V.C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

JPM NO: 09 RO/SRO A.1.a

EOP-18.2 Maximum Allowable Head Vent Calculation

APPROVAL: WRQ APPROVAL DATE: 4/25/2007

REV NO: 0

CANDIDATE:

EXAMINER:

THIS JPM IS APPROVED





Monday, December 01, 2008

TASK:

TASK STANDARD:

Calculation of Head Venting time of approximately 10.4 minutes (tolerance of 9.1-11.6 minutes).

PREFERRED	EVALUATION	LOCATION	PREFI	ERRED E	EVALUATI	ON METHOD
CLAS	SROOM			PE	RFORM	
REFERENCE	<i>.</i>					
TOOLS:	EOP-18.2 Calculator Pen					
EVALUATIO	N TIME	15	TIME CRITICAL	NO	10CFR55:	55.45(a)12
TIME START:		TIME FINISH	(: 	PERFORM	IANCE TIME:	
<u>PERFORMA</u>	NCE RATING:	SAT:	UNSAT:			
EXAMINER:						
				SIGNA	TURE	DATE



READ TO OPERATOR:

WHEN I TELL YOU TO BEGIN, YOU ARE TO PERFORM THE ACTIONS AS DIRECTED IN THE INITIATING CUES. I WILL DESCRIBE THE GENERAL CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THIS TASK IS TO BE PERFORMED AND PROVIDE THE NECESSARY TOOLS WITH WHICH TO PERFORM THIS TASK. BEFORE STARTING, I WILL EXPLAIN THE INITIAL CONDITIONS, WHICH STEPS TO SIMULATE OR DISCUSS, AND PROVIDE INITIATING CUES. WHEN YOU COMPLETE THE TASK SUCCESSFULLY, THE OBJECTIVE FOR THIS JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE WILL BE SATISFIED.

SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: None

INITIAL CONDITION: The following conditions exist:

- 1. RB Pressure is 0.9 psig on PI-950.
- 2. RB Temperature is 148°F on TI-9201A
- 3. RB Temperature is 146°F on TI-9203A.
- 4. Hydrogen Concentration is 2.1% on CI-8257
- 5. Hydrogen Concentration is 2.3% on CI-8258.
- 6. RCS Pressure is 310 psig on PI-402
- 7. RCS Pressure is 320 psig on PI-403.

INITIATING CUES: The CRS has directed you to perform EOP-18.2 step 17 to determine the maximum allowable head venting time.

HAND JPM BRIEFING SHEET TO OPERATOR AT THIS TIME!



Monday, December 01, 2008

JPM BRIEFING SHEET

OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS:

SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: None

- INITIAL CONDITION: The following conditions exist:
 - 1. RB Pressure is 0.9 psig on PI-950.
 - 2. RB Temperature is 148°F on TI-9201A
 - 3. RB Temperature is 146°F on TI-9203A.
 - 4. Hydrogen Concentration is 2.1% on CI-8257
 - 5. Hydrogen Concentration is 2.3% on CI-8258.
 - 6. RCS Pressure is 310 psig on PI-402
 - 7. RCS Pressure is 320 psig on PI-403.
- *INITLATING CUES:* The CRS has directed you to perform EOP-18.2 step 17 to determine the maximum allowable head venting time.



HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU FEEL THAT YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.



Monday, December 01, 2008

Page 4 of 7



STEPS

STEP: 1

CUES:

CR SEQ

No Yes Record values for the following parameters: a. TI-9201A, RB TEMP "F. "F b. TI-9203A, RB TEMP "F. "F c. CI-8257, RB H2 CONC %. %H2 d. CI-8258, RB H2 CONC %. %H2 e. PI-402, RCS WR PRESS PSIG. psig f. PI-403, RCS WR PRESS PSIG. Psig

COMMENTS:

STEP STANDARD:

148°F is entered for TI-9201A and 146°F for TI-9203A; 2.1 % Hydrogen Concentration is entered for CI-8257 and 2.3% for CI-8258; 310 psig is entered for PI-402 and 320 psig for PI- 403.

SAT

UNSAT

STEP: 2

CUES:

CR SEQ

Yes Yes Use the higher of the two readings recorded above to calculate: a. Reactor Building volume (at standard temperature and pressure): RB AIR VOLUME = (1.84E6 ft3) x [492"R/(RB TEMP ("F) + 460)] RB AIR VOLUME = ft3

> MAX VENTED VOL = (3% - RB H2 CONC %) x (RB AIR VOLUME (STP)) ft3/100%

MAX VENTED VOL = ft3

COMMENTS:

STEP STANDARD:

RB Air Volume is approximately 1.489E6 ft3

SAT

UNSAT



Monday, December 01, 2008





CUES:

CR SEQ

No Yes Maximum hydrogen volume to be vented (when RB H2 CONC is LESS THAN 3%):

3

COMMENTS:

STEP STANDARD:

Max Vented Volume is approximately 1.0423E4 ft3.

SAT ____

UNSAT

STEP: 4

CUES:

CR SEQ

STEP STANDARD:

STEP STANDARD:

Yes Yes From the graph on the next page, determine the hydrogen flow rate using the higher RCS pressure recorded from Step 1: HYDROGEN FLOW RATE = SCFM

SCFM calculated to be approximately 1000 SCFM (based on 320 psig). Based on a tolerance of +/- 1/2 the smallest increment, the tolerance for RCS pressure would be 300-350 psig (unacceptable to read below 300 psig line), which results in a hydrogen flow rate tolerance of 900-1150 SCFM.

A calculated Maximum Allowable Head Venting Time of approximately 10.4

minutes. Based on the tolerance of 900-1150 SCFM hydrogen flow rate, the

maximum allowable venting time should be from 9.1 minutes to 11.6 minutes.

SAT

UNSAT

STEP: 5

CUES:

CR SEQ

Yes Yes Calculate maximum allowable head venting period:

MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE HEAD VENTING TIME = (MAX VENTED VOL) ft3 /(HYDROGEN FLOW RATE) SCFM MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE HEAD VENTING TIME = Minutes

COMMENTS:

SAT

UNSAT

Examiner ends JPM at this point.



Monday, December 01, 2008

COMMENTS:

JPM SETUP SHEET

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JPM NO: 09 RO/SRO A.

DESCRIPTION: EOP-18.2 Maximum Allowable Head Vent Calculation

IC SET:

INSTRUCTIONS:

COMMENTS:





Monday, December 01, 2008

NRC Ro/SRO Admin A.I.a

KEY

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

COPY NO. _____

EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE

EOP-18.2

RESPONSE TO VOIDS IN REACTOR VESSEL

REVISION 13

SAFETY RELATED

Original signed by Baker01/16/05DISCIPLINE SUPERVISORDATE

Original signed by Ray 01/19/05 APPROVAL AUTHORITY DATE



RESPONSE TO VOIDS IN REACTOR VESSEL

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RESPONSE TO VOIDS IN REACTOR VESSEL

<u>PURPOSE</u>

This procedure provides instructions for responding to voids in the Reactor Vessel Head.

ENTRY CONDITIONS

This procedure is entered from EOP-12.0, MONITORING OF CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS, Attachment 6.



۲		ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE		ALTERNATIVE ACTION	
		<u>OPERATO</u>	R ACTI	LONS	
		<u>CAU</u> If a controlled natural circulation in the Reactor Vessel Upper Head i be performed.	n coo		
		NC	TE		
		Conditions for implementing Emerge evaluated using EPP-001, ACTIVATIO PLAN.			
	1	Verify SI has been terminated: a. SI has been reset.	1	RETURN TO the Procedure and Step in effect.	
	2	Verify Instrument Air to the RB 🗌 has been established.	2	Perform the following: a) Start <u>one</u> Instrument Air Compressor and place the other in Standby. <u>IF no</u> Instrument Air Compressor can be started, <u>THEN</u> locally start the Diesel Driven Air Compressor. REFER TO SOP-220 , STATION AND BACKUP INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEMS .	
				 b) Open PVA-2659, INST AIR TO RB AIR SERV. c) Open PVT-2660, AIR SPLY TO RB. 	

	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	ALTERNATIVE ACTION
	3 Verify at least <u>one</u> Charging Pump is running.	 3 Perform the following: a) IF CCW flow to the RCP Thermal Barrier(s) is lost, THEN close MVT-8102A(B)(C), A(B)(C) SEAL WTR INJ ISOL, to the AFFECTED RCP(s) before starting a Charging Pump. b) IF Charging Pump miniflow is isolated, THEN open the started open the start
		miniflow valves: 1) Open MVG-8106, CHG PP. 2) Open MVT-8109A(B)(C), CHG PP A(B)(C). c) Ensure at least <u>one</u> CCW Pump is running. d) Start the associated Charging
	4 Verify Charging flow on FI-122A, CHG FLOW GPM.	 Pump. 4 Perform the following: a) Close FCV-122, CHG FLOW. b) Open both MVG-8107 AND MVG-8108, CHG LINE ISOL. c) Adjust FCV-122, CHG FLOW, to obtain 60 gpm Charging flow. 1F FCV-122, CHG FLOW, is inoperable, <u>THEN</u> locally control Charging flow (AB-412 West Pen): a) Close XVG08402B-CS, CHG HDR FLOW CONTROL INLET ISOL VALVE. b) Throttle open XVT08403-CS, FCV0122-CS BYPASS, to obtain 60 gpm Charging flow. <u>IF</u> 60 gpm Charging flow can <u>NOT</u> be established, <u>THEN</u> RETURN TO the Procedure and Step in effect.
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	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE		ALTERNATIVE ACTION	
	5 Verify Letdown flow on FI-150, [LO PRESS LTDN FLOW GPM.] 5	Establish Normal Letdown:	
			a) Set PCV-145, LO PRESS LTDN, to 70%.	
			b) Open TCV–144, CC TO LTDN HX.	
			c) Open PVT-8152, LTDN LINE ISOL.	
			d) Open <u>both</u> LCV-459 <u>AND</u> LCV-460, LTDN LINE ISOL.	
			e) Open desired Orifice Isolation Valve(s) to obtain 60 gpm to 120 gpm:	
			 PVT-8149A, LTDN ORIFICE A ISOL (45 gpm). 	
			 PVT-8149B, LTDN ORIFICE B ISOL (60 gpm). 	
			 PVT-8149C, LTDN ORIFICE C ISOL (60 gpm). 	
			f) Adjust FCV-122, CHG FLOW, to maintain TI-140, REGEN HX OUT TEMP °F, between 250°F and 350°F while maintaining PZR level.	
			g) Adjust PCV-145, LO PRESS LTDN, to maintain PI-145, LO PRESS LTDN PRESS PSIG, between 300 psig and 400 psig.	
			h) Place PCV-145, LO PRESS LTDN, in AUTO.	
			i) Place TCV–144, CC TO LTDN HX, in AUTO.	
			j) Verify 60 gpm to 120 gpm on FI-150, LO PRESS LTDN FLOW GPM.	
			k) Transfer Charging Pump suction to the VCT:	
			1) Open both LCV-115C(E), VCT OUTLET ISOL.	
			2) Close both LCV-115B(D), RWST TO CHG PP SUCT.	
			<u>IF</u> Normal Letdown can <u>NOT</u> be established, <u>THEN</u> establish Excess Letdown. REFER TO SOP-102, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM.	
L	PAGE	4 OF 1	6	<u>-</u>

