 5, CORI EXIT SATURATION MARGIN CONTRO	E				
i.	REQUEST Shift Manager/Operations Leader to evaluate restoring normal Letdown.					

ients / Refe	rence: From SO23-1	2-11, Attachment 5	Revision a						
LEAR ORGAN S 2 AND 3	REV	RGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCT ISION 6 ACHMENT 5	TON SO23-12-11 ISS 2 PAGE 110 OF 278						
	EOI SUPF	PORTING ATTACHMENTS							
	CORE EXIT SAT	URATION MARGIN CONTR	ROL						
	NOTE								
During ESD	E the value of PTS Sub	cooling (CFMS page 311) should b	e used in place of CESM.						
		CAUTION	1						
attachment Upper Head	Attachment 29, POST-ACCIDENT PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS is the controlling attachment when: 1) the Natural Circulation cooldown strategy of minimizing Reactor Vessel Upper Head void formation is used, or 2) the EOIs are entered from a lower mode and Shutdown Cooling was NOT initially in service.								
	CORE	XIT SATURATION MARGIN (CESM	M)						
CONTROL METHOD LOCA,SGTR,SBO,FR: less than 20°F SDE,LOFW, LOOP/LOFC: less than 80°F LOWER MODE ENTRY: less than 20°F		LOCA,SGTR,FR: between 20°F and 160°F ESDE,LOFW, LOOP/LOFC: between 80°F and 160°F LOWER MODE ENTRY: greater	SBO: greater than 50°F OTHER: greater than 160°F LOWER MODE ENTRY: No Upper Limit						
Feedwater Flowrate	RAISE, MAINTAIN S/G Levels - less than 80% NR.	STABILIZE S/G Level – between 40% and 80% NR.	LOWER, MAINTAIN S/G Levels – greater than 40% NR						
S/G Steaming Rate	RAISE	MAINTAIN	LOWER						
SI Flowrate Charging Flowrate	RAISE, ATTEMPT to maintain PZR level – less than 60%.	IF SI throttle/stop criteria (FS-7) – satisfied, THEN throttle flowrate to maintain PZR level – between 30% and 60%	IF SI throttle/stop criteria (FS-7) – satisfied, THEN lower flowrate and maintain PZR level – greater than 30%.						
Letdown Flowrate	LOWER	IF SIAS - reset, THEN ATTEMPT to place PLCS in AUTO.	RAISE						
Normal Spray Auxiliary Spray	LOWER, ATTEMPT to maintain PZR level – less than 60%.	MAINTAIN Saturation Margin as RCS temperatures are reduced.	RAISE, REQUEST SM/OL evaluate opening PZR Vents per SO23-3-2.33, REACTOR COOLANT GAS VENT SYSTEM.						
PZR Htrs.	If PZR level greater than 30%, ENSURE ON.		ENSURE OFF						

omment	ts /	Ref	erence: From LP 2LC750, Page 44	Revision # 3-3						
B. Neu	itro	n De	etector Response							
1. Excore NIS										
	a.	Ge	eneral System Description							
		1)	Safety Channels (4)							
			a) Use 3 vertically stacked fission chambers.							
			b) Are not post-accident qualified.							
		2)	Startup/Wide Range Channels (2)							
			 Use 2 side by side fission chambers. 							
			b) Channels are post-accident qualified.							
	b.	Εxβ	bected Response of Excore NIs							
		1)	Similar to response at TMI-2.							
		2)	Can be used to detect:							
			a) Core water level							
			b) RCS voiding (bulk boiling) with RCPs running							
			c) Core re-arrangement due to severe damage.							
		3)	Excore response changes due to 3 fundamental causes:							
			a) Change in source multiplication							
			 Reduced shielding due to voiding (bulk boiling) 							
			 c) Change in nature or location of neutron sources. 							
		4)	As core and downcomer water level decreases:							
			 Neutron leakage increases due to loss of moderator/reflector. 							
			b) More neutrons reach detector.							
			c) Indicated power level will increase.							

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	2	
	K/A #	016 /	44.01
	Importance Rating	2.9	

Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: NNI channel select controls

Proposed Question: Common 31

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 2 is operating at normal pressure, temperature and level with the Pressurizer Level Controller, LIC-0110 in LOCAL (Operator) Setpoint Control.
- All other Pressurizer level and pressure controls are in Automatic.
- A power descension is in progress.

While in LOCAL (Operator) Setpoint Control, which ONE (1) of the following describes how Pressurizer level is controlled?

Pressurizer level setpoint is...


- A. automatically maintained as T_{AVE} changes.
- B. automatically maintained as Letdown flow changes.
- C. adjusted based on level deviation from setpoint.
- D. manually controlled by the Operator.


Proposed Answer: D

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because T_{AVE} changes will generate a deviation from setpoint, however, only when the controller is in REMOTE.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because as letdown flow changes pressurizer level will change, however, not in the reverse order.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that the deviation signal will prompt the operator to make level setpoint changes, however, SO23-3-10 directs the operator to follow Attachment 5 when in LOCAL (Operator) Setpoint Control.
- D. Correct. The operator adjusts the LOCAL setpoint based on SO23-3-10, Attachment 5.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-3-1.10, Attachment 1, Step 1.2.1	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO23-3-1.10, Attachments 5 and 8	Comments / Reference

ES-401SONGS Oct 2009 NRC Written Exam WorksheetForm ES-40					Form ES-401-5	
Propose	ed reference	es to be	e provided during exam	nination: None		
Learnin 56421	g Objective	:	DESCRIBE the proce Control evolutions, inc misoperations.	cluding the consequence		gnment or
Questio	n Source:		Bank #			
			Modified Bank #		(Note changes	s or attach parent)
			New	Х		
Questio	n History:		Last NRC Exam			
Questio	n Cognitive	Level:	Memory or Fundame Comprehension or A	•	X	
10 CFR	Part 55 Co	ontent:	55.41 7			
			55.43			
Comme	ents / Refere	ence: F	rom SO23-3-1.10, Atta	chment 1, Step 1.2.	1	Revision # 21
	EAR ORGAN S 2 AND 3	NIZATIO	N OPERATING INSTR REVISION 21 ATTACHMENT 1	RUCTION	SO23-3-1.10 PAGE 26 OF	58
1.0	PROCEDU	<u>RE</u> (Cor	ntinued)			
	1.2 <u>Tra</u>	nsfer Pre	essurizer Level Auto Contr	ol <u>(Remote ~ Local)</u>		
			NOTE	S		
1.	During REM program. D	NOTE lev Ouring LC	vel control, the level setpoi DCAL level control, the leve	nt is determined by a co el setpoint is determine	omputer driven TA d by the Operator	NVG
2.	 On LIC-0110 Page 1, Remote setpoint is indicated as "ESP". Local setpoint is indicated as "OSP". 					
3.	During norn Remote Se		ations, the Local setpoint (SP).	OSP) will automatically	track with the	
	1.2	.1	Transfer from REMOTE	to LOCAL setpoint co	ntrol	
			Ensure a Reactivity Brief I SO123-0-A1, Section for F		this activity per	
			Ensure LIC-0110, PZR Le letdown flow.	vel Controller, is in MAI	NUAL with stable	
			Transfer LIC-0110 setpoir R/L pushbutton.	t control to LOCAL by a	lepressing the	
	₩ B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B		Adjust LIC-0110 Local set actual PZR level (middle o	point, OSP, (left columr column).	n) to match the	
			Ensure letdown and charg	.		
	×		Transfer LIC-0110, PZR L	-		
	×	.7	Initiate maintaining PZR le determined by RCS tempe	evel at the required setp erature per Attachment	oint as 5.	





Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	2	
	K/A #	029	K3.01
	Importance Rating	2.9	

<u>Containment Purge System</u>: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Containment Purge System will have on the following: Containment parameters

Proposed Question: Common 32

Given the following conditions:

- The Unit is in MODE 4 with a cooldown to MODE 5 in progress.
- A Containment Mini-Purge is in progress.
- A Containment Mini-Purge Exhaust Isolation Valve fails closed.
- NO other Containment Mini-Purge components have repositioned.
- Current weather conditions are 75°F.

Which ONE (1) of the following Containment parameter changes can be observed within five (5) minutes if no operator action is taken?


- A. Humidity level rises.
- B. Temperature rises.
- C. Radiation level rises.
- D. Pressure rises.

Proposed Answer: D

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because with exhaust isolated, humid air is still being added to Containment, but at a continuously reducing rate as pressure in Containment builds. Normal Containment Cooling would be reducing humidity.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because the flow of air being added to Containment via the Mini-Purge Supply is reduced, however, there is no forced cooling of this air and Containment Normal Cooling is still in service. Also, there is an RCS cooldown in progress.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because Mini-Purge Exhaust flow is reducing airborne radionuclide concentration and that flow has just been reduced. Over time normal RCS leakage would add radioactivity to the Containment atmosphere but this would not be observable in such a short time span.
- D. Correct. With Mini-Purge Exhaust isolated and Mini-Purge Supply still in service, air volume is being added to Containment and Containment pressure would slowly but steadily rise.

SONGS Oct 2009 NRC Written E	Exam Worksheet Form ES-401-5
SD-SO23-770, Figure 1 and 5	5 Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference
be provided during examination:	None
	ems interfacing with the CIS, CSS, and SIS and purpose of each interconnection.
Bank # Modified Bank # New	27145 (Note changes or attach parent)
Last NRC Exam SONG	S 2005B
Comprehension or Analysis	owledge <u>X</u>
From SD-SO23-770, Figure 1	Revision # 8
PPLY UNIT Y UNIT HAUST UNIT ST UNIT SEE Figure 5 HV-3825 HV-3825 HV-3825 HV-3825 HV-3823 HV-3824 HV-3824 HV-3824 HV-3824	
	and DESCRIBE the flowpath Bank # Modified Bank # New Last NRC Exam SONG el: Memory or Fundamental Kne Comprehension or Analysis t: 55.41 9 55.43 From SD-SO23-770, Figure 1 E & MINI-PURGE SYSTEMS PPLY UNIT UNIT SUNIT SUNIT See Figure 5 HV-5825 Figure 5 HV-5825 Figure 5 HV-5825 Figure 5 HV-5825 Figure 5 HV-5825 Figure 6 HV-5825 Figure 7 HV-5825 Figure 7 HV-5825 Fi

Form ES-401-5



Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	2	
	K/A #	035 I	<6.03
	Importance Rating	2.6	

Steam Generator System: Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the SGs: Steam generator level detector

Proposed Question: Common 33

Given the following condition:

• Unit 2 is at 100% power with Main Feedwater controls in Automatic.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the impact on Steam Generator E088 level control if Narrow Range Level Transmitter LT-1123-1 fails off-scale high?

Steam Generator E088 level control...

- A. raises mean level signal value to the Feedwater Control System causing level to lower until operator manual actions are taken.
- B. automatically excludes the failed channel from the mean average on poor quality and controls on the remaining good channels average.
- C. automatically transfers to MANUAL control if deviation is greater than 7% narrow range.
- D. generates a High Level Override signal to close the Feedwater Control Valves to E088.

Proposed Answer: B

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that the FWCS would continue to average the signals and only provide alarms to alert the operator.
- B. Correct. Three channels are compared and a poor quality signal would be discarded automatically from the average.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that a single channel failure would shift the FWCS to MANUAL, however, for this to occur there must be more than one failed channel.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that a single channel failure would result in generation of a HLO signal, however, it must be actual level to generate the HLO signal.

Technical Reference(s)	SD-SO23-250, Page	es 59 & 73	Attached w/ Revision # See
-	SO23-9-6, L&S 4.5		Comments / Reference
Proposed references to be	provided during exa	mination: None	
Learning Objective: 52830	Feedwater Control S	System, including the	monitor the operation of the name, function, sensing points, measured, and the location of each
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	<pre>_ (Note changes or attach parent)</pre>
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundam Comprehension or	0	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43		

Comments / Reference: From SD-SO23-250, Page 59	Revision # 14						
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNIT 2 AND 3	SYSTEM DESCRIPTION SD-S023-250 REVISION 14 PAGE 59 OF 143						
PART III FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM	PART III FEEDWATER CONTROL SYSTEM						
2.0 <u>DESCRIPTION</u> (Continued)							
2.1 <u>System Overview</u> (Continued)							
2.1.1 General Control Scheme (Continued) (Figure III-1)						
	.5 The DFWCS Input Algorithms use 4 field inputs (e.g., 1E S/G N/R Level) or 2 field inputs (e.g., FW Temp).						
.5.1 The Signal Validation Circuit	can only accommodate						
-	any 4-field input validations. in BYPASS and the other 3 go						
.5.1.2 2 inputs for validation use a "mean average".							
.5.1.3 If there is only one input (for any reason), shifts the validation to either the "last know good" or to MANUAL.							

nments /	Reference: F	rom SD-SO23-250, Page 65	Revisio	on # 14
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNIT 2 AND 3		SYSTEM DESCRIPTION SD- REVISION 14 PAGE		
RT III	FEEDWATER C	CONTROL SYSTEM		
0 DESC	CRIPTION (Co	ntinued)		
2.3	Detailed	Control Scheme		
	2.3.1 The	DFWCS has an input for ea	ich S/G from: (Figure III-1)	
	.1 Nar	row Range Steam Generator	Level	
		Main level input for cont modes	rol - used in Low Power and I	High Power
	.1.1.1	E089 LT1113-1, -2, -3,	-4	
	.1.1.2	E088 LT1123-1, -2, -3,	-4	
	.1.2 Signal quality is a root only a gross failure.		check of 4 to 20 ma. It lo	oks for
	.1.2.1	See Section III-2.1.1. validation and fault.	for detailed explanation o	f signal
	.2 Wid	le Range Steam Generator Lo	evel	
		Used in Low Power mode to (PID) Output	bias Proportional Integral I	Derivative
	.2.1.1	E089 LT1115-1, -2		
	.2.1.2	E088 LT1125-1, -2		
	.2.1.3	Average value is used	for each S/G (if 2 good sign	als)
.2.2 Rate of change & devia Failure. .2.2.1 On a channel failur signal.		the second s	or Bad Quality will cause	a Channel
			he system will use the rema	ining good
			als will cause the "last know with different gains and resolve	

Comments / Reference: From SC	Revision # 12				
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION OPER UNITS 2 AND 3 REVIS ATTAC	55				
FEEDWATER CONTROL SYST	EM LIMITATIONS AND S	PECIFICS (Continued)			
4.5 The Digital FWCS has multiple inputs with selection logic, bypass capability, and signal quality determinations. Use the below chart for determination of attributes.					
INPUT SIGNAL SELECTION LOGIC	SIGNAL QUALITY	USE	FAILURE MODE		
N arrow R ange Lvl 1 sign al bypassed LT1113-1 thru 4 Median Value is LT1123-1 thru 4 selected	Signal deviations and bad quality.	Low Power and High Power Modes	3 failures switch FWCS to manual		

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	2	
	K/A #	041	A2.03
	Importance Rating	2.8	

<u>Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control System</u>: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SDS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of IAS

Proposed Question: Common 34

Given the following conditions:

• Unit 3 experienced a complete Loss of Instrument Air and tripped from 100% power.

Which ONE (1) of the following:

- 1.) Describes the post-trip plant response?
- 2.) What action must be taken to mitigate the situation?
- A. 1.) Steam Bypass Control Valves fail open and will NOT modulate closed as Steam Generator pressure lowers.
 - 2.) Place the Master Controller in MANUAL to close valves.
- B. 1.) Steam Bypass Control Valves fail closed until manually opened.
 - 2.) Place the Master Controller in MANUAL and open as necessary to control Steam Generator pressure.
- C. 1.) Steam Bypass Control Valves fail closed.
 - 2.) Open the Atmospheric Dump Valves to restore Steam Generator pressure to normal.
- D. 1.) Steam Bypass Control Valves fail as is.

С

2.) Place the Master Controller in MANUAL and close as necessary to control Steam Generator pressure.

Proposed Answer:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because placing the Master Controller in MANUAL would close the valves for most conditions, however, during a loss of Instrument Air the SBCS Valves fail closed.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that a backup nitrogen supply was available to operate the valves, however, only the Atmospheric Dump Valves have this feature.
- C. Correct. All air is lost to the SBCS Valves and they fail closed. The Atmospheric Dump Valves are in MANUAL and CLOSED until the operator takes control per SO23-12-1, SPTAs.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that SBCS Valves would fail as is (which under normal conditions would be closed) to prevent a power excursion. If this were the case the action described would be correct if backup air were available.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-13-5, Attachmo	ent 2	Attached w/ Revision # See
-	SO23-12-1, Step 8b	RNO	Comments / Reference
Proposed references to be	provided during exar	nination: None	
Learning Objective: 54348	Steam Bypass Contro	ol System conditions	associated with the following /operations: the Steam Bypass Control
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundam Comprehension or /	0	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>5, 10</u> 55.43		

mments / Reference: From S	Revision # 7	
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION	ABNORMAL OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 7 ATTACHMENT 2 <u>AFFECTED UNIT EQUIPMENT RESPONSE</u> (Continue	S023-13-5 PAGE 25 OF 3
IN THE AFFECTED AREAS	S2(3)2417MU028 WILL RESULT IN THE	
AFFECTED ARE	A IMPACTED E	QUIPMENT TO ISOLATED AREA
ADV/MFW Area Isolation: S2(3)2417MU076 (Above MP-053 Suc	 HV-1105 and HV- FAIL-CLOSED. FV-1111 and FV- 	will rely on Backup Nitrogen 1106, Feedwater bypass Valves, 1121, Feedwater Regulating Valves,
MSIV/Tank Farm Area Isolation: S2(3)2417MU043 (7" TB at Seal Oi	FAIL-OPEN • HV-4053 and HV-4054, Blowdown ISO VL FAIL-CLOSED	
SBCS Area Isolation: S2(3)2417MU117	 Steam Bypass Va 	Ives FAIL-CLOSED

omn	nent	s / Reference: From SO2	23-12-1, Step 8b	RNC)	Revision # 21	
			EMERGENCY REVISION 21	ENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION SO23-12-1 PAGE 10 OF		TING INSTRUCTION SO23-12-1 PAGE 10 OF 28	
		S	TANDARD POS	T TR	RIP A	ACTIONS	
			OPERATO	R AQ	стіс	ONS	
	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED						
7		RIFY Core Heat Remova tisfied:	l criteria				
	a.	VERIFY at least one RC	P – operating.	a.	GC	D TO step c.	
	b.	VERIFY core loop ΔT (T – less than 10°F.	_H –T _C)				
	C.	VERIFY Core Exit Satura – greater than or equal					
		QSPDS page 611 CFMS page 311.					
8		RIFY RCS Heat Removal tisfied:	criteria				
	a.	VERIFY at least one S/G – between 21% NR and		a.	EN	SURE EFAS - actuated.	
		AND					
		Feedwater - available.					
	b.	VERIFY heat removal ad	lequate:	b.	1)	IF RCS T _C – greater than 555°F,	
		1) RCS T _c	on F45%F and			THEN	
		 trending to betwe 555°F. 	en 545 r and			 a) OPERATE SBCS to maintain RCS T_c between 545°F and 555°F. 	
						OR	
						 b) OPERATE ADVs to maintain RCS T_c between 545°F and 555°F. 	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	2	
	K/A #	055	A3.03
	Importance Rating	2.5	

Condenser Air Removal System: Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CARS, including: Automatic diversion of CARS exhaust

Proposed Question: Common 35

Given the following conditions:

C is a typo

- Unit 2 is operating at 100%.
- Annunciator C60A46 SECONDARY RADIATION HI is in alarm.
- RE-7818, Low Range Air Ejector Radiation Monitor has alarmed and RE-7870, Wide Range Air Ejector Radiation Monitor has a rising trend but is not in alarm.
- A Steam Generator Blowdown Radiation Monitor is in alarm.

Which ONE (1) of the following correctly describes the current condition of A361, Steam Air Ejector Exhaust Unit and the proper operator response?

- A. Flow has been automatically aligned through A361, Steam Air Ejector Exhaust Unit. Place A361 Control Switch in DIRECT to ensure flow through the unit.
- B. Flow is normally aligned through A361, Steam Air Ejector Exhaust Unit. Place the Exhaust Unit Heater to ON.
- C. Flow has been automatically aligned through A361 due to RE-7818 ALERT alarm. Place A361 Control Switch to ON and ensure heater is in AUTO.
- D. Flow is bypassing A361, Steam Air Ejector Exhaust Unit. Place A361 Control Switch in DIRECT to manually align flow through the unit.

Proposed Answer: D

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that this automatic feature exists, however, this action must be performed by the operator.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that this could be the normal alignment, however, this is not the normal alignment in order to preserve A361.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that this feature exists and is from the wide range monitor versus the narrow range, however, alignment must be performed by an operator.
- D. Correct. The unit has no AUTO alignment features and is not normally aligned. The operator places the control switch in DIRECT based on Annunciator Response Procedure guidance.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-15-60.A2, 60A46		Attached w/ Revision # See	
	SD-SO23-190, Page16			Comments / Reference
Proposed references to be	provided during exar	mination:	None	
Learning Objective: 52660	•			AIN the response of major o a steam generator tube
Question Source:	Bank #			
	Modified Bank #			Note changes or attach parent)
	New		X	
Question History:	Last NRC Exam			
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundam Comprehension or <i>J</i>		wledge	<u>X</u>
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7, 10, 13</u> 55.43			

Comm	ents / Reference: From SO23-1	15-60.	A2, 60A46		Revision # 14				
	EAR ORGANIZATION S 2 AND 3	REVI	M RESPONS SION 14 CHMENT 2		3-15-60.A2 E 59 OF 101				
60A4	6 SECONDARY RADIATION	HI (Continued)					
2.0	CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:								
	NOTE								
ser	e to the high air flow with sitivity of 2(3)RE-7870, Co steam generator tube leak	onden	ser Air E	jector Radiation Monitor,					
	SPECIFIC CAUSES		SPECIFIC	CORRECTIVE ACTIONS					
2.1	HI radiation in Steam Generator Blowdown Processing	2.1	Check rac 2(3)RE-78	diation levels of 2(3)RE- 870.	7818 and				
	riocessing		2.1.1	<u>If</u> high radiation levels present, <u>then</u> perform the following:	are				
				.1 START Vacuum Pump 2(3 per SO23-10-7, Section Starting 2(3)MP-054, Pump (Vacuum Establis	on for Vacuum				
				.2 PLACE A-361, Air Ejec Exhaust Unit, in DIRE					
				.3 GO TO SO23-13-14, Rea Coolant Leak.	actor				
			2.1.2	Notify 70' HP Control Po- monitor increasing radiat on BPS filters, deminera effluent.	tion levels				
			NOTE:	Main Steam Line Monitors respond to Tech. Spec. pr secondary leakage limits total, with typical RCS a (i.e., < 1% failed fuel).	rimary to of 1 gpm activities				

7

mments / Reference: From SD-SO23-190, Page 16	Revision # 11
2.3.2 Steam Air Ejector Exhaust Unit	
.1 The Air Ejector Exhaust Unit is control Room 2(3)CR-60. The control switch ha positions. When switch is in BYPASS, and valves 2(3)HV-9792B & C are CLOSED is selected, valves 2(3)HV-9792B & C (CLOSES placing the Unit in service.	is "DIRECT" and "BYPASS" valve 2(3)HV-9792A is OPEN). When the DIRECT position
.2 The Air Ejector Exhaust Unit is normal When high radiation is detected, by Ra and/or 2(3)RE7870A1, B1, C1, the Unit "DIRECT" position. For details of ope refer to Radiation Monitoring System I	diation monitors 2(3)RE7818A is normally shifted to the eration of radiation monitors
.3 The Exhaust Unit Heater is controlled Ventilation Control Panel 2(3)L-155. positions: OFF, ON and AUTO. In AUTO exhaust flow energizes the Heater.	The switch has three

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	2	
	K/A #	056	K1.03
	Importance Rating	2.6	

<u>Condensate System</u>: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the Condensate System and the following systems: MFW Proposed Question: Common 36

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power.
- All Condensate Pumps are running.
- Condensate Pump P053 trips on overcurrent.

А

• Main Feedwater Pumps are in their normal alignment.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the effect on the Main Feedwater Pumps?

- A. Reheat Steam Supply Valves open and Main Feedwater Pump speed rises.
- B. Reheat Steam Supply Valves close and Main Feedwater Pump speed lowers.
- C. Main Steam Supply Valves open and Main Feedwater Pump speed rises.
- D. Main Steam Supply Valves close and Main Feedwater Pump speed lowers.

Proposed Answer:

- A. Correct. With all four Condensate Pumps running at 100% power the trip of one Condensate Pump will lower suction pressure to the MFW Pump which will lower discharge pressure. With the lower discharge pressure less Feedwater will enter the Steam Generator, Steam Generator level will lower, and the Feedwater Control Valve will open to raise Steam Generator level. As the control valve opens valve differential pressure will lower and the Master Controller will send a signal to the MFW Pump to increase its speed. Given the conditions listed, the Reheat Steam Supply Valves control steam flow to the MFW Pump and open to raise MFW Pump speed.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because at this power level the Reheat Steam Supply Valves are in control, however, the valves would open and speed would rise.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because Main Feedwater Pump rises, however, at this power level the Reheat Steam Supply Valves are in control.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible if thought that Main Feedwater Pump speed lower, however, at this power level the Reheat Steam Supply Valves are in control.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-9-6, Section 6.	2	Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference
Proposed references to be	provided during exar	nination: None	
Learning Objective: 64706	DESCRIBE the config Feedwater Pump and	S 1	onal characteristics of Main
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundam Comprehension or /	•	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7, 10</u> 55.43		

mments / Referer	ce: From SO23-9-6, Section	n 6.2		Revision # 21	
NUCLEAR ORGANI. UNITS 2 AND 3	ATION OPERATING INSTR REVISION 21	RUCTION	S023-9-6 PAGE 5 (
6.0 <u>PROCEDUR</u>	E (Continued)				
6.2 Fee	dwater Control System (Operation - On Li	ne		
	INFORMATIO)N USE			
NOTE					
S/C loval fluctuatio		_	Foodwater Co	ntrol	
Valves <u>and</u> the nur put on line, <u>then</u> th	ns have a direct relationship to th ber of Condensate Pumps runn e AP across the Main Feedwater imizes Steam Generator level o	- he ΔP across the Main ing. <u>When</u> the fourth C Control Valves is incre	Condensate Pu eased. The Dig	ımpis gital	
Valves <u>and</u> the nur put on line, <u>then</u> the Control System mi	ns have a direct relationship to th ber of Condensate Pumps runn e AP across the Main Feedwater imizes Steam Generator level o	- he ΔP across the Main ing. <u>When</u> the fourth C Control Valves is incre scillations when the fou ross the Feedwater Co	Condensate Pu eased. The Dig urth Condensa 	ımpis gital te	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	2	
	K/A #	072 A	A1.01
	Importance Rating	3.4	

<u>Area Radiation Monitoring System</u>: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ARM system controls including: Radiation levels Proposed Question: Common 37

Which ONE (1) of the following Area Radiation Monitors (ARM) initiates an automatic actuation of equipment on increasing radiation levels?

- A. RE-7851, Control Room General Area Radiation Monitor.
- B. RE-7820, Containment High Range Radiation Monitor.
- C. RE-7874, Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor.
- D. RE-7839, PASS Lab Radiation Monitor.

Proposed Answer: D

Α.	Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that this monitor what automatically realigned
	Control Room ventilation, however, it is a different monitor located inside the air plenum.

- B. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that this monitor would initiate a Containment Purge Isolation Signal, however, it is the Containment Airborne Radiation Monitors that perform this function.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that this monitor would close the Main Steam Isolation Valves, however, this monitor is used for indication only.
- D. Correct. This monitor will isolate sampling to the Chemistry Lab and bypass the Sample Coolers on high radiation.

Technical Reference(s)	SD-SO23-690, Page	60	Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference
Proposed references to be	provided during exan	nination: <u>None</u>	
Learning Objective: 103329	DESCRIBE the config Monitoring System co	o 1	onal characteristics of Radiation
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	75147	_ (Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundam Comprehension or <i>I</i>	•	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>11</u> 55.43		

omments / Reference: Fro	om SD-SO23-690, Page 60		Revision # 16
UCLEAR ORGANIZATION NITS 2 AND 3	SD-S023-690 PAGE 60 OF 157		
.0 <u>DESCRIPTION</u> (Contir	nued)		
2.3.3 Liquid	Process Radiation Monitorin	g System (Continue	d)
	Sample Lab Isolation Area R 7839 (See Section 2.2.5.2 an		2/3RE-7838 &
proc	Normal Sample Lab Isolation cess monitors. They are phy ated in the vicinity of pipe	sically area radia	tion monitors
.3.1.1 t	the RCS Hot Leg 1		
.3.1.2 t	the RCS Hot Leg 2, and		
.3.1.3 t	the Pressurizer Surge Line		
.3.1.4 1	to the Normal Sample Lab (Ra	dio-Chem Lab).	
moni lab	v consist of a GM detector a itors are located in the Pos valve gallery, at elevation Iding.	t Accident Sample	System (PASS)
Radi	monitor functions to alarm, io-Chem Lab and bypass the S iation in the sample lines.		
	communication/control modul 13B in the PASS lab.	es for these monit	ors are on
in t the 2/3F	RE-7838 and 2/3RE-7839 have the PASS room on 2/3L-13B (2 wall of the stairway down t RI-7839A) and in the Radio-C RI-7839B). High radiation a	/3RI-7838 and 2/3R o the PASS Lab (2/ hem Lab (2/3RI-783	I-7839), on 3RI-7838A and 8B and

Comments / Reference: From SO23-12-11, FS-28, Step b1 Caution Revision # 6								Revision # 6	
	NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY OPER UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 6 ATTACHMENT 2					RATING INSTRUCTION SO23-12-11 ISS 2 PAGE 64 OF 278			
E OI SUPPORTING ATTACHMENTS									
			FLOATI	NG S	TEP	s			
	<u>AC</u>	TION/EXPECTED F	RESPONSE	<u>F</u>	RESF	PON S	<u>SE N</u>	<u>OT OBTAINED</u>	
FS-28	MO	NITOR Isolated S/	G (Continued)						
b.		NITOR Isolated S∕ ≋sure:	G Level and	b.					
			<u>(</u>	:AUT	ION	ļ			
	and		ctive releases fro	om dire), the possibility of valve (f through the ADVs sh	
	1)	VERIFY isolated S - less than 80% M OR			1)	Lea		ST Shift Manager/Opera to evaluate a method of l al:	
		S/G cooldown in p	roaroce por			a)	INI	TATE backflow to RCS:	
		Attachment 18, BA	∿CKFLOWING				1)	INITIATE Shutdown Ma monitoring per step c.2)	
							2)	IF no RCPs are operati	ng,
								THEN ENSURE RCPs affected loop disabled p step 6). RNO.	
							3)	LOWER RCS pressure isolated S/G pressure p Attachment 3, COOLD(DEPRESSURIZATION	ier DWN /
						b)	per	TATE draining S/G to Ra Attachment 25, S/G DR GNMENT TO RADWAS	AIN
						c)	by S	TATE steaming the affeo SBCS operation through ass.	
						d)	INI S/G	TIATE blowdown of the a	iffected
						e)		TATE steaming the affeo AD∨operation.	cted S/G

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	2	
	Group #	2	
	K/A #	086	K6.04
	Importance Rating	2.6	

<u>Fire Protection System</u>: Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the Fire Protection System: Fire, smoke, and heat detectors

Proposed Question: Common 38

Which ONE (1) of the following conditions will result following an inadvertent actuation due to a Fire Detection System failure?

- A. Emergency Diesel Generator Building Pre-Action Sprinkler System pressurized dry pipe will depressurize and cause the deluge valve to open initiating flow.
- B. Hydrogen Seal Oil System Water Spray System will actuate to pressurize the header and when a fusible link melts spray flow is initiated.
- C. Main Turbine Bearing Boat HALON will actuate and flow is immediately initiated through open nozzles.
- D. Computer Room Fire Dampers close and HALON is discharged.

Proposed Answer: D

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because this type of pre-action system exists but not in the Emergency Diesel Generator Building.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that to preclude an inadvertent spray down of the Seal Oil Unit a second, confirmatory actuation should occur. This would be a pre-action type of system instead of the water spray system installed at SONGS.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because the statement is correct with the exception that the Main Turbine system uses carbon dioxide.
- D. Correct. This is the correct sequence for an inadvertent actuation due to detector failure.

Technical Reference(s)	SD-SO23-590, Pages 12, 14, 20, 69 & 70	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

Bank #

Learning Objective: 107169 / 107170	DESCRIBE the configuration and operational characteristics of Fire Protection System components.
	INTERPRET instrumentation and controls utilized in the Fire Protection System.
_	

ES-401	SONGS Oct 2009 NRC	Written Exam Worksl	heet Form ES-401-5
	Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Lev	vel: Memory or Fundam Comprehension or A	0	<u>X</u>
10 CFR Part 55 Conten	nt: 55.41 <u>7, 8</u> 55.43		

Comments / Referen	nce: From SD-SO23-590, Page 12	Revision # 14
	atic Water Suppression Systems (see Figures 1-A, B) inued)	
.5.2 We	t Pipe Sprinklers	
.5.2.1	Wet Pipe Sprinklers are supplied water from the Firemain through an isolation valve and an alarm check valve.	
.5.2.2	The Sprinklers are Fusible Link Type, which will initiate spray when the fusible link melts.	
.5.2.3	Control Room Panel CR61 indicates position of each wet pip sprinkler inlet isolation valve.	e
.5.2.3.1	Upon initiation of flow through a sprinkler, the alarm che valve repositions to annunciate actuation on Control Room Panel CR61 and the Fire Detection CRT.	ck
.5.2.3.2	Flow also actuates a local alarm bell.	
.5.3 Au	tomatic Pre-action Sprinklers	
.5.3.1	Automatic Pre-action Sprinkler Systems are supplied by wat from the Firemain via an isolation valve and a pre-action deluge valve.	er
.5.3.1.1	The pipe downstream of the deluge valve is normally dry.	
.5.3.1.2	The sprinklers are fusible link type.	
.5.3.1.3	A typical deluge valve and its associated Release Enclosur Box are shown in Figure 5.	e
.5.3.1.4	The valve may be automatically actuated by the associated local panel, or manually by using the manual pull handle.	
.5.3.1.5	The clapper to the deluge valve is normally held closed by latch.	a

Comments / Referen	nce: From SD-SO23-590, Page 14	Revision # 14		
2.1.2 The Fire Protection System consists of eight separate subsystems: (Continued)				
	atic Water Suppression Systems (see Figures 1-A, B) inued)			
.5.3.7	Control Room indication of status of the inlet isolation valve is provided at Panel CR61.			
.5.3.7.1	Initiation of the deluge valve is monitored on the Fire Computer Display CRT.			
.5.4 Wa	ter Spray Systems			
.5.4.1	Water Spray Systems are supplied water from the Firemain through an isolation valve and a deluge valve.			
.5.4.1.1	The sprinklers are open nozzle type.			
.5.4.2	Deluge valves similar to those used in the pre-action sprinkler systems are used, except that water spray systems are initiated by thermal fire detectors, and spray commence immediately upon valve actuation.			
.5.4.3	Control Room indication of inlet isolation valve status is provided at Panel CR61.			
.5.4.3.1	Initiation of the deluge valve is monitored by the Fire Computer Display CRT.			
.5.4.4	Fire water to the water spray systems for the Reactor Coolant pumps and Charcoal Filter Unit 2(3)A-353, enter Containment via a Containment Isolation valve prior to reaching the deluge valve and sprinklers.			

ence: From SD-SO23-590, Page 20	Revision # 14
1301 Suppression System (see Figures 3A - 3C) (Continued)	
ermal detectors are used in the Computer Rooms.	
Ionization smoke detectors are used in the Telecommunications Room and Radio Chemical Counting Room #1 for fire detection.	
The Radio Chemical Counting Room #1 also has a photoelectric smoke detector.	
Upon detection, a pre-discharge alarm is initiated in the area.	
Halon system actuation is alarmed on a CRT display on Panel CR61.	
A common alarm signal is annunciated on a window on CR61.	
e first detector alarm received in the Telecommunications om initiates an alarm and automatically shuts down the Room's C Unit.	
The second alarming detector signal initiates release of Halon after a 30 second time delay.	
scharge of Halon is delayed for 30 seconds to allow the rsonnel time to leave the area.	
The Smoke Duct Dampers are automatically CLOSED in the Computer Rooms and the Radio Chemical Counting Room #1.	
Computer Room Fire Dampers, 2(3)HV-9715A and B and 2(3)HV-9734A and B, CLOSE to isolate the area.	
The Telecommunications Room Air Handling Units are automatically shut down upon Halon actuation.	
	1301 Suppression System (see Figures 3A - 3C) (Continued) ermal detectors are used in the Computer Rooms. Ionization smoke detectors are used in the Telecommunications Room and Radio Chemical Counting Room #1 for fire detection. The Radio Chemical Counting Room #1 also has a photoelectric smoke detector. Upon detection, a pre-discharge alarm is initiated in the area. Halon system actuation is alarmed on a CRT display on Panel CR61. A common alarm signal is annunciated on a window on CR61. e first detector alarm received in the Telecommunications om initiates an alarm and automatically shuts down the Room's C Unit. The second alarming detector signal initiates release of Halon after a 30 second time delay. scharge of Halon is delayed for 30 seconds to allow the rsonnel time to leave the area. The Smoke Duct Dampers are automatically CLOSED in the Computer Rooms and the Radio Chemical Counting Room #1. Computer Room Fire Dampers, 2(3)HV-9715A and B and 2(3)HV-9734A and B, CLOSE to isolate the area. The Telecommunications Room Air Handling Units are

Comments / Reference: From SD-SO23-590, Page 69

Revision # 14

TABLE 1 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM DETECTION, ALARMS, AND SUPPRESSION				
REA DETECTION DEVICE ALARM POINT SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS				
		Primary and	Containment	
Reactor Coolant Pumps	fixed temp	CR and Local	Water Spray System, portable CO2, portable dry chemical extinguishers, rate of rise fire hose station. A lube oil collection system is provided for the RCPs.	
Charcoal Filters	fixed temp	CR and Local	Water Spray System, portable CO2, portable dry chemical extinguishers, rate of rise fire hose station.	
General areas	smoke detector	CR	Portable CO ² , portable dry chem. extinguishers, fire hose station.	
Elevator Machinery Room	smoke detector	CR and Local	Portable CO ₂ extinguishers	
		Control B	uilding	
Control Room	smoke detector	CR and Local	Portable CO ₂ extinguishers, portable dry chem. extinguishers, manual fire hose station, fire hose from hydrant, portable water exting.	
Cable Spreading Room	smoke detector fixed temp. rate of rise	CR and Local	Water Spray System, portable CO ₂ extinguishers, manual fire hose station, fire hose from hydrant.	
Plant Computer Rooms	smoke detector fixed temp. rate of rise	CR and Local	Automatic Halon 1301 System, portable CO ₂ extinguishers, fire hose station, fire hose from hydrant.	

Comments / Reference: From SD-SO23-590, Page 70

Revision # 14

TABLE 1 FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM DETECTION, ALARMS, AND SUPPRESSION				
AREA	DETECTION DEVICE	ALARM POINT	SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS	
Switchgear Rooms	smoke detector fixed temp. rate of rise	CR and Local	Fire hose station, fire hose from hydrant, portable CO_2 extinguishers.	
Remote Shutdown Room	smoke detector	CR and Local	Fire hose station, fire hose from hydrant, portable CO_2 extinguishers	
Station Battery Rooms Safety Related Nonsafety Related	smoke detector smoke detector	CR and Local CR and Local	Portable CO ₂ extinguishers, portable dry chem. Fire hose station, fire hose from hydrant, portable CO ₂ extinguishers. Fire hose station, fire hose from hydrant, portable CO ₂ Fixed Automatic Water Spray System, portable CO2 extinguishers.	
Cable riser areas	smoke detector fixed temp.	CR and Local	Water Spray System, portable CO2 extinguisher, fire hose station, fire hose from hydrant rate of rise.	
Emergency chillers	smoke detector	CR and Local	Manual Water Spray System, fire hose stations, fire hose from hydrant.	
Fan Room Charcoal Filters	smoke detector fixed temp. rate of rise	CR and Local	Water Spray System, fire hose stations, fire hose from hydrant.	
El 9', 30', 50', and 70' corridors	smoke detector fixed temp. rate of rise	CR and Local	Wet Pipe Sprinkler system.	
Technical Support Center	smoke detector fixed temp. rate of rise	CR and Local	Portable CO ₂ extinguisher, portable dry chem. extinguisher, fire hose from hydrant, portable water extinguishers.	

omments / Reference	e: From SD-SO2	3-590, Page 7	71	Revision # 14
		Turbine Build	ing and Deck	
Turbine – Generator	smoke detector fixed temp. rate of rise	CR and Local	Water Spray System, portable CO ₂ portable dry chemical extinguishe station, fire hose from hydrant.	
Turbine - Generator Bearings	Fixed temp. rate of rise	CR and Local	Automatic CO ₂ System, portable CO portable dry chemical extinguishe station, fire hose from hydrant.	
Lube Oil Reservoir Room 103	Fixed temp. rate of rise	CR and Local	Water Spray System, Wet Pipe Spri portable CO ₂ extinguishers, porta extinguishers, fire hose stations hydrant.	ble dry chemical

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	007 E	K2.03
	Importance Rating	3.5	

<u>Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery</u>: Knowledge of the interrelations between a reactor trip and the following: Reactor trip status panel

Proposed Question: Common 39

Given the following conditions:

- An Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) has occurred on Unit 2.
- The Reactor Operator has opened the supply breakers to 2B15 and 2B16.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the Reactor trip indication available on the Reactor Trip Status Panel?

1. MG Set Output Contactor RED lights _____.


В

- 2. UV WHITE lights _____.
- 3. Reactor Trip Circuit Breaker RED lights _____.
 - A. 1.) ON2.) ON3.) OFF
 - B. 1.) OFF2.) OFF3.) ON
 - C. 1.) ON 2.) OFF 3.) OFF
 - D. 1.) OFF 2.) ON 3.) ON


Proposed Answer:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because this is the indication available following a Reactor trip.
- B. Correct. The MG set breakers open (green lights are illuminated), the UV lights extinguish, however, the RTCBs remain closed.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because the UV lights are extinguished, however, MG set red lights are off and the Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers are still closed with their lights illuminated.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because the MG set lights are extinguished and the RTCBs remain closed, however, when power is lost to the UV coils their respective lights extinguish.

Technical Reference(s)			Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference
-	SD-SO23-520, Page	4 & Figure 2	
Proposed references to be	provided during exan	nination: None	
Learning Objective: 56628 / 56622	DESCRIBE the input their trip setpoints an		on System, the purpose of each,
_	alarms, including pos		ection System to failures and on the system or overall plant,
Question Source:	Bank # Madified Dank #	128139	(Nata changes or ottach parent)
	Modified Bank #		(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundam Comprehension or <i>I</i>	•	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>6</u> 55.43		



Comments / Refe	erence: From SD-SO23-520, Page 4	Revision # 6
2.1.1 <u>Main</u>	<u>Signal Paths</u> (see Figures 2 & 3)	
chanr	ATWS/DSS Main Signal Path, which consists of foune nels, four 2-out-of-4 Logics and two Trip Paths, tor Trip in the event of Hi-Hi PZR pressure (ind).	, initiates a
a Sig Block	measurement channel consists of a Sensor (Press gnal Conditioner (Current to Voltage Converter) k and Timer Blocks which are part of the configu ks of the Spec. 200 Micro Control Module. (See	and an Alarm ured function
gener Press	Measurement Channel measures the Pressurizer Pre rates a Trip Signal Output to all four 2-out-of- surizer Pressure reaches or exceeds the 2428 psi cative of an ATWS event.	-4 Logics when the
funct	of the four 2-out-of-4 Logics, which is also a tion block of the Foxboro Spec. 200 Micro-module ne two Trip Paths to OPEN an M-G Set Output Cont	e, activates one
Me	nis occurs when any two of the four inputs from easurement Channels reach the High-High Pressuri etpoint.	
	nis produces an output from all four 2 out of 4 nd activates trip path 1 and Trip Path 2 Relays.	-
.4.3 Th	nese Trip Relays in turn OPEN M-G Sets 1 & 2 Out	tput Contactors.
.4.3.1	The 2 out of 4 Logic Channels 1 and 3 activate Relays which OPEN M-G Set #1 Contactor.	e Trip Path 1 Trip
.4.3.2	The 2 out of 4 Logic Channels 2 and 4 activate Relays which OPEN M-G Set #2 Contactor.	e Trip Path #2
.4.3.3	Outputs from Logic Channel 1 or 3 and 2 or 4 a OPEN both M-G Set Contactors to Trip the React	



SONGS Oct 2009 NRC Written Exam Worksheet

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	008 A	K1.02
	Importance Rating	3.1	

<u>Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident</u>: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to a Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: Change in leak rate with change in pressure Proposed Question: Common 40

Given the following initial conditions:

- A Reactor Coolant System leak has occurred.
- Reactor Coolant System pressure is 2200 psia.
- Pressurizer level is 20% and lowering.
- The leak size is estimated at 500 gpm.

Current conditions:

- The Reactor Coolant System leak is determined to be a Pressurizer vapor space break.
- Reactor Coolant System pressure is 1600 psia.
- Pressurizer level is 50% and rising.

With the change in Reactor Coolant System pressure noted above, which ONE (1) of the following is the resultant Reactor Coolant System leak rate?

- A. ~300 gpm.
- B. ~375 gpm.
- C. ~425 gpm.
- D. ~500 gpm.

Proposed Answer: C

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because this answer could be arrived at if an error is made calculating the square root of the differential pressure to determine flow rate.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible if thought that leakrate was based on a simple ratio/proportion calculation. In this instance 3/4^{ths} the pressure would yield 1/4th the leak rate.
- C. Correct. This question meets the KA because it tests the operator's understanding of the change in leakrate based on a change in pressure. Leak rate is proportional to the square root of the ΔP . $1/4^{th}$ the original pressure will correspond to a leak rate approximately 85% of the original leak rate. The operational implications of this are important when evaluating ability to keep the core covered.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible if thought that the leak rate would not change because it is a vapor space leak and Pressurizer level is rising.

Technical Reference(s)	NRC Exam Formula Sheet	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination: <u>NRC Exam Formula Sheet</u>

Learning Objective: 54932	Per the Reactor Cool expected plant respo	•	, SO23-13-1	4, DESCRIBE : The
Question Source:	Bank #		_	
	Modified Bank #	127170	(Note cha	nges or attach parent)
	New		_	
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	SONGS 2005B		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundam	ental Knowledge		
	Comprehension or A	Analysis	X	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 14			
	55.43			
Comments / Reference: So	quare Root of Differer	tial Pressure Calcul	ation	Revision # N/A
Square root of 2200 psia =	46.9 psid Square ro	ot of 1600 psia = 40	psid theref	ore:
40 / 46.9 = .852 x 500 gpm	n = ~426 gpm			
Comments / Reference: Ra	atio & Proportion Calc	ulation		Revision # N/A
2200 psia / 1600 psia = 50	0 gpm / x gpm \rightarrow 800	$000 = 2200 \text{ x} \rightarrow \text{x} =$	~363 gpm	

Comments / Reference: Exam Bank #127170	Revision #10/23/06
Given the following initial conditions:	
 A Reactor Coolant System leak has occurred. 	
 Reactor Coolant System pressure is 2200 psia. 	
 Pressurizer level is 20% and lowering. 	
The leak size is estimated at 1000 gpm.	
Current conditions:	
The Reactor Coolant System leak is determined to be a Pressurizer	vapor space break.
 Reactor Coolant System pressure is 1100 psia and stable. 	
 Pressurizer level is 70% and rising. 	
Which ONE (1) of the following is the current approximate Reactor Coolant	System leak rate?
A. ~300 gpm.	
B. ~500 gpm.	
C. <u>~700 gpm.</u>	
D. ~1000 gpm.	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	009 E	K2.03
	Importance Rating	3.0	

<u>Small Break LOCA</u>: Knowledge of the interrelations between the small break LOCA and the following: SGs Proposed Question: Common 41

Given the following conditions:

- A Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident is in progress.
- The Safety Injection Actuation Signal has actuated.
- All systems are operating as expected.

Per the stated conditions, which ONE (1) of the following is the basis for maintaining a secondary heat sink?

- A. To minimize boron stratification of the RCS.
- B. Cooling from the injection flow alone is inadequate to remove decay heat.
- C. Reflux boiling is the primary means of heat removal prior to voiding in the hot legs.
- D. Minimize potential for PTS during cooldown and depressurization phase.

Proposed Answer: B

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because boron stratification is a concern, however, more so during a Large Break LOCA.
- B. Correct. Any Reactor Coolant System pressure that remains above the shutoff head of the High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps will result in a lowering of inventory without the attendant makeup. The Steam Generators provide decay heat removal until the system is cooled down and depressurized.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because this statement is true if talking about a large break LOCA.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that PTS was a concern during a small break LOCA, however, the concern is the ability to remove decay heat.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-14-3, Section 2.0	Attached w/ Revision # See
_		Comments / Reference

ES-401	SONGS Oct 2009 NRC	Written Exam Works	sheet Form ES-401-5
Learning Objective: 53006	PREDICT and EXPL and parameters to a	•	f major plant systems, equipment ation
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	75386	_ _ (Note changes or attach parent) _
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	SONGS 2008	
Question Cognitive Lev	el: Memory or Fundam Comprehension or	0	X
10 CFR Part 55 Conten	t: 55.41 <u>5</u> 55.43		

Comm	ents / Reference: From SO23-14-3, Section 2.0	Revision # 8
2.0	EVENT DESCRIPTION	
	LOCA is an accident that is caused by a break in the Reactor Coolar boundary. The break can be as large as a double-ended guillotines small as a break that results in a failure of one of the Safety Function pressure or Containment radiation levels). A LOCA is characterized RCS pressure and inventory. Subsequent RCS inventory and press upon the size of the break.	break in the hot leg or as is, (i.e., Containment by an initial decrease in
	Small and large break LOCAs differ in their effect on the post-LOCA For a large break, the heat removal path is flow out the break, with the System (SDC) Heat Exchangers providing cooling, (after a Recircula occurred). For small breaks, heat removal via the flow out the break cooling; therefore Steam Generator (S/G) heat removal is required. during the actual emergency do not require the operator to distinguis	tion Actuation Signal has is not sufficient to provide The action steps to be used
	For large breaks inside Containment, an increase in Containment ter occurs relatively soon after the LOCA. However, in the short term, a be detectable on Containment temperature and pressure instruments radiation monitoring instruments in Containment.	small break LOCA may not
	The LOCA primarily affects RCS Inventory and Pressure Control, RC Safety Functions; and, to a lesser degree, Reactivity Control, Contain Containment Pressure and Temperature Control Safety Functions. H Functions should be monitored to assure public safety and to detect other events in progress.	nment Isolation, and Iowever, all Safety

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	011 E	A1.05
	Importance Rating	4.3	

Large Break LOCA: Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to a large break LOCA: Manual and/or automatic transfer of suction of charging pump to borated source Proposed Question: Common 42

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 3 has experienced a large break Loss of Coolant Accident with initiation of SIAS and CIAS.
- Train A 4160 V Bus 3A04 was lost following a plant trip.
- 3LV-0227B, Volume Control Tank Outlet Valve failed to operate on SIAS.
- NO operator action has been taken.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the status of boration flow to the Charging Pump suction?

- A. Boric Acid Makeup Pumps are supplying adequate suction flow through 3HV-9247, Emergency Boration Block Valve.
- B. Refueling Water Storage Tank is supplying adequate suction flow through 3LV-0227C, RWST to Charging Pump Suction Isolation.
- C. Boric Acid Makeup Tanks are supplying adequate suction flow through 3HV-9240 and 3HV-9235, Gravity Feed Valves.
- D. There is NO boric acid flow to the Charging Pump suction; the VCT continues to supply adequate suction head.

