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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Title: 2.206 Petition on Florida Power and

Light Company by Thomas Saporito

Docket Number: (n/a)

Location: (telephone conference)

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1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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4	PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB)
5	CONFERENCE CALL
6	+ + + +
7	THURSDAY
8	MAY 7, 2009
9	+ + + +
10	2.206 PETITION ON FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
11	BY THOMAS SAPORITO
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13	
14	The conference call was held, Thomas B.
15	Blount, Petition Review Board Chairman, presiding.
16	NRC HEADQUARTERS STAFF:
17	THOMAS B. BLOUNT, Chairman, PRB
18	TRACY J. ORF, Petition Manager
19	TANYA M. MENSAH, Petition Coordinator
20	MOLLY L. BARKMAN, OGC/GCHEA/AGCMLE
21	AUDREY L. KLETT, NRR/ADRO/DIRS/IP
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23	PETITIONER:
24	THOMAS SAPORITO

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2	MARVIN SYKES, DRP/PB2
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PROCEEDINGS

(1:33:45 p.m.)

MR. ORF: I'd like to thank everybody for attending this meeting. My name is Tracy Orf, and I am sitting in for Jason Paige, the Turkey Point Project Manager. We are here today to allow the Petitioner, Mr. Thomas Saporito, to address the Petition Review Board regarding the 2.206 Petition dated January 11th, 2009. I am the current Petition Manager for this petition.

The Petition Review Board Chairman is Tom Blount, Deputy Director for the Division of Policy and Rulemaking. As part of the Petition Review Board's, or PRB's review of this petition, Mr. Thomas Saporito has requested this opportunity to address the PRB.

This meeting is scheduled from 1:30 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. The meeting is being recorded by the NRC Operations Center, and will be transcribed by a court reporter. The transcript will become a supplement to the petition. The transcript will also be made publicly available.

I'd like to open this meeting with introductions, and as we go around the room, please be sure to clearly state your name, your position, and the office that you work for within the NRC, or your

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1	subject organization. I'll start it off. My name is
2	Tracy Orf. I work for NRR at the NRC.
3	MS. JARRIEL: Lisa Jarriel. I'm the Agency
4	Allegation Advisor in the Office of Enforcement.
5	MS. BARKMAN: Molly Barkman. I'm an
6	attorney in the Office of General Counsel.
7	MR. BLOUNT: I'm Tom Blount. I'm the PRB
8	Chair. I'm also Deputy Director for the Division of
9	Policy and Rulemaking in NRR.
10	MS. KLETT: My name is Audrey Klett. I'm
11	a Reactor Operations Engineer in the Office of Nuclear
12	Reactor Regulation, Division of Inspection, Regional
13	Support.
14	MS. MENSAH: My name is Tanya Mensah. I'm
15	the 2.206 Petition Coordinator.
16	MD ODE: Observe Election and the ADO
ļ	MR. ORF: Okay. That's everybody at NRC
17	Headquarters. Has anyone from the regional office
17 18	
	Headquarters. Has anyone from the regional office
18	Headquarters. Has anyone from the regional office joined us yet?
18 19	Headquarters. Has anyone from the regional office joined us yet? MR. SYKES: Hi. This is Marvin Sykes from
18 19 20	Headquarters. Has anyone from the regional office joined us yet? MR. SYKES: Hi. This is Marvin Sykes from Region II.
18 19 20 21	Headquarters. Has anyone from the regional office joined us yet? MR. SYKES: Hi. This is Marvin Sykes from Region II. MR. ORF: Okay. The licensee for Turkey
18 19 20 21 22	Headquarters. Has anyone from the regional office joined us yet? MR. SYKES: Hi. This is Marvin Sykes from Region II. MR. ORF: Okay. The licensee for Turkey Point is Florida Power and Light. Would you please

MR. ORF: Okay. And, Mr. Saporito, would 2 you please introduce yourself for the record. sir. 3 SAPORITO: Yes, My name 4 Thomas Saporito. I'm with Saporito Energy 5 Consultants, and I am the Petitioner for this meeting. MR. ORF: Okay. Is there anyone that I've 6 7 Okay. I'd like to emphasize that we need to missed? 8 speak clearly and loudly to make sure the court reporter can accurately transcribe this meeting. 9 10 you do have something that you would like to say, 11 please first state your name for the record. At this 12 time, I'll turn it over to the PRB Chairman, Blount. 13 14 MR. BLOUNT: Good afternoon. Welcome to the meeting regarding the 2.206 petition submitted by 15 Mr. Thomas Saporito. I'd like to first share some 16 background on our process. 17 Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of 18 Federal Regulations describes the petition process, 19 20 the primary mechanism for the public to request 21 enforcement action by the NRC in a public process. 22 This process permits anyone to petition NRC to take enforcement-type actions related to NRC licensees, or 23 license activities. 24

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evaluation, NRC could modify, suspend, or revoke an NRC-issued license, or take any other appropriate enforcement action to resolve a problem. The NRC Staff Guidance for the disposition of 2.206 petition requests is in Management Directive 8.11, which is publicly available.

The purpose of today's meeting is to allow the Petitioner, Mr. Saporito, an opportunity to continue with his presentation of March 19th, 2009, providing any additional explanation or support for the petition before the Petition Review Board's initial consideration and recommendation.

This meeting is not a hearing, nor is it an opportunity for the Petitioner to question or examine the PRB on the merits or issues presented in the petition request. No decisions regarding the merits of this petition will be made at this meeting.

Following this meeting, Petition the Review Board will conduct its internal deliberations. outcome of this internal meeting will The discussed with the Petitioner. The Petition Review Board typically consists of a Chairman, usually a Manager at the Senior Executive Service level at the NRC. Ιt has а Petition Manager, PRB Coordinator. Other members of the Board are

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determined by the NRC Staff based on the content of the information in the petition request.

At this time, I'd like to introduce the I am Tom Blount, as I indicated earlier, the Petition Review Board Chairman. Tracy Orf is the Petition Manager for this petition under discussion Tanya Mensah is the Office's PRB Coordinator. today. Audrey Klett is the Office of NRR, or Nuclear Reactor Regulation Technical Lead on Safety Culture. Marvin Sykes is the NRC's Region II representative. obtain advice from our Office of General Counsel represented by Molly Barkman. also We have a representative from the Office of Enforcement, OE, Lisamarie Jarriel, Agency Allegation Advisor.

The PRB notified the NRC OIG of the 2.206 PRB meeting today in consideration of Mr. Saporito's request that the OIG be in attendance. The OIG has requested a copy of the transcript of this PRB meeting.

As described in our process, the NRC staff may ask clarifying questions in order to better understand the Petitioner's presentation, and to reach a reasoned decision whether to accept or reject the Petitioner's request for review under the 2.206 process. Florida Power and Light, the licensee for

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Turkey Point, has been invited to this meeting, and will be afforded an opportunity to ask clarifying questions of the Petitioner. For clarification, the licensee is not part of the decision making process, or the NRC's review of 2.206 petitions. We invite the licensees so that they are aware of a request for provide action against their facility, and an questions opportunity to ask SO that they understand the details pertaining to their facility.

I would like to summarize the scope of the petition under consideration, and NRC's activities to On January 11th, 2009, Mr. Thomas Saporito date. submitted to the NRC a petition under 2.206 regarding concerns with Turkey Point's Employee Concerns In this petition request, Mr. Saporito identified the following areas of concern. request for issuance for notice of violation with civil penalty for \$1 million. Two, request that NRC issue a confirmatory order modifying the Florida Power and Light license to impose requirements for safety assessments, ratings of supervisors culture and employees, training programs all managers by supervisors and managers on safety conscious work environment, and the employee protection rule. And licensee shall inform all employees of the

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confirmatory order and their rights to raise safety concerns. The proffered basis for the two requests are that the licensee did a self-assessment of its ECP, which identified weaknesses and areas of improvement in the ECP; that the NRC has issued two Notices of Violations for violations of the Employee Protection Rule, and that Florida Power and Light has a 20-year history of retaliatory actions.

Allow me to discuss the NRC activities to date. The NRR Petition Review Board has not met internally to make an initial recommendation on this 2.206 petition. Following the conclusion of today's call, the Petition Review Board will convene internally to make an initial recommendation. You will be informed of the initial recommendation.

As a reminder for the phone participants, please identify yourself if you make any remarks, as this will help us in the preparation of the meeting transcript that will be made publicly available. Thank you.

As I have stated before, this teleconference is a continuation of the March 19th, 2009 teleconference. Mr. Saporito, there is no need to begin anew, as the PRB has been provided a transcript of the previous teleconference. For your

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information, we have received and reviewed the documents that you provided to Mr. Paige on April $21^{\rm st}$, 2009. You will have one hour and a half, 90 minutes, to provide the PRB with additional information in support of your request. And we will alert you when there are 10 minutes remaining.

