#### DISCLAIMER

# UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS

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### Official Transcript of Proceedings

### **NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

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Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems

Subcommittee: OPEN SESSION

Docket Number: (n/a)

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Date: Friday, October 23, 2009

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1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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4	ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARD
5	(ACRS)
6	+ + + +
7	DIGITAL INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
8	SUBCOMMITTEE
9	+ + + +
10	OPEN SESSION
11	+ + + +
12	FRIDAY
13	OCTOBER 23, 2009
14	+ + + +
15	ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND
16	+ + + +
17	The Subcommittee met at the Nuclear
18	Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North, Room
19	T2B3, 11545 Rockville Pike, at 8:30 a.m., Dr. George
20	Apostolakis, Chairman, presiding.
21	SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:
22	GEORGE APOSTOLAKIS, Chairman
23	DENNIS C. BLEY
24	JOHN D. SIEBER
25	JOHN W. STETKAR

### CONSULTANTS TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE PRESENT:

EARL BOEBERT

SERGIO GUARRO

NRC STAFF PRESENT:

CHRISTINA ANTONESCU, Designated Federal Official and

Cognizant Staff Engineer

CRAIG ERLANGER

RALPH COSTELLO

RUSS SYDNOR

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	3	3
1	T-A-B-L-E O-F C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S	
2	Introduction4	
3	Cyber Security Assessment Team8	
4		
5		
6		
7		
8		
9		
10		
11		
12		
13		
14		
15		
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8:28 a.m.

#### P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: The meeting will now to come order.

This is a meeting of the Digital

Instrumentation and Control Systems Subcommittee of
the ACRS. I am George Apostolakis, Chairman of the
Subcommittee.

ACRS members in attendance are Dennis Bley, John Stetkar and Jack Sieber.

Sergio Guarro and Earl Boebert are also attending as consultants for the Subcommittee.

Christina Antonescu of the ACRS staff is a Designated Federal Official for this meeting.

The purpose of this meeting is to discuss Regulatory Guide 5.71, Cyber Security Programs for Nuclear Facilities. We will also discuss the status of the Cyber security Assessment Team and the NERC/FERC MOU.

Any other acronyms, Christina?

CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: ACRS, GEA.

The Subcommittee will gather information, analyze relevant issues and facts and formulate and propose positions and actions as appropriate for deliberation by the full Committee.

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The rules for participation in today's meeting have been announced as part of the notice of this meeting previously published in the *Federal*Register on October 1st, 2009.

We have receive no written comments or requests for time to make oral statement from members of the public regarding today's meeting.

A portion of this meeting may be closed in order to discuss and protect information classified as national security information as well as safeguards information pursuant to 5 USC 55.2(b)(c)(1) and (3).

We also have Region II on the bridge phone listening to the discussions. To preclude interaction of the meeting the phone line will be placed on listen-in mode during the presentations and Committee discussions.

A transcript of the meeting is being kept and will be made available as stated in the Federal Register notice. Therefore, we request that participants in this meeting use the microphones located throughout the meeting room when addressing the Subcommittee. The participants should first identify themselves and speak with sufficient clarity and volume so that they may be readily heard.

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Before we proceed with the meeting I would like to welcome our new consultant, Mr. Earl Boebert. And I would like him to say a few words of why he's here. MR. BOEBERT: I'm here because George asked me to come. CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. MR. BOEBERT: He's a friendly guy, so you

George asked me to recite a bit of my background. Air Force 1962 to 1966. Honeywell 1966 to roughly 1985. Technical founder of Secure Computing Corporation, Sandia National Laboratories from 1995 to 2005 performing intelligence analysis and leading Red Team activities.

CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Wonderful. Thank you very much, Earl.

We'll now proceed with the meeting. call upon Mr. Craig Erlanger, Chief of the Integrated Security Coordination and Policy Branch, Division of Security Policy in the office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response to provide some introductory remarks.

Craig?

MR. ERLANGER: Good morning, everyone. My name is Craig Erlanger, I'm the Chief

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of the Integrated Security Coordination and Policy Branch. And my branch is responsible for the development of Regulatory Guide 5.71.

This morning, as was mentioned, we have a very packed agenda with open and closed sessions.

We're going to begin with an overview of the Cyber security Assessment Team, followed by a break to make this a closed session. A very quick break. And then we're going to be discussing the FERC/NERC MOU as well as a detailed opening of where we have been and where we are heading with cyber security regulations throughout the Agency, given by my boss, the Deputy Director for Reactor Security Scott Morris.