Proposed Answer: D

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that the power loss did not affect the BAMU Pumps and Emergency Boration Valve. With this path aligned the failure of LV-0227B would have no affect.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that LV-0227C still had power and the RWST height of water would overcome the VCT.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that the BAMU Tank height of water would overcome the VCT or that there were two trains of isolation from the VCT outlet.
- D. Correct. The Gravity Feed path is aligned but can not overcome the VCT NPSH.

Technical Reference(s)	SD-SO23-390, Appendix F, Various Page	Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference
Proposed references to be	e provided during examination: <u>None</u>	
Learning Objective: 52868 / 53388	DESCRIBE the operation of the following System controls, including the name, func each: Boric Acid Makeup Pumps (P-174 &	tion, interlocks, and location of
-	DESCRIBE the cause/effect relationships Chemical and Volume Control System con effect on overall plant operation of transfe the VCT to the RWST.	nditions and/or operations: The
Question Source:	Bank #	
	Modified Bank #X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7, 8</u> 55.43	

	1		CNTMT - Conta	inment PEN - Penetration Area	RWB - Radwaste Building MCR -	Main Control Room
		LOCATION			DESIGN DATA	
COMPONENT	COMPONENT	CONTROL	INSTRUMENT	FUNCTIONS	CAPACITY/TEMP/PRESS	CONTROLS/ INTERLOCKS
Volume Control Tank (VCT), 2(3)T-077 and VCT Vent Valve, 2(3)HV-9209	50' RWB	MCR CR-58 L-042	MCR CR-58 L-042	<pre>Volume Control Tank (VCT), 2(3)T-077, purposes: - RCS Degas; - accumulate RCP Controlled; - Bleed-Off (CBO); - control RCS Hydrogen Concentration; - provide a surge volume of Reactor Coolant for RCS makeup - provide Charging Pump suction head VCT Vent is provided to relieve excess VCT pressure to the Waste Gas System.</pre>	Vertical cylindrical tank with a capacity of 4,780 gallons Design data: 75 psig; 250 °F; Blanket Gas: Normal: Hydrogen Shutdown: Nitrogen VCT Vent Valve: 3/4" air operated globe valve VCT Relief Valve: set at 75 psig with a capacity of 305 gpm NORMALLY - 37 to 60%; 25 - 35 psig; 120 °F; Flow: Letdown 38 gpm;	HV-9209 has OPEN/CLOSED Pushbuttons AUTO level control will divert Letdown Flow to the Coolant Radwaste System on a high VCT Level @78%. AUTO makeup to the VCT will start on a low VCT Level @32%. Makeup to the VCT is provided by a preset blend of Primary Plant Make-up (demineralized) Water and Boric Acid.

mments / Reference: F	rom SD-SO23-3	390, Append	lix F, Page 1	85 Revision #	# 17	
VCT Outlet Valve, 2(3)LV-0227B	43' RWB	CR-57	CR-57 CR-58	To provide isolation of the VCT Outlet to the Charging Pumps on a Low-low Level or a SIAS.	4", motor operated gate valve NORMALLY - OPEN	HV-0227B: fails "AS- IS" on a loss of power OPEN/AUTO/MANUAL/ CLOSED Pushbuttons Provides isolation of VCT Outlet upon receipt of: Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) VCT Low-low Level @ 65

Form ES-401-5

CNTMT - Containment PEN - Penetration Area RWB - Radwaste Building MCR - Main Control Room									
LOCATION		innere Fen - Feneration Area	DESIGN DATA						
COMPONENT	COMPONENT	CONTROL	INSTRUMENT	FUNCTIONS	CAPACITY/TEMP/PRESS	CONTROLS/ INTERLOCKS			
WST to Charging Pumps (3)LV-0227C	9' RWB	CR-57	CR-57 CR-58	LV-0227C prevents a complete loss of Charging Pump suction fluid during normal and emergency operations.	3", motor operated gate valve	HV-0227C: fails "AS- IS" on a loss of power OPEN / AUTO-MANUAL / CLOSED / OVERRIDE Pushbuttons Provides AUTO OPEN of RWST to Charging Pump Suction upon receipt of: Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) VCT Low-low Level @ 6% A SIAS Override Switch is provided to allow opening LV-0227C after			

Comments / Reference: Fro	mments / Reference: From SD-SO23-390, Appendix F, Page 192 Revision # 17						
PEN - Penetration Area FHB - Fuel Handling Building RHB - Radwaste Building SEB - Safety Equipment Building MCR - Main Control Room CB - Control Building							
		LOCATION			DESIGN DATA		
COMPONENT	COMPONENT	CONTROL	INSTRUMENT	FUNCTIONS	CAPACITY/TEMP/PRESS	CONTROLS/ INTERLOCKS	
					NAVWELL - 143-133 L		
Boric Acid Makeup Tanks 2(3)T-071 & 072	24' RWB	MCR CR-58	MCR CR-58 L-42	BAMU tanks provide a source of concentrated boric acid solution, with a minimum Technical Specification Limit of 2.3 wt%, for RCS injection during normal and emergency conditions.	TANK: Vertical, Cylindrical, 11,800 gal, 15 psig, 200°F HEATER: Electrical Strap-On, 2.25 kW each (2 Banks of 3 Each) FLUID: 2.25 wt% to 3.5 wt% Boric Acid	None	
					NORMALLY - ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE, 80°F		

PEN - Penetration Area	FHB - Fusi Ha	LOCATION	IG KNB – Radhas	∶te Building – SEB – Safety Equipm	isnt Building MCR - Main Contr DESIGN DATA	οι κοοm ιβ - Control Building
COMPONENT	COMPONENT	CONTROL	INSTRUMENT	FUNCTIONS	CAPACITY/TEMP/PRESS	CONTROLS/ INTERLOCKS
Boric Acid Makeup Pumps 2(3)P-174 & P-175	9' RWB	MCR CR-58	MCR CR-58	The BAMU pumps can provide boric acid to the charging pump suction header, RWST and VCT. They are also used to recirculate the BAMU tanks and transfer acid from one BAMU tank to the other.	Pump: Centrifugal, Horizontal, 480 VAC, 3 Phase, 25 hp, 3600 RPM, 31 FLA, 200 psig, 250°F, 231 ft., 145 gpm RUNOUT HEAD: 170 ft. FLOW: 220 gpm NPSH AVAILABLE: 7 ft. MINIMUM FLOW: 10 gpm NORMALLY - 80°F, 10-13 psig	SIAS START Selected BAMU Pump Starts when HS-0210 is selected to AUTO and a VCT Auto Makeup demand is present or HS-0210 is selected to BORATE
Emergency Boration Valve Block, 2(3)HV-9247	9' RWB	MCR CR-58	MCR CR-58 CR-57	Emergency Boration Block Valve, HV-9247, is designed to supply boric acid to the charging pumps suction header in an emergency.	3", motor operated gate valve NORMALLY - CLOSED	Fails: OPEN OPEN, CLOSE and OVERRIDE switchlight module SIAS OPENS
BAMU Tanks Gravity Feed Yalves, 2(3)HV-9235 & 9240	26' RWB	MCR CR-58	MCR CR-58 CR-57	A gravity feed path is required, as defined in S023-3-3.1, "Boric Acid Flow Path Testings," by TS LCO 3.1.9 and 3.1.10 Boration Systems Operating and Shutdown. These valves insure a boric acid path to the RCS.	3", motor operated gate valve NORMALLY - CLOSED	Fails: AS-IS OPEN, CLOSE and OVERRIDE switchlight module SIAS OPEN

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	015/17	AA2.01
	Importance Rating	3.0	

<u>RCP Malfunctions</u>: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): Cause of RCP failure

Proposed Question: Common 43

The following annunciators are received in the Control Room:

- 56C24 RCP P001 SEAL PRESS HI/LO.
- 56B57 RCP BLEEDOFF FLOW HI/LO.

The Reactor Operator reports the following for Reactor Coolant Pump P-001:

- Vapor seal cavity pressure = 75 psia.
- Upper seal cavity pressure = 1162.5 psia.
- Middle seal cavity pressure = 2250 psia.


Which ONE (1) of the following describes the event in progress?

- A. Lower Seal <u>only</u> has failed.
- B. Middle Seal <u>only</u> has failed.
- C. Both Lower and Middle Seals have failed.
- D. Both Lower and Upper Seals have failed.

Proposed Answer: A

- A. Correct. This is the correct seal failure diagnosis per SO23-13-6, Attachment 1.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because the Middle Seal is at RCS pressure, however, this is because the Lower Seal has failed. If this were true the Middle and Upper Seals would both be indicating 1162.5 psia.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because the Middle Seal is at RCS pressure it could be thought that both the Lower and Middle Seals have failed, however, if this were true the Upper Seal would be indicating 2250 psia.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that with the Middle Seal indicating RCS pressure it is the only seal currently working, however, if this were true the Upper Seal would be indicating 75 psia.

ES-401	SONGS Oct 2009 NRC	Written Exam Workshe	eet Form ES-401-5
Technical Reference(s)	SO23-13-6, Attachm	ent 1	Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference
Proposed references to	be provided during exa	mination: <u>None</u>	
Learning Objective: 55452	Using SO23-13-6, R expected plant respo	-	Seal Failure, DESCRIBE: The
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Lev	rel: Memory or Fundam Comprehension or	•	X
10 CFR Part 55 Conter	nt: 55.41 <u>3, 5</u> 55.43		



Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	025 A	A2.05
	Importance Rating	3.1	

Loss of RHR System: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: Limitations on LPI flow and temperature rates of change Proposed Question: Common 44

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 2 entered MODE 5 two (2) days ago for a Refueling Outage.
- Train A Shutdown Cooling Pump tripped on overcurrent.
- Train B Shutdown Cooling Pump is being placed in service.
- The Shutdown Cooling System has been secured for approximately 1 hour.

Which ONE (1) of the following identifies the:

- MINIMUM Shutdown Cooling System flow rate and
- MAXIMUM <u>expected</u> Shutdown Cooling System heatup rate when restoring the system to operation?

MINIMUM Shutdown Cooling System flow rate is ______ and MAXIMUM expected Shutdown Cooling System heatup rate is ______.

- A. 2000 gpm 5°F per hour
- B. 2000 gpm 50°F per hour
- C. 2500 gpm 5°F per hour
- D. 2500 gpm 50°F per hour

Proposed Answer: D

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that a 5°F/hr heatup rate is appropriate with the Unit in MODE 5, however, it has been demonstrated that a heatup rate can reach 50°F/hr.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because the expected heatup rate is correct, however, 2000 gpm is less than the Technical Specification minimum of 2200 gpm.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because the flow rate is correct, however, when securing Shutdown Cooling in this condition one would expect to see a heatup rate of up to 50°F/nr.
- D. Correct. This is the minimum administrative limit for flow and maximum expected heatup rate when restoring the Shutdown Cooling System to service after temporary termination.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-3-2.6, Step 6.2	2.2 Caution	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO23-3-2.6, L&S 2.1	& 2.2	Comments / Reference
-	SO23-5-1.3, L&S 4.4		
Proposed references to be	e provided during exar	mination: None	
Learning Objective: 52628	limitation, of administ	trative requirement, S	d by a procedural precaution, STATE the limiting condition and Shutdown Cooling System.
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundam Comprehension or <i>J</i>	0	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7, 10</u> 55.43		

ments / Reference	: From SO23-3-2.6, Step	o 6.2.2 Ca	aution		Revisior
IUCLEAR ORGANIZ INITS 2 AND 3	ATION OPERATING REVISION 28		TION	SO23-3 PAGE	3-2.6 7 OF 134
.0 <u>PROCEDURE</u>	(Continued)				
6.2.2	Maintain SHUTD OWN (Ref. 2.2.1, 2.2.4 and 2	COOLING (.2.14) [LS	i FLOW within S-2.1 through l	the follow _S-2.3 , Att	ing guidelines: achment 7]
	CAU	TION			
To ensure adequate (LS-2.2)	core cooling, SDC flow sha	ll be mainta	ained at least :	2500 gpm	in all modes.
	SINGLE LPSI PU	MP OPE	RATION		
RCS LEVEL	MAXIMUM FLOW (gpm)	RCS	LEVEL		1UM FLOW gpm)
> TOH	5500		24"		3700
21011			23"	3500	
28" to TOH	4400		22"	:	3300
27"	4300	21"		:	3100
26"	4100	20"		2900	
25"	3900		19" 2700		
NOTE: MAXII	s should be set -/+ 200 gpm MUM FLOW values are adm flow limits to ensure the LP\$	inistrative o	auidelines whi	čh are 200	preferred). I gpm below
		P COMB	INATIONS		
SD C PUMP Combinations	RCS LEVEL CONDITION	ON	ALLOWABLE (gpm		ALARM SE TPOINTS LO/HI
2 LPSI	Above TOH		5200 - 8	100	±200 gpm
1 CS	≥ 23' above the flan¢ (38% PZR Level)	ge	2500 - 2 [4]	?750	2550/2700
2 CS	≥ 23' above the flange (38% PZR Level)		2500 - 38 (<1970 per	75 [4] Pump)	2550/3800
1 or 2 CS	< 23' above the flang (38% PZR Level)	ge	2500 - 2 [4]	?750	2550/2700
		> 23"		to SO23-3	2061

Comments / Reference: From SO23	Comments / Reference: From SO23-3-2.6, L&S 2.1 & 2.2 Revision # 26						
UNITS2AND3 RE							
SHUTDOWN COOLING	SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM LIMITATIONS AND SPECIFICS						
OBJECTIVE To provide a list of system/component limitations and specific operational details related to the steps in this procedure. Although the information presented here is not necessary to perform an evolution, it does provide supplementary information to enhance understanding and increase awareness. Some of this information may also be considered for Pre-job Brief subjects. Appropriate steps in this procedure will reference this attachment, for example (LS-2.2) for Limitations and Specifics Item No. 2.2.							
 Verify this document is current b described in SO123-VI-0.9. 	y checking a contro	lled copy or by using the method					
1.0 SDCS Pressure and Temper	rature Limitations	5					
within the following RCS							
 Pressure using Mai (both pressure instr 		rruments: ≤ 364 psia ithin 38 psi)					
● Pressure using PCS (the largest ∆P betw	S/QSPDS instrumen veen instruments wi	ıts: <u>≤</u> 370 psia thin 24 psi)					
 Temperature of < 3. 	40°F						
2.0 SDCS Flow Limitations							
2.1 <u>LIMIT</u> : Shutdown Coolin (Tech. Spec. LCO 3.9.4,	g flow shall be grea 3.9.5)	iter than or equal to 2200 gpm.					
2.2 <u>LIMIT</u> : LPSI and SDCHX	(Flow Limits, as foll	ows:					
SDC CONFIGURATION	LIMITS	REFERENCES/NOTES					
2 SDCHXs & 2 LPSI Pumps SDC flow range	5000-8300 gpm	Ref. 2.2.1 & AR 970400821					
1 SDCHX maximum CCW flow	1 SDCHX maximum CCW flow Refer to SO23-2-17 for limits based on system configuration.						
1 SDCHX maximum SDC flow (both HXs required >5300 gpm)	≤5320 gpm	Ref. 2.2.1					
1 LPSI Pump maximum flow	≤5500 gpm	Ref. 2.2.1					
1 LPSI Pump minimum flow - Long Term (≥ 25" RCS Hot Leg)	> 3900 gpm	For Pump protection during long te use.	erm				
SDCS minimum flow: FI-0306	≥ 2500 gpm	LCO 3.9.4, 3.9.5 & Ref. 2.2.14					
SDCS minimum flow: F306 (CFMS)	≥2400 gpm	LCO 3.9.4, 3.9.5 & Ref. 2.2.14					

omme	nts / R	eference: From	SO23-5-1.3, L&S 4.4		Revision # 32
	LEAR O S 2 ANI	RGANIZATION D 3	INTEGRATED OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 32 ATTACHMENT 12	SO23-5-1.3 PAGE 110 (DF 119
3.0	SAFE	SHUTDOWN OP	ERABILITY REQUIREMENTS		
	3.1	non-applicable N of the compensa restoring the spe	10CFR50 Appendix R Action Statement by ent Aode prior to the end of the 60-day Action will a tory measures. However, reentry into an appli- scific component/feature to OPERABLE status v sume at the point in the 60-day period when it w	llow for termin cable Mode wi will cause the /	thout
	3.2	2 <u>LIMIT</u> : Steam Generator Pressure Indication Channels A and B are required for Safe Shutdown. (Tech. Spec. LCS 3.7.113-1)			
	3.3	Steam Generator Pressure Indication may still be used to meet Safe Shutdown requirements while in bypass or tripped.			
	3.4	<u>When</u> requesting I&C to make "Live" Channel A <u>or</u> B Steam Generator Pressure Instruments, <u>then</u> any other "Live" pressure channel other than A <u>or</u> B will be simulated per the I&C procedure.			
4.0	RCS	НЕАТИР LIMITAT	IONS		
	4.1	The RCS HEAT (this guideline is limit of 60° F/hou	UP Administrative guideline is 50°F/hr. when To more conservative than Tech. Spec. LCO 3.4.3 rr).	c <u>></u> 70 • F 3 and LCS 3.4	103
	4.2	collapse is cause tubes. When wa resultant flow los Consequently.c	Due to a high rate of S/G tube failure, RCS nom he RCS is >340°F. This is based on a theory t ed by differential expansion rates between the s ater is trapped in this gap, it causes deformation ss. This expansion rate is greater at higher tem ontrolling the heatup rate to a nominal 20°F/HF educe this failure rate. (AR 060102028)	sleeves and th) of the sleeve peratures.	e with
	4.3	An RCS Heatup temperature fron Unplanned (tran (T.S. Bases SR	or Cooldown evolution is defined as a planned n one plateau to another of ≥10°F total change sient) temperature changes should be evaluate 3.4.3.1)	change in RC d against T.S.	S Limits.
		4.3.1 Logg	ging and Plotting is required for all heatup/coold	lown evolution	S.
	4.4	Initial Heatup rat however, no exp	e (during first 5 minutes) after securing SDC c erience in any outage has exceeded 50⁼F/hr a	ould exceed 50 fter 15 minutes	D⁼F/hr; ₃.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	026 A	K3.02
	Importance Rating	3.6	

Loss of Component Cooling Water: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: The automatic actions (alignments) within the CCWS resulting from the actuation of ESFAS Proposed Question: Common 45

Which ONE (1) of the following is the reason that the Containment Emergency Cooling Unit (ECU) Component Cooling Water (CCW) Inlet Valves are required to remain <u>OPEN</u> in MODES 1 through 4 even though they receive an open signal when a Containment Cooling Actuation Signal is initiated?

- A. Assist Normal Containment Cooling during an accident.
- B. Ensure sufficient Containment Cooling in the event Containment Spray fails to actuate.
- C. Prevent thermally locking the ECU CCW Outlet Valves if Containment temperature rises during an accident.
- D. Prevent Component Cooling Water Pumps from operating in a reduced flow condition.

Proposed Answer: C

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that this system remains in operation until a Containment Isolation Actuation Signal is received, however, Normal Chill Water isolates on an SIAS.
- B. Incorrect. The Containment Emergency Cooling Units provide the necessary protection in the event Containment Spray fails to actuate, however, that is not the reason why the CCW Inlet Valves are left open.
- C. Correct. Per L&S 5.7 in SO23-2-17, there is a concern that the ECU Outlet Valves are susceptible to hydraulic locking if the CCW Inlet Valves are left closed in MODES 1 through 4.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because Component Cooling Water system alignment requires adequate flow to the pump, however, in an accident condition there is sufficient flow.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-3-2.22, Attachment 4	Attached w/ Revision # See	
	SO23-2-17, L&S 2.16 and 5.7	Comments / Reference	

ES-401	SONGS Oct 2009 NRC	DNGS Oct 2009 NRC Written Exam Worksheet Form ES-401			
Learning Objective: 79748	by a procedural prec	aution, limitation, or	S, and SIS conditions addressed administrative requirement, is for that limiting condition.		
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)		
Question History:	Last NRC Exam				
Question Cognitive Lev	el: Memory or Fundam Comprehension or <i>i</i>	0	X		
10 CFR Part 55 Conten	t: 55.41 <u>7, 8</u> 55.43				

Comment	Comments / Reference: From SO23-3-2.22, Attachment 4 Revision # 16							
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-3 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 16 PAGE 4 ATTACHMENT 4								
2.0 <u>PR</u>	<u>OCEDURE</u> (Co	ntinued)				RF. BY TIALS	
2	for A.C.S hour, due	Source to the	on occurs, <u>then</u> ENSURE SO23 s Verification, is completed for b 1E 4kv Bus Tie Breaker Contro S did not occur.) [Tech. Spec. L	oth Units v sbeing in	vithin one		<u> </u>	
2	.3 ENSURE flow. (Ma	the as ark N/A	sociated Emergency Chiller(s) h if this is a spurious actuation.)	ave CCVV				
2	per SO23 Steady S	I-1-3.1, tate Pa	ociated Emergency Chiller(s) op Section for Verification of Emer rameters. (Mark N/A if this is a ler will be in-service < 30 minute	gency Chil spurious a	ler			
2	5 VERIFY S	sias/c	CAS Train A component actu	ation at Cl	R-57 :			
<u>STEP</u>	NUMBER OF <u>COMPONEN</u>		IN NAME	NOTE	REQUIRED		RF. BY ITIALS	
2.5.1	HV-6370	C C V I sola	Vto Containment ECU E-399 tion	[1]	OPEN			
2.5.2	HV-6371	C C V I sola	V from Containment ECU E-399 tion	[1]	OPEN			
2.5.3	HV-6366	C C V I sola	Vto Containment ECU E-401 tion	[1]	OPEN			
2.5.4	HV-6367	C C V I sola	V from Containment ECU E-401 tion	[1]	OPEN			
Comment	s / Reference:	From	SO23-3-2.22, Attachment	ļ			Revis	sion # 16
NUCLEAF UNITS 27	R ORGANIZATIO AND 3		OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 16 ATTACHMENT 4		S023-3-2 PAGE 42		146	
2.0 <u>PRO</u>	CEDURE (Cont	inued)						
2.4	VERIFY SI	AS/CC.	AS Train A component actuati	on at CR-	57: (Continued	4)		
<u>STEP</u>	NUMBER OF COMPONENT	NOUN	I NAME	<u>NOTE</u>	REQUIRED		F. BY IALS	
2.5.12	HV-7802	Conta Isolati	inment Rad Mon Train A on	[2][3]	CLOSED			
2.5.13	HV-9920		al Chilled Water to inment Isolation	[2][3]	CLOSED			
2.5.14	HV-9921		al Chilled Water to inment Isolation	[2][3]	CLOSED			

Comments / Reference: From SO23-2-17, L&S 2.16 Revision #27 NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION OPERATING INSTRUCTION SO23-2-17 PAGE 97 OF 107 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 27 ATTACHMENT 9 CCW SYSTEM LIMITATIONS AND SPECIFICS (Continued) 2.0 SYSTEM GUIDELINES (Continued) The following table provides projected CCW flowrates through a SDCHX for various 2.15 system alignments (actual flows may vary), however, being outside of the normal operating range is not an issue of operability, rather an issue of long term system reliability (excessive flow through a SDCHX may result in a mechanical failure of the heat exchanger): CCW SYSTEM ALIGNMENTS AND SDCHX FLOWRATES COW FLOWPATH ALIGNMENTS. SDCHX. Noncritical Loop Flowrate Condition ECU Return Emergency (gpm) Chiller ONE SEPHX RCPs/CEDMs Valves (2) OPEN OPEN OPEN OPEN 4900 CCW Pump OPEN OPEN OPEN CLOSED 5200 Rundut OPEN CLOSED OPEN OPEN 5670 OPEN CLOSED OPEN CLOSED 5960 CLOSED CLOSED OPEN OPEN 6550 Normal OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED 6650 Operating OPEN CLOSED CLOSED OPEN 6830 . Range CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED 6970 OPEN OPEN CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED 7280 CLOSED CLOSED ONLY 1 OPEN CLOSED 7600 CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED OPEN 8000 Excessive SDCHX Flow CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED CLOSED 8500 Flowrates given assuming minor flowpaths are open, e.g., PACU, [1] HPSI/LPSI/CS Pump Coolers.)

Comments	Revision # 27					
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3		OPERATING INSTRUCTION REMISION 27 ATTACHMENT 9	S023-2-17 PAGE 103	OF 107		
	<u>CCWSYST</u>	EM LIMITATIONS AND SPECIFICS (Continued)			
5.0 VALVE GUIDELINES (Continued)						
5.7 Containment ECU CCW Inlet Valves (HV-6366, HV-6368, HV-6370, HV-6372) must remain open in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 to minimize the differential pressure across the corresponding ECU Outlet Valve (HV-6367, HV-6369, HV-6371, HV-6373). Minimizing the differential pressure across the outlet valve ensures that it can be opened when required. If an ECU supply valve is closed (for surveillance testing, SDC flow balancing, etc.), then the associated ECU is inoperable. (AR 971201623, DBD 400, Sect. 4.4, Tech. Spec. 3.6.6.2 and Ref. 2.3.1.14)						

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	027 A	K1.02
	Importance Rating	2.8	

 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction:
 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: Expansion of liquids as temperature increases

 Proposed Question:
 Common 46

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 2 is at 100% power with Reactor Coolant System T_{COLD} on program.
- Pressurizer pressure control setpoint is 2250 psia.
- Pressurizer pressure is 2250 psia.
- Both Pressurizer Proportional Heaters are in service.
- All Pressurizer Backup Heaters are secured.
- Both Pressurizer Spray Valves are closed.
- One (1) Charging Pump is in service.
- A step change in Turbine Control Valve position results in the following:
 - Reactor Coolant System T_{AVE} rises 5°F.
 - Pressurizer level rises 5%.
 - Pressurizer pressure rises 75 psia.

Which ONE (1) of the following would be indicative of initial plant response to the above conditions?

- A. Letdown flow will rise to MAXIMUM.
- B. The running Charging Pump will STOP.
- C. Letdown flow will isolate.
- D. Both Pressurizer Spray Valves will go full OPEN.


Proposed Answer: D


Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because Letdown flow will increase, however, it would take a +10.6% deviation for Letdown to be at MAXIMUM flow.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because the Backup Charging Pumps will STOP with a + 4% deviation, however, the Charging Pump in AUTO will continue to run.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible if thought that this condition would isolate flow.
- D. Correct. With a 50 psia rise in Pressurizer pressure, both Pressurizer Spray Valves go full OPEN.

Technical Reference(s)	SD-SO23-360, Figures 3-9 & 3-16	Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference	

Learning Objective: 56419		Control System and	s associated with the Pressurizer an increasing or decreasing
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	127315	_ _ (Note changes or attach parent) _
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundame Comprehension or A	Ũ	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>5, 7</u> 55.43		





Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	029 E	A2.07
	Importance Rating	4.2	

<u>ATWS</u>: Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a ATWS: Reactor trip breaker indicating lights Proposed Question: Common 47

Given the following conditions on Unit 2 at 100% power:

- Several Reactor Protection System annunciators are received.
- Several Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers have opened.
- The Control Element Assemblies (CEAs) have NOT inserted.

If the plant is still at power with all CEAs fully withdrawn, which of the following <u>OPEN</u> trip breakers would indicate an Anticipated Transient without Scram (ATWS) condition exists?

Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers ______ indicate open.

A. 1, 2, 5, and 6
B. 1, 3, 5, and 7
C. 3, 4, 7, and 8

D. 1, 2, 3, and 4


Proposed Answer: B

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that this combination of trip breakers open should result in all rods being deenergized.
- B. Correct. This combination of breakers being open should result in all rods being deenergized and the Reactor should trip.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that this combination of trip breakers open should result in all rods being deenergized.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that this combination of trip breakers open should result in all rods being deenergized.

Technical Reference(s)	SD-SO23-710, Figure 2	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

ES-401	SONGS Oct 2009 NRC	Written Exam Works	heet Form ES-401-5			
Learning Objective: 55846 / 56627	ATWS/DSS. DESCRIBE the operation instrumentation, inclu	IDENTIFY the plant parameter, including trip value, used to actuate the ATWS/DSS. DESCRIBE the operation of the Plant Protection System components and instrumentation, including function, location, design basis, interlocks, setpoints, special features and power supplies, where applicable.				
Question Source:	Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # New		(Changed Distractor C) (Note changes or attach parent)			
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	SONGS 2005A				
Question Cognitive Lev	el: Memory or Fundam Comprehension or <i>i</i>	•	X			
10 CFR Part 55 Conter	nt: 55.41 <u>6</u> 55.43					



Comments / Reference: From Exam Bank #127053	Revision # 10/20/06
Distractor C: Replaced RTCB #9 with RTCB #8 for better plausibility.	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	038 E	K1.01
	Importance Rating	3.1	

<u>Steam Generator Tube Rupture</u>: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the SGTR: Use of steam tables

Proposed Question: Common 48

Given the following conditions:

- A Steam Generator Tube Rupture has occurred and both Steam Generators are being used to lower Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure.
- Reactor Coolant System T_{HOT} was initially lowered to less than 530°F.
- The ruptured Steam Generator has been isolated.
- Step 12 of SO23-12-4, Steam Generator Tube Rupture for lowering Pressurizer pressure is being implemented.
- Ruptured Steam Generator pressure is currently 800 psia.

Which ONE (1) of the following is the <u>HIGHEST</u> acceptable temperature for RCS T_{HOT} when lowering Pressurizer pressure to within 50 psia of ruptured Steam Generator pressure while maintaining at least 20°F subcooling?

- A. 460°F
- B. 480°F
- C. 500°F
- D. 520°F

Proposed Answer: C

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that it was desirable to lower temperature to the point where subcooled margin was increased.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that it was desirable to lower temperature to the point where subcooled margin was increased.
- C. Correct. With saturation pressure for 850 psia at 525°F, a target temperature of 500°F would still allow for sufficient subcooled margin.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because this temperature corresponds to a value close to 850 psia, however, it does not allow for any subcooled margin.

ES-401	SONGS Oct 2009 NRC	Written Exam Works	heet Form ES-401-5
Technical Reference(s)	SO23-12-4, Step 12		Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference
Proposed references to	be provided during exan	nination: <u>Steam Ta</u>	bles
Learning Objective: 52660	•		PLAIN the response of major s to a steam generator tube
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	127066	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	SONGS 2005A	
Question Cognitive Lev	el: Memory or Fundam Comprehension or A	Ū.	X
10 CFR Part 55 Conten	t: 55.41 <u>10, 14</u> 55.43		

Comments / Reference: From SO23-12-4, Step 12 Revision # 21								
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGE UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION	TING INSTRUCTION SO23-12-4 PAGE 12 OF 32							
STEAM GENER	STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE							
OPERAT	FOR ACTI	ONS						
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	RE	ESPONSE NOT OF	<u>TAINED</u>					
12 INITIATE Lowering PZR Pressure:								
	NOTE							
NPSH Tc requirements. This strategy sh	SGTR depressurization strategy should be to reduce RCS pressure while maintaining RCP NPSH Tc requirements. This strategy should continue until RCS pressure is within 50 PSI of the ruptured S/G pressure or S/G level is not rising.							
Keeping RCS pressure higher than S/G backflow unless backflow is intended.	CAUTION pressure is	=	ze RCS dilution due to					
<u>CAUTION</u> IF uncontrolled S/G level rise is occurring, THEN reducing RCS pressure to less than 1000 PSIA takes priority over maintaining RCP NPSH or 20°F Core Exit Saturation Margin. In this case stopping RCPs should be evaluated.								
a. MAINTAIN RCS pressure requirement SO23-12-11, Attachment 29, POST-ACCIDENT PRESSURE /	sofa.1)	 NOT satisfie 						
TEMPERATURE LIMITS:		THEN						
1) ESTABLISH RCS pressure:	_	a) STOP all R						
 low in allowable band for SGTF (approximately equal to rupture) 			uxiliary Spray					
S/G pressure).		OR						
AND		Manual Aux	S-32, ESTABLISH iliary Spray.					
 greater than RCP NPSH curve with RCPs running. 	2)	IF all RCPs stop	ped,					
AND – lessthan 160°F curve.	20°F Saturation SO23-12-11, Att	achment 29, IT PRESSURE /						

Comments / Reference: From Exam Bank #127066	Revision # 10/20/06
A steam generator (SG) tube rupture has occurred and both SGs are being used temperature and pressure. All the RCPs have been stopped due to a saturation margin of 20°F. Step 12 (Lowering Pzr Pressure) of SO23-12-4, "Steam Generator Tube Ruptur implemented.	
If ruptured SG pressure is currently 600 psia, then an acceptable initial target te would be:	mperature for RCS T_{hot}
A.525°F <u>B.475°F</u> C.425°F D.375°F	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	055 G	2.2.44
	Importance Rating	4.2	

Station Blackout: Equipment Control: Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a
system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditionsProposed Question:Common 49

Given the following conditions exist on Unit 3 two (2) hours after initiation of a Station Blackout:

- Reactor Coolant System pressure is 1850 psia.
- Core Exit Saturation Margin is 19°F.
- Reactor Coolant System T_{HOT} is 555°F and stable.
- Reactor Coolant System T_{COLD} is 535°F and stable.
- Representative Core Exit Thermocouple is 605°F.
- Reactor Vessel Level indicates 100%.
- Atmospheric Dump Valves are in service.
- P140, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is in service.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the status of Core Heat Removal and required actions?

- A. Natural Circulation Criteria are met. MAINTAIN Atmospheric Dump Valve steaming rate to ensure subcooling between 10°F and 20°F.
- B. Natural Circulation Criteria are <u>NOT</u> met. REDUCE the steaming rate to MINIMIZE Reactor Coolant System inventory shrinkage and allow the Pressurizer pressure rise to recover subcooling.
- C. Natural Circulation Criteria are <u>NOT</u> met. INCREASE Atmospheric Dump Valve steaming rate to raise subcooling to greater than 20°F and lower REP_{CET} - T_{HOT} Δ T.
- D. Two Phase Heat Removal Criteria are met. RAISE Steam Generator narrow range levels to greater than 80% to MAXIMIZE heat removal capability.

Proposed Answer: C

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that Natural Circulation is met, however, the correct minimum Core Exit Saturation Margin is 20°F.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because Natural Circulation is <u>not</u> met and it could be thought that the RCS shrinkage aspect could be the overriding factor for recovering subcooling.
- C. Correct. Given the conditions listed, these are the correct actions per SO23-12-8.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because given the conditions listed, two phase heat removal is in progress per the RNO column of Step 10 (REP CET minus Thot is > 16°F). Heat removal is maximized by raising Steam Generator level up to, but not greater than, 80% narrow range.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-12-8, Step 10		Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference
Proposed references to be	e provided during exa	mination: None	
Learning Objective: 53297 / 53125	EXPLAIN the observ maintenance of sing		t to verify the establishment and ulation.
-	Explain the operation circulation relative to		o Reactor Coolant System natural
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundam Comprehension or	•	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43		

Comr	ner	nts / Reference: From SC	023-12-8, Step 10)	Revision # 20
		AR ORGANIZATION 2 AND 3	EMERGENCY OP REVISION 20	ERATING INSTRUCTION SO23-12-8 PAGE 9 OF	
			STATION BLAC	KOUT	
			OPERATOR A	CTIONS	
	4	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPO	DNSE	RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED	
			NOT	E	
	l	Low flow during Natural Circu ime rises to between 5 minu	ulation slows RCS re tes and 10 minutes.	sponse to temperature changes. Loop	transit
10		INTAIN Stable RCS Condit tural Circulation:	ions With		
	a.	ENSURE AFW flow to at le	ast one S/G. a.	GO TO SO23-12-9, FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY	
				AND	
				INITIATE SO23-12-9, Attachment FR RECOVERY – HEAT REMOVAL.	-5,
	b.	ENSURE ADV - available on S/G with AF	W flow.		
	C.	MAINTAIN available S/G(s) — between 40% NR and 80			

mments / Reference: From	SO23-12-8, Ste	ep 10)		Revision # 20
UCLEAR ORGANIZATION NITS 2 AND 3	EMERGENC) REVISION 20		ERAT	FING INSTRUCTION SO23-12 PAGE 10	
	STATION E	BLAC	KOL	JT	
	OPERATO	R AC	стіс	ONS	
ACTION/EXPECTED RE	SPONSE		<u>RE</u>	SPONSE NOT OBTAINED	
MAINTAIN Stable RCS Cor Natural Circulation: (Conti					
d. OPERATE AFW and av maintain Core Exit Satu – greater than or equal	ration Margin	0		single phase natural circulation steps d. through h. – NOT sa	
QSPDS page 611.	1020F.		ΤH	EN	
e. VERIFY operating loop.	Α Τ (Τ _{4 -} Τ ₂)		•	MAINTAIN two-phase heat re	emovial:
 less than 58°F. 				a) MAXIMIZE available S/G — less than 80% NR.	levels
f. VERIFY T _H and T _C – N	NOT rising.	-	ł	 b) OPERATE ADVs to raise 	e available
 g. VERIFY operating loop — within 16°F. 	T _H and REP CET			S/G steaming rates.	
QSPDS page 611				 c) RAISE Core Exit Saturat – greater than or equal 	
CFMS page 311.				QSPDS page 611	
h. VERIFY Reactor Vesse – greater than or equal (Plenum):				CFMS page 311. MONITOR REP CET temper:	atura:
QSPDS page 622			•	QSPDS page 611	ature.
CFMS page 312 SO23-12-11, Attack	nment 4			CFMS page 311.	
	inion 4.		•	IF REP CET temperature - greater than 700°F,	
				THEN GO TO SO23-12-9, R RECOVERY	JNCTIONAL
				AND	
				INITIATE SO23-12-9, Attachi RECOVERY - HEAT REMOV	
			•	IF after 2 hours of Station Bla Exit Saturation Margin – lowering to 20°F,	ackout Core
				THEN GO TO step 13.	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	056 A	A2.20
	Importance Rating	3.9	

Loss of Offsite Power: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power: AFW flow indicator

Proposed Question: Common 50

Given the following conditions on a trip from 100% power EOC:

- A Loss of Offsite Power has occurred.
- Train A Emergency Diesel Generator has failed to start.
- Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signals (EFAS) 1 and 2 have both actuated.
- HV-8200, Main Steam Supply from Steam Generator E089 to P140, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump failed CLOSED.

Which ONE (1) of the following is the expected Auxiliary Feedwater flow indication to each Steam Generator as read on the CR-52 lumigraph?

Auxiliary Feedwater flow indication for Steam Generator E088 is indicating _____ gpm; Auxiliary Feedwater flow indication for Steam Generator E089 is indicating _____ gpm.

A. 500 200

B. 500 500

C. 800 200


D. 800 500


Proposed Answer: D

- A. Incorrect. Plausible if thought that Steam Generator E089 is receiving reduced low from P140 because its associated Main Steam Supply Valve is not open and Steam Generator E088 is receiving flow from P504 and reduced flow from P140.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because the flow value for Steam Generator E089 is correct, however, Steam Generator E088 is receiving flow from P504 and P140.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because Steam Generator E088 is receiving flow from P504 and P140, however, Steam Generator E089 is receiving full flow from P140.
- D. Correct. Steam Generator E088 is receiving flow from P504 and P140. Steam Generator E089 is receiving flow from P140 only. Flow values were validated on the Simulator.

Technical Reference(s)	SD-SO23-780, Figure	e 1		Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference
Proposed references to be	provided during exan	nination:	None	_
Learning Objective: 52728	Auxiliary Feedwater S	System, in	cluding the na	itor the operation of the ame, function, sensing points, sured and location of each
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New		(N	ote changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam			_
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundam Comprehension or A		wledge	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>5, 7</u> 55.43			







Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	057 A	K3.01
	Importance Rating	4.1	

Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: Actions contained in EOP for loss of vital AC electrical instrument bus
Proposed Question:
Common 51

Given the following conditions:

- SO23-13-18, Reactor Protection System Failure/Loss of a Vital Bus is in progress.
- Vital AC Instrument Bus Y01 has been lost due to Inverter failure with the Unit operating at power.
- SO23-6-17, Class 1E 120 VAC Vital Bus Power Supplies System Operation is in progress to energize the Alternate Source.

Which ONE (1) of the following actions is required?

- A. OPERATE Charging Pumps as necessary to control Pressurizer level.
- B. ACTUATE Train B FHIS, TGIS, CRIS and CPIS due to Train A FHIS, TGIS, CRIS and CPIS actuation.
- C. VERIFY SG wide/narrow range levels and pressures for Channel D auto transfer into service and Channel A auto bypass <u>out of</u> service on Feedwater DCS.
- D. TRANSFER Pressurizer Level to Channel X to allow restoring the Pressurizer Level Controller to AUTO.

Proposed Answer: A

Explanation:

- A. Correct. This action is required per SO23-13-18, Attachment 1.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because Train A FHIS, TGIS, CRIS and CPIS will actuate on a loss of Vital Bus Y01, however, the only action required is verification of proper alignment. Train B is not actuated.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because the Channel A Steam Generator levels and pressures must be bypassed on both Steam Generators, however, this action is performed manually by the operator.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because Pressurizer level must be transferred, however, Channel Y must be placed in service as it is powered from Vital Bus Y02.

SO23-13-18, Attachment 1	Attached w/ Revision # See
	Comments / Reference
	SO23-13-18, Attachment 1

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

ES-401	RO Written Exa	am Worksheet	Form ES-401-5
Learning Objective: 55180		2	e procedure, SO23-13-18, e for each major step.
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	128051	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	SONGS 2008	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundame Comprehension or A	0	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7, 10</u> 55.43		

omme	ents / Reference: From S	502	3-13-18, Attachment 1	Revision # 8
	AR ORGANIZATION 5 2 AND 3	RE	NORMAL OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-1 VISION 8 PAGE 1 TACHMENT 1	3-18 4 OF 33
		L	<u>OSS OF VITAL BUS YO1</u>	
			CONTINUOUS USE	
1.0	PREREQUISITES			
	None、			
2.0	PROCEDURE			
	2.1 Review Tech. Spe 3.8.9 and 3.7.5		impacted LCO 3.4.9.b, 3.8.1, 3.8.2, 3.8.3,	3.8.7,
	2.2 EFFECTS AND ACT	ONS	ON LOSS OF YITAL BUS YO1.	
	2.2.1 Perfo	rm t	he following:	
	AFFECTED EQUIPMENT		INDICATIONS AND ASSOCIATED ACTIONS	
.1	PPS A Status lights extinguished		VERIFY protection system bistables NOT TR on PPS Channels B and D ROMs.	IPPED
.2	Channels 1 & 3 Red ESFAS Function lights along the bottom of the ROM extinguished		VERIFY all ESFAS function lights ILLUMINA PPS Channels B and D ROMs.	TED on
.3	Channel A Lumigraphs on CR56 extinguished		VERIFY Safety Channel indications providi input to PPS Channels B, C, and D <u>do not</u> indicate that a Plant Protection Trip Set has been exceeded.	-
.4	Charging Pumps P-190, P-191, and P-192、		Operate Charging Pumps as necessary to co PZR level.	ntrol
.5	PZR Pressure and Level Control		ENSURE PZR Level Channel Y is SELECTED.	
÷	Level control		If LIC-0110 is selected to setpoint LS1, transfer Pressurizer level setpoint to LS S023-3-1.10, Attachment for Transferring Pressurizer Level and Pressure Controls.	
			<u>If</u> an ACTUAL Pressurizer LO-LO level exis <u>then</u> ENSURE all heaters DE-ENERGIZED. (AR 020900184)	ts,
.6	Vital Bus Inverter YOO1 de-energized		ENSURE S023-6-17, Attachment for Re-energ Vital Bus Y01 from the Alternate Source, progress. (Tech. Spec. LCO 3.8.7 and LCO 3.8.9)	

	ents / Reference: From S		3-13-18, Attachment 1 NORMAL OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-	Revision # 8
	2 AND 3	REI		16 OF 33
.0	<u>PROCEDURE</u> (Continued)			
	2.2 EFFECTS AND ACTI	ONS	ON LOSS OF YITAL BUS YO1. (Continued)	
	AFFECTED EQUIPMENT		INDICATIONS AND ASSOCIATED ACTIONS	
.15	SIAS, CCAS, CIAS	•	Trip Paths 1 and 3 Actuated.	
	MSIS, CSAS, RAS		VERIFY ESFAS alarms on CR-57 not ANNUNCIA	TED、
.16	SOES Alarm on Emergency Cooling System	•	If YO1 is de-energized, then OES Alarm for Emergency Cooling System will alarm witho delay <u>only</u> at the SOES (Sacramento) and r the Control Room.	ut
			INITIATE S0123-0-A7, Section for State Of of Emergency Services (SOES) Communicatio Guidelines.	fice n
.17	PT-0102-1, Wide Range PZR Pressure Transmitter		<u>IF</u> PT-0102-1 is aligned as the WR PZR Pre input to LIC-0103, PZR Compensated Level Indication,	essure
			AND LIC-0103 is needed for level indicati	on,
			<u>THEN</u> Per SRO direction, DISABLE the Inope PZR Pressure Input to LIC-0103 per S023-3 Attachment for Transferring Pressurizer L Pressure Controls.	-1.10,
.18	PT-1013-1, S/G E-089 Pressure Transmitter PT-1023-1, S/G E-088 Pressure Transmitter		At the Feedwater Digital Control System p in BYPASS the affected Channels for <u>both</u> S/G E-088 <u>and</u> S/G E-089:	lace
	LT-1113-1, S/G E-089 NR Level Transmitter LT-1123-1, S/G E-088 NR Level Transmitter		Channel "A" S/G PRESS Channel "A" NR LEVEL Channel "A" WR LEVEL	
	LT-1115-1, S/G E-089 WR Level Transmitter LT-1125-1, S/G E-088 WR Level Transmitter		per SO23-3-2.38, Section for Bypassing Se Feedwater Signals.	lected
.19	LT-5903-1, Diesel G002 Fuel Oil Storage Tank T-035 Level	•	P-093 and P-096, Fuel Oil Transfer Pumps not run in AUTO due to LT-5903-1 failing	will low.
		•	P-093 and/or P-096 can be operated in LOC from the Fire Isolation switch at L-160A.	AL

Comments / Reference: From SONGS 2008 NRC Exam Revision # N/			
Given the following conditions:			
 Vital Bus Y-02 has been lost due to Inverter failure with the Unit operating at power. 			
 Vital Bus Y-02 has <u>not</u> been energized from the Alternate Source. 			
Which ONE (1) of the following actions is required and the reason for that action	?		
A. TRANSFER Pressurizer Level Setpoint to Setpoint LS1 to allow restoring	ig the Pressurizer		
Level Controller to AUTO.			
B. Manually ACTUATE Train A FHIS, TGIS, CRIS and CPIS due to Train B FHI	IS, TGIS, CRIS and		
CPIS actuation.			
C. VERIFY Auxiliary Feedwater flow to Steam Generator E088 due to EFAS Trip Paths 2 and 4			
actuation.			

D. CLOSE the failed open Atmospheric Dump Valve (HV-8421) due to loss of the pressure input from the Main Steam pressure transmitter.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	058 A	K1.01
	Importance Rating	2.8	

Loss of DC Power: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of DC power: Battery charger equipment and instrumentation Proposed Question: Common 52

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power with all systems aligned for normal operations.
- DC Buses are aligned to the Dedicated Battery Chargers.
- A loss of 480 VAC Bus B06 occurs.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the current status of DC Buses 2D2 and 2D4?

- A. 2D2 and 2D4 DC Buses each continue to be supplied by their respective Dedicated Chargers and 1E Batteries. Should be Charger here and below
- B. D2 is being supplied only by the 1E Battery and D4 is still supplied by its Dedicated Chargers and 1E Battery.
- C. D4 is being supplied only by the 1E Battery and D2 is still supplied by its Dedicated Chargers and 1E Battery.
- D. 2D2 and 2D4 are being supplied only by their respective 1E Batteries.

Proposed Answer: D

Explanation:


- A. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that the Dedicated Chargers were from an uninterruptible power source.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that only the Dedicated Charger to D2 was lost.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because could be thought that only the Dedicated Charger to D4 was lost.
- D. Correct. Both Train B Dedicated Chargers are lost.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-13-26, Attachment 6	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SD-SO23-140, Figure I-2B	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination: <u>None</u>

ES-401	RO Written Exam Works	heet Form ES-401-5		
Learning Objective: 80703 / 80682	DESCRIBE the configuration and operational characteristics of Non-IE 120 VAC and 125 VDC Power Supply System components.			
-	VDC Power Supply System and	n bases of the Non-IE 120 VAC and 125 I its components.		
Question Source:	Bank # 12805 Modified Bank # New	52 (Note changes or attach parent)		
Question History:	Last NRC Exam SONGS	2008		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Know Comprehension or Analysis	vledgeX		
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7, 10</u> 55.43			

Comments / Reference: From SC	Revision # 8	
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION ABNORMAL OPERATING INSTRUCTION SO23-13-26 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 8 PAGE 28 OF 63 ATTACHMENT 6		
2.0 <u>PROCEDURE</u> (Continued)		
2.1 EQUIPMENT ACTION	SFOR LOSS OF BUS B06. (Continued)	
2.1.1 (Continued)		
AFFECTED EQUIPMENT	ASSOCIATED ACTIONS	
.2 B002, D2 Battery Charger, <u>AND/OR</u> B004, D4 Battery Charger, <u>AND/OR</u> B022, when aligned to the affected Unit (T.S. 3.8.4, 3.8.5)	If the Required Battery Chargers aligned to both D4 are de-energized, then ENTER Tech. Spec. / 3.8.4A, 3.8.4B, 3.8.5A, and/or 3.8.5B for loss of t Battery Chargers on the same Train. Initiate Restoring D2 and then D4 Batteries. [2] ENSURE B022, Swing Charger, and MCC E powered from the unaffected Unit. [SO23-1- Transfer of MCC BS and Emergency Chiller to the Unit 2(3) Power Source.], and Place B022, Swing Battery Charger, in servi AND/OR Place B017, Spare Charger(s) in service. AND/OR REQUEST Maintenance to supply Temporal to Required Charger(s). If required, then perform D2 Battery Load reducti as follows: [1] (T.S. 3.3.1, 3.3.3)	Action two 1E 3S are 3.1, ME-335 ce. ry Power



Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	062 G	2.4.35
	Importance Rating	3.8	

Loss of Nuclear Service Water: Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects Proposed Question: Common 53

Given the following conditions:

- SO23-13-2, Shutdown from Outside of the Control Room is in progress due to a fire in the Unit 2 Control Room.
- The Radwaste Operator ensures that the Saltwater Cooling / Component Cooling Water (SWC/CCW) Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve is open.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the reason this action is required?

- A. A hot short due to fire could have caused Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve automatic closure and the associated SWC Pump is running at shutoff head.
- B. A hot short due to fire could have caused Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve closure and SWC Pump trip. Opening Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve restarts the SWC Pump.
- C. The CRS will be unable to start the SWC Pump from the Second Point of Control due to the interlock with the Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve being closed.
- D. The CRS will be starting the SWC Pump from the Second Point of Control and the automatic opening feature is defeated with the Fire Isolation Switch in LOCAL.

Proposed Answer: D

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because hot shorts can result in spurious equipment operation and it could be thought that there were no operator actions to secure the SWC Pump.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because hot shorts can result in spurious equipment operation and an interlock does exist between these components but no interlocks exist with the Fire Isolation Switch in LOCAL.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because an interlock does exist between these components but no interlocks exist with the Fire Isolation Switch in LOCAL.
- D. Correct. As part of the local operator actions the Fire Isolation Switch is placed in LOCAL in order to start the SWC Pump. The automatic opening feature is defeated with the FIS in LOCAL.