RESPONSE TO VOIDS IN REACTOR VESSEL

		ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE			ALTERNATIVE ACTION	
~~~	6	Establish stable RCS conditions:				
		a. Verify PZR level is GREATER THAN 72%.		a.	Control Charging and Letdown flows to establish PZR level GREATER THAN 72%.	
		b. Verify RCS pressure is stable.		b.	Control PZR Heaters and Normal PZR Spray as necessary to control RCS pressure.	
					<u>IF</u> Normal PZR Spray is <u>NOT</u> available <u>AND</u> Letdown is in service, <u>THEN</u> use Aux Spray. <b>REFER TO SOP-102, CHEMICAL AND</b> <b>VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM.</b>	
		c. Verify RCS Thot is stable.		с.	Dump steam as necessary to control RCS Thot.	
	7	Verify <u>all</u> RCPs are stopped.	7	GO	TO Step 13.	
	8	Check if RCS pressure should be increased:				
		a. Verify RCS pressure is at least 100 psi LESS THAN the Tech Spec limit. <b>REFER TO Attachment 1.</b>		a.	GO TO Step 11. Observe the CAUTION and NOTE prior to Step 11.	
		b. Verify RCS pressure is LESS THAN 1875 psig.		b.	<b>GO TO Step 11</b> . Observe the <b>CAUTION</b> and <b>NOTE</b> prior to <b>Step 11</b> .	
		c. Control PZR Heaters as necessary to increase RCS pressure 50 psi.				
	9	Control Charging and Letdown flows to maintain PZR level GREATER THAN 30% [50%].				
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		ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	ALTERNATIVE ACTION	
	10	Check RVLIS Upper Plenum level:		
		a. Verify level is increasing.	a. GO TO Step 11. Observe the CAUTION and NOTE prior to Step 11.	
		b. Verify level is GREATER THAN 94%.	b. RETURN TO Step 8.	
		c. Control PZR Heaters as necessary to stabilize RCS pressure.		
		d. RETURN TO the Procedure and Step in effect.		
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#### RESPONSE TO VOIDS IN REACTOR VESSEL

		ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	ALTERNATIVE ACTION
			<u>Step 11</u> been lost, the AFFECTED RCP(s) should ing evaluation, to prevent RCP Seal
		<u>NOTE</u> -	Step 11
		Priority should be given to startin	g RCP A to restore Normal PZR Spray.
	11	Try to start <u>one</u> RCP:	
		a. Establish the following conditions prior to RCP start:	a. GO TO Step 13.
		• PZR level GREATER THAN 72%. 🔲	
		<ul> <li>RCS subcooling on TI-499A(B), □ A(B) TEMP °F, GREATER THAN 55°F.</li> </ul>	
<b>v</b>		• Use PZR Heaters as necessary [] to saturate PZR water.	
		<ul> <li>Establish normal conditions for starting RCP(s).</li> <li>REFER TO SOP-101, REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM.</li> </ul>	
		b. Start RCP A.	b. <u>IF</u> RCP A can <u>NOT</u> be started, □ <u>THEN</u> start RCP B <u>AND</u> C.
	12	Check if RVLIS level is LESS THAN [] the following:	12 GO TO Step 23.
		RCPs running RVLIS level	
		0 94% Upper Plen	
		1 37% WR	
		2 56% WR	

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#### RESPONSE TO VOIDS IN REACTOR VESSEL

<b>@</b>	<u>,</u>	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE		ALTERNATIVE ACTION	
	13	Start the RB Hydrogen Analyzers. REFER TO SOP-122, POST ACCIDENT HYDROGEN REMOVAL SYSTEM.	13	<u>IF</u> <u>both</u> Hydrogen Analyzers are inoperable, <u>THEN</u> notify Chemistry to sample the RB atmosphere for hydrogen concentration.	
	14	Check if Low PZR Pressure SI can be blocked:			
		a. Verify PZR pressure is LESS THAN 1925 psig.		a. Decrease PZR pressure to LESS THAN 1925 psig using Normal PZR Spray.	
				<u>IF</u> Normal PZR Spray is <u>NOT</u> available <u>AND</u> Letdown is in service, <u>THEN</u> depressurize using Aux Spray. <b>REFER TO SOP-102, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME</b> <b>CONTROL SYSTEM.</b>	
				<u>IF</u> Aux Spray is <u>NOT</u> available, <u>THEN</u> depressurize using <u>one</u> PZR PORV.	
		b. Place <u>both</u> PZR SI TRAIN A(B) Switches to BLOCK.			
	15	Establish the following RCS conditions:			
		a. Verify PZR level is GREATER THAN 72%.		a. Control Charging and Letdown flows as necessary to establish PZR level GREATER THAN 72%.	
		b. Verify RCS pressure is stable.		b. Control PZR Heaters and Normal PZR Spray as necessary to control RCS pressure.	
				<u>IF</u> Normal PZR Spray is <u>NOT</u> available <u>AND</u> Letdown is in service, <u>THEN</u> use Aux Spray. <b>REFER TO SOP-102, CHEMICAL AND</b> VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM.	
		c. Verify RCS subcooling on TI-499A(B), A(B) TEMP °F, is GREATER THAN 80°F.		c. Dump steam to increase subcooling.	
		d. Verify RCS Thot is stable.		d. Dump steam as necessary to control RCS Thot.	
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	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	ALTERNATIVE ACTION
	<u>NOTE -</u> RB Purge and Alternate Purge System available Containment air circulat prevent hydrogen from forming loca	ion equipment should be started to
	16 Prepare the RB for Reactor Vessel venting:	
	a. Verify PRT pressure is <u>NOT</u> [] EQUAL TO RB pressure.	a. Consult with TSC personnel to □ determine if Reactor Vessel venting should be performed without an INTACT PRT.
		IF Reactor Vessel venting will □ <u>NOT</u> be performed, <u>THEN</u> GO TO Step 23.
	b. Verify Containment Ventilation Isolation Valves closed by verifying the following SAFETY INJECTION monitor lights are dim:	<pre>b. <u>IF any</u> listed SAFETY INJECTION monitor light is bright, <u>THEN</u> close the associated damper (HVAC Panel):</pre>
v	• XCP-6103 3-4 (POST ACCID HR ☐ EXH 6057 & 6067).	<ul> <li>● PVG-6057, ALT PUR SPLY ISOL</li> <li>▶ VLV, <u>AND</u> PVG-6067,</li> <li>▶ CNTMT PUR EXH ISOL VLV.</li> </ul>
	● XCP-6103 2-1 (POST ACCID HR ☐ EXH 6056/6066).	<ul> <li>● PVG=6056, ALT PUR SPLY ISOL</li> <li>■ VLV, AND PVG-6066,</li> <li>■ CNTMT PUR EXH ISOL VLV.</li> </ul>
	c. Start <u>all</u> other available RB □ ventilation fans. <b>REFER TO</b> SOP-114, REACTOR BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM.	
	d. Align the PRT for cooldown. <b>REFER TO SOP-101, REACTOR</b> <b>COOLANT SYSTEM.</b>	

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#### RESPONSE TO VOIDS IN REACTOR VESSEL

	ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	ALTERNATIVE ACTION
	<u>NOTE -</u> Venting time is limited to prevent exceeding 3% in the event the PRT R	hydrogen concentration in the RB from
	17 Determine maximum allowable head venting time:	
	a. Verify RB hydrogen 🔲 concentration is LESS THAN 3%.	a. Reduce RB hydrogen concentration to LESS THAN 3%:
		1) Verify hydrogen concentration is LESS THAN 6%.
		2) Start <u>one</u> Hydrogen Recombiner. <b>REFER TO</b> SOP-122, POST ACCIDENT HYDROGEN REMOVAL SYSTEM.
		<u>IF</u> hydrogen concentration is GREATER THAN 6%, <u>THEN</u> notify TSC personnel of excessive RB hydrogen concentration. <b>GO TO</b> <b>Step 23</b> .
	b. COMPLETE ATTACHMENT 2, CALCULATION OF MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE HEAD VENTING TIME.	
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#### RESPONSE TO VOIDS IN REACTOR VESSEL


 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE	ALTERNATIVE ACTION
 Review Reactor Vessel venting termination criteria:	
<ul> <li>RCS subcooling on TI-499A(B), A(B) TEMP °F, is LESS THAN 30°F.</li> </ul>	
<u>OR</u>	
• PZR level is LESS THAN 30% [50%].	
<u>0R</u>	
<ul> <li>RCS pressure decreases by 200 psi.</li> </ul>	
<u>OR</u>	
• The venting time is GREATER THAN the maximum determined on ATTACHMENT 2, CALCULATION OF MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE HEAD VENTING TIME.	
OR	
<ul> <li>PRT pressure increases to 80 psig.</li> </ul>	
<u>OR</u>	
• PRT level increases to 100%.	
<u>OR</u>	
<ul> <li>RVLIS GREATER THAN the following indicates the Reactor Vessel Upper Head is full:</li> </ul>	
RCPs running RVLIS level	
0 94% Upper Plen	
1 37% WR	
2 56% WR	

		ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE		ALTERNATIVE ACTION
		If any venting termination crite	erio	<u>Step 19</u> n in <b>Step 18</b> is exceeded, venting tion criteria may be reached rapidly.
	19	Initiate Reactor Vessel Head venting:		
		a. Locally unlock and close the breakers for the Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valves:		
		<ul> <li>XMC1DA2X 05IM, RX HEAD VENT VLV TO PRT XVT08095A-RC (IB-463).</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>XMC1DA2X O7AE, RX HEAD VENT VLV TO PRT XVT08096A-RC (IB-463).</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>XMC1DB2Y 23FJ, RX HEAD VENT VLV TO PRT XVT08095B-RC (AB-463).</li> </ul>		
		<ul> <li>XMC1DB2Y 12IM, RX HEAD VENT VLV TO PRT XVT08096B-RC (AB-463).</li> </ul>		
		b. Open <u>both</u> valves in <u>either</u> vent path:		b. <u>IF</u> either valve fails to open in <u>one</u> vent path, <u>THEN</u> close <u>both</u> valves and open the valves
		<ul> <li>Open <u>both</u> MVG-8095A <u>AND</u> MVG-8096B, RX HEAD VENT VLV.</li> </ul>		in the other vent path.
		<u>OR</u>		
		<ul> <li>Open <u>both</u> MVG-8095B <u>AND</u> MVG-8096A, RX HEAD VENT VLV.</li> </ul>		
	20	Continue venting until <u>any</u> of the criteria of Step 18 are satisfied before continuing with Step 21.		
	21	Close Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valves opened in Step 19.		

#### RESPONSE TO VOIDS IN REACTOR VESSEL

	ACTION/EXPEC	TED RESPONSE			ALTERNATIVE ACTION	]
22	Verify RVLIS GRI following indica Vessel Upper Hea	ites the Reactor		22	Increase RCS pressure to the higher value recorded on ATTACHMENT 2, CALCULATION OF MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE HEAD VENTING TIME.	
	RCPs running	RVLIS level			RETURN TO Step 13.	
	0	94% Upper Plen				
	1	37% WR				
	2	56% WR				
	3	94% WR				
23	Verify PZR level	is stable.		23	Control Charging and Letdown flow as necessary to stabilize PZR level.	s 🔲
24	RETURN TO the Pr in effect.	rocedure and Step				
			End c	of E0 	P-18.2	

#### RCS PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS




EOP-18.2 REVISION 13 ATTACHMENT 1 PAGE 1 of 1

# CALCULATION OF MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE HEAD VENTING TIME

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			OPERATOR ACTIONS				
1.	Record the following parameters:						
	a.	TI-9201A, RB TEMP	• F.	• F			
	b.	TI-9203A, RB TEMP	•F	• F			
	С.	CI-8257, RB H ₂ COM	NC %.	<b>%</b> H ₂			
	d.	CI-8258, RB H ₂ COM	NC 2.	<b>%</b> H ₂			
	e.	PI-402, RCS WR PRE	ESS PSIG.	psig			
	f.	PI-403, RCS WR PRE	ESS PSIG.	psig			
2.	Use	the higher of the	<u>two</u> readings recorded abov	e to calculate:			
	a. Reactor Building volume (at standard temperature and pressure):						
		RB AIR VOLUME =	(1.84E6 ft ³ ) x [492°R/(RB	TEMP (°F) + 460)]			
		RB AIR VOLUME =	ft3				
	b.	Maximum hydrogen v (when RB H₂ CONC i	volume to be vented is LESS THAN 3%):				
		MAX VENTED VOL =	(3% - RB H ₂ CONC %) x (RB	AIR VOLUME (STP)) ft3			
			100%				
		MAX VENTED VOL =	ft3				
3.			next page, determine the h re recorded from Step 1:	ydrogen flow rate using			
	ΗYD	ROGEN FLOW RATE =	SCFM				
	Cal	culate maximum allo	wable head venting period:				
4.		IMUM ALLOWABLE =	(MAX VENTED VOL) ft3				
4.	MAV	INUN ALIUWADIE 🥌					
4.		D VENTING TIME	(HYDROGEN FLOW RATE) SCF	Μ			


# CALCULATION OF MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE HEAD VENTING TIME



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EOP-18.2 REVISION 13 ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE 2 of 2 · _____

			*******	
		OPERATOR ACTION	<u>IS</u>	
1.	Rec	ord the following parameters:		
	a.	TI-9201A, RB TEMP °F.	148	• F
	b.	TI-9203A, RB TEMP ∘F.	146	• F
	с.	CI-8257, RB H ₂ CONC %.	2.1	<b>%</b> H ₂
	ď.	CI-8258, RB H ₂ CONC %.	2.3	<b>%H</b> 2
	e.	PI-402, RCS WR PRESS PSIG.	310	psig
	f.	PI-403, RCS WR PRESS PSIG.	320	psig
E6 x 0	• <b>8/</b> b.	(at standard temperature and pressure RB AIR VOLUME = $(1.84E6 \text{ ft}^3) \times [49]$ RB AIR VOLUME = $1.49 \not\equiv 6$ Maximum hydrogen volume to be vented	92°R/(RB TEMP (°F) 148 ≠4 ft3	+ 460)] 60 = 608
E6 x 0		RB AIR VOLUME = $(1.84E6 \text{ ft}^3) \times [49]$ RB AIR VOLUME = $1.49 \not\equiv 6$ Maximum hydrogen volume to be vented (when RB H ₂ CONC is LESS THAN 3%):	$(3-2.3) = [0.7 \times 1.4]$	+ 460)] 60 = 608 19EG] = 1.04EG
	b.	RB AIR VOLUME = $(1.84E6 \text{ ft}^3) \times [49]$ RB AIR VOLUME = $1.49 \not\equiv 6$ Maximum hydrogen volume to be vented (when RB H ₂ CONC is LESS THAN 3%):	92°R/(RB TEMP (°F) 148 ≠4 ft3	+ 460)] 60 = 608 19EG] = 1.04EG
E6 × 0 <u>1.04</u> E 100	b.	RB AIR VOLUME = $(1.84E6 \text{ ft}^3) \times [49]$ RB AIR VOLUME = $1.49 \not\equiv 6$ Maximum hydrogen volume to be vented (when RB H ₂ CONC is LESS THAN 3%): $(3\% - \text{RB H}_2 \text{ CONC } \%$	$\frac{972 \cdot R}{148} (\circ F)$ $\frac{148}{44} \neq 4$ $(3-2.3) = [0.7 \times 1.4]$ $(3) \times (RB AIR VOLUME)$ $100\%$	+ 460)] 60 = 608 19EG] = 1.04EG
1.04E	b. G	RB AIR VOLUME = $(1.84E6 \text{ ft}^3) \times [49]$ RB AIR VOLUME = $1.49 \# 6$ Maximum hydrogen volume to be vented (when RB H ₂ CONC is LESS THAN 3%): ( MAX VENTED VOL = $(3\% - \text{RB H}_2 \text{ CONC } 2)$ MAX VENTED VOL = $1.04 \# 4$ m the graph on the next page, determine	92°R/(RB TEMP (°F) 148 + 4 (3-2.3)=[0.7 × 1.4 6) x (RB AIR VOLUME 100% ft3 he the hydrogen flo	+ 460)] •• = 608 <b>9=6] = 1.04E6</b> (STP)) ft3 w rate using
1.04E 100	b. G	RB AIR VOLUME = $(1.84E6 \text{ ft}^3) \times [49]$ RB AIR VOLUME = $1.49 \text{ E}6$ Maximum hydrogen volume to be vented (when RB H ₂ CONC is LESS THAN 3%): ( MAX VENTED VOL = $(3\% - \text{RB H}_2 \text{ CONC } 2)$ MAX VENTED VOL = $1.04 \text{ E}4$	92°R/(RB TEMP (°F) 148 ≠4 (3-2.3)=[0.7 × 1.4 (3) × (RB AIR VOLUME 100% ft3 he the hydrogen flo p 1: ToLeRANCE E	+ 460)] •• = 608 <b>9=6] = 1.04E6</b> (STP)) ft3 w rate using
1.04E 100	b. Fro the HYD	RB AIR VOLUME = $(1.84E6 \text{ ft}^3) \times [49]$ RB AIR VOLUME = $1.49 \# 6$ Maximum hydrogen volume to be vented (when RB H ₂ CONC is LESS THAN 3%): ( MAX VENTED VOL = $(3\% - \text{RB H}_2 \text{ CONC } 2)$ MAX VENTED VOL = $1.04 \# 4$ m the graph on the next page, determing higher RCS pressure recorded from Ster ROGEN FLOW RATE = $900 - 1/50$	92° R/(RB TEMP (°F) 148 ≠4 (3-2.3)=[0.7 × 1.4 (3) × (RB AIR VOLUME 100% ft3 t100% ft3 SCFM 500 MAXIMEN 115	+ 460)] 60 = 608 9EG = 1.04EG (STP)) ft ³ w rate using 5TABCissed ON 2 oth ATT 2.



PAGE 16 OF 16



#### *JPM NO:* 09 RO A.1.b

PERFORM A SHUTDOWN MARGIN FOR INTENDED PLANT CONDITIONS

APPROVAL: APPROVAL DATE:

REV NO: 0

CANDIDATE:

EXAMINER:

THIS JPM IS NOT APPROVED



 $\bigcirc$ 

TASK:

#### TASK STANDARD:

Obtain required data from the Curve Book, tables, and graphs. Use obtained data to calculate required boron concentration to maintain required shutdown margin in MODE 5. Determine that shutdown margin is not satisfied for MODE 5 using Attachment III of STP-134.001.

PREFERRED E	VALU	JATION L	OCATION	PREFI	ERRED	EVALUATIO	ON METHOD
CLASS	ROON	/1			Р	ERFORM	
REFERENCES		Curve Boo	k	Station Curve Boo	ik		
		GOP-5		REACTOR SHUT (Mode 2 to Mode 3		FROM STAR	TUP TO HOT ST
		STP-134.0	01	SHUTDOWN MAP	rgin ve	RIFICATION	
TOOLS:	STP- Static Fig	134.001, S		0) MARGIN VERIFICA of the following:	ATION		
<b>EVALUATION</b>	TIME	Ξ	20	TIME CRITICAL	NO	10CFR55:	55.45(a)13
TIME START:			TIME FINISH:		PERFOR	MANCE TIME:	
<u>PERFORMANC</u>	C <b>E R</b> A	TING:	SAT:	UNSAT:			
<u>EXAMINER:</u>					SIGN	ATURE	DATE



#### **INSTRUCTIONS TO OPERATOR**


READ TO OPERATOR:

WHEN I TELL YOU TO BEGIN, YOU ARE TO PERFORM THE ACTIONS AS DIRECTED IN THE INITIATING CUES. I WILL DESCRIBE THE GENERAL CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THIS TASK IS TO BE PERFORMED AND PROVIDE THE NECESSARY TOOLS WITH WHICH TO PERFORM THIS TASK. BEFORE STARTING, I WILL EXPLAIN THE INITIAL CONDITIONS, WHICH STEPS TO SIMULATE OR DISCUSS, AND PROVIDE INITIATING CUES. WHEN YOU COMPLETE THE TASK SUCCESSFULLY, THE OBJECTIVE FOR THIS JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE WILL BE SATISFIED.

#### SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: N/A

# *INITIAL CONDITION:* [°] The unit had been operating at 100% power for 150 days when a shutdown to Mode 5 was directed by plant management to repair a leaking Main Steam Safety Valve.

- ° RCS Tavg is 557 °F.
- ° Current RCS Boron Concentration is 262 ppm.
- ° Core Burnup is 20000 MWD/MTU
- [°] One Control Bank (D) Control Rod did not indicate movement during the power reduction and is assumed to be untrippable.
- ^o The operating crew is performing GOP-5, REACTOR SHUTDOWN FROM STARTUP TO HOT STANDBY (Mode 2 to Mode 3) and will continue to MODE 5.







#### HAND JPM BRIEFING SHEET TO OPERATOR AT THIS TIME!



Monday, November 24, 2008

### JPM BRIEFING SHEET

**OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS:** 

N/A SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS:

- INITLAL CONDITION: ° The unit had been operating at 100% power for 150 days when a shutdown to Mode 5 was directed by plant management to repair a leaking Main Steam Safety Valve.
  - ° RCS Tavg is 557 °F.
  - ^o Current RCS Boron Concentration is 262 ppm.
  - ° Core Burnup is 20000 MWD/MTU
  - ° One Control Bank (D) Control Rod did not indicate movement during the power reduction and is assumed to be untrippable.
  - The operating crew is performing GOP-5, REACTOR SHUTDOWN FROM STARTUP TO HOT STANDBY (Mode 2 to Mode 3) and will continue to MODE 5.

INITIATING CUES: You are an extra licensed operator in the Control Room. The Control Room Supervisor has directed you to perform GOP-5, Step 3.7.b: If a return to power from present conditions is not desired, perform STP-134.001, Shutdown Margin Verification, for the desired Mode and temperature. Round any calculations to the nearest whole number.

## HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR **EVALUATOR WHEN YOU FEEL THAT YOU** HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.



Monday, November 24, 2008

Page 5 of 11

_	ampag		
	STEPS	<i>STEP</i> : 1	
	CUES:		
	CR SEQ		STEP STANDARD:
	No Yes	Review Precautions.	Reviews Precautions in front of STP- 134.001. Initials the top blank on Page 1 of Attachment I of STP-134.001.
	COMMENT	rs:	SAT
			UNSAT
		<i>STEP</i> : 2	
	CUES:		
	CR SEQ		STEP STANDARD:
	No Yes	Review Initial Conditions.	Reviews Initial Conditions for STP- 134.001.
			Initials the second blank on Page 1 of Attachment I of STP-134.001.
Ì	COMMENT	rs:	SAT
			UNSAT
		<i>STEP</i> : 3	
	CUES:		
	CR SEQ		STEP STANDARD:
	No Yes	Record Cycle Burnup.	Enters "20,000 on Attachment III step 1, of STP-134.001.

SAT

UNSAT

Monday, November 24, 2008

COMMENTS:

4

CUES:

Evaluato	r Note: There is no error band because the value	can be read directly from the figure.
CR SEQ		STEP STANDARD:
Yes Yes	Enter required RCS boron concentration to maintain Shutdown Margin based on Burnup: Using Curve Book Figure II-9.1 (Column SI BLOCKED MODES 3, 4, 5) enter the required RCS boron concentration to maintain Shutdown Margin based on Burnup.	Enters "1108" on Attachment III step 2, of STP-134.001.
COMMENT	`S:	SAT
		UNSAT
CUES:	<i>STEP:</i> 5	
CR SEQ		STEP STANDARD:
Yes Yes	Perform the following to calculate the required additional Boron concentration to compensate for untrippable Control Rods: 3.a.1 If no Control Rods are untrippable, enter a value of zero. 3.a.2 Enter 2200 pcm if one rod is untrippable.	Enters 2200 on Attachment III step 3.a, of STP-134.001
COMMENT	`S:	SAT

**UNSAT** 





#### CUES:

CUES: Evaluato of + or - 1	r Note: The acceptable band for differential boro 1/2 the smallest increment on the graph of Firgure	n worth is based on applying a tolerence e II-7.3:				
The smallest increment on the graph is 50 ppm; therefore the graph may be read between 1083 (1108 - 25) and 1133 ppm (1108 + 25)						
The DBV	The DBW for 1083 = - 7.57 and the DBW for 1133 = - 7.50					
CR SEQ		STEP STANDARD:				
Yes Yes	Enter the Differential Boron Worth for the boron concentration entered in Step 2 (Curve Book Figure II-7.3 at 557 °F)	Enters a value at or between -7.50 and - 7.57, on Attachment III step 3.b, of STP- 134.001.				
COMMENT	<i>"S</i> :	SAT				
		UNSAT				
	<i>STEP</i> : 7					
CUES:						
CR SEQ		STEP STANDARD:				
Yes Yes	Divide Step 3.a by Step 3.b.	Enters a value at or between -290 and - 293, on Attachment III step 3.c, of STP- 134.001.				
		2200 pcm ÷ -7.50 = ≤ -293 (293.3)				
		2200 pcm ÷ -7.57 = ≥ -290 (290.6)				
COMMENTS: SAT						

**UNSAT** 



CUES:

CR SEQ

Yes Yes Determine required minimum boron concentration to maintain Shutdown Margin (Subtract Step 3.c from Step 2).

#### STEP STANDARD:

Enters a value at or between 1398 and 1401, on Attachment III step 3.c, of STP-134.001

1108 - (-293) = 1401 ppm

1108 - (-291) = 1399 ppm

## SAT

UNSAT

STEP: 9

CUES:

**COMMENTS:** 

CR SEQ		STEP STANDARD:
Yes Yes	Enter present boron concentration.	Enters "262" ppm on Attachment III step

Enter present boron concentration. Yes Yes

**COMMENTS:** 

SAT

UNSAT

10 STEP:

CUES:

**COMMENTS:** 

CR SEQ Yes Yes Shutdown Margin is satisfied if Step 5 is greater than Step 4.

#### STEP STANDARD:

5, of STP-134.001.

Circles or otherwise indicates NO and signs his/her Initials

SAT

UNSAT

Start .	

#### STEP: 11

CUES:

Evaluator Cue: For the purpose	es of the JPM, there will be no independent verification of your
work. You may review it yourse	If if you choose to do so now.
CR SEO	STEP STANDARD:

CR SEQ	
No Yes	Calculated by:

Signs and dates.

**COMMENTS:** 

SAT

UNSAT ...

Examiner ends JPM at this point.





## JPM SETUP SHEET

*JPM NO*: 09 RO A.1.b

DESCRIPTION: PERFORM A SHUTDOWN MARGIN FOR INTENDED PLANT CONDITIONS

IC SET:

**INSTRUCTIONS:** 

COMMENTS:





Monday, November 24, 2008

09 NRC R0 A.I.b.

STP-134.001 ATTACHMENT III PAGE 1 OF 2 REVISION 12 STTS #

#### SHUTDOWN MARGIN VERIFICATION WITH SAFETY INJECTION BLOCKED (MODES 3, 4, AND 5)

- STEP ACTION
- 5.2.a PRECAUTIONS of Section 2.0 reviewed.
- 5.2.b INITIAL CONDITIONS of Section 5.0 met.
- 1. Enter Cycle Burnup.
- 2. Using either of the following enter the required RCS boron concentration to maintain Shutdown Margin based on Burnup:
  - a. Curve Book Figure II-9.1 (column SI BLOCKED, MODES 3, 4, 5).
  - b. An EIR supplied by Reactor Engineering.

DATA SS/CIRS Signature SS/CRS Signature 20000 MWD/MTU 1108 ppm (+) 2200 pcm

-750

pcm/ppm

__ ppm

(-) -7.57

- Perform the following to calculate the required additional Boron concentration to compensate for untrippable Control Rods:
  - 3.a Enter one of the following Bounding Worths of Untrippable Control Rods:
    - 1) If no Control Rods are untrippable, enter a value of zero.
    - 2) Enter 2200 pcm if one rod is untrippable.
    - 3) Enter 7000 pcm if more than one rod is untrippable).
  - Enter the Differential Boron Worth for the boron concentration entered in Step 2 (Curve Book Figure II-7.3 at 557°F).
  - 3.c Divide Step 3.a by Step 3.b:

$$\begin{array}{rcrcrc} 7.50 & & & 243. \\ (+) & 2200 & \text{pcm} \div (-) & 7.57 & \text{pcm/ppm} = & (-) & 290. \\ \hline & \text{Step 3.a} & & \text{Step 3.b} \end{array}$$



09 NRC RO A.I.b. KE STP-134.001 ATTACHMENT III PAGE 2 OF 2 **REVISION 12** STTS # SHUTDOWN MARGIN VERIFICATION WITH SAFETY INJECTION BLOCKED (MODES 3, 4, AND 5) STEP ACTION DATA Noke 1108+293.3=1401.3 Examiner May conservatively vou al Determine required minimum boron concentration to maintain 4. Shutdown Margin Shutdown wargen (Subtract Step 3.c from Step 2): 293.3 1401 (+) //08 1399____ppm 5. Enter present boron concentration. __ ppm YES / NO 8.3 Shutdown Margin is satisfied if Step 5 is greater than Step 4. Initials: Date: (TODAY'S DATE Calculated by: Verified by: Date:

Figure II-9.1 Revision Date: Prepared By: Verified By: Approved By:

## Required Boron Concentration for Shutdown Margin as a Function of Temperature and Burnup for Modes 3-5, No Xenon


Bumup	Shutdown	n Banks In	Shutdown	Banks Out	SI Blocked, Modes 3, 4,		
(MWD/MTU)	450 °F	557 °F	450 °F	557 °F	68 to 557 °F		
0	1294	1136	1397	1283	1452		
500	1339	1185	1452	1346	1475		
1000	1379	1230	1503	1404	1503		
1500	1416	1270	1548	1455	1534		
2000	1449	1306	1588	1501	1566		
2500	1478	1337	1624	1542	1598		
3000	1503	1364	1656	1577	1629		
3500	1524	1387	1683	1607	1657		
4000	1543	1406	1706	1632	1683		
4500	1557	1421	1724	1652	1704		
5000	1569	1432	1739	1668	1722		
5500	1577	1440	1750	1679	1735		
6000	1582	1444	1757	1687	1745		
6500	1584	1445	1761	1689	1750		
7000	1583	1443	1761	1688	1752		
7500	1580	1437	1758	1683	1749		
8000	1573	1428	1752	1675	1744		
8500	1564	1416	1743	1663	1735		
9000	1552	1402	1731	1648	1724		
9500	1538	1384	1716	1630	1710		
10000	1522	1364	1699	1608	1694		
10500	1503	1342	1679	1584	1677		
11000	1482	1317	1656	1557	1657		
11500	1459	1290	1632	1528	1636		
12000	1434	1261	1605	1497	1614		
12500	1407	1229	1577	1463	1591		
13000	1378	1196	1546	1427	1567		
13500	1348	1161	1514	1390	1542		
14000	1316	1124	1481	1351	1516		
14500	1282	1086	1446	1310	1489		
15000	1247	1046	1410	1269	1461		
15500	1211	1005	1372	1226	1432		
16000	1173	962	1334	1182	1402		
16500	1134	919	1295	1137	1370		
17000	1094	874	1255	1092	1337		
17500	1054	829	1214	1046	1302		
18000	1012	783	1173	1000	1266		
18500	970	736	1131	953	1228		
19000	926	688	1090	907	1189		
19500	883	640	1048	861	1149		
20000	839	592	1006	815	1108		
20500	794	544	965	770	1067		
21000	749	495	924	725	1026		
21500	704	447	883	682	987		
22000	659	398	843	639	951		
22500	614	350	804	597	918		
23000	569	302	765	557	891		

Note: When SI is blocked, credit for Samarium is included. With SI enabled, credit for Samarium may be taken per STP-134.001. All scenarios include penalty for B10 depletion.

Tech Spec Ref.: 3.1.1.2

Procedure Ref.: STP-134.001

Figure Ref.: Calc DC0 020K-040



Tech Spec Ref .: N/A

Procedure Ref.: STP-134.001

Figure Ref.: Calc DC0 020K-037

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

COPY NO.____

SURVEILLANCE TEST PROCEDURE

STP-134.001

## SHUTDOWN MARGIN VERIFICATION

**REVISION 12** 

SAFETY RELATED

### **RECORD OF CHANGES**

CHANGE LETTER	TYPE CHANGE	APPROVAL DATE	CANCELLATION DATE	CHANGE LETTER	TYPE CHANGE	APPROVAL DATE	CANCELLATION DATE
A	Р	05/25/06					
В	P	10/12/06					
С	Р	10/31/07					

## CONTINUOUS USE

Continuous Use Of Procedure Required. Read Each Step Prior To Performing.

## DOCUMENT REVIEW FORM

Page 1 of 2

			Document	t Ident	ification				
Origin	nators Name:	R. Perrill;			Ext:	555	524	Mail Code:	410
Date:	05/01/07	Document No.: ST	P-134.001		Revisio	n No.:	12	Change Let	ter: C
Title	Shutdown Ma	argin Verification							NNS
Permi	opment Proces anent: (check emporary App iption: See at	roval	/Chg or	Ed	itorial Correct	ion			
Reaso s the S	on/Basis for the prosection of	Change: See attached ocedure affected by this cl		YES 🗌					
Tempo	orary Approva						Fin	al approval n (30 day	
	QR	DC&R (Pers	on Notified)		SS	1	-	Date	
			ument Revi	iewers	(Enclosure	C)			
Required	Position QR	Type/Print Name FLuca S		*Additional	Position RENO DIS SE	102	Bry Bry She Zumf	<u>sow</u>	
Super	visor/Date	P	<u>0 (07</u> re- impleme	entatio		05/	25/		
All C	Comments Re	solved	X	Yes	BRez	Driginator/	( to (	02/07	
Con	nmitments Add	dressed per SAP-0630	Ø	NA	Yes, P/0	CAP # _		MLSA	Test a UD at
Pre- Train PSR NSR	implementatio	mpleted		NA NA NA NA	☐ Yes, Att ☐ Yes ☐ Yes, CE ☐ Yes, Mt ☐ Yes, Mt ☐ Yes, Mt ☐ Yes Gt	R # _	Update Noti	det port	Initial/Date
Superv	visor/Date	feel alth		Approv	val Authority/	Date	10	131/07	- Mill

* Failure by the "Additional Reviewers" to provide comments within 5 working days following the comment due date may be considered as "No Comment".

## DOCUMENT REVIEW FORM

	Page	2	of	2	
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Document No.:	STP-134.001	Rev. 12	Chg. C
		No.:	Ltr.:

### **DESCRIPTION CONTINUED:**

- a. Simplified wording in Steps 6.1 c and d for ease of transition to the proper attachment.
- b. Modified Attachment III as follows
  - 1) Changed title description to include IPCS Shutdown Margin Program (XENON) unavailable.
  - 2) Deleted Caution regarding unavailability if the IPCS Program.
  - 3) Amended Step 14 transition requirements.
- c. Added new Note 6.1.a through d regarding using values for Shutdown margin calculations provided by the Reactor Engineering group when the station Curve Book has not been updated.

### **REASON/BASIS FOR CHANGE CONTINUED:**

- a. Procedure enhancement.
- b. Reason:
  - 1) Attachment II is not used unless the IPCS Shutdown Margin Program is unavailable; otherwise, Attachment II is used.
  - 2) Caution is unnecessary when applied as a limitation for attachment use in the title description.
  - This transition description change is required because the IPCS Shutdown margin Program cannot be used when the Shutdown Banks are not inserted.
- c. Procedure feedback from Refuel 16 stating that the procedure did not compensate for Mode 1 through 5 conditions when the Station Curve Book had not been updated.



^{*} Failure by the "Additional Reviewers" to provide comments within 5 working days following the comment due date may be considered as "No Comment".

## DOCUMENT REVIEW FORM

Page 1 of 1.

			Documer	nt Ident	ification			
Origina	ators Name:	Fenstermacher			Ext:	5974	Mail Code:	410
Date:	10/12/06	Document No.: ST	P-134.001		Revision N	lo.: 12	Change Le	tter: B
Title:	SHUTDO	WN MARGIN VERIFIC	CATION			D		
Permai	mporary App	one) 🗌 Normal Rev		-	torial Correction		S.	
	n/Basis for ( COPE of the pr	Change: 1) Feedba			nulator startup).			
Tempor	ary Approva	1			,	F	inal approval (30 da	
	QR	DC&R (Pers	on Notified)		SS		Date	
				iewers	(Enclosure C)			
Required	Position <u>QR</u> 	Type/Print Name		*Additional	Position	Type/Pr	int Name	
	sor/Date	10/140		Comm	ent Due Date			
Comn 50.59 Pre-im Trainir PSRC	Applicability nplementatio ng required a Review Cor Review Cor	solved dressed per SAP-0630 /Review Completed (S n Training Completed after implementation mpleted	AP-0107)	Yes NA	. hllall	nator/Date P # ned # No		InitiaVDate
Supervis	TAS sor/Date	tohn 19/12	106	Approv	TASP al Authority/Date	e 1	9120	b

* Failure by the "Additional Reviewers" to provide comments within 5 working days following the comment due date may be considered as "No Comment".

## DOCUMENT REVIEW FORM

Page 1 of ____

			Document	Identi	fication			
Origin	nators Name:	Eric L. Erickson			Ext:	55666	Mail Code	e: 410
Date:	05/24/06	Document No.: STI	P-134.001		Revision	No.: 12	Change L	etter: A
Title:	SHUTDOW	N MARGIN VERIF	ICATION			$\boxtimes$		
Perm	opment Proce anent: (check iption: Correc		pproval	Re	itorial Correctio stricted Chg (e			)
Is the S		Change: Typos ocedure affected by this ch	ange? NO 🛛	YES 🗆	lf yes, attach SAF		al approval	required by:
remp	orary Approva					7.00	(30 da	
1	QR	DC&R (Perso	on Notified)	-	SS		Dat	e
				wers	(Enclosure C)			
Required	Position OPS	Type/Print Name	Comments Yes/No	*Additional	Position	Type/Pri	nt Name	
Conci	urrence			Com	nent Due Date			
Super	visor/Date				140			_
Con 50.5 Pre- Trai PSF	59 Applicability implementation ning required RC Review Co RC Review Co er:	esolved dressed per SAP-0630 y/Review Completed (S on Training Completed after implementation empleted ompleted	AP-0107) X X X X X X X X X X X X X	Yes	Yes, P/C. Yes, Atta Yes Yes Yes, CEF	ched		A
Super	1AS visor/Date	telier 5/251	06	Appro	MA val Authority/D	ate		

* Failure by the "Additional Reviewers" to provide comments within 5 working days following the comment due date may be considered as "No Comment".

## DOCUMENT REVIEW FORM

Page 1 of 2

		Document	Identif	ication			
Originators Name:	Eric L. Erickson			Ext:	55666	Mail Code	: 410
Date: 05/03/06	Document No.: ST	P-134.001		Revisio	n No.: 1	2 Change L	etter: N/A
Title: Shutdown I	Margin Verification						
Development Proce Permanent: (check	k one) 🛛 Normal Rev		-	torial Correct stricted Chg (			)
Description: see P Reason/Basis for	Change: CER-06-128	5, change to	Station	Curve Book F	Figure II-9.	I, verbal comm	nents, the
ECR that installed	the new IPCS, and a P rocedure affected by this c	rocedure Fee	dback		AP-0107 form		required by:
1				100	1		
QR	DC&R (Pers	son Notified) ument Revie	-	SS Engloques C		Dat	e
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* Failure by the "Additional Reviewers" to provide comments within 5 working days following the comment due date may be considered as "No Comment".

## DOCUMENT REVIEW FORM

Page	2	of	2

Document No.:	STP-134.001	Rev. 12	Chg. N/A
		No.:	Ltr.:

DESCRIPTION CONTINUED: <u>The Shutdown Margin philosophy was altered</u> somewhat to simplify the process, as well as alleviate the potential for being needlessly required by procedure to perform an Emergency Boration following a Reactor Trip. In so doing, the overriding considerations as to which attachment to utilize, especially in Mode 3, became dependent upon whether or not the Low Pressure SI or Steam Line Pressure SI is blocked and the position of the Shutdown Banks. The new IPCS required that the electronic S/D Margin Calculation be modified in order to print the report. Reformatted several steps to remove important information from Notes.

## REASON/BASIS FOR CHANGE CONTINUED: N/A

#### DOCUMENT REVIEWERS CONTINUED:

	Position	Type/Print Name	Comments Yes/No		Position	Type/Print Name	Comments Yes/No
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* Failure by the "Additional Reviewers" to provide comments within 5 working days following the comment due date may be considered as "No Comment".

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## **ATTACHMENTS**

Attachment I	-	Required RCS Boron Determination For Maintaining Shutdown Margin In Mode 3 (Safety Injection Unblocked)
Attachment II	-	Required RCS Boron Determination For Maintaining Shutdown Margin In Mode 3 Shutdown Margin Program (Xenon) Not Available (Safety Injection Unblocked)
Attachment III	-	Shutdown Margin Verification With Safety Injection Blocked (Modes 3, 4, And 5)
Attachment IV	-	Boron Concentration Verification For Mode 6
Attachment V	-	Shutdown Margin Verification Prior To Initial Entry Into Mode 1 Following Refueling





## 1.0 PURPOSE/SCOPE

- 1.1 This procedure determines if the Limiting Condition For Operation requirements for Reactor Shutdown Margin found in Sections 3.1.1.1 and 3.1.1.2 of Technical Specifications are satisfactorily met by performing Surveillance Requirements 4.1.1.1.1.a, 4.1.1.1.1.d, or 4.1.1.2, as appropriate for the Operational Mode.
- 1.2 When in Mode 6, this procedure determines if the Limiting Condition For Operation requirement for Reactor Shutdown Margin found in Section 3.9.1 of Technical Specifications is satisfactorily met by performing Surveillance Requirements 4.9.1.1 and 4.9.1.2.
- 1.3 The SAP-107 Applicability Determination established that 10CFR50.59 Screening is not required as this procedure is classified as a maintenance activity which restores SSCs to their original condition.
- 1.4 Changes to this procedure that have been determined to comply with the Scope of this procedure will not require screening per 10CFR50.59. However, the following processes will apply:
  - a. 10CFR50.65a(4).
  - b. SAP-139 (10CFR50, Appendix B).

## 2.0 PRECAUTIONS

- 2.1 Following a plant shutdown, Shutdown Margin may decrease by as much as 3000 pcm due to Xenon decay over a 24 hour period. Any deviation from the conditions used in the Shutdown Margin calculation requires reverification of adequate Shutdown Margin.
- 2.2 The RCS must be borated to a Cold Shutdown, Xenon-Free concentration whenever the Low Pressurizer Pressure SI below P-11 or the Low Steam Line Pressure SI below P-12 signals are required to be manually blocked per Station Curve Book Figure II-9.1 (Column SI Blocked, Modes 3, 4, 5).

## 3.0 TEST EQUIPMENT

3.1 None.

## 4.0 TEST FREQUENCY

- 4.1 Normal Operations:
  - a. In Mode 1 or 2, at least once every 12 hours (see NROATC Operating Logs).
  - b. Upon initial entry into Mode 3 from Modes 1 or 2. A Shutdown Margin calculation shall be performed on demand thereafter to ensure Shutdown Margin is maintained.
  - c. In Modes 3, 4, and 5, at least once every 24 hours.
  - d. Prior to entering Mode 6.
  - e. In Mode 6, at least once every 72 hours.
  - f. After each fuel loading, prior to exceeding five percent power.
- 4.2 While in Modes 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5, during operation with inoperable Control Rod(s), Shutdown Margin should be verified within one hour after detection of the inoperable Control Rod(s) and at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the rod(s) is inoperable.

## NOTE 5.0 through 8.0

An asterisk (*) preceding a step indicates that data or a signoff is required on the Attachment identified within that step.

## 5.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS

- 5.1 The plant is in any of the Operational Modes as defined in Technical Specifications Section 1.0, Table 1-1.
- 5.2 The Shift Supervisor/Control Room Supervisor has signed on the appropriate attachment signifying the following:
  - *a. The Precautions of Section 2.0 have been discussed with the necessary personnel involved in the performance of the test.
  - *b. All Initial Conditions required for this test have been met.



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## 6.0 PROCEDURE

## 6.1 Normal Operation:

## NOTE 6.1.a through d

When the latest revision to the Station Curve Book is unavailable, Reactor Engineering should be contacted to provide documentation providing updated values required for Shutdown Margin calculations.

- a. For Mode 1 or 2, verify that all Control Rods are above the Rod Insertion Limit (see NROATC Operating Logs).
- b. Prior to the initial entry into Mode 1 after completion of physics testing, perform the following and record on Attachment V:
  - *1) Verify all BOL startup testing acceptance criteria have been met.
  - *2) Verify all Rods are above the Rod Insertion Limit.

## <u>NOTE 6.1.c</u>

The IPCS Shutdown Margin Program (XENON) assumes the Shutdown Banks are inserted.

- For Mode 3 perform either of the following when the Low Pressurizer Pressure SI (below P-11) or the Low Steam Line Pressure SI (below P-12) are unblocked:
  - *1) If the Shutdown Banks are inserted perform Attachment I.
  - *2) If the Shutdown Banks are withdrawn perform Attachment II.
- *d. For Modes 3, 4, or 5 when either the Low Pressurizer Pressure SI (below P-11) or the Low Steam Line Pressure SI (below P-12) is blocked perform Attachment III.

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## Step 6.1 continued

- e. For Mode 6, perform the following:
  - *1) Request a calculation from Reactor Engineering of the boron concentration sufficient to ensure that the more restrictive of the following is met, and record on Attachment IV:
    - a) The required boron concentration which will ensure a K_{eff} less than or equal to 0.95.
    - b) A boron concentration of greater than or equal to 2000 ppm.
  - *2) Record the present boron concentration on Attachment IV.
  - *3) Verify the present boron concentration is greater than the Reactor Engineering calculated minimum value, and record on Attachment IV.

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## <u>NOTE 6.2</u>

In Mode 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 with one or more untrippable control rod(s), the RCS should be borated per the applicable Abnormal Operating Procedure.

- 6.2 Operation with one or more inoperable rod(s):
  - a. For Mode 1 or 2:
    - With one or more untrippable rods, Shutdown Margin requirements can not be verified per this procedure. AOP-403.5, Stuck Or Misaligned Control Rod, must be implemented, which in turn will require emergency boration and verification of shutdown margin in Mode 3.
    - With one control rod below the Rod Insertion Limit (whether misaligned or dropped), Shutdown Margin requirements are met by limiting cycle design calculations, and a Shutdown Margin calculation is not required.
    - 3) With one or more Inoperable rods due to an electrical malfunction (not misaligned, dropped, or untrippable), Shutdown Margin requirements are satisfied by verification of rods above their Rod Insertion Limit and documented on GTP-702, Attachment IV.A.



## Step 6.2 continued

- *b. For Mode 3, complete Attachment I, Attachment II, or Attachment III, referring to the appropriate figures in the Station Curve Book.
- *c. For Mode 4 or 5 complete Attachment III, referring to the appropriate figures in the Station Curve Book.





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## 7.0 DATA REQUIREMENTS

- 7.1 All required data will be entered on the applicable Attachment.
- 7.2 IPCS Shutdown Margin Program printout.

## 8.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

- 8.1 In Mode 1 or 2, all Control Rods are above the Rod Insertion Limit.
- *8.2 Prior to initial Mode 1 entry after Refueling, all BOL startup testing acceptance criteria have been met, and Control Rods are above the Rod Insertion Limit.
- *8.3 In Mode 3, 4, or 5, Shutdown Margin is above the limits of Technical Specification 3.1.1.2.
- *8.4 In Mode 6, the boron concentration is sufficient to ensure the more limiting of:
  - a. A boron concentration greater than or equal to 2000 ppm, or
  - b. The boron concentration required to maintain a Keff of 0.95 or less.
- 8.5 If any Acceptance Criteria is not met, Emergency Borate per AOP-106.1, Emergency Boration.

### 9.0 REFERENCES

- 9.1 AOP-106.1, Emergency Boration.
- 9.2 AOP-403.5, Stuck Or Misaligned Control Rod.
- 9.3 CGSS-97-547, Cycle 11 N-2 Stuck Rod Worth.
- 9.4 NROATC Operating Logs.
- 9.5 V.C. Summer Station Curve Book.
- 9.6 V.C. Summer Tech Specs, Section 1.0, Table 1-1 and Sections 3.1.1.1, 3.1.1.2, and 3.9.1.

STP-134.001 ATTACHMENT I PAGE 1 OF 2 **REVISION 12** STTS#

#### **REQUIRED RCS BORON DETERMINATION** FOR MAINTAINING SHUTDOWN MARGIN IN MODE 3

#### (SAFETY INJECTION UNBLOCKED)

#### STEP ACTION

DATA

- 5.2.a PRECAUTIONS of Section 2.0 reviewed.
- 5.2.b INITIAL CONDITIONS of Section 5.0 met.

SS/CRS Signature

SS/CRS Signature

CAUTION

Following a plant shutdown, Shutdown Margin may decrease by as much as 3000 pcm due to Xenon decay over a 24 hour period. Any deviation from the conditions used in the Shutdown Margin calculation requires reverification of adequate Shutdown Margin.

If the Shutdown Margin Program (XENON) is not available, Shutdown Margin should be determined manually using Attachment II.

NOTE

1. At an IPCS terminal, enter XENON.

2. Select #6 to start the calculations.

NOTE 3

The following fields are populated by default, and only need to be changed if current conditions need to be adjusted.

(Required) (Not required) 3. Enter input data for the calculation, if required: 3.a. Year (last two digits). Month (Two digit number). 3.b. 3.c. Day (Two digit). 3.d. Hour (Two digit 24 hour number). 3.e. Minute (Two digit).





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
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STP-134.001 ATTACHMENT I PAGE 2 OF 2 REVISION 12 STTS # _____

#### REQUIRED RCS BORON DETERMINATION FOR MAINTAINING SHUTDOWN MARGIN IN MODE 3

## (SAFETY INJECTION UNBLOCKED)

<u>STI</u>	<u>EP</u>	ACTION	DATA	
	3.f.	Burn up (MWD/MTU).		
	3.g.	Number of untrippable Rods.		
	3.h.	Xenon Correction Factor (0.9)		
	3.i.	Xenon Concentration (100 at equilibrium).		
	3.j.	Iodine Concentration.		
	3.k.	Samarium Concentration.		
	3.1.	Promethium Concentration.		
4.	Pr	ress F2 to calculate.	Π	
5.	Pr	ress < Esc >.		
6.		om the menu, select LOGS/REPORTS.	Π	
7.		elect window 3-4, LOG MANAGER.		
8.		ick on TIMESTAMP twice to organize the files in escending order by time.		
9.	Se	elect the most recent SDMC file.		
10.	CI	ick PRINT to display the available printers.		
11.	Se	elect the desired printer and click OK.		
		NOTE 12 and 13		
Th	ne prin	ted output will list the required boron concentration	each hour for the next several days.	
12.	At	tach the IPCS printout to this Attachment.		
13.	Er	ter present boron concentration.		_ ppm





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STP-134.001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 1 OF 4 REVISION 12 STTS #_____

#### REQUIRED RCS BORON DETERMINATION FOR MAINTAINING SHUTDOWN MARGIN IN MODE 3

#### SHUTDOWN MARGIN PROGRAM (XENON) NOT AVAILABLE

## (SAFETY INJECTION UNBLOCKED)

When the IPCS Shutdown Margin Program (XENON) becomes available and the Shutdown Banks are inserted, the required RCS boron concentration for maintaining Shutdown Margin in Mode 3 should be determined using Attachment I.

NOTE

#### STEP ACTION

- 5.2.a PRECAUTIONS of Section 2.0 reviewed.
- 5.2.b INITIAL CONDITIONS of Section 5.0 met.
  - CAUTION

Following a plant shutdown, Shutdown Margin may decrease by as much as 3000 pcm due to Xenon decay over a 24 hour period. Any deviation from the conditions used in the Shutdown Margin calculation requires reverification of adequate Shutdown Margin.

1. Enter Cycle Burn-up.

2. Present RCS temperature:

3. Desired RCS temperature:

re

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SS/CRS Signature

DATA

SS/CRS Signature

MWD/MTU

_____°F

•F

STP-134.001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 2 OF 4 REVISION 12 STTS #

#### REQUIRED RCS BORON DETERMINATION FOR MAINTAINING SHUTDOWN MARGIN IN MODE 3

#### SHUTDOWN MARGIN PROGRAM (XENON) NOT AVAILABLE

#### (SAFETY INJECTION UNBLOCKED)

## STEP ACTION

#### DATA

## CAUTION 4

- a. The RCS must be borated to a Cold Shutdown, Xenon-Free concentration per Attachment IV prior to manually blocking the Low Pressurizer Pressure SI below P-11 or the Low Steam Line Pressure SI below P-12 signals.
- b. During EOP/AOP directed rapid cooldowns, boration to a Cold Shutdown, Xenon-Free concentration per Attachment III prior to manually blocking either the Low Pressurizer Pressure SI below P-11 or the Low Steam Line Pressure SI below P-12 is not required, unless directed by the EOP/AOP.
- 4. Using Curve Book Figure II-9.1 (column SHUTDOWN BANKS OUT or SHUTDOWN BANKS IN), enter the required RCS boron concentration to maintain Shutdown Margin based on Burnup at the desired temperature, as well as Shutdown Bank position.

S/D	Banks	OUT
S/D	Banks	IN

_____ ppm

#### NOTE 5 through 7

If no data for Xenon or Samarium is available from the IPCS or Reactor Engineering, zero should be recorded as the value for Xenon and Samarium Worths.

5. Determine Xenon Worth using 5.a or 5.b:

	5.a	(XENDISP or U1500) X 0.9 = (Correction Factor)		(-)	_ pcm
	5.b	Obtain Xenon Worth from Reactor Engineering.		(-)	_ pcm
6.		Determine Samarium Worth using 6.a <u>or</u> 6.b:			
	6.a	(XENDISP or U1503) X 0.9 = (Correction Factor)		(-)	_pcm
	6.b	Obtain Samarium Worth from Reactor Engineering.		(-)	_ pcm
7.		Calculate the Total Poison Worth:			
		(-) + (-) (Xenon Worth from Step 5) (Samarium Worth from Step 6)	=	<u>(-)</u>	_ pcm



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STP-134.001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 3 OF 4 **REVISION 12** STTS # _____ **REQUIRED RCS BORON DETERMINATION** FOR MAINTAINING SHUTDOWN MARGIN IN MODE 3 CHG SHUTDOWN MARGIN PROGRAM (XENON) NOT AVAILABLE (SAFETY INJECTION UNBLOCKED) STEP ACTION DATA 8. Enter one of the following Bounding Worths of Untrippable (+) pcm Control Rods: a) If no Control Rods are untrippable, enter a value of zero. b) Enter 2200 pcm if one rod is untrippable. c) Enter 7000 pcm if more than one rod is untrippable). 9. Add Step 7 and Step 8: ()_____pcm + (+) = (-) (Rod Worth from Step 8) (Total Poison Worth from Step 7) (-) pcm/ppm 10. Enter the Differential Boron Worth for the boron concentration entered in Step 4 (Curve Book Figure II-7.3 at 557°F). 11. Divide Step 9 by Step 10: _____pcm ÷ (-) ____pcm/ppm = Step 9 Step 10 () ppm 12. Determine required minimum boron concentration to maintain Shutdown Margin (Subtract Step 11 from Step 4): CHG ppm - ( ) ____ ppm = А ppm Step 4 13. Enter present boron concentration. __ ppm