With that said, Mr. Saporito, I'll turn it over to you, and allow you to provide any information you believe the PRB should consider as part of this petition.

MR. SAPORITO: All right. Thank you very much. I appreciate the second opportunity to address the PRB in this matter. I think it's important for the public to interface with the government regarding nuclear power operations in this country.

Just for the record, I believe the first meeting was on March 14th, and not March 19th. Because this is a public record, I heard the acronym NRC OIG mentioned. NRC OIG for the public's information is Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Office of the Inspector General.

I'm going to be referencing the documents that I did provide to the Agency, and they were enumerated with a SEC number at the top of each document, with the first document being SEC Number 1.

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And that would be the petition. So, the PRB members have those documents at their disposal at this time. Is that correct?

MR. ORF: This is Tracy Orf. Yes, we have them.

MR. SAPORITO: Okay. Great.

All right. As the Petition Manager, Mr. Blount, accurately stated, the petition was filed on January 11th, 2009, and was seeking a \$1 million penalty, Notice of Violation with a \$1 million penalty to get the licensee's attention to correct the work environment. That's the essence of this petition. strongly believe in nuclear power production in this country, but the employees have to have a work environment that encourages them to raise safety concerns without any fear of retaliation whatsoever. And that's what the essence of this petition is, is for, number one, to get the licensee's attention with a stiff penalty, a monetary penalty. And, number two, to modify the license in such a way that the licensee is required to take aggressive measures to change, what I believe to be hostile culture, hostile work environment because of poor management culture at that nuclear plant just over the last 20 years.

Okay. The first document we're going to

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look at is SEC Number 2, which is where we left off in March. This is the State of Florida Public Counsel brief, the Citizen's brief on Issue 13. It's a document that was submitted in the Florida Public Service Commission Rate Hearing involving Florida Power and Light. The page I want to continue on is page 11, where I left off last time, and specifically at the bottom of the page under Paragraph 5.

There is language there that talks about Commissioner Skop, S-K-O-P. Now, he pursued a concern with the Public Counsel and with Florida Power and Light attorneys regarding a hole that had been drilled in the plant system as an act of sabotage related to a contract worker who was permitted unescorted access to the facility.

The part that I want to highlight to the PRB is that a co-worker became knowledgeable of this vandalism before FPL discovered the vandalism, but the co-worker did not report it immediately. So, there was some apprehension of that co-worker. It's my understanding, the beliefs that the co-worker did not want to be subject to any type of retaliation for identifying this safety issue, and it shows that in this one instance, in any event, that there was a delayed reaction in not coming forward with the

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information. And if my recollection serves me correctly, I believe FPL offered \$100,000 reward to anyone at that plant with information leading to the individual or individuals who performed this act of sabotage. So, the fact that a licensee has to offer \$100,000 for their workforce to come forward with information should be a red flag to the NRC that there is a problem with that work environment, where people aren't properly trained to come forward with these concerns, and fear retaliation if they do come forward with safety complaints.

If you turn to page 12, the next page of that same document, the Public Counsel is talking about the same point I just made. It raises the issues of the adequacy of FPL's training of workers with nuclear power plant access, and that they must be trained about the importance of reporting anything that could be a safety concern. In fact, this particular worker, who was a co-worker, failed to report this serious act of vandalism, that's a concern of itself, and it reflects FPL's failure to properly train its nuclear workforce at the Turkey Point facility. And the fact that this contract worker was allowed access to the power plant, also calls into question FPL's failure as a licensee regarding plant

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access to their nuclear power plant. So, it's an illustration of failed training programs at the facility.

And, Commissioner Skop, his concerns included the adequate emphasis of how critical it is for nuclear workers to report safety concerns. FPL, according to this document, is not able to properly, or definitively answer the Commissioner's concerns.

The very end of that document, the last paragraph talks about -- there's a statement there. "First, this failure arose in the training process just as in Docket No. 900001." And the reason why I highlight that particular sentence is because that docket was another Public Service Commission public That was back in 1989 where numerous hearing. operators at the Turkey Point facility failed to pass the NRC required re-qualification exam. So, the NRC took action back then, and those plants were not permitted to restart until those operators could demonstrate their knowledge of how to operate that plant. So, you can see that there's quite a lengthy history of 20 years, where we're addressing training problems at that facility.

The next page, page 13, under Paragraph 6, this talks about, there was an NRC augmented

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inspection team sent to the Turkey Point facility in 2006 when this vandal drilled a hole in one of the reactor system loops. And the augmented inspection team went in and investigated, and made a report. that was followed by a report by the FBI, who did their own investigation. FPL put a witness on the stand, and the individual took an oath to tell the truth at a public hearing. And the Public Counsel, his comment related to that testimony. And after referencing the ATR report, the Public Counsel goes on to say, "Nevertheless, FPL witness took liberties to make several public representations which purported to characterize the AIT's findings, the actual language of the confidential report, however, directly contradicts the public representation that FPL made about AIT's findings."

And the very next sentence says, "The utility's witness claimed that the NRC's confidential findings exonerated FPL." And the Public Counsel pointed to the Commissioner saying that, "Mr. Jones' claims, however, are directly contradicted by the report, itself."

And the next page has a big section at the top that you can't read because it was crossed out, because it's confidential part of that report because

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it's a security-related matter. That's why that's blacked out like that, or redacted. But that's what he's referring to. He said FPL put a witness under oath up here, testified that the NRC exonerated the utility, which meant they did nothing wrong allowing this contractor to come on their site, even though the contractor ended up vandalizing the plant. And Public Counsel is saying that's all -- what he's saying really is suborned perjury, putting somebody under You're saying one thing, and it's totally a That should be of grave concern to the NRC, because we're talking about a licensee here who's entrusted with public health and safety in operating two nuclear power reactors on this Turkey Point facility. So, these are very serious situations when you have a utility, in what appears to be a very blatant act of suborned perjury, in my view.

Anyway, on page 14, the next page of that document, Public Counsel goes on to say, "The clear and unambiguous language the AIT report itself directly contradicts Mr. Jones' claim that the AIT found FPL's programs, processes, and procedures in full compliance with the NRC." And "in full compliance with the NRC" is in quotes, meaning that's the words of Mr. Jones, the FPL representative.

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Then at the bottom of page 14, Public Counsel goes on to talk about that, "Initially, FPL never mentioned any red flags, but rather led the Commission to understand that the individual's application, meaning the vandal, was clean. And then just days before the hearing, it was revealed that the individual's security questionnaire, with FPLpossession since 2006", okay, for two years they've had that, "showed a number of red flags that should have concerned FPL." So, that was the point made by the Public Counsel.

And, on the very next page, on page 15, talks about, "The vandal the Public Counsel confided to a co-worker that he had drilled the hole, and had the co-worker reported this serious violation, serious admission in a timely fashion, the hole would discovered and repaired without have been additional outage. Requiring workers to incidents of such magnitude is the responsibility of FPL's program for training nuclear plant workers." And that brings us back to the point that FPL has a failed training program across the board over there at the Turkey Point facility with respect to compliance with the NRC regulations at 10 CFR 50.7.

They don't properly train their

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management, and they don't properly train their supervisory personnel. They don't properly train the nuclear workers, themselves, about the employees unfettered right to raise nuclear safety complaints directly to the NRC, directly to management, or to the media without any fear of retaliation, whatsoever. And this particular exhibit, which is SEC Number 2, amplifies that point in spades.

All right. The next document I'm going to talk about is SEC Number 3. Number 3 is entitled, "FPL Turkey Point Employee Concerns Program, Selfassessment dated January 14th-17th, 2008." And, guess we'll go to page 7 first, and we're just going to highlight the points that I want to emphasize here. On page 7, there's a methodology, I'm sorry, that they talk about. If you go down to the second paragraph, it talks about the team performing interviews on off-site personnel. And it says they performed 27 interviews. And, in Μy view, interviews is not representative of the volume of the personnel at the Turkey Point site. Therefore, the base, what I consider the baseline data for Turkey Nuclear Plant's Employee Concerns Point evaluation by the licensee is flawed, the methodology is flawed, just on that basis alone. And I would

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extend that concern back at least five years on all their programs. You have to look at the baseline data, how many employees did they interview? How many were nuclear workers, craft, mechanics, electricians, type of people, how many people were Operations, how many people did you talk to, supervise? How many people did you talk to who were managers, executive managers, corporate managers that have responsibility and authority over the operations at the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant? So, 27 people is not adequate. It's not representative of the work environment at that facility, in my view.