Technical Reference(s)	SD-SO23-410, Page 9	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO23-13-2, Attachment 2, Section 4.0	Comments / Reference
	SO23-13-2, Attachment 6, Step 17.3	
	SO23-13-2, Attachment 10, Section 7.0	
Proposed references to be	e provided during examination: <u>None</u>	
Learning Objective: 56671	DESCRIBE the purpose and operation of the given component.	Fire Isolation Switch for a
Question Source:	Bank #	
		ote changes or attach parent)
	New X	
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis	<u>X</u>
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7, 8, 10</u> 55.43	
Comments / Reference: F	rom SD-SO23-410, Page 9	Revision # 7
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3	SYSTEM DESCRIP REVISION 7	PTION SD-S023-410 PAGE 9 OF 40
2.0 <u>DESCRIPTIONS</u> (Co	ntinued)	
	ater Cooling Pumps (P-112, P-113, P-114 and inued)	P-307)
li am be P- pa tw fi th CR po an	ch Saltwater Cooling Pump is equipped with a ght module with START, STOP and OVERRIDE pus meter. The control switches are located on (red HS-6380-1 for P-112, HS-6382-1 for P-30 113 and HS-6383-2 for P-114. Each pump can b nel CR-64 or from the associated 4 kV switch o-position fire/isolation switch is located re isolation panel in the switchgear room. V e "LOCAL OR REMOTE" position, the pump can b -64 or the 4 kV switchgear. With the switch sition, the pump can be operated only at the d pump's valve interlocks are bypassed for p d P-307.	shbuttons and an CR-64 and are num- 7, HS-6381-2 for be controlled from ngear. A in the associated with the switch in be operated from in the "LOCAL" e 4 kV switchgear

Comments / Reference: From SO23-13-2, Attachment 2, Section 4.0	Revision # 11
	13-2 19 OF 227
<u>UNIT 2 CRS DUTIES</u> (Continued)	PERF. BY <u>INITIALS</u>
4.0 In the Unit 2 Train B 1E Switchgear Room:	
4.1 UNLOCK (93) and OPEN Fire Isolation Panel 2L-413.	
CAUTION	Ī
When repositioning the Fire Isolation Switches in the following Step, DO NOT reposition the DG Crosstie Switches marked "Normal" and "50.54X	
4.1.1 SELECT all Fire Isolation Switches to LOCAL.	
4.2 Open Second Point of Control Cubicle 2A06-01.	
4.2.1 SELECT all Control Switches to STOP.	
Comments / Reference: From SO23-13-2, Attachment 6, Step 17.3	Revision # 11
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION ABNORMAL OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 11 PAGE ATTACHMENT 6	13-2 49 OF 227
UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 11 PAGE	
UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 11 PAGE ATTACHMENT 6 <u>22 DUTIES</u> (Continued)	49 OF 227 PERF. BY
UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 11 ATTACHMENT 6 <u>22 DUTIES</u> (Continued) 17.3 Establish Cooling Systems: NOTE: SWC Pump will start approximately 5 seconds after control	49 OF 227 PERF. BY INITIALS
UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 11 ATTACHMENT 6 <u>22 DUTIES</u> (Continued) 17.3 Establish Cooling Systems: NOTE: SWC Pump will start approximately 5 seconds after control switch is operated. 17.3.1 <u>When</u> 2HV-6497, SWC/CCW HX Outlet Valve has been verified Open, then coordinate with the Unit 2 CR	49 OF 227 PERF. BY INITIALS
UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 11 ATTACHMENT 6 <u>22 DUTIES</u> (Continued) 17.3 Establish Cooling Systems: NOTE: SWC Pump will start approximately 5 seconds after control switch is operated. 17.3.1 <u>When</u> 2HV-6497, SWC/CCW HX Outlet Valve has been verified Open, <u>then</u> coordinate with the Unit 2 CR to start a SWC Pump from Second Point of Control:	49 OF 227 PERF. BY INITIALS
UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 11 ATTACHMENT 6 <u>22 DUTIES</u> (Continued) 17.3 Establish Cooling Systems: NOTE: SWC Pump will start approximately 5 seconds after control switch is operated. 17.3.1 When 2HV-6497, SWC/CCW HX Outlet Valve has been verified Open, then coordinate with the Unit 2 CR to start a SWC Pump from Second Point of Control: IMP-307	49 OF 227 PERF. BY INITIALS
UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 11 ATTACHMENT 6 22 DUTIES (Continued) 17.3 Establish Cooling Systems: NOTE: SWC Pump will start approximately 5 seconds after control switch is operated. 17.3.1 When 2HV-6497, SWC/CCW HX Outlet Valve has been verified Open, then coordinate with the Unit 2 CR to start a SWC Pump from Second Point of Control: MP-307 MP-112 17.3.2 If 2HV-6497 will not open, then coordinate with the Primary Operator to OPEN MCC Breaker 2BK23 and MANUALLY OPEN 2HV-6496,	49 OF 227 PERF. BY INITIALS

Comm	ents /	Reference: From SO23-13-2, Attachment 10, Section 7.0	Revision # 11
	AR ORG 2 AND	ANIZATION ABNORMAL OPERATING INSTRUCTION SO23- 3 REVISION 11 PAGE ATTACHMENT 10	13-2 78 OF 227
		RADWASTE OPERATOR DUTIES - UNIT 2	
		CONTINUOUS USE	PERF. BY <u>INITIALS</u>
1.0	TLD,	D Locker, obtain an emergency lantern, Alarming Dosimeter, Headset and Unit 2 Primary Operator Keyset (4, GMK, HR). KIT: Pri. Op.)	
	1.1	Obtain a set of security keys.	
2.0	Perfo	rmance Guidelines:	
	2.1	Do not delay these actions for Security, or any other concerns unless a delay is necessary to maintain personnel safety.	
	2.2	Due to the seriousness of the emergency, prompt completion of these actions overrides all other Procedures, Documents, Work Plans, Technical Specifications, Technical Manuals, and/or Verbal Directions given by any person or group other than the Operations Shift Manager.	
	2.3	<u>If</u> Card Readers are inoperative, <u>then</u> use Security Key No. O to pass through Card Reader Doors.	
3.0		ed to Radwaste via Control Building Central Stairwell and h Physics Control Point.	
4.0	At 24	' Radwaste:	
	4.1	OPEN 2HV-9235, BAMU Gravity Feed.	
	4.2	OPEN 2HV-9240, BAMU Gravity Feed.	
5.0	At 37	' Radwaste:	
	5.1	CLOSE 2LV-0227B, VCT Outlet, (Rm. 319A, Key No. HR).	
6.0	At 9'	Radwaste:	
	6.1	ENSURE CLOSED 2LV-0227C, RWST to Charging Pump suction.	
7.0	In th	e SWC Pump Room:	
	7.1	ENSURE OPEN 2HV-6497, SWC/CCW HX Outlet Valve.	
		7.1.1 <u>If</u> 2HV-6497 will not open, <u>then</u> OPEN MCC Breaker 2BK23 and MANUALLY OPEN 2HV-6496, Overboard Block Valve to Seawall.	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	065 A	A2.03
	Importance Rating	2.6	

Loss of Instrument Air: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of the Instrument Air: Location and isolation of leaks

Proposed Question: Common 54

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 2 and 3 are experiencing a major air leak.
- The following Annunciators are in alarm:
 - 61C19 INST AIR HEADER PRESS LO.
 - 61B38 N2 SUPPLY TO INST AIR HEADER ON.
 - 61C18 SERVICE AIR HEADER PRESS LO.
 - 61B39 INST AIR DRYER TEMP/LEVEL/DP HI.
 - 61B40 INST AIR DRYER TROUBLE.
- The following indications are available:
 - 2PI-5344A, Instrument Air Header Pressure on CR-61 indicates 65 psig and is slowly lowering.
 - Two (2) Instrument Air Compressors are running loaded.
 - One (1) Instrument Air Compressor is in <u>standby</u>.
 - 2PI-5344B, Nitrogen Supply Header Pressure on CR-61 is steady.
 - 2HV-5343 and 3HV-5343, Instrument Air Supply to Containment Excess Flow Check Valves are OPEN.
 - Annunciator 57C58 INSTRUMENT AIR TO CONTAINMENT is NOT in alarm on either unit.
 - Flow indication to Unit 2 and Unit 3 are approximately the same.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the condition that exists?

There is a major leak...

- A. at the outlet of the Instrument Air Dryers.
- B. at the inlet of the Instrument Air Dryers.
- C. on one of the Instrument Air Receivers.
- D. on the Instrument Air header going into the Fuel Handling Building.


Proposed Answer:


А

- A. Correct. The leak location would cause all SA and IA compressors to run and cause the Hi D/P alarm on the dryer. The downstream pressure being constant indicates the N2 system is supplying.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because the leak before the IA Dryer would cause the dryer trouble alarm and other low pressure indications, however, it would not cause the IA Dryer Temp/Level/ΔP alarms.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought there was not a check valve at each receiver outlet and all compressors would feed the leak.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that the leak on the Fuel Bldg supply would also create the high ΔP condition on the Dryer, however, the N2 Supply pressure would not be stable while IA header pressure was dropping; should indicate the same pressure for this leak.

Technical Reference(s)	SD-SO23-570, Figure I-1		Attached w/ Revision # See
	SD-SO23-570, F	Pages 6 to 9	Comments / Reference
	SO23-13-5, Entry	/ Conditions	
Proposed references to be	e provided during e	examination: <u>None</u>	
Learning Objective: 72867		al and abnormal operati rvice Air Systems.	ons of the Instrument and
Question Source:	Bank #		
	Modified Bank #		(Note changes or attach parent)
	New	Χ	_
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	۱	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fund	damental Knowledge	
	Comprehension	or Analysis	<u> X </u>
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 7		
	55.43		

Form ES-401-5





Comments / Reference: From SD-SO23-570, Page 6 Revision					
PART I INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM					
2.0 <u>DESCRIPTION</u> (C	2.0 <u>DESCRIPTION</u> (Continued)				
2.1 System O	verview (Continued)				
.2.5 In the event Instrument Air Compressors are not available Respiratory Service Air system can supply the Instrument Air header. Instrument Air is established through 2/3PCV-5354 Pressure Regulating Valve, and spring loaded soft seated check valve, SA2423MU1573. Located between the valves are a constantly open vent and 2/3PI-5354 pressure indicator. They are available to verify Instrument Air is not flowing into Respiratory Service Air system.					
.2.6 Air from the common air header is directed to 1 of 2 Instrument Air Dryers. The Instrument Air Dryer separates and removes moisture and oil from the air. Downstream of the Air Dryers is a check valve followed by a branch line connection the Nitrogen Backup Supply System.					
.2.7 Dry Instrument Air is then directed to 3 Air Filters, the 4th is in standby. The Air Filters remove particulate from the air with 5 micron filters. The Instrument Air is then sent to a line that directs it to each Units Instrument Air Header and the Unit 2 Full Flow Condensate Polishing Demineralizers.					
.2.8 Individual instrument air lines tap off of each Units Instrument Air Header. Instrument air is directed to all instrument air connections throughout the plant including those within the Containments.					
.2.9	There are isolating check valves in each Unit's Headed downstream of the Instrument Air Filters. Back-up Ni connects to each Unit's Header branch lines downstread isolating check valves. The Back-up Nitrogen is direct through a pressure regulator 2/3PCV-5448 set at 83 ps 5 micron (maximum) Filter. Nitrogen supply lines the to supply each Unit's Instrument Air Header separated downstream of the isolating check valves. Each branch provided with an 2(3)HV-5343 Reactor Instrument Air S Excess Flow Check Valve, a check valve and an a contr 2(3)HV-5388 Instrument Air to Containment Isolation V	trogen m of the ected ig, then a en branches y h is supply Flow ol valve			

mments / Reference	e: From SD-SO23-570, Page 7	Revision # 16
RT I INSTRUMENT A	IR SYSTEM	
0 <u>description</u> (C	ontinued)	
2.1 System O	verview (Continued)	
.2.10	2(3)HV-5343 Reactor Instrument Air Supply Flow E Check Valve will close given a sufficiently larg of ≥200 CFM, isolating the fault in instrument a The isolating check valves in the other unit will the non-faulted piping can not feed the break. Nitrogen would then feed only the non-faulted un Instrument Air System pressurized. A 0.030" orif Excess Flow Check Valves' poppet allows pressure across the valve, automatically resetting it aft restoration.	ge line break, air piping. 1 ensure that The backup nit, keeping its Fice in the e to equalize
.2.11	Flow indicators, 2(3)FI-5385 for the Containment Supply Excess Flow Check Valves are provided dow Backup Nitrogen tie-in points to provide a means system air consumption. The flow indicators ar troubleshoot system problems.	nstream of the of monitoring
.2.12	Individual Instrument Air lines tap off of each Instrument Air Header. Instrument air is direct Instrument Air connections throughout the plant within Containment.	ed to all
.2.13	Instrument Air to Containment is first directed Excess Flow Check Valve. The excess flow check isolate instrument air to Containment upon abnor conditions.	valve will
.2.14	From the Excess Flow Check Valve, Instrument Air 2(3)HV-5386 Instrument Air to Containment Isolat enters Containment through penetration #22.	
.2.15	Inside Containment, instrument air is directed t valve and to the Containment Instrument Air load	

Comments / Reference: From SD-SO23-570, Page 8 Revision # 16							
PART I INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM							
2.0 <u>DESCRIPTION</u> (Continued)							
2.1 System Overview (Continued)							
.3 The Instrument Air System is designed to maintain system air pressure under varying anticipated flow demands. Instrument Air System air pressure is controlled by: (Figure I-3)							
.3.1 Air compressor(s) loading and unloading operations.							
.3.2 Nitrogen Back-up Supply System. Nitrogen is supplied down stream of the Instrument Air Filters.							
.3.3 Respiratory / Service Air Backup Supply. The air pressure is supplied through the cross connection upstream of the Instrument Air Dryers.							

Comments / Referenc	e: From SD-SO23-570, Page 9	Revision # 16					
PART I INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM							
2.0 <u>DESCRIPTION</u> (Continued)							
2.1 System 0	verview (Continued)						
.5 Upon decreasing system pressure, as a "full-load" pressure sensor set point is reached, each Air Compressor aligned to that pressure sensor fully-loads.							
.5.1 As Instrument Air system pressure decreases, each of the 3 Instrument Air Compressors start and receive half-load and full-load control signals from the pressure sensors they are aligned to.							
.5.2 That the flow resistance through one air dryer is too great to allow 3 Compressors to load at once.							
.5.3 2/3PVC-5354 Service Air Backup TO Instrument Air System Pressure Control Valve is normally set at 88 psig.							
.5.4 This set point will allow the first two instrument Air Compressors (LEAD and LAG1) to fully load, and the third (LAG2) Compressor to half load before starting to supply Service Air to the Instrument Air system. NOTE: that the Service Air pressure regulator can be set higher or lower at Operations/STEC direction to either carry the plant Instrument air load or to emulate the LAG1 or LAG2 Air Compressors.							
.5.5 If pressure decreases to 83 psig, the Nitrogen Backup Supply System Isolation Valve 2/3PCV-5448 NITROGEN BACK-UP PRESS CONTROL VALVE to Instrument Air opens to allow nitrogen to assist in maintaining Instrument Air System pressure.							
.5.6	As system pressure recovers to above 83 psig, the Nit Backup flow stops and the Instrument Air System press again maintained by the Instrument Air Compressors.	-					

Comments / Refer	ence: From SO23-13-5, Entry	Conditions	Revision # 7				
NUCLEAR ORGANIZA UNITS 2 AND 3	TION ABNORMAL OPERATI REVISION 7	NG INSTRUCTION	S023-13-5 PAGE 2 OF 34				
	LOSS OF INSTRUM	ENT AIR					
PURPOSE							
	tions to mitigate effects of loss of Instrument Air Compr		r System				
ENTRY CONDIT:	<u>DNS</u>						
This event	may be caused by any of the	following abnormal cond	itions:				
1.	Excessive Instrument Air Sys	tem flow.					
2、	Unplanned Loss of all Instru	ment Air Compressors.					
This event indicatior	could be identified by one o S:	r more of the following	alarms or				
1.	261C19, INST AIR HEADER PRES	S L0					
2、							
3.	61858, INST AIR COMPRESSOR C	ONTROL PANEL TROUBLE					
4. 61B38, N2 SUPPLY TO INST AIR HEADER ON							
	ive flow through the Instrum pressure above the alarm set		ase Dryer				
5、	61B39, INST AIR DRYER TEMP/L	EVEL/DP HI					
6.	6、 2/3PI5344A, Instrument Air Header Pressure (CR61)						
7、	7. 2/3PI5344B, Nitrogen Supply Header Pressure (CR61)						
8.	s Flow Check						
9、	ssor(s) <u>or</u>						

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	007 A	A1.05
	Importance Rating	3.9	

<u>Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances</u>: Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: Engineered safety features
Proposed Question:
Common 55

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 2 is in MODE 1 at 100% power.
- Entry into SO23-13-26, Loss of Power to an AC Bus is required due to a loss of 4160 V Bus 2A08.

Which ONE (1) of the following identifies the action required per SO23-13-26, Loss of Power to an AC Bus?

- A. ENERGIZE 1E Pressurizer Heaters as required due to loss of <u>ALL</u> Non-1E and Proportional Heaters.
- B. ENSURE the standby Condensate Pump has started due to low Main Feedwater Pump suction pressure.
- C. INITIATE a Containment Cooling Actuation Signal due to loss of the Containment Chillers.
- D. REDUCE power to 65% due to loss of two (2) Circulating Water Pumps.

Proposed Answer: C

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because the 1E Pressurizer Heaters must be operated, however, not all Pressurizer Backup Heaters are lost.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because the standby Condensate Pump would start on low discharge pressure or trip of a running Condensate Pump, however, this loss is associated with Bus A03.
- C. Correct. A Containment Cooling Actuation Signal (CCAS) must be initiated in the Control Room because Normal Containment Cooling is lost.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because this is the required action per SO23-5-1.7, Power Operations, however, the Circulating Water Pumps are lost on a loss of 4160 V Bus 2A03 or 2A07.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-13-26, Attachments 8 & 12	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO23-5-1.7, Attachment 5	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

ES-401	RO Written Exam Worksheet	Form ES-401-5					
Learning Objective: 54513	DESCRIBE plant and initial operator response to a loss of a Non-1E 4.16 KV bus while at power in accordance with SO23-13-26.						
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New X	(Note changes or attach parent)					
Question History:	Last NRC Exam						
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis	X					
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43						

Comme	ents / Reference: From SO2	3-13-	26, /	Attac	chment 12 Revision # 8				
	IS 2 AND 3 F	ABNO REVIS ATTA	SION	8	PERATING INSTRUCTION SO23-13-26 PAGE 51 OF 63				
2.0	2.0 PROCEDURE (Continued)								
2.1 EQUIPMENT ACTIONS FOR LOSS OF BUS A08. (Continued)									
2.1.1 (Continued)									
1	AFFECTED EQUIPMENT				ASSOCIATED ACTIONS				
.3	(Continued)		6)		ACE ME-331, Aux Building Chiller in service per 23-1-3, Section for Starting a Chiller Unit.				
	MCC B10, MP-158 <u>and</u> MP-159, Aux Bldg Chilled Water Pumps		7)		ux Building Chiller restart is delayed, and ESF om temperatures become unacceptably high, <u>then</u> :				
	<u>and</u> 2Q0612, Instrument Bus #2. (Unit 2 only) and			a.	START Emergency Cooling in ESF rooms per SO23-3-2.27, Attachment for Emergency Cooler Exercise Run, as needed to maintain the following room temperatures:				
					 SEB ESF Rooms < 104°F 				
	RT-7808, Plant Vent				 Charging/BAMU Pp. Rooms < 97°F 				
	Stack Radmonitor				 ESF Switchgear/Battery Rooms < 90°F 				
	and				 Vital Power Dist. Rooms < 99°F 				
	Waste Gas Analyzers		8)	nit 2 only) If the transfer of B10 to Unit 3 was successful, then TRANSFER 2Q0612 to the ergency power source by selecting 2VS612, 0612 Instrument Bus #2 Transfer Switch to ergency.					
			9)	then Atta 2/3F	RT7865 and 3RT7865 are not Operable, <u>n</u> perform required actions of SO23-3-2.24 achments for Waste Gas Holdup System RE7808 & 3RE7865 <u>and</u> Plant Vent Stack RE7808 & 2RE7865/3RE7865.				
.4	ME-202, Containment Chiller				the Containment Emergency Cooling System in by manually initiating a Containment Cooling on Signal using:				
	MP-448, ME-201 Cont. Chiller Oil Pump				-9138-1 and HS-9138-2 at CR56				
	MP-128, Containment Chilled Water Pump			HS-	OR -9138-3 and HS-9138-4 at CR53				
.5	ME-403, CEDM Cooling Unit.	ENSURE ME-404, CEDM Standby Cooling Unit is in service.							

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION ABNORMAL OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-13-26 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 8 PAGE 52 OF 63 ATTACHMENT 12						
0	PROCEDURE (Continued)					
-	、 ,	NS FO	R LOSS OF BUS A08. (Continued)			
1	AFFECTED EQUIPMENT		ASSOCIATED ACTIONS			
.6 MA-310, Continuous Exhaust Fan (Unit 2 only)			(Unit 2 only) ENSURE MA311 and MA312 are in service per SO23-1-5, Section for Placing Continuous Plant Exhaust System in Service.			
7	MA319 and MA321, RX Cavity Cooling Fans		START MA320 and MA322, RX Cavity Cooling Fans.			
.8	E122, Proportional PZR Heaters		OPERATE the remaining PZR Backup heaters and 1E Heaters as necessary to Compensate for Proportional heater loss			
	E126 and E124 Backup PZR Heaters		neater 1035.			
9	MP-200 and MP-202, PMW Pumps		Ensure MP-201, PMW Pump is aligned fo Unit 2 <u>and</u> that MP-203, PMW Pump is ali operation on Unit 3 per SO23-8-10.	r operation on gned for		
10	3L-395, Unit 3 Aircraft Beacon Panel (Unit 3 only)		If both Unit 2 and 3 Aircraft Beacon Lights NOTIFY the US Federal Aviation Adminis Diego Flight Services Station at 1-619-55	tration, San		
11	MA-317 , FHB Normal Exhaust Fan		ENSURE Running MA-316, FHB Standby	Exhaust Fan.		
	Exnaust Fan MA-359, FHB Normal Supply Fan		ENSURE Running MA-360, FHB Standby	Supply Fan.		
12	MA-192, Radwaste Bldg Normal Exhaust Fan		ENSURE Running MA-193, Radwaste Blo Exhaust Fan.	lg Normal		

Comments / Reference: From SO23-13-26, Attachment 8 Revision # 8									
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION ABNORMAL OPERATING INSTRUCTION SO23-13-26 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 8 PAGE 33 OF 63 ATTACHMENT 7									
	LOSS OF 4kV BUS AD3								
ACTION/EXPECTED R	<u>ESPONSE</u>		<u>RE</u>	SPONSE NOT OBTAIN	ED				
2 Attempt Bus A03 Energization from Reserve Aux Transformer:									
☐ a. CHECK Reserve Aux T available for load.	ransformer X R1		a.	INITIATE Attachment 8 Equipment Actions for AD3.	3, Loss of Bus				
			1)	<u>If</u> Bus AO3 return to se delayed, <u>then</u> evaluate loads with temp. powe SO23-6-32.3.	supplying				
			2)	WHEN Bus A03 is re-e directed by the in use f when All equipment at Attachment 8 have bee <u>THEN</u> GO TO Step 2f.	EOI, <u>OR</u> ctions of en completed,				
b. ENSURE OPEN the fol Load Supply Breakers:	lowing Bus A03								
🗇 1) MP-120 TPCW Pur	np								
🔲 2) MP-058 Heater Dra	in Pump								
🖾 3) MP-050 Condensat	e Pump								
🔲 4) MP-051 Condensat	e Pump								
🔲 5) MP-115 Circ. Wate	r Pump								
🔲 6) MP-117 Circ. Wate	r Pump								

С	omments / Reference: From S	O23-13-26, Attachment 8	Revision # 8			
	UNITS2AND3 R		23-13-26 GE 36 OF 63			
	2.0 <u>PROCEDURE</u> (Continued)					
	2.1 EQUIPMENT ACTION	S FOR LOSS OF BUS A03. (Continued)				
	2.1.1 (Continued)					
	AFFECTED EQUIPMENT	ASSOCIATED ACTIONS				
	.10 XM1, Main Transformer Normal Fans/Coolers	TRANSFER Fan/Cooler Assembly Power fro to the alternate source per SO23-6-5, Section Fan/Cooler Assembly Operations.	om the normal on for			
	.11 MP-077, H2 Seal Oil Vacuum Pump	TRANSFER the H2 Seal System Operation Treatment to Bypass Mode per SO23-6-21, for On-Line Transfer from Vacuum Treatmer Mode.	from Vacuum Attachment nt to Bypass			
	.12 Non-running Circ. Water Pumps	Remove non-running Circulating Water Pum associated Condenser Sections from service SO23-2-5.				

Comments / Reference: From SO23-5-1.7, Attachment 5 Revision # 41								
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3			RGANIZATI	ON O R	PERATING INSTRUCTION EMSION 41 TTACHMENT 5	SO23-5-1 PAGE 46	.7	
				<u>RECO</u>	MMENDED POWER PLATEAUS			
					INFORMATION USE			
Ţ	OBJEC	TNE						
	Level P	lateau. 1	t of examples These are int 4.2.2, 2.4.2.3	tended fo	sed as an aid in determining the desire r extended periods of time- Not of shor)	d reduced Power t duration.		
This list is comprised of known long term acceptable power levels. Plant Power may be maintained at a higher level with Ops. Management's approval. Plant Grid conditions may warrant further adjustment of these values.				al. Plant				
2	2.0	<u>Equip</u>	ment Out of S	Service			Reactor <u>Power</u>	
		2.1	Circulatin	ng Water	y Water System			
			2.1.1	Operati	on With Reversed Tunnels	90-1	100% [1]	
			2.1.2	One Cir <u><</u> 12 hr:	rculating Water Pump (Expected OOS s and OPS Management approval is of	duration is otained.)	100%	
			2.1.3	One Cir duratior	rculating Water Pump (Expected OOS n is > 12 hrs and <u><</u> 3 days.)		85%	
			2.1.4	One Cir (Expect	rculating Water Pump ted OOS duration is >3 days.)		75% [2]	
			2.1.5	Heat Tr	reatment of the Circulating Water Syste	m	80-100%	
			2.1.6	Circulat	ting Water System Tunnel Reversal		80-100%	
			2.1.7	Two Cir	rculating Water Pumps		65% [8]	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	E05 I	EK2.2
	Importance Rating	3.7	

<u>Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer</u>: Knowledge of the interrelations between the Excess Steam Demand and the following: Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

Proposed Question: Common 56

Given the following conditions while at 100% power:

- An Excess Steam Demand Event has occurred inside Containment.
- SO23-12-5, Excess Steam Demand Event directs stabilizing Reactor Coolant temperatures using the Atmospheric Dump Valve on the intact Steam Generator once dry out has occurred on the affected Steam Generator.

Which ONE (1) of the following is the reason for stabilizing Reactor Coolant System temperature?

- A. Ensure minimum Reactor Coolant System Core Exit Saturation Margin is maintained.
- B. Ensure consistent Reactor Coolant System loop temperatures to prevent loss of Auxiliary Feedwater flow due to high Steam Generator differential pressure.
- C. Prevent the post-accident Reactor Coolant System cooldown rate from exceeding the limits in Technical Specifications.
- D. Limit Reactor Coolant System heatup which may result in rapid re-pressurization and the onset of Pressurized Thermal Shock conditions.

Proposed Answer: D

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because this is a desired condition during an ESDE, however, it is the heating of the Reactor Coolant System that is the major concern.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because an asymmetric cooldown is taking place, however, this situation is unavoidable and Auxiliary Feedwater flow can be overridden.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because the cooldown rate can be excessive dependent on ESDE severity, however, under most circumstances the Technical Specification cooldown limit is exceeded.
- D. Correct. Limiting Reactor Coolant System heat up is paramount in avoiding Pressurized Thermal Shock conditions.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-12-5, Step 7 Caution		Attached w/ Revision # See	
	SO23-14-5, Step 7 Caution Bases		Comments / Reference	
Proposed references to b	e provided during examination:	None		
Learning Objective: 54790	Per the ESDE procedure SO23-12-5 DESCR caution or note.		: The basis for each step,	
Question Source:		360		
	Modified Bank # New	(Note	changes or attach parent)	
Question History:	Last NRC Exam			
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Kn Comprehension or Analysis	owledgeX		
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43			
Comments / Reference: F	rom SO23-12-5, Step 7 Cautic	n	Revision # 21	
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3 EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION SO23-12-5 REVISION 21 PAGE 7 OF 25 EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT				
	OPERATOR AC	CTIONS		
ACTION/EXPEC	CTED RESPONSE	RESPONSE NOT O	DBTAINED	
7 PREVENT Pressu	rized Thermal Shock:			
	ΝΟΤ	E		
	team demand remains NOT isola ed S/G may be higher than REP		stopped, THEN T _c in loop	
	Lish steaming flow path on least moval capabilities will result in ra	affected S/G before		
a. INITIATE FS-3 Temperature of	80, ESTABLISH Stable RCS during ESDE.			

nment	s / Referer	ce: From SO23-14	-5, Step 7 Caution Bases	Revision # 8
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3		IIZATION	EOI SUPPORT DOCUN REVISION 8 ATTACHMENT 1	MENT SO23-14-5 PAGE 20 OF 50
E	XCESS S	TEAM DEMAND E	VENT BASES AND DEVIATIONS	S JUSTIFICATION
		I	EOI STEP BASES	
I.O <u>B/</u>	ASES DES	CRIPTION (Continue	ed)	
.4.7	STEP 7	PREVENT Press	urized Thermal Shock	
vessel, return RCS temperature stable RCS pressure and temper started. In general, a controlled			n overcooling event is to minimize th e to within the Appendix G limits of T perature until a cooldown to SDC ent d cooldown should be started as soo rator to take control of, and stabilize, ESDE.	Fech Specs, and establish ry conditions can be on as possible. The intent
	.1 NOTE	prior to Step 7a		
natural circulation conditions sink to cause natural circular have little or no flow through remains, resulting in its RCS coolant passing through the <i>least affected</i> S/G is started natural circulation driving he			situation in which the <i>least affected</i> S ns. For this situation, the <i>most affect</i> lation of coolant through the core. T gh it. Reverse heat transfer will take CS T _{COLD} possibly being higher than the core (CET, or REP CET). In such after the <i>most affected</i> S/G is dry, nead would result. Natural circulation perature rise above the <i>least affected</i>	cted S/G provides the heat The least affected loop will place if some RCS flow the temperature of the a case, if steaming of the a temporary loss of n will be re-established

.2 CAUTION prior to Step 7a

The CAUTION statement describes the expected plant response (rapid RCS repressurization due to heatup and expansion of the RCS coolant) if a steaming flow path is not established on the *least affected* S/G before the *most affected* S/G loses effective heat removal capabilities. Initiation of steaming of the *least affected* S/G prior to the *most affected* S/G losing effective heat removal capability will ensures that the heat sink for the RCS is maintained.

temperatures as a result of steaming the least affected loop.

Method

At this point in the event there is reasonable probability the ESDE has been isolated. RCS temperature and pressure could now be expected to rise quickly. Action must be initiated at this point to prevent Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS). The *least affected* S/G needs to be operated to stabilize RCS temperature and limit RCS repressurization.

When the isolated S/G dries out following an ESDE, RCS temperature will begin to rise unless a means of controlled steaming is established. If a method of heat removal is not established, the RCS heatup, in conjunction with the safety injection inventory added, could cause the plant to go solid and create a potential PTS concern.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	2	
	K/A #	060 A	A1.02
	Importance Rating	2.9	

Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release: Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Accidental Gaseous Radwaste: Ventilation system
Proposed Question: Common 57

Given the following conditions:

- A planned release of T086, Waste Gas Decay Tank is in progress.
- A high spike occurs on 2RE-7865, Wide Range Gas Monitor.
- 2/3HV-7202, Waste Gas Discharge Isolation Valve failed to close.

Which ONE (1) of the following would result in the closing of 2/3HV-7202, Waste Gas Discharge Isolation Valve?


- A. LOSS of all Continuous Exhaust Fans (A310, A311 and A312).
- B. INITIATE a Containment Purge Isolation Signal.
- C. RAISE 2/3RE-7808, Plant Vent Stack Wide Range Monitor <u>setpoint</u> at the Data Acquisition System.
- D. LOSS of both Radwaste Area Exhaust Fans (A192 and A193).


Proposed Answer: A

- A. Correct. Loss of the Continuous Exhaust Fans will close 2/3 HV-7202, Waste Gas Discharge Isolation Valve.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because 2RE-7865, Wide Range Gas Monitor can be aligned to initiate a CPIS, however, this action will not secure 2/3 HV-7202.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because 2/3RE-7808 is interlocked to close 2/3 HV-7202, Waste Gas Discharge Isolation Valve, however, raising the setpoint will not close the valve.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because the Radwaste Area Exhaust Fans discharge to the Continuous Exhaust Plenum and it could be thought that low flow would trip the Continuous Exhaust Fans.

Technical Reference(s)	SD-SO23-660, Figure 1	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SD-SO23-660, Page 17	Comments / Reference
	SD-SO23-622, Figure I-1	_
	SD-SO23-690, Page 62	_

ES-401	RO Written Exam Worksheet	Form ES-401-5			
Proposed references to be	provided during examination: <u>None</u>				
Learning Objective: 56619 / 56617	ANALYZE normal and abnormal operations of the Gaseous Radwaste System. DESCRIBE the configuration and operational characteristics of Gaseous Radwaste System components.				
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New X	(Note changes or attach parent)			
Question History:	Last NRC Exam				
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis	X			
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43				





Comments / I	Reference: From SD-SO23-690, Page 62	Revision # 16
2.3.4 Gase	ous Effluent Radiation Monitoring System	
	: Vent Stack Wide Range Radiation Monitor, 2/3RE-7808 (See ~e 3)	
.1.1 TH	ne Plant Vent Stack Wide Range Radiation monitor is used to):
.1.1.1	Monitor Plant Vent Stack for radiation levels.	
.1.1.2	Monitor Waste Decay Tank release and CLOSE the Waste Gas Isolation Valve, 2/3FV-7202, on high radiation or instrum failure.	nent
si co so do	(3RE-7808 is common to both Units, located on the plant ver cack at the 63 foot elevation of the Radwaste Building prridor. The monitor draws a sample from and returns the ample to the ventilation duct leading to the Plant Vent Sta pwnstream of the Continuous Exhaust Plenum. The monitor ca e aligned to sample either one or both discharge flow paths	ack, an
ex Wa	ne channels monitor for airborne gaseous activity in the khausted air. 2/3RE-7808 functions to alarm and to STOP a oste Decay Tank release by CLOSING the Waste Gas Isolation olve, 2/3FV-7202, upon high radiation levels.	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	2	
	K/A #	051 A	K3.01
	Importance Rating	2.8	

Loss of Condenser Vacuum: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Condenser Vacuum: Loss of steam dump capability upon loss of condenser vacuum Proposed Question: Common 58

Which ONE (1) of the following states the reason the Steam Bypass Control System Valves close on Condenser low vacuum?

- A. Prevent overfilling the Condenser Hotwells.
- B. Protect the Main Turbine.
- C. Prevent damage to the Condenser due to overheating.
- D. Avoid damage due to differential pressure between Water Boxes.

Proposed Answer: C

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because this situation can occur if water box differential pressure is high, however, the reason is to avoid Condenser overheating.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible if thought that Main Turbine protection were the concern, however, the reason is to avoid Condenser overheating.
- C. Correct. This is the reason for blocking SBCS on low Condenser vacuum.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because differential pressure between Water Boxes does impact plant operation, however, this is not the correct reason.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-15-52A, 52A1	9	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SD-SO23-175, Page	es 27 & 32	Comments / Reference
Proposed references to b	e provided during exa	mination: <u>None</u>	
Learning Objective: 59226	INTERPRET instrum System.	nentation and contro	Is utilized in the Main Steam
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	127199	<pre>_ (Note changes or attach parent)</pre>
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	SONGS 2005B	

Question Cogni		y or Fund ehension			X	_		
0 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 <u>5, 7</u> 55.43								
Comments / Re	ference	e: From SO2	3-15-52A,	52A19			Revisio	n # 12
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION ALARM RESPONSE INSTRUCTION SO23-15-52.A UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 12 PAGE 45 OF 120 ATTACHMENT 2								
52A19		DISABLED				1		
APPLICAB	ILITY	PRIORITY	REFLAS	H ASS	OCIATED WINDO	WS		
Modes 1	-3	AMBER	N/A		99B07			
INITIATING DEVICE	1	NOUN NAME	SETPOINT VALIDATION PCS INSTRUMENT ID		LINK # U2/U3			
2(3)HS-8429	SBCS Vac Tri Pushbi	Emergency/OF ip Reset utton	F/ Depr	ressed	NONE	NONE	795/806	-
2(3)L-120 Relay	Main C Low	Condenser Vacu		' Hg pressure	2(3)PR-3205 2(3)PI-3202A 2(3)PI-3383A 2(3)PI-3395A			
1.0 REQUIRED ACTIONS: 1.1 Proceed to Section 2.0. 2.0 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:								
SPECIF	IC CAU	SES	SPECIFI	C CORRE	CTIVE ACTIONS			
2.1 Low Ma Vacuun	enser	2.1	Refer to S Vacuum.	023-13-10, Loss (of Conde	nser	-	
3.0 <u>ASSOC</u> 3.1	Refer to	RESPONSES: SO23-3-2.18. or pressure.	1, and use	ADVs as n	ecessary to maint	ain prope	er steam	-

nments / Reference: From SD-SO23-175, Page 27	Revision # 6
To prevent SBCS actuation during times of insufficient conductors separate and independent pressure switches from the List sections must be satisfied in a two out of three configurat any SBCV can open. An actuation from two out of any three cause a quick closing of any open valve(s) via the <u>Condense</u> and <u>2 Circuits</u> . These circuits are the same ones actuated mergency Off pushbutton. The actuation setpoint from conductors is $\geq 10^{"}$ HgA. This interlock will <u>automatically</u> results controllers, and the Master Controller is in "AUTO". If an these controllers is in manual, the Condenser Interlock 1 amust be manually reset via the Emergency Off/Condenser Interlock 1 amust be manually reset via the Emergency Off/Condenser Interlock 1.	P condenser ion before R swithes will <u>r Interlock 1</u> by the enser back et when idual valve y one of nd 2 signals

mm	ents / F	Reference: From SD-SO23-175,	Page 32	Revision # 6
	EAR ORO	GANIZATION D 3	SYSTEM DESCRIF REVISION 6	PTION SD-S023-175 PAGE 32 OF 55
3.0	OPER	ATIONS (Continued)		
	3.2	Abnormal Operations		
		more circulating water pum	Operations include inoperabl ps secured, return to servic ervice of a SBCV with steam	ces following a
		3.2.1 Inoperable Steam Byp	ass Control Valves	
		for the number of in Above 55%, the react the setpoint need no	ctor Trip setpoint is reduce operable SBCVs, if Reactor p or automatically trips on a t be re-adjusted. The Plant ed to re-adjust the Reactor	ower is below 55%. turbine trip and t Superintendent's
		3.2.2 Operations With Secu	red Circulating Water Pumps	
		serving that section service. Failure to sheet damage. Placin "OFF" takes that val	Water Pump that is secured, of the condenser must be to do this could result in tur g the appropriate SBCV permi ve out of service. If below Load permissive accordingly.	aken out of rbine and tube issive switch in v 55% power, reset

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	2	
	K/A #	032 G	2.1.27
	Importance Rating	3.9	

Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation: Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of system purpose and/or function Proposed Question: Common 59

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 2 is in MODE 6 with core re-load in progress.
- JI-0005, Startup Channel B has failed low.
- JI-0006, Startup Channel A remains OPERABLE.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes operating functions that are affected?

- A. Potential loss of audible count rate and loss of input to Core Vibration Monitor.
- B. Loss of one channel of Plant Protection System High Log Power Bypass and input to the Main Control Board SUR indication.
- C. Loss of one channel of Boron Dilution Monitoring and loss of input to Core Vibration Monitor.
- D. Loss of one channel of Boron Dilution Monitoring and loss of Remote Shutdown Panel indication.

Proposed Answer: D

Explanation:


- A. Incorrect. Plausible because loss of audible count rate is correct, however, the non-safety channels do not input into the Main Control Board SUR indication.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible if thought that these inputs were provided by the Startup Channels, however, these indications are provided by the Safety Channels.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because loss of Boron Dilution Monitoring is correct, however, the non-safety channels do not input into the Core Vibration and Loose Parts Monitors
- D. Correct. These functions are affected by failure of Startup Channel B.


Technical Reference(s)	SD-SO23-470, Figures 1A and 1B	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO23-3-2.15, L&S 4.2.1	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

Learning Objective: DESCRIBE the Excore Nuclear Startup Channel System instrumentation

ES-401	RO Written Exam Worksheet	Form ES-401-5
56475	and controls, including the name, function supplies, where applicable.	, location, interlock and power
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis	<u> X </u>
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>6</u> 55.43	





UCLEA		Reference: From SO23-3-2.15, L&S 4.2.1 NIZATION OPERATING INSTRUCTION 3 REVISION 13 ATTACHMENT 4	Revision # 13 S023-3-2.15 PAGE 15 OF 16
.0	SAFE	Y CHANNEL INDICATOR OPERATIONS (Continued)	
	3.2	The 1E-4% lamp bistable energizes, providing of for use in bypassing the High Log Power trip v >1E-4%. In addition, contact outputs are pro- permit bypassing the low DNBR and High Local M facilitate CPC testing when Reactor power is M power is >1E-4%, then the local 1E-4% lamp wi	when Reactor power is vided to the CPCs which Power trips in order to below the setpoint. When
	3.3	The 55% lamp bistable supplies the PPS which a Loss of Load trip when Reactor power is below power (or current Loss of Load setpoint), the de-energizes and the 55% lamp will be illumin setpoint is equal to the current setpoint for	the setpoint、 When ≻55% n the bistable ated、 The 55% lamp
	3.4	The rate lamp illuminates when the rate circu exceeds 2.5 DPM、 This lamp is normally extin	itry of the safety channel guished.
4.0	SOUR	E RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENT OPERATION	
	4.1	JI-0005 S/U Channel B, JI-0006 S/U Channel A, Nuclear Instrument Power Supply Transfer Swite Components. (LCS 3.7.113.1)	
	4.2	One source range neutron flux monitor <u>shall</u> be and 3, with readout capable of being displayee room、(Tech、Spec、LCO 3.3.11, Table 3.3.11-1 Table 3.3.12-1 Item 1.a)	e operable in Modes 1, 2 d external to the control Item 1 and LCO 3.3.12,
		4.2.1 The ONLY Startup Channel which meets Te Shutdown Instrumentation, is Channel B, the only channel located remotely at L- of the channel results in entry into Ac restore within 30 days.	, JI-0005, because it is 042. Therefore, the loss
	4.3	<u>When</u> Alternate Power is transferred, <u>then</u> eith FIRE ISOLATION SWITCH IN LOCAL <u>OR</u> 57B14, FIRE IN LOCAL will annunciate.	her Alarm 57A14. ISOLATION SWITCH

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	2	
	K/A #	AK	3.06
	Importance Rating	3.6	

 Steam Generator Tube Leak:
 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Steam Generator

 Tube Leak: Normal operating precautions to preclude or minimize SGTR
 Proposed Question:

 Common 60
 Common 60

Both Unit 2 and Unit 3 operate with reduced T_{COLD} bands at power and Turbine Governor Valves full open.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the reason for operating at reduced T_{COLD} ?

Reduced RCS temperatures...

- A. result in lower energy release on a Main Steam Line Break at EOL which reduces the challenge to peak Containment pressure limits.
- B. minimize the fouling of the Steam Generator U-tubes which optimizes secondary side heat transfer.
- C. lower U-tube degradation caused by Stress Corrosion Cracking extending Steam Generator life.
- D. maintain the Condenser ΔT limits associated with National Pollution Discharge Elimination Standards.

Proposed Answer: C

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because there would be a reduction in the energy release on a MSLB but any change to prevent exceeding a design limit would be addressed by Technical Specifications not an administrative guideline.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that the corrosive film layer would be affected by the reduced temperature.
- C. Correct. Due to Steam Generator metallurgy, operating with a reduced temperature minimizes Stress Corrosion Cracking.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because there is a limit on condenser differential temperature, however, reduced T_{COLD} is associated with stress corrosion cracking.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-5-1.7, LS-1.8	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

ES-401	RO Written Exam Worksheet			Form ES-401-5
Learning Objective:	DESCRIBE the conditi tube rupture accident.	ons that affect the	severity of t	he steam generator
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note cha	nges or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam			
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamer Comprehension or Ar	0	X	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43			
Comments / Reference: Fr	rom SO23-5-1.7, LS-1.8	8 (p77)		Revision # 41

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3 OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 41 ATTACHMENT 15 S023-5-1.7 PAGE 77 OF 86 1.0 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (Continued) 1.1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (Continued) 1.8 The normal operating band for RCS Cold Leg Temperature at 100% Rated Thermal Power is 537*F and 541*F as identified in Attachment 13. The objective of the Tcold band is to maximize generation while minimizing long term Steam Generator tube degradation. Operation at the lower end of this band will prolong the life of the Steam Generators. 1.8.1 The best strategy at full power is to operate with Tcold low in the band and HP Stop and Governor Valves wide open (lower Thot). When approaching 100% power (265%), then it is preferable to have Tcold on the program value. The goal is to operate with valves wide open (VWO) and diute to achieve 100% power while remaining below the upper band of 541*F. For Unit 2 at full power, dilution at 540.7*F is recommended to maintain temperature high in the band. 1.8.2 Unit 2 is not able to achieve 100% power with Tcolw the ensure within the operating band, then Operations management should be consulted for guidance. (AR 040400300) 1.8.3 Unit 3 is able to achieve 100% power with Tc low in the operating band. However, this may cause the minimum pressure should be raised by diluting to RAISE Tc and throttling Turbine Governor Valves as necessary. This will result in operation slightly below 100% power, which is acceptable. 1.8.4 The Tcold Operating Band is not a limit and may be exceeded in certain cases to optimize plant performance. Engineering has stated that a Tcold of up to 545*F for perei						
 1.8 The normal operating band for RCS Cold Leg Temperature at 100% Rated Thermal Power is 537*F and 541*F as identified in Attachment 13. The objective of the Tcold band is to maximize generation while minimizing long term Steam Generator tube degradation. Operation at the lower end of this band will prolong the life of the Steam Generators. 1.8.1 The best strategy at full power is to operate with Tcold low in the band and HP Stop and Governor Valves wide open (lower Thot). When approaching 100% power (>95%), then it is preferable to have Tcold on the program value. The goal is to operate with valves wide open (WVO) and dilute to achieve 100% power while remaining below the upper band of 541*F. For Unit 2 at full power, dilution at 540.7*F is recommended to maintain temperature high in the band. 1.8.2 Unit 2 is not able to achieve 100% power due to temperature being near the upper band of 541*F. If not able to stay above the minimum pressure specified by the Reload Ground Rules with temperature within the operating band, then Operations management should be consulted for guidance. (AR 040400300) 1.8.3 Unit 3 is able to achieve 100% power with Tc low in the operating band. However, this may cause the minimum pressure specified by the Reload Ground Rules to be challenged. If Steam Generator pressure approaches the minimum pressure the pressure should be raised by diluting to RAISE Tc and throtting Turbine Governor Valves as necessary. This will result in operation slightly below 100% power, which is acceptable. 1.8.4 The Tcold Operating Band is not a limit and may be exceeded in certain cases to optimize plant performance. Engineering has stated that a Tcold of up to 545*F for periods of up to 2 weeks without having to reassess the impact of the RCS Materials is acceptable. Such cases include, but are not limited to LOCO power reductions when it is desirable to utilize MTC, during the performance of Turbine Valve Testing and/or required load reduction, and during trans				REVISION 41		
 Power is 537 *F and Š41*F as identified in Attachment 13. The objective of the Tcold band is to maximize generation while minimizing long term Steam Generator tube degradation. Operation at the lower end of this band will prolong the life of the Steam Generators. 1.8.1 The best strategy at full power is to operate with Tcold low in the band and HP Stop and Governor Valves wide open (lower Thot). When approaching 100% power (>95%), then it is preferable to have Tcold on the program value. The goal is to operate with valves wide open (VWO) and dilute to achieve 100% power while remaining below the upper band of 541*F. For Unit 2 at full power, dilution at 540.7*F is recommended to maintain temperature high in the band. 1.8.2 Unit 2 is not able to achieve 100% power with 1 the band. 1.8.3 Unit 3 is able to achieve 100% power with Tc low in the operating band. However, this may cause the minimum pressure specified by the Reload Ground Rules with temperature band for guidance. (AR 040400300) 1.8.3 Unit 3 is able to achieve 100% power with Tc low in the operating band. However, this may cause the minimum pressure should be raised by diluting to RAISE Tc and throttling Turbine Governor Valves as necessary. This will result in operation slightly below 100% power, which is acceptable. 1.8.4 The Tcold Operating Band is not a limit and may be exceeded in certain cases to optimize plant performance. Engineering has stated that a Tcold of up to 545*F for periods of up to 2 weeks without having to reasses the impact of the RCS Materials is acceptable. Such cases include, but are not limited to, EOC power reductions when it is desirable to utilize MTC, during the performance of Turbine Valve Testing and/or required load reduction, and during transient conditions while attempting to maintain S/G pressure above MSIS pretrips and 		1.0	REAC	TOR COOL	ANT SYSTEM (Continued)	
 and HP Stop and Governor Valves wide open (lower Thot). When approaching 100% power (>95%), then it is preferable to have Tcold on the program value. The goal is to operate with valves wide open (VWO) and dilute to achieve 100% power while remaining below the upper band of 541*F. For Unit 2 at full power, dilution at 540.7*F is recommended to maintain temperature high in the band. 1.8.2 Unit 2 is not able to achieve 100% power due to temperature being near the upper band of 541*F. If not able to stay above the minimum pressure specified by the Reload Ground Rules with temperature within the operating band, then Operations management should be consulted for guidance. (AR 040400300) 1.8.3 Unit 3 is able to achieve 100% power with Tc low in the operating band. However, this may cause the minimum pressure specified by the Reload Ground Rules to be challenged. If Steam Generator pressure approaches the minimum pressure should be raised by diluting to RASE Tc and throttling Turbine Governor Valves as necessary. This will result in operation slightly below 100% power, which is acceptable. 1.8.4 The Tcold Operating Band is not a limit and may be exceeded in certain cases to optimize plant performance. Engineering has stated that a Tcold of up to 545*F for periods of up to 2 weeks without having to reassers the impact of the RCS Materials is acceptable. Such cases include, but are not limited to, EOC power reductions when it is desirable to utilize MTC, during the performance of Turbine Valve Testing and/or required load reduction, and during transient conditions while attempting to maintain S/G pressure above MISIS pretrips and 			1.8	Power is 5 Tcold band tube degra	37°F and 541°F as identified in Attachment 13. I is to maximize generation while minimizing lor dation. Operation at the lower end of this band	The objective of the ng term Steam Generator
 the upper band of 541°F. If not able to stay above the minimum pressure specified by the Reload Ground Rules with temperature within the operating band, then Operations management should be consulted for guidance. (AR 040400300) 1.8.3 Unit 3 is able to achieve 100% power with Tc low in the operating band. However, this may cause the minimum pressure specified by the Reload Ground Rules to be challenged. If Steam Generator pressure approaches the minimum pressure, then pressure should be raised by diluting to RAISE Tc and throttling Turbine Governor Valves as necessary. This will result in operation slightly below 100% power, which is acceptable. 1.8.4 The Tcold Operating Band is not a limit and may be exceeded in certain cases to optimize plant performance. Engineering has stated that a Tcold of up to 545°F for periods of up to 2 weeks without having to reassess the impact of the RCS Materials is acceptable. Such cases include, but are not limited to, EOC power reductions when it is desirable to utilize MTC, during the performance of Turbine Valve Testing and/or required load reduction, and during transient conditions while attempting to maintain S/G pressure above MSIS pretrips and 	and HP Stop and Governor Valves wide open (lower Thot). When approaching 100% power (>95%), then it is preferable to have T cold o the program value. The goal is to operate with valves wide open (VWC and dilute to achieve 100% power while remaining below the upper band of 541°F. For Unit 2 at full power, dilution at 540.7°F is		(lower Thot). When referable to have Tcold on h valves wide open (VWO) ining below the upper on at 540.7°F is			
 However, this may cause the minimum pressure specified by the Reload Ground Rules to be challenged. If Steam Generator pressure approaches the minimum pressure, then pressure should be raised by diluting to RAISE Tc and throttling Turbine Governor Valves as necessary. This will result in operation slightly below 100% power, which is acceptable. 1.8.4 The Tcold Operating Band is not a limit and may be exceeded in certain cases to optimize plant performance. Engineering has stated that a Tcold of up to 545°F for periods of up to 2 weeks without having to reassess the impact of the RCS Materials is acceptable. Such cases include, but are not limited to, EOC power reductions when it is desirable to utilize MTC, during the performance of Turbine Valve Testing and/or required load reduction, and during transient conditions while attempting to maintain S/G pressure above MSIS pretrips and 				1.8.2	the upper band of 541°F. <u>If</u> not able to stay a pressure specified by the Reload Ground Rule the operating band, <u>then</u> Operations manager	bove the minimum es with temperature within
cases to optimize plant performance. Engineering has stated that a Tcold of up to 545°F for periods of up to 2 weeks without having to reassess the impact of the RCS Materials is acceptable. Such cases include, but are not limited to, EOC power reductions when it is desirable to utilize MTC, during the performance of Turbine Valve Testing and/or required load reduction, and during transient conditions while attempting to maintain S/G pressure above MSIS pretrips and				1.8.3	However, this may cause the minimum pressu Ground Rules to be challenged. <u>If</u> Steam Ger approaches the minimum pressure, <u>then</u> pres diluting to RAISE Tc <u>and</u> throttling Turbine Go necessary. This will result in operation slightly	ıre specified by the Reload herator pressure sure should be raised by vernor ∨alves as
Reload Ground Rules limits. (AR 041101727)				1.8.4	cases to optimize plant performance. Enginee Tcold of up to 545°F for periods of up to 2 we reassess the impact of the RCS Materials is a include, but are not limited to, EOC power red desirable to utilize MTC, during the performan Testing and/or required load reduction, and du	ring has stated that a eks without having to cceptable. Such cases uctions when it is ce of Turbine Valve uring transient conditions

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	2	
	K/A #	059 A	K2.01
	Importance Rating	2.7	

Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release: Knowledge of the interrelations between the accidental liquid Radwaste release and the following: Radioactive liquid monitors
Proposed Question: Common 61

Given the following condition:

• The Preheater for 2/3E-354, Gas Stripper has developed a leak.