С

PAGE 4 OF 4 **REVISION 12** STTS # REQUIRED RCS BORON DETERMINATION FOR MAINTAINING SHUTDOWN MARGIN IN MODE 3 SHUTDOWN MARGIN PROGRAM (XENON) NOT AVAILABLE (SAFETY INJECTION UNBLOCKED) ACTION STEP DATA 14. Monitor for Xenon decay as follows: 14.a Repeat this calculation every four hours using indicated Xenon  $\Box$ (XENDISP or U1500) and Samarium (XENDISP or U1503) values. 14.b When XENDISP or U1500 indicates Xenon is starting to add positive reactivity, perform one of the following: If the Shutdown Banks are inserted, borate the RCS to 1) Mode 3, Xenon-Free (Curve Book Book Figure II-9.1 (column SHUTDOWN BANKS IN). 2) If the Shutdown Banks are withdrawn, ensure Shutdown Margin is maintained between Shutdown Margin verifications by borating the RCS to 120 ppm greater than the calculated value determined in Step 12 above until the RCS has been borated to Mode 3, Xenon-Free(Curve Book Figure II-9.1 (column SHUTDOWN BANKS OUT): _ppm + <u>120</u>ppm = ____ppm STEP 12 8.3 Shutdown Margin is satisfied if line 13 is greater than line 12. YES / NO Initials: Date: _____ Calculated by: _____ Date: _____ Verified by:

STP-134.001 ATTACHMENT II

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STP-134.001 ATTACHMENT III PAGE 1 OF 2 REVISION 12 STTS #_____

#### SHUTDOWN MARGIN VERIFICATION WITH SAFETY INJECTION BLOCKED (MODES 3, 4, AND 5)

<u>STEP</u>	ACTION	DATA
5.2.a	PRECAUTIONS of Section 2.0 reviewed.	SS/CRS Signature
5.2.b	INITIAL CONDITIONS of Section 5.0 met.	SS/CRS Signature
1.	Enter Cycle Burnup.	MWD/MTU
2.	Using either of the following enter the required RCS boron concentration to maintain Shutdown Margin based on Burnup:	ppm
	a. Curve Book Figure II-9.1 (column SI BLOCKED, MODES 3, 4, 5).	
	b. An EIR supplied by Reactor Engineering.	
3.	Perform the following to calculate the required additional Boron concentration to compensate for untrippable Control Rods:	
3.a	<ul> <li>Enter one of the following Bounding Worths of Untrippable Control Rods:</li> <li>1) If no Control Rods are untrippable, enter a value of zero.</li> <li>2) Enter 2200 pcm if one rod is untrippable.</li> <li>3) Enter 7000 pcm if more than one rod is untrippable).</li> </ul>	<u>(+)</u> pcm
3.b	Enter the Differential Boron Worth for the boron concentration entered in Step 2 (Curve Book Figure II-7.3 at 557°F).	<u>(-)</u> pcm/ppm
3.c	Divide Step 3.a by Step 3.b:	
	(+) pcm ÷ (-) pcm/ppm = Step 3.a Step 3.b	<u>(-)</u> ppm

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STP-134.001 ATTACHMENT III PAGE 2 OF 2 REVISION 12 STTS #_____ _____

### SHUTDOWN MARGIN VERIFICATION WITH SAFETY INJECTION BLOCKED (MODES 3, 4, AND 5)

<u>STEP</u>	ACTION	DATA
4.	Determine required minimum boron concentration to maintain Shutdown Margin (Subtract Step 3.c from Step 2):	
	(+) ppm - (-) ppm = Step 2 Step 3.c	ppm
5.	Enter present boron concentration.	ppm
8.3	Shutdown Margin is satisfied if Step 5 is greater than Step 4.	YES / NO Initials:
Calcula	ted by:	Date:
Verified	by:	Date:

STP-134.001 ATTACHMENT IV PAGE 1 OF 1 REVISION 12 STTS#_____ 

## BORON CONCENTRATION VERIFICATION FOR MODE 6

5.2.a	PRECAUTIONS of Section 2.0 reviewed.		
			SS/CRS Signature
5.2.b	INITIAL CONDITIONS of Section 5.0 met.		SS/CRS Signature
6.1.e.1)	Reactor Engineering's calculated minimum boron concentr	ation:	ppm
6.1.e.2)	Present boron concentration: ppm		
6.1.e.3)	Verify the present boron concentration exceeds the Reactor calculated value.	or Engineering	INITIALS
8.4	Acceptance criteria is met.		INITIALS
	Prepared by:	Date:	
	Reviewed by:	Date:	

STP-134.001 ATTACHMENT V PAGE 1 OF 1 REVISION 12 STTS # _____

## SHUTDOWN MARGIN VERIFICATION PRIOR TO INITIAL ENTRY INTO MODE 1 FOLLOWING REFUELING

5.2 <i>.</i> a	PRECAUTIONS of Section 2.0 reviewed.	······································
		SS/CRS Signature
5.2.b	INITIAL CONDITIONS of Section 5.0 met.	
		SS/CRS Signature
6.1.b.1)	All BOL startup testing acceptance criteria met.	INITIALS
0.4 h 0)		
0.1.D.Z)	All rods are above the Rod Insertion Limit.	INITIALS
8.2	Acceptance Criteria is met.	
0.2		INITIALS
	Prepared By:	Date:
	Reviewed By:	Date:



#### *JPM NO:* 09 SRO A.1.b

DETERMINE REQUIRED ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

APPROVAL: APPROVAL DATE:

*REV NO*: 0

CANDIDATE:

EXAMINER:

SRO ONLY

THIS JPM IS NOT APPROVED



TASK:

#### 341-038-03-02 INTERPRET AND ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH PLANT ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES DURING NORMAL AND OFF NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS

### TASK STANDARD:

The most limiting Technical Specification is determined and the Removal and Restoration Checksheeet is completed satisfactorily.

### **PREFERRED EVALUATION LOCATION**

PREFERRED EVALUATION METHOD

### PERFORM

REFERENCES:	OAP 106.1	OPERATING ROUNDS
	SAP-134	CONTROL OF STATION SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES
	GTP-702	SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITY TRACKING AND TRIGGER
	SAP-205	Status Control and Removal and Restoration
	T.S.	Technical Specifications
	SOP-304	7.2 kV SWITCHGEAR



TOOLS: SOP-304, 115KV/7.2KV Operations Technical Specifications SAP-205, Status Control and Removal and Restoration GTP-702, Surveillance Activity Tracking and Triggering. OAP-106.1 Operating Rounds

EVALUATION TIME	30	TIME CRITICAL	NO	10CFR55:	55.45(a)13	
TIME START:	TIME FINISH	ł:	PERFOR	RMANCE TIME:		
PERFORMANCE RATING:	SAT:	UNSAT:				

EXAMINER:

SIGNATURE

DATE



## **READ TO OPERATOR:**

WHEN I TELL YOU TO BEGIN, YOU ARE TO PERFORM THE ACTIONS AS DIRECTED IN THE INITIATING CUES. I WILL DESCRIBE THE GENERAL CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THIS TASK IS TO BE PERFORMED AND PROVIDE THE NECESSARY TOOLS WITH WHICH TO PERFORM THIS TASK. BEFORE STARTING, I WILL EXPLAIN THE INITIAL CONDITIONS, WHICH STEPS TO SIMULATE OR DISCUSS, AND PROVIDE INITIATING CUES. WHEN YOU COMPLETE THE TASK SUCCESSFULLY, THE OBJECTIVE FOR THIS JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE WILL BE SATISFIED.

#### NONE SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS:

### INITIAL CONDITION: ° 100% Power

- ° B1 Maintenance Week is in progress
- The Integrated Fire Computer is being fed from Train 'A'
- The Supplemental Instrument Air Compressor is NOT running
- ESF Bus 1DB must be transferred to XTF-4/6 to allow the normal source feeder breaker to be replaced. The work is expected to take approximately two hours. ESF Bus 1DA will remain on the normal source during the work and alarm setpoints will NOT be adjusted since the alignment will only be in effect for approximately two hours.



INITIATING CUES: You are the CRS. Determine the administrative requirements assoctiated with transferring Bus 1DB to XTF-4/6 and complete any associated paperwork.

HAND JPM BRIEFING SHEET TO OPERATOR AT THIS TIME!



Monday, December 01, 2008

## JPM BRIEFING SHEET

### **OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS:**

#### SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: NONE

- INITIAL CONDITION: ° 100% Power
  - [°] B1 Maintenance Week is in progress
  - ° The Integrated Fire Computer is being fed from Train 'A'
  - ^o The Supplemental Instrument Air Compressor is NOT running
  - ESF Bus 1DB must be transferred to XTF-4/6 to allow the normal source feeder breaker to be replaced. The work is expected to take approximately two hours. ESF Bus 1DA will remain on the normal source during the work and alarm setpoints will NOT be adjusted since the alignment will only be in effect for approximately two hours.
- *INITIATING CUES:* You are the CRS. Determine the administrative requirements associated with transferring Bus 1DB to XTF-4/6 and complete any associated paperwork.



# HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU FEEL THAT YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.



Monday, December 01, 2008

NRC SRO KEY

SAP-205 ATTACHMENT I PAGE 1 OF 1 REVISION 10

## REMOVAL AND RESTORATION CHECKSHEET

	TYPE: Action Tracking	SERVICE IMPAC	From Service	TRAIN:   'A' Train   'X' Train   'B' Train   N/A		R&R NUMBER	. Ken	1.16	hE										
	SYSTEM:	THE ASW-	108	EQUIPMENT NAME:															
	REASON INOPE	IDB Alis	1 12 3	17 Para	A.														
Section 2-Removal Requirements	COMPENSATORY REQUIREMENTS:		Required By Date/Time	Comple Date/T	ted TECHNICA	TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS:				-									
	Trip/Bypass Bistables?		1	1															
	Backup Fire Suppression?		1	1	TECH. SPI	EC. 3.0.4 APPLIES	REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT OPERABLE.												
	Roving Fire	Roving Fire Watch?		1	Restrain	ing Mode:													
	Continuous	Fire Watch?	1	- 1	Mode Di	scovered:	DN/A	_		_									
	Alternate Radiation Monitoring?		7 1	1		SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION													
	Smoke Detectors Operable?		TBONYI Vár	- 1 7.1. 3/4 8.1 2.1		True Shine	provens care. Tha Adams												
ection 2	GTP-702 A	GTP-702 Att		1	6.5%	123 14	- series	R.											
		ComperTS	1	1				_	_	_									
	REMOVAL COMMENTS: POWELS & STATUS			RELATED DO						_									
			Completed	Document	1	Completed	1												
	Operable S	STP STTS#	Date/Time	Type*	Document #	Initials/Date	Comments												
			1			1													
			1			1				-									
	l		1			1	1												
6 L.	-	1995 Barrier - 1995	1			1	1			-									
			ECR Operability			1	1												
			Form?	-		1	1												
			□Yes □No	Continued on Attachment VII. *ECR, MWR, NCN, PMTS, RTO, STTS, WI			1												
			□N/A	*ECR, MW	R, NCN, PMIS	RIO, SITS, W	PO, etc.		RESTORATION COMMENTS:										
	N/A RESTORATION C		N/A	FECR, MW	R, NCN, PMIS	, RIO, STIS, W	PO, etc.												
	N/A RESTORATION C	COMMENTS: ORATION STATUS	SS Author		1	oncurrence	PO, etc. Date/Time		Update	d									
	N/A RESTORATION C	ORATION STATUS	1		1			MCB Yes	BISI Yes	EOC									
	N/A RESTORATION C REMOVAL/REST	ORATION STATUS	1		1		Date/Time	MCB	BISI	EOC Vet									
	N/A RESTORATION C REMOVAL/REST Declared Inop Time Limit to I	ORATION STATUS perable Declare Operable	1		1		Date/Time	MCB Yes	BISI Yes	ed EOC No									
	N/A RESTORATION O REMOVAL/REST Declared Inop Time Limit to I Restoration F	oration status perable Declare Operable Required By	1		1		Date/Time /	MCB Yes	BISI Yes	EOC									
	N/A RESTORATION C REMOVAL/REST Declared Ino Time Limit to I Restoration F Downgraded	ORATION STATUS perable Declare Operable Required By Tracking	SS Author		1		Date/Time / / /	MCB Yes	BISI Yes										
	N/A RESTORATION C REMOVAL/REST Declared Ino Time Limit to I Restoration F Downgraded to:	ORATION STATUS perable Declare Operable Required By Tracking Restricted Service	SS Author		1		Date/Time / / / /	MCB Yes	BISI Yes										
	N/A RESTORATION C REMOVAL/REST Declared Ino Time Limit to I Restoration F Downgraded to: Declared Ope	ORATION STATUS perable Declare Operable Required By Tracking Restricted Service erable	SS Author		1		Date/Time / / /	MCB Yes No	BISI DYes No										
	N/A RESTORATION C REMOVAL/REST Declared Ino Time Limit to I Restoration F Downgraded to: Declared Ope Total Time:	ORATION STATUS perable Declare Operable Required By Tracking Restricted Service	SS Author		1		Date/Time / / / /	MCB Yes No	BISI Yes No	EOC									

## *STEP*: 4

## CUES:

,E		s Note: When the Removal and Restoration Concluded.	Checksheet is handed to the Examiner the
CR	SEQ		STEP STANDARD:
Yes	No	Completes a Removal and Restoration Checksheet for the transfer of Bus 1DB.	Removal and Restoration Checksheet properly completed.
			Critical Elements:
			Type: ACTION Service Impact: REMOVED FROM SERVICE Train: "B" TRAIN Equipment I.D. and Equipment Name: ANY DESIGNATION AS TO BUS 1DB IS ACCEPTABLE Reason Inoperable: XSW-1DB ALIGNED TO XTF-4/6 Compensatory Requirements: GTP-702 Att(VI.Y-1) Required By Date/Time: Time within one hour of transfer accomplished. And Current Date. Other: CHECKED: REMOVAL COMMENTS: Statement reflecting need to record Bus 1DB Voltage Readings Hourly Technical Specifications: 3.8.1.1.a required as a minimum Tech Spec 3.0.4 applies: YES CHECKED Restraining Mode: MODE 4 Annotated. Mode Discovered: MODE 1 Annotated. Redundant Equipment Operable: YES CHECKED
CON	AMENT:	S:	SAT

#### COMMENTS:

UNSAT

_____

Examiner ends JPM at this point.



## JPM SETUP SHEET

JPM NO: 09 SRO A.1.b

DESCRIPTION: DETERMINE REQUIRED ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS

IC SET:

**INSTRUCTIONS:** 

COMMENTS:





-----

#### **STEPS**

STEP: 1

(	CU	'ES	5:			
	-	-	-	-	-	

Evaluator's Cue: Provide SOP-304 if electronic or hard co	py access is not available.
CR SEQ	STEP STANDARD:
Yes Yes Review SOP-304 Precautions.	Determines hourly Bus 1DB voltage logs are required per PRECAUTION II.1:
	Anytime the 7.2KV ESF buses are placed in a lineup other than normal or XTF0006, XTF0004 7.2KV VOLTAGE REGULATOR, is in MANUAL or OFF, hourly Bus Voltage readings should be recorded per OAP-106.1, Operating Logs. Readings should be taken until the alarm setpoint has been reset to new limits for the applicable lineup per Attachment VA and/or Attachment VB.
COMMENTS:	SAT
	UNSAT
STEP: 2 CUES:	
CR SEQ	STEP STANDARD:

**Review SOP-304 PRECAUTIONS.** Yes Yes PRECAUTION II.8 ° To maintain separate offsite circuit operability in Modes 1 through 4, one of the following conditions must be met for BUS 1DA and BUS 1DB:

> [°] Both NORM FEED BREAKERS must be closed.

> ° Both ALT FEED BREAKERS must be closed.

**COMMENTS:** 

Determines offsite circuit operablility is affected since both BUS 1DA and 1DB will not meet the requirements of precaution II.8 of SOP-304.



**UNSAT** 

.



CUES:

### CR SEQ

Yes Yes Deterimines actions required by Technical Specifications per precaution II.8 of SOP-304

#### STEP STANDARD:

Determines LCO 3/4.8.1 is not met and action a) is applicable

#### 3.8.1.1

a. Two Physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system, is not met.

Action a) With one offsite circuit of 3.8.1.1.a inoperable:

Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining offsite A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1 within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter, and

if either EDG has not been successfully tested within the past 24 hours, demonstrate its OPERABILITY by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.3 separately for each such EDG within 24 hours unless the diesel is already operating, and

Restore the offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

**SAT** .....

UNSAT



Monday, December 01, 2008

**COMMENTS:** 

SAP-205 ENCLOSURE A PAGE 1 OF 10 REVISION 10

### INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF ATTACHMENT I.

### REMOVAL AND RESTORATION CHECKSHEET

### NOTE

This procedure is applicable when R&Rs are prepared manually or by the Computer Generated R&R program.

1. Section 1, Summary Data.

1)

- A. R&R Type There are two R&R types Action and Tracking. The appropriate block should be checked.
  - Action R&R An R&R for which any of the following apply:
    - a) The Technical Specification LCO requirements are met only by reliance on the Action Statement and action must be completed to restore the equipment to full LCO requirements within a specified time period or additional actions must be initiated (i.e., plant shutdown or additional reporting requirements).
    - b) Technical Specification 3.0.4 is identified as being applicable.
    - c) Reportability requirements exist as specified in any of the following:
      - (1) Technical Specifications.
      - (2) FPP-023, FPP-024, FPP-025, and FPP-027.
      - (3) Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.
      - (4) Other administrative reportability requirements (i.e., AMSAC).
    - d) REG GUIDE 1.97 requirements are identified in the Technical Specifications Cross-Reference program.