The next page we're going to look at is page 10. And this talks about, the second paragraph, specifically, "Employees continue to have a negative perception that ECP, or Employees Concerns Program, will address and investigate concerns properly. level of upper management support is sufficient, and the program not be used without retaliation, and that confidentiality of the concern will not be maintained." So, what they're saying here in this one paragraph is the employees have a very negative perception about using the program. feel that their concerns not only will not be properly addressed or investigated, but they also have a fear

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of retaliation if they would go ahead and use that
program. And they certainly don't feel that there's
any measure of confidentiality maintained about people
who go and avail themselves of this program. So,
that's a pretty serious finding, and, let's face it,
that's the heart of any Employee Concerns Program.
You have to have a nuclear workforce at your facility
that is encouraged to use the program. They have to
feel good about it, they have to feel confident about
it. They have to know that when they raise a nuclear
safety complaint, that management takes that complaint
seriously, that management will exhaust no finite
amount of resources to insure that that concern is
investigated, and that at the proper point in time
when the licensee investigates, and either concludes
or fails to validate the concern, that there is proper
feedback to the individual, or individuals who brought
that concern. So, these items, or these elements of
the Employee Concerns Program are failed at the Turkey
Point facility. And, therefore, you have a generic
pervasive problem in implementing the existing
Employee Concerns Program. And this Employee Concerns
Program is labeled the icon ECP, is a product from the
prior program, which is called "Speak Up". And that
program is a failed program, also, so it's just a

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continuation of that failed program.

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If you would turn to page 11 of document, again, at the top it talks that the team only interviewed 27 employees. And some of those employees were contractors, meaning that they didn't work directly for the licensee. And, at some point, there services would no longer be needed, and they would leave. At the bottom of that page at Paragraph 5, it says, "Some individuals felt there has been retaliation in the past for CRs", and CRs Critters. It's the licensee's documentation concerns. "There has been retaliation in the past for CRs, and were concerned that it would be the same now. A lot said there is retaliation for using the ECP. This is part of the perception, where individuals -fear retaliation they if raise feel complaints, and that they that there retaliation going on right now with people who engage in the licensee's current ECP program."

All right. Then the next page of the document, page 12. I'm going to go down to Paragraph 7, and it talks about, "None of the interviewees could recall having any ECP specific training." So, of the 27 individuals that were interviewed, nobody was trained. No one was trained on the ECP. Here is our

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program, here's an outline of the program. If you have a concern you would go here. You go here, this is the next process. We look into the concern. either validate it or we don't, and then there's a feedback step. We'll come back and ask for more input from you before we make a final determination. at some point, you're going to get feedback. And you are protected as an employee in raising this concern. If you feel -- if you've been retaliated against, you can contact the NRC, because it's a violation under 10 CFR 50.7. They can't make you whole economically. economic harm, fired, get some you get you or whatever, you can file a Department of Labor complaint under 42C-58.51.

explained of that was to None these employees, and that's part of the heart of the failed program. If you don't train your nuclear workers about your program, if you don't train your first level supervisors about the program, if you train your managers about the program, and you don't train your executive management about the program, the program is inherently flawed, and it will fail, as this program has failed.

We go down below Paragraph 9 on page 12, you'll see "Conclusions." And what I want to

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highlight, it says, "The majority of the employees did
not know the ECP Coordinator, or his name." Now, I
think that's very significant. I mean, if you're
going to have an effective Employee Concerns Program,
well, then individual charged with the responsibility
of implementing that program, and operating that
program, had darned well better become the most
popular individual at that nuclear power plant. That
individual should be attending management meetings.
That individual should be attending daily tel board
meetings in the maintenance department, in operations
department, health physics department, wherever that
individual can engage the volume of employees, that
individual should make himself known, make himself
seen, should be wearing a badge, I'm the ECP
Coordinator. You've got safety concerns, come talk to
me. He should go out there and solicit concerns, you
know. He can go in there at a plant safety meeting,
say I'm the ECP, in case you forgot who I am. I'm
still here. My name is whoever. Just want to let you
know, if you've got a concern, you come talk to me, or
I'll come meet you. You need to have a rapport with
people. You've got to make them understand that the
program is meant to encourage them to use it. And if
they do use it, I'm the guy that's going to help you

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get through this. If something bad happens to you after you talk to me, darned sure someone is going to be held accountable for it.

Well, these things aren't being done. Hell, the people don't even know who this individual is. They didn't even know what his name was, so, I mean, that's a very, very big red flag. And NRC should be very, very concerned about that.

Let's move to page 21 of the same document. This says, "Conclusionary Statement" under ECP facility, under Paragraph 1 at the very, very bottom. Conclusionary Statement. "The ECP facilities did not create a welcoming environment to conduct investigations/interviews. Office accessibility was also discussed, and the location of the trailers in an area with heavy traffic, which could compromise the concerned individual's confidentiality."

What they're saying here is that the office facility where this unknown Employee Concerns Program facility resides, it's not conducive -- it's not a professionally -- it's an unprofessional looking facility. It's a trailer. First of all, it's a trailer, and it's a heavily trafficked area. If Mr. Smith wants to go report a safety concern, he's going to be seen by all these people going into this

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trailer, where everybody knows the trailer is the ECP
Coordinator's home. So, that does nothing to instill
confidence and encourage people to use the program.
And I have recently attended NRC Region II progress
meeting regarding Turkey Point Power Plant down in
Homestead, Florida a couple of weeks ago. I believe
Mr. Sykes on the line here, and he can validate that
one of the Commissioners stood up there. I believe
her name was Kathleen Soresen, I believe, if my memory
serves me right. And one of her concerns was, she
says, "Look, when people called in, talked to me, they
said there's a trailer out there at this Turkey Point
facility, and that's where people are supposed to
voice safety concerns. And there's a camera on it.
And she said that's something I want the NRC to look
into." She told that to the Region II people. So
this is the same trailer that we're talking about.
She's saying her people, and I have actually since
that time confirmed, or even prior to that time
confirmed that that is one of the concerns of these
people. Someone has told me yes, there is a camera
there, and that is one reason people don't want to use
that trailer facility to report concerns. And, as the
report documents, when you go in there you've got
to have an Employee Concerns Program, employees,

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whether they feel confident in using that program or not, depends on a number of elements, some of which we've already discussed. But one of those elements is certainly whether or not management is serious about the Employee Concerns Program, or do the majority of the employees, including supervision and management, believe that the program is just superficial; meaning that, you know, the NRC is our regulator. regulations at 10 CFR 50.7 says we've got to have a work environment that encourages employees to raise safety concerns. To meet that obligation, to keep our operating license, we're going to come up with this -up with this ECP program. But employee sees that it's so superficial -- and, believe me, if I walk into a trailer that has a camera on it, and I've got to go through a bunch of my co-workers to get there, management is not telling me that they're very serious about this ECP program. They're not spending any amount of resources, whatsoever.

there well-built Ι mean, are very professional looking office facilities available at Turkey Point nuclear site. And absolutely no reason that some of those resources should not have been expended, and allocated, dedicated to the Employee Concerns Program. I'm

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talking about going into a professional office, not a trailer, a structure, building that's going to at least withstand a hurricane, and that it's made out of concrete and bricks, and it's well lit, and it's got an Employee Concerns Program in there, and it's got a secretary in there to assist this individual, so that these employees can see that management is serious. Management is not serious if you've got to report your concerns to an individual who hangs his hat on a trailer and monitoring everybody that comes in and out of there with a camera.

22 Turning on to page of that same under the second half is highlighted document, "Training". There's two paragraphs highlighted there. First one I'm going to talk about, it says, "Team did interviews conduct any with supervisors/managers." Think about that. Here is a licensee doing a self-assessment of their Employee Concerns Program, and the reason they're theoretically, the reason they're doing a selfassessment is to identify deficiencies, to highlight those deficiencies, and to resolve those deficiencies, and to enhance the overall effectiveness of program. So, this team -- my understanding, there was individuals, people from other nuclear team of

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plants were part of this team, so they're getting input from all these other nuclear plants, which is an excellent idea. It's an excellent way to handle this. They have their ECP -- their licensing manager round up all these individuals from these other plants and made this team, but then they don't talk to any site They don't talk to any managers at the supervisors. I mean, what's with that? That's very, very to have -- and when you're going important establish a baseline for your program -- I mean, you have to have an effective baseline. interview from the top. You have to start with the executive management level. You have to talk to this guy J.A. Stall, who's been there since probably the first brick was laid at the Turkey Point facility. You have to start with him. You have to interview him, get his understanding of how serious he is about dedicating resources to this program. What he knows about the program, does he understand what 10 CFR 50.7 Does he understand employees can go directly means? to the NRC without -- have to be able to go there without fear of retaliation to raise safety complaints. And if you don't start there, the rest of your baseline is flawed to begin with.

You have to interview the licensing

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attorneys, like this fellow, William Blair that's on the line. You need to interview him. You need to get his aspects, because he counsels executive managers like Mr. Stall, and like Louis Hay, who is the CEO of this company.

They want to build two more nuclear plants out there, and here we have two nuclear plants which they can't even manage effectively with respect to an Employee Concerns Program, which is the heart of protecting public health and safety. So, this program is serious — this self-assessment is seriously flawed, and it shows how seriously flawed the ECP existing at the Turkey Point facility is.