Which ONE (1) of the following Radiation Monitors would be the *first* to detect this leakage?

- A. RE-7812, Radwaste Condensate Return Radiation Monitor.
- B. RE-7819, Component Cooling Water Non-Critical Loop Radiation Monitor.
- C. RE-7813, Liquid Waste Discharge Radiation Monitor.
- D. RE-7870, Condenser Air Ejector Wide Range Radiation Monitor.

Proposed Answer: A

Explanation:


- A. Correct. Although RE-7870 & RE-7813 could eventually detect the leakage (and RE-7819 if a leak were to occur in this location) this is the <u>first</u> monitor to sense the outflow.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because the Sample Cooler for the Radwaste Condensate Return Radiation Monitor is cooled by CCW via the Non-Critical Loop, however, a leak would need to develop in that Sample Cooler in order for this detector to sense the leak.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because Condensate Return from the Gas Strippers can be directed to the Miscellaneous Test Tank which would then be released past Radiation Monitor RE-7813, however, it is not the first detector in the flowpath.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because Condensate Return from the Gas Strippers can be directed to the Main Condenser which would then be released past Radiation Monitor RE-7870, however, it is not the first detector in the flowpath.


Technical Reference(s)	SD-SO23-650, Figures 1 & 2	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SD-SO23-690, Figures 8, 11, 12, & 13	Comments / Reference


Proposed references to be provided during examination: None


ES-401	RO Written	Form ES-401-5					
Learning Objective: 103331 / 103328	ANALYZE normal and abnormal operations of the Radiation Monitoring System. EXPLAIN the interfaces between the Radiation Monitoring System and other plant systems.						
-							
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)				
Question History:	Last NRC Exam						
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fund Comprehension	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X				
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>11</u> 55.43						


Form ES-401-5














Examination Outline Cross-reference:

	RO	800
Level	RU	SRO
Tier #	1	
Group #	2	
K/A #	067 A	A2.05
Importance Rating	3.2	

<u>Plant Fire on Site</u>: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site: Ventilation alignment necessary to secure affected area

Proposed Question: Common 62

Given the following condition with Unit 2 in MODE 1:

• Annunciator 60A44 - COMPUTER ROOM SMOKE DETECTED is in alarm.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the response to this alarm?

At Control Room Panel 2L-154, ensure the Smoke Exhaust Dampers between the Computer Room and the Control Room align to...

- A. exhaust smoke from the Computer Room and that the Smoke Exhaust Fan is running.
- B. isolate the Computer Room.
- C. exhaust smoke from the Control Room and that the Smoke Exhaust Fan is running.
- D. isolate the Control Room.

Proposed Answer: B

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that the Smoke Exhaust Dampers would align to either the Control Room or Computer Room.
- B. Correct. This is the correct response given the condition listed.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that the Smoke Exhaust Dampers would align to exhaust any smoke in the Control Room that might have escaped the Computer Room. This action would occur if the Control Room Smoke Detector alarmed.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that the Smoke Exhaust Dampers would align to isolate the Control Room from the source of smoke.

Technical Reference(s)	SD-SO23-624, Page 10	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO23-15-60.A2, 60A44	Comments / Reference
	SO23-15-60.B, 60B18	

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

Learning Objective: 73024 / 73027	EXPLAIN the interfaces between the Fire Protection System and other plant systems.							
-	ANALYZE normal and abnormal operations of the Fire Protection System.							
Question Source:	Bank #							
	Modified Bank #	(Note changes or attach parent)						
	New X							
Question History:	Last NRC Exam							
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis	X						
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7, 8</u> 55.43							

Comments / Re	ferenc	e: From SD-SO23-624, Page 10	Revision # 1							
CONTROL ROOM COMPLEX VENTILATION SYSTEM										
2.1.3	2.1.3 General Control Scheme (Continued)									
.1	NORI	MAL VENTILATION (Continued)								
	.1.5 The Computer Room Recirculation Units and the two air distribution fans are normally running continuously. A Temperature Controller (TC) in each computer room controls discharge temperature from the recirculation unit by positioning a chilled water, three-way valve that controls the flow of chilled water through two-thirds of the unit's cooling coil, and a solenoid valve that controls flow through the other one-third of the cooling coil. The TC also controls a heater in the humidifier to increase temperature. A moisture controller controls area humidity by controlling a humidifier and the chilled water solenoid valve in each unit.									
	.1.6 The Guard Room Unit has a local adjustable Temperature Controller to control unit capacity.									
.2	SMO	KE MODE								
.2.1 If the Control Room complex smoke detector (DCH-9718) senses smoke, the smoke damper in the recirculation header shuts, the outside air smoke damper opens and the Smoke Exhaust Fan starts if outlet dampers for the fan are open.										
	.2.2	Each computer room has two smoke detectors. If detector detects smoke, it shuts "B" train dampers HV-9715A, B, C a (HV-9715 A and B - Unit 3), if they are in normal. Detector detecting smoke, shuts "A" train dampers HV-9734A, B and (HV-9734A, B, C and D - Unit 3), if they are in normal.	and D DCH-9734							
	.2.3	A Halon system actuation signal from the Halon Fire Protect System (see SD-SO23-590), closes all the computer room s isolation dampers, regardless of control switch position.								

omments / Re	ferenc	e: From SO2	3-15-60.	.A2, 60A44	1		Revisio	on # 14
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION ALARM RESPONSE INSTRUCTION UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 14 ATTACHMENT 2						-15-60.A2 51 OF 101		
60A44 COI	MPUT	ER ROOM	SMOKE	DETECT	ED			
APPLICABILI	[ΤΥ	PRIORITY	REFLAS	H ASS	SOCIATED WIND	IONS		
Modes ALL	-	AMBER	YES		61A15			
INITIATING DEVICE		NOUN NAME		SETPOINT	VALIDATION INSTRUMENT	PCS ID	LINK # U2/U3	
2(3)DCH-9715 Control Building Computer Room A/C Isolation Smoke Detector Controller High			etector	NONE	NONE	DH-9715	2172/1740 2173/1741	
2(3)DCH-9734 Control Building Computer Room A/C Isolation Smoke Detector Controller High								
1.0 <u>REQUIRED</u> 1.1 At t 1.1.	the af	 fected Unit, At Panel 2L	-154, EN:	SURE CLOSE	wing actions D the follow	ing Damper		
		 2HV-9715 Damper 	A, Contr	rol Room Co	omputer Room	A/C Isola	tion	
 2HV-9715B, Control Room Computer Room A/C Isolation Damper 								
 2HV-9715C, Control Room Computer Room A/C Isolation Damper 								
 2HV-9715D, Control Room Computer Room A/C Isolation Damper 								
		• 2HV-9734 Damper	A, Contr	rol Room Ca	omputer Room	A/C Isola	tion	

- 2HV-9734B, Control Room Computer Room A/C Isolation Damper
- 2HV-9734C, Control Room Computer Room A/C Isolation Damper

Comm	ents / R	eferenc	e: From SO2	3-15-60).B, 6	0B18			Revisio	on # 16-1
	NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION ALARM RESPONSE INSTRUCTION SO23-15-60.B UNITS 2 AND 3 REMISION 16 EC 16-1 PAGE 64 OF 87 ATTACHMENT 2									
60B ⁻	60B18 CONTROL ROOM SMOKE DETECTED									
AF	PPLICAB	ILITY	PRIORITY	REFLA	\SH	ASSO	CIATED WINDO	NS		
	Modes A	LL	AMBER	N/A	、		61A15			
1	INITIATING NOUN NAME SETPOINT VALIDATION PCS ID LINK # U2									
2/3R4 [1] 2/3BU-28, 2/3MA-035 Smoke Exhaust Fan Autostart Relay			NON	E	NONE	NONE	2229			
1.0	<u>REQUI</u>	RED AC	<u>TIONS</u> :							-
	1.1	Inspect	Control Room	30 foot el	evatio	n to find	the source of ala	rm.		
	1.2 At 2L-154 VERIFY the following:									
		1.2.1 2/3MA-035, Control Room Smoke Exhaust Fan running.								
		1.2.2	2/3HV-9718	3B, and 2	2/3HV	9718C,	Smoke Dampers	Open.		
		1.2.3 2/3HV-9718A, Smoke Damper Closed.								

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	2	
	K/A #	A13 /	AK3.4
	Importance Rating	3.1	

<u>Natural Circulation</u>: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Natural Circulation Operations: RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facility license and amendments are not violated **Proposed Question:** Common 63

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 2 has experienced a Steam Generator Tube Rupture on E088.
- All Reactor Coolant Pumps are secured due to a Loss of Offsite Power.
- Steam Generator E088 has been isolated per SO23-12-11, EOI Supporting Attachments, Attachment 27, SGTR Actions.
- Cooldown to Shutdown Cooling is required and the following parameters exist:
 - Pressurizer level is 5% and rising.
 - Reactor Coolant System pressure is 1200 psia.
 - Core Exit Saturation Margin is 21°F and rising.
 - Steam Generator E088 narrow range level is 45% and stable.
 - All ESFAS actuations occurred as designed.

Which ONE (1) of the following is required and the reason for this action?

- A. Establish and maintain Pressurizer level at greater than or equal to 40% during cooldown to ensure adequate SHUTDOWN MARGIN.
- B. Limit initial cooldown rates to 35-40°F per hour to optimize Natural Circulation flow in both loops.
- C. Immediately reduce pressure using manual Auxiliary Spray to less than 1100 psia to prevent lifting Main Steam Safety Valves when E088 fills solid.
- D. Throttle Safety Injection flow to prevent a Pressurized Thermal Shock condition with the ruptured Steam Generator isolated.

Proposed Answer: B


Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that this strategy is required for Natural Circulation cooldown, however, this is the strategy for a Natural Circulation cooldown during a Control Room Evacuation.
- B. Correct. This strategy is required for Natural Circulation cooldown as identified in SO23-12-11, Attachment 3, Step 1g Note.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because for an uncontrolled increase in the isolated SG level this action would be directed, however, this pressure is not low enough to keep a Main Steam Safety Valve from lifting. The first MSSV lifts at 1105 psig.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because with the SG isolated RCS conditions are recovering and it could be thought that throttle conditions had been established and actions to prevent PTS conditions are warranted.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-12-11, Attachment 27, Step 7 Caution	Attached w/ Revision # See			
	SO23-13-2, Attachment 16, Step 1 Note	Comments / Reference			
	SO23-12-11, Attachment 3, Step 1d Caution				
	SO23-12-11, Attachment 3, Step 1g Note				

Learning Objective: 53298	EXPLAIN how each of the following can affect single-phase natural circulation: Primary-to-secondary heat transfer rate.						
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New X	(Note changes or attach parent)					
Question History:	Last NRC Exam						
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis	X					
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43						

Comments / Reference: From	SO23-12-11, Attac	hment 27, Step 7 Caution	Revision #	<i>#</i> 6				
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATIONEMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTIONSO23-12-11ISS 2UNITS 2 AND 3REVISION 6PAGE 261 OF 278ATTACHMENT 27								
E OI SUPPORTING ATTACHMENTS								
	SGTR ACT	IONS						
ACTION/EXPECTED RES	PONSE	RESPONSE NOT OBTAINE	: <u>D</u>					
7 INITIATE Lowering PZR Pro	ssure:							
	NO.	TE						
	his should continue un	reduce RCS pressure while m til RCS pressure is within 50 PS						
				ſ				
	<u>CAU</u>	<u>TION</u>						
Keeping RCS pressure higher than S/G pressure is preferred to minimize RCS dilution due to backflow unless backflow is intended.								
	CAUTION							
	ning RCP NPSH or 2	reducing RCS pressure to less 0°F Core Exit Saturation Marg						



Comments / Reference: From SO23-12-11, Attachment 3, Step 1d Caution Revision # 6									
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION SO23-12-11 ISS 2 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 6 PAGE 89 OF 278 ATTACHMENT 3									
EOI SUPPORTING ATTACHMENTS									
COOLDOW	COOLDOWN / DEPRESSURIZATION								
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	RE	SPONSE NOT OBTAINED							
1 INITIATE RCS Cooldown and Depressurization: (Continued)									
NOTE Tech. Spec. Shutdown Margin may not be met during an ESDE. Frequent monitoring of Reactor Power and SUR during cooldown is desired.									
d. VERIFY adequate Shutdown Ma	rgin: d.								
1) Boration in progress — at greater than or equal t 40 GPM)) OR	ESTABLISH Boration — at greater than or equal to 4	40 GPM						
	2)	، MAINTAIN Shutdown Margin	within limits:						

Comments / Reference: From S	SO23-12-11, Attachment 3, Step 1g Note	Revision # 6						
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3	EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 6 ATTACHMENT 3	I SO23-12-11 ISS 2 PAGE 92 OF 278						
EC	EOI SUPPORTING ATTACHMENTS							
CO 01	LOOWN / DEPRESSURIZATION							
ACTION/EXPECTED RES	PONSE RESPONSE NOT OBT.	AINED						
1 INITIATE RCS Cooldown and Depressurization: (Continued)								
	NOTE							
slower RCS cooldown rate rate of 35-40°F/HR may b does not continuously div	IF Natural Circulation conditions exist and an Asymmetric Cooldown must be performed, THEN slower RCS cooldown rates are needed to maintain RCS flow in both loops. Normally a guideline rate of 35-40°F/HR may be established initially, then slowly increased further provided $T_{c} \Delta T$ does not continuously diverge. For low decay heat conditions, an initial guideline rate of 10-20°F/HR should be used.							
NOTE								
RCS cooldown rate determination should consider Condensate Inventory per Attachment 16, DETERMINE TIME UNTIL SHUTDOWN COOLING REQUIRED, if no Demineralized Water Storage Tanks are available.								
g. DETERMINE and RECO								

DETERMINE and RECORD desired RCS cooldown band on Figure 2:

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	2	
	K/A #	A16 AA1.1	
	Importance Rating	3.4	
Excess RCS Leakage: Ability to operate and monitor the fr	plowing as they apply to the Excess R	CS Leakane. C	omponents

Excess RCS Leakage: Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to the Excess RCS Leakage: Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features

Proposed Question: Common 64

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

Added MISALIGNED to correct title of alarm window

- The following Annunciators are in alarm:
 - 57C43 RCS LEAKAGE ABNORMAL/RECIRC SYS VLV.
 - 56A56 CONTAINMENT SUMP LEVEL HI.

Which ONE (1) of the following statements identifies the operation of the Containment Sump Pumps in this condition?

- A. A Pump is running and will AUTO Stop on low level or SIAS/CIAS actuation.
- B. A Pump will AUTO start when level reaches the HI-HI alarm and will AUTO Stop on low level or SIAS/CIAS actuation.
- C. They will AUTO start when both Discharge Line Isolation Valves are opened and will AUTO Stop on low level.
- D. They must be started manually after opening both discharge valves and will AUTO Stop on low level.

Proposed Answer: D

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because the pumps automatically stop on low level and it could be thought that the pumps would start on a high level alarm.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because the pumps automatically stop on low level and it could be thought that the pumps would start on hi-hi level alarm.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because the pumps automatically stop on low level, however, the pumps must be manually started.
- D. Correct. There are no auto start features and the valves must be open to start the pumps. The pumps automatically stop on low level.

Technical Reference(s)	SD-SO23-670, Pa	age 8	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO23-2-16, Step	6.19.3	Comments / Reference
	SO23-15-57.C, 5	7C43	
	SO23-15-56.A, 5	6A56 and 56A55	
Proposed references to be	e provided during e	examination: None	
Learning Objective: 81446 / 81448		onfiguration and operatic tem components.	onal characteristics of
-	ANALYZE norma	I and abnormal operatior	ns of the Containment System.
Question Source:	Bank #		
	Modified Bank #		(Note changes or attach parent)
	New	X	
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	ı	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fund Comprehension	damental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7, 9</u> 55.43		

Comments / Refere	ence: From SD-SO23-670, Page	8	Revision # 10	
NUCLEAR ORGANIZAT UNITS 2 AND 3	ION	SYSTEM DESCRIPTION REVISION 10	SD-S023-670 PAGE 8 OF 48	
2.0 <u>DESCRIPTION</u>	[(Continued)			
2.2.3	Containment Normal Sump and P	umps, 2(3)P-007 & 008 (se	e Figure 1)	
	PUMP TYPE:	Vertical, centrifugal, s	ingle stage	
	PRIME MOVER:	480 VAC, 3 phase, 3 HP,	1800 RPM	
	DESIGN HEAD:	34 ft.		
	DESIGN NPSH:	11 ft.		
	DESIGN FLOW:	50 gpm		
	BEARING LUBRICATION:	Nuclear Service Water, 1	-3 gpm	
	SUMP: ELEVATION: DIMENSION: CAPACITY:	17 ft. 6 in. 4.5 ft. x 4.5 ft. x 6.0 ~900 gals.	ft. deep	
IN	ITERLOCKS:	2(3)HV-5803 & 5804		
.1	The Containment Normal Sump a Containment inside the bio-sh drainage from Containment.			
.1	.1 The pump discharge is dire	cted to the Radwaste Sump		
.2	: The Containment Sump Pumps ar in the Control Room Panel, 2(Pump(s) will auto stop on a S	3)CR-56. The Containment	Sump	
. 3	The Containment Normal Sump i which provides sump level ind			
.3.1 Two redundant channel level transmitters send separate signals to the Control Room for post-Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) level indication and recording.				
. 3	.2 The sump level signal from 2(3)LT-5853-2, also inputs (PMS) and the "Critical Fu	to the "Plant Monitoring	System"	

Comments / Reference: From SO23-2-16, Step 6.19.3 Revision # 23							
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATI UNITS 2 AND 3	SO23-2-16 PAGE 42 OF	168					
6.0 <u>PROCEDURE</u> (C	ontinued)						
6.19.3	Initiate pumping Containment Sump to the Ra follows:	dwaste Sump, a	s				
.1	Obtain the Radwaste Operator's concurrence the Radwaste Sump. (See Attachment 34)	to pump to					
.2	OPEN HV-5803, Sump Pump Containment Is	olation Valve.					
.3	OPEN HV-5804, Sump Pump Containment Is	olation ∨alve.					
.4	OPEN HV-7911, Nuclear Service Water to Co	intainment.					
.5	START the Containment Sump Pumps. (One	or both)					
	🔲 MP-007 (HS-5801A) 🛛 🗍 MP-008 (HS	-5801B)					
.6	VERIFY receipt of 56A45 (56A46), CONTAIN PUMP P007 (P008) RUNNING, annunciator.	MENT SUMP					
6.19.4	When desired Containment Sump level is rea	ched:					
.1	STOP the running Containment Sump Pump(s).					
	🔲 MP-007 (HS-5801A) 🛛 🗍 MP-008 (HS	-5801B)					
.2	VERIFY 56A45 (56A46), CONTAINMENT SU (P008) RUNNING, annunciator resets.	MP PUMP P007					
.3	CLOSE HV-7911, Nuclear Service Water to Containment. (N/A if being maintained open SO23-5-1.8 for outage support.)	per					
.4	CLOSE HV-5803, Sump Pump Containment I	solation Valve.					
.5	CLOSE HV-5804, Sump Pump Containment I	solation Valve.					

			23-15-57.C, 5				Revision	# 18		
NUCLEAR OF JNITS 2 AND		RE\	RM RESPONS //SION 18 /ACHMENT 2	EIN	STRUCTION	SO23-15 PAGE 9-	5-57.C 4 OF 143			
7C43	RCSL	EAKAGE	ABNORMAI	JR	ECIRC SYS V	/ MISALIG	NED			
APPLICAE	BILITY	PRIORITY	REFLASH	AS	SSOCIATED WIND	IOWS				
Modes /	ALL	AMBER	YES		57C10,57C20					
INITIATING DEVICE	NOU	JN NAME	SETPOINT	-	VALIDATION INSTRUMENT	PCS ID	LINK# U2/U3			
[1]	Contain In Leaka	ment Sump age	1 GPM or 0.5 GPM incre	ase	C_KFCSTCHG [2]	NONE	208/208			
	RCDT Ir	n Leakage	5 GPM		C_KFRDTCHG [2]					
	Contain Emerge Valves	ment ncy Sump	Not fully Closed with no RAS		2(3)HS-9302-2 2(3)HS-9303-1 2(3)HS-9304-2 2(3)HS-9305-1	ZL9302-2 ZL9303-1 ZL9304-2 ZL9305-1				
	Contain	njection and ment Spray w Valves	Not fully Opened with no RAS N/A		2(3)HS-9306-1 2(3)HS-9307-1 2(3)HS-9347-2 2(3)HS-9348-2	ZH9306-1 ZH9307-1 ZH9347-2 ZH9348-2				
	48∨ Pov on L096	ver Failure			N/A	NONE				
N/A	Main Co Purge V	intainment ′alves	Closed when in Midloop		C_ZL99502 [2] C_ZL99511 [2]					
.0 <u>Requ</u>	IRED AC	TIONS:								
NOTES:	1. "Re ori	eactor Coolant more of the no	Pressure Bour Prmal inputs to t	idary he R	/" is initiated by a h eactor Coolant Dra	igh flow rate f ain Tank.	rom one			
NUTES:		nidentified Lea rmal Containn		"isi	nitiated by a high fl	ow rate into tl	he			
1.1	Check (FMS Page 12	22 to determine	the	source of this alarn	n.				
1.2	Check F	PCS message	logs for cause (of thi	s alarm.					
1.3	<u>lf</u> alarm	f alarm is due to draining a component to the Containment Sump during an o								

- 1.3 If alarm is due to draining a component to the Containment Sump during an outage, then no response is necessary.
- [1] Alarm is CFMS generated.
- [2] PCS Point ID (AR 061001335)

Comments / Reference: From SO23-15-56.A, 56A56 Revision # 7									
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION ALARM RESPONSE INSTRUCTION SO23-15-56.A UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 7 PAGE 107 OF 113 ATTACHMENT 2									
56A56 CONTAINMENT SUMP LEVEL HI									
APPLICABILIT	Y PRIORITY	REFLA	∿SH	ASSO	CIATED WINDOW	vs			
Modes ALL	WHITE	N/A			56.A55				
INITIATING DEVICE	NOUN NAME	Ē	SETF	POINT	VALIDATION INSTRUMENT	PCS ID	LINK# U2/U3		
	Containment Sump Control	Level	4'0" [1]	2(3)LR-5853 CFMS Page 122	NONE	436/463		
1.0 REQUIRED ACTIONS: 1.1 Proceed to Section 2.0. 2.0 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:									
SPECIFIC	CAUSES		SP	PECIFIC	CORRECTIVE A	CTIONS			
2.1 Normal Ini	eakage	2.1	2.1 Monitor 2(3) LR-5853, Containment Sump Recorder and/or CFMS Page 122 for indication of sudden or un explained changes in rate of level change or flow.						
			2.1.1 <u>If</u> CFMS Delta Flow is >1 gpm, <u>then</u> perform SO23-3-3.37, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance.						
			2.1.2 <u>If</u> CFMS 24 hour or 30 minute average is >1 gpm, <u>then</u> Notify Maintenance Engineering.						
2.1.3 <u>If</u> leakage is determined to be normal, <u>then</u> Pump the Containment Sump per SO23-2-16, Section for Pumping the Containment Normal Sump.									
2.2 Sudden Ex	cessive Inleakage	2.2	Att	empt to) Identify the source	e of the inl	eakage.		
		2.2	Co	otify Chemistry to sa ontainment Sump fo (drazine, and Amin)	or Boron, N	litrates,			
[1] The 4'0" se and 2(3)Ll-									

Comments / Reference: From SO23-15-56.A, 56A55

Revision # 7

U	Unine			6. 110111 302	5-15-0	ю.д, с	0433				17641310	π
	NUCL UNITS	EAR ORG/ S 2 AND 3	ANIZA	REV	RM RE 1SION 1 ACHME	7	SEINSTR	RUCTION			15-56.A 105 OF 113	
	56A5	5 C	ONT		SUMF	LEV	EL HI-I	н				
	APF	PLICABILIT	Υ	PRIORITY	REFL	ASH	ASSO	CIATED WINDON	NS			
	N	/lodes ALL		AMBER	N/	A		NONE				
		IATING EVICE		NOUN NAME	:	SET	POINT	VALIDATION INSTRUMENT	PCS	S ID	LINK# U2/U3	
	2(3)LS	SHH-5800	Cont Leve	ainment Sump I	HI-HI	5'0" (1	1]	2(3)LR-5853	NON	ΙE	435/462	
	1.0 2.0		rocee	CTIONS: d to Section 2.0 ACTIONS:).							
		SPECIFIC	C CAL	ISES		SF	PECIFIC	CORRECTIVE A	спо	NS		
	2.1	Containm	ent S	ump Inleakage	2.1	2.1 Pump the Containment Sump per SO23-2-16, Section for Pumping the Containment Normal Sump.						
						2.1.1 Verify HI/HI level alarm resets.						
2.1.2 <u>If</u> the frequency of pumping Containment Sump has incr monitor the Containment Su 2(3)LR-5853 and/or CFMS frequent basis <u>and</u> coordina Chemistry to identify the sou of inleakage.							creas Sump Sionia Nate V	sed, <u>then</u> Recorder a more with				
	3.0	ASSOCIA	TED	RESPONSES:								•
		3.1 N ar	otify tl nd init	he CRS/SM an iate an EDMR/I	d the S _COAR	TA to ro , as reo	eview Tei quired.	ch. Specs. LCO 3	8.4.13	, LCC	0 3.4.14,	
3.2 Notify the CRS/SM and the STA to review the EPIPs and SO123-0-A7, and perform notifications as required.												
	[1]			nt corresponds 3-2 (CR-57)	to 85%	on 2(3)LI-5839	(CR-56) , and 15'	6" on	2(3)	LI-5853-1	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	1	
	Group #	2	
	K/A #	068 A	A1.28
	Importance Rating	3.8	

<u>Control Room Evacuation</u>: Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Control Room Evacuation: PZR level control and pressure control Proposed Question: Common 65

Given the following condition:

• The Control Room has been evacuated due to a seismic event.

Which ONE (1) of the following represents the location and reason for the monitoring of Pressurizer level?

- A. Evacuation Shutdown Panel (L-042) because the instrument range is adequate to maintain the plant in a HOT STANDBY condition.
- B. Essential Plant Parameters Monitoring Panel (L-411) because the instrument range is adequate to place the plant in a COLD SHUTDOWN condition.
- C. Essential Plant Parameters Monitoring Panel (L-411) because the panel is located in the seismically qualified Penetration Building.
- D. Evacuation Shutdown Panel (L-042) because the Pressurizer level instrument retains its seismic qualification at this location.

Proposed Answer: D

Explanation:

Α.	Incorrect. Plausible because the Evacuation Shutdown Panel is the correct location, however, the
	reason is because its seismic qualification is maintained.

- B. Incorrect. Plausible because achieving Cold Shutdown is a desired condition during a seismic event, however, this panel is used when a fire is the reason the Control Room was evacuated.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because the EPPM is located in the Penetration Building which has seismic qualifications, however, the EPPM itself is not seismically qualified.
- D. Correct. Pressurizer level is monitored from the Evacuation Shutdown Panel during a seismic event given the design criteria associated with this indication. The Essential Plant Parameters Monitoring Panel would be used if a fire had occurred.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-13-2, Step 4	4.10.5 Note	Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference
Proposed references to be	e provided during e	xamination: <u>None</u>	
Learning Objective: 56667	applicable section		ch step, note and caution, per the e Shutdown from Outside the
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fund Comprehension	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43		

omme	nts / Reference: F	rom SO23-13-2, Step 4.10.5	Re	vision # 11
	AR ORGANIZATION 2 AND 3	ABNORMAL OPERATING INSTRU REVISION 11	CTION SO23-13-2 Page 7 of	
4.0	SUBSEQUENT OPER/	TOR ACTIONS (Continued)		RF. BY TIALS
		NOTES		
1.		riteria, PZR level monitoring loc Hutdown event. (Ref. 5.2.2)	ation is dictated	
2.	<u>If</u> a seismic ev done at the EVS	ent has occurred, <u>then</u> PZR level (L-042).	monitoring must be	
3.	<u>If</u> a <i>fire event</i> done at the EPP	has occurred, <u>then</u> PZR level mon 1 (L-411).	itoring must be	
-	4.10.5	Ensure Pressurizer actual (corre between 10% and 70%, and trendir 40% and 50%: (Ref. 5.2.2)		
	.1	Direct the 21/31 to coordinate w and control PZR level by operati Pumps using the Auxiliary Contro	ng Charging	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	3	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	G 2.	.1.21
	Importance Rating	3.5	

<u>Conduct of Operations</u>: Ability to verify the controlled procedure copy Proposed Question: Common 66

Which ONE (1) of the following activities does <u>NOT</u> require verification that the procedure is the most current revision?

Performing...

- A. an evolution in the Main Control Room with a goldenrod controlled copy of the procedure.
- B. an evolution at the FFCPD Control Room with a field controlled copy of the procedure.
- C. a frequently performed evolution in the Main Control Room with a laminated copy of the procedure.
- D. an evolution at the FFCPD Control Room with a multiple use procedure in a plastic jacket.

Proposed Answer: A

Explanation:

- A. Correct. This type of procedure is considered a controlled document.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that these types of procedure copies were controlled documents.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that these types of procedure copies were controlled documents.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that these types of procedure copies were controlled documents.

Technical Reference(s)	SO123-0-A3, Section 6.3	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

ES-401	RO Written Exam Worksheet	Form ES-401-5
Learning Objective: 55120	STATE the guidelines for procedure use including: "Procedure-In-Use" file per Op Procedures.	o 1
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43	
Comments / Reference: F	rom SO123-0-A3, Section 6.3	Revision # 8

NUCLE UNITS		RGANIZATI ND 3	ON OPERATIONS DIVISION PROCEDURE SO123-0-A3 REVISION 8 PAGE 9 OF 38	
6.0	<u>PROC</u>	EDURE (C	ontinued)	
	6.3	User Co	ntrolled and Field Controlled Documents	
		6.3.1	Operations has classified the following types of procedures and activities as User-Controlled documents per SO123-VI-0.9:	
			 Procedure pages that are posted locally at plant locations. These are printed on buff (yellow) colored paper and stamped "OPERATIONS USER CONTROLLED DOCUMENT." 	
			 Procedure steps and activities performed on Hand-held computers 	
		.1	Posted procedure pages and hand-held computer steps/activities are maintained up-to-date with CDM controlled procedures by the Operations Procedure Group. Consequently, field verification that these documents are up-to-date is not required.	
		.2	Posted procedure page locations are identified in PRO-16, Posted User Controlled and Field Controlled Procedures.	
		6.3.2	Operations has Field Controlled procedures located in the FFCPD Control Rooms, and HFMUD Control Room.	
		.1	Field Controlled procedures are ensured to be up-to-date with CDM controlled procedures by the Operator prior to use.	
		.2	Field Controlled procedures are copies of controlled documents which are laminated or placed inside plastic jackets to allow multiple use.	
		.3	Authorized Field Controlled procedures for the FFCPD and HFMUD Control Rooms are identified in PRO-16, Posted User Controlled and Field Controlled Procedures.	
		6.3.3	Operators in the Main Control Room may maintain high use procedure Sections in plastic jackets or laminated "hard cards" for convenience.	
		.1	Control Room jacketed or laminated procedures are ensured to be up-to-date with CDM controlled procedures by the Operator prior to use.	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	3	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	G	2.1.15
	Importance Rating	2.7	

<u>Conduct of Operations</u>: Knowledge of administrative requirements for temporary management directives, such as standing orders, night orders, Operations memos, etc.

Proposed Question: Common 67

Given the following conditions:

- SO23-3-3.19, 4 kV Emergency Bus Transfer Test, Attachment 5, SSD Second Point of Control Tests - 2G002 Output Breaker 2A0413 is in progress.
- 2G002 Breaker 2A0413 fails to close when operated at the Train A Second Point of Control.

In accordance with SO23-3-3, Operations Surveillance Program Requirements, which ONE (1) of the following is the <u>first</u> person that needs to be notified about the breaker failure?

- A. Shift Manager.
- B. Operations Manager.
- C. Cognizant System Engineer.
- D. SRO Operations Supervisor.

Proposed Answer: D

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because the Shift Manager is concerned especially if it affected component OPERABILITY, however, it is the SRO Operations Supervisor that is responsible per SO23-3-3.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because at some point the Operations Manager would be informed, however, it is the SRO Operations Supervisor that is responsible per SO23-3-3.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because at some point this individual would be informed, however, it is the SRO Operations Supervisor that is responsible per SO23-3-3.
- D. Correct. As defined in SO23-3-3, Operations Surveillance Program Requirements.

Attached w/ Revision # See
 Comments / Reference
O23-3-3, Steps 6.1.5 and 6.5.1

Learning Objective: 55161 -	Given a plant situation involving the performance of the performance o	nts for surveillances have been
Question Source:	Bank # 127272 Modified Bank # New	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43	

Comments / Reference	: From SO23-3-3, Step 6.1.5 and 6.5.1	Revision # 12
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3		3-3-3 4 OF 47
6.0 <u>PROCEDURE</u> (Cor	tinued)	
6.1.3	The Surveillance/Compliance Coordinator is responsi	ble for:
	 Generating the daily Surveillance Control Shee the operating shifts 	ets for
	 Producing the Technical Specification Surveill Report for the cognizant Equipment Control and Operations Supervisors 	
	 Auditing completed surveillance documents for deficiencies 	
	• Implementing approved changes to the OSCAR Pro)gram
6.1.4	The SRO Ops. Supervisor is responsible for:	
	 Authorizing Surveillance Testing after assessi impact on Unit reliability or Generating Capac 	
	 Taking action to maintain/restore equipment Operability 	
	 Reporting schedule deviations to the Surveillance/Compliance Coordinator 	
	 Reporting unsatisfactory surveillance results Shift Manager 	to the
	 Initiating a LCOAR/EDMR if applicable 	
	 Reviewing the completeness, accuracy (where applicable), and results of Surveillance Testi procedures 	ng
6.1.5	The Balance of Plant Operator is responsible for:	
	• Completing the Surveillance Testing as schedul	ed
	 Reviewing the completed surveillance procedure informing the SRO OPS. Supervisor of deficient difficulties encountered 	
	 Reporting any reason why a scheduled surveilla not be completed on time 	nce will

Comments / Reference	: From SO23-3-3, Step 6.5.1	Revision # 12
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3	SURVEILLANCE OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023 REVISION 12 TCN 12-4 PAGE	-3-3 8 OF 47
6.0 <u>PROCEDURE</u> (Cor	ntinued)	
6.4.5	The daily Surveillance Control Sheets will be comple follows:	eted, as
.1	The Operator who actually performed the surveillance initial the Surveillance control sheets, as applical	
.2	<u>After</u> verifying all completed documents are placed CRS Surveillance Hold Box, <u>and</u> ensuring all uncomplesurveillances are rescheduled, <u>then</u> the NCO initials Surveillance control sheets for the current shift.	eted
.3	Just before turnover to DAY shift, the NIGHT shift will:	NCO.
	 Review the violation Date/Time to ensure the r completion time (plus any allowable extension sufficient to complete the surveillance requir 	time) is
	 Reschedule any uncompleted Technical Specifica surveillances from the previous day's Surveill Control Sheets to the current sheets 	
	 Notify the SRO Ops. Supervisor of any schedule surveillance which will not be completed on the 	
	 Note on the Surveillance Control Sheets any in Non-Technical Specification surveillances with for non-completion 	
	 Transfer all completed surveillances from the Surveillance Hold Box to the Red Book for retr the Surveillance/Compliance Coordinator 	
6.4.6	The Surveillance/Compliance Coordinator updates the program then generates the computerized Technical Specification Surveillance Report.	OSCAR
6.5 Survei	llance Performance Guidelines	
	INFORMATION USE	
6.5.1	Performance of Surveillance instructions, <u>except</u> she surveillances (≤72 hours) and passive surveillances status not changed), shall be approved by the cogni: on-shift SRO Ops. Supervisor.	(plant
.1	The SRO Ops. Supervisor's final approval accounts for current plant status and equipment Operability. This ensures the surveillance will not violate any Technical Specification LCOs nor place the unit(s) unsafe condition.	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	3	
	Group #	1	
	K/A #	G 2.	1.31
	Importance Rating	4.6	

<u>Conduct of Operations</u>: Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and indications, and to determine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup

Proposed Question: Common 68

Which ONE (1) of the following will generate the Steam Bypass Control System Annunciator 50A07 - SBCS DEMAND PRESENT?

The Steam Bypass Control System...

- A. AUTO Permissive Channel Circuitry is generating an output.
- B. AUTO Permissive Channel Circuitry and the Master Controller (PIC-8431) are both generating an output.
- C. Master Controller (PIC-8431) is generating an output.
- D. AUTO Permissive Channel Circuitry and Rate of Change Circuitry are both generating an output.

Proposed Answer: B

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because this is 1 of 2 conditions required.
- B. Correct. Both conditions must be present for the annunciator to be active.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because this is 1 of 2 conditions required.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because Auto Permissive Channel Circuitry is required, however, the Rate of Change Circuitry is not required.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-3-2.18, L&S 2.1	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Learning Objective: 102466 / 102485	INTERPRET instrumentation and controls utilized in the Main Steam System. ANALYZE normal and abnormal operations of the Main Steam System.		
Question Source:	Bank #	128167	
	Modified Bank # New		(Note changes or attach parent)

ES-401			RO Written Exam Worksheet	Form ES-401-5
Questic	on Hist	ory:	Last NRC Exam	
Questic	on Cog	nitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis	
10 CFF	R Part 5	55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43	
Comme	ents / F	Reference: Fr	om SO23-3-2.18, L&S 2.1	Revision # 20
	EAR OF S 2 AND	RGANIZATION 93	OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-3- REVISION 20 PAGE 4 ATTACHMENT 9	
		<u>STEAM I</u>	BYPASS SYSTEM LIMITATIONS AND SPECIFICS	
1.0	SBCS	GENERAL IN	FORMATION (Continued)	
	1.7	<u>When</u> in Mod dumped throu tube damage 060901029)	es 1-2 with Generator Load < 200MWe or in Modes 3-5, <u>and</u> ugh the SBCS Valves, <u>then</u> to minimize the possibility of Cond , all 4 Circulating Pumps should be in service. (ARs 03010030	steam is denser D7-7 and
		1.7.1 <u>lf</u> u	one or more CWP is out of service, <u>then</u> SBCS operation sho sed only if ADVs are not available.	ould be
		tv C	SBCS must be used with only 2 or 3 CWPs in service, <u>then</u> u vo SBCS valves, and dump only to the Condenser section the WPs running (this results in less risk to the tubes than dumpi) both ends of the Condenser).	use only at has two ng steam
	1.8	Prior to chan should be pla	ging the setpoint selector switch, PIC-8431, SBCS Master Co ced in MANUAL.	ntroller,
	1.9	To prevent op minimize the	eening of more than one valve from a single component failu time the SBCS is in MANUAL PERMISSIVE.	re,
2.0	SBCS	RESPONSE		
	2.1	50A07,SBC9	CS Master Controller (PIC-8431) receives a demand signal, <u>t</u> 3 DEMAND PRESENT, annunciates. Typically, the initiation o lemand occurs as the power descent approaches 15%.	<u>hen</u> f steam
		C	<u>when</u> both the AUTO PERMISSIVE Channel and the SBCS M ontroller (PIC-8431) are generating an output, <u>then</u> 50A07, S EMAND PRESENT, will annunciate.	
	2.2	SBCS Valves when valves (AR 0401000	due to a known valve design deficiency may exhibit a jerky r are going closed between 45% to 20% of valve stroke. 64)	notion

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	3	
	Group #	2	
	K/A #	G 2.	2.22
	Importance Rating	4.0	

Equipment Control: Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits Proposed Question: Common 69

Which ONE (1) of the following conditions requires entry into a Technical Specification ACTION STATEMENT while in MODE 3?

- A. Pressurizer level is 30%.
- B. Charging Pump P191 is cleared.
- C. Train A Fuel Oil Storage Tank level is 39,000 gallons.
- D. Reactor Coolant System T_{COLD} is 535°F.

Proposed Answer: C

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because 38% Pressurizer level is the minimum per the Pressurizer Level Control Program, however, there is no Technical Specification minimum value for level.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because two RCS boron injection flow paths must be OPERABLE, however, Charging Pump P191 is the Swing Pump and can be cleared without impact to boration systems.
- C. Correct. This level meets the minimum requirements for MODE 5 or 6, however, level must be greater than 41,800 gallons in MODES 1, 2, 3 or 4.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because this temperature is less than the average temperature required at Hot Zero Power, however, the Technical Specification Minimum Temperature for Criticality is 522°F.

Technical Reference(s)	Technical Specification LCO 3.8.3	Attached w/ Revision # See
	Technical Specification LCO 3.4.2	Comments / Reference
	SO23-3-1.10, Attachment 5	_
	Technical Specification LCO 3.1.9	_
Proposed references to b	e provided during examination: None	

Learning Objective: 56649 Given plant and equipment conditions, or Technical Specification/LCS surveillance results, DETERMINE system or equipment OPERABILITY and LCO(s) impacted along with all required actions and surveillances using SONGS procedures, Technical Specifications and Licensee Controlled Specifications (LCS).

Question Source:	Bank #		_
	Modified Bank #	73789	(Note changes or attach parent)
	New		_
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	SONGS 2007	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundar Comprehension or	0	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43		

mments / Reference: From	Technical Specification LCO 3.8.3	A	mendment # 211
3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER S 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube O			
LCO 3.8.3 The stored be within I	l diesel fuel oil, lube oil, and starting a mits for each required diesel generat	air subsystem sha or (DG).	11
APPLICABILITY: When ass	ociated DG is required to be OPERAI	BLE.	
ACTIONS Ni Separate Condition entry is al	DTE lowed for each DG.		
CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION		N
A. One or more DGs with fuel volume < 48,400 gallons and > 41,800 gallons in storage tank during MODE 1,2,3 or 4	A.1 Restore fuel oil level to within limits.	48 hours	
 B. One or more DGs with lube oil inventory < TS min and ≥ TS inop. 	B.1 Restore lube oil inventory to within limits.	48 hours	
C. One required DG with fuel volume in the storage tank < 43,600 gallons and > 37,400 gallons during MODE 5 or 6.	C.1 Restore fuel oil level to within limits.	48 hours	
D. One or more DGs with stored fuel oil total particulates not within limits.	D.1 Restore fuel oil total particulates to within limits.	7 days	

omments / Reference: Fror	n Technical Specification LCO 3.4.2	Amendment # 127
3.4 REACTOR COOLANT	SYSTEM (RCS)	
3.4.2 RCS Minimum Tempe	erature for Criticality	
	Clean cold log to growth we (T.) chall	50.0#F
LCO 3.4.2 Each RC	S loop cold leg temperature (T _c) shall l	UE≥ 5227F.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 MODE 2	, THERMAL POWER ≤ 30% RTP and , K _{ent} ≥ 1.0 and T _e < 535 °F.	$T_{o} < 535$ °F, and
ACTIONS		
omments / Reference: Fror	n SO23-3-1.10, Attachment 5	Revision # 21
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3	OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 21 ATTACHMENT 5	S023-3-1.10 PAGE 51 OF 58
PRE	SSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL PROGRAM	1
59 (%) 57 J 55 J 53 J 53 J 51		
55		
<u>б</u> 51		
49		
H 47		
45		
H 49 47 45 45 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43		
¥ 39		
<u>a</u> 37		
35	17	566
540 545 ⁵⁴	[*] 550 555 560	565 570
RCS AVE	ERAGE TEMPERATU	RE (Dea F)

comments / Refe	erence: From Te	chnical Specification LCO 3.1.9		Amendment #127
3.1 REACTIVI	TY CONTROL S	YSTEMS		
3.1.9 Boration	Systems - Opera	ating		
LCO 3.1.9 Two RCS boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE with the contents of the Boric Acid Makeup (BAMU) tanks in accordance with the LCS.				
APPLICABILIT	Y: MODE	S 1, 2, 3 and 4.		
ACTIONS				
CONI	DITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLET TIME	
	n injection flow PERABLE .	A.1 Restore boron injection flow path to OPERABLE.	72 hours	
Comments / Refe	erence: From Ex	am Bank #73789		Revision # 05/22/01
TATEMENT wh	ile at 80% powe			
		el Oil Day Tank level is 29 inche 5 level is 45,850 gallons.	<u>s.</u>	
. Reactor Cool	ant System Tcol	ld is 541ºF.		
. Charging Pur	np 2P-191 is tag	ged out for repairs.		

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	3	
	Group #	2	
	K/A #	G 2.	.2.39
	Importance Rating	3.9	

Equipment Control: Knowledge of less than or equal to one hour Technical Specification action statements for systems Proposed Question: Common 70

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 2 is in a Refueling Outage.
- Spent fuel is being moved inside Containment.
- Refueling Cavity level is greater than 23 feet above the fuel.

Which ONE (1) of the following is the required condition for the Personnel Air Lock (PAL) doors, Emergency Air Lock (EAL) doors, and Equipment Hatch?

- A. The Equipment Hatch must be closed and held in place by 2 bolts; both doors of the PAL and EAL must be closed.
- B. The Equipment Hatch must be closed with all bolts installed; both doors in the PAL and EAL must be closed.
- C. The Equipment Hatch must be closed and held in place by 4 bolts; both doors in the EAL and PAL must be closed.
- D. The Equipment Hatch must be closed and held in place by 4 bolts; one door in the EAL must be closed, and one door in the PAL must be closed or OPERABLE.

Proposed Answer: D

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because if the Equipment Hatch were OPERABLE (requires 4 bolts) this condition would be correct, however, only one door in the PAL and EAL must be closed.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because the Equipment Hatch would be OPERABLE with all bolts installed, however, only one door in the PAL and EAL must be closed.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because the Equipment Hatch requirements are correct, however, only one door in the PAL and EAL need be closed.
- D. Correct. Per Technical Specification LCO 3.9.3.

Technical Reference(s)	Technical Specification LCO 3.9.3	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

ES-401		RO Written Exam Worksheet		Form ES-401-5
Learning Objective: 56649	surv LCC SOI	en plant and equipment conditions, or eillance results, DETERMINE system D(s) impacted along with all required a NGS procedures, Technical Specificat cifications (LCS).	n or equipme actions and tions and Li	ent OPERABILITY and surveillances using
Question Source:	Ban Moo Nev	lified Bank #	(Note cha	nges or attach parent)
Question History:	La	st NRC Exam SONGS 2005A		
Question Cognitive Le		mory or Fundamental Knowledge mprehension or Analysis	<u> X </u>	
10 CFR Part 55 Conte		41 <u>10</u> 43		
Comments / Reference	e: From	Fechnical Specification LCO 3.9.3		Amendment # 193
а т	Penetration he conta . The he equip re met:) The capa) The		ce by four bo owing condit	tions
3 4 5) Ade Struc	signated crew is available to close the C ture Equipment Hatch Shield Doors, ainment purge is in service, and reactor has been subcritical for at least		
b _		door in each air lock closed; NOTE doors of the containment personnel airl ded:	lock may be	open
	a. b1.	one personnel airlock door is OPERAE the plant is in MODE 6 with 23 feet of v fuel in the reactor vessel, or	-	the
	b2.	defueled configuration with fuel in cont in refueling machine or upender).	ainment (i.e	., fuel

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	3	
	Group #	2	
	K/A #	G 2	.2.41
	Importance Rating	3.5	

Equipment Control: Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings Proposed Question: Common 71

Given the following condition:

• An overload condition has occurred on Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 2XR1

Per Drawing 30103, which ONE (1) of the following are automatic functions initiated by operation of Overcurrent Relay, 451-1?

Along with initiating an Annunciator,...

A. trips 230 kV CBs, trips 6.9 kV CBs, and initiates DDSMS.

B. trips 230 kV CBs, trips 6.9 kV CBs, and initiates DFR1 Channel 23.

C. trips 6.9 kV CBs, trips 4.16 kV CBs, and initiates DFR1 Channel 22.

D. trips 230 kV CBs, trips 480 V CBs, and initiates 230 kV Breaker Failure Backup.

Proposed Answer: B

Explanation:


- A. Incorrect. Plausible because tripping of the breakers is correct, however, this device does not initiate DDSMS.
- B. Correct. Per the Function Table on Drawing 30103 and overcurrent relay 451-1.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because tripping of the breakers is correct, however, this device actuates DFR1 Channel 23.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because the 230 kV Breakers and Breaker Failure Backup are actuated by the overcurrent device, however, there are no 480 V circuit breakers that are tripped.

Technical Reference(s)	Drawing 30103, 451-1 Overcurrent Relay	Attached w/ Revision # See
	Drawing 30103, Function Table	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination: <u>Drawing 30103 (Size "C")</u>

Learning Objective:	Given the appropriate Elementary diagram, DETERMINE starting,
54937	stopping, overriding, indicating, protecting, and interlock criteria, as
	applicable, for any component.