It's interesting to note that 5.71 is the last of the tier 1 Reg. Guides related to the Part 73 rulemaking. So there is an emphasis states to get this Reg. Guide completed. And we are really looking forward to your feedback on your review of the document, and hopefully answering any questions you have related to the Guide.

With no further introductions, I'd like to turn it over to Mr. Ralph Costello from the Division of Security Operations. And he will be providing you with an update on the Cyber security Assessment Team. And if there are no questions, I

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will turn it over to Ralph right now.

MR. COSTELLO: Good morning, everyone.

My name is Ralph Costello. I'm with the Office of

Nuclear Security and Incident Response.

I would like to thank the Chairman and the Committee for the opportunity to speak here today.

The purpose of my presentation is information only. I'll be discussing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Cyber Assessment Team, in particular I'll provide an overview of the team's formation and composition. I'll also discuss the team's purpose, the progress we made to date and our path forward.

The Cyber Assessment Team was formed by the Executive Director for Operations of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in April of 2009.

The team is composed of staff with expertise in cyber security from various offices and regions. And the skills and backgrounds of the team members are extensive and include digital instrumentation and control, plant operations, electrical information, technology security, digital forensics, digital security and much, much more. With this diverse and multi-talented group the

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Nuclear Regulatory Commission has the capability to quickly marshall these skill sets to address any emerging issues with potential cyber security related implications.

The purpose of the team is to provide a constant process for evaluation and resolution of these events. I'm going to go over the process briefly in the high level, and then on the next slide I'll go into some more detail.

The first step that the team takes would be to analyze and determine the facts; who, what, when, where, how and why of the issues brought to them. One of the first two questions we're going to ask in that analysis phase is there an actual perceived threat our licensees. And the other question we'd want an answer to is is there a vulnerability which can possibly be exploited by an adversary.

The next thing we'd want to do is determine the impact to our licensees.

And last but not least, provide recommendations and services to our stakeholders.

The visual provided has the activity in terms of how we process. And I don't want to belabor a lot of detail here, but I want to give you a high

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level view of how the process is going to work.

You can see that the slide provides two columns. One column has the heading of threat on the top, and the other column has the heading of event or vulnerability at the top.

The first type I'd like to discuss of an issue that would come to us would be one in which there was a threat actual perceived to our licensees. An example would be the Department of Homeland Security United States Computer Emergency Response Team provides an announcement concerning a certain software vulnerability which would impact or could impact our licensees. That would be processed definitively by our Cyber Assessment Team, and again using the overall high level processing analysis that we have discussed, we'd look at the impact to our licensees and provide recommendations.

The column on the left hand side gives us an overview of those issues which at first we have an unknown source of the issue. An example of that would be a situation whereby a software anomaly could cause a plant transient. Again, the initial cause were unknown, and could have been possibly caused by malicious actions. And because it's unknown, or because of the capability of possibility errors, our

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1	assessment team would process it through our system
2	and come to a resolution.
3	Again, we would want to have answers to
4	the following information:
5	We would want know is the issue caused by
6	an adversary, or possibly caused by an adversary
7	and/or is it a vulnerability which could be exploited
8	by an adversary threat. If the answer is yes to
9	either of the above, we would follow through to
10	final completion of our process.
11	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: What kind of
12	guidance dose this team have? I mean, when you say
13	cyber team perform emergency assessment and so
14	MR. COSTELLO: Yes.
15	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Does the team rely
16	on the expertise of its members or there is some sort
17	of guidance?
18	MR. COSTELLO: That's a very good
19	question, sir. You're reading into my next slide.
20	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: I am?
21	MR. COSTELLO: Yes, sir.
22	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: I do know that.
23	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Yes, sir. And I
24	appreciate that reading.
25	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Okay. Sorry. If
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you are going to addressing it, that's fine.

MR. COSTELLO: I will.

I just want to add one more point. And that is if the issue definitively not a vulnerability or potential vulnerability and definitively not an actual attack or an exploit by an adversary, then obviously it would be handled through the normal processes the Agency uses for digital I&C or electricity for Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and their processes, operating experience, et cetera.

I'll now follow into the Chairman's question, this goes to the progress that we've made so far. And we've developed a charter and procedures. And as an answer to the Chairman's question, we follow those procedures and we do rely on the extensive backgrounds of the team members, both here at Headquarters and the regions.

These guidelines are not set in stone.