The next couple of lines down it talks about conclusion. It says, "Employees are not trained effectively." HIRD HIRD is Intimidation, Retaliation and Discrimination. Tt. says, "There is no specific ECP HIRD training for supervisors and managers." There is no training. They're not trained on the program. They're not trained about 10 CFR 50.7. They're not trained that retaliate against employees you cannot who safety concerns, either to the management, or directly to NRC, or if they decide to go to the media. look what happened here at this plant. They're not

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trained at all, so if you're not training supervisors, if you're not training your managers, quess what, your program is going to fail. People who use the program, the crafts, the operators, technicians, they're going to get retaliated against raising safety complaints. Why? Because management and supervisors, they don't know any They weren't even trained as to how better. ascertain what the route for a safety complaint is, the protected status of the employee bringing that concern, and how to interface, react, and deal with safety concern that was raised, and how interface, react, and deal with the employee raised that safety complaint. This is very, very, very, very serious. It's a very serious finding.

The next page, page 23, paragraphs highlighted there. Ι want to ao Paragraph 3. It says, "There is no formal ECP This is not applicable." training. So, this is a generic statement about there is no training, period. The employees aren't being trained, the craft the electricians aren't being trained, workers, instrument control technicians aren't being trained, mechanics aren't being trained, electricians aren't being trained, management isn't being trained,

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supervisors aren't being trained, plant nuclear licensed operators aren't being trained. Nobody is being trained.

Paragraph 5 below that says, "There are no ECP training objectives." There's no module, there's no trainer to conduct the training sessions. So, this is a failed program that will continue to fail because there is absolutely no training going on at all with respect to training the nuclear workforce at Turkey Point Nuclear Station, or to train management, supervision. This amplifies, and exemplifies the comments made by the Public Service Commissioner, Commissioner Skop, S-K-O-P, when he said, "Look at this contract nuclear worker that you allowed on your He drilled a hole in one of your nuclear plant. reactor loops. And a co-worker observed this, became aware of it ahead of FPL, but that co-worker did not report this concern."

Well, why would they? They were never even trained that they were supposed to report that nuclear safety concern. Had they been trained, even though they're a contractor, they should be trained. They're working at a licensed facility, licensed by the NRC. Had the employee been trained, the issue could have been dealt with swiftly. The plant could

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have been brought on line much quicker than the week it took to expend the funds for replacement FPL would have saved themselves about million. It's a failed program, and that's what happens when you have a failed program. You have a contract worker drilling a hole in a loop, and it's not reported in a timely manner. It could not have been reported at all, and it could have been another system where the reactor started after it came up to some level of power, another system would have failed. could have been vandalized in a much more sophisticated manner. And this is very serious. Ιf you have a program that's failed, public health and safety is at risk. That's the bottom line.

If we have a Three Mile Island incident here, and there is a release of radiation, then we're not going to be coming back to our homes. We live in this area, and we like coming back to our homes, so we depend on the NRC to constantly monitor the activities of these plants in such a way that protects our health and safety. And, right now, that's not being done.

When I attended the performance meeting held by Region II, they gave them green lights across the board, green, green, green, green, green.

Everything is fine. Everything is safe. There's no

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problems at this nuclear plant. It's unbelievable
comments in the light of what's progressed over the
last couple of years over there, with the hole being
drilled, security guards sleeping, security guards
covering for sleeping security guards, security guards
disassembling their weapons, nuclear engineer
violating a procedure willfully, licensee denying the
willfulness of these security violations, and the fact
that the violation even existed. All these things
transpiring at a couple of nuclear plants licensed by
the NRC where there is a failed Employee Concerns
Program, people the public should be gravely
concerned about their health and safety, at this
point, because no one knows if there is a safety
concern out there that hasn't been reported, because
people due to the hostile work environment. I'm
telling you, right now, and people are scared to raise
safety complaints. And, on top of that, you have an
Employee Concerns Program which is a failed program,
where there is absolutely no training across the
board, a pervasively failed program, where no one is
being trained. And there are plenty of examples to
that extent.

Okay. On page 26 of this report of SEC Document 3, Exhibit 3, it says, "Another example of

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event-based investigative focus contained the of a substantiated concern involving the chilling behavior of a supervisor." It goes on to say that, "The report noted some of the interviewees had mentioned that the performance of this supervisor had been called into question before." So, then it says, "Did you have a problem with a supervisor?" It says, "Chilling behavior. Supervisor did something that was very what's called aberrant, aberrant behavior is a concern that should raise the eyebrows of the NRC, because this is a nuclear plant." If you have a supervisor acting in an aberrant manner, then that's a big red flag.

So, they found this guy, this male, female, whoever, supervisor acted this way before. Other people have seen this supervisor act in this manner, and this team of licensee — this licensee's team is doing this ECP review, and in their view it was chilling behavior. So, that just emphasizes again the negative and hostile retaliatory work environment at that facility, at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant.

The next page, page 27 talked about,
"There's recurring concern expressed by station
personnel in various forms. The perception is ECP is

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either unwilling or unable to maintain confidentiality." And then it says, "This issue is evidenced not only from a number of interviews described previously in this report, but has been extensively documented in previous inspections and surveys dating back, the 2005 survey, the 2006 survey, NRC problem identification and resolution inspection, and in January of 2007, and in July 2007 when the NRC did a PINR inspection." And it goes on to say, "The problem" -- this says, "The team is not aware of significant efforts underway to address the problem, or relay the problem, underlying issues appears to gone unnoticed, and the ineffectiveness previous corrective actions." Meaning, the licensee was aware of this dating back to 2005. I've mentioned this point before. "They're aware of this deficiency, that there's a problem with the confidentiality, with the ECP program. They known about this for now over four years, and the problem has not been resolved." And it's been, again, documented here, so this is a big red flag that the licensee's program has failed.

I'm going to move on to page 23 of this bottom of page 23 exhibit. at the are some conclusionary statements. "These efforts to prevent perception of retaliation have been the not

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effective." Now, how could they? No one even knows who this guy is, or what he does. They don't even know what his name is. No one is given any training from the nuclear worker, and all the way up through management. So, it's no reason that the conclusion is that there is a perception that there's no effort to prevent retaliation. Ιn fact, retaliation has occurred at that plant. They forced the resignation of a senior nuclear plant operator because he had safety concerns in restarting a nuclear reactor, and he had numerous other safety concerns this individual had raised during his employment there. And it got to a point where they were challenging his NRC license, because is a licensed operator. So, they were challenging his license and ordering him to restart And it's coming from Bill Jefferson, this reactor. the Plant Manager. Bill Jefferson, being perceived by Nuclear Plant Operator, is retaliating Senior against him because he wants to operate the plant in conformance with his own NRC license, plus the plant's license, of course.

At the bottom of that page, again, it says, "Some station personnel expressed a concern that ECP is unable to prevent retaliation." It is. It's unable to prevent retaliation, because, again, there

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is no training. People aren't aware of the program. Managers aren't trained, supervisors aren't trained. Therefore, if there is retaliation going on, no one knows that what they're doing is wrong. Managers don't know, the supervisors don't know that they're not supposed to act this way to a nuclear worker, and that's a violation of NRC requirements and regulation at 10 CFR 50.7, because they weren't trained. They have no idea, they have no concept.

I've worked at that nuclear plant, believe me, and I stayed in touch with a lot of people there There's a lot of good quality people over the years. But I don't care how good you are, professional you are, how many degrees you have, how many years experience you have, if you aren't trained in a specific area, or specific function, you're not knowledgeable. And you're going to make missteps, and licensee, management, supervisors have the made missteps, and continue to make missteps, and will continue to make missteps in retaliating against nuclear workers because they have not been trained This is very, very serious. otherwise.

I mean, Paul Insanger used to be their licensing manager. He was the fellow who gathered these nuclear professionals from the other NRC

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licensed facilities, and formed this team. They fired They fired him right after he turned this report in to FPL management and NRC. So, think about that. People know who Paul Insanger was out there. well liked, professional individual, probably 15 or more years in the industry. He was fired right after he submitted this report. Because why? This report puts FPL, puts the licensee in a bad light to the NRC. And the individual doesn't have a job there anymore. co-workers know he doesn't have a job there anymore, and they know that he was the main author behind this report. And they know that FPL was made aware of this report, and NRC was made aware of this report. That just goes to instill the hostility and the retaliatory work environment at the Turkey Point That's probably one of the most serious nuclear safety concerns that this PRB will ever hear. The licensee -- the manager gets fired for engaging the licensee on the failure of their ECP. an incredible, incredible event.