Question Source:	Bank # 73728 Modified Bank # New	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>7</u> 55.43	



Comments / Referen	nce: From Drawing 30103, Function	Table	Revision # 11
	FUNCTION TABLE		
F—A	ANNUNCIATION & COMPUTER INPUT		
в	TRIP 230KV RES AUX XFMR PCB'S		
с	TRIP 6 9KV RES AUX XFMR PCB'S	۲ ۲	
D	TRIP 4 16 KV RES AUX XFMR PCB'S		
Ε	TRIP RES AUX XFMR COOLING		
F	XFMR FAN CONTROL		
G	230KV RES AUX PCB FAILURE B.U. PROT INITIATION	-	
Q	COMPUTER [NPUT		
s	DDSMS		

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	3	
	Group #	3	
	K/A #	G 2	.3.12
	Importance Rating	3.2	

<u>Radiation Control</u>: Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. **Proposed Question:** Common 72

Given the following conditions on Unit 3:

• Unit 3 is in a Refueling shutdown with a Reduced Inventory Condition.

Which ONE (1) of the following conditions requires that the Unit 3 Containment be evacuated?

- A. Notification from Security that a Direct Armed Attack (Code RED) is in progress.
- B. Annunciator CONTAINMENT SUMP HI LEVEL alarms in the Control Room.
- C. An inadvertent Reactor Coolant System dilution of 100 gallons.
- D. Receipt of a seismic alarm at less than Operating Basis Earthquake.

Proposed Answer: A

Explanation:

- A. Correct. This is the required action per SO23-13-25, Operator Actions During Security Events.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that receipt of this alarm would require a Containment evacuation, however, it is not required for this condition.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that a dilution, especially in Reduced Inventory Condition would result in increasing count rate, however, AOI SO23-13-11 Emergency Boration of the RCS/Inadvertent Dilution or Boration does not require Containment Evacuation. An increase in radiation levels could require evacuation but this condition is not specified.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that evacuating Containment would be prudent for a seismic event but is not an action specified in SO23-13-3, Earthquake.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-13-25, Step 12a RNO, p6 SO23-13-11, Step 5a		Attached w/ Revision # See
-			Comments / Reference
	SO23-13-3, Attac	chment 1	
Proposed references to be	e provided during e	examination: <u>None</u>	
Learning Objective: 54470	note in the Abnor		BE basis for each step, caution or n and the expected plant or 23-13-25.
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	I	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis		<u>X</u>
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>12</u> 55.43		

Comments / Reference: From	SO23-13-25, Step	12a RN	0	Revision # 12-1
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3	ABNORMAL OPERA REVISION 12 EC 12			3-25 6 OF 43
OPERA	FOR ACTIONS DURIN	IG SECU	RITY EVENTS	
OPERATOR ACTIONS ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE 12 PERFORM Unit 3 Containment Actions:				
□ a. Verify Containment is C	LOSED.	□а.	Initiate Containment Eva Closure.	cuation <u>and</u>
□ b. Verify Normal and Eme Containment lighting DB	rgency E-ENERGIZED.	∏b.	DE-ENERGIZE Normal : Emergency Containmen (SO23-3-2.34).	
☐ c. VERIFY CLOSED both doors <u>and</u> VERIFY DE- Personnel Hatch.		Щ с.	CLOSE both Personnel <u>and</u> DE-ENERGIZE the Hatch (SO23-3-2.34).	

	- 0000 40 44 .01 5	• -		Devision # 4.4
Comments / Reference: Fron	n SO23-13-11, Step 5	ba		Revision # 14
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3	ABNORMAL OPERAT REVISION 14	TING IN		I3-11 8 OF 19
EMERGENCY BORATIC	N OF THE RCS / INAD	/ERTEN	T DILUTION OR BORATI	ON
	OPERATOR ACT	IONS		
ACTION/EXPECTED R	ESPONSE	<u>RE</u> S	PONSE NOT OBTAINED	
5 Inadvertent Dilution Action	ns:			
While in Mode 5, Reactor than one hour. (Ref. 1.2.1	CAUTIO Criticality can occur if an)		lution event continues for g	greater
□a. VERIFY Refueling NC	DT in progress.]a. 1)	ENSURE operations invo core alterations or positiv reactivity changes are suspended.	
		□ 2)	<u>IF</u> the Refueling Cavity is filled,	s being
			THEN STOP Cavity fill,	
			AND	
			VERIFY fill water Boron Concentration meets requirements.	
		Д 3)	GO TO Step b.	

Comments / R	eference: From	SO23-13-3, Attachment 1		Revision # 11-1
NUCLEAR OR UNITS 2 AND	SO23- PAGE	13-3 9 OF 33		
	POST OPE	RATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE INSPECTIONS		
		CONTINUOUS USE		
	MODE	DATE	TIME	
1.0 <u>PRERE</u>	<u>EQUISITES</u>			PERF. BY INITIALS
1.1	This attachment h	as been directed by the OPERATOR ACTIONS		
2.0 <u>PROCE</u>	EDURE			
		NOTES		
1. Stepsi	n this attachment	should be performed concurrently.		
2. An OBI	E is 50% of the De	sign Basis Earthquake.		
2.1	<u>If</u> in Mode 1 or 2, (Mark N/A if alrea	<u>then</u> initiate normal plant shutdown. dy in Mode 3, 4, 5 or 6.)		
2.2	<u>When</u> in Mode 3 (Mode 5 per SO23	or 4 , <u>then</u> initiate normal plant cooldown to -5-1.5. (Mark N/A if already in Mode 5 or 6.)		
2.3	ENSURE T-120 r	equired inventory for plant cooldown:		
	2.3.1 SECU	RE 2(3)MP-049, Condensate Transfer Pump.		
		NOTE		
An REP is no closing S2(3) vault.	rmally required fo 1414MU092 it ma	r entry into the RVVST vault, but for expediency i y be necessary to notify HP and proceed directly	n y to the	
	2.3.2 WIT MT-12 (T-005	HIN 30 MINUTES : CLOSE S2(3)1414M 0 and MT-121 Makeup Header Isolation. RWST Vault Under Platform.)	U092,	
	(2HV-{	HIN 90 MINUTES : CLOSE 2(3)HV-5715 Insate Transfer Pump MP-049 Suction from MT- 5715 located South of BPS Sluice Pump P-431, 715 located outside T-121 vault, near MP-049.)	120.	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	3	
	Group #	3	
	K/A #	G 2	2.3.4
	Importance Rating	3.2	

Radiation Control:Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditionsProposed Question:Common 73

Given the following conditions:

- A room, accessible to individuals, has general area radiation levels of 50 mrem/hour.
- A valve on the far wall of the room has a contact radiation level of 2000 mrem/hour.
- The radiation level 30 centimeters from the valve is 80 mrem/hour.

Which ONE (1) of the following is the correct posting for the room?

- A. "CAUTION, RADIATION AREA" with the valve identified as a "HOT SPOT."
- B. "CAUTION, RADIATION AREA" with no "HOT SPOT" identified.
- C. "CAUTION, HIGH RADIATION AREA" with the valve identified as a "HOT SPOT."
- D. "CAUTION, HIGH RADIATION AREA" with no "HOT SPOT" identified.

Proposed Answer: A

Explanation:

- A. Correct. Given the conditions listed, the posting is correct.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because the posting is a Radiation Area is correct, however, this area also has a hot spot.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that the hot spot radiation area level qualified as a High Radiation Area.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that the general area radiation levels qualify as a High Radiation Area.

Technical Reference(s)	SO123-VII-20, Attachment 1	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO123-VII-20, Step 6.11.3.3	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

Learning Objective: 52585 Given a type of Radiation Area, DESCRIBE its radiation limits, as well as the access controls required by 10CFR20 and site procedures to enter this area. Include in this description any signs and barriers that define this area.

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Comprehension or Analys	0	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>12</u> 55.43		

6	ammanta / Dataranaa: Eram 20102 \	/II 00 Attackment 1	Davi	iaian # 12
C	omments / Reference: From SO123-	/II-20, Attachment 1	Rev	ision # 13
	NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 1, 2 AND 3	HEALTH PHYSICS PROCEDURE REVISION 13 ATTACHMENT 1	SO123-VII-20 PAGE 89 OF 9	98
	DEFINITIONS, ABE	REVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS		
	CONTAMINATED AREA means an access contamination levels greater than or equal than or equal to 20 dpm/100 cm ² alpha acti	to 1000 dpm/100 cm² beta-gamma acti	ce vity or greater	Ι
	CRITICAL STEP means a step in a work e exposure or control in the release of radioa	volution which is important to the contro ctive material.	ol of a worker's	3
	DOSE QUANTITY means the type of dose SDE/ME.	being measured including DDE, LDE, 3	SDE/WB, or	
	DECLARED PREGNANT WOMAN (DPW) Cognizant HP Technical Specialist in writin the estimated date of conception.	means any woman who has voluntarily g of her pregnancy or intent to become	y informed the pregnant and	
	DEEP DOSE EQUIVALENT (DDE) is the c of radiation.	lose to one whole body location from ex	ternal source:	S
	DERIVED AIR CONCENTRATION (DAC) which, if breathed for a working year (2000	means the concentration of a given rad hours), results in an intake of one ALI.	ionuclide in ai	r
	EFFECTIVE DAC means the DAC value (µ mixture of radionuclides present in air.	iCi/cc) which is calculated based on the	e anticipated	
	EFFECTIVE DOSE EQUIVALENT (EDE) is radiation.	s the dose to the whole body from exte	rnal sources of	f
	EMBRYO/FETUS means the developing u from the time of conception until the time of		NT WOMAN	
	ENTRANCE or ACCESS POINT means ar access to radiation areas or to radioactive i	<u>ny</u> location through which an individual o material (10CFR20.1003).	could gain	
	EXTERNAL DOSE ASSESSMENT (EDA) body count report estimates greater than 1	is the method of assigning SDE initiate DO mrem SDE due to noble gas subme	d when a whol rsion.	le
	EXTERNAL DOSE REVIEW (EDR) is the readings. Dosimeter readings are replaced reading is invalid or suspect.	method of assigning dose to replace do I when a dosimeter is lost, damaged, o	simeter ffscale or wher	na
	HEALTH PHYSICS (HP) means the protect effects of radiation.	tion of human and the environment from	m the harmful	
	HIGH CONTAMINATION AREA (HCA) me contamination levels greater than or equal activity or greater than or equal to 100 dpm	to 100,000 dpm/100 cm² beta-gamma (rea loose surfa distributed	ce
	HIGH RADIATION AREA (HRA) means ar 100 mRem deep dose equivalent in 1 hour	n accessible area in which an individual at 30 centimeters from the source (100	could receive CFR20.1003).	

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 1, 2 AND 3	HEALTH PHYSICS PROCEDURE REMSION 13 ATTACHMENT 1	SO123-VII-20 PAGE 91 OF 98
DEFINITIONS	ABBREMATIONS AND ACRONYMS	
	n individual is required to be monitored for oc rior dose determination and occupational dos	
NATIONALLY TRACKED SOURCE 10CFR 20 Appendix E. This does no encapsulated for disposal.	is a sealed source that exceeds the activity th t include material contained in a fuel assemb	hresholds in Iy or waste
NRC FORM-4 is a report of an individ	dual's lifetime occupational exposure history.	
NRC FORM-5 is a report of an individ	dual's occupational exposure for a monitoring	period.
NVLAP is the National Voluntary Lab of Science and Technology.	ooratory Accreditation Program conducted by	National Institute
	dose received by an individual during the cou assigned duties involve exposure to radiatior	
OCCUPATIONAL WORKER means during employment.	an individual who enters a Restricted Area at	t San Onofre
lots located on the west side of Inters	A) is SONGS SCE Property to include facilitie state 5 freeway, extending westward from Old th and south by the State Beach Park.	es and parking I Highway 101 to
PLANT ACCESS DATA SYSTEM (P respirator qualifications, and occupati	PADS) is a system for tracking security cleara ional dose records for transient workers.	nce, training and
PERSONNEL CONTAMINATION RE dose when a PCR indicates skin cont investigation level of 10,000 cpm as r	ECORD (PCR) DOSE EVALUATION is methon tamination greater than the personnel contam measured with a standard frisker.	od of assigning nination
QUALIFICATION means the conditio Qualifications include area access, R they have attained all necessary requ	on of being authorized to perform a radiologic EP specific, and respirator use. Individuals a uirements.	al activity. re qualified when
QUALIFIED ESCORT means an esc applicable area.	ort who has the radiological qualification for a	access to the
	sible area in which an individual could receive meters from the source (10C FR20.1003).	e 5 mRem deep
	REP) means a document which identifies wor iological control requirements and provides ra	
RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL AREA m times Appendix C quantities is used of	neans an area or room where licensed materi or stored (10CFR20.1902).	al exceeding 10

Comments / Reference	e: From SO123-VII-20, Step 6.11.3.3		Revision # 13
NUCLEAR ORGANIZA UNITS 1, 2 AND 3	TION HEALTH PHYSICS PROCEDURE REVISION 13	SO123-\ PAGE 52	
6.11.3.3	In addition to the 10CFR 20 posting requirements, othe posting inserts may be used to communicate radiologic workers such as:		
	Locked High Radiation Area		
	Hot Spot,		
	Contaminated Area,		
	ALARA Cool/Cold Zone, and/or		
	Hot Particles.		
.4	In addition to posting entrances into large areas or roor inside the larger area which contain substantially greate posted.	ns, discret er hazards	e areas : are also

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	3	
	Group #	4	
	K/A #	G 2	.4.2
	Importance Rating	4.5	

Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge of system setpoints, interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions

Proposed Question: Common 74

Given the following conditions:

• Unit 2 is operating at 100% power.

Which ONE (1) of the following conditions would require the operators to trip the Unit?

- A. Stator Hot Gas temperature of 150°F.
- B. Steam Generator E089 narrow range level of 90%.
- C. Instrument Air header pressure of 65 psig.
- D. Main Condenser ΔT is 27°F.

Proposed Answer: B

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that this temperature would require a plant trip, however, the Turbine would trip automatically at 181°F.
- B. Correct. The Turbine should automatically trip at 89% narrow range level.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that this pressure would require a plant trip, however, a Unit trip must be initiated at 50 psig.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because a 25°F Δ T is an NPDES violation, however, it does not require a Unit trip.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-15-52.A, 52A11	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO23-15-99.C, 99C01	Comments / Reference
	SO23-13-5, Step 2b	
	SO23-2-5, L&S 2.4	

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

Learning Objective:	As the RO, RECOGNIZE and RESPOND to a reactor trip event and
53972	manipulate plant systems and equipment to perform the Standard Post Trip
	Actions per SO23-12-1.

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	_ (Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamer Comprehension or Ar	•	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43		

mments / Reference: From SO23-15-52.A, 52A11 Revision							# 12			
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION ALARM RESPONSE INSTRUCTION S023-15-52.A UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 12 PAGE 27 OF 120 ATTACHMENT 2										
52A11 FWCS SG2 E088 LEVEL HI OVERRIDE										
APPLICABIL	.ITY	PRIORITY	REFL	LASH	ASSO	CIATED WINDON	NS			
Modes 1-4	1	RED N		0	D NONE					
INITIATING Device				VALIDATION IN STRUMENT	PC	s id	LINK # U2/U3			
LAHLSG2HLO (5XL)	FWCS Overric	SG2 E088 LV de	1L HI	L HI <u>≥</u> 85%		2(3)LI-1125-1	NON	νE	784/795	
1.0 <u>Requir</u>	ED ACT	<u>10NS</u> :					•			
	NOTE									
A S/G High Level Reactor trip is automatically initiated at 89%.										
1.1 If a Reactor Trip has occurred, then GO TO SO23-12-1, Standard Post Trip Actions.										

Comments	s / Reference: From SC		Revision # 7			
	R ORGANIZATION 2 AND 3	ABNORMAL OPER/ REVISION 7	ATING INSTRUCTION		23-13-5 GE 8 OF 34	
		<u>LOSS OF INSTR</u>	UMENT AIR			
		OPERATOR A	CTIONS			
<u>ACT</u>	ION/EXPECTED RESPONSE		RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED			
2 Pre	ssure less than 50 ps	ig: (continued))			
ы ^b .	Mode 1 or 2: PERFORM	the following:				
1 5	1) TRIP the <i>offected</i>	Unit Reactor.				
	2) INITIATE S023-12-1, Standard Post Trip Actions.					
	3) LOCATE and ISOLATE the leak using Attachment 2.					
	4) SRO Ops. Supv. EV/ <u>all</u> Instrument Air Unit per Attachmen	• to the offecte) d			

comments / Reference: From SO23-15-99.C, 99C01								Revisio	n # 14
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION ALARM RESPONSE INSTRUCTION S023-15-99.C UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 14 PAGE 6 OF 120 99C01 GENERATOR HOT GAS TEMP HI TURBINE TRIP									
1							1		
	Y PR	RIORITY	REF	'LASH	AS	SOCIATED WINI	DOWS		
Modes 1-3		RED	١	10		NONE			
INITIATING DEVICE [1]	NOL	UN NAME		SETPO	INT	VALIDATION INSTRUMENT	PCS ID	LINK# U2/U3	
2(3)TSH-2910A		Hot Gas Inlet to Number 1 Cooler Top		181•F		NONE	TE2910A	. 1240/1240	*
2(3)TSH-2910B	Hot Gas Inlet to Number 2 Cooler Top			181•F			TE2910B		
2(3)TSH-2910C	Hot Gas Inlet to Number 3 Cooler Top			181•F			TE2910C		
2(3)TSH-2910D	Hot Gas Inlet to 181° F TE2910D								
Number 4 Cooler Top 1.0 REQUIRED ACTIONS: 1.1 Verify that the Turbine Generator has Tripped by observing the following: • Turbine Speed < 2000 rpm and Lowering									

mm	nents /	Reference	e: From SO23-2-5, L&S 2.4	Revision #
	EAR OR(S 2 ANI	GANIZATION D 3	OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 26 ATTACHMENT 18	S023-2-5 PAGE 150 OF 163
	<u>C</u>]	IRCULATING	WATER SYSTEM LIMITATIONS AND SPECIFICS	(Continued)
2.0	BUMP)	ING A CIRC	WATER PUMP	
	2.1	Bumping with the	a CWP takes 20 to 30 minutes including fi pump actually being off for ≈10 minutes.	eld manipulations,
	2.2		ation should be given to the effect on Co order that pumps are bumped:	ndenser Vacuum due
		mil ● Bad mod ● Goo res	d pump next to bad pump: Stopping the bad dest transient because good waterbox can pump next to bad pump: Stopping either p erate transient because both waterboxes a d pump next to bad pump: Stopping good pu ults in worst transient because bad water slack	take up the slack ump results in re degraded mp (NOT RECOMMENDED)
	2.3	Saltwate	Water ∆T is near the upper limit, <u>then</u> st r Cooling Pump will provide ≈ 0.5°F reduc e considered.	arting a second tion in ∆T and
	2.4	Discharg Under no 25°F∆T requiren	The differential temperature of the Circu je and Intake shall not exceed the NPDES ∆ urmal conditions (Non Circ. Water Heat Tre limit for any time period is a NPDES viol ment for maintaining less than 25°F ∆T is ter Heat Treatment Process only . (Ref. 2.	T limit of 25°F ∆T. at) exceeding the ation. The NPDES exempted during
		2.4.1	The permit endnotes state "insignificar rounded to the nearest significant figu maximum indicated ∆T is 25.4°F which ro	ıres." Therefore.
		2.4.2	The Data Logger receives input from eig the Intake Structure、 Only one RTD <u>or</u> NPDES monitoring and reportability、	
		2.4.3	The warmer the inlet temperature the cl instantaneous ∆T you will become when a <u>If</u> additional Circ Water Pumps will be may have to wait a few minutes to allow to recover. Action should be taken to 25°F instantaneous ∆T is approached.	the CWP is secured. bumped, <u>then</u> you ≀ the Circ Water ∆T

camination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #	3	
	Group #	4	
	K/A #	G 2	.4.39
	Importance Rating	3.9	

Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge of RO responsibilities in emergency plan implementation Proposed Question: Common 75

Given the following conditions:

- An emergency event has been declared as an ALERT at 1030.
- You have assumed the duties of Operations Leader.

Which ONE (1) of the following is the LATEST time that you should activate the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS)?

A. 1045.

B. 1100.

- C. 1130.
- D. 1145.

Proposed Answer: C

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because the Siren and PA Coordination must be performed within 15 minutes by the Operations Leader.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because personnel must be briefed by the operations leader every 30 minutes as to the status of the plant, Emergency Response Priorities, and any Protective Actions Recommendations initiated by the Emergency Coordinator
- C. Correct. The Emergency Response Data System must be activated within one hour of declaration of an ALERT or higher classification.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that 15 minutes was allocated to Siren and PA Coordination and then one hour later the ERDS would be activated.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-VIII-30, Step 6.1.1.11.12	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination: _ I	None
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Learning Objective:	DESCRIBE the responsibilities of the Operations Leader during an
56184	emergency event per SO23-VIII-30, including: Providing plant status
	information.

Question Source:	Bank # 130572 Modified Bank # New	2 (Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowl Comprehension or Analysis	edge X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 <u>10</u> 55.43	

Comments / Reference:	From SO23-VIII-30, Step 6.1.1.11.12	Revision # 15
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATI UNITS 2 AND 3	ON EPIP REVISION 15	SO23-VIII-30 PAGE 4 OF 16
6.0 PROCEDURE		
6.1 <u>Activation</u>		
NOTES:	(1) See sections indicated in parentheses for	detailed instructions.
	(2) The Units 2/3 SM retains operational cont ISFSI.	rol for Unit 1 and the
	(3) PA announcements made by Security are requirements of this procedure.	in addition to the
6.1.1	Upon event declaration, or as directed by the E Operations Leader Duties.	C, assume the
C .1	Immediately, (within 15 minutes of event declar: siren coordination per Attachment 1 before cont procedure.	ation) perform PA and inuing with this
.2	Evacuate personnel from hazardous areas (see	Section 6.6).
.3	Notify EC/SED of Unit 1/ISFSI changing condition recommendations in accordance with SO123-V	onsand make II-1.
.4	Use the lvory Phone to provide plant status to o facilities on the circuit (see Section 6.2).	ther emergency
.5	Maintain a log of decisions and actions required documentation of conditions, events, and comm appropriate. Ensure a complete and adequate misunderstanding and to identify items requiring	unications wherever record to minimize
.6	Retain operators needed for immediate in-plant auxiliary operators to report to the Operations S	response and direct upport Center (OSC).
	.6.1 For security events, direct auxiliary opera Control Room Lunch Room.	ors to report to the
.7	Track location and Security Badge numbers of Section 6.3).	on-shift operators (see
.8	When OSC Operations Coordinator is ready, tra location and Security Badge numbers of on-shif (see Section 6.3).	nsfer tracking of t operators
.9	Inform OSC Operations Coordinator when send Control Room to the field (see Section 6.4).	ing operators from the
.10	Contact Health Physics (HP) for in-plant radiolo inform them of changes in plant conditions whic radiological conditions (see Section 6.5).	gical conditions and h may affect

Comments / Reference:	Revision # 15			
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATI UNITS 2 AND 3	NC	EPIP REVISION 15	SO23-VIII-3 PAGE 5 OF	
6.1.1.11	<u>If</u> a Site Area Emergency (SA declared, <u>then</u> prohibit eating clearance has been given by	E) or General Emero and drinking in the 0 HP (see Section 6.5	gency (GE) is Control Room).	until
.12	Within one (1) hour of an Ale Emergency Response Data S in accordance with SO23-3-2	rt or higher classifica System (ERDS) to NF .32.	tion, activate RC Operation:	s Center
.13	rization is required p C activation, <u>then</u> obt on 6.7).	rior to Techni ain volunteers	cal s and	
.14	Brief Operations personnel a: approximately every 30 minu following:	ssigned to Unit 1 (if a tes or as conditions v	applicable) warrant. Inclu	de the
	Plant Status			
	Emergency Response Prior	ities (i.e., repair activ	rities)	
	Onsite protective actions ar	nd Offsite PARs mad	e by the EC	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		1
	Group #		1
	K/A #	040 A	A2.05
	Importance Rating		4.5

Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer: Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to the Steam Line Rupture: When ESFAS systems may be secured Proposed Question: SRO 76

Given the following conditions during an Excess Steam Demand Event outside Containment and upstream of the Main Steam Isolation Valves on Steam Generator E089:

- Steam Generator E089 has been isolated.
- T_{HOT} is 480°F and stable.

Should be Valve

- Lowest T_{COLD} is 469°F and stable.
- Representative Core Exit Thermocouple is 495°F and stable.
- Pressurizer level is 39% and rising.
- Pressurizer Pressure is 1690 psia and rising.
- Auxiliary Feedwater is in service supplying E088.
- Reactor Vessel level indicates 100%.
- All CEAs inserted on the trip and power is less than $1X10^{-4}$ and lowering.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the <u>NEXT</u> action of SO23-12-5, Excess Steam Demand Event for these conditions?

- A. Refer to SO23-3-2.2, Makeup Operations and ensure a boration of greater than or equal to 40 gpm is maintained.
- B. Refer to SO23-12-11, EOI Supporting Attachments, FS-31, Establish CVCS Letdown Flow and override and open Letdown Isolation Valves and restore Letdown to control Pressurizer level.
- C. Refer to SO23-12-11, EOI Supporting Attachments, FS-7, Verify SI Throttle / Stop Criteria and stop Charging Pumps one at a time to establish Pressurizer level control.
- D. Refer to SO23-12-11, EOI Supporting Attachments, FS-1, Verify Pressurizer Pressure and initiate Pressurizer Spray flow to reduce RCS and Pressurizer differential temperature.

Proposed Answer: C

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that Shutdown Margin is in jeopardy due to the Excess Steam Demand Event.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because for Pressurizer level greater than 80% the EOI directs action to place Letdown in service, however, implementing FS-7 is a more direct way to address this concern.
- C. Correct. Throttle conditions are met and with RCS pressure above SI Pump shutoff head the next throttling steps require securing Charging Pumps.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because at 160°F the EOI does direct actions to initiate spray flow for PTS mitigation, however, this action is not performed by this Floating Step.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-12-5, Steps 7 & 13		Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO23-12-11, Attac	hment 2, FS-7	Comments / Reference
	SO23-14-5, Step 7	Bases	
	SO23-12-10, Attac		
Proposed references to	be provided during ex	amination: <u>None</u>	
Learning Objective: 54789	STATE the major reco	very actions in respor	ise to an ESDE event.
Question Source: Bank #			
	Modified Bank #		_ (Note changes or attach parent)
	New	Х	_
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Leve	el: Memory or Funda Comprehension c	amental Knowledge or Analysis	<u> </u>
10 CFR Part 55 Conten	:: 55.41 55.43 _5		

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION SO23-12-5 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 21 PAGE 7 OF 25					
EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT					
OPERATOR ACTIONS					
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED					
7 PREVENT Pressurized Thermal Shock:					
NOTE WHEN excess steam demand remains NOT isolated and all RCPs are stopped, THEN T _C in loop with <i>least affected</i> S/G may be higher than REP CET temperature.					
<u>CAUTION</u> Failure to establish steaming flow path on least affected S/G before most affected S/G loses effective heat removal capabilities will result in rapid re-pressurization (PTS consideration).					
 a. INITIATE FS-30, ESTABLISH Stable RCS Temperature during ESDE. b. INITIATE FS-7, VERIEY SI Throttle/Stop 					

 INITIATE FS-7, VERIFY SI Throttle/Stop Criteria.

Comments / Reference: From SO23-12-5, Step 13 Revision # 2							
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3	12-5 13 OF 25						
EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT							
	OPERATOR ACTIONS						
ACTION/EXPECTED RESP	PONSE	RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED					
13 LIMIT RCS Re-pressurization	n:						
a. VERIFY PTS Subcooling: CFMS page 311.	a.	DETERMINE PTS Subcooling us RCS temperature and highest P.					
b. VERIFY PTS Subcooling	b.	GO TO step e.					
– greater than 160°F							
AND							
– rising.							
IF a harsh environment (esc of HV-9202 and HV-9203 fo		nside containment, THEN changing	the position				
c. VERIFY environment in C – NOT harsh.	containment c.	INITIATE FS-32, ESTABLISH M Auxiliary Spray.	anual				
d. INITIATE PZR spray opera	ation.						
e. INITIATE SO23-12-11, Att CORE EXIT SATURATIO CONTROL using the value Subcooling in place of Cor Saturation Margin.	N MARGIN e of PTS						

	nents / Reference: From SO23-12-11, Attachment 2, FS-7				Revision # 6	
	ICLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY ITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 6 ATTACHMENT		6	OPERATING INSTRUCTION SO23-12-11 ISS 2 PAGE 20 OF 278 2		
	E	DI SUPPORTII	NG AT	TACHMENTS		
		FLOATI	NG S	TEPS		
	ACTION/EXPECTED R	ESPONSE	Ē	RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED		
FS-7	VERIFY SI Throttle/Sto	p Criteria				
Ар	plicability: ALL					
a.		operating:	a.	GO TO SO23-12-9, FUNCTIC RECOVERY	WAL	
	1) SBCS – available OR			AND		
	ADV – available.			INITIATE SO23-12-9, Attachm RECOVERY – HEAT REMOV		
	AND					
	2) Feedwater – availa	able.				
b.	VERIFY PZR level		۰	IF any criteria of steps b. throu – NOT satisfied,	ıgh d.	
	 greater than 30% AND 			THEN		
	 NOT lowering. 			 OPERATE Charging and necessary to maintain Thi criteria – satisfied. 		
C.	VERIFY Core Exit Satur — greater than or equal	ation Margin to 20°F:		 THROTTLE Loop Injectio as required. 	n valves	
	QSPDS page 611 CFMS page 311.			 ENSURE auxiliaries to SI 	Pumps:	
d.	 greater than or equal 			a) Electrical power to pu valves.	umps and	
	(Plenum):			b) Proper system alignn	nent.	
	QSPDS page 622 CFMS page 312			c) CCVV flow.		
Attachment 4.			d) HVAC.			

Comme	ents / Reference: From SO23-	Revision # 8	
	EAR ORGANIZATION 3 2 AND 3	T SO23-14-5 PAGE 21 OF 50	
	EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EV	/ENT BASES AND DEVIATIONS JU	STIFICATION
	E	OI STEP BASES	
4.0 <u>F</u>	BASES DESCRIPTION (Continued	(5	
4.4.7	STEP 7 PREVENT Pressu	rized Thermal Shock (Continued)	
	the unaffected loop. Opening the S/G inventory to ensure Heat R S/G. Transferring the ADV to A approximately 200 PSIA above the unaffected S/G with little or reaches dryout, the unaffected 3 address any additional cooldow	ed S/G, actions are taken to begin steam ne unaffected S/G ADV supplements th emoval is not lost and initiates the trans UTO/MODULATE to maintain the least the most affected S/G pressure will res no temperature rise in the RCS. After t S/G ADV is again adjusted for the lowe n associated with the remaining affecte controlling RCST _{COLD} with little or no R imulator experiences.	e remaining affected sition to the unaffected affected S/G pressure ult in heat transfer to he affected S/G st RCS T _{COLD} to d S/G inventory. The
	 S/G with an unisolable steam lin being removed by the steam lin 	establish stable RCS temperature antine break or after isolation of the ESDE. The break, with little or none by the <i>least</i> at transfer this heat removal to the <i>least at</i> for more detail.	RCS heat is primarily affected S/G. Action
	rapid drop in RCS temperatures flow which adds cold water (app flow at full SI Pump discharge p condition could result in exceed This could lead to brittle fracturi would result in unisolable loss o	VERIFY SI Throttle/Stop Criteria. The s. This effect could be aggravated by S proximately 70°F) from the RWST to the ressure could result in increased RCS ing design pressure of the RCS for the ng of RCS components, including the R f coolant flow paths). It is therefore des op Criteria are met. See SO23-14-11 fo	afety Injection (SI) RCS; continued SI pressures. Such a existing temperature. leactor Vessel (which sirable to throttle/stop

Comments	Comments / Reference: From SO23-12-10, Attachment SF-5 Revision # 3						
	NUCLEAR ORGANIZATIONEMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTIONSO23-12-10ISS 2UNITS 2 AND 3REVISION 3PAGE 33 OF 100ATTACHMENT SF-5						
	SAFE	TY FUNCTION STA	TUS CHECK				
	EXCESS STEAM DEMAND EVENT						
1. VERIF – sati	 VERIFY at least one Safety Function Acceptance Criteria for each Safety Function satisfied at intervals of less than 15 minutes. 						
2. IFany	/ Safety Function Criterion	– NOT satisfied,					
THEN	l immediately inform SRO-i	n-charge.					
	SAFETY FUNCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA NOT MET						
1 Read	tivity Control						
a. F	Reactor Power:		RE-EVALUATE event per, Attac RECOVERY DIAGNOSTIC.	hment SF-1,			
1	I) Lowering	r					
C	OR	•	 IF re-evaluation identifies at NOT Excess Steam Deman 				
2	2) Lessthan 10 ^{- 4} %		THEN GO TO identified EO	1.			
	AND	•	• IF re-evaluation identifies:				
	 stable or lowering. 		a) Excess Steam Demand	d Event			
b. N	Maximum of one full length - NOT fully inserted.	CEA	OR				
	DR		b) More than one event,				
E	Boration in progress - at greater than or equal	to 40 GPM	THEN GO TO SO23-12-9, i RECOVERY	RUNCTIONAL			
	DR		AND				
S	Shutdown Margin establish - greater than 5.15% ∆ KA	ed <	INITIATE SO23-12-9, Attac RECOVERY – REACTIVIT	hment FR-1, Y CONTROL.			
<u> </u>							

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		1
	Group #		1
	K/A #	E02 I	EA2.2
	Importance Rating		4.0

<u>Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery</u>: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Reactor Trip Recovery: Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments. Proposed Question: SRO 77

Given the following conditions:

- A Reactor trip has occurred on Unit 3.
- A transition to SO23-12-2, Reactor Trip Recovery has been completed.
- All four Reactor Coolant Pumps are running.

Subsequently:

- Pressurizer Pressure is 1870 psia and slowly lowering with all heaters energized.
- Pressurizer level is 30% and slowly lowering with all Charging Pumps operating.
- Containment sump level is rising.
- Steam Generator E088 Blowdown Radiation monitor shows a rising trend.
- Reactor Coolant System T_{COLD} is 520°F and stable.
- Reactor Coolant System T_{HOT} is 522°F and stable.

В

Which ONE (1) of the following identifies the action that should be taken in this situation?

- A. Enter SO23-12-04, Steam Generator Tube Rupture and isolate Steam Generator E088.
- B. Re-diagnose the event per SO23-12-10 Safety Function Status Checks, Attachment SF-1, Recovery Diagnostics and enter the identified EOI.
- C. Enter SO23-12-03, Loss of Coolant Accident and initiate SIAS and CIAS.
- D. Enter SO23-12-09, Functional Recovery and isolate Steam Generator E088.

Proposed Answer:

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because an indication of secondary activity is present, however, there is also leakage into Containment indicated and re-diagnosis is required.
- B. Correct. The SFSCs of Reactor Trip Recovery for Pressurizer level and pressure and secondary activity are not met and re-diagnosis is specified.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because of RCS pressure and temperature and Containment sump level rise, however, there is also secondary activity indicated and re-diagnosis is required.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because there are indications of more than one event, however, confirmation via the re-diagnosis process is required.

Technical Reference(s) SO23-12-10, Ste	ps 2, 4, and 7	Attached w/ Revision # S Comments / Reference	ee
Proposed references to	be provided during e	examination: <u>N</u>	lone	
Learning Objective: 54780	-	n and direct and	ons to select the appropriate Emergenc coordinate the activities of shift person t per SO23-12-2.	
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach pare	ənt)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	ו		
Question Cognitive Lev	vel: Memory or Fund Comprehension		ledgeX	
10 CFR Part 55 Conter	nt: 55.41 55.43 _5			

						Γ	
Commen	ts / Reference: From SO		Revision # 3				
	NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY OPERATING UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 3 ATTACHMENT SF-2					I-12-10 ISS 2 E7 OF 100	
	SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK						
	REACTOR TRIP RECOVERY						
<u>SAFET</u>	SAFETY FUNCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA NOT MET					<u>MET</u>	
3 R(CS Inventory Control						
a.	PZR level:				TE event per, Atta DIAGNOSTIC.	chment SF-1,	
	– between 10% and 70%		 IF re-evaluation ident NOT uncomplicated F 				
	AND						
	 trending to between 309 	% and 60%		THEN G	OTO identified E	01.	
b.	Core Exit Saturation Margi — greater than or equal to			 IF re-evaluation 	aluation identifies:		
	QSPDS page 611		a) Uncompli		Uncomplicated R	eactor Trip	
	CFMS page 311.			OR			
C.	Reactor Vessel level — greater than or equal to	48% (Head):		b)	More than one ev	ent,	
	QSPDS page 622			THEN G <i>RE</i> COV	ю то <i>SO23-12-9,</i> Еву	RUNCTIONAL	
	CFMS page 312						
	Attachment SF-10.			AND			
					E SO23-12-9, Atta ERY – RCS INVEľ OL.		

Comments / Reference: From SO23-12-10, Step 4 Revision # 3				
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3				
SAFE	TY FUNCTION STAT	JS CHECK		
RE	ACTOR TRIP REC	OVERY		
SAFETY FUNCTION ACCEPTANC		EPTANCE CRITERIA NOT N	<u>NET</u>	
4 RCS Pressure Control				
a. PZR pressure (NR and WF – between 1740 PSIA and	R) • RE 3 2380 PSIA RE	SEVALUATE event per, Atta ECOVERY DIAGNOSTIC.	chment SF-1,	
AND	•	IF re-evaluation identifies a		
 trending between 2025 PSIA and 2275 PS 	SIA	NOT uncomplicated React	1.	
b. Core Exit Saturation Margi – between 20°F and 160°	n •	IF re-evaluation identifies:		
QSPDS page 611		a) Uncomplicated Re	eactor Trip	
CFMS page 311.		OR		
		b) More than one ev	ent,	
		THEN GO TO SO23-12-9, RECOVERY	RUNCTIONAL	
		AND		
		INITIATE SO23-12-9, Attac RECOVERY – RCS PRES CONTROL.		
Comments / Reference: From SC	023-12-10, Step 7		Revision # 3	

NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3	EMERGENCY C REVISION 3 ATTACHMENT	DPERATING INSTRUCTION SO23-12-10 ISS 2 PAGE 11 OF 100 SF-2				
SAF	ETY FUNCTION	STATUS CHECK				
REACTOR TRIP RECOVERY						
SAFETY FUNCTION ACCEPTAN	<u>CE CRITERIA</u>	ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA NOT MET				
7 Containment Isolation						
a. Containment pressure – less than 1.5 PSIG.		 RE-EVALUATE event per, Attachment SF-1, RECOVERY DIAGNOSTIC. 				
b. Containment Area Radia – NOT alarming or trend		 IF re-evaluation identifies another event, NOT uncomplicated Reactor Trip, 				
		 THEN GO TO identified EOI. IF re-evaluation identifies: a) Uncomplicated Reactor Trip 				
c. Secondary Radiation Mo – NOT alarming or trend		OR				
	Ejector, WRGM. Ejector	b) More than one event,				
R6759 EC R7874A/R7875A EC	188 Blowdown	THEN GO TO SO23-12-9, FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY				
R7874B/R7875B EC		AND				
		INITIATE SO23-12-9, Attachment FR-6, RECOVERY – CONTAINMENT ISOLATION.				

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		1
	Group #		1
	K/A #	015/17	G 2.1.20
	Importance Rating		4.6

<u>RCP Malfunctions</u>: Conduct of Operations: Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps Proposed Question: SRO 78

Given the following conditions while in MODE 1:

- Annunciator 50A51 VIBRATION AND LOOSE PARTS MONITORING SYSTEM TROUBLE is in alarm due to Reactor Coolant Pump P-004 vibration.
- Containment Sump inlet flow indicates 1.1 gpm.
- Charging and Letdown flow mismatch has risen by about 1 gpm.
- Reactor Coolant Pump P-004 Seal Cavity pressures are all normal.
- Reactor Coolant Pump P-004 Controlled Bleedoff flow is 1.5 gpm.
- All other seal parameters are normal.
- Reactor Coolant System Inventory Balance identified the leakage as 1.2 gpm.
- A Containment entry has identified leakage via a crack in the RCP casing.

Which ONE (1) of the following identifies the type of leakage and the action(s) required?

- A. This is UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE greater than 1 gpm and must be corrected or the plant taken to COLD SHUTDOWN.
- B. This is IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE less than 10 gpm and continued operation is allowed with no restrictions.
- C. This is PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE and the Unit must be placed in MODE 5.
- D. This is leakage from a known source that has been specifically located and does not interfere with leakage detection systems. Establish controls to monitor for changes in the leakage rate.

Proposed Answer: C

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that due to the location this would not be PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE (PBL), however, pump casing leaks are unisolable from the RCS and meet the requirement for PBL.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that this was considered UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE based on being visually identified and not interfering with the leakage detection systems; however, this is PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE which is not allowed in any quantity.
- C. Correct. This is PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE and the Unit must be placed in MODE 5.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because this particular criterion is used in the Tech Specs to differentiate IDENTIFIED and UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE, however, no PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE is allowed.

Technical Reference(s)	Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO23-13-6, Step 3	Comments / Reference
	SD-SO23-360, Figures I-13 & I-17A	
	Technical Specification Definitions	


Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

Learning Objective: 56649 Given plant and equipment conditions, or Technical Specification/LCS surveillance results, DETERMINE system or equipment OPERABILITY and LCO(s) impacted along with all required actions and surveillances using SONGS procedures, Technical Specifications and Licensee Controlled Specifications (LCS).

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	mental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.43 2		

Comments / Reference: From Technical Specification LCO 3.4.13				Amendment # 204	
3.4	3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)				
3.4.1	3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE				
100					
100	LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to: a. No pressure boundary LEAKAGE;				
	 b. 1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE; 				
			n identified LEAKAGE; and		I
			illons per day primary to secondary I	LEAKAGE thmu	ah l
		any on	e Steam Generator (SG).		
APF	LICABILITY:	MODES 1,2	2, 3, and 4.		
ACT	ACTIONS				
	CONDI	TION	REQUIRED ACTION		DN
Α.	than pressu LEAKAGE (not within asons other ire boundary or primary to	A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to within limits.	4 hours	
	secondary LEAKAGÉ.				
В.	 B. Required Action and associated Completion 		B.1 Be in MODE 3.	6 hours	
	Time of Cor met.	nditio'n A not		0.0 h a una	
			B.2 Be in MODE 5.	36 hours	
	Pressure bo				
	Pressure bo				

Comments / Reference: From SO23-13-6, Step	3		Revision # 5
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION ABNORMAL OPER UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 5	ATING IN		-13-6 5 OF 10
REACTOR COOLANT PU	1P SEAL	FAILURE	
OPERATOR A	CTIONS		
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE		RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED	
3 Subsequent Diagnosis/actions:			
	_		
NOT	_		
<u>If</u> there is no indicated CBO flow, <u>and</u> Va other seal parameters are trending normal CBO flow is blowing into Containment. (To	ly, then	the vapor seal has fai	, <u>but</u> led and
□a. PERFORM SO23-3-3.37 to determine leakage into Containment.		1	
□b. VERIFY CBO leakage into Containment - ≤ 10 gpm.	□_b. ∎>	TRIP the RX.	
contarnment - <u>s</u> ro gpm.		 5 seconds after CEA bottom lights are illuminated, TRIP th affected RCP(s). 	
		2) GO TO SO23-12-1.	
□c. VERIFY CBO leakage into Containment - ≤ 4 gpm.	🗆 с.	INITIATE a controlled P Shutdown per S023-5-1.7	
		 AFTER Reactor is tra AND CEAs have been inserted 5 seconds, 	ipped,
		THEN SECURE the affe RCP(s).	ected
☐d. EVALUATE with Management the need to make a Containment entry to locate leak.			



comments / Reference: From Technical Specification Definitions Amendm			
measurement, response time may be verified for selected components provided that the components and methodology for verification have been previously reviewed and approved by the NRC.			
LEAKAGE shall be:			
a. <u>Identified LEAKAGE</u>			
 LEAKAGE, such as that from valve packing (except read (RCP) leakoff), that is ca conducted to collection sy or collecting tank; 	ctor coolant pump aptured and		
 LEAKAGE into the containme from sources that are both located and known either r with the operation of leak systems or not to be press LEAKAGE; or 	n specifically not to interfere (age detection		
3. Reactor Coolant System (R0 through a steam generator System (primary to seconda	to the Secondary		
b. <u>Unidentified LEAKAGE</u>			
All LEAKAGE that is not ident	ified LEAKAGE.		
c. <u>Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE</u>			
LEAKAGE (except primary to se through a nonisolable fault i component body, pipe wall, or	n an RCS		
	 measurement, response time may be selected components provided that and methodology for verification previously reviewed and approved LEAKAGE shall be: a. <u>Identified LEAKAGE</u> 1. LEAKAGE, such as that from valve packing (except read (RCP) leakoff), that is calconducted to collection s; or collecting tank; 2. LEAKAGE into the containment from sources that are both located and known either n with the operation of leak systems or not to be press LEAKAGE; or 3. Reactor Coolant System (RAGE) a steam generator System (primary to second) b. <u>Unidentified LEAKAGE</u> All LEAKAGE that is not ident c. <u>Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE</u> LEAKAGE (except primary to se through a nonisolable fault i 		

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		1
	Group #		1
	K/A #	009 G	2.2.37
	Importance Rating		4.6

<u>Small Break LOCA</u>: Equipment Control: Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment Proposed Question: SRO 79

Given the following conditions:

- A Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident is in progress on Unit 2.
- A total loss of Component Cooling Water has occurred on Unit 2.
- The Recirculation Actuation Signal will actuate in 5 minutes.
- Bus 2A04 has tripped and locked out due to a bus fault.
- High Pressure Safety Injection Pump P-018 is running on Train B.
- Actions of SO23-12-3, Loss of Coolant Accident are in progress.
- Steam Generator levels are being maintained by Auxiliary Feedwater.

Which ONE (1) of the following actions must be taken to mitigate the situation?

- A. Remain in SO23-12-3, Loss of Coolant Accident and cross-connect Unit 2 Component Cooling Water with Unit 3 per SO23-13-7, Loss of Component Cooling Water and invoke 10CFR50.54.X.
- B. Start Train B P-019, HPSI Pump following the Recirculation Actuation Signal in order to provide additional flow and transition to SO23-12-9, Functional Recovery, Attachment FR-5, Recovery - Heat Removal if HPSI Pump performance becomes unstable.
- C. Transition to SO23-12-9, Functional Recovery, Attachment FR-5, Recovery Heat Removal and perform SO23-12-11, EOI Supporting Attachments, Attachment 23, Cross-Connecting Class 1E 480V Buses Between Units.
- D. Perform actions of SO23-12-11, EOI Supporting Attachments, Attachment 14, RAS Operations to raise RWST level in order to flood Containment above the 23' (foot) level to improve Net Positive Suction Head to the operating HPSI Pump.

Proposed Answer: A

- A. Correct. Given the conditions listed, remaining in SO23-12-3 is appropriate and cross connecting CCW places the Unit in a 50.54.X notification.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because the pump is available (P-018, the 3rd of a kind Pump will start on an SIAS, therefore, P-019 is available) and might be considered, however, according to Step 5 EOI Bases, it will only increase flow marginally, if at all, and one operating train is sufficient at his time. Transitioning to the FR is plausible as this is the RNO action in Floating Step 22 if HPSI Pump flow becomes unstable.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that the FR is the procedure required for this condition, however, one Train is all that is required given the conditions listed.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because refilling the RWST would be a desired action given the loss of CCW and raising level does improve HPSI Pump NPSH, however, flooding above the 22'5" level will impact the Emergency Cooling Unit ductwork and could complicate the loss of CCW that already exists.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-12-3, Step 5		Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO23-14-3, Step 5 E	Bases	Comments / Reference
	SO23-12-11, FS-22		
	SO23-13-7, Attachm	ent 4	
	SO23-12-11, Attachr	ment 14	
Proposed references to	be provided during exa	mination: <u>None</u>	
	TATE the major recove	•	
Д	VAULATE Component Administrative and Tech ction, if any, is required	nical Specification r	em conditions against equirements and determine what
Question Source:	Bank #	129077	_
	Modified Bank #		(Note changes or attach parent)
	New		_
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	SONGS 2008	
Question Cognitive Leve	I: Memory or Fundam	nental Knowledge	
-	Comprehension or	Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content	55.41		
	55.43 2, 5		

Comments / Reference: From SO23-12-3, Ste	o 5	Revision # 20								
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 20	NUCLEAR ORGANIZATIONEMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS023-12-3UNITS 2 AND 3REVISION 20PAGE 5 OF 23									
LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT										
OPERATOR	OPERATOR ACTIONS									
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE <u>RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED</u>									
5 ESTABLISH Optimum SI Alignment:										
a. ESTABLISH two train operation:	a.									
 All available Charging Pumps operating. 		to direct plant resources to establish the following support systems for non-operating/ unavailable equipment:								
 One HPSI and one LPSI per train operating. 		1) Electrical power to pumps and valves.								
 3) All Cold Leg flow paths – aligned. 		2) Proper system alignment.								
4) VERIFY SI flow required:		3) CCW flow.								
SI flow - indicated		4) HVAC.								
OR										
RCS pressure — greater than 1250 PSIA										
OR										
 VERIFYFS-7, VERIFY SI Throttle/Stop Criteria – satisfied. 										

Comments / Reference: From SC	023-14-3, Step 5 Bases	Revision # 8
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3		SO23-14-3 PAGE 17 OF 55
LOSS OF COOLANT AC	CIDENT BASES AND DEVIATIONS JUSTIF	FICATION
	EOI STEP BASES	
4.0 BASES DESCRIPTION (Cont	inued)	
4.4.5 STEP 5 E STABLISH	Optimum SI Alignment	
That is, SI flow should be in given RCS pressure can be SO23-12-11, EOI Supporti trains of SI, but only one tra Therefore, it may be optime operation delivering flow in (one SI pump running with 4.4.5 STEP 5 ESTABLISH O The addition of a second H injection will increase flow of flow due to the second pum none at all. Starting the sec redundant train of HPSI ¹ . I flow evenly due to difference This is particularly important flow from the other pump.	ensure that SI flow is within the limits of the des n accordance with the SI delivery curves. Requi e found in SO23-12-10, Safety Function Status (ing Attachments. The SI system design provides ain operation is necessary to meet the intent of t um for RCS inventory recovery purposes to have accordance with the two pump curve, but one tr flow in accordance with the one pump curve) is Optimum SI Alignment (Continued) PSI pump (third-of-a-kind or standby) to one trai only 35-40% of the single pump's run-out flow. T np, at the lower end of single pump operation, wi cond HPSI pump on one train will not make up for n addition, two pumps operating in parallel will no ces in the installed impellers; the higher head pump it at lower flows where the higher head pump ca	ired SI flow for Checks and s two redundant the this step. e two SI trains in rain in operation acceptable. The increase in ill be minimal or for the loss of the normally not split mp will dominate. in effectively stop
made available to provide a	additional water to satisfy RCS inventory control	sooner.
with the highest head pump and foll	form a generic curve for the two in parallel, you alway ow that curve out un til its head drops to the shutoffha n e additive. Gary Johnson, Em ail dated 7/10/98, Subj	ead of the other

Comments / Reference: From SO23-13-7, Attachment 4 Revision #13 NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3 ABNORMAL OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 13 S023-13-7 PAGE 46 OF 110 ATTACHMENT 4 SUPPLYING UNIT 2 CCW SYSTEM FROM UNIT 3 TRAIN A CCW SYSTEM CONTINUOUS USE OBJECTIVE Supply the Unit 2 CCW System from the Unit 3 CCW System by cross connecting through the Radwaste CCW Supply and Return Headers when Unit 2 is in Mode 5 or 6. This attachment would only be used when Unit 2 has lost all Saltwater Cooling or Component Cooling Water. This attachment invokes 10CFR50.54.X on Unit 2 only. GUIDELINES During the use of this Attachment, Unit 3 remains within its design and licensing basis analysis. The CCW Train being used to supply Unit 2 remains Operable. Therefore, it is not necessary to invoke 10CFR50.54.X on Unit 3. (AR 001001740) 1. In order to provide miniflow protection for the CCW Pump in the event that the Noncritical Loop is lost, CCW flow to the Unit 3 Emergency Cooling Units on the Train supplying Unit 2 should be maintained. 2、 3. Train A, Train B, and 55 Lock keys are required. CCW to the Emergency Chiller for the Train that will supply Unit 2 is isolated by this Attachment. This places Unit 3 in a 14 day action 4. statement.