We're Constantly enhancing them and improving them.

And as we speak we're making some enhancement to the procedures as a learning and improving organization.

CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: I mean, again,
maybe it's because I'm not an expert in the field but
how do you decide what is a threat? It says here on
the previous slide threat or exploit. How does the

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team become aware of the fact that there is a threat 2 somewhere? I mean --MR. COSTELLO: Well, the example I gave was a US-CERT announcement of, say, a certain exploit--CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Oh, so somebody 6 else tells you there is a threat. 8 MR. COSTELLO: There's many inputs. 9 input can be from a licensee. Input could be from 10 US-CERT. Input could be through intelligence channels. There's many input points that we view 11 this information. 12 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: All right. 13 MR. COSTELLO: It could be an allegation. 14 15 There's other areas. I'm sure I'm missing where we could have input points. 16 17 And then we would analyze them. We would do a thorough analyses and we'd follow at the ground 18 19 to ensure that the public health and safety and security is protected. 20 CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Yes. 21 Thank you. MR. COSTELLO: As I mentioned, we have 22 these processes and procedures. And this team is on 23 call 24 hours a day, seven days a week and has been 24 25 since shortly after we formed.

Have been trained initially in conjunction with our Operation Center officers and our Information Assessment Team. I'd like to say a little bit about Information Assessment Team. You may not know what that organization is, but they are formed by intelligence analysts who have close contact and integration with our partners in the intelligence community. And we work closely with that team also.

The training that we conducted initially consist of: familiarization with emergency operations; our procedures, as mentioned; digital I&C controls, and; plant operations and scenario-based team training. These joint training sessions that we conduct initially we found to be very beneficial. We will continue to this and other type training in the future on a regular basis.

MEMBER STETKAR: Ralph?

MR. COSTELLO: Yes, sir.

MEMBER STETKAR: In your evaluations do you make any attempts to rank or rate a particular threat or vulnerability with respect to its relative importance to plant safety, or is everything simply rated a potential threat?

MR. COSTELLO: No. Your question is a

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very good one. That is, in fact, one of the 2 enhancements we're making to the procedure as we speak. So that, we found out very early on that that would be a very good tool for the team to expeditiously process and know where to go. these are all learning things that we found out real 6 early on, and that's part of the --8 MEMBER STETKAR: It's in process right 9 now? 10 MR. COSTELLO: It's being integrated in 11 the procedure as we speak. And it's going to be on a color-based tiered level. 12 MEMBER STETKAR: So it seems to work, so 13 that's fine. 14 15 MR. COSTELLO: Sir? MEMBER BLEY: That guidance is going to 16 be in the new ISG when we see it, is that right? 17 MR. COSTELLO: I don't believe it will 18 19 be. MEMBER BLEY: It won't? It's separate? 20 MR. COSTELLO: Yes, sir. 21 MEMBER BLEY: I was just curious. 22 The ISG, I guess I get mixed up on this 23 occasionally. The ISG can either be something that's 24 25 going to become an SRP or a Reg. Guide. And the ISGs

here are aimed at the Reg. Guides, is that right rather than SRP?

If this is going to be guidance to your staff, why wouldn't be in an ISG or a SRP?

MR. ERLANGER: What might be helpful is how the CAT team came into existence. We were under direction from the EDO to come under the process to deal with everything Ralph mentioned and in addition, the topics you saw on the news. The Soviets attacked at Georgia, the Chinese attacked the grid.

Everything, how do we address and deal with these

What we're in right now is a one year pilot to conclude approximately winter of 2010. So at this time we're basically just trying -- we recognized a need to deal with an emerging threat, a topic that was constantly in the news. You caught all these headlines. There were a few just this week that we saw there. How do you take that, what you see in the news, or a real threat that we get through intelligence channels and work it into our longstanding processes. The analogy that Ralph made to the Information Assessment Team is probably the closest.

As you know, 24/7 you might have an

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issues.