Page 41 of this document at the "Management down, talks about, third paragraph attention to the EC program did not meet expectations. Management awareness of the EC program was superficial, and program values had been not

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emphasized with their employees. The ECP facility was of low quality, and did not give the impression of being important to management. Two of the items we've previously talked about, three of the items we've talked about. "There is a perception problem with the ECP in the areas of confidentiality, and potential retribution", the report goes on to say. So, again, people do not feel that their complaining about safety complaints will be kept confidential, and they certainly feel that they'll be retaliated against if they use this program.

"Previous surveys and assessments have identified this perception, but little or no progress has been made in reversing this perception." I mean, they knew about it. The licensee has known about this for the better part of four or five years. Nobody has done anything about it, to correct it, so the program continues to be a failed program.

Then at the very end it says, "A large percentage of concerns submitted anonymously hampers feedback to individuals." This is a very, very critical and important statement for the NRC to analyze. What they're saying here is, our licensee employees, including management, supervisors, they can raise safety complaints anonymously if they fear

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retaliation. Because, you know, if you do it
anonymously, no one is supposed to know who you are,
so how can you be retaliated against, if you're doing
this anonymously? Well, the licensee is saying here
that there's a lot of people filing complaints
anonymously. So, number one, that raises a red flag,
should raise a red flag to the NRC saying well, these
people were fearing retaliation, because everybody
wants to be anonymous. If you didn't fear
retaliation, you just go up to your supervisor, you go
up to your manager, or if you're a manager you go to
your next level of management and say look, this
indicator over here on the control board, you know,
doesn't look right to me. It's supposed to indicate
this, it's indicating this. We may have a problem
with the pressure coming out of this pump, whatever.
And let me know how you make out on this. That's not
happening. No, no, no. People are trying to secretly
submit their concerns because, like I say, the people
at Turkey Point facility are very excellent workers.
They're very talented, they're educated, they're
professionals, and they have due regard for public
health and safety. And they want to see that nuclear
power plant operate safely. Hell, their jobs and
their livelihoods depend on that plant running safely,

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and their kids go to the same schools as the people who live in the area. But, on the other hand, they don't want to take that complaint directly to management or NRC, because if they get found out, they're going to lose their job. They're going to in some way get retaliated against.

In the past, they've seen Gino Urbanos, a nuclear engineer, he got discriminated He got fired. He was a nuclear plant against. operator, he got demoted, failed to get a promotion. They were cited on both of those occasions by the NRC as retaliation. How many retaliatory issues does the NRC Region II, that they're not even aware of over the last 20 years? Numerous ones. Go to the DOL website, there's been many DOL complaints filed. Now, it's very hard to prosecute a DOL complaint under 42 USC 58.51, because when you're economically damaged by an employment action FPL, fired, by you get the they want \$10,000 minimum before they're attorneys, even going to talk to you. You got \$10,000? Sit down, I want to talk to you. You don't have \$10,000 -- well, why don't you go see Joe Blow down the street here. He might be able to help you out. You're just left twisting in the wind.

However, if any one of those nuclear

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workers at Turkey Point decided to go rob a bank down there in Homestead, God forbid, but they decided to rob a bank and they got caught, first thing the Department of Justice does is appoint the individual an attorney free of charge if you're economically disadvantaged. Free of charge. You can rob a bank, you can get represented by this government. You can raise a nuclear safety complaint, get fired, and you're on your own.

Anyway, back to this report, on page 41. "A large number of employees are using the program anonymously, and the licensee is saying that that hampers their ability to provide feedback." that's a ridiculous statement, because if the program up correctly, and properly managed, set you can have employees raise concerns anonymously. You can identify those concerns with a enumerate them, FPL - you can number, have the Employee Concerns forms somewhere out there in plant. And they're all numbered with an FPL number, or a Turkey Point number, TPN 0002. And these forms be throughout the plant, different boxes, could Employee Concerns stations, and people can on the fly pick these up. And, hell, the licensee could mandate and require all supervisors, managers, and nuclear

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workers to have one of these forms. They should be everywhere. There should be no -- you shouldn't have to tiptoe around the rose bushes to find one of these forms, and try to get one secretly. They should be everywhere, so that everybody has access to them, so that if you want to raise a concern anonymously, you When it goes have the form already. It's enumerated. into the little locked box, or however they want to get it to the Employee Concerns manager, that manager has a document with a nuclear safety concern on it from an individual that he has no idea who it is, but it's enumerated. So that nuclear safety concern can be readily identified. It could be investigated. can be corrected, if need be. And, in any event, when final resolution is achieved by the licensee, that nuclear safety complaint can be posted publicly at the nuclear facility on another FPL form with that FPL This is Turkey Point Nuclear Safety Concern tag. Number 2. It doesn't identify anybody, but, guess what, it gives feedback to the guy or girl who raised the safety concern, because they know. It could be a tri-part form. They kept the last part before they turned it in. Their part says it's Concern Number 2, and this is my concern they're talking about. here's what they did about it.

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Not only does that instill confidence in individual who used the program, whose safety complaint was looked at by FPL and investigated, whether it was validated or not, it shows the employee that FPLtook his concern, his or her There was an effort made to investigate seriously. it, and to resolve it one way or another. And it was posted, so the employee knows that it was done. his or her co-workers see that a concern was raised. took the following actions, and here's final resolution. And that's the way the program could be run, and should be run to address those individuals who want to remain anonymous. So, don't tell me, being the licensee, don't tell me, FPL, that this provide feedback hampers your ability to That's a failed That's totally absurd. individuals. analysis by this team, who did this report. And it's a failed conclusion by the licensee, itself. So that should be a separate concern with the NRC, extent that the licensee can't even manage their ECP program, which is a failed program to begin with.

The next page, page 42 down here it talks about -- Paragraph 2, "Weakness", there's a number 3 after it. Talks about the quality of the Employee Concerns office. It says -- it talks about, "The

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appearance of the office is such" -- it's a poor appearance. It doesn't give the appearance that management is serious about the program, or that management is going to expend any amount of resources to enhance and operate the Employee Concerns Program.

We talked about that before.

Hello? Are we still on the line here?

(Chorus of yeses.)

MR. SAPORITO: Okay. I'm sorry. It must have been my phone.

So, again, the perception problem certainly needs to be addressed. And you've got to start with providing professional building office area for the ECP Coordinator or Manager to work from. they do need some help, whether it's a male or female, the person needs at least one secretary, some help. You need to look -- the NRC needs to look at the program from an operational perspective, first of all, or the use of computers if they -- as their filing system, and how do they manage it? Is it electronic filing system? How is it managed? Is it a paper system? How is it managed? Where are all these things kept, and how -- you need to interview the ECP coordinator. How are you operating your program? you out there talking to people? Are you making

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yourself known? Do you interface with management, interface with supervisors, interface with first-level workers, craft? Do you attend meetings? If people give you a concern, what do you do? How are you keeping it confidential, if they want be confidential? If you investigate, how it is being investigated? Do you turn it over to quality team, specific experience? people that have Ιf an operations concern, do you have a -- do you have a licensed plant operator as part of a three or fourmember team to address it? If it is an operations problem, and it involves a piece of equipment, motoroperated valve, do you have an electrician on this team? Do you have a mechanic on this team? Licensing department on this team?

One individual cannot effectively manage the entire program by themself, so you have two nuclear plants out there. One individual cannot investigate the volume of safety complaints that are out there. One individual certainly is not qualified to address the array of nuclear safety complaints that come in nuclear plants to the extent the individual is not a licensed operator himself. What is his background, electrical, mechanical? No one possesses all those skills to, in a sufficient quantity or

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quality to ascertain, and validate any nuclear safety complaint. He needs teams at his disposal, he or she needs teams at their disposal so that when they get safety complaints, these teams are already in place. Here's one, operational nuclear safety Here's mechanical maintenance nuclear safety Here's a health physics nuclear safety complaint. complaint.

The team analyzes the complaint, investigates the complaint, makes their preliminary findings. He can review it with the team, and then they can decide on resolution, and then feedback to the individual bringing it about. But as it exists, the entire program, the overall program is a failed Employee Concerns Program. It is a failed program.

This only a sampling of 27 people, and there is no managers, or no supervisors in this sample. So, the baseline — there is no baseline, first of all, for this particular self-assessment. Other self-assessments will show you the same. And, therefore, the baseline for the entire — the last five, ten, fifteen, twenty years, there is no baseline of what the environment is out there at Turkey Point Nuclear Station.

So, first of all, you know, 2.206, you can

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request a modification of licensee's -- to order the licensee to have valid self-assessment done. need to have an outside entity, someone outside of FPL's business relationship to come in there and do a self-assessment. You have to -- if you're going to do a baseline, a valid baseline, you need to talk to I would say 100 percent of the people. You need to talk to 100 percent of the people out there to get your first valid baseline. You need to be talking to Lou Hays and get his understanding, how serious is he in operating nuclear power plants under his authority. And to the You need to talk to J.A. Stall, certainly. licensing attorneys, Blair and their Ross, understanding of how serious are they about implementing a valid program, something that's going And then you need to interview the entire population at that facility, the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant. And that's your baseline.

this program is garbage. This is a major and significant nuclear safety concern that the NRC should be very concerned about, very gravely concerned about. And, to the extent that the NRC Office of the Inspector General is going to read these transcripts, the OIG should be extremely concerned about Region II

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representing to the public at its recent meeting that everything is green at the Turkey Point Plant. Everything is safe. The plant is running just fine.