Comme	nts /	Reference: From S	023-12-11, FS	-22			Revision # 6
NUCLE UNITS :		DRGANIZATION D 3	EMERGENCY REVISION 6 ATTACHMENT		RAT	ING INSTRUCTION SO23-1 PAGE (2-11 ISS 2 51 OF 278
		EO	SUPPORTING	AT	FACI	HMENTS	
			FLOATING	s s'	ГЕР	S	
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED							
FS-22		NITOR ECCS Pump(s	s) Suction After				
Ар	RA plical	S bility: □12-3, □12-3	9				
a.	VE	RIFY RAS – actuated	l.	a.	GO	TO next applicable floating s	tep.
b.		RIFY ECCS Pump(s) s formance:	suction	b.	1)	OVERRIDE and STOP both Containment Spray Pumps.	
	1)	Operating ECCS Pun – stable.	np(s) flow		2)	OVERRIDE and CLOSE bot Containment Spray Pump D Valves.	
	2)	Operating ECCS Pun pressure – stable.	np(s) discharge		3)	IF HPSI Pump performance	– unstable,
	21		an(a) matar			THEN	
	3)	Operating ECCS Pun amps – stable.	np(s) motor			a) In Cold Leg Injection mo – THROTTLE SI flow t requirements of Atta- MINIMUM REQUIRE FLOWRATES DURII LEG INJECTION.	o minimum chment 12, ED SI
						OR	
						 b) In Hot/Cold Leg Injectio THROTTLE HPSI flo minimum requireme Attachment 13, MINI REQUIRED HPSI FL DURING HOT / COL INJECTION 	w to ntsof MUM .OVVRATES
					4)	IF HPSI Pump performance	– unstable,
						THEN STOP HPSI Pump.	
					5)	NOTIFY SRO-in-charge.	
					6)	GO TO SO23-12-9, FUNCT RECOVERY	IONAL
						AND INITIATE SO23-12-9, Attachment FR-5, RECOVE REMOVAL.	RY – HEAT

Comments / Reference: From SO23-12	-11, Attachm	ent 14		Revision # 6
UNITS2AND3 REVIS		ATING INSTR	RUCTION SO23-12 PAGE 1	2-11 ISS 2 61 OF 278
EOI SUPPO	RTING ATTA	ACHMENTS		
RAS	S OPERATI	ION		
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	Ē	RESPONSE N	<u>OT OBTAINED</u>	
	NOTE			
Filling the Containment sump improv level below 22'5" prevents flooding th	ves the NPSH he ECU ductwo	of the remaini ork.	ng HPSI Pump and	d filling to a
4 EVALUATE RWST Isolation:				
a. VERIFY Containment Sump level – greater than 22 feet.	a. <i>'</i>	Leader ev the source MONITOF maintain F	T Shift Manager/Op aluate makeup to F of water selected R RWST Level, step RWST level: m 20% and 40%.	RWST using in FS-20,
	2		makeup to the RVV y the Shift Manage	
	3		ontainment Sump le than 22 feet,	evel
		THEN CLI valves:	OSE RWST Outlet	Isolation
		HV-9(HV-9(
	1	4) GOTOsti	ep 5.	
b. CLOSE RWST Outlet Isolation valv	ves:			
HV-9300 HV-9301.				

	SRO
• #	1
up #	1
# 025 AA	2.07
ortance Rating	3.7
ļ	up #

Loss of RHR System: Ability to determine the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: Pump cavitation

Proposed Question: SRO 80

Given the following conditions:

- The Reactor Coolant System is in a Midloop Condition with RCS level lowering.
- Train A Shutdown Cooling Pump is oscillating ± 12 amps.

Which ONE (1) of the following identifies the desired action(s) for the conditions listed?

- A. Vent the Train B Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger and start the Train B Shutdown Cooling Pump per SO23-3-2.6, Shutdown Cooling System Operation.
- B. Vent the Train A Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger and throttle flow through Train B Shutdown Cooling Pump per SO23-3-2.6, Shutdown Cooling System Operation.
- C. Commence emergency refill of the RCS by starting any HPSI Pump and open two Cold Leg Injection Valves per SO23-13-15, Loss of Shutdown Cooling.
- D. Start any available Containment Spray Pump aligned as a Shutdown Cooling Pump per SO23-13-15, Loss of Shutdown Cooling.

Proposed Answer: C

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because the Train A Shutdown Cooling Pump is cavitating and this action would be desired if the RCS were not in a Reduced Inventory Condition, however, venting the Train B SDC Heat Exchanger with the Train A SDC Pump running could worsen the condition.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because vortexing probably is occurring which is causing the Shutdown Cooling Pump to cavitate, however, in this condition emergency refill of the RCS is required.
- C. Correct. Shutdown Cooling Pump cavitation is identified by an amperage fluctuation of ± 10 amps. With the Reactor Coolant System in a Reduced Inventory Condition emergency refill of the RCS must be performed and the desired flowpath is via a HPSI Pump and Hot or Cold Leg Injection Valves.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because the RNO action for emergency refill of the RCS requests that a Containment Spray Pump be started, however, the CS Pump must be aligned to the RWST in order to refill the RCS.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-13-15, Steps	4h & 4j	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO23-3-2.6, L&S 7.	4 and 7.6	Comments / Reference
	SO23-13-15, Attach	ment 10	
Proposed references to	be provided during exa	mination: <u>None</u>	
Q	As the SRO, DIRECT o SO23-13-15.	perator response t	to a loss of shutdown cooling per
	Per the Loss of Shutdov basis for each step, cau	01	ure, SO23-13-15, DESCRIBE: The
Question Source:	Bank #		
	Modified Bank #		(Note changes or attach parent)
	New	Х	
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Lev	el: Memory or Fundar	mental Knowledge	
	Comprehension or	Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Conten	t: 55.41		
	55.43 5		

LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING									
OPERATOR ACTIONS									

omments	/ Re	ference: From S	SO23-13-15, Step	4j			Revision # 18
NUCLEAR (JNITS 2)			ABNORMAL OPERATI REVISION 18	ING IN	ISTRU		-13-15 8 OF 78
			LOSS OF SHUTDOWN	COOL	ING		
			OPERATOR ACT	IONS			
<u>AC</u>	TION/	EXPECTED RESPON	<u>ISE</u>		<u>res</u>	PONSE NOT OBTAINED	
4 RE ((Co	COYER ontin	RCS Inventory: ued)	:				
∐i.	emer All)UNCE "Commenci rgency refill c personnel star openings."	of the RCS.				
j.		RT operable or [Pump、	available	j.		START the AVAILABL Pump aligned from RWST [9]	
	1)	ENSURE select does not bypa	ss the RX			AND	
		Core through leaks.	known			THROTTLE OPEN Disc Valve to establish	
	2) □	ESTABLISH flo throttling OP				less than 1000 gpn (FI-0338/FI-0348).	N
	_	Leg Injection				• P-012: S2(3)120	6MU012
		<u>0R</u>				• P-013: S2(3)120	6MU014
		<u>If</u> location o loss is unkno				OR	
		identified as Breach, <u>then</u> FLOW thru one injection val	a Cold Leg DIRECT Hot Leg			If CS Pump(s) not available, then Sl available Charging Pump(s) from a boi source. (Tech. Spe LCO B 3.1.10)] ^ated
□ k.	CONS	inventory avail SIDER dumping a ilable SITs to	11				

omme	ents / F	Reference: From	SO23-3-2.6, L&S 7.4 and 7.6		Revision # 26	
	LEAR O S 2 ANI	RGANIZATION 03	OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 26 ATTACHMENT 16	S023-3-2.6 PAGE 131		
7.0	RCS	Reduced Invento	ry Condition			
	7.1	LIMIT: While the RCS temperature	RCS is in a Reduced Inventory Cond will not exceed 148°F. (Ref. 2.2.6)	lition, the maximum	allowed	
		7.1.1 RCS < 120	temperature should be maintained at "F) to maximize the Time-to-Boil mar	less than 140°F (pi rgin.	referably	
	7.2 To prevent vortexing and air entrapment in the SDCS piping, RCS level should be maintained ≥ 17 inches on 2(3)LI-1520N, RWLI and/or DLMS.					
	7.3		in Midloop Condition, excessive venti xtion due to vortexing in the RCS Hot		ause loss	
	7.4	and any other act	itation develops (current swings of ±1 ivities affecting RCS level should be s SO23-13-15, Loss of Shutdown Cooli	stopped, <u>and r</u> ecove	S venting ery actions	
	7.5	<u>If</u> SDC flow is lost while in a Midloop Condition, <u>then</u> the onlyvalid Reactor Core temperature indications are the operable CETs and HJTCs.				
	7.6	During SDC operation in a RIC, or when the RCS is depressurized, small amounts of gas trapped between HPSI cold leg flow indicating orifices and the upstream isolation valves can give rise to oscillating indications of HPSI flow. These indications are expected on the HPSI header associated with the SDC flow path and are characterized by:				
		 Oscillation period of a few seconds or less Oscillation magnitude of 100 gpm or less 				
When these conditions are present, the flow oscillations cannot be corrected by I&C and venting of the affected section of piping is generally not possible. No action besides monitoring is required.					ed by I&C action	

omments / Reference	e: From SO2	3-13-15, Atta	achment 10)		Revision # '			
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3	ICLEAR ORGANIZATION ABNORMAL OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-13-15 IITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 18 PAGE 71 OF 78 ATTACHMENT 10								
RCS LEVEL CORRELATION CHART									
REFERENCE	REFERENCE RWLI/DLMS RWST PZR HJTC ABOVE P WR LEVEL LEVEL [1] FUEL E								
Refueling Level	+23.50'	95、1%	39.5%		434.5"	61'0"			
PZR On Scale	+12.27'	59.5%	0%		297、5"	49'7"			
RV Head Upper Pen. Overflow	+7.00'	43、6%			236.5"	44'6"			
RV Head Middle	+3.375'	32、3%		# 1	193"	40'10.5"			
Ref. Information	+1.833'	27、5%	RWLI-WR SIGHT		174.5"	39'.4"			
Above Flange	+0.790'	24、3%	GLASS	# 2	162"	38'3.5"			
Vessel Flange	0.000'	21、8%	0.000'		152.5"	37'6"			
Below Flange	-0.500'	20、2%	-0.500'		146.5"	37'0"			
RV HJTC	-1.790'	16.2%	-1.790'	#3	131.0"	35'8.5"			
RCP Vent Overflow	-2.000'	15.6%	-2.000'		128.5"	35'6"			
Ref. Information	-2.167'	15.1%	-2.167'		126.5"	35'4"			
RV HJTC	-2.875'	12.9%	-2.875'	# 4	118.0"	34'7.5"			
RIC and RCP Seal Overflow	-3.000'	12.5%	-3.000'		116.5"	34'6"			
Above Hot Leg	-3.767'	10.1%	-3.767'.		107.3"	33'8.8"			
S/G Manway Ovfl.	-3.850'	9、8%	-3.850'		106.3"	33'7.8"			
REFERENCE	RWLI/DLMS WR	RWLI/DLMS NR	WR SIGHT GLASS	НЈТС [1]	ABOVE FUEL	PLANT ELEV.			
<i>MIDLOOP COND</i> Top of Hot Leg	-4.875'	42" S I	-4.875'	# 5	94"	32'7.5"			
RCP Casing Flange	-4.958'	41" Å	-4.958'		93"	32'6.5"			
Ref. Information	-5.292'	37" G	-5.292'		89"	32'2.5"			
NORMAL LEVEL	-5.375'	36" L	-5.375'		88"	32'1.5"			
Ref. Information	-5.542'	34" S	-5.542'		86"	31'11.5"			
<u> </u>		NDITION CONT		EXT DAGE		↓			

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		1
	Group #		1
	K/A #	011 G	2.2.42
	Importance Rating		4.6

Large Break LOCA: Equipment Control: Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications

Proposed Question: SRO 81

Given the following conditions on Unit 2 three (3) hours after a Large Break LOCA:

- Chemistry reports the following sampling results just prior to a Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident:
 - Safety Injection Tank T-007 boron concentration 2360 ppm.
 - Safety Injection Tank T-008 boron concentration 2540 ppm.
 - Safety Injection Tank T-009 boron concentration 2740 ppm.
 - Safety Injection Tank T-010 boron concentration 2380 ppm.
 - Refueling Water Storage Tank boron concentration 2875 ppm.
 - Reactor Coolant System pH is 7.2.

Based on the sample results, which ONE (1) of the following describes the impact of the Chemistry results and actions post-accident to remedy this condition?

- A. Safety Injection Tank T-009 boron concentration is out of specification high. Containment Sump pH will result in accelerated corrosion of metals and production of hydrogen gas. Make preparations to purge hydrogen per SO23-1-4.2, Containment Purge and Recirculation Filtration System.
- B. Combined Sump water boron concentration will be out of specification low causing an increased chance of return to criticality. Monitor the Reactivity Critical Safety Function and initiate SO23-12-9, Functional Recovery, FR-1, Recovery - Reactivity Control actions.
- C. Safety Injection Tanks T-007 and T-010 boron concentrations are out of specification low causing an increased chance of return to criticality. Monitor the Reactivity Critical Safety Function and initiate SO23-12-9, Functional Recovery, FR-1, Recovery - Reactivity Control actions.
- D. Refueling Water Storage Tank boron concentration is out of specification high. The amount of boron in the sump post-LOCA will cause early precipitation of boron on the core surfaces. Consider performing SO23-12-11, EOI Supporting Attachments, Attachment 11, Simultaneous Hot / Cold Leg Injection.

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that this SIT boron was too high. High boron concentration will affect the sump pH. This is the required procedure if a Containment Purge is necessary.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that this SIT boron was too low if confused with the low limit for RWST boron of 2350 ppm. If boron was low the effects would be correct and the actions appropriate.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that these SITs boron were too low if confused with the low limit for RWST boron of 2350 ppm. If boron was low the effects would be correct and the actions appropriate.
- D. Correct. The boron limit is 2800 ppm and could result in boron precipitation on the core earlier than expected on a large break LOCA. Early initiation of Simultaneous Hot / Cold Leg Injection would be a consideration.

Technical Reference(s)	Technical Specification LCO 3.5.4 Bases		Attached w/ Revision # See
	Technical Specifi	cation SR 3.5.4.3	Comments / Reference
	Technical Specifi	cation SR 3.5.1.4	
Proposed references to be	e provided during e	examination: <u>None</u>	
•		nt methods of recovery th y Operating Instruction (E	at are unique to the Functional EOI).
Question Source:	Bank #		
	Modified Bank #		(Note changes or attach parent)
	New	Х	
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	۱	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fund Comprehension	damental Knowledge	X
	Comprehension		<u></u>
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41		
	55.43 2, 5		

Com	ments / Reference: From Technical Specification LCO 3.5.4 Bases	Amendment # 127
Thi	s LCO ensures that	
a.	The RWST contains sufficient borated water to support the ECCS during the injection phase;	
b.	Sufficient water volume exists in the CES to support continued operation of the ESF pumps at the time of transfer to the recirculation mode of cooling; and	
C.	The reactor remains subcritical following a LOCA.	
co mo reo pre ca	ufficient water inventory in the RWST could result in insufficient bling capacity of the ECCS when the transfer to the recirculation de occurs. Improper boron concentrations could result in a luction of shutdown margin (SDM) or excessive boric acid cipitation in the core following a LOCA, as well as excessive ustic stress corrosion of mechanical components and systems ide containment.	
Com	ments / Reference: From Technical Specification LCO 3.5.4 Bases	Amendment # 127
e: fo bi th C	the 2350 ppm limit for minimum boron concentration was stablished to ensure that, following a LOCA with a minimum level the RWST, the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition llowing mixing of the RWST and RCS water volumes. Small eak LOCAs assume that all control rods are inserted, except for e control element assembly (CEA) of highest worth, which is ithdrawn from the core. Large break LOCAs assume that all EAs remain withdrawn from the core. The most limiting case cours at beginning of core life.	
bi Ve ni th to pi co fic pi co th B	he maximum boron limit of 2800 ppm in the RWST is based on boron precipitation in the core following a LOCA. With the reactor essel at saturated conditions, the core dissipates heat by pool ucleate boiling. Because of this boiling phenomenon in the core, e boric acid concentration will increase in this region. If allowed proceed in this manner, a point will be reached where boron ecipitation will occur in the core. Post LOCA emergency ocedures direct the operator to establish simultaneous hot and old leg injection to prevent this condition by establishing a forced by path through the core regardless of break location. These ocedures are based on the minimum time in which precipitation build occur, assuming that maximum boron concentrations exist in e borated water sources used for injection following a LOCA. bron concentrations in the RWST in excess of the limit could esult in precipitation earlier than assumed in the analysis.	

omme	ents / Refe	1	Amendment # 127	
SR	3.5.4.1	Only required to be performed when ambient air temperature is < 40°F or > 100°F. Verify RWST borated water temperature is ≥ 40°F and ≤ 100°F.	24 hours	
SR	3.5.4.2	Verify RWST borated water volume is ≥ 362,800 gallons above the ECCS suction connection.	7 days	
SR	3.5.4.3	Verify RWST boron concentration is ≥ 2350 ppm and ≤ 2800 ppm.	7 days	

Comments / Re	ference: From Technical Specification SR 3.5.1.	4	Amendment # 135
SURVEILLANG	E REQUIREMENTS		
	SURVEILLANCE	FREQUENC	Ý
SR 3.5.1.1	Verify each SIT isolation valve is fully open.	12 hours	
SR 3.5.1.2	Verify borated water volume in each SIT is ≥ 1680 cubic feet and ≤ 1807 cubic feet.	12 hours	
SR 3.5.1.3	Verify nitrogen cover pressure in each SIT is ≥ 615 psia and ≤ 655 psia.	12 hours	
SR 3.5.1.4	Verify boron concentration in each SIT is ≥ 2200 ppm and ≤ 2800 ppm.	31 days <u>AND</u> NOTE Only required to be performed to affected SIT Once within 6 hours after each solution volume increase of ≥ 1% of tank volume that is not the result of addition from to refueling water storage tank	se < If he

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		1
	Group #		2
	K/A #	032 A	A2.07
	Importance Rating		3.4
Less of Course Dense NIL Ability to determine and interms	et the following on these englists the Lee	a of Course Dou	n en Nivela en

Loss of Source Range NI: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation: Maximum allowable channel disagreement Proposed Question: SRO 82

Proposed Question: SRU 82

Given the following conditions:

- The Unit is in MODE 2 with a Reactor startup in progress.
- JI-001-2, Log Power Safety Channel has failed low and was placed in BYPASS.
- The remaining three Log Power Safety Channels indicate the following:
 - JI-001-1 reads 5 x 10⁻⁴%.
 - JI-001-3 reads 4 x 10⁻⁵%.
 - JI-001-4 reads 7 x 10⁻⁴%.
- JI-001-4, Log Power Safety Channel has failed low and is INOPERABLE.

Which ONE (1) of the following identifies the required actions?

Place JI-001-4, Log Power Safety Channel in...

- A. TRIP within one (1) hour. The Reactor Startup CANNOT continue until the channel is repaired.
- B. BYPASS within one (1) hour. The Reactor Startup CANNOT continue until the cause of the greater than one-half (½) decade channel deviation between the remaining two channels is corrected.
- C. TRIP or BYPASS within one (1) hour. The Reactor Startup CAN continue as long as the deviation between the two OPERABLE channels is less than one-half (1/2) decade when criticality is achieved.
- D. TRIP or BYPASS within one (1) hour. The Reactor Startup CAN continue and criticality achieved with the remaining two channels deviation as is.

Proposed Answer: A

- A. Correct. Because one channel is already failed and in BYPASS the second channel must be placed in TRIP per Technical Specifications. There are insufficient Log Safety Channels available to continue the startup.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because the failed channel action must occur within one hour, however, the 2nd failed channel must be placed in TRIP. A channel deviation of greater than ½ decade is allowed until the Reactor is critical; however, there are insufficient Log Safety Channels available to continue the startup.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because the guidance contained in SO23-3-3.2, Excore NI Calibration allows a one decade disagreement applies until criticality is achieved, however, the 2nd failed channel must be placed in TRIP.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible if thought that only two channels were required during the startup and that the 2nd failed channel could be placed in TRIP or BYPASS.

Technical Reference(s)			Attached w/ Revision # See
			Comments / Reference
	SO23-3-1.1, Attac	hment 8	
Proposed references to be	e provided during ex	xamination: <u>None</u>	
56649 su LC SC	rveillance results, D O(s) impacted alon	ETERMINE system or g with all required acti	echnical Specification/LCS requipment OPERABILITY and ons and surveillances using ns and Licensee Controlled
Question Source:	Bank # _ Modified Bank # _ New	X	_ (Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Funda Comprehension o	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.43		

Comments / Reference: From Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1				Amendment # 127
3.3.1 Reactor Protective	System (RPS) Instrumentation — Operating		
LCO 3.3.1 Four Fund	RPS trip and tion in Table 3	operating bypass removal char 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.	inels for eac	h
APPLICABILITY: Acco	ording to Table	9.3.1-1.		
1. Separate Conditio		wed for each RPS Function. , continued operation with the c pletion Time specified by Requ le Onsite Review Committee.	hannel in the ired Action A	.2
CONDITION		REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLE	
A. One or more Fu with one automa trip channel inop	itic RPS	Place Channel in bypass or trip.	1 hour	
AND A.2 Restore channel to OPERABLE status. MODE 2 following next MODE 5 entry				
B. One or more Fur with two automat trip channels ino	tic RPS	NOTE LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable. Place one Functional Unit in bypass and the other in trip.	1 hour	

Comments / Reference:	From SO23-3-3.2, Attachment 4	Revision # 14
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3	SURVEILLANCE OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-3-3.2 REVISION 14 PAGE 43 OF ATTACHMENT 4	ISS 2 47
2.0 <u>PROCEDURE</u> (Cont	tinued)	PERF、 BY <u>INITIALS</u>
[2,1,3,5]	If ≥ 5% Reactor Power, then verify operable PPS Linear Power indicators agree within ± 7. (Value obtained by subtracting the lowest reading from the highest reading.)	
[.6]	If < 5% Reactor Power, then verify the following:	
	 All PPS Linear Power indications appear stable and reasonably close in value. Safety Channel green power lights illuminated. Test Panel white trouble lights extinguished. 	
	<u>SAT / UNSAT</u> (Circle one)	
2.1.4	Record Log Power Safety Channel readings. [1]	
	JI-0001-1 JI-0001A3	
	JI-0001-2 JI-0001A4	
[.1]	Modes 1-4: Verify operable Log Power Safety channel indicators agree within ½ decade of each other、 (With the Reactor subcritical, the deviation between channels shall be within 1 decade due to electrical noise.)	
[.2]	Mode 5: Verify operable Log Power Safety channel indicators agree within 1 Decade of	
	each other. <u>SAT / UNSAT</u> (Circle one)	
2.1.5	Record CPC Compensated LPD (Kw/ft) from CPC Point IDs 179、 (Mark Section N/A if in Modes 3-5、) [1]	
	Channel A Channel C	
	Channel B Channel D	
[,1]	Verify all Compensated LPD indications are within 1.0 Kw/ft of each other. SAT / UNSAT (Circle one)	

Comments / Refere	nce: From S	O23-3-1.1, Attachment 8		Revision # 323
NUCLEAR ORGANI UNITS 2 AND 3	S023-3-1 PAGE 47			
	REACTOR S	TARTUP SURVEILLANCE REQUIREM	<u>IENTS</u>	
		CONTINUOUS USE		
OBJECTIVE				
To ensure Technic Tech. Spec. LCO and SR 3.4.2.1.	cal Specificati 3.1.6, LCO 3.	on Surveillance Requirements are met 4.2, LCS Figure 3.1.102-1, SR 3.3.1.7,	in a timely fashiol , SR 3.3.2.2, SR 3	n. 3.3.4.4,
UNIT	DA	TE	TIME	
1.0 <u>PREREQUIS</u>	ITES			PERF. BY INITIALS
1.1 Verify using	y this docume the method (nt is current by checking a controlled c described in SO123-VI-0.9.	opy or by	
2.0 <u>PROCEDUR</u>	E			
shall the R	be Operable: X Trip Breake	4 Excore Logarithmic Power Channels Modes 1-2, and Modes 3-5 with ers (RTCBs) closed and any CEA capal . (Tech. Spec. SR 3.3.1.7 and SR 3.3.	ble	
2.1.1	been ti require	e 3 of 4 Excore Log Safety Channels ha ested and verified Operable within the ed surveillance interval per Tech. Spec. 9.1.7 and SR 3.3.2.2.		
	Verifie	ed By: I&CForeman or GF Date	Time	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:LevelROSROTier #1Group #2K/A #068 G 2.4.41Importance Rating4.6

Control Room Evacuation: Emergency Procedures / Plan: Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications

Proposed Question: SRO 83

Given the following conditions from full power :

- At 1317 both Units 2 and 3 entered SO23-13-2, Shutdown from Outside the Control Room due to a fire with dense smoke inside the Control Room.
- At 1327 Unit 3 reported that Local Control was established.
- At 1329 the Fire Team Leader reported that the fire was out.
- At 1331 Unit 2 reported that Local Control was established.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the required action associated with these conditions?

- A. Notify the NRC within one hour that 10CFR50.54.X was invoked on both Units to establish Local Controls for Train A equipment.
- B. Declare an UNUSUAL EVENT based on a fire threatening vital equipment lasting longer than 10 minutes.
- C. Declare an ALERT based on Control Room evacuation and successfully establishing Local Control for both Units within 15 minutes.
- D. Declare a SITE AREA EMERGENCY based on a fire that required Control Room evacuation.

Proposed Answer: C

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that 50.54.X is invoked for disabling automatic features of safeguards equipment. 50.54.X would be invoked if Train B components were required to be used with Train A.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because the fire lasting longer than 15 minutes would result in an UNUSUAL EVENT.
- C. Correct. Control Room evacuation and successfully establishing local control within 15 minutes is an ALERT.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible if thought that two separate events required declaration of a SITE AREA EMERGENCY if it was determined that HOT SHUTDOWN capability was lost.

Technical Reference(s)	SO123-VIII-1, Attachment 2, Tab D2-4		Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO123-VIII-1, Atta	chment 2, Tab D3-4	Comments / Reference
	SO123-VIII-1, Atta	chment 2, Tab E1-1	
	SO23-13-2, Step 2	Caution (p198)	
Proposed references to b	e provided during ex	amination: <u>SO123-VII</u>	I-1, Attachment 2
U	s the SRO, CLASSIF	0,	equiring Emergency Plan
Question Source:	Bank #		
	Modified Bank #		(Note changes or attach parent)
	New	Х	
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level	: Memory or Funda	amental Knowledge	
	Comprehension c	or Analysis	<u>X</u>
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41		
	55.43 5		

Comments / Referen	ce: From SO123-VII	II-1, Attachment 2, Tab I	D2-4	Revision # 27
NUCLEAR ORGANIZAT	ION	EPIP	S0123-V	
UNITS 1, 2 AND 3		REVISION 27	PAGE 35	0 F 74
	UNITS 2/3 A	ND SITE-WIDE EVENTS	ATTAC	HMENT 2
	LOSS OF S	AFETY EQUIPMENT <u>Alert</u>	т	AB D2
3. For Modes 1	- 4:			
Unplanned lo	ss of most or all C	ontrol Room annunciato	rs with either:	
(a) Alterna availab		n from the Plant Monito	ring System not	t
		<u>OR</u>		
	onditions associate ent 5 are unstable	ed with any of the syst and uncontrolled.	ems listed in	
NOTE: Fo	r loss of annunciat ternate alarm indic	ors with unstable plan ation unavailable, see	t conditions, a Event Code D3-	nd 3.
4. For Modes 1 (a) The Con	- 6: trol Room is evacua	ted		
		AND		
	of shutdown system n panel within 15 m	ns is established local minutes.	ly or at the re	emote
	control of shutdow minutes, see Event	n systems is not estab Code D3-4.	lished in	

С	Comments / Reference: From SO123-VIII-1, Attachment 2, Tab D3-4 Revision # 27							
	NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 1, 2 AND 3	EPIP REVISION 27	S0123-V PAGE 38					
	UNIT	S 2/3 AND SITE-WIDE EVENTS	ATTACH	IMENT 2				
	LOSS	AB D3						
	4. For Modes 1 - 6:							
	(a) The Control Room is	evacuated						
	AND							
		systems has not been establish panel within 15 minutes.	ed locally or	at				

omments / Reference: From SO123-VIII-1, Attachment 2, Tab E1-1				
ICLEAR ORGANIZATIO NITS 1, 2 AND 3	N EPIP REVISION 27	S0123-VIII-1 PAGE 42 OF 74		
	UNITS 2/3 AND SITE-WIDE EVENTS	ATTACHMENT 2		
	DISASTER <u>UNUSUAL EVENT</u>	TAB E1		
imme oper shou Emer to w	rrence of any natural or manmade disaster s diately evaluated for impact on plant compo- ation. Emergency classification of these o ld be made under applicable E1 event codes gency Coordinator judges the impact to be s arrant emergency notification of offsite au	onents or occurrences if the significant or uthorities, even		
A fire which i within 15 minu control room a	igh the explicit criteria of the event code 6: (Site-wide Event) s not declared extinguished by the Fire Ind ites of Control Room notification or verific larm at any of these locations:	cident Commander cation of a		
 For Modes 1 - A fire which i within 15 minu control room a Inside th 	6: (Site-wide Event) s not declared extinguished by the Fire Ind tes of Control Room notification or verific larm at any of these locations: e Protected Area and affecting or adjacent s containing vital, safety related or safe-	cident Commander cation of a to areas and		
 For Modes 1 - A fire which i within 15 minu control room a Inside th structure equipment 	6: (Site-wide Event) s not declared extinguished by the Fire Ind tes of Control Room notification or verific larm at any of these locations: e Protected Area and affecting or adjacent s containing vital, safety related or safe-	cident Commander cation of a to areas and		
 For Modes 1 - A fire which i within 15 minu control room a Inside th structure equipment Multipurp 	6: (Site-wide Event) s not declared extinguished by the Fire Ind tes of Control Room notification or verific larm at any of these locations: e Protected Area and affecting or adjacent s containing vital, safety related or safe-	cident Commander cation of a to areas and		
 For Modes 1 - A fire which i within 15 minu control room a Inside th structure equipment Multipurp South Yar 	6: (Site-wide Event) s not declared extinguished by the Fire Ind tes of Control Room notification or verific larm at any of these locations: e Protected Area and affecting or adjacent s containing vital, safety related or safe-	cident Commander cation of a to areas and -shutdown		

Comments / Reference: From	n SO23-13-2, Step 2 Caution		Revision # 11
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3	ABNORMAL OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 11 ATTACHMENT 24	S023-13 PAGE 19	-2 8 OF 227
	TRAIN B SYSTEMS RECOVERY		
	CONTINUOUS USE		
UNIT			
			PERF. BY INITIALS
1.0 Performance Guideli	nes:		
	these actions for Security, or any o ss a delay is necessary to maintain ety.	ther	
of these acti Work Plans, T and/or Verbal	riousness of the emergency, prompt c ons overrides all other Procedures, echnical Specifications, Technical M Directions given by any person or g ations Shift Manager.	Documents, anuals,	
	CAUTION		
analyzed methodology are combination of Train A, maintain Safe Shutdown c would depart from licens order to protect the pub	ver Train A Safe Shutdown Systems pe not completely successful, <u>THEN</u> uti B, C and D Systems as necessary to a onditions. If required, then such a e conditions. However, they are per lic health and safety per 10 CFR 50. cation would be required within one	lize any chieve and ction mitted in 54(x).	
2.0 In the Train B 1E 9	witchgear Room:		
2.1 Open Second P	oint of Control Cubicle A06-01.		

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		1
	Group #		2
	K/A #	067 A	A2.03
	Importance Rating		3.5

<u>Plant Fire on Site</u>: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site: Fire alarm Proposed Question: SRO 84

Given the following conditions:

- Annunciator 61A15 FIRE DETECTED has alarmed.
- The fire was in the Train C Y03 1E Inverter Room and has been extinguished.
- Efforts to maintain Y03 1E Inverter Room temperatures less than 90°F have not been successful.

Which ONE (1) of the following is required per SO23-1-5, Auxiliary Building Normal HVAC System Operation?

- A. Open all 1E Inverter Room doors and initiate a Fire Impairment for the Technical Specification Fire Doors.
- B. Align the Swing Battery Charger to the Y03 inverter and initiate a Fire Impairment for door blockage.
- C. Align forced ventilation when Inverter Room temperatures exceed 120°F.
- D. Open the Y03 1E Inverter Room door, align forced ventilation and initiate a Fire Impairment.

Proposed Answer: D

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because these actions are correct, however, the only time <u>all</u> doors are opened is if temperatures exceed 100°F.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because a Fire Impairment would be issued anytime a door is blocked, however, aligning the Swing Battery Charger is not required.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because forced ventilation must be aligned, however, this action must be performed when room temperatures exceed 90°F.
- D. Correct. With the affected room temperature greater than 90°F but less than 100°F, open the affected room door, align forced ventilation, and initiate a Fire Impairment.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-1-5, Attachment 9	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

3 ,	Per the Fire procedure, SO23-13-21, DESCRIBE: The basis for each step, caution, or note and the expected plant response for each step.					
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)			
Question History:	Last NRC Exam					
Question Cognitive Leve	el: Memory or Fundament Comprehension or Ana	•	X			
10 CFR Part 55 Conten	t: 55.41 55.43 _5					

Commer	nts / Reference: Fr	rom SO23-1-5, Attachment 9	Revision # 20
NUCL UNIT:	EAR ORGANIZATIO 5 2 AND 3	-5 106 OF 155	
2.0	<u>PROCEDURE</u> (Co	ntinued)	PERF. BY
	2.5.2	Actions to maintain 1E Inverter Room Temperature < 99*F (Alarm Setpoint): (LS-1.7)	<u>INITIALS</u>
	.1	<u>FULLY</u> OPEN all the 1E Inverter Room Doors.	
	.2	Perform the following:	
		 Notify the Fire Department that the 1E Inverter Room Doors are propped Open. 	
		 Initiate Fire Impairments for the affected Tech. Spec. Fire Doors. 	
		• Log the name of the Fire Department person contacted.	
ġ	.3	Within 3 hours, establish Forced <u>Supply</u> Ventilation, from a source of outside air to the hallway <u>or</u> into the 1E Inverter Rooms, sufficient to maintain temperatures below 99°F.	
	.4	<u>If</u> room temperature exceeds the room analytical limit of 104°F , <u>then</u> Initiate a Notification for an Operability Assessment.	I
	2.5.3	Actions to maintain ESF Switchgear Room Temperature < 90*F(Alarm Setpoint): (LS-1.7)	
	.1	FULLY OPEN all the doors to each affected ESF SWGR Room.	
	.2	Perform the following:	
		 Notify the Fire Department that the ESF Switchgear Room Doors are propped Open. 	
		 Initiate Fire Impairments for the affected Tech. Spec. Fire Doors. 	
		Log the name of the Fire Department person contacted.	
ġ	.3	Within 3 hours, establish Forced <u>Supply</u> Ventilation, from a source of outside air to the hallway <u>or</u> into the ESF SWGR Rooms, sufficient to maintain temperatures below 90°F.	
	.4	<u>If</u> room temperature exceeds the room analytical limit of 95°F , <u>then</u> Initiate a Notification for an Operability Assessment.	Ι

Examination Outline Cross-reference:

Level	RO	SRO
Tier #		1
Group #		2
K/A #	E09 G	2.2.42
Importance Rating		4.6

<u>Functional Recovery</u>: Equipment Control: Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry level conditions for Technical Specifications

Proposed Question: SRO 85

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

- A Station Blackout occurred two (2) hours ago.
- Efforts to recover power or cross-tie to Unit 3 have been unsuccessful.
- Entry into SO23-12-9, Functional Recovery, Attachment FR-2, Recovery Vital Auxiliaries was made to perform power restoration.
- Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P140 tripped on startup and the overspeed trip linkage is broken and will NOT reset.
- Both Steam Generators are empty and entry to SO23-12-9, Functional Recovery, Attachment FR-5, Recovery - Heat Removal has been made due to NO OPERABLE Steam Generator and Reactor Coolant System temperatures RISING.
- Subcooling has been lost and Core Exit Thermocouples are approaching 700°F.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the actions to take to establish heat removal?

Align Fire Water to the discharge of...

- A. P504, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and feed Steam Generator E089 using Fire Water at low flow for at least 30 minutes and then recover levels to at least 40% narrow range.
- B. P504, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and feed both Steam Generators using Fire Water. Invoke 10CFR50.54.X due to using Firewater to feed the Steam Generators and notify the NRC within 8 hours.
- C. P141, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and feed Steam Generator E088 using Fire Water. Enter the Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) due to Steam Generator dryout.
- D. P141, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and feed both Steam Generators by cross-tying Auxiliary Feedwater trains using Fire Water. Invoke 10CFR50.54.X due to isolating Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and notify the NRC within one hour.

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that the connection was on P504. The Steam Generator recovery level listed is consistent with guidance in the Functional Recovery Procedure; however, the time is 15 minutes.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because invoking 50.54.X is required due to isolating the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, however, not for the reasons stated. Additionally, the Fire System connection is on P141 and NRC notification would be required within one hour.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because feeding both Steam generators is desired and the correct AFW Pump is being used, however, entry into the SAMG is not required.
- D. Correct. With the Heat Removal Safety Function NOT met and all other design paths unavailable, the Functional Recovery Procedure directs aligning the Fire System which has a Diesel Driven Pump and feeding both Steam Generators. 10CFR50.54.X (Step 8a, Caution) is declared due to isolating the AFW Pumps because of overpressure concerns with the fire water connection (Step 8c, Caution).


Technical Reference(s)	SO23-12-9, Step 8		Attached w/ Revision # See
	Technical Specificati	on LCO 3.7.5 Bases	Comments / Reference
	SD-SO23-780, Figur	e 1	
Proposed references to	be provided during exar	mination: <u>None</u>	
ξ,	Per the Functional Reconaction at Reconaction and the step, caution or not	<i>y</i> 1	3-12-9 DESCRIBE: The basis for
Question Source:	Bank #		
	Modified Bank #		(Note changes or attach parent)
	New	Х	-
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Leve	•	0	
	Comprehension or A	Analysis	<u> X </u>
10 CFR Part 55 Content	55.41		
	55.43 1, 2, 5		

Comm	Comments / Reference: From SO23-12-9, Step 8 Revision # 25							
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 25 ATTACHMENT FR-5			PAGE 1	2-9 ISS 2 51 OF 274				
	FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY							
	RECOVERY - HEAT REMOVAL							
		Success Path Actions:	IR-1,	, s	S/G with no ECCS			
	4	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE			RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED			
8 ESTABLISH Fire System Flow to available S/Gs:								
			NC	т	E			
		Isolation of P-141, AFW Pump, is require Connecting the flange, located in locked discharge of P-141 AFW Pump will rend 10 CFR 50.54(x) should be utilized after Safety Functions are challenged by bein	l box er the norm	(55 AF al o	key) inside of the AFW Pump r W system INOPERABLE. The p design actions have proven unsu	oom, to the rovisions of		
a	a.	REQUEST Shift Manager:						
		 APPROVE use of 10 CFR 50.54(x) for use of Fire Pump connection to AFW piping. 						
		 INITIATE NRC notification within on hour regarding actions per this step 						
ł	b.	VERIFY one of the following Fire Pump — available:	s b).	ESTABLISH alternate pump and to the firewater system from one following sources:			
		P-220, Diesel Firewater Pump P-221, Firewater Pump P-222, Firewater Pump.			 HFMUD SA1417MT351, Demineralize Storage Tank Onsite/Offsite Fire Trucks 	d Water		
ł	b.	 available: P-220, Diesel Firewater Pump P-221, Firewater Pump 	s b	D.	 to the firewater system from one following sources: HFMUD SA1417MT351, Demineralize Storage Tank 	of the		

Comments / Reference: From SO23-12-9, Step 8	Revision # 25						
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-9 ISS 2 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 25 PAGE 152 OF 274 ATTACHMENT FR-5 ATTACHMENT FR-5							
FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY							
RECOVERY - HEAT REMOVAL							
Success Path Actions: HR-1, S/G with no ECCS							
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED							
8 ESTABLISH Fire System Flow to available S/Gs: (Continued)							
CAUTION							
Flange is not rated for use with an AFW Pump in service. Isolation or remova required prior to starting an AFW Pump.	l of flange is						
 ENSURE P-141, AFW discharge flowpath isolated: 							
CLOSE 1305MU127 CLOSE 1305MU131 CLOSE 1305MU154 CLOSE 1305MU635.							
d. Cross-connect Fire Header with AFW d. System:							
 CONNECT one end of fire hose to Connect Fire hose to any a Fire System supply: pressurized fire system cor 							
<u>For Unit 2</u> SA2301MU254, Fire Hydrant 8N, (located near Unit 2 Containment Emergency Access Hatch on 30 ft.).							
<u>For Unit 3</u> SA2301MU262, Fire Hydrant 8S, (located between Unit 3 Isophase Bus Cooling Unit and Tank Building on 30 ft.).							
 Connect other end of fire hose to 6" connection on P-141, AFW Pump discharge piping. 							

mr	men	tts / Reference: From SO23-12-9, Ste	ep 8		Revision # 25
		AR ORGANIZATION EMERGENC 2 AND 3 REVISION 25 ATTACHMEN	5		12-9 ISS 2 153 OF 274
		FUNCTIONA	LRE	COVERY	
		RECOVERY -	HEA	TREMOVAL	
		Success Path Actions: HF	₹-1 ,	S/G with no ECCS	
	:	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE		RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED	
}		TABLISH Fire System Flow to available Gs: (Continued)			
	e.	ENSURE AFW Pump discharge and Discharge Bypass valves – closed:			
		<u>P-504</u> <u>P-141</u> HV-4712 HV-4713 HV-4762 HV-4763			
	f.	START available Fire Pump.			
	g.	ESTABLISH fire water hose overpressure protection:	!		
		 CLOSE AFW Pump Manual Discharge valves (sys 1305): 			
		<u>P-504</u> <u>P-140</u> <u>P-141</u> MU533 MU122 MU127			
	h.	OPEN Fire System Supplyvalve selected in step 8d.1):	h.	Open an Alternate Fire Header in step 8d.1) RNO.	valve selected
		 For Unit 2 SA2301MU254, Fire Hydrant 8N. 			
		<u>For Unit 3</u> SA2301MU262, Fire Hydrant 8S.			
	i.	ALIGN flowpath to both S/Gs by OPENING the following valves:			
		1305MU131 1305MU154 1305MU634 1305MU635.			

Comments / Referen	ce: From	Technical Specification LCO 3.7.5 Bases	Amendment # 127
		AF	W System B 3.7.5
BASES (continued)			
BACKGROUND (continued)	1.	Motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump dischar(bypass control valves, HV-4762 and HV-4763, only be capable of being closed, or be isolated manual valves;	need
	2.	Steam turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump steam supply isolation ∨alves, HV-8200 and HV and turbine stop ∨alve, HV-4716, need only be of being opened, and	v-8201, capable
	3.	Manual crosstie valves 1305MU634 and 1305M may be open in Mode 3 provided a minimum of has elapsed since reactor shutdown.	
	The AFW (Ref. 1).	System is discussed in the UFSAR, Section 10.4	4.9



Corrected font

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		2
	Group #		1
	K/A #	010 A2	.01
	Importance Rating		3.6
Pressurizer Pressure Control System: Ability to (a) predic	t the impacts of the following malfunction	ons or operations o	on the PZR

<u>Pressurizer Pressure Control System</u>: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PZR PCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Heater failures

Proposed Question: SRO 86

Given the following conditions with the Unit in MODE 1 at 80% power:

- A Steam Bypass Control Valve failed open 2 minutes ago and is now closed.
- Pressurizer pressure is 2020 psia and <u>slowly</u> increasing.
- PIC-100, Pressurizer Pressure Indicating Controller output is 0%.
- Annunciator 50A14 PZR PRESS HI/LO is in alarm.
- Annunciator 50A04 PZR PRESS DEVIATION HI/LO is NOT in alarm.
- All systems are in Automatic.

Which ONE (1) of the following:

1.) Identifies the impact of Pressurizer Pressure Control on Technical Specifications?

- 2.) What procedural action must be taken to address this situation?
- A. 1.) Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, DNB Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Limits must be entered and corrected.
 - 2.) Refer to SO23-13-27, Pressurizer Pressure and Level Malfunctions, Step 3,
 Pressure Out of Band and ensure all Heaters are energized and both
 Pressurizer Spray Valves are closed.
- B. 1.) Technical Specification LCO 3.4.3, RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits must be entered and Pressurizer Heaters restored.
 - Refer to SO23-3-1.10, Pressurizer Pressure and Level, Section 6.1, Normal Pressurizer Pressure Control and control Pressurizer Heaters and Spray in manual.
- C. 1.) Technical Specification LCO 3.4.3, RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits must be entered and pressure restored.
 - 2.) Trip the Reactor and enter SO23-12-1, Standard Post Trip Actions due to loss of Pressurizer Pressure control.
- D. 1.) Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, DNB Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Limits must be entered and corrected.
 - 2.) Refer to SO23-3-1.10, Pressurizer Pressure and Level, Section 6.7, Manual Pressurizer Pressure Control and operate PIC-100, Pressurizer Pressure Controller in manual to control pressure.

Proposed Answer:

Explanation:

- A. Correct. Given that the reason for the pressure transient is known, entry into SO23-13-27 is appropriate given the response of the primary system. Swapping to the other Pressurizer Pressure Channel is not required because the deviation alarm is not annunciating. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1 contains the correct information.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible if thought that Pressurizer Heaters were out of service because pressure was responding slowly.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible if thought that this Technical Specification LCO is not being met. Given the conditions listed, a Reactor trip is not warranted.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because the Technical Specification entry is correct, however, the wrong procedure and Section of SO23-3-1.10 is used.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-13-27, Step 3b RNO & 3a	Attached w/ Revision # See
	Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1	Comments / Reference
	SO23-3-1.10, Section 6.1 & 6.7	
	Technical Specification LCO 3.4.3	
	Technical Specification LCO 3.4.9	
	SO23-15-50.A1, 50A04 & 50A14	

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

А

55213 / 56649		be taken for a Pressuriz	lant conditions, DETERMINE er Pressure or Level Malfunction
:	surveillance results, I LCO(s) impacted alo	DETERMINE system or ng with all required actic Technical Specification	chnical Specification/LCS equipment OPERABILITY and ons and surveillances using s and Licensee Controlled
Question Source:	Bank #		
	Modified Bank #		(Note changes or attach parent)
	New	Χ	-
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	ı	
Question Cognitive Lev	el: Memory or Fund Comprehension	damental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Conten	t: 55.41 55.43 <u>2, 5</u>		

Comments / Reference: From SO23-13-27,	Step 3	RNO Revision # 4	
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION ABNORMAL OF UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 4	PERAT	IG INSTRUCTION SO23-13-27 PAGE 11 OF 20	
PRESSURIZER PRESSURE	AND	EVEL MALFUNCTION	
OPERATO	R ACT	ONS	
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE		RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED	
3 Pressure out of band (Continued)			
□b. VERIFY Pressurizer Pressure is stable.	*	<u>If</u> Pressurizer pressure is trending high, <u>then</u>:	
		 COMMENCE operating PIC-0100 in MANUAL per SO23-3-1.10, Section for Manual Pressurizer Pressure Control. 	
	\Box	2) SECURE heaters, as necessary.	
		I <u>f</u> Pressurizer pressure is trending Iow , <u>then</u> :	
		 START Pressurizer heaters, as necessary. 	
		 ENSURE both Pressurizer Spray Valves are closed. 	
		<u>If</u> unable to close affected Spray Valve in manual, <u>then</u> GO TO STEP 3e.	