    - e) A GTP-702 Attachment exists to track required actions.

SAP-205 ENCLOSURE A PAGE 2 OF 10 REVISION 10

#### INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF ATTACHMENT I,

#### REMOVAL AND RESTORATION CHECKSHEET (Cont'd)

- 2) Tracking R&R An R&R for which any of the following apply:
  - a) Reactor Building Door Seal testing requirements following Reactor Building entries.
  - b) Removal of a Spent Fuel Cooling Pump/Train from service for Maintenance.
  - c) Removal of a TB Instrument Air Compressor from service for maintenance (XAC0003A(B)).
  - d) Shift Supervisor's discretion to track systems or components to ensure timely and proper restoration.
- B. R&R Service Impact The appropriate block should be checked.

Removed From Service: - This statement is used when alignment of the system or component must be changed such that the system is unavailable to perform its intended function.

2) Restricted Service:

1)

- a) This statement is used if the alignment of a system or component can remain such that the system is available to perform its intended function however, associated activities such as open paperwork or work in the near vicinity requires increased operator awareness.
- b) This statement must detail conditions for which the operator must be alerted if the system actuates.
- c) This statement can apply to either an Action or Tracking R&R. If it is an Action R&R, the clock is still running. Technical Specification credit is not taken for Restricted Service equipment.
- C. R&R Train Check the appropriate block for the train associated with the inoperable equipment. This information is usually located in the CHAMPS equipment record.

SAP-205 ENCLOSURE A PAGE 3 OF 10 REVISION 10

### INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF ATTACHMENT I.

- D. R&R Number The R&R number is a sequential number consisting of the year followed by four digits. The Removal and Restoration Index, Attachment II, is used to keep track of the numbers.
- E. System, Equipment ID, and Equipment Name Fill in using the information from the CHAMPS equipment record.
- F. Reason Inoperable Enter a short statement describing the inoperable condition.
- 2. Section 2, Removal Requirements.
  - A. Compensatory Requirements:
    - 1) If no requirements are identified, check NONE.
    - 2) Check marks by the various items indicate that the specified item applies. N/A's are not required for non-applicable items.
    - 3) Required By Date/Time indicates the time the requirement must be accomplished. The implementing documents, such as Fire Watch Log, GTP-702 Checklist, Bistable Trip Report, etc. will provide documentation as to actual compliance.
    - 4) Completed Date/Time indicates the time that the requirement was completed.
  - B. Technical Specifications Enter the applicable LCOs and other documents listed in the Tech Spec Cross-Reference (FPPs, ODCM, REG GUIDE 1.97, etc.).
    - 1) Check the appropriate block specifying whether Technical Specification 3.0.4 applies.
    - Restraining Mode is the lowest mode in which the LCO applies. Example: The restraining mode for Emergency Feedwater System is Mode 3.
    - 3) Mode Discovered Enter the mode the inoperable condition was initiated or discovered.

SAP-205 ENCLOSURE A PAGE 4 OF 10 REVISION 10

### INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF ATTACHMENT I,

### REMOVAL AND RESTORATION CHECKSHEET (Cont'd)

- Redundant Equipment Operable Check the appropriate block. This question refers to the opposite train component, not swing components.
- 5) Supporting Documentation Enter any other applicable documentation, such as SAPs, etc.
- Removal Comments Enter any comments applicable to the items in Section 2, Removal Requirements, including plant restrictions or other amplifying information. Examples: "Mode 1 <10%" or "Mode 4 > 300°F".

#### 3. Section 3, Restoration Requirements/Related Documents.

A. Restoration Requirements:

C.

- The STP section records the surveillance tests performed to determine an operable condition. Record the STP and task sheet number. Enter the completion date and time when the surveillance is satisfactorily completed.
- 2) All Compensatory Requirements shall be terminated or restored to normal alignment and the section marked YES unless another condition not reflected on the R&R exists. A NO answer shall be explained in the Restoration Comments section. If Compensatory Requirements is marked NONE, the N/A block should be checked.
- 3) ECR Operability Form (ORS) If the inoperable condition was related to an ECR implementation, an Operability/Return to Service Form may be required:
  - a) Check YES if the ECR Engineering Change Review/Impact Form affecting system/component operability has been completed.
  - b) Check NO if there is no system/component operability impact identified on the ECR Engineering Change Review/Impact Form.

SAP-205 ENCLOSURE A PAGE 5 OF 10 REVISION 10

### INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF ATTACHMENT I.


- c) If no ECR is associated with the R&R, the N/A block should be checked.
- d) A summary of ECRs reflecting this information is located in the Operations Procedure Unit files.
- e) If the requirement for the form cannot be determined, contact the Project Manager or Responsible Engineer for guidance.
- B. Related Documents Record the serial number and document type of the documents which caused the inoperable condition for cross-referencing purposes, including the STTS number for any failed STP that initiated the R&R condition.
  - These documents provide additional information concerning the inoperable condition that is not reflected on the Removal and Restoration Checksheet. Use Attachment VII when additional space is needed.
  - 2) The Completed Initials/Date column may be used as a convenience to track document completion status, but is not required if this is being accomplished in another fashion, such as a Work Package Organizer (WPO) or danger tagout.
- C. Restoration Comments Enter any comments applicable to the items in Section 3, Restoration Requirements/Related Documents. Comments will be entered if:
  - 1) All compensatory requirements are not restored or terminated.
  - A method other than an STP is used to determine operability, such as post MWR VT-2.
  - 3) An R&R is voided when additional information and review confirm that the condition was not an inoperable condition.
  - 4) An NCN disposition confirms operability.



SAP-205 ENCLOSURE A PAGE 6 OF 10 REVISION 10

### INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF ATTACHMENT I.

- 4. Section 4 Removal/Restoration Status.
  - A. Declared Inoperable Date/Time The time the Shift Supervisor either determines the system or component is inoperable or when he authorizes work to begin. This entry starts the clock for subsequent actions.
    - 1) SS Authorization indicates the Shift Supervisor has:
      - a) Completed the responsibilities specified in Section 5.4.
      - b) Reviewed and concurred with the information entered on the Removal and Restoration Checksheet.
      - c) Approved declaring the system inoperable.
    - 2) OATC Concurrence indicates the Reactor Operator at the Controls has reviewed the Removal and Restoration Checksheet, is aware of the conditions and impact on plant operations, and concurs with the inoperable status and required actions.
    - 3) Updated:
      - a) If the inoperable condition impacts on a component with Main Control Board control, an orange R&R marker shall be placed on that control. The purpose of the marker is to alert the operator and provide a visual indication that the control relates to an inoperable or restricted service component. The operator shall be responsible for knowing the exact conditions and what actions, if any, should be performed if the equipment actuates.
      - b) BISI update is required for Action R&Rs associated with the following systems:
        - (1) High Head Safety Injection.
        - (2) Low Head Safety Injection.
        - (3) Accumulator System.



### INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF ATTACHMENT I,

- (4) Reactor Building Spray System.
- (5) Containment Isolation System.
- (6) Reactor Building Cooling.
- (7) Emergency Feedwater System.
- (8) Steam Generator Isolation.
- (9) Ventilation and Cooling System.
- (10) Emergency Safeguard Power.
- (11) Service Water System.
- (12) Component Cooling System.
- c) For R&Rs impacting risk, EOOS shall be updated to reflect the impact of the inoperable equipment.
- B. Time Limit to Declare Operable The time specified by the Technical Specification Action Statement for recovery or administrative time limits imposed on non-Technical Specification items. If the R&R is a Tracking R&R, this should be left blank.
- C. Restoration Required Date/Time The summation of the Technical Specification time limit or the administrative time limit added to the Declared Inoperable Date/Time. The units of time shall also be the Technical Specification or administrative time units. If the Technical Specification or administrative limit reflects hours, the restoration time shall reflect the hour, minute and date of expiration. If the R&R is a Tracking R&R, this should be left blank.

SAP-205 ENCLOSURE A PAGE 8 OF 10 REVISION 10

### INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF ATTACHMENT I.

- D. Downgraded To Tracking:
  - 1) When all compensatory and reportability requirements have been completed, an Action R&R may be downgraded to Tracking.
  - 2) SS Authorization indicates the Shift Supervisor has:
    - a) Verified all compensatory and reportability requirements have been completed.
    - b) Approved downgrading the R&R to Tracking.
  - 3) When an Action R&R is downgraded, the following items shall also be accomplished:
    - a) The R&R type shall be changed on the Removal and Restoration Checksheet.
    - b) The Removal and Restoration Index shall be updated.
    - c) The Removal and Restoration Checksheet shall be moved to the Tracking section of the R&R Logbook.
- E. Downgraded To Restricted Service:
  - 1) When an inoperable system or component is restored to a condition where it is available to perform its intended function as specified in Technical Specifications, but associated activities such as open paperwork or work in the near vicinity require increased operator awareness and vigilance, an R&R may be downgraded to Restricted Service.
  - Downgrading to Restricted Service permits an inoperable system or component to be declared functional, with the additional functional time used as maintenance rule available time.
  - Restricted Service shall not be used for systems specified in Section 6.6.3.



SAP-205 ENCLOSURE A PAGE 9 OF 10 REVISION 10

### INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF ATTACHMENT I,

- 4) Systems or components in a Restricted Service Mode may be energized provided:
  - a) Operations shift personnel are completely aware of the restrictions and what impact it has on system function.
  - b) No credit is taken for the equipment when determining Technical Specification LCO compliance.
  - c) The energized system or component will not prevent related equipment from performing its function.
- 5) SS Authorization indicates the Shift Supervisor has:
  - a) Reviewed conditions for which operators must be alerted if the system actuates.
  - b) Informed Operations shift personnel of the restrictions and impact of the restricted service equipment.
  - c) Verified the energized system or component will not prevent related equipment from performing its function.
  - d) Approved downgrading the R&R to Restricted Service.
- 6) OATC Concurrence indicates the Reactor Operator at the Controls is aware of the conditions and impact on plant operations, required actions upon system actuation, and concurs with the Restricted Service condition.
- 7) When an R&R is downgraded to Restricted Service, the R&R Service Impact shall be changed on the Removal and Restoration Checksheet.

SAP-205 ENCLOSURE A PAGE 10 OF 10 REVISION 10

### INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF ATTACHMENT I.

- F. Declared Operable Enter the date and time the inoperable condition is restored or corrected.
  - 1) SS Authorization indicates the Shift Supervisor has:
    - a) Reviewed and concurred with the information entered on the Removal and Restoration Checksheet.
    - b) Reviewed and concurred with the documentation proving operable conditions.
    - c) Approved declaring the system or component Technical Specification operable.
  - 2) OATC Concurrence indicates the Reactor Operator at the Controls is aware of the conditions and impact on plant operations and concurs with the operability determination.
  - Updated Any orange Main Control Board R&R markers should be removed, manual BISI inputs updated, and EOOS equipment status updated as required at this time.
- G. Total Time Inoperable Enter the total time the system or component was inoperable. Mark N/A if restrictions are not reflected in the Restoration Requirements section.
- H. Total Time Non-Functional If the R&R was downgraded to Restricted Service, enter the total time the system or component was inoperable and unable to perform its intended function. Obtain by subtracting the date and time inoperable from the date and time the R&R was downgraded to Restricted Service.

- a. 10CFR50, Appendix B.
- b. 10CFR50.59.
- c. SAP-630, Procedure/Commitment Accountability Program.


### II. PRECAUTIONS

- Anytime the 7.2KV ESF buses are placed in a lineup other than normal or XTF0006, XTF0004 7.2KV VOLTAGE REGULATOR, is in MANUAL or OFF, hourly Bus Voltage readings should be recorded per OAP-106.1, Operating Logs. Readings should be taken until the alarm setpoint has been reset to new limits for the applicable lineup per Attachment VA and/or Attachment VB.
- 2. All electrical work should be complete, applicable danger tags cleared, and ground straps removed prior to energizing any transformer or bus.
- 3. For the protection of equipment, parallel operations should be kept to a minimum with both normal and alternate feeder breakers closed.
- 4. XTF0006, XTF0004 7.2KV VOLTAGE REGULATOR, AUTO-OFF-MANUAL Control Switch must be in the OFF position and the tap position indicator in the N position before placing the regulator in service or removing it from service.
- 5. XES0008, 7.2KV TRANSFER & DISC SWITCHES, SOURCE and LOAD Switches must be open before operating the TRANSFER Switch.
- 6. The SOURCE or LOAD Switches should not be operated with the switch door open.
- 7. The TRANSFER Switch should be in the LOAD Position or the AUTO-OFF-MANUAL Control Switch is in the OFF position before paralleling XTF0004, UNIT 1 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARD TRANSFORMER with any other power source.
  - To maintain separate offsite circuit operability in Modes 1 through 4, one of the following conditions must be met for BUS 1DA and BUS 1DB:
  - a. Both NORM FEED BREAKERS must be closed.
  - b. Both ALT FEED BREAKERS must be closed.

PAGE 2 OF 75

CHG B

### SOP-304 REVISION 11



### SOP-304 REVISION 11

### C. PLACING ESF BUS 1DA AND 1DB ON ALTERNATE FEED

### 1.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS

- 1.1 A <u>**Pre-Job Brief**</u> has been conducted per OAP-100.3.
- 1.2 The Engineered Safety Features 7.2KV buses are energized from their normal sources.
- 1.3 Both BUS 1DA XFER INIT and BUS 1DB XFER INIT Switches are in OFF.
- 1.4 If manual transfer of BUS 1DB to alternate feed is to be performed, Breathing Air has been removed from service per SOP-220.

### 2.0 INSTRUCTIONS

- 2.1 Notify the System Controller of the applicable bus voltage limits from Enclosure B.
- 2.2 If required, adjust the 115KV and/or 230KV alarm setpoints per Attachment VA and/or Attachment VB for the current lineup.