Where was the NRC over the last 20 years? Why did the NRC Region II allow these plants' work environments to degrade to this degree? That's what the OIG should be looking into.

Okay. The next document we're going to look at is SEC Number 4, Exhibit 4. It's a "Miami Herald" news article entitled, "Court papers reveal nuclear feud at Turkey Point". It's dated March 12th, 2009. And page 1 of this document talks about this fellow I mentioned earlier, David Hoffman. He's a Senior Nuclear Plant Operator, and he's a licensed individual. He holds a license from the NRC separate and apart from FPL's operating license as DRP-31 and 41, which regard the operation of those two nuclear reactors.

Mr. Hoffman -- well, he happened to be on duty on February 26th, 2008, when another engineer at one of the FPL substations obviously violated, apparently violated a procedure, maintenance procedure. He pulled some relays he shouldn't have. He tripped the entire Florida Power and Light high line, which caused an imbalance, and then scrammed

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both nuclear reactors at the Turkey Point facility automatically as a safety function of that system. And Mr. Hoffman was in charge. He was the senior nuclear power operator. And, yet, all his safety concerns about starting this reactor in less than 12 hours were cast aside by plant management. brushed aside. People from Juno Beach were apparently sent down there, and given orders. And he got very concerned about safety. Не had safety concerns before. They apparently weren't addressed, and now his authority has been usurped by people from the Juno facility. And the licensee, being FPL, and through, I would imagine, Bill Jefferson, the Plant Manager, wanted to get this reactor started back up within 12 So, the licensee sets a time table. hours. We want this reactor restarted within 12 hours.

Well, think about that. You're putting your operations department on a time line now. It doesn't matter what happened, doesn't matter what the status of that nuclear reactor is at the core when the neutron flux in that reactor, whatever it did when these reactors scrammed, and whether it was too much Xenon in there, or displacement of the flux within that core, or the status of any of the equipment that was involved in the significant action of a nuclear

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reactor scram. No matter what, we want this reactor started within 12 hours. Okay? So, you're putting your -- the licensee is putting plant operations in a very precarious position to look at changing their focus from the safety aspects of what just happened, to let's get this reactor back on. Let's make our million dollars a day. It's an economic consideration over safety, licensee is putting money over safety. And they're doing it in a very direct, and forceful They're having their management from their corporate offices, Juno Beach rush down there and take over, brushing away Mr. Hoffman, who was in charge, who knows how to operate a nuclear reactor. hired to do so by FPL for many years. And brushing him aside, and all his authority, and all insights, and you're saying we want a time line, and we're going to have this reactor back up in less than 12 hours.

That is a nuclear safety concern, in and of itself, putting your operations department in such a precarious position. So, Hoffman got to the point well, this is it. I'm out of here. You're going to jeopardize my NRC license. The guy's got a family. He's got to make a living, and if he loses his plant operating license, what is he going to do? So, he

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leaves. He resigns, and he resigns on the cusp of having raised a significant nuclear safety concern to management, who just brushed it aside, and brushed him aside, all in the name of economics, to get the plant back on line.

Page 2 of that news report, you have a statement by this fellow, Tom Veenstra. He represents Florida Power and Light as their spokesman. Не represents the licensee. He's making a statement to And he's quoted public. as say, "Without exception, the safety of our customers, communities, employees is always FPL's top priority at Point, and all of our facilities. The facts clearly show this case is totally without merit, having nothing do with safety, but rather, to individual's attempt to improperly keep a retention payment that he chose to forfeit."

That's the outrageous, and most incompetent statement I've ever heard any manager, or any spokesman for the Florida Power and Light Company. That is outrageous, and it's totally contradicted by the actual events that happened concerning Mr. Hoffman. And it's contradicted by the Employee Concerns Program report we just went through. Because FPL does not, without exception, look after

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the safety of their customers and communities, their employees. That's not always their top Their top priority is restarting this priority. reactor as fast, within 12 hours. Their top priority isn't maintaining the facilities for the Employee No, let's just get them a fricken Concerns Program. trailer out somewhere back there. You know what, put a camera on it. I want to know who's coming in and out of there. And make sure it's a heavily traveled area, in case somebody sees them. We want somebody to see who's going in there. That's FPL's top priority, So, this statement is just totally making money. outrageous. And that's how they retaliate. This is retaliation against Hoffman, because he -- Hoffman. Yes, he was paid a big amount of money, like all the people. We're going to get that, all these nuclear workers down there are paid a big bunch of money by FPL because no one wants to work there. Believe me. Everybody in the nuclear industry knows how bad it is at Turkey Point, everybody. All the other nuclear plants know how bad it is at Turkey Point, so to get anybody to work there, you're going to have to pay them a lot of money. And if you pay somebody a lot of money, they're going to say oh, if I have to work there, I could probably stick it out for three years,

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and I'll maybe get my house paid off. I mean, that's the only incentive, that's the only reason that people like Hoffman, who are professionals, would go to Turkey Point, to begin with. So, the fact that they're saying oh, you know, Hoffman is just trying to get out of his bonus payment. That's totally frivolous. That's totally without merit, and it's a misrepresentation to the public of what's really going on at Turkey Point.

The report goes on to say that, according to this reporter, "29.2 percent", and they're talking about the Employee Concerns Program -- it says, "The Employee Concerns Program found that one in four, 29.2 percent disagreed with the following statement. `I am confident that nuclear safety and quality issues reported to the ECP are thoroughly investigated, and appropriately resolved.' More than one in three agree with this statement. `I can use the ECP without fear of retaliation." So, here again, you have a reporter that apparently reviewed this report, and even the layman can see that there's a problem, where people fear retaliation using the Employee Concerns Program at Turkey Point. And they don't believe that the issues that they raise in that facility are going to be resolved. So, you know, this is -- it

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exemplifies in layman's terms. It's a news reporter who can take this report, and see the inherent problems with it.

The next exhibit, Exhibit 5, is a Miami News article, "Silence clause aims to keep Turkey Point workers quiet". It's dated March 12th of 2009. Page 1 of this document, if you go down to the fourth paragraph, it says, "One reason" -- they're talking about "virtually, all operators are reluctant to talk to journalists. One reason is that many signed bonus agreements, which they promise not to say anything bad." It's supposedly quoted in the bonus agreement that, "The employee shall not at any time in the future, and in any way, make any statements that may be derogatory or detrimental to the company's good name." And the reporter is saying, this is the way that the document was phrased on the contract of employment agreement that David Hoffman signed. employment agreements where FPL is operators, and health physics technicians, and nonlicensed operators, and other craft a lot of money to come work at it's Turkey Point Nuclear Plant. And they require them to sign these agreements.

This is inherently discriminatory. This document is inherently discriminatory, where you

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require the employee to sign saying they won't make any statements that are derogatory or detrimental to the company's good name, because it precludes them from raising safety complaints at that facility, at the Turkey Point facility. And that is a direct violation of 10 CFR 50.7. I mean, there is no if, ands, or buts about it, that is inherently discriminatory, and inherently in violation of NRC requirements and regulations under 10 CFR 50.7.

But, FPL Spokesman, Tom Veenstra, in this report is quoted as saying that, "The utility vigorously encourages any one at any of our nuclear power plants, or our other facilities, to identify safety concerns without fearing reprisal of any kind."

Well, that is totally false. I mean, their own self-assessment contradicts that statement by Mr. Veenstra, and they're making this to the public, again. They're misleading the public.

The fact of the matter is that FPL doesn't vigorously encourage anyone. They don't even train people about their nuclear safety concerns program. If you don't train people, how are you going to encourage them? I mean, it's just -- it's totally ridiculous. And there was -- FPL is a huge company. They renamed their FPL groups into FPL Next

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Generation, and FPL or something. They renamed it. But, anyway, they have other power plants that are licensed by the NRC, and I just want the PRB to make note of a document dated December 22nd, 2008. It's FPL's response to an NRC enforcement action, EA-06-178, regarding the safety culture of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, that the NRC inspected and found the safety culture to be very, very poor. And, actually modified FPL's license to operate that plant in such a way as to correct the work environment there. where you have an FPL spokesman, Tom Veenstra, saying that we vigorously encourage anyone working at any of our nuclear power plants, or other facilities, to identify safety concerns without fearing reprisal of any kind, is totally false, totally misleads the And it's contradicted by the ECP, and it's contradicted by the fact that the NRC cited another nuclear facility operated by FPL, because they have a work environment that doesn't encourage employees to raise safety concerns without fear of reprisal. That's what you're dealing with here. You have a licensee who denies everything. They deny all violations, they deny there's nothing wrong with our facility, and it's a mess.