Comments / Reference: Fron	1 50A14SO23-13-27	. Ste	p 3a		Revision # 4
			•		
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION UNITS 2 AND 3	ABNORMAL OPERAT REVISION 4	ING		SO23-13-2 PAGE 10 (
PRESSURI	ZER PRESSURE AND	LEVE	L MALFUNCTION		
	OPERATOR ACT	FIONS	5		
ACTION/EXPECTED RE	<u>SPONSE</u>		RESPONSEN	IOT OBTA	INED
3 Pressure out of band					
	GUIDELINI	ES			
 A Pressurizer Pressure s in the following way: 	signal failure affects the	Modu	llate and Permissive	e circuits of	SBCS
the permissives a	igh failure could delay tl arly ow failure will delay the i				pring in
2) See Attachment 1 for the	Pressurizer Pressure (Contro	ol Block Diagram.		
3) See Attachment 4 for Pr	essurizer Pressure Cont	trol Di	agrams.		
4) To diagnose controller a Response and Foxboro	arms, refer to SO23-3-1 Controller Page Data.	.10,7	Attachment for Foxb	oro Alarm	
5) Reactivity will be impact configuration and Press Coefficient is a positive value of the Moderator	urizer Spray control. Th coefficient and is about	ie RC one ti	S Reactivity Pressu	re	
□a. VERIFY the selected Pr Pressure channel is bet 2225 and 2275 psia and	veen 🕂		VERIFY the other p is available by obse or PR-0100B or CFMS page 325.	rving PR-0	annel 100A
			POSITION HS-0100 Channel Select Swi channel.)A, PZR P tch, to the	ressure other

omments / Rele	rence: Fr	om Technical Specification LO	CO 3.4.1	Amendment #149
3.4.1 RCS DNB	(Pressur	e, Temperature, and Flow) Lin	nits	
LCO 3.4.1	temper	rameters for pressurizer pres ature, and RCS total flow rat specified below:	ssure, cold leg te shall be within the	
	a. Pi	ressurizer pressure ≥ 2025 p:	sia and ≤ 2275 psia;	
	b. R(1.	CS cold leg temperature (T_): For THERMAL POWER less the $522^{\circ}F \leq T_{c} \leq 558^{\circ}F$,	an or equal to 30% RTP	,
	2.	For THERMAL POWER greater ≤ 558°F.	• than 30% RTP, 535°F ≤	T _c
	c. RO	S total flow rate ≥ 396,000	gpm.	
APPLICABILITY:	MODE 1.			
		rizer pressure limit does not		
•	a. TH	IERMAL POWER ramp > 5% RTP pe	r minute; or	
	b. TH	ERMAL POWER step > 10% RTP.		
ACTIONS				
CONDITIO	N	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME	
A. Pressurize	RCS	A.1 Restore parameter(s) to within limit.	2 hours	

Comments / Reference:	From SO23-3-1.10, Section 6.1		Revision # 21
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATI UNITS 2 AND 3	ON OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 21	SO23-3- PAGE 5	l.10 OF 58
6.0 <u>PROCEDURE</u>			
6.1 Normal	Pressurizer Pressure Control		
	INFORMATION USE		I
6.1.1	The following operating conditions are Pressurizer pressure parameters: The are in service and sprays are not being	se apply when both spra	
	RCS Pressure (PIC-0100 Controller Pressure)	2250 +/- 5 psia	
	PIC-0100 controller output	20% to 60%	
	Spra y Valves	Fully Closed	
	RCS pressure setpoint	_≤2260 psia	
	Non-1E backup heaters (LS-1.3)	1 or 2 bank(s) energiz	ed
6.1.2	With the RCS at normal operating temp pressure control configuration is, as fol	perature, the normal PZ lows:	R
.1	PIC-0100, Pressurizer Pressure Contro fixed such that RCS pressure will be m	ller, in AUTO with the s aintained at 2250 psia.	etpoint (LS-1.5)
.2	HIC-0100 A & B, Spray Valve Controlle (LS-1.6)	ers; both Controllers in A	NTO.
.3	HS-0100A, PZR Pressure Channel Sel channel closest to the highest Narrow F PIDs CPC009A, B, C, D). The TS 3.4.1 Narrow Range pressure.	Range pressure indicate	ediat PCS
.4	HS-9170 and HS-9171, Proportional He	eaters, are ON.	
.5	<u>When</u> PZR and RCS boron concentrati <u>then</u> PZR Backup Heaters may be ene PZR Proportional Heater capacity at ap	rgized as required to ma	aintain 1.5)
6.1.3	Pressurizer heater configuration may b	e changed per Section (5.4.
1			

Comments / Refer	ence: From	SO23-3-1.10, Section 6.7		Revision	# 21
NUCLEAR ORGA UNITS 2 AND 3	NIZATION	OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 21	SO23-3-1 PAGE 12		
6.0 <u>PROCEDU</u>	<u>RE</u> (Continue	ed)			
6.7 Ma	anual Pres	surizer Pressure Control			
		CONTINUOUS USE			I
		NOTES			
1.	Loss of Offs 1E Backup I	ite Power does not preclude manual energizatio Heaters even though tripping relay power is non	n of Press -1E.	urizer	
2.	No interlock Backup Hea	exists for prevention of manual energization of ters when RCS pressure is greater than 2340 p	Pressurize sia.	r1E	
3.	 SO123-0-A4 Specification 	R Spray <u>or</u> Auxiliary Spray with ΔT > the limit spe will require a Design Cycle evaluation per Tech n Table 5.7-1 and completion of SO123-0-A4, A Spray Cycles-Units 2 and 3. (Ref. 2.1.4, 2.3.11)	nnical ttachment f	for	
6.7	Öper	essurizer pressure deviates from program outsid ator's control, <u>then</u> GO TO SO23-13-27 , Pressu sure and Level Malfunction.		·	
6.7	.2 Man	ually control PIC-0100, Pressurizer Pressure	Controlle	г	
	.1 ENS SOI:	URE a Reactivity Brief has been conducted for t 23-0-A1 , Section for Reactivity.	his activity	per 🗆	
*		NSFER PIC-0100, Pressurizer Pressure Control UAL	ller, to		
*	.3 ADJI	JST output as necessary to maintain setpoint.			

omments	/ Reference: From	Fechnical Specifica	tion LCO 3.4.3	3	Amendment #203
3.4.3 RC	S Pressure and Temp	erature (P/T) Limit	5		
LCO 3.4.	3 The combina heatup and limits as s REPORT (PTL	tion of RCS pressur cooldown rates shal pecified in the RCS R}.	e, RCS tempera l be maintaine PRESSURE-TEMM	ature and RCS ed within the PERATURE LIMITS	
APPLICABI ACTIONS	LITY: At all time	5.			-
	CONDITION	REQUIRED A	CTION	COMPLETION TI	ME
Requ shal wher	vired Action A.2 li be completed never this	A.1 Restore p to within AND	arameter(s) limits.	30 minutes	
Requ	iition is entered. uirements of LCO met in MODE 1, 2,	A.2 Determine acceptabl continued		72 hours	

Com	ments / Refer	ence: From	Technica	I Specification LCO 3.4.9	9	Amendment #161
3.4.	9 Pressurizo	er				
LC0	3.4.9	The pressur	izer sha	11 be OPERABLE with:		
		a. Pressu	rizer wat	ter level ≤ 57%; and		
		b. Two gro capacit	oups of p ty of ead	pressurizer heaters OPEF ch group ≥ 150 kW.	ABLE with the	
APPL		MODES 1, 2,	and 3.			
	CONDITI	ON		REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TI	ME
·A.	Pressurizer level not wi limit.		A.1	Be in MODE 3 with reactor trip breakers open.	6 hours	
			<u>AND</u>			
			A.2	Be in MODE 4.	12 hours	
в.	One required pressurizer inoperable.		8.1	Restore required group of pressurizer heaters to OPERABLE status.	72 hours	

	enc	e: From SO2	23-15-5	50.A1,	50A04			Revisio	on # 8
IUCLEAR ORGAN INITS 2 AND 3	IIZAT	REV	RM RES ASION 8 ACHME	}	EINSTR	UCTION	SO23-15 PAGE 10		
0A04 PZ	RP	RESS DEV	ΛΑΤΙΟ		LO				
APPLICABILITY		PRIORITY	REFL	ASH	ASSO	CIATED WINDOW	/s		
Modes 1-4		WHITE	N/	Ά		NONE			
INITIATING DEVICE	NC	UN NAME	S	ETPOIN	νT	VALIDATION INSTRUMENT [1]	PCS ID	LINK# U2/U3	
2(3)PSHL-0100 [2]		tch HI/LO 🛛 🛛 🖉	Opposite Deviatior Channel	n from S	nel <u>+</u> 5% Selected	2(3)PI-0101A 2(3)PI-0101B 2(3)PI-0102A 2(3)PI-0103	P100X P100Y P102A P102B P102C P102D	613,635	
omments / Refer	enc	e: From SO	23-15-{	50.A1,	50A14			Revisio	on # 8
NUCLEAR ORGAN JNITS 2 AND 3	IIZA'	RE\	RM RES USION 8 ACHME	3	EINSTR	UCTION	SO23-1: PAGE 3	5-50.A1 4 OF 64	
50A14 PZ	RP	RESS HI/L	.0						
APPLICABILIT		PRIORITY		LASH	ASSO		vs		
			REFI	LASH O		CIATED WINDOV 04,50A24,50A34	_		
APPLICABILIT		PRIORITY	REFI	0			_	LINK# U2/U3	Ţ
APPLICABILIT Modes 1-3	Y (Pr Sv	PRIORITY		O SETF	50A(04,50A24,50A34 VALIDATION INSTRUMENT	PCS		*

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		2
	Group #		1
	K/A #	059 G :	2.2.44
	Importance Rating		4.4

Main Feedwater:Equipment Control: Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a
system, and understand how operator actions affect plant and system conditionsProposed Question:SRO 87

Given the following conditions on both Steam Generators at full power:

- Feedwater flow is GREATER THAN steam flow.
- Steam Generator narrow range levels are RISING.
- Feedwater Control System Master Controller outputs are LOWERING.
- Feedwater Control Valves are CLOSING.
- K006, Main Feedwater Pump speed is RISING.
- K005, Main Feedwater Pump speed is LOWERING.

Which ONE (1) of the following actions is required?


- A. Ensure both Steam Generator Feedwater Control Systems are operating in AUTO per SO23-9-6, Feedwater Control System Operations.
- B. Place K006 EAP/MSC in MANUAL and attempt to lower output per SO23-13-24, Feedwater Control System Malfunctions.
- C. Place both Steam Generator Feedwater Control Valves in MANUAL and lower output per SO23-9-6, Feedwater Control System Operations.
- D. Place both Steam Generator Master Controllers in Preferred Manual and attempt to lower level per SO23-13-24, Feedwater Control System Malfunctions.

Proposed Answer: B

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because as long as the system was in AUTO one would expect level to be controlled, however, a Feedwater malfunction exists and entry into the AOI is required.
- B. Correct. Given the conditions listed, placing K006, Main Feedwater Pump in MANUAL and lowering output to lower speed is the desired action. Refer to hard copy of SO23-13-24, Attachment 1; Flowchart in PDF version is not legible.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because this would help to regain level control, however, the guidance would come from the Abnormal Operating Instruction.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because this is a desired action to lower level, however, the Master Controller is already performing this function.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-13-24, Attac	hment 1	Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference
Proposed references to b	e provided during ex	amination: <u>None</u>	
56415 m	· •	E the process in deterr	edwater Control System nining the required actions in
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	128188	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level	: Memory or Funda Comprehension o	mental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.43 <u>5</u>		



Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		2
	Group #		1
	K/A #	007 G	2.2.40
	Importance Rating		4.7

Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank System: Equipment Control: Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system Proposed Question: SRO 88

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power.
- The lift setpoint for PSV-0200, Pressurizer Safety Valve is determined to be out of tolerance (low) due to an error in the test calculation.
- PSV-0201, Pressurizer Safety Valve is OPERABLE.

Which ONE (1) of the following states the Technical Specification REQUIRED ACTION for this condition?

Restore within...

- A. 15 minutes or be in MODE 3 in the next 6 hours.
- B. one (1) hour or gag the safety valve and be in MODE 5 in the next 36 hours.
- C. two (2) hours or be in MODE 4 within the next 24 hours.
- D. four (4) hours or be in MODE 5 in the next 30 hours.

Proposed Answer: A

Explanation:

- A. Correct. Per Technical Specification LCO 3.4.10, this is the REQUIRED ACTION and COMPLETION TIME. The valve must be restored within 15 minutes; however, MODE 3 entry is required in the next six hours.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that the ACTION time was 1 hour and that on a low setting, gagging the safety would be prudent and entry into MODE 5 would remove the heat energy for valve lift, however, the initial ACTION time is 15 minutes and MODE 3 entry is required in the next 6 hours per Tech Specs.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that two hours applies, however, MODE 3 entry is required in the next six hours per Tech Specs and the 12 hours to MODE 4 is the ACTION for two safeties INOPERABLE.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible if thought that MODE 5 needed to be entered.

Technical Reference(s)	Technical Specific	ation LCO 3.4.10	Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference
Proposed references to b	e provided during ex	amination: None	
56649 su LC SC	rveillance results, D CO(s) impacted alon	ETERMINE system g with all required ac	Technical Specification/LCS or equipment OPERABILITY and ctions and surveillances using ons and Licensee Controlled
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level	Memory or Funda Comprehension of	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.43 _2		

mments / Referen	ce: From T	echnical Specification LCO 3.4.	10	Amendment # 156
3.4 REACTOR CO	OLANT SYS	STEM (RCS)		
3.4.10 Pressurizer				
	2			
LCO 3.4.10	Two pressur settings of 2	izer safety valves shall be OPERA 500 psia, +3% or -2%.	ABLE with as-four	nd lift
APPLICABILITY:	MODES 1,			
	MODE 3 for under ambi 36 hours fo	NOTENOTE	LCO limits during irizer safety valve on is allowed for	:s old
Each pressurizer safety valve has an as-found tolerance of +3% or - 2%. Following testing in accordance with TS 5.5.2.10, pressurizer safety valves shall be set within ±1% of the specified setpoint.				
ACTIONS				
CONDITI	ON	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLET TIME	ION
A. One pressuri: valve inopera		A.1 Restore valve to OPERABLE status.	15 minutes	
B. Required Act associated C Time not met	ompletion	B.1 Be in MODE 3.	6 hours	
<u>OR</u>		B.2 Be in MODE 4.	12 hours	
_ .	zer safety			
Two pressuri: valves inoper	able.			

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		2
	Group #		1
	K/A #	013 A	2.06
	Importance Rating		4.0
Engineered Safety Features Actuation System: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following r	malfunctions or o	nerations on

Engineered Safety Features Actuation System: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ESFAS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Inadvertent ESFAS actuation

Proposed Question: SRO 89

Given the following conditions:

- The Unit is operating in MODE 1 when a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) occurs.
- Pressurizer Pressure is 2245 psia.
- Containment Pressure is 0.3 psig.
- The cause of the SIAS was due to failure of a Matrix Channel.
- The Matrix Channel was declared INOPERABLE.
 - 1.) Which ONE (1) of the following identifies the impact of the channel failure on Technical Specifications?
 - 2.) What action must be taken to mitigate the situation?
 - A. 1.) Technical Specification LCO 3.3.5, ESFAS Instrumentation is applicable.2.) Enter SO23-12-1, Standard Post Trip Actions and trip the Reactor and Turbine.
 - B. 1.) Technical Specification LCO 3.3.5, ESFAS Instrumentation is applicable.
 2.) Enter SO23-3-2.7.2, Safety Injection System Removal/Return to Service Operation to reset the SIAS to restore Normal Containment Cooling.
 - C. 1.) Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, ESFAS Logic and Manual Trip is applicable.
 2.) Enter SO23-13-28, Rapid Power Reduction and place the Unit in MODE 3 within one hour.
 - D. 1.) Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, ESFAS Logic and Manual Trip is applicable.
 - 2.) Enter SO23-13-17, Recovery from Inadvertent Safety Injection/Containment Isolation or Containment Spray and override and stop all Charging Pumps.

Proposed Answer: D

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. The Tech Spec entry is incorrect. A Reactor trip and entry into SO23-12-1 per SO23-13-7, RCP Seal Failure would be considered because Controlled Bleed Off flow to the VCT is lost, however, the CBO relief would lift and the RCPs would be protected.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because the condition to reset SIAS to restore normal Containment Cooling is correct, however, the Technical Specification and procedure entry are both incorrect.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because the Tech Spec entry is correct, however, this would be the wrong procedure to enter because a Rapid Power Reduction is not required.
- D. Correct. The SIAS must be recovered from in less than one hour to avoid Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3 entry. This is the correct Tech Spec and procedure entry. Letdown is isolated on an SIAS and the Charging Pumps must be overridden and stopped.

Technical Reference(s	s) Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO23-13-17, Steps 3 & 5	Comments / Reference
	SO23-13-6, Step 2	
	SO23-13-17, Steps 6k, 6l, & 6m	
Proposed references t	o be provided during examination: <u>None</u>	
Learning Objective: 53939 / 56649	As the SRO, DIRECT operator actions during safety injection / containment isolation per SO	-
	Given plant and equipment conditions, or Tech surveillance results, DETERMINE system or e LCO(s) impacted along with all required action SONGS procedures, Technical Specifications Specifications (LCS).	quipment OPERABILITY and is and surveillances using
Question Source:	Bank #	

Question Source:	Modified Bank # New	Х	 (Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundar Comprehension or	0	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41		

55.43 5

omments / Referer	nce: From Te	echnical Specification LCO 3.3.6)	Amendment # 127	
3.3 INSTRUMENT	ATION				
3.3.6 Engineered S Trip	Safety Featur	es Actuation System (ESFAS) Lo	gic and Manual		
LCO 3.3.6 Six channels of ESFAS Matrix Logic, four channels of ESFAS Initiation Logic, two channels of Actuation Logic, and two channels of Manual Trip shall be OPERABLE for each Function according to Table 3.3.6-1.					
APPLICABILITY:	According to	Table 3.3.6-1.			
ACTIONS					
Separate Conditior	n entry is allow	E wed for each Function.			
CONDITI	ON	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETI TIME	ON	
A. ———-NOTE- This action al when three M channels are due to a com source failure de-energizing matrix power ——————— One or more with one Matr channel inope	so applies latrix Logic inoperable mon power three supplies. Functions	A.1 Restore channel to OPERABLE status.	48 hours		

Commer	ts / Reference: From So	023-13-17, Step 3		Revision # 5
	AR ORGANIZATION 2 AND 3	ABNORMAL OPERATING IN REVISION 5		-13-17 5 OF 16
	RECOVERY FROM INADV	RTENT SAFETY INJECTIO OR CONTAINMENT SPRA	N/CONTAINMENT ISOLATION	<u>1</u>
		OPERATOR ACTIONS		
	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPO	I <u>SE</u> <u>RES</u>	PONSE NOT OBTAINED	
3 SI.	S actuation actions:			
a.	VERIFY the following parameters met:	R∰a. TRIP t ∐ AND	he Reactor and Turbine	
	1) Pressurizer Pressu ≥ 1740 psia		S023-12-1	
	2) Containment Pressu < 3.4 psig		his procedure.	
□ b.	ENSURE CVCS Letdown -	ISOLATED		
		CAUTIONS		
1.	Isolating Charging pla inoperable Boration f inoperable. SIAS shal Tech. Spec. 3.0.3 sha preapproved entry.	ow paths by rendering be Reset within one I	hour: otherwise	on for
2、	temperatures to rise	apidly. Loss of CEDM	ausing the CEDM shroud cooling for≻one hour uated to cool the CEDMs	
□ c.	OVERRIDE <u>and</u> STOP all Pumps.	Charging		
□ d.	REDUCE Turbine Load as to MAINTAIN Turbine Po with Reactor Power.	necessary wer matched		
🗆 e.	OVERRIDE <u>and</u> OPEN HV-: Instrument Air to Cont Isolation Valve.	388, ainment		
f.	OVERRIDE <u>and</u> OPEN RCP to VCT Isolation Valvo			
	1) HV-9217			
	2) HV-9218			
🗆 g.	INITIATE CCAS.			
□ h.	GO TO Step 6.			

ommer	nts / Reference: From S	023-13-6, Step 2			Revision # 5
	AR ORGANIZATION 2 AND 3	ABNORMAL OPE REVISION 5	RATING IN	NSTRUCTION	SO23-13-6 PAGE 4 OF 10
	Ē	REACTOR COOLANT P	UMP SEAL	FAILURE	
		OPERATOR	ACTIONS		
2 Im	mediate Diagnosis/ac	ctions:			
2 Im	mediate Diagnosis/ac AFFECTED PUM			AC	TIONS
2 Im	-	P CONDITIONS	1)		TIONS y TRIP the Reactor.
1	AFFECTED PUM	P CONDITIONS	□ 2)	Immediatel	

Commer	nts / Reference: From	n SO23-13-17, Steps 6	k, 6l, & 6m	Revision # 5
	AR ORGANIZATION 2 AND 3	ABNORMAL OPERATIN REVISION 5	G INSTRUCTION SO23- PAGE	-13-17 9 OF 16
	RECOVERY FROM IN/	ADVERTENT SAFETY INJEC OR CONTAINMENT S	TION/CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PRAY	l
		OPERATOR ACTIO	NS	
	ACTION/EXPECTED RES	PONSE	RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED	
6 Re as	cover from inadverte follows: (Continue	nt SIAS, d)		
🗖 g.	OVERRIDE <u>and</u> CLOSE Emergency Boration			
∐ h.	INITIATE Attachment Restoration of SIAS Breakers.	2, Actuated		
□i.	NOTIFY opposite Uni S023-3-3.23, Attack Sources Verificatic completed within 1 the 1E 4kv Bus Tie in Manual.	ment for A.C. n, must be hour, due to		
j.	The Shift Manager S	HALL:		
	 NOTIFY the Mana Operations Unit designee. 	ger, Plant s 2/3 or his		
	 DETERMINE the r event classific S0123-VIII-1. 			
	 DETERMINE reporrequirements of 	ting S0123-0-A7、		
□ k.	VERIFY proper actua S023-3-2.22, Attack SIAS/CCAS Actuation	ment for		
□ 1.	PERFORM S023-3-2.22 for SIAS/CCAS and (, Attachment IAS Reset.		
🗆 m.	PERFORM S023-3-2.22 for SIAS/CCAS Resto	, Attachment ration.		

Comme	ents	/ Reference: From S	6023-13-17, Step	5		Revision # 5
NUCLE UNITS		RGANIZATION ND 3	ABNORMAL OPERAT REVISION 5	ING INSTRUCTION		13-17 7 OF 16
	<u> </u>	RECOVERY FROM INADV	<u>ERTENT SAFETY IN</u> OR CONTAINMEN	JECTION/CONTAINMEN T_SPRAY	T ISOLATION	
			OPERATOR AC	TIONS		
	<u>AC1</u>	ION/EXPECTED RESPO	NSE	<u>RESPONSE NOT OB</u>	<u>TAINED</u>	
5 Re as	cove fol	r from Inadvertent lows:	CIAS,			
à.		store the Non-Criti w to the RCPs, as				
	1)	ENSURE a CCW/SWC 1 operating、	оор			
	2)	DEPRESS HS-6397-1 the CIAS.	to override			
	3)	DEPRESS HS-6397-2 the CIAS.	to override			
	4)	OPEN HV-6212 <u>and</u> H Noncritical Loop S Return Valves (Loo	upply and			
		OR				
	5)	OPEN HV-6213 <u>and</u> H Noncritical Loop S Return Valves (Loo	upply and			
	6)	OPEN HV-6211, NCL Containment İsolat	Supply ion Valve.			
	7)	OPEN HV-6223, NCL Containment Isolat	Supply ion Valve、			
	8)	OPEN HV-6216, NCL Containment İsolat	Return ion Valve.			
	9)	OPEN HV-6236, NCL Containment Isolat	Return ion Valve.			
□ Ь.	S02	RIFY proper actuati 23-3-2、22, Attachme cuation Verificatio	nt for CIAS			
C.		RFORM S023-3-2.22. SIAS/CCAS and CIA				
□ d.	PEF for	RFORM SO23-3-2.22, . CIAS Restoration.	Attachment			

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		2
	Group #		1
	K/A #	076 G 2.4	4.21
	Importance Rating		4.6
Service Water System: Emergency Procedures/Plan: Kno	wledge of the parameters and logic us	ed to assess safety	,

Service Water System: Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc.

Proposed Question: SRO 90

Given the following conditions on Unit 2:

- SO23-12-9, Functional Recovery was entered due to a Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident and Excess Steam Demand Event.
- Offsite power is unavailable and Train B Emergency Diesel Generator failed to start.
- Containment pressure is 17 psig.
- Reactor Coolant System pressure is 1600 psia and the Pressurizer is empty.
- Subcooled Margin is 2°F.
- All Train A Engineered Safety Feature actuations occurred as required.
- Reactor Vessel Level is 21% in the Plenum.

While performing Safety Function Status Checks you learn that the <u>only available</u> Salt Water Cooling Pump has just tripped.

- 1.) Which ONE (1) of the following identifies the highest Safety Functions that are NOT met?
- 2.) Which Functional Recovery Procedure will be entered <u>FIRST</u>?
- A. 1.) RCS Inventory Control and RCS Pressure Control.2.) Implement FR-3, Recovery RCS Inventory Control.
- B. 1.) RCS Pressure Control and Core Heat Removal.2.) Implement FR-4, Recovery RCS Pressure Control.
- C. 1.) Core Heat Removal and RCS Heat Removal.2.) Implement FR-5, Recovery Heat Removal.
- D. 1.) Containment Isolation and Containment Temperature and Pressure Control.2.) Implement FR-6, Recovery Containment Isolation.

Proposed Answer: A

Explanation:

- A. Correct. These are highest Safety Functions affected and the highest priority Safety Function in jeopardy is RCS Inventory Control.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that the Core Heat Removal Safety Function was the highest priority Safety Function jeopardized due to the loss of the SI Pumps but the challenge doesn't exist if SG cooling is working and CETs are less than 700°F.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that both Heat Removal Safety Functions were jeopardized which would require entry into FR-5.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because Containment pressure is 17 psig with no indication that it is lowering, however, FR-6 would be implemented later if conditions did not improve.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-12-10, Attachment SF-3, Steps 3 to 8	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO23-12-9, Attachment FR-3, Step 4	Comments / Reference

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

Learning Objective:EXPLAIN the different methods of recovery that are unique to the Functional
Recovery Emergency Operating Instruction (EOI).55280 / 55217Per the Functional Recovery procedure SO23-12-9 DESCRIBE: The basis for
each step, caution or note.

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	X	<pre>_ (Note changes or attach parent) </pre>
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fund Comprehension	lamental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.43 5		

omments / Reference: From SO23-12-10, At	tachment SF-3, Step 3 Revision # 3							
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY JNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 3 ATTACHMENT	OPERATING INSTRUCTION SO23-12-10 ISS 2 PAGE 15 OF 100 SF-3							
SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK								
LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT								
SAFETY FUNCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA NOT MET								
3 RCS Inventory Control								
 CONDITION 1 a. RCS inventory: PZR level between 10% and 70% OR greater than 70% for the purpose of compensating for void collapse. AND Charging and/or Letdown or SI available to maintain PZR level. b. Core Exit Saturation Margin greater than or equal to 20°F: QSPDS page 611 CFMS page 311. c. Reactor Vessel level greater than or equal to 100% (Plenum): 	 RE-EVALUATE event per, Attachment SF-1, RECOVERY DIAGNOSTIC. IF re-evaluation identifies another event, NOT Loss of Coolant Accident, THEN GO TO identified EOI. IF re-evaluation identifies: a) Loss of Coolant Accident OR b) More than one event, THEN GO TO SO23-12-9, FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY AND INITIATE SO23-12-9, Attachment FR-3, RECOVERY – RCS INVENTORY CONTROL. 							

Comments / Refer	Comments / Reference: From SO23-12-10, Attachment SF-3, Step 3 Revision # 3								
NUCLEAR ORGAN UNITS 2 AND 3	NIZATION EMERGENCY REVISION 3 ATTACHMEN								
	SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK								
	LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT								
SAFETY FUNCTIO	N ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA	ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA NOT MET							
3 RCS Inventor	y Control (Continued)								
– gre lim RE DU OR 2) In Hot – gre lim RE DU	Id Leg Injection Mode eater than or equal to minimum its of Figure 1, MINIMUM EQUIRED SI FLOWRATES JRING COLD LEG INJECTION. t/Cold Leg Injection Mode eater than or equal to minimum its of Figure 2, MINIMUM EQUIRED HPSI FLOWRATES JRING HOT/COLD LEG JECTION.	 THEN GO TO identified EOI. IF re-evaluation identifies: a) Loss of Coolant Accident OR 							
QSPE CFMS	'essel level rthan or equal to 41% (Plenum): DS page 622 S page 312 hment SF-10.	AND): INITIATE SO23-12-9, Attachment FR-3, RECOVERY – RCS INVENTORY CONTROL.							

Comments / Reference: From SO23-12-10, Attachment SF-3, Step 4 Revision # 3									
UNITS2AND3 REV	GENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTIO ION 3 CHMENT SF-3	DN SO23-12-10 ISS 2 PAGE 17 OF 100							
SAFETY FU	NCTION STATUS CHECK								
LOSS OF	LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT								
SAFETY FUNCTION ACCEPTANCE CRI		RIA NOT MET							
4 RCS Pressure Control									
CONDITION 1	 RE-EVALUATE even RECOVERY DIAGNO 								
a. Core Exit Saturation Margin – between 20°F and 160°F:	 IF re-evaluation NOT Loss of Control 	identifies another event, plant Accident,							
QSPDS_page 611 CFMS_page 311.	THEN GO TO id	entified EOI.							
CONDITION 2	IF re-evaluation	IF re-evaluation identifies:							
a. SI flow:	a) Loss of Coo	lant Accident							
 In Cold Leg Injection Mode greater than or equal to m 	OR								
limits of Figure 1, MINIMU REQUIRED SI FLOWRAT	1 b) More than o	ne event,							
DURING COLD LEG INJE		023-12-9, FUNCTIONAL							
OR	AND								
 In Hot/Cold Leg Injection Mo greater than or equal to m limits of Figure 2, MINIMU REQUIRED HPSI FLOWF DURING HOT/COLD LEG INJECTION. 	nimum INITIATE SO23- 1 RECOVERY – R	12-9, Attachment FR-4, CS PRESSURE							

Comments / Reference: From SO23-12-10, Attachment SF-3, Step 5 Revision #					
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 3 ATTACHMENT		3-12-10 ISS 2 E 18 OF 100			
SAFETY FUNCTION	I STATUS CHECK				
LOSS OF COOL	ANT ACCIDENT				
SAFETY FUNCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA	ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA NOT	MET			
5 Core Heat Removal					
a. REP CET temperature – less than 700°F:	 RE-EVALUATE event per, Att RECOVERY DIAGNOSTIC. 	achment SF-1,			
QSPDS_page 611 CFMS_page 311.	 IF re-evaluation identifies NOT Loss of Coolant Act 				
	THEN GO TO identified B	:OI.			
	• IF re-evaluation identifies	:			
	a) Loss of Coolant Acci	dent			
	OR				
	b) More than one event				
	THEN GO TO SO23-12-4 RECOVERY), FUNCTIONAL			
	AND				
	INITIATE SO23-12-9, Att RECOVERY – HEAT RE				

Comments /	omments / Reference: From SO23-12-10, Attachment SF-3, Step 6 Revision # 3								
NUCLEAR C UNITS 2 AN			2-10 ISS 2 9 OF 100						
	SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK								
	LOSS OF COOLA	١NT	ACCIDENT						
<u>SAFETY FU</u>	NCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA	A	CCEPTANCE CRITERIA NOT ME	<u></u>					
6 RCS He	at Removal								
a. Any	/ S/G:	ø	RE-EVALUATE event per, Attach RECOVERY DIAGNOSTIC.	nment SF-1,					
1)	Level – between 40% NR and 80% NR		IF re-evaluation identifies an NOT Loss of Coolant Accide						
	AND		THEN GO TO identified EOI						
	Feedwater – available.		 IF re-evaluation identifies: 						
OR			a) Loss of Coolant Accider	ıt					
2)	Level – trending to between 40% NR and 80% NR		OR						
	AND		b) More than one event,						
	Feedwater Flow confirmed		THEN GO TO SO23-12-9, F RECOVERY	UNCTIONAL					
	 when level less than 40% NR. 		AND						
b. 1)	Single-phase Operating Loop RCS flow:		INITIATE SO23-12-9, Attach RECOVERY – HEAT REMO	ment FR-5,					
	$RCST_{c}$ – stable or lowering.		RECOVERT - HEAT REMO	VAL.					
OR									
2)	Two-phase Operating Loop RCS flow:								
	REP CET trend – stable or lowering.								

Con	Comments / Reference: From SO23-12-10, Attachment SF-3, Step 7 Revision # 3								
		AR ORGANIZATION 2 AND 3	N EMERGENCY OP REVISION 3 ATTACHMENT SF		2-10 ISS 2 0 OF 100				
	SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK								
			LOSS OF COOLAN	T ACCIDENT					
<u>.s</u> a	FET.	Y FUNCTION ACCE		ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA NOT ME	<u>T</u>				
7	Co	ntainment Isolation	I						
	NOTE During extreme containment temperature transient conditions such as LOCA, the Containment Area High Range Radiation Monitors may indicate a dose rate as high as 100 R/Hr due to thermally induced currents on their signal cables.								
Ē	a.	Containment press – less than 3.4 PS		RE-EVALUATE event per, Attach RECOVERY DIAGNOSTIC.	iment SF-1,				
		OR CIAS – actuated. Containment Area Radiation Monitors		 IF re-evaluation identifies an NOT Loss of Coolant Accide 					
	h			THEN GO TO identified EOI.					
	U.	 NOT alarming o 		• IF re-evaluation identifies:					
			Access Hatch General Area	a) Loss of Coolant Acciden	t				
		R7820-1 (Containment (High) Containment (High).	OR					
		OR	(3)	b) More than one event,					
		SIAS – actuated.		THEN GO TO SO23-12-9, F RECOVERY	UNCTIONAL				
		OR		AND					
		CIAS – actuated.		INITIATE SO23-12-9, Attach RECOVERY – CONTAINME					
	C.	Secondary Radiation – NOT alarming o		Aonitors ISOLATION.					
		R6753	Air Ejector, WRGM. Air Ejector E088 Blowdown 5A E088 Steamline E089 Blowdown 5B E089 Steamline.						

Comme	Comments / Reference: From SO23-12-10, Attachment SF-3, Step 8 Revision # 3									
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 3 ATTACHMENT				OPERATING INSTRUCTION SO23-12-10 ISS 2 PAGE 21 OF 100 T SF-3						
SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK										
	LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT									
<u>SAFET</u>	<u>en fu</u>	INCTION ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA	A	<u>icce</u>	EPTANCE CRITERIA NOT M	ET				
	ontair ontrol	nment Temperature and Pressure I								
<u>cc</u>	<u>ONDI:</u>	TION 1	¢	RE	E-EVALUATE event per, Attac ECOVERY DIAGNOSTIC.	chment SF-1,				
a.	 a. Containment average temperature – less than 205°F. 			•	IF re-evaluation identifies a NOT Loss of Coolant Accid					
 b. Containment pressure – less than 14 PSIG. 					THEN GO TO identified EC					
<u>C(</u>	<u>ondi</u>	TION 2		•	IF re-evaluation identifies:					
a.	Co	ntainment Spray:			a) Loss of Coolant Accide	ent				
	1)	Containment Spray Train A flow — greater than 1600 GPM.			OR					
	2)	S Containment Spray Train B flow			b) More than one event,					
	í	 – greater than 1600 GPM. 			THEN GO TO SO23-12-9, RECOVER Y	RUNCTIONAL				
	3)	Containment pressure — Iess than 60 PSIG.			AND					
					INITIATE SO23-12-9, Attac RECOVERY – CONTAINM TEMPERATURE AND PRE CONTROL.	IENT				

Commer	nts / F	Reference: From SO2	23-12-9, Attac	hme	ent FR-3, Step 4	Revision # 25		
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY OP UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 25 ATTACHMENT FF					ERATING INSTRUCTION SO23-12-9 ISS 2 PAGE 58 OF 274 R-3			
		I	FUNCTIONAL	REC	OVERY			
		RECOVE	RY - RCS IN\	/EN	TORY CONTROL			
		RCS INVENTO	RY CONTRO)L F	RECOVERY ACTIONS			
	<u>ACTI</u>	ON/EXPECTED RESPO	DNSE		RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED			
4 IN	ITIAT	E Leak Isolation: (Con	rtinued)					
C.		SURE Pressurizer Vent closed:	valves					
		HV-0297A HV-0297B.						
d.		SURE Reactor Vessel H ves – closed:	ead Vent					
		HV-0296A HV-0296B.						
e.		SURE Combined PZR/R htvalves – closed:	leactor Vessel					
		HV-0298 HV-0299.						
f.	VE	RIFY:		f.	ENSURE SIAS – actuated			
	1)	Outside Containment ra alarms	adiation		AND			
		 – NOT alarming or trending to alarm. 	nding to		REQUEST Shift Manager/Oper	ations Leader:		
	alarrn. 2) Outside Con		Gumps		 EVALUATE possible LOCA Containment 	outside		
		 NOT abnormally risi 	ng.		2) INITIATE FS-20, MONITOR	R RWST Level.		
					3) EVALUATE CIAS actuation	1.		

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		2
	Group #		2
	K/A #	045 G 2.1.20	
	Importance Rating		4.6

Main Turbine Generator System:Conduct of Operations: Ability to interpret and execute procedure stepsProposed Question:SRO 91

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 3 is at 75% power and performing a shutdown from 100% power for Refueling.
- Unit 2 has been at 100% power for 95 days and is performing monthly In Service Testing on a standby Charging Pump.
- Annunciator 50A02 COLSS ALARM actuates on Unit 2 and a steady slow power ramp to 100.06% is observed with a slight drop in T_{COLD}.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the cause of this alarm and the actions required to mitigate the event?

- A. Auxiliary Steam is aligned to Unit 2 and is starting to supply the Unit 3 Turbine Gland Sealing Steam. Enter SO23-13-11, Emergency Boration of the RCS / Inadvertent Dilution or Boration and immediately borate to restore Shutdown Margin.
- B. Auxiliary Steam is aligned to Unit 2 and is starting to supply the Unit 3 Turbine Gland Sealing Steam.
 Enter SO23-5-1.7, Power Operations and immediately reduce power to less than or equal to 100%.
- C. The standby Charging Pump had reduced boron concentration in its lines when it was started. Enter SO23-13-11, Emergency Boration of the RCS / Inadvertent Dilution or Boration and immediately borate to restore Shutdown Margin.
- D. The standby Charging Pump had elevated boron concentration in its lines when it was started. Enter SO23-5-1.7, Power Operations and immediately reduce power to less than or equal to 100%.

Proposed Answer: B

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible if thought that there would be inadequate SHUTDOWN MARGIN with power at this level. If SHUTDOWN MARGIN were inadequate this would be the correct procedure to enter.
- B. Correct. The Turbine Gland System is self-sealing above 80% power. Once power drops below 80%, Gland Sealing Steam will be supplied by Auxiliary Steam which will raise power on the supplying Unit. The action required is to reduce power to within 100% per SO23-5-1.7.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that there could be reduced boron in the Charging Pumps causing power to rise, however, an idle Charging Pump during an extended run is not likely to have reduced boron in the lines and a dilution would result in rising T_{COLD}.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because the procedural action is correct, however, an idle Charging Pump during an extended run is not likely to have elevated boron in the lines and a boration would result in a lowering T_{COLD}.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-5-1.7, L&S 5.21	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO23-5-1.7, Step 6.1.2	Comments / Reference
	SO23-5-1.7, L&S 2.1	
	SO23-15-50.A1, 50A02	

ι,	During Power Operations, EXPLAIN the precaution, limitation or administ requirement applicable to plant condition per SO23-5-1.7.				
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New X	<pre> (Note changes or attach parent)</pre>			
Question History:	Last NRC Exam				
Question Cognitive Lev	el: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis	X			
10 CFR Part 55 Conter	nt: 55.41 55.43 1, 5				

Comme	ents / R	Reference: Fron	n SO23-5-1.7, L&S 5.21		Revision # 41
	LEAR OI S 2 AND	RGANIZATION) 3	OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 41 ATTACHMENT 15	SO23-5- PAGE 85	
5.0	SE CO	NDARY PLANT	(continued)		
	5.17	generation by u The COLSS Ca PAGE) has be Secondary Calo	Program provides the possibility of gain sing Main Steam Flow for the COLSS po lorimetric Selection Display Interface (Cl en designed to latch the most recent cho primetric State. <u>When</u> MSBSCAL is sele for Unit 2 or > 95% for Unit 3, <u>then</u> MSB 950200596-01)	ower calculation (B OLSSCAL SELEC pice for the Default ected (default), <u>and</u>	SCAL). T
		(AN 1% and	en the Advanced Measurement Analysis (AG) is Out of Service, <u>then</u> FWBSCAL i higher than MSBSCAL. <u>If</u> MSBSCAL in COLSS is transferred to FWBSCAL, <u>the</u> eed 100%.	may indicate appro dicates >99% pow	xímately er,
	5.18	Feedwater Syst	CPD to the Condenser causes perturbati ems that can affect FWBSCAL and may is effect is not observed on MSBSCAL.	cause the COLSS	
	5.19	_ <u>≤</u> 95%. <u>If</u> reduc	s to FWBSCAL when Unit 2 power is <u><</u> 92 ing power at or below these values, <u>the</u> Ily transferring both COLSS Primary <u>and</u>	<u>n</u> consideration sho	ould be
	5.20	Assuring at leas miniflow closes mini⊦flow = 10,5 are closed, a 30	FT-3433A are the same FT's that input to st 10,500 gpm MFP Suction Flow will en- and remains closed (setpoint = 7000 gp i00 gpm) when placed in MODULATE.) MWe Unit power improvement is expect roximately 3500 gpm for each miniflow v	sure the associated m +3500 gpm thru When MFP miniflov cted and condensa	d J vvalves te flow
	5.21	become "non-s corresponding of Steam. If the U	oad is reduced below 80%, the Turbine elf sealing". This causes an increase in <u>decrease</u> in COLSS Power Margin for th nit supplying Aux Steam is at 100% pow e anticipated and Unit load adjusted acco	Aux Steam deman e Unit supplying Au ver operation, the C	d and a אנ

Comments / F	Reference:	From SO23-5-1.7, Step 6.1.2		Revision # 41
NUCLEAR O UNITS 2 ANI	03	ON OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 41	S023-5-1 PAGE 8 0	
	EDURE			
6.1	Guidelir	es for Steady State Power Opera	tion	
	C 1 1	REFERENCE USE		
	6.1.1 .1	System Parameter Guidelines REFER to Attachment 14 for parameter mor guidelines.	nitoring and control	band
	6.1.2	Power Level Guidelines (LS-2.14)		
	.1	MAXIMIZE Unit generation within the limits ((LS-5.10 and LS-5.28)	of Attachment 5.	
	.2	MAINTAIN Reactor Power constant by diluti per SO23-3-2.2, Section for Dilution Makeup Borating to the Charging Pump Suction. (LS	o Mode <u>OR</u> Section	equired for
	.3	MATCH Turbine Generator load with Reactor Section 6.3.	or Power changes p	er
	.4	MAINTAIN Power such that 50A02, COLSS except as allowed per ARP.	Alarm, is not annui	nciated,
	.5	<u>If</u> 100.6% Rated Thermal Power (BSCAL, C approached, <u>then</u> REQUEST the STA or Re determine if 100.6% RTP was exceeded. (L	actor Enginéering t	o)
	.6	If Excore Linear Power, CPC ΔT Power (PIE Power (PID 171) indication exceeds 101.5% SO23-3-3.2, Excore Nuclear Instrumentation	6, then PERFORM	İ
Comments / F	Reference:	From SO23-5-1.7, L&S 2.1		Revision # 41
NUCLEAR O UNITS 2 ANI)RGANIZATI(D 3	ON OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 41 ATTACHMENT 15	S023-5-1 PAGE 79	
2.0 POW	ER GUIDELI			
2.1	The most a CV9005A\ calculation are allowe once per s averaged o exceed 10 <u>When</u> it is	NGS is required to not exceed 100% Rated 1 accurate measure of power is secondary calo /G). Power is monitored by COLSS (continuo s (every 15 minutes). The excore nuclear ins d to deviate from the secondary calorimetric t hift per SO23-3-3.25. As long as BSCAL doe over an eight hour period it is acceptable for t D%. BSCAL may fluctuate slightly above 100 determined by BSCAL that RTP has exceede turn power to ≤ 100%. (Ref. 2.4.2.10) While it is acceptable for the NI/Core ΔT po should not exceed 102%.	rimetric (BSCAL), ously) or by manual struments and core by -1%/+5% and an es not exceed 100% he NI/core ΔT powo 1% without operator ed 100%, <u>then</u> actio	ΔT power e verified 6 RTP ers to r action. n shall be

Comme	ents / Reference: From	SO23-1	15-50.	A1, 50A02		Revisio	n # 8
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION ALARM UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISIO ATTACI			ON 8	ONSEINSTRUCTIO 7 2	N SO23-15 PAGE 10		
50A0	2 COLSS ALARM (Contin	ued)					
2.0	CORRECTIVE ACTIONS	<u>3</u> :					
	SPECIFIC CAUSES			SPECIFIC CORRE	CTIVE ACTION S		ſ
2.1	Plant power exceeds lice power limit.	nsed	2.1	Reduce Reactor po on Guidelines for C Reactor Power.	wer per SO23-5-1.7, hanging Turbine Loa	Section d and	:
				inadvertent SO23-13-1	r increase is due to a dilution, <u>THEN</u> initiate I , Emergency Boratio ertent Dilution or Bora	e n of the	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		2
	Group #		2
	K/A #	071 G :	2.1.32
	Importance Rating		4.0

<u>Waste Gas Disposal System</u>: Conduct of Operations: Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions Proposed Question: SRO 92

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 3 is performing a Waste Gas Decay Tank release using 2/3 RT-7808, Plant Vent Stack and Containment Purge Radiation Monitor.
- During the release, 3RT-7865, Containment Purge Radiation Monitor is declared INOPERABLE.

Per the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), which ONE (1) of the following is required?

- A. Verify 2/3RT-7808 is OPERABLE.
- B. Analyze two independent samples prior to continuing.
- C. Estimate the process flow rate at least once per 12 hours.
- D. Verify valve alignment, sample and release rate calculations.

Proposed Answer: A

Explanation:

- A. Correct. Per ODCM, Table 4-3, a minimum of one Channel must be OPERABLE.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because ACTION 35a states that when the number of OPERABLE Channels is less than required, at least two independent samples of the tank contents should be analyzed.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because ACTION 36a states that when the number of OPERABLE Channels is less than required, the process flow rate should be estimated at least once per 12 hours.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because ACTION 35b states that when the number of OPERABLE Channels is less than required, the valve alignment and release rate calculations must be re-verified.

Technical Reference(s)	SO123-ODCM, Table 4-3	Attached w/ Revision #
	SO123-ODCM, Table 4-3, ACTIONs 35a & 35b	See Comments /
	SO123-ODCM, Table 4-3, ACTION 36a	Reference

Learning Objective:	Given plant conditions concerning an effluent release, DETERMINE the
53393	applicable technical specification/administrative requirements or limitations.

Questi	on Source:	Bank #	71065			
		Modified Bank #		(Note char	nges or attach p	parent)
		New				·
Questi	on History:	Last NRC Exam				
Questi	on Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fund	amental Knowledge	e X		
	-	Comprehension	or Analysis			
10 CFF	R Part 55 Content:	55.41				
		55.43 1, 4				
Comm	ents / Reference: F	rom SO123-ODCM	l, Table 4-3	R	evision # 0	
			TABLE 4-3	·		
		RADIOACTIVE GASEOU	S EFFLUENT MONITORING	INSTRUMENTATION		
	INSTRUMENT***			MININUM CHANNELS	APPLICABILITY	ACTION
1.	WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYST	EM				
	Termination of R	ty Monitor - Providing elease - 2/3RT-7808, o e Moritoring Device	g Alarm and Automatic or 3RT-7865-1	L L	* *	35 36a

omments / Re	ferenc	e: From SO123-ODCM, Table 4-3, ACTIONs 35a & 35b	Revision #	
ACTION 35 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, the contents of the tank(s) may be released to the environment provided that prior to initiating the release:				
	a.	At least two independent samples of the tank's conte analyzed, and	nts are	
	b.	At least two technically qualified members of the Fa independently verify the release rate calculations a valve lineup;	cility Staff nd discharge	
	0ther	wise, suspend releases of radioactive effluents via t	his pathway.	
		4-12	S0123-ODCM Revision 0 02-27-07	

Comments / Referer	ce: From SO123-ODCM, Table 4-3, ACTIONs 36a	Revision # 0
	TABLE 4-3 (Continued)	
	TABLE NOTATION	
Chan	the number of channels OPERABLE less than required nels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via the inue provided:	
a.	The process flow rate is estimated at least once p during actual releases. In addition, a new flow o be made within I hour after a change that affects has been completed. System design characteristics to estimate process flow.	estimate shall process flow
b.	The particulate and iodine (P&I) sample flow rate or verified at least once per 12 hours during actu	is estimated ual releases.

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		2
	Group #		2
	K/A #	034 A	43.02
	Importance Rating		3.1

Fuel Handling Equipment System:Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Fuel Handling System, including: Load limitsProposed Question:SRO 93

Given the following conditions during Refueling:

- A Spent Fuel Assembly was placed in the Fuel Transfer Carriage inside Containment.
- While transferring the Assembly between the Containment and Fuel Handling Building, the Fuel Transfer Carriage became lodged in the Transfer Canal.
- Transfer stopped when the 800 pound overload limit was reached.

Which ONE (1) of the following actions is required?

- A. Evacuate Containment only.
- B. Notify Health Physics to monitor radiation levels in the Fuel Transfer Tube Area.
- C. Evacuate the Fuel Handling Building only.
- D. Notify Health Physics to monitor radiation levels in the Radwaste Building.

Proposed Answer: B

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that Containment must be evacuated because of the location of the Transfer Canal, however, this area is inaccessible to personnel during refueling.
- B. Correct. Given the conditions listed, this the action to be taken for a stuck Fuel Assembly.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because there are individuals inside the Fuel Handling Building, however, it is the Fuel Transfer Tube Area (Penetration Room 111) that must be monitored.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible if thought that the Radwaste Building was the location of the Transfer Canal.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-X-7, Precautions 4.43 and 4.51	_ Attached w/ Revision # See	
	SD-SO23-430, Pages 75 & 76	Comments / Reference	

Learning Objective:	As the SRO, DIRECT the response to Fuel Handling Accidents/Loss of Cavity
54861	or SFP Level Control per SO23-13-20.

Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	Х	_ (Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundam Comprehension or <i>J</i>	•	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.43 _7		

mments / F	Reference: From SC	D23-X-7, Precaution 4.43	Revision # 16
NUCLEAR UNITS 2 AM	ORGANIZATION ND 3	NUCLEAR FUELS SERVICES PROCEDURE REVISION 16	SO23-X-7 PAGE 22 OF 198
4.41	their weight is les	ols, spacers, etc., may be stored in the spen s than 100 pounds. Items whose dimensior d whose weight is less than 1500 pounds m	ns are similar to a
	EXAMPLES: tras	sh baskets, dummy fuel assemblies, CEA ca	arriers, etc.
	Items which conta maximum drop he height as a fuel a	ain fuel, such as fuel rod storage baskets, an eight of 21.7 feet, by sizing these containers ssembly.	re limited to a to the same
4.42	The rod storage b containing up to 4	askets are currently approved for storage o 4.8% initial U-235 enrichment (w/o).	f fuel rods
	with mos	storage baskets shall be treated as if it wer enrichment and burnup of the rod in the ba t limiting combination of enrichment and bu ordance with LCS 4.0.100.7.	sket with the
4.43	bundle or other hi HP at the 70' Con irradiated fuel bur transfer tube and	O' Control point (86695) if planning to stop a ighly radioactive items in the U2 or U3 trans itrol Point (86695) if the transfer carriage, w ndle or other highly radioactive items, stops cannot be restarted within 3 minutes. Advis around the fuel transfer tube in penetration I d increase.	ter tube. Notity hile carrying an in the U2 or U3 se HP that dose
omments / F	Reference: From SC	D23-X-7, Precaution 4.51	Revision # 16
NUCLEAR UNITS 2 AI	ORGANIZATION ND 3	NUCLEAR FUELS SERVICES PROCEDURE REVISION 16	SO23-X-7 PAGE 24 OF 198
4.51	time, pending ree 080100570 and o	embly containing a CEA may be placed in the valuation of the transfer system load rating order # 200003889). Placing two fuel assem taining a CEA, is acceptable.	reterence AR #

Comments / Reference: From SD-SO23-430, Pages 75 & 76	Revision # 12
2.3.15 Transfer Carriage (Manual):	
Transferring the carriage from one side of the transfer tube to the other in manual is accomplished by an operator on either console turning the "CARRIAGE TRANSFER" selector switch to the name of the side required. When the input is detected, the output for the carriage motor brake is turned on, the drive enable output is closed, and the drive speed reference is set for slow speed. When the carriage is fully in the transfer tube the speed reference is changed to the high speed setting, until the end of the tube is reached, where slow speed is again commanded. For carriage motion to be operated the following conditions are required:	
.1 The carriage in position switch on the spent fuel pool side must be open if the carriage is commanded to that side.	
.2 The carriage in position switch on the reactor side must be open if the carriage is commanded to that side.	
.3 A normal overload of 800 LBS cannot exist or one of the load override pushbuttons must be held depressed while moving in the reverse direction of the overload.	
.4 The Max. overload of 2000 LBS cannot be activated.	
.5 An automatic sequence is not in operation.	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		3
	Group #		1
	K/A #	G 2	.1.5
	Importance Rating		3.9

<u>Conduct of Operations</u>: Ability to use procedures related to shift staffing, such as minimum crew complement, over time limitations, etc.

Proposed Question: SRO 94

Given the following:

- Unit 2 is in MODE 1.
- The shift is manned to the minimum composition per Appendix R.
- The shift has 4 hours remaining.
- The 21 Watch has become ill and must leave the site for emergency medical treatment.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the requirements regarding the shift composition and required action in this situation?

- A. The 21 Watch may leave the site immediately after turnover of responsibilities to another qualified person on shift. A replacement must arrive within 2 hours.
- B. The 21 Watch may NOT leave the site until minimum manning has been maintained by calling in a qualified relief.
- C. Responsibilities of the 21 Watch may be turned over to the 22 Watch for the remainder of the shift.
- D. The CRS may assume the responsibilities of the 21 Watch. The Shift Manager may perform concurrent SM/CRS duties until shift relief with a qualified STA on site.