  - 2.3 Manually transfer BUS 1DA to alternate feed as follows:

### <u>NOTE 2.3.a</u>

If the Integrated Fire System computer is being powered from Train A, there will be a momentary power interruption to the computer.

- a. Turn BUS 1DA XFER INIT Switch to the N-E position. (PEER <)
  - b. Verify the following:
    - 1) BUS 1DA potential lights remain energized.
    - 2) BUS 1DA ALT FEED breaker closes.
    - 3) BUS 1DA NORM FEED breaker opens.
  - c. Turn BUS 1DA XFER INIT Switch to OFF. (PEER ✓)
    - d. Match flags for the BUS 1DA ALT FEED and BUS 1DA NORM FEED breakers.



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*JPM NO:* 09 NRC RO A2

Perform STP-127.001 PRESSSURIZER BLOCK VALVE OPERABILITY.

APPROVAL: APPROVAL DATE:

REV NO: 0

·····

CANDIDATE:

EXAMINER:

THIS JPM IS NOT APPROVED



Monday, December 01, 2008

TASK:

#### 115-026-02-01 PERFORM A VALVE SURVEILLANCE TEST-STP

TASK STANDARD:

Completion of STP-127.001 PRESSURIZER BLOCK VALVE OPERABILITY TEST and Identification of MVG-8000C exceeding its MAXIMUM LIMITING STROKE TIME.

PREFERRED E	<b>EVALUATION</b>	N PREFI	PREFERRED EVALUATION METHOD					
SIMULATOR				PERFORM				
REFERENCES	S: STP-127	.001	PRESSURIZER B	LOCK VALVE OPERABILITY 1				
TOOLS:		nment 1 for	nformation available fo the TEST EQUIPMEN 27.001,		eting STP-			
<b>EVALUATION</b>	TIME	20	TIME CRITICAL	NO	10CFR55:	55.45(a)12		
TIME START:		TIME FINI	SH:	PERFO	RMANCE TIME:	- Salahan Sana Sana Sana Sana Sana Salahan Sana Salahan Sana		
PERFORMAN	CE RATING:	SAT:	UNSAT:	-				
EXAMINER:								
				SIGN	IATURE	DATE		





**INSTRUCTIONS TO OPERATOR** 

READ TO OPERATOR:

WHEN I TELL YOU TO BEGIN, YOU ARE TO PERFORM THE ACTIONS AS DIRECTED IN THE INITIATING CUES. I WILL DESCRIBE THE GENERAL CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THIS TASK IS TO BE PERFORMED AND PROVIDE THE NECESSARY TOOLS WITH WHICH TO PERFORM THIS TASK. BEFORE STARTING, I WILL EXPLAIN THE INITIAL CONDITIONS, WHICH STEPS TO SIMULATE OR DISCUSS, AND PROVIDE INITIATING CUES. WHEN YOU COMPLETE THE TASK SUCCESSFULLY, THE OBJECTIVE FOR THIS JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE WILL BE SATISFIED.

#### SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: NONE

INITIAL CONDITION: 100% Power All Controls are in their normal, full power alignment and no equipment is out - of - service Pressurizer Block Valve Operablility Test, STP-127.001 is due.

INITIATING CUES: The CRS has directed you to perform STP-127.001 PRESSURIZER BLOCK VALVE OPERABILITY TEST.



HAND JPM BRIEFING SHEET TO OPERATOR AT THIS TIME!



Monday, December 01, 2008



**OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS:** 

SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: NONE

INITIAL CONDITION: 100% Power All Controls are in their normal, full power alignment and no equipment is out - of - service Pressurizer Block Valve Operablility Test, STP-127.001 is due.

INITIATING CUES: The CRS has directed you to perform STP-127.001 PRESSURIZER BLOCK VALVE OPERABILITY TEST.



# HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU FEEL THAT YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.



Monday, December 01, 2008

STEPS

*STEP*: 1

CUES:

Evaluator	Cue: Provide Handout		) 
CR SEQ		STEP STANDARD:	
No Yes	Review Procedure	Reviews Sections:	
		1.0-PUPOSE/SCOPE	
		2.0-PRECAUTIONS	
		3.0-TEST EQUIPMENT	
		4.0-FREQUENCY	
		5.0-INITIAL CONDITIONS	
COMMENTS	::	SAT	_

v15:

STEP:

2

CUES:

CR SEQ

No Yes STP-1267.001 Step 6.1

Record all calibration datat on Attachment I as required

**COMMENTS:** 

*STEP:* 3

CUES:

CR SEQ

No No STP-127.001 Step 6.2

Perform an AS FOUND equipment lineup per Attachment II

**COMMENTS:** 

STEP STANDARD:

Fills out Attachment 1 TEST EQUIPMENT block for the stopwatch

SAT _____

UNSAT

UNSAT

STEP STANDARD:

On Attachment II, marks all PCVs CLOSED and al MVGs OPEN

SAT _____

UNSAT



Monday, December 01, 2008

Page 5 of 11



#### CUES:

Evaluator Note: The applicant may complete all ACEPTANCE CRITERIA MET and RPI/LOCAL blocks when all three valves have been tested.

#### CR SEQ

Yes Yes STP-127.001, Step 6.3

Procedure Note: To prevent preconditioning, the Block Valves open and closed exercises may be performed out of sequence.

6.3.a Ensure PCV-445A, PWR RELIEF, is closed.

6:3.b Close MVG-8000A, Relief 445A ISOL, and measure the stroke time to the nearest 0.1 second, from switch actuation until the closed light is lit and the open light goes out.

6.3.c Record the stroke time for XVG08000A-RC, PRZ PWR OPER RELIEF ISOL VLV, on Attachment I.

6.3.d Open MVG-8000A, RELIEF 445A ISOL, and measure the stroke time to the nearest 0.1 second, from switch actuation until the open light is lit and the closed light goes out.

6.3.e Record the stroke time for XVG08000A-RC, PRZ PWR OPER RELIEF ISOL VLV, on Attachment I.

**COMMENTS:** 

#### STEP STANDARD:

Ensures PCV-445A closed. (NOT CRITCAL)

Places MVG-8000A in Close and simultaneously starts the stopwatch.

Stops the stopwatch when the CLOSED light is LIT and the OPEN light is OUT.

Records the CLOSE stroke time in the CLOSE block for XVG08000A-RC, PRZ PWR OPER RELIEF INLET ISOL VLV, on Attachment I.

Places MVG-8000A in OPEN and simultaneously starts the stopwatch.

Stops the stopwatch when the OPEN light is LIT and the CLOSED light is OUT

Records the OPEN stroke time in the OPEN block for XVG08000A-RC, PRZ PWR OPER RELIEF INLET ISOL VLV, on Attachment I.

Marks YES in both ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA MET Blocks.

> SAT _____ UNSAT _____

.





### CUES:

Evaluator Note:

The applicant may complete all ACEPTANCE CRITERIA MET and RPI/LOCAL blocks when all three valves have been tested.

#### CR SEQ

Yes Yes STP-127.001, Step 6.4

Procedure Note: To prevent preconditioning, the Block Valves open and closed exercises may be performed out of sequence.

6.4.a Ensure PCV-444B, PWR RELIEF, is closed.

6.4.b Close MVG-8000B, Relief 444B ISOL, and measure the stroke time to the nearest 0.1 second, from switch actuation until the closed light is lit and the open light goes out.

6.4.c Record the stroke time for XVG08000B-RC, PRZ PWR OPER RELIEF ISOL VLV, on Attachment I.

6.4.d Open MVG-8000B, RELIEF 444B ISOL, and measure the stroke time to the nearest 0.1 second, from switch actuation until the open light is lit and the closed light goes out.

6.4.e Record the stroke time for XVG08000B-RC, PRZ PWR OPER RELIEF ISOL VLV, on Attachment I.

**COMMENTS:** 

#### STEP STANDARD:

Ensures PCV-444B closed. (NOT CRITCAL)

Places MVG-8000B in Close and simultaneously starts the stopwatch.

Stops the stopwatch when the CLOSED light is LIT and the OPEN light is OUT.

Records the CLOSE stroke time in the CLOSE block for XVG08000B-RC, PRZ PWR OPER RELIEF INLET ISOL VLV, on Attachment I.

Places MVG-8000B in OPEN and simultaneously starts the stopwatch.

Stops the stopwatch when the OPEN light is LIT and the CLOSED light is OUT

Records the OPEN stroke time in the OPEN block for XVG08000B-RC, PRZ PWR OPER RELIEF INLET ISOL VLV, on Attachment I.

Marks YES in both ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA MET Blocks.

> SAT _____ UNSAT _____





#### CUES:

Evaluator Cue: If necessary, acknowledge a report of ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA NOT MET. Direct the applicant to finish the procedure before taking any further action. Actions would be (Step 8.1.b) to either immediately retest (one time) or declare the valve inoperable.

CR SEQ

Yes Yes STP-127.001, Step 6.5

Procedure Note: To prevent preconditioning, the Block Valves open and closed exercises may be performed out of sequence.

6.5.a Ensure PCV-445B, PWR RELIEF, is closed.

6.5.b Close MVG-8000C, Relief 445B ISOL, and measure the stroke time to the nearest 0.1 second, from switch actuation until the closed light is lit and the open light goes out.

6.5.c Record the stroke time for XVG08000C-RC, PRZ PWR OPER RELIEF ISOL VLV, on Attachment I.

6.5.d Open MVG-8000C, RELIEF 445B ISOL, and measure the stroke time to the nearest 0.1 second, from switch actuation until the open light is lit and the closed light goes out.

6.5.e Record the stroke time for XVG08000C-RC, PRZ PWR OPER RELIEF ISOL VLV, on Attachment I.

**COMMENTS:** 

#### STEP STANDARD:

Ensures PCV-445B closed. (NOT CRITCAL)

Places MVG-8000C in Close and simultaneously starts the stopwatch.

Stops the stopwatch when the CLOSED light is LIT and the OPEN light is OUT.

Records the CLOSE stroke time in the CLOSE block for XVG08000C-RC, PRZ PWR OPER RELIEF INLET ISOL VLV, on Attachment I.

Places MVG-8000C in OPEN and simultaneously starts the stopwatch.

Stops the stopwatch when the OPEN light is LIT and the CLOSED light is OUT

Records the OPEN stroke time in the OPEN block for XVG08000C-RC, PRZ PWR OPER RELIEF INLET ISOL VLV, on Attachment I.

Marks NO in both ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA MET Blocks.

SAT _____

UNSAT



#### CUES: STEP STANDARD: CR SEQ STP-127.001, Step 6.6 On Attachment II, marks all PCVs No Yes CLOSED and all MVGs OPEN Perform a RETURN AS FOUND equipment lineup per Attachment II. SAT _____ **COMMENTS:** UNSAT STEP: 8 CUES: Evaluator Cue: L I Acknowledges the request for and independent verifier. t For the purposes of the examination, no independent verification will be provided. Leave the I verification block BLANK _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ STEP STANDARD: CR SEQ STP-127.001, Step 6.7 Request an independent verifier. No Yes Perform a RETURN AS FOUND equipment lineup independent verification per Attachment II. SAT . **COMMENTS:**





*STEP:* 7

Ē	valuator	Note:	
i E	ased up	on plant conditions Verification of local valve posi	tions is not required.
CR	SEQ		STEP STANDARD:
No	Yes	STP-127.001, Step 6.8	Marks all RPI/LOCAL blocks N/A.
		Procedure Note:	
		Local verificationn of valve position indication shall be performed on designated valves per Step 6.8 each Refuel Outage.	
		Valve position indication verification shall be verified in both the open and closed positions regardless of the safety functions performed by the valve.	
		Perform local verification of valve position indication as follows:	
		6.8.a Station a qualified valve operator at the valve	
		6.8.b When the valve is stroked, verifiy Main Control Board position indication matches local valve position.	
		6.8.c Place a check mark in the RPI/LOCAL column on Attachment I	
COM	IMENT.	S:	SAT
			UNSAT

Examiner ends JPM at this point.



### JPM SETUP SHEET

JPM NO: 09 NRC RO A2

DESCRIPTION: Perform STP-127.001 PRESSSURIZER BLOCK VALVE OPERABILITY.

IC SET:

**INSTRUCTIONS:** 

COMMENTS:



A NRC RO AZ 1

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION

#### NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

### NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

COPY NO.____

### SURVEILLANCE TEST PROCEDURE

#### STP-127.001

### PRESSURIZER BLOCK VALVE OPERABILITY TEST

#### **REVISION 8**

SAFETY RELATED

 $\bigcirc$ 

Original signed by:Dennis A. Baker02/24/04DISCIPLINE SUPERVISORDATEOriginal signed by:George A. Lippard03/01/04APPROVAL AUTHORITYDATE

#### RECORD OF CHANGES

	CHANGE	TYPE	APPROVAL	CANCELLATION	CHANGE	TYPE	APPROVAL	CANCELLATION
	LETTER	CHANGE	DATE	DATE	LETTER	CHANGE	DATE	DATE
1			<u> </u>					<u> </u>
								[]

#### CONTINUOUS USE

Continuous Use of Procedure Required. Read Each Step Prior to Performing.



STP-127.001 PAGE i REVISION 8 

### TABLE OF CONTENTS

	SECTION	PAGE
1.0	PURPOSE/SCOPE	1
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3.0	TEST EQUIPMENT	1
4.0	TEST FREQUENCY	1
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6.0	PROCEDURE	2
7.0	DATA REQUIREMENTS	5
8.0	ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA	5
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	ATTACHMENTS	

Attachment I	-	Valve Data Sheet
Attachment II	-	Equipment Lineup



### 1.0 PURPOSE/SCOPE

- 1.1 This procedure demonstrates the following:
  - a. The operability of the PORV Block Valves in accordance with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements 4.0.5 by performing quarterly stroke timing in addition to position indication verification once every 2 years on the following Valves.
    - 1. XVG08000A-RC, PRZ PWR OPER RELIEF INLET ISOL VLV
    - 2. XVG08000B-RC, PRZ PWR OPER RELIEF INLET ISOL VLV
    - 3. XVG08000C-RC, PRZ PWR OPER RELIEF INLET ISOL VLV
  - b. The operability of the PORV Block Valves in accordance with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements 4.4.4.2 by exercising the valve through one complete cycle of full travel at least once every 92 days.
- 1.2 10CFR50 Appendix B, 10CFR50.65a(4), and 10CFR50.55a(f) apply to this procedure. A 10CFR50.59 review is not required.

### 2.0 PRECAUTIONS

2.1 The testing of a PORV Block Valve that has been closed with the power removed in order to meet the requirements of Technical Specification 3.4.4.b, 3.4.4.c, or 3.4.4.d, shall not be performed.

### 3.0 TEST EQUIPMENT

3.1 Stopwatch with 0.1 second increment timing capability.

### 4.0 TEST FREQUENCY

- 4.1 PORV Block Valves must be Inservice Tested at least once every 92 days in accordance with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.0.5.
- 4.2 Prior to returning a PORV Block Valve to service following maintenance or repair.
- 4.3 Local verification of PORV Block Valve position indication shall be performed each Refuel Outage.



### NOTE 5.0 through 8.0

An asterisk (*) preceding a step indicates that data or a signoff is required on the attachment identified within the step.

### 5.0 INITIAL CONDITIONS

5.1 None

### 6.0 PROCEDURE

- 6.1 Record all calibration data on Attachment I as required.
- 6.2 Perform an AS FOUND equipment lineup per Attachment II.

### NOTE 6.3, 6.4, 6.5

To prevent preconditioning, the Block Valves open and closed exercises may be performed out of sequence.

- 6.3 Stroke test XVG08000A-RC, PRZ PWR OPER RELIEF INLET ISOL VLV, as follows:
  - a. Ensure PCV-445A, PWR RELIEF, is closed.
  - b. Close MVG-8000A, RELIEF 445A ISOL, and measure the stroke time to the nearest 0.1 second, from switch actuation until the closed light is lit and the open light goes out.
  - c. Record the stroke time for XVG08000A-RC, PRZ PWR OPER RELIEF INLET ISOL VLV, on Attachment I.
  - d. Open MVG-8000A, RELIEF 445A ISOL, and measure the stroke time to the nearest 0.1 second, from switch actuation until the open light is lit and the closed light goes out.
  - e. Record the stroke time for XVG08000A-RC, PRZ PWR OPER RELIEF INLET ISOL VLV, on Attachment I.



### NOTE 6.3, 6.4, 6.5

To prevent preconditioning, the Block Valves open and closed exercises may be performed out of sequence.

- 6.4 Stroke test XVG08000B-RC, PRZ PWR OPER RELIEF INLET ISOL VLV, as follows:
  - a. Ensure PCV-444B, PWR RELIEF, is closed.
  - b. Close MVG-8000B, RELIEF 444B ISOL, and measure the stroke time to the nearest 0.1 second, from switch actuation until the closed light is lit and the open light goes out.
  - c. Record the stroke time for XVG08000B-RC, PRZ PWR OPER RELIEF INLET ISOL VLV, on Attachment I.
  - d. Open MVG-8000B, RELIEF 444B ISOL, and measure the stroke time to the nearest 0.1 second, from switch actuation until the open light is lit and the closed light goes out.
  - e. Record the stroke time for XVG08000B-RC, PRZ PWR OPER RELIEF INLET ISOL VLV, on Attachment I.

### NOTE 6.3, 6.4, 6.5

To prevent preconditioning, the Block Valves open and closed exercises may be performed out of sequence.

- 6.5 Stroke test XVG08000C-RC, PRZ PWR OPER RELIEF INLET ISOL VLV, as follows:
  - a. Ensure PCV-445B, PWR RELIEF, is closed.
  - b. Close MVG-8000C, RELIEF 445B ISOL, and measure the stroke time to the nearest 0.1 second, from switch actuation until the closed light is lit and the open light goes out.