Exhibit 6 is a Miami News article

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entitled, "Amid nuclear worker shortage, FPL says it's following the rules", dated March 12th, 2009. Page 1 of this document, third paragraph down, talks about, "In the first six weeks of 2008, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission found that the Florida Power and Plant Nuclear Plants had 21 overtime deviations, 17 plant operators that worked more than 72 hours a week, which exceeds the maximum allowed, and that two of those workers were involved in a spill of 200 gallons of boric acid used to control the nuclear reaction in the core."

At the bottom of that document there's a couple of paragraphs that talks about, "The NRC Chairman, himself, Dale Klein, he visited Turkey Point, and then he spoke with journalists. And he talked about "how furiously understaffed the facility was." This is dated March 12th, 2009. But this reported document that Mr. Klein visited the facility last year, so this is approximately one year dated. He's talking about the serious under staffing. And Mr. Klein was quoted by this reporter as saying, "This is the first time I've delivered a message of this magnitude on a plant's human performance issues." And then he's quoted again as saying, "A lot of operators are complaining about the overtime they do." And he

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says, "FPL was way behind in filling openings, and its training programs weren't sufficient."

Well, the NRC -- the Commissioner, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is telling the public that it's an overtime issue, because Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plants are being They're working numerous hours, and that overworked. he's personally coming down to the plant here. Не personally came there, admonished them about it, because he's serious about it. He's concerned for public health and safety. But the fact of the matter is, FPL has failed training programs, is what the Commissioner said. And we already talked about their failed training programs with the ECP. He's talking about now failed training programs regarding plant The fact that there aren't enough operators. operators. You're working too much overtime. even though it's an overtime issue, it also deals with training, failed training program at the licensee's And it also deals with the situation, plant. extensive overtime, 72 hours a week, extensive overtime takes away from the overall work environment at Turkey Point Nuclear facility. And there can be no if, ands, or buts about it. I've worked at that facility. I've worked seven days a week, ten, twelve

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or more hours a day, and you're just a zombie down there. So, it takes away from the work environment, believe me. And Mr. Klein was perfectly correct that there's a very serious problem here.

The next document is SEC Exhibit 7. It's a "Miami Herald" news article entitled, "At the heart of Turkey Point plant worker's unrest overtime", March 12th, 2009 is the date of it. And, again, the second, the third and fourth paragraph is talking about the core issues involved, bonuses, which operators could get \$40,000 or \$50,000 a year in addition to their regular salary, which can easily run over \$100,000 with overtime. Overtime is important at Turkey Point, because there is so much of it. The lawsuit said that most operators, an average work week is sixty or seventy hours more."

What you have here is a news article related to a lawsuit filed by at least 20 operators at Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant regarding overtime issues, and the way that FPL allocates the overtime with respect to the Department of Labor rules and regulations in that regard. But, the only reason I bring this to the PRB's attention, again, because it deals with overtime. It deals with the fact that FPL is paying large monetary bonuses to recruit workers,

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and to force workers to stay at Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. And those two issues, again, go to illustrate the poor work environment at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant facility.

People don't want to work there. People know you get retaliated against. You raise safety complaints, they know how bad it is down there. Money, that's the only reason FPL is offering this money, is to get these people down there for at least three years.

next exhibit, SEC Exhibit "Associated Press" article entitled, "Ex-Worker Florida Power Company puts safety second". It's dated March 14th, 2009. And it talks about Hoffman again. It says Hoffman or FPL's - and he's quoted saying, "Horrible management". He was quoted as saying in his resignation letter to Bill Jefferson. And, Hoffman, of course, he hired an attorney. He's suing FPL because FPL is wanting to get back their bonus pay they gave him. And they're claiming that's the only reason that he quit. He's trying to weasel out of this payment. But according to Hoffman's attorney, this guy, Joe Hackney, he said that his client's case was the, "tip of the iceberg."

It's an attorney who's in the know. He's

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in the know, because he's talking to Hoffman. That's his client, and witnesses that are involved in the Hoffman case, and whatnot. The attorney is saying it's the tip of the iceberg. So, the NRC should be very concerned. That's a red flag to the NRC that there's many, many other issues regarding safety, and the environment at that plant that are going to be coming out.

And just a point of record here, one of those plant operators, there's 20 operators, I think the name is Klein, I think it's Mark Klein. There's another document that references the name, so I can identify that later. But he told this reporter that people are retaliated against when they raise safety concerns at Turkey Point Nuclear Plant. And he's working there right now. He's an operator, licensed operator, so Region II, you might want to look into that.

Okay. The next exhibit, SEC 9 is a "Miami Herald" news article entitled, "Turkey Point Nuclear Operator Response to Miami Herald Article." It's dated March 14th, 2009. This is Hoffman. He responded to the news article. I guess the one that said there's a feud going down there, a nuclear feud at Turkey Point. But, anyway, he's quoted here about

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the third, fourth paragraph down. He said, "FPL has chosen to continue to neglect the environment created at Turkey Point regarding the retaliatory nature of the management team in place. Multiple examples of this inappropriate behavior will continue to be presented as the lawsuit moves forward."

So, remember my earlier comment about his attorney saying this is just the tip of the iceberg. Well, here, this is the iceberg, Hoffman is telling you what the iceberg is. There is retaliation, there is a hostile work environment at Turkey Point Nuclear Plant. There's going to be witnesses testify to that effect. Some of the NRC should be very concerned about it.

The last paragraph talks about, "As the Senior Licensed Operator with the NRC who was charted to safely operate the nuclear power plant, while insuring the health and safety of the public, I left FPL when I was no longer allowed to satisfy these requirements."

That's what the -- Dave Hoffman. That's what that Senior Nuclear Power Operator had to say. He quit, he could not meet the requirements under NRC's licensing requirement. And his license that he holds with FPL -- Dave Hoffman's license that he holds

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with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the DRP31, 41, which are licenses FPL holds with the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, David Hoffman is saying he
can no longer maintain the -- to work at the Turkey
Point facility, because he can't work where there is a
safety environment which it's required, where he'd get
his safety concerns acknowledged, addressed, and
resolved to protect public health and safety. So,
he's saying there's a retaliatory work environment.
That's what that -- he's telling the public here
through this reporter.

And, again, I go back to Region II presentation a week or so ago to the public, that everything at Turkey Point is fine. We give them green across the board. The Region II Administrator, he never even attended the meeting. I guess it's not important to him. It's not important to him to interface with the public, and all the concerns that were raised at that meeting.

He should have been there giving answers to myself, and to other members of the public who have some serious safety issues that they're bringing to Region II. And many of those issues weren't -- there was no answer. I guess, people that were representing Region II at the time were going to look into it, and

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didn't have an answer available at that time. But they said everything is green. I think that's a gross misrepresentation what's actually happening at Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant.

And to the extent that OIG is going to be reviewing these transcripts, OIG needs to look into how regions, like NRC Region II, interface with the public. And they should be more -- there should be more sunshine. There should be more transparency. The NRC should say we cited them these violations. We sent a guy in there. They found guards sleeping on the job. They found guards covering up for other guards. They found guards taking their weapons apart. And this is what we did about it. And this is where that situation is now. Yes, we know Hoffman resigned after this reactor scram, and we're looking at it, and this is where we are now.

No, they didn't do any of that stuff. It's just dancing around this silly report, these White findings, and Green findings, and Orange findings. And hell, the public don't know what the hell they're talking about. All they hear is the NRC thinks everything is fine out there.

MR. BLOUNT: Excuse me, Mr. Saporito.

MR. SAPORITO: Yes.

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MR. BLOUNT: Just to let you know, we're coming up on an hour and a half. You've got about 10 minutes left.

MR. SAPORITO: Okay. Thank you.

MR. BLOUNT: Yes.

MR. SAPORITO: All right. So, SEC Number 10, I just want to get through these, so I'm going to go a little faster here. An article talking about FPL's response to the Turkey Point story. And this is by Bill Jefferson. He's the Turkey Point Site Vice President. Everything he says in this report, I'm not going to read it to you. You can read it for yourselves. But everything it says is contradicted by the documents we've already reviewed, and the Employee Concerns Program itself. And by statements made by Hoffman in those reports, so that's why I put that in there. He's trying to make the public think that everything is fine. It's really not.

The next exhibit, SEC Number 11, this talks about the David Hoffman lawsuit. But, specifically, the first page. If you go down to the dotted paragraph, there's are safety concerns that Hoffman raised. Okay? And that's the reason he quit. These safety concerns, all of them, not just the incident that happened on that one night where he

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quit, but all these incidents he didn't think were getting resolved.