1	incident at a plant related to, it could be a pipe,
2	it could be whatever and there are subject matter
3	experts available to look at that to adjudicate it
4	whether it is a just it happened because or there was
5	some malicious intent. So that's what this process
6	is trying to mirror.
7	Whether or not it fits into an ISG or
8	Reg. Guide, I would say that is not the thought
9	process at this time. It's just really
10	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: But what you're
11	doing today is just briefing the Subcommittee.
12	MR. COSTELLO: Yes, sir. Just information
13	only.
14	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: That this team
15	exists.
15 16	exists.  MR. COSTELLO: Absolutely, sir.
16	MR. COSTELLO: Absolutely, sir.
16 17	MR. COSTELLO: Absolutely, sir.  CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: It has nothing to
16 17 18	MR. COSTELLO: Absolutely, sir.  CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: It has nothing to  do with Regulatory Guide 5.71?
16 17 18	MR. COSTELLO: Absolutely, sir.  CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: It has nothing to  do with Regulatory Guide 5.71?  MR. COSTELLO: It is not. That's correct,
16 17 18 19 20	MR. COSTELLO: Absolutely, sir.  CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: It has nothing to  do with Regulatory Guide 5.71?  MR. COSTELLO: It is not. That's correct,  yes.
16 17 18 19 20 21	MR. COSTELLO: Absolutely, sir.  CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: It has nothing to  do with Regulatory Guide 5.71?  MR. COSTELLO: It is not. That's correct,  yes.  MR. ERLANGER: That's correct.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR. COSTELLO: Absolutely, sir.  CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: It has nothing to  do with Regulatory Guide 5.71?  MR. COSTELLO: It is not. That's correct,  yes.  MR. ERLANGER: That's correct.  CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: This is he warm-up

1	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: The warm-up.
2	MR. COSTELLO: we feel you need to
3	know.
4	MR. ERLANGER: It's another leg to what
5	we're doing for cyber as an Agency.
6	CONSULTANT BOEBERT: How many people?
7	MR. COSTELLO: Over 20.
8	CONSULTANT BOEBERT: How many locations?
9	MR. COSTELLO: Headquarters and the four
10	regions.
11	CONSULTANT BOEBERT: Communications,
12	secure mail
13	MR. COSTELLO: We have all that. Yes,
14	sir.
15	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Okay.
16	MR. COSTELLO: And last but not least, we
17	can open the database with current and past notable
18	issues as a tool for this team to work through its
19	issues.
20	The path forward.
21	As noted previously, we're going to
22	continue to assess team processes as noted by the
23	some questions we've already worked towards, some of
24	those improvements already.
25	And we're going to apply those

1	efficiencies through enhancements on a continuous
2	basis and, obviously, continue training efforts in
3	that vein.
4	Today we discussed the Cyber Assessment
5	Team's formation, the composition, the team's
6	purpose, the progress we've made and our path
7	forward. Are there any questions?
8	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Well hearing none,
9	thank you.
10	MR. COSTELLO: Thank you, sir.
11	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: We're ahead of
12	schedule here, aren't we?
13	MR. COSTELLO: I'm sorry about that.
14	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Yes, you should
15	apologize.
16	Now we're moving to Mr. Morris, or he's
17	not here.
18	MR. SYDNOR: He stepped out to his
19	office?
20	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Russ?
21	MR. ERLANGER: Let me, I'll grab him.
22	He's probably right out this door.
23	MS. ANTONESCU: We're moving to the
24	closed session?
25	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Who is?

	20
1	MS. ANTONESCU: Well, we are.
2	CHAIRMAN APOSTOLAKIS: Yes, you're right.
3	Okay. So what do we do?
4	I am advised that we are moving to a
5	closed session. And, Christina, what does that mean?
6	MS. ANTONESCU: That means that people
7	who were already approved are able stay, and the
8	other ones have to leave the closed session.
9	(Whereupon, at 8:48 a.m. the open session
LO	was concluded.)
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### NRC CYBER ASSESSMENT TEAM

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
Digital Instrumentation and Control Subcommittee
October 23, 2009

Ralph Costello
Division of Security Operations
Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
(301-415-6821, ralph.costello@nrc.gov)

## Formation of the CAT Team

CAT team was formed in April 2009

Composition of the CAT team



# **Purpose and Process**


 Provide a consistent process for evaluation and resolution of cyber security issues with potential cyber security related implications

### Process

- Analyze cyber security issue
  - Determine the facts
  - Determine impact to licensees
  - Make recommendations to stakeholders



### **Process continued**





# **CAT Team Progress**

- CAT team charter and procedures
- Cat team is available on a 24/7 basis
- Personnel have received initial training
  - Regular continuous training
- Database is being developed



### Path forward

- Assess processes of the CAT team
- Apply enhancements continuous
- Continuous training



## **Questions?**



# **Acronyms**

- CAT Cyber Assessment Team
- HOO Headquarters Operations Officer
- IAT Information Assessment Team
- IAW In Accordance With
- OIP Office of International Programs