Proposed Answer: A

Explanation:

- A. Correct. A medical emergency meets the requirements of an "unexpected absence" and the individual is allowed to leave. Immediate action must be taken to restore the shift complement to the minimum requirements.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because if there is an emergency they may leave, however, the position must be filled within 2 hours.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because the crew may choose to assume responsibilities as they need to, however, there is too much time left on shift (4 hours) to not have a replacement.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because the crew may choose to assume responsibilities as they need to, however, a maximum of 2 hours below minimum manning is allowed.

Technical Reference(s)	SO123-0-A1, Attachr	ment 2	Attached w/ Revision # See
-	Technical Specification	ons Section 5.2.2	Comments / Reference
Proposed references to be	provided during exar	nination: None	
•	ven plant conditions, D 10CFR50.54.	DETERMINE if licens	e conditions have been violated
Question Source:	Bank #	151972	
	Modified Bank #		(Note changes or attach parent)
	New		
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	SONGS 2006	
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge		X
	Comprehension or A	Analysis	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41		
	55.43 2, 5		

	ce: From SO123-0-		Revision # 18
IUCLEAR ORGANIZ INITS 1, 2 AND 3	ATION OPERATIO REVISION ATTACHM		SO123-0-A1 PAGE 58 OF 67
(Tech Specé	MINIMUM OPERATIC 5.2.2.a, 5.2.2.b, 5.2.2.c	NSSHIFT CREW COMPOSITION (LCS 5.0.100.1; 5.0.100.1.1 , Tab	le 5.0.100-1)
<u>IF</u> Unit2 is in	AND Unit 3 is in	<u>THEN</u> the minimum Operations composition is [1] [2]	Shift crew
MODE 1-4	MODE 1-4	1 SM (SRO) [5] [7] 2 CRSs (SRO) [7] 5 CO/ACOs (RO) [4] 4 Primary Qualified NPEOs 1 STA [9] 1 FTA [8] [9] 1 Appendix R [8]	
MODE 5-6	MODE 5-6	1 SM (SRO) [5] 1 CRS (SRO) 5 CO/ACOs (RO) [4] 4 Primary Qualified NPEOs 1 STA [6] [9] 1 FTA [8] [9] 1 Appendix R [8]	
MODE 1-4	MODE 5-6	1 SM (SRO) [5] [7] 2 CRSs (SRO) [7] 5 CO/ACOs (RO) [4] 4 Primary Qualified NPEOs 1 STA [6] [9] 1 FTA [8] [9] 1 Appendix R [8]	
MODE 5-6	MODE 1-4	1 SM (SRO) [5] [7] 2 CRSs (SRO) [7] 5 CO/ACOs (RO) [4] 4 Primary Qualified NPEOs 1 STA [6] [9] 1 FTA [8] [9] 1 Appendix R [8]	
MODE 1-4	CORE ALTS	1 SM (SRO) [5] [7] 3 CRSs (SRO) [3] [7] 5 CO/ACOs (RO) [4] 4 Primary Qualified NPEOs 1 STA [9] 1 FTA [8] [9] 1 Appendix R [8]	
CORE ALTS	MODE 1-4	1 SM (SRO) [5] [7] 3 CRSs (SRO) [3] [7] 5 CO/ACOs (RO) [4] 4 Primary Qualified NPEOs 1 STA [9] 1 FTA [8] [9] 1 Appendix R [8]	

mme	ents / Reference: From	n SO123-0-A1, Attachment 2	Revision # 18
	LEAR ORGANIZATION S 1, 2 AND 3	OPERATIONS DIMISION PROCEDURE REMISION 18 ATTACHMENT 2	SO123-0-A1 PAGE 59 OF 67
	MINIMUM	1 OPERATIONS SHIFT CREW COMPOSITIO (Continued)	Ν
Footr	notes		
[1]	requirements for a perio unexpected absence of to restore the shift crew does not permit any shift	ager, the shift crew composition may be one lo of of time not to exceed 2 hours in order to acc on duty shift crew members provided IMMEDI composition to within the minimum requirement ft crew position to be unmanned upon shift cha son being late or absent. (Tech. Spec. 5.2.2.c.)	commodate ATE ACTION is taken nts. This provision ange due to an
[2]	At least one ACTIVELY fuel is in the Reactor.(LICENSED Reactor Operator shall be in the C Fech. Spec. 5.2.2.b)	Control Room when
[3]	LICENSED Senior Read	during periods of CORE ALTERATIONS, shal ctor Operator (SRO), who has no other concur pervise the CORE ALTERATION from the refu .100.1.2)	rent duties during this
[4]	The minimum Tech. Sp 32, ARO, and 41/51. (/	ec. limit is 3 ROs. Normal RO staffing would ir AR 070401390-4)	nclude the 21, 31, 22,
[5]	Individual may fill positio	on for both Units.	
[6]		ifety assessment, the STA position shall be co ted by Management. (Ref. 2.3.4)	ntinuously manned in
[7]	While the Unit is in Mod Operator shall be in the	e 1, 2, 3 or 4, at least one ACTIVELY LICENS Control Room Area. (Tech. Spec. 5.2.2.b)	ED Senior Reactor
[8]	The Fire Technical Advi who does not have cond	sor (FTA) position <u>must</u> be filled with a Licens current Appendix "R" responsibilities. (AR 0704	ed Reactor Operator 401390-4)
[9]	The WPS may be desig position. (AR 07040139	nated as the Fire Technical Advisor if not conc 90-4)	currently filling the STA

Comments / I	Referer	nce: From Technical Specifications Section 5.2.2	Amendme	ent # 207
5.2.2	UNIT	<u>T STAFF</u>		
	The	unit staff organization shall include the following:		
	a.	A non-Licensed Operator shall be assigned to each reactor co fuel and an additional non-Licensed Operator shall be assigne each unit when a reactor is operating in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4.		
		With both units shutdown or defueled, a total of three non-Lice operators are required for the two units.	ensed	
	b.	At least one licensed Reactor Operator (RO) shall be in the Co Room when fuel is in the reactor. In addition, while the unit is MODE 1, 2, 3 or 4, at least one licensed Senior Reactor Opera (SRO) shall be in the Control Room Area.	in	
	C.	Shift crew composition may be less than the minimum require 10 CFR $50.54(m)(2)(i)$ and $5.2.2.a$ for a period of time not to e hours in order to accommodate unexpected absence of on-du crew members provided immediate action is taken to restore t crew composition to within the minimum requirements.	xceed 2 ty shift	
	d.	A radiation protection technician shall be on site when fuel reactor. The position may be vacant for not more than 2 hours order to provide for unexpected absence, provided immediate taken to fill the required position.	s, in	I
	e.	Administrative controls shall be developed and implemented to working hours of personnel who perform safety-related function senior reactor operators, reactor operators, auxiliary operators physicists, and key maintenance personnel). The controls sha guidelines on working hours that ensure that adequate shift co maintained without routine heavy use of overtime for individual	ins (e.g., 5, health all include werage is	
		Any deviation from the working hour guidelines shall be author advance by the cognizant corporate officer, or designees, in accordance with approved administrative procedures, or by his levels of management, in accordance with established proced with documentation of the basis for granting the deviation.	n gher	I
		Controls shall be included in the procedures such that individu overtime shall be reviewed monthly by the cognizant corporat officer, or designees, to ensure that excessive hours have n assigned. Routine deviation from the above guidelines shall r authorized.	te ot been	
	f.	The Manager, Plant Operations (at time of appointment), Shif Managers, and Control Room Supervisors shall hold a Senior Operator's license.	t Reactor	
	g.	The Shift Technical Advisor (STA) shall provide advisory tech support to the Shift Manager in the areas of thermal hydraulic engineering, and plant analysis with regard to the safe operati unit. The STA shall have a Bachelor's Degree or equivalent in scientific or engineering discipline with specific training in plan and in the response and analysis of the plant for transients an accidents.	s, reactor ion of the n a it design	

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		3
	Group #		1
	K/A #	G 2.	1.23
	Importance Rating		4.4

<u>Conduct of Operations</u>: Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation Proposed Question: SRO 95

Given the following conditions:

- SO23-12-8, Station Blackout is currently in use.
- Subsequently, a Loss of Coolant Accident occurs.
- Qualified Safety Parameter Display System is OPERABLE.
- Pressurizer level has been below the indicating range for greater than 1 hour.
- Core Exit Thermocouple temperature is 713°F.
- Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is in operation.

Based on the conditions listed, which ONE (1) of the following is the Control Room Supervisor's top priority?

- A. Remain in SO23-12-8, Station Blackout, and attempt to restore power to at least one 1E 4160 Volt Bus.
- A. Determine that core damage is in progress. Remain in SO23-12-8, Station Blackout and implement the Severe Accident Management Guidelines.
- B. Reactor Vessel water level is below the top of the core. Transition to SO23-12-9, Functional Recovery and implement FR-3, Recovery - RCS Inventory Control.
- B. The core has just reached saturation conditions and SO23-12-11, EOI Supporting Attachments, Attachment 5, Core Exit Saturation Margin Control should be implemented.

Proposed Answer: C

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because restoration of power to a Safeguards Bus is a priority, however, Inadequate Core Cooling conditions exist and entry into SO23-12-9 is required.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because the Severe Accident Management Guidelines are available for use, however, conditions have not degraded to the point where the SAMGs would be implemented.
- C. Correct. Given the conditions listed, entry into the Functional Recovery Procedure is required.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because feedwater is available, however, superheat conditions exist regardless of RCS pressure and entry into the Functional Recovery Procedure is required.

Technical Reference(s)		2-9, Entry Conditions	Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference
	SO23-14-9, FR-3 Ba	ases	
Proposed references to I	pe provided during exa	mination: None	
3 ,	Per the Functional Reco ach step, caution or no		-12-9 DESCRIBE: The basis for
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank #	127126	(Note changes or attach parent)
	New		(Note changes of attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	SONGS 2005A	
Question Cognitive Leve	I: Memory or Fundan Comprehension or	•	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content	55.41		

55.43 5

nmer	nts / Reference: From SO23-12-9, Entry Conditions	Revision # 25
	EAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S 2 AND 3 REVISION 25 F	SO23-12-9 ISS 2 PAGE 2 OF 274
	FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY	
JRPO	DSE	
To for	provide a systematic approach to mitigate any event that actuates or require which:	s a Reactor Trip,
1	A diagnosis is NOT confirmed.	
	OR	
2	A diagnosis of multiple malfunctions occurs.	
	OR	
3	An optimal recovery instruction is NOT adequately recovering the plant.	
Th	e actions specified maintain each Safety Function.	
NTRY	(CONDITIONS	
1	ANY of the following conditions present:	
	 An event diagnosis is NOT confirmed. 	
	 Multiple events are diagnosed. 	
	 SRO Operations Supervisor specifies Functional Recovery due to action recovery EOI. 	is from an optimal
	Optimal recovery EOI safety function acceptance criteria NOT satisfied.	
	AND	
	SO23-12-1, STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS, steps 1 through 10 have b	een
	completed (Modes 1 and 2)	
OF		

Comments / Reference: From SO23-14-9, FR-3 Bases Revision # 25						
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EOI SUPPORT UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 10 ATTACHMENT	T DOCUMENT SO23-14-9 PAGE 51 OF 243 T 1					
FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY BASES AND DEVIATION	ONSJUSTIFICATION					
EOI STEP BASES						
4.0 BASES DESCRIPTION (Continued)						
4.7 ATTACHMENT FR-3, RECOVERY - RCS INVENTORY COM	NTROL					
is to keep the core covered with an effective medium for the r RCS inventory is maintained between the minimum volumes with an effective coolant medium and the maximum level des (i.e., to prevent solid plant operation with its associated press	The purpose of maintaining RCS Inventory Control, in conjunction with RCS Pressure Control, is to keep the core covered with an effective medium for the removal of decay heat. To do this, RCS inventory is maintained between the minimum volumes required to keep the core covered with an effective coolant medium and the maximum level desirable for operational purposes (i.e., to prevent solid plant operation with its associated pressure control problems). The Functional Recovery RCS Inventory Control attachment is divided into the following three main sections:					
1. Recovery Actions						
 <u>Resource Assessment Charts</u> The two RACs provide graphical representation of plant equipment and information needed to fulfill the Inventory Control Safety Function via a given Success Path. The charts are used as aids in determining if a success path is available. They are: 						
RAC-IC-1: CVCS						
RAC-IC-2: ECCS						
3. Success Path Actions						
 Success Path Actions: IC-1, CVCS 						
 Success Path Actions: IC-2, ECCS 						
4.7.1 Recovery Actions						
.1 Step 1 Determine RCS Inventory Control Success	s Path available					
The first step of the Recovery Actions provides direction for should be used to recover the Inventory Control Safety Fu Safety Function Status Check or an optimal EOI normally attachment. If a Success Path is already identified, then it Success Path is identified for this Safety Function, the Res (RAC-IC-1 and RAC-IC-2) are used to determine the meth Inventory Control Safety Function.	unction. The Functional Recovery directs entry into the recovery t is implemented. Unless a specific source Assessment Charts hod(s) available to recover the					
SAMG initiation should be evaluated. The actual evaluation EOI. Generally speaking, continued inability to establish of warrants SAMG initiation. In addition to this SAMG reques on with the remaining steps of the Recovery Actions.	on and initiation is done outside this control of this Safety Function,					

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		3
	Group #		2
	K/A #	G 2	
	Importance Rating		3.6

Equipment Control: Knowledge of the process for making changes to procedures Proposed Question: SRO 96

A Procedure Modification Permit which could potentially change the <u>intent</u> of an Operating Instruction is being prepared.

Which ONE (1) of the following activities is required for the Procedure Modification Permit?

- A. Approval by the Shift Manager is required within 14 days of completion.
- B. A 50.59 Safety Evaluation must be performed within 14 days of completion.
- C. Approval by the Manager, Operations is required prior to implementation.
- D. Approval by the Operations Procedure Group Supervisor must be performed prior to implementation.

Proposed Answer: C

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because their approval may be required prior to implementation depending on the availability of the Ops Manager.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because a 50.59 is required, however, it is required based on the time the PMP will be used. See Step 3 of OP(123)28.
- C. Correct. Per Step 4 of OP(123)28.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because they would review but only to determine if a REV or TCN is required.

Technical Reference(s)	SO123-0-A3, Step 6.16	Attached w/ Revision # See
	Form OP(123)28, Step 4 & Keypoint 13	Comments / Reference

Learning Objective:	As an SRO, given a plant situation, DESCRIBE the administrative or technical
55169	specification requirements applicable to a situation not covered by Normal,
	Abnormal or Emergency Operating instructions and determine the required
	action.

Question Source:	Bank #	128199	
	Modified Bank #		(Note changes or attach parent)
	New		

ES-401	SRO Written Exam Worksheet		Form ES-401-5
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis	<u> X </u>	
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.43 3		

Comments / Reference:	From SO123-0-A3, Step 6.16	Revision # 8			
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION OPERATIONS DIVISION PROCEDURE SO123-0-A3 UNITS 1, 2 AND 3 REVISION 8 PAGE 25 OF 38					
6.0 <u>PROCEDURE</u> (Continued)					
6.16 Procedu	re Modification Permit (PMP), Form OP(123) 28				
6.16.1	A PMP, Form OP(123) 28, should be used to resolve issues th facilitate in-use or imminent use of a procedure for current plan conditions, when such conditions are different from those assue the original procedure, and are more extensive than CLARIFIC.	t med by			
6.16.2	malities, not MP using 29, <u>or</u> on as				
6.16.3	Operation Division Forms are available in Portal or SAP GUI us SCASE module and accessing Records >Record: Nuclear Con Forms.				
.1	In instances when the Portal or SAP GUI are unavailable, conta for a copy of the form or to verify the form is the current version				
6.16.4	PMPs shall be prepared, approved, and implemented using Fo OP(123) 28, Keypoints-Procedure Modification Permit, as a gui	rm ide.			
.1	It is acceptable to use more than one permit form for a particula However, only one approval page is required and all pages sha numbered and accounted for.	ar PMP. all be			
6.16.5	Initial Approval of the PMP shall be made by a member of PLA MANAGEMENT STAFF-OPERATIONS and an SRO based up assessment of system and/or plant status and conditions. (LCS 5.0.103.1.3.b)				
.1	After Initial Approval, <u>then</u> the PMP shall be attached to the affe STAND ALONE PROCEDURE/ATTACHMENT, and the listed procedure steps modified as described on the PMP.	ected			
6.16.6	<u>If</u> the preparer determines the PMP should be evaluated for incorporation into existing procedures, <u>then</u> a Notification shoul initiated, <u>and</u> a copy of the PMP should be sent to the Operatio Procedures Group Supervisor for evaluation as a TCN or revisi	ins			
6.16.7	<u>After</u> a PMP has received Initial Approval, <u>then</u> it shall not be de for subsequent use unless specifically allowed by the PMP.	uplicated			

Comments / Reference: From OP(123)28, Step 4 Revision # 0									
Reference: S0123-0-A3									
PROCEDURE MODIFICATION PERMIT CONTINUOUS USE									
PERHIT #	PERHIT # UNIT PROCEDURE NUMBER REV/TON ATTACHMENT # PMP PAGE								
	□ 2 □ 3 □ C				OF _				
SECTION/AT	TACHMENT TITLE:	•							
NAME OF REC	UESTER:								
1. Does ti and/or	his activity conflict with LCS (Licensee Controlled	the Operating License Specifications)?	, Technical	Specifications,	YE T				
	. <u>then</u> cancel activity, re		icensing.						
	implementation of this act e adverse ENVIRONMENTAL EF				YE T				
b. Pot	entially impact the TOPICA	L REPORT, SECURITY PLA	NS, EMERGEN	ICY PLAN, FIRE	L				
1	TECTION PROGRAM (including		l/or ISI Pro)gram?	L L				
	entially impact TECHNICAL entially move fluid and/or	•	s vs t.em?						
IT YES	to a. b. c. and/or d. <u>the</u> tach justification if prov	_ n obtain approval from	•	ant Division Supa	⊶ ≀rvision.				
I	(✔) all items that apply t								
Imp	lements ALREADY APPROYED (Enter identifiers and asso	changes ciated numbers:							
I =	Olves MAINTENANCE ACTIVITI								
	lements EDITORIAL CORRECTI		CEDURE MODI	FICATIONS		- NA			
If the or if	Involves a procedure that is SO.59 DNA YES NA If there are parts of the PMP that are not entirely addressed by the items above. □□□ or if this supports a Maintenance Activity and the PMP will be in effect ≥90 days at power. <u>then</u> complete 10CFR50.59 screening prior to 90 days. <u>and</u> attach after this cover page.								
	AR Number:								
1	his PMP Change INTENT of t				rnew ⊤				
a. All	owing performance of a new w path, not originally aut	, unrelated function, thorized?	or creates	a new evolution	ornew <u>L</u>				
1	uiring a new or additional				Γ				
<u>If</u> YES impleme	to a and/or b. <u>then</u> OBTAI entation. (TS D6.8.2 and	N approval from Manage LCS 5.0.103.12)	r. Operation	ns prior to					
	his activity involve DCS/I omplatad. Name:	SFSI? <u>If</u> YES, <u>then</u> en	SURS RSVISH	by a 72.48 Scrss	enerhas YE	IS NO			
	he proposed change affect . <u>or</u> unkno∺n, <u>then</u> complet				y e L	I D			
omments /	Reference: From OP(1)	23)28, Keypoint 13			Revision #	£ 0			
	<u>KEYPOINTS - PROCE</u>	DURE MODIFICATION	PERMIT (Continued)					
add the	the permit changes the itional 10CFR50.59 Eve n the Manager, Operati lementation. (Keypoint	aluation, <u>or</u> create ions shall approve	s a new e	volution or f					

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		3
	Group #		2
	K/A #	G 2.	2.25
	Importance Rating		4.2

Equipment Control: Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits Proposed Question: SRO 97

Given the following BOC conditions:

- Unit 2 is operating at 100% power with a leaking Main Steam Safety valve on Steam Generator E088.
- There is one (1) Main Steam Safety Valve already gagged on Steam Generator E088.
- Preparations are being made to gag second leaking Main Steam Safety Valve on E088.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the Technical Specification requirements that apply to gagging a <u>second</u> Main Steam Safety Valve on E088 and what is the basis for this requirement?

Reduce...

- A. power which will allow the Safety Valves to remove the required amount of decay heat to prevent exceeding the Safety Limit of 1.03 for DNBR on a loss of the normal secondary heat removal path.
- B. allowed power and High Power trip setpoints which ensures that the RCS Pressure Safety Limit of ≤ 2750 psia is NOT exceeded on a loss of the normal secondary heat removal path.
- C. High Pressure trip setpoints which ensures that the peak centerline temperature of < 4960°F is NOT exceeded on a loss of the normal secondary heat removal path.
- D. High Power trip setpoints which ensures that the Safety Limit of 1.03 for DNBR is NOT exceeded on a loss of the normal secondary heat removal path.

Proposed Answer: B

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that limiting power would limit decay heat and subsequent RCS temperature post-event and protect against exceeding DNBR, however, the DNBR value is incorrect.
- B. Correct. Limiting power and high power trip setpoints is required and in conjunction with the PZR Safety Valves protects against exceeding the RCS Pressure Safety Limit of ≤ 2750 psia.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that limiting power and High Pressure setpoints would limit decay heat and subsequent RCS temperature post-event and protect against exceeding Peak Centerline Temperature Safety Limit. The Peak Centerline Temperature listed reflects an EOC condition as PCT is reduced 58°F for every 10,000 MWD/MTU.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that limiting power would limit decay heat and subsequent RCS temperature post-event and protect against exceeding the DNBR safety limit, however, the DNBR value is incorrect.

Technical Reference(s)	Technical Specific	cation LCO 3.7.1	Attached w/ Revision # See
	Technical Specific	cation LCO 3.7.1, Table	Comments / Reference
	Technical Specific	cation LCO 3.7.1, Bases	
	Tech Spec Safety	/ Limit 2.1.1 & 2.1.2, Bases	
Proposed references to be	e provided during e	examination: <u>None</u>	
56649 su LC SC	rveillance results, O(s) impacted alor	ng with all required actions Technical Specifications a	uipment OPERABILITY and and surveillances using
Question Source:	Bank #		
	Modified Bank #	1)	Note changes or attach parent)
	New	Х	
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Level:	Memory or Fund Comprehension	lamental Knowledge _ or Analysis _	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.43 _2		

Сс	Comments / Reference: From Technical Specification LCO 3.7.1 Amendment # 212							
	3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs)							
	LCO 3.7.1 The MSSVs shall be OPERABLE as specified in Table 3.7.1-1 and Table 3.7.1-2.							
	APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2							
	Separate Condition entry is allo	Ved for	each MSSV.					
	CONDITION		REQUIRED ACTION	N	COMPLET TIME	10N		
	A. Two to seven required MSSVs per SG inoperable. A.1 Reduce power to less than or equal to the applicable % RTP listed in Table 3.7.1- 1.							
		L a					I	
<u> </u>	mmonto / Poforonco: Erom T			271 7		۸m	ondmont # 212	
	Comments / Reference: From Technical Specification LCO 3.7.1, Table 3.7.1.1 Amendment # 212 Table 3.7.1-1 (page 1 of 1) Maximum Allowable Power Level versus Inoperable MSSVs							
	NUMBER OF INOPERABLE MSSVs PER STEAM GENERAT(MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER (% RTP)	ALL LINEA LEVEL	XIMUM OWABLE AR POWER HIGH TRIP RTP)				
	2		95	95				
	3		56	56				
	4		46	46		ĺ		
	5 to 7		MODE 3	Not ap	plicable			
Ŀ								

Comments / Reference: From Technical Specification LCO 3.7.1 Bases	Amendment # 127
APPLICABLE The design basis for the MSSVs comes from Reference 2; its SAFETY ANALYSES purpose is to limit secondary system pressure to ≤ 110% design pressure when passing 100% of design steam flo This design basis is sufficient to cope with any anticipate operational occurrence (AOO) or accident considered in Design Basis Accident (DBA) and transient analysis.	w. d
The events that challenge the MSSV relieving capacity, and th RCS pressure, are those characterized as decreased heat rem events, and are presented in the UFSAR, Section 15.2 (Ref. 3 these, the full power loss of condenser vacuum (LOCV) event the limiting AOO. An LOCV isolates the turbine and condense and terminates normal feedwater flow to the Steam Generators Before delivery of auxiliary feedwater to the Steam Generators RCS pressure reaches ≤ 2750 psig. This peak pressure is les than or equal to 110% of the design pressure of 2500 psia, bu enough to actuate the pressurizer safety valves. The maximum relieving rate of the MSSVs during the LOCV event (Ref. 3, Fig. 15.2-10), is within the rated capacity of the MSSVs.	noval). Of is er, s. s. s. t high
The limiting accident for peak RCS pressure is the full power feedwater line break (FWLB), inside containment, with the failu the backflow check valve in the feedwater line from the affecter Steam Generator. Water from the affected Steam Generator i assumed to be lost through the break with minimal additional h transfer from the RCS. With heat removal limited to the unaffe Steam Generator, the reduced heat transfer causes an increas RCS temperature, and the resulting RCS fluid expansion caus an increase in pressure. The RCS pressure increases to ≤ 3000 psia (Ref. 3, Fig. 15.2-40), with the pressurizer safety valves providing relief capacity. The maximum relieving rate o MSSVs during the Feedwater Line Break event (Ref. 3, Fig. 16 51), is within the rated capacity of the MSSVs.	d is heat ected se in es f the
The MSSVs satisfy Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement.	

Comments / Ref	Amendment # 127	
LCO	This LCO requires all MSSVs to be OPERABLE in complianc Reference 2, even though this is not a requirement of the DB analysis. This is because operation with more than one MSS inoperable per steam generator requires limitations on allowa THERMAL POWER (to meet Reference 2 requirements) and adjustment to Reactor Protection System trip setpoints. Thes limitations are according to those shown in Table 3.7.1-1, Ref Action A.1, and Required Action A.2. An MSSV is considered inoperable if it fails to open upon demand.	V ble se quired
	The OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is defined as the ability to o in accordance with Lift Settings specified in Table 3.7.1-2, rel Steam Generator overpressure, and reseat when pressure ha been reduced. The OPERABILITY of the MSSVs is determin periodic surveillance testing in accordance with the inservice testing program.	iève
	The Lift Settings specified in Table 3.7.1-2 correspond to amb conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.	pient
	This LCO provides assurance that the MSSVs will perform the designed safety function to mitigate the consequences of acc that could result in a challenge to the Reactor Coolant Pressu Boundary.	idents

Comments / Refere	nce: From Tech Spec Safety Limit 2.1.2 Bases	Amendment # 127				
APPLICABLE The RCS pressurizer safety valves are sized to prevent SAFETY ANALYSES system pressure from exceeding the design pressure by more (continued) than 10%, in accordance with Section III of the ASME Code for Nuclear Power Plant Components (Ref. 2). The transient that establishes the required relief capacity, and hence the valve size requirements and lift settings, is a complete loss of external load without a direct reactor trip. During the transient, no control actions are assumed except that the safety valves on the secondary plant are assumed to open when the steam pressure reaches the secondary plant safety valve settings, and nominal feedwater supply is maintained.						
	The Reactor Protective System (RPS) trip setpoints (LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protective System (RPS) Instrumentation"), together with the settings of the MSSVs (LCO 3.7.1, "Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs)") and the pressurizer safety valves, provide pressure protection for normal operation and AOOs. In particular, the Pressurizer Pressure — High Trip setpoint is specifically set to provide protection against overpressurization (Ref. 5). Safety analyses for both the Pressure — High Trip and the RCS pressurizer safety valves are performed, using conservative assumptions relative to pressure control devices.					
	More specifically, no credit is taken for operation of the follow	ng:				
	a. Steam Bypass Control System;					
	b. Pressurizer Level Control System; or					
	c. Pressurizer Pressure Control System.					
SAFETY LIMITS	The maximum transient pressure allowable in the RCS pressuves vessel under the ASME Code, Section III, is 110% of design pressure; therefore, the SL on maximum allowable RCS press is established at 2750 psia.					
APPLICABILITY	SL 2.1.2 applies in MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 because this SL be approached or exceeded in these MODES due to overpressurization events.	could				

Comments / Referen	nce: From Tech Spec Safety Limit 2.1.1 Bases	Amendment # 207
SAFE TY LIMITS	SL 2.1.1.1 and SL 2.1.1.2 ensure that the minimum DNBR is less than the safety analyses limit and that fuel centerline temperature remains below melting.	not
	The minimum value of the DNBR during normal operation and design basis AOOs is limited to 1.31, based on a statistical combination of CE-1 CHF correlation and engineering factor uncertainties, and is established as an SL. Additional factors as rod bow and spacer grid size and placement will determine limiting safety system settings required to ensure that the SL maintained.	such e the
	A steady state peak linear heat rate of 21 KW/ft has been established as the Limiting Safety System Setting to prevent f centerline melting during normal steady state operation. Follo design basis anticipated operational occurrences, the transier linear heat rate may exceed 21 KW/ft provided the fuel center melt temperature is not exceeded.	owing nt
	The design melting point of new fuel with no burnable poison 5080 °F. The melting point is adjusted downward from this temperature depending on the amount of burnup and amount type of burnable poison in the fuel. The 58 °F per 10,000 MWD/MTU adjustment for burnup was accepted by the NRC Topical Report CEN-386-P-A, Reference 3. Adjustments for burnable poisons are established based on NRC approved To Report CENPD-382-P-A, Reference 4.	: and in I

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		3
	Group #		3
	K/A #	G 2	2.3.4
	Importance Rating		3.7

Radiation Control:Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditionsProposed Question:SRO 98

Given the following conditions:

- An emergency event is in progress on Unit 2, and a SITE AREA EMERGENCY has been declared.
- The Emergency Coordinator duties have been turned over from the Station Emergency Director (SED) to the Corporate Emergency Director (CED).

In this situation, which ONE (1) of the following must authorize EMERGENCY RADIATION EXPOSURE exceeding 10CFR20 limits?

- A. Operations Leader
- B. Health Physics Leader
- C. Station Emergency Director
- D. Corporate Emergency Director

Proposed Answer: C

Explanation:

- A. Incorrect. Plausible because the Operations Leader has responsibilities associated with selecting a volunteer for emergency radiation exposure, however, this can only be authorized by the Station Emergency Director.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because an emergency radiation exposure is involved, however, this can only be approved by the Station Emergency Director.
- C. Correct. Even though the Station Emergency Director has been relieved, they are still the individual responsible for this authorization.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that with turnover complete that responsibility now resides with the Corporate Emergency Director, however, that person would not be as familiar with plant conditions as the Station Emergency Director.

Technical Reference(s)	SO123-VIII-10, Step 4.2.2	Attached w/ Revision # See
		Comments / Reference

ES-401	SRO Written Exam Workshee	t Form ES-401-5
55369	As an SRO, DETERMINE Emergency (notification, evacuation, and exposure of making notifications and Protective Acti agencies in accordance with SO123-VI	control of onsite personnel, and for on Recommendations to offsite
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New X	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	
Question Cognitive Lev	el: Memory or Fundamental Knowledg Comprehension or Analysis	ge <u>X</u>
10 CFR Part 55 Conten	it: 55.41 55.43 _4, 5	

UCI		RGANIZATI	e: From SO123-VIII-10, Step 4.2.2 Revision # 26-1 ION EPIP SO123-VIII-10 REVISION 25 TCN <u>25-1</u> PAGE 3 OF 24
0.1	PRE	REQUIS	SITES
	3.1		y Planning is responsible for ensuring that the current copy of this is in the emergency notebook for use during declared emergencies and
	3.2	when not i	are responsible for ensuring they use the current copy of this document in a declared emergency or drill by checking the electronic document ent system or by use of one of the methods described in SO123-VI-0.9.
	3.3	Verify leve	el of use requirements on the first page of this document.
4.0	PRE	CAUTIO	INS
	4.1	Commissio	nould ensure the verbal notification to the Nuclear Regulatory on (NRC) is made within 20 minutes after declaration, and no later than after declaration.
	4.2	EC duties title to the	are normally performed by the Units 2/3 SM prior to turnover of the EC SED, and ultimately to the Corporate Emergency Director (CED).
		4.2.1	SM/EC may be relieved by other qualified ECs prior to TSC activation.
		4.2.2	Prior to turnover of the EC title to the CED, only the EC (SM or SED) may authorize:
			 Emergency Event Declaration/Classification Site Assembly and Site Evacuation Exceeding 10CFR20 Exposure Limits Notification to Offsite Agencies Offsite Protective Action Recommendations (PARs)
		4.2.3	When the EC title is turned over to the CED the EC duties are split between the SED and the CED. Following turnover of the EC title to the CED,
		.1	The SED retains the authority for:
			 Emergency Event Declaration/Classification Site Assembly and Site Evacuation Exceeding 10 CFR 20 Exposure Limits
		.2	The CED assumes the authority for:
			 Notification to Offsite Agencies Offsite Protective Action Recommendations (PARs)

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		3
	Group #		4
	K/A #	G 2	4.6
	Importance Rating		4.7

Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies Proposed Question: SRO 99

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power due to a Loss of Offsite Power.
- A Pressurizer Safety Valve is partially stuck <u>OPEN</u>.
- Both Trains of SIAS have actuated and Safety Injection flow meets the Minimum Required SI Flowrates during Cold Leg Injection per SO23-12-11, EOI Supporting Attachments, Attachment 12.

Current conditions are as follows:

- Pressurizer pressure is 1025 psia.
- Core Exit Thermocouple temperature is 539°F.
- Pressurizer level is 80% and slowly rising.
- Containment temperature is 165°F.
- Reactor Coolant System subcooling is 10°F and lowering.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the mitigation strategy in accordance with SO23-12-03, Loss of Coolant Accident?

- A. Allow Pressurizer level to increase and cooldown the RCS per SO23-12-11 EOI Supporting Attachments, Attachment 5, Core Exit Saturation Margin Control.
- B. Maintain RCS temperature constant and stabilize Pressurizer level per SO23-12-11 EOI Supporting Attachments, Floating Step 33, Monitor RCS Solid Operation.
- C. Throttle HPSI flow to prevent a solid Pressurizer and cooldown the RCS per SO23-12-11 EOI Supporting Attachments, Floating Step 7, Verify SI Throttle/Stop Criteria.
- D. Maintain RCS temperature constant while reducing Pressurizer level to less than 60% per SO23-12-11 EOI Supporting Attachments, Attachment 5, Core Exit Saturation Margin Control.

Proposed Answer:

Explanation:

- A. Correct. Given the conditions listed with subcooling < 20°F, allowing Pressurizer level to increase while cooling down is the desired action per Attachment 5, Core Exit Saturation Margin Control.
- B. Incorrect. Plausible because solid Pressurizer conditions are imminent, however, cooldown must be performed due to lack of subcooling.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible if thought that a solid Pressurizer was an undesirable condition, however, a lack of subcooling precludes SI Throttle/Stop.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because maintaining Pressurizer level less than 60% is guidance contained in Attachment 5 when Core Exit Saturation Margin is less than 20°F, however, a cooldown must be performed even if it results in a solid Pressurizer.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-12-3, Step 10	Attached w/ Revision # See
	SO23-12-11, Attachment 5	Comments / Reference
	SO23-12-11, Floating Steps 7 & 33	

Proposed references to be provided during examination: None

А

55279 / 54723	er the EOI Attachments procedure, SO23-12-11, DESCRIBE: The basis for ach step, caution or note.		
	As the SRO, DIRECT res per SO23-12-3.	sponse to and recove	ery from a loss of coolant accident
Question Source:	Bank #	127481	
	Modified Bank #		(Note changes or attach parent)
	New		-
Question History:	Last NRC Exam		
Question Cognitive Lev	el: Memory or Fundam Comprehension or /	0	X
10 CFR Part 55 Conter	nt: 55.41 55.43 5		

Com	Comments / Reference: From SO23-12-3, Step 10 Revision # 20							
	NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION S023-12-3 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 20 PAGE 7 OF 23							
	LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT							
		OPE	RATOR AC	TIONS				
		ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE		RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED				
9	СС	NFIRM Leak Isolation:						
	a.	VERIFY rate of RCS inventory an pressure loss – less than available Charging P capacity.		GO TO step 15.				
10		TABLISH RCS Inventory and Pre ntrol:	ssure					
	a.	INITIATE indicated actions for ava control methods of SO23-12-11, Attachment 5, CORE EXIT SATU MARGIN CONTROL.						
	b.	VERIFY RCS pressure	b.	GO TO step 15.				
		 stable or rising 						
		AND						
		 controlled. 						
11	ES	TABLISH RCS Heat Removal Co	ntrol:					
	a.	VERIFY SBCS available:	a.	OVERRIDE (as required) and O	PERATE			
		 Condenser Backpressure less than SBCS Interlock 3 	AD∨s. er Backpressure an SBCS Interlock Setpoint.					
		AND						
		2) MSIVs – open.						
	b.	VERIFY MFW available:	b.	OPERATE AFW to establish at I S/G level – between 40% NR a				
		 MAINTAIN S/G levels between 40% NR and 80% 	% NR.					

ents / Reference: From SO23-12-11, Attachment 5Revision # 6EAR ORGANIZATIONEMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION REVISION 6SO23-12-11S 2 AND 3EMERGENCY OPERATING INSTRUCTION PAGE 110 OF 278								
ATTACHMENT 5								
EOI SUPPORTING ATTACHMENTS								
c	ORE EXIT SAT	URATION MARGIN CONTI	ROL					
During ESDE	NOTE During ESDE the value of PTS Subcooling (CFMS page 311) should be used in place of CESM.							
CAUTION Attachment 29, POST-ACCIDENT PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS is the controlling attachment when: 1) the Natural Circulation cooldown strategy of minimizing Reactor Vessel Upper Head void formation is used, or 2) the EOIs are entered from a lower mode and Shutdown Cooling was NOT initially in service.								
	CORE EX	(IT SATURATION MARGIN (CES	M)					
LOCA,SGTR,SBO,FR: less than 20°F ESDE,LOFW, METHOD 80°F LOWER MODE ENTRY: less than 20°F		OP TIMU M SB0: between 20°F and 50°F LOCA,SGTR,FR: between 20°F and 160°F ESDE,LOFW, LOOP/LOFC: between 80°F and 160°F LOWER MODE ENTRY: greater than 20°F (No Upper Limit)	SBO: greater than 50°F OTHER: greater than 160°F LOWER MODE ENTRY: No Upper Limit					
	RAISE, MAIN TAIN S/G Levels - less than 80% NR.	STABILIZE S/G Level - between 40% and 80% NR.	LOWER , MAINTAIN S/G Levels – greater than 40% NR					
S/G Steaming Rate	RAISE	MAINTAIN	LOWER					
Flowrate	RAISE, ATTEMPT tomaintain PZR level – less than 60%.	IFSIth rottle/stop criteria (FS-7) – satisfied, THEN throttle flowrate to maintain PZR level – between 30% and 60%	IFSIth rottle/stop criteria (FS-7) – satisfied, THEN lower flowrate and maintain PZR level – greater than 30%.					
Letdown Flowrate	LOWER	IF SIAS – reset, THEN ATTEMPT to place PLCS in AUTO.	RAISE					
Auxiliary	LOWER, ATTEMPT tomaintain PZR level – less than 60%.	MAIN TAIN Saturation Margin as RCS temperatures are reduced.	RAISE, REQUEST SM/OL evaluate opening PZR Vents per SO23-3-2.33, REACTOR COOLANT GAS VENT					
1	lfPZR level greater than 30%, EN SURE ON.		SYSTEM. ENSURE OFF					

Comments / Reference: From SO23-12-11, Floatin	g Step 33 Rev	vision # 6						
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENCY OPE UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 6 ATTACHMENT 2	RATING INSTRUCTION SO23-12-11 PAGE 79 OF							
EOI SUPPORTING ATT	EOI SUPPORTING ATTACHMENTS							
FLOATING ST	EPS							
ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	ESPONSE NOT OBTAINED							
FS-33 MONITOR RCS Solid Operation								
Applicability: 🛛 12-3, 🗖 12-4, 🗖 12-5, 🕞 12-9								
CAUT		T						
Water solid operation of the RCS should be avo Margin of 20°F can NOT be recovered by othe indicated, then changes in S/G feeding or steamir flow, CBO flow or other RCS drain paths should a effect of the action taken. Multiple or simultaneou a. VERIFY RCS is NOT water solid:	means. If RCS water solid condition g, SI flow, charging or letdown flow, san I be made slowly allowing time to monit	ns are mpling itor the						
1) VERIFY liquid interface indicated:	THEN							
a) PZR level – lessthan 100% OR	 ENSURE RCS pressure within the of Attachment 29, POST-ACCIDEI PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LII 	ENT						
b) Reactor Vessel level – less than 100% (Head)	2) CONTROL RCS temperature.							
QSPDS page 622 CFMS page 311.	 IF criteria of FS-7, VERIFY SI Throttle/Stop Criteria – satisfied, THEN CONTROL charging, letdow 							
 VERIFY exaggerated or severe pressure response associated with RCS inventory or temperature changes – NOT indicated. 	 4) NOTIFY Shift Manager/Operations Leader of possible RCS water soli condition. 	IS						

comme	ents / Reference: From SC	D23-12-11, Floati	ng Step 7 Revision # 6							
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENC UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 6 ATTACHMEI			Y OPERATING INSTRUCTION SO23-12-11 ISS 2 PAGE 20 OF 278							
	EOI SUPPORTING ATTACHMENTS									
		FLOATING S	TEPS							
	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED									
FS-7	VERIFY SI Throttle/Stop Criteria									
Ар	plicability: ALL									
a.	VERIFY at least one S/G op	perating: a.	GO TO SO23-12-9, FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY							
	1) SBCS – available OR		AND							
	ADV – available.		INITIATE SO23-12-9, Attachment FR-5, RECOVERY – HEAT REMOVAL.							
	AND									
	2) Feedwater – available	9.								
b.	VERIFY PZR level	0	IF any criteria of steps b. through d. – NOT satisfied,							
	 greater than 30% 		THEN							
	AND									
	 NOT lowering. 		 OPERATE Charging and SI systems as necessary to maintain Throttle/Stop criteria – satisfied. 							
C.	VERIFY Core Exit Saturatio — greater than or equal to 3		 THROTTLE Loop Injection valves as required. 							
	QSPDS page 611 CFMS page 311.		ENSURE auxiliaries to SI Pumps:							
d.	VERIFY Reactor Vessel lev — greater than or equal to		 a) Electrical power to pumps and valves. 							
	(Plenum):		b) Proper system alignment.							
	QSPDS page 622 CFMS page 312		c) CCW flow.							
	Attachment 4.		d) HVAC.							

Comme	nts / Reference: From SO2	3-12-3, Floatin	g Ste	ер 7	Revision # 6					
	NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION EMERGENC UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 6 ATTACHMEN		Y OPERATING INSTRUCTION SO23-12-11 ISS 2 PAGE 21 OF 278 NT 2							
	EOI SUPPORTING ATTACHMENTS									
		FLOATING S	TEF	PS .						
	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED									
FS-7	VERIFY SI Throttle/Stop Cri (Continued)	teria								
e.	RCS Cooldown – NOT in pr	ogress. e.	. MAINTAIN Boration – at least 40 GPM.							
f.	VERIFY SI Pumps – NOT operating per SO23-1 Attachment FR-1, RECOV REACTIVITY CONTROL, 1 RC-3 Success Path.	'ERY –	GO to step h.							
g.	THROTTLE OR STOP SI Pur required — one train at a time									
h.	VERIFY Charging Pumps – NOT operating per SO23-1 Attachment FR-1, RECOV REACTIVITY CONTROL, 1 RC-2 Success Path	12-9, ERY –	GO to step k.							
i.	VERIFY PZR Level - less th	nan 80%. i.	1)	INITIATE FS-31, ESTABLIS Letdown Flow.	SH CVCS					
			2)	INITIATE FS-33, MONITOF Operation.	RCS Solid					
j.	STOP Charging Pumps as re at a time.	quired one								
k.	MAINTAIN criteria of steps a. — satisfied.	through e.								
I.	VERIFY Containment pressur – less than 3.4 PSIG.	re I	1)	ENSURE the following – a SIAS CIAS CCAS CRIS.	ctuated:					
			2)	GO TO next applicable floa	ting step.					

Examination Outline Cross-reference:	Level	RO	SRO
	Tier #		3
	Group #		4
	K/A #	G 2	4.9
	Importance Rating		4.2

Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge of low power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies

Proposed Question: SRO 100

Given the following conditions:

- Unit 2 has tripped from 100% power.
- Reactor Trip Override is reset and Steam Generator levels are normal.
- Pressurizer level is 30% and slowly lowering.
- Pressurizer pressure is 2240 psia.
- Letdown is secured.
- Steam Bypass Control System (SBCS) is operating to maintain Steam Generator pressures at 1000 psia.
- Annunciator 50A01 QUENCH TANK PRESS HI has come in and cleared.
- Annunciator 50A11 QUENCH TANK LEVEL HI/LO is in alarm.
- Annunciator 50A21 QUENCH TANK TEMP HI is in alarm.
- Annunciator 50A31 PZR SAFETY VALVE OUTLET TEMP HI is in alarm.
- Containment pressure is 1.8 psia and rising.
- Containment temperature and humidity are rising.

Which ONE (1) of the following describes the mitigation strategy for the event in progress?

- A. Commence controlled cooldown using the Steam Generators and Steam Bypass Control System per SO23-12-11, EOI Supporting Attachments, Attachment 3, Cooldown / Depressurization.
- B. Initiate a manual Safety Injection to provide makeup water to the Reactor Coolant System and transition to SO23-12-9, Functional Recovery.
- C. Commence cooldown at maximum achievable rate using Atmospheric Dump Valves per SO23-12-11, EOI Supporting Attachments, Attachment 5, Core Exit Saturation Margin Control.
- D. Open Pressurizer Normal and Auxiliary Spray Valves to rapidly reduce pressure to less than 1400 psia per SO23-12-1, Standard Post Trip Actions.

Proposed Answer: A

Explanation:

A. Correct. Using information gleaned from Annunciator Responses, it can be determined that the Page 133 of 136 Rev 2d rupture disc on the Quench Tank has blown. This allowed the high pressure condition on the Quench Tank [50A51 - See Note (1)] to clear while continuing a Small Break LOCA out the Pressurizer Safety Valves. In this condition a controlled cooldown is desired to maintain Pressurizer level and minimize voiding of the Reactor Coolant System.

- B. Incorrect. Plausible if thought that a manual Safety Injection at this time was going to provide makeup and the starting of all Charging Pumps would do this via the SI, however, in this condition a control cooldown is required via the Steam Generators and SBCS. If a high radiation condition existed inside Containment then this would be an appropriate response, however, it is only addressed in the Functional Response Procedure.
- C. Incorrect. Plausible because it could be thought that the faster the RCS was cooled down the quicker HPSI flow would be introduced, however, RCS voiding should be minimized and Pressurizer level control should be maintained.
- D. Incorrect. Plausible because using the Pressurizer Normal and Auxiliary Spray Valves to reduce pressure is an approved method, however, voiding could occur and there is no guarantee that HPSI flow would be adequate for the break size.

Technical Reference(s)	SO23-14-3, Sectio SO23-15-50-A.1, 5		Attached w/ Revision # See Comments / Reference
Proposed references to b	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
č ,	s the SRO, DIRECT er SO23-12-3.	response to and recove	ery from a loss of coolant accident
Question Source:	Bank # Modified Bank # New	126631	(Note changes or attach parent)
Question History:	Last NRC Exam	SONGS 2003	
Question Cognitive Level	: Memory or Funda Comprehension o	amental Knowledge or Analysis	X
10 CFR Part 55 Content:	55.41 55.43 _5		

14-3, Section 3.0	Revision # 8
EOI SUPPORT DOCUMEN REVISION 8 ATTACHMENT 1	T SO23-14-3 PAGE 8 OF 55
INT BASES AND DEVIATIONS JUS	TIFICATION
EOI STEP BASES	
the break flow rate exceeds the availab wentory Control is regained via injection tion (HPSI) Pumps, and control of RCS ally depressurize to HPSI shutoff head. System (SIS) refills the RCS and PZR I subsequent small break post-LOCA op of are: (1) decrease RCS pressure with HPSI and Charging Pumps, (3) heat rer tions, and (4) isolating or depressurizing CAs, during the period of time the RCS i achieved, there may be voiding in the R or Vessel Head region, the RCS loops, i of for RCS Heat Removal: Heat transfe via the fluid flowing out the break. For the heat removal due to break flow is in than 1430 PSIA, then two RCPs must b ng will facilitate RCS depressurization v it RCS leakage exists to allow HPSI injec- to the previous approach that secured blonged four RCP operations during a L y forced or natural circulation. The open S/Gs and control steam flow via the St imp Valves (ADVs). are are reduced to SDC entry conditions System.	n from the Charging cooldown rate. Pressure control is level is regained. erator actions which Pressurizer (PZR) noval via the S/Gs in g the Safety Injection is refilling, and CS. The voided or the Safety Injection is refilling, and CS. The voided or the S/G tubes. r to the secondary small break LOCAs, nadequate. re tripped. The when no charging ection to restore RCS all four RCPs OCA could increase rator must maintain eam Bypass Control
	EOI SUPPORT DOCUMENT REVISION 8 ATTACHMENT 1 INT BASES AND DEVIATIONS JUS EOI STEP BASES the break flow rate exceeds the availab ventory Control is regained via injection tion (HPSI) Pumps, and control of RCS ally depressurize to HPSI shutoff head. System (SIS) refills the RCS and PZR subsequent small break post-LOCA op of are: (1) decrease RCS pressure with HPSI and Charging Pumps, (3) heat rer ions, and (4) isolating or depressurizing chieved, there may be voiding in the R or Vessel Head region, the RCS loops, in the heat removal due to break flow is in han 1430 PSIA, then two RCPs must b ng will facilitate RCS depressurization v t RCS leakage exists to allow HPSI inject to the previous approach that secured longed four RCP operations during a L of forced or natural circulation. The oper S/Gs and control steam flow via the Sti mp Valves (ADVs). re are reduced to SDC entry conditions

Comments / Reference: From SO23-15-50-A.1, 50A01 Revision # 8								on # 8		
NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION ALARM RESPONSE INSTRUCTION SO23-15-50.A1 UNITS 2 AND 3 REVISION 8 PAGE 6 OF 64 ATTACHMENT 2										
50A01 QUENCH TANK PRESS HI										
APPLICABILITY PRIORITY REFLASH ASSOCIATED WINDOWS										
Modes 1	Modes 1-4 AMBER					N/A 50A31,50A11				
INITIATING NOUN NAME DEVICE				SETPOINT		VALIDATION INSTRUMENT	PCSID	LINK# U2/U3		
2(3)PSH0116	2(3)PSH0116 Quench Tank Pressure Switch High			24 PSIG [1]		NONE	P116	609/631	-	
2.0 <u>CORRE</u>										
SPECIFIC CAU SES 2.1 2(3)PCV-5437 , Quench Tank N2 Regulator, failed			2	 SPECIFIC CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 2.1 Cycle 2(3)HV-9100, Quench Tank to Waste Gas Header Isolation Valve, as required, to lower Quench Tank pressure to the normal range of 3 to 20 psig. 2.1.1 If venting becomes difficult, then drain the Waste Gas Collection Header per SO23-8-14, Attachment for Draining the Waste Gas Header. 2.1.2 If 2(3)PCV-5437, Quench Tank N2 Regulator, is failed, <u>and</u> Containment is accessible, then perform the following: .1 Isolate 2(3)PCV-5437, Quench Tank N2 Regulator .2 Manually control Quench Tank pressure. 						
[1] Pressur	es exce	eding 25 psig n	nay d	istort the	Quench	ı Tank Rupture D	iisk.			