But there's a paragraph, the second one from the bottom of that paragraph, says, operating crews should never be placed in the position to get the reactor startup completed under a time -- the pressure condition, which to me seem ΙV plotting requirements for the third doubling with a rapidly changing Xenon condition. This lack of desire to listen and act on input continues to force written correspondence, and is a major contributor to why we have an SCWD issue at the station. People are not valued, and they're treated like equipment numbers."

What he's saying is, I raised these safety complaints, including the one to restart this reactor, and no one cares, no one listens. They want to get the reactor back on line. We're nothing more than equipment and numbers to this plant. Again, that goes to the work environment.

The next couple of pages, this one is entitled, "Counterclaim Count One-Retaliation", not that one. I'm sorry. It's the next page following that. It's Item 11 and 12, talks about, "The plant manager insisted that Hoffman start the reactor", and

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it talks about Hoffman being put in the position of being constructively discharged because he refused to do something he thought was not safe. And, again, that goes to the environment.

And on, this page is not numbered. Oh, it's page 4 of 6 of the Retention Bonus Agreement, Paragraph D. It says, "The employee shall not, at any time in the future in any way disparage the company, related entities, or any current or officers, directors, and employees orally or writing, or make any statements that may be derogatory or detrimental to the company's good name, or business reputation, of that of its related entities." This is the statement that Hoffman and all these nuclear workers have to sign to get their bonus pay. This is inherently discriminatory. It's inherently violation of 10 CFR 50.7.

The next, Exhibit 12 is just the Union's Memorandum of Understanding. Again, it highlights the amount of pay and the fact that it's across the board. It's a pervasive bonus program to keep their nuclear workers at Turkey Point. They don't even want them transferring out of Turkey Point to another plant owned or operated by FPL. They're paying them big dollars, \$40-50,000, to agree to stay at Turkey Point.

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It's because the environment is so poor there, they have to offer these kind of bonuses.

The next document, SEC Exhibit 13. This is the amended complaint. I don't have time to go through this. It's pretty self-explanatory. But, again, the reason I put it in there, it accentuates issues concerning the environment at Turkey Point, the poor environment.

SEC Number 14, again, this is a Memorandum of Understanding. It talks about the bonuses. And number 9 on the first page of it says, "Operators execute the election agreement will not be eligible to bid out of Turkey Point, TPN is Turkey Point Operations Department prior to 2010." Again, the environment is so bad, they want to pay you big dollars, thousands, and thousands, and thousands of dollars, and they don't even want you bidding out of the department, let alone the plant.

Okay. The next document, SEC Number 15, is FPL Motion to Dismiss. Again, I'm not going to go through this document. This document said -- so the PRB has some insight as to FLP's challenge to the lawsuit.

And, SEC Number 16, I wrote a letter to Louis Hay. He's the Executive Officer of FPL, the

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Chief Executive Officer. And I offered my services to go in that plant, assess the environment, do a baseline, put a training program together, talk to employees, bring everybody up to speed what their protections are, why you need to raise safety concerns, how important it is, and their avenues of protection within the Department of Labor, and how the NRC investigates under 10 CFR 50.7.

He never responded, not even the courtesy of a reply. So, you need -- in closing, I just want to say that the petition asks for \$1 million Notice of Violation issues with a civil penalty. That's to get their attention. Money talks. They don't care about anything else. You've got to hit them with the money first.

If you say send us \$1 million, you're going to get the attention of Lou Hays, believe me. You're going to get the attention of Lou Hays. You're going to get the attention of Stall. You're going to get the attention of William Blair, and of Mitch Ross, because \$1 million is \$1 million. And the public is going to see that, as hey, the government is doing something about safety at these plants.

Second of all, the modification of licenses, because you need an independent firm to come

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in here and do a baseline, do an assessment of the
Employee Concerns Program, and to make
recommendations, and require the licensee to make the
changes that are recommended, and to monitor that
program over the next 10, 15, 20 years.
So, if there's any questions, I'll be
certainly happy to answer them.
MR. BLOUNT: Thank you. Any questions
from the folks here at headquarters for Mr. Saporito?
Okay. How about the Region? Does the Region have
any questions for Mr. Saporito?
MR. SYKES: No. No, we don't.
MR. BLOUNT: Do we have any questions from
the licensee?
MR. BLAIR: Yes, if I may. I'll try to be
brief. This is William Blair from Florida Power and
Light.
Mr. Saporito, what specific rule,
regulation, or order are you alleging that Florida
Power and Light violated at Turkey Point?
MR. SAPORITO: Well, Mr. Blair, it's
pretty obvious that 10 CFR 50.7 has been violated over
the years at Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant. It's a
matter of public record. The NRC has cited Florida
Power and Light twice to the extent that those

regulations have been violated. The fact that the Turkey Point Nuclear facilities are being operated, in my view, with a hostile work environment, and not in full compliance with the requirement, the NRC requirement to maintain a healthy work environment which encourages employees to raise safety concerns directly to the NRC, or directly to the licensee management, or to the media, if they so desire, is a violation of NRC requirements.

Because that, certainly, the work environment there is nothing near, it's not even close to complying with the NRC requirements to maintain that type of environment, which encourages employees to freely raise safety complaints without fear of retaliation.

MR. BLAIR: All right. You've mentioned the pressurizer piping hole incident. Mr. Saporito, do you have any specific information as to the individual that would have committed that act?

MR. SAPORITO: I reference the Public Counsel's 13C brief. It's in that brief. There is an FBI investigative report, an FBI Special Agent conducted an investigation, apparently interviewed the individual who drilled the hole. And I would point you to the FBI for that specific information.

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1	MR. BLAIR: Okay. So, you have no
2	specific knowledge, other than what the FBI and NRC
3	looked at.
4	MR. SAPORITO: Well, yes, I do. If you
5	I don't have all the pleadings in that Public Service
6	Commission hearing before me right at this time. And
7	it goes into quite specific detail about what
8	transpired when that hole was drilled.
9	MR. BLAIR: All right. I'll move on.
10	You went on at length about the ECP report
11	from January of 2008. Who performed that report?
12	MR. SAPORITO: That's proprietary,
13	confidential information at this time. I can't
14	release that to you.
15	MR. BLAIR: Well, do you know if there
16	were any corrective actions taken as a result of that
17	report?
18	MR. SAPORITO: Do I know what?
19	MR. BLAIR: If there were any corrective
20	actions taken as a result of that report?
21	MR. SAPORITO: No, I don't. I'm not
22	knowledgeable at this time if there was any corrective
23	action. In my view, whatever corrective actions that
24	may have been taken, were not sufficient to overcome
25	the overwhelming evidence which points to a failed

1	program.
2	MR. BLAIR: Right. I don't doubt that.
3	Do you know if the NRC inspects the safety conscious
4	work environment at Turkey Point?
5	MR. SAPORITO: I know they're supposed to.
6	I haven't followed the inspectors around at the plant
7	to monitor their actions.
8	MR. BLAIR: Thank you. You mentioned that
9	the Hoffman case, as well as Insanger, do you know if
10	those issues were raised those individuals to the NRC?
11	MR. SAPORITO: Do I know what?
12	MR. BLAIR: If those individuals raised
13	their concerns for themselves to the NRC?
14	MR. SAPORITO: I am under the
15	understanding, certain communications that the NRC
16	Office of Investigations, is conducting an
17	investigation of the Hoffman case.
18	MR. BLOUNT: At this point this is Tom
19	Blount, the PRB Chairman. I'd like to make sure that
20	we're directing our questions of the Petitioner to
21	clarifying the petition.
22	MR. BLAIR: I'm confused, quite frankly,
23	as to what his petition is. I was going to make sure
24	that I understood his statements, but I'll skip to the
25	chase. The petition is dated January 11 th , and

addressed to the Office of Inspector General. Mr. Saporito, now after a period of two and a half hours, has talked about everything except what he thinks Turkey Point did to violate, so I'm just confused. And I'll just leave it at that. It's not clear to me what his alleged violation is.

MR. SAPORITO: And this is Thomas Saporito with Saporito Energy Consultants. I just want to confirm that Mr. Blair is confused, because the petition, January 11, 2009, was addressed to the NRC Executive Director for Operations, and not to the Inspector General. So he, apparently, is confused.

MR. BLOUNT: I understand. With that in mind, I want to thank you very much for the final clarifying remarks.

Are there any members of the public on line? If there are, before I conclude the meeting, the members of the public may provide comments regarding the petition, and ask questions about the 2.206 petition process. However, as stated in the opening, the purpose of this meeting is not to provide an opportunity for the petitioner, or the public, to question or examine the PRB regarding the merits of the petition request.

Hearing no questions, I want to thank Mr.

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Saporito for taking time to provide the NRC with clarifying information on the petition you've submitted. With that, this meeting is concluded, and we'll be terminating the phone connection.

MR. SAPORITO: Thank you.

(Whereupon, the proceedings went off the record at 3:16:50 p.m.)

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