  - c. Record the stroke time for XVG08000C-RC, PRZ PWR OPER RELIEF INLET ISOL VLV, on Attachment I.
  - d. Open MVG-8000C, RELIEF 445B ISOL, and measure the stroke time to the nearest 0.1 second, from switch actuation until the open light is lit and the closed light goes out.





### STP-127.001 REVISION 8

- e. Record the stroke time for XVG08000C-RC, PRZ PWR OPER RELIEF INLET ISOL VLV, on Attachment I.
- 6.6 Perform a RETURN AS FOUND equipment lineup per Attachment II.
- 6.7 Perform a RETURN AS FOUND equipment lineup independent verification per Attachment II.

### NOTE 6.8

- A. Local verification of valve position indication shall be performed on designated valves per Step 6.8 each Refuel Outage.
- B. Valve position indication verification shall be verified in both the open and closed positions regardless of the safety functions performed by the valve.
- 6.8 Perform local verification of valve position indication as follows:
  - a. Station a qualified valve operator at the valve.
  - b. When the valve is stroked, verify Main Control Board position indication matches local valve position.
  - c. Place a check mark in the RPI/LOCAL column on Attachment I.




### 7.0 DATA REQUIREMENTS

7.1 All required data will be entered on Attachments I and II.

### 8.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

- 8.1 Power Operated Valve Acceptance Criteria:
  - a. A valve is considered operable in accordance with Technical Specifications 4.0.5 and 4.4.4.2 when both of the following conditions are satisfied:
    - 1) The measured stroke time is less than or equal to the maximum limiting stroke time.
    - 2) The measured stroke time is greater than or equal to the minimum limiting stroke time.
    - A valve shall be immediately retested one time and documented in accordance with GTP-302 or declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specifications 4.0.5, 3.4.4, and 3.4.10 as applicable, when either of the following conditions exist:
      - The measured stroke time is greater than the maximum limiting stroke time and less than or equal to the maximum allowed stroke time.
      - 2) The measured stroke time is less than the minimum limiting stroke time and greater than or equal to the minimum allowed stroke time.
  - c. A valve shall be declared inoperable and action taken per Technical Specifications 4.0.5, 3.4.4, and 3.4.10 as applicable, when any of the following conditions exist:
    - 1) The measured stroke time is greater than the maximum allowed stroke time.
    - 2) The measured stroke time is less than the minimum allowed stroke time.
    - 3) Valve stem or disc for power operated valves fails to exhibit the required change in position.
    - 4) The valve fails to meet the acceptance criteria of Step 8.1.a after retesting in accordance with Step 8.1.b.







b.

### STP-127.001 REVISION 8

d. For local verification of valve position indication (RPI/LOCAL), Main Control Board position indication matches local valve position.

### 9.0 <u>REFERENCES</u>

- 9.1 Technical Specifications
  - 9.1.1 Section 3.4.4, RCS Relief Valves
  - 9.1.2 Section 3.4.10, RCS Structural Integrity
  - 9.1.3 Section 4.0.5, Surveillance Requirements
- 9.2 FSAR:
  - 9.2.1 Section 5.7.7, Preservice and Inservice Inspection of Class 1, 2, and 3 Components
  - 9.2.2 Section 5.5.10, Pressurizer
  - 9.2.3 Section 5.5.12, Valves
- 9.3 ASME OM Code, Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants, 1998 Edition with Addenda through 2000.
  - 9.3.1 Subsection ISTA, General Requirements
  - 9.3.2 Subsection ISTC, Inservice Testing of Valves in Light-Water Reactor Power Plants
- 9.4 Procedures:
  - 9.4.1 GTP-302, Inservice Testing of Valves Third Ten Year Interval.
  - 9.4.2 SAP-145, Containment Leakage Rate and Inservice Test Programs
  - 9.4.3 SAP-1131, Corrective Action Program
- 9.5 Drawings:
  - 9.5.1 D-302-602, Reactor Coolant System
- 9.6 1MS-94B-003, Copes-Vulcan, Inc. Instruction Manual.





### 10.0 REVISION SUMMARY

- 10.1 Section 1.0, Identified components, by tag number and description, that are tested by this procedure and testing performed. Provided statement regarding the controls associated with changes to the procedure and applicability to 50.59 safety evaluation.
- 10.2 Typical, when referring to a valve or recording data the valve's Champs tag number was referenced. When referring to valve positioning or switch manipulation the valve ID as identified at the control station was used. Also, this is consistent with the valve tag numbering in the IST Program. The renumbering is intended to establish consistency in the STPs since some STPs currently reflect this numbering format and others don't.
- 10.3 Step 4.3 and Note 6.8, Changed should to shall and deleted going into per IST Engineer.
- 10.4 Section 5.0, Included Note explaining Asterisk.
- 10.5 Steps 6.3.b, 6.4.b, 6.5.b, Deleted these steps to prevent preconditioning per the IST Engineer. Also added Note 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 to identify exercising of block valves may be performed out of sequence to prevent preconditioning.
- 10.6 Step 6.3, Changed valve tag numbers from MVG-8000A to XVG08000A-RC per revision step 10.2.
- 10.7 Step 6.4,, Changed valve tag numbers from MVG-8000B to XVG08000B-RC per revision step 10.2.
- 10.8 Step 6.5,, Changed valve tag numbers from MVG-8000C to XVG08000C-RC per revision step 10.2.
- 10.9 Note 6.8, Provided new Note regarding position indication verification for consistency with other test procedures.
- 10.10 Section 9.0, Organized References by subject and included SAP-145 and SAP-1131 as new procedure references. Also provided Code reference to reflect Third 10-Year Interval.
- 10.11 Enclosure 10.0, Deleted for consistency with other procedures.
- 10.12 Attachments 1, Provided hard numbers for reference stroke time, minimum/maximum limiting stroke time and changed valve tag numbers to reflect Champs and PV Plus. Also revised maximum limiting stroke times per the IST Engineer.





ROA.2 HEY

STP-127.001 ATTACHMENT I PAGE 1 OF 1 REVISION 8 STTS #_____

#### VALVE DATA SHEET

					X.					
COMPONENT	TEST DIRECTION	REFERENCE STROKE TIME (SEC)	MINIMUM ALLOWED STROKE TIME (SEC)	MINIMUM LIMITING STROKE TIME (SEC)	MEASURED STROKE TIME (SEC)	MAXIMUM LIMITING STROKE TIME (SEC)	MAXIMUM ALLOWED STROKE TIME (SEC)	ACCEP	ON 8.0 TANCE ERIA ET	RPI/ LOCAL (1)
								YES	NO	
XVG08000A-RC	CLOSED	9.5	N/A	7.2	9.9	11.8	15.0	in the second se		A /4
	OPEN	9.1	N/A	6.9	37	11.3	15.0	Berganar		1.12
XVG08000B-RC	CLOSED	9.3	N/A	7.0	7 7	11.6	15.0	in me		1.10
	OPEN	9.2	N/A	6.9	9.1	11.5	15.0			NID
XVG08000C-RC	CLOSED	9.5	N/A	7.2	(13,1)	11.8	15.0		V	Nje
	OPEN	9.3	N/A	7.0	KI3 V	11.6	15.0		6.	14/10

(1) RPI Verification shall be performed each Refueling Outage.

Light and sider Acceptions

1.5 . 7 84 16 6

	TEST EQUIPMENT								
TYPE	NUMBER	CALIBRATION DUE DATE	TYPE	NUMBER	CALIBRATION DUE DATE				
TBO	780	700							

* All Strate Times are measured on analytic







#### ATTACHMENT II PAGE 1 OF 1 REVISION 8 STTS #_____

## EQUIPMENT LINEUP

COMPONENT	DESCRIPTION	AS FOUND	RETURN AS FOUND	INITIALS	VERIFIERS INITIALS
PCV-445A	PWR RELIEF	closed	clus rel	1.2 1	
MVG-8000A	RELIEF 445A ISOL	CPer	OPC V		
PCV-444B	PWR RELIEF	c los ed	cluser		
MVG-8000B	RELIEF 444B ISOL	open	OPEN	R	
PCV-445B	PWR RELIEF	clused	closed	L.	
MVG-8000C	RELIEF 445B ISOL	oren	OPEN	R	

# V.C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

#### JPM NO: 09 NRC SRO A2

#### EVALUATION OF SURVEILLANCE TEST RESULTS

APPROVAL: APPROVAL DATE:

**REV NO:** 0

CANDIDATE:

EXAMINER:

SRO ONLY

THIS JPM IS NOT APPROVED



Friday, November 21, 2008

Page 1 of 6

TASK:

#### 342-026-03-02 REVIEW RESULTS OF SURVEILLANCE TESTS

TASK STANDARD:

Correctly determine that STP 205.004 does not pass the acceptance criteria.

PREFERRED	EVALUATION 1	LOCATION	PREFI	ERRED	EVALUATI	ON METHC	D
CLASS	SROOM			S	IMULATE		
REFERENCE	STP 205.	004	RHR PUMP AND	VALVE	OPERABILIT	Y TEST	
TOOLS:	STP 205.004 ar STTS	nd attached	data sheets.				
EVALUATION	I TIME	15	TIME CRITICAL	NO	10CFR55:	41b8	
TIME START:		TIME FINISH	ł:	PERFO	RMANCE TIME:		
<u>PERFORMAN</u>	CE RATING:	SAT:	UNSAT:				
EXAMINER:						, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	
				SIGN	ATURE	DATE	



READ TO OPERATOR:

WHEN I TELL YOU TO BEGIN, YOU ARE TO PERFORM THE ACTIONS AS DIRECTED IN THE INITIATING CUES. I WILL DESCRIBE THE GENERAL CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THIS TASK IS TO BE PERFORMED AND PROVIDE THE NECESSARY TOOLS WITH WHICH TO PERFORM THIS TASK. BEFORE STARTING, I WILL EXPLAIN THE INITIAL CONDITIONS, WHICH STEPS TO SIMULATE OR DISCUSS, AND PROVIDE INITIATING CUES. WHEN YOU COMPLETE THE TASK SUCCESSFULLY, THE OBJECTIVE FOR THIS JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE WILL BE SATISFIED.

SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: None

INITIAL CONDITION: TS required surveillance has been completed on "A" RHR pump.

*INITIATING CUES:* You are the Control Room Supervisor and STP 205.004, RHR PUMP AND VALVE OPERABILITY TEST, has been completed and given to you for review. Determine if STP 205.004 meets the acceptance criteria..





Friday, November 21, 2008

# JPM BRIEFING SHEET

**OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS:** 

SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: None

INITIAL CONDITION: TS required surveillance has been completed on "A" RHR pump.

*INITIATING CUES:* You are the Control Room Supervisor and STP 205.004, RHR PUMP AND VALVE OPERABILITY TEST, has been completed and given to you for review. Determine if STP 205.004 meets the acceptance criteria.



# HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU FEEL THAT YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.



Friday, November 21, 2008



#### STEPS

STEP:

1

CUES:

CR SEQ

Yes Yes

#### Review STP-205.004 Test Data.

#### STEP STANDARD:

Determine that the Test Data does not meet the acceptance criteria of STP-205.004.

Stroke time for FCV00602A-RH 8809B exceeds maximum limiting stroke time, which requires the valve to be immediately retested one time and documented in accordance with GTP-302 Attachment I, Evaluation/Corrective Action For Power Operated Valves, or declared inoperable.

A math error is introduced into the reading for RHR Pump A. The Recorded Value is 129 which IS within the acceptance criteria. However, mathematically the actual value based on discharge and inlet pressure should be 127 which falls outside the acceptable range. With pump DP outside the acceptable range. The pump should be declared inoperable in accordance with the acceptance criteria.

RHR Pump A vibration data point XPP0031A 2H (MOH) 90 degress is recorded and the value is in the ALERT Range for that vibration point. In accordance with the acceptance criteria: The frequency of testing specified shall be doubled until the cause of the deviation is determined and the conditon corrected.

SAT .

UNSAT



Friday, November 21, 2008

Examiner ends JPM at this point.

**COMMENTS:** 

¢

# JPM SETUP SHEET

JPM NO: 09 NRC SRO A

DESCRIPTION: EVALUATION OF SURVEILLANCE TEST RESULTS

IC SET:

**INSTRUCTIONS:** 

COMMENTS:





Friday, November 21, 2008

- B. The MEASURED STROKE TIME is less than the MINIMUM ALLOWED STROKE TIME.
- C. Valve stem or disc for power operated valves fails to exhibit the required change in position.
- D. The valve fails to meet the acceptance criteria of Step 8.2.1 after retesting in accordance with Step 8.2.2.
- 8.2.4 For local verification of valve position indication (RPI/LOCAL), Main Control Board position indication matches local valve position.
- 8.3 Check Valve Acceptance Criteria
  - 8.3.1 XVC08958A(B)-SI shall be considered operable in the closed direction in accordance with Technical Specification 4.0.5 by exhibiting a minimum differential pressure of seven (7) psid or a VCT level decrease of less than or equal to three percent (3%) over a ten minute interval.
    - A. If either the pressure differential requirement or VCT level requirement is not met, a Test Deficiency should be written and the cause should be investigated and corrected on a priority basis. The check valve is still considered operable.
    - B. If both criteria, pressure differential and VCT level, cannot be met, the valve shall be declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 4.0.5, 3.4.1.4.1, and 3.4.1.4.2 as applicable.
  - 8.3.2 XVC08716A(B)-RH shall be considered operable in the closed position in accordance with Technical Specification 4.0.5 by exhibiting a differential pressure of greater than or equal to 90 psid.
    - A. If the required differential pressure is not obtained, the valve shall be declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specifications 4.0.5, 3.4.1.3, 3.4.1.4.1, 3.4.1.4.2, 3.5.2, 3.5.3, 3.9.7.1 and 3.9.7.2 as required.
    - B. An evaluation shall be performed to determine the effects of the deficiency.



## STP-205.004 REVISION 6

- 8.1.3 If deviations exceed the REQUIRED ACTION RANGE, take the following actions:
  - A. The pump shall be declared inoperable and action taken per Technical Specifications 4.0.5, 3.4.1.3, 3.4.1.4.1, 3.4.1.4.2, 3.5.2, 3.5.3, 3.9.7.1, and 3.9.7.2 as applicable.
  - B. The pump will not be returned to service until the condition has been corrected and a satisfactory Inservice Test has been conducted.
  - C. The instruments involved may be recalibrated and the test rerun.
  - D. Attachment II of GTP-301, Inservice Testing of Pumps Third Ten Year Interval, will be completed and attached to the Re-test STTS.
  - E. Write a CER.
- 8.2 Power Operated Valve Acceptance Criteria
  - 8.2.1 The valve is considered operable in accordance with Technical Specification 4.0.5 when both of the following conditions are satisfied:
    - A. The MEASURED STROKE TIME is less than or equal to the MAXIMUM LIMITING STROKE TIME.
    - B. The MEASURED STROKE TIME is greater than or equal to the MINIMUM LIMITING STROKE TIME.
  - 8.2.2 A valve shall be immediately retested one time and documented in accordance with GTP-302 Attachment I, Evaluation/Corrective Action For Power Operated Valves, or declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specifications 4.0.5, 3.4.1.3, 3.4.1.4.1, 3.4.1.4.2, 3.5.2, 3.5.3, 3.9.7.1, and 3.9.7.2 as applicable, when either of the following conditions exist:
    - A. The MEASURED STROKE TIME is greater than the MAXIMUM LIMITING STROKE TIME and less than or equal to the MAXIMUM ALLOWED STROKE TIME.
    - B. The MEASURED STROKE TIME is less than the MINIMUM LIMITING STROKE TIME and greater than or equal to the MINIMUM ALLOWED STROKE TIME.
  - 8.2.3 A valve shall be declared inoperable and action taken per Technical Specifications 4.0.5, 3.4.1.3, 3.4.1.4.1, 3.4.1.4.2, 3.5.2, 3.5.3, 3.9.7.1, and 3.9.7.2 as applicable when any of the following conditions exist:
    - A. The MEASURED STROKE TIME is greater than the MAXIMUM ALLOWED STROKE TIME.









STP-205.004 REVISION 6

# <u>NOTE 6.3</u>

Valve position indication verification shall be verified in both the open and closed positions regardless of the safety functions performed by the valve.

- 6.3 Perform local verification of valve position indication of designated valves as follows:
  - 6.3.1 Station a qualified valve operator at the valve.
  - 6.3.2 When the valve is stroked, verify Main Control Board position indication reflects accurate local valve position.
  - * 6.3.3 Place a checkmark in the RPI/LOCAL column on Attachment IIIA or IIIB as applicable.

# 7.0 DATA REQUIREMENTS

7.1 All required data will be entered on all Attachments.

#### *8.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

- 8.1 Pump Acceptance Criteria
  - 8.1.1 If Test Quantities fall in the ACCEPTABLE RANGE, the pump is considered operable in accordance with Technical Specification 4.0.5, 4.5.2.f and 4.5.3.1.
  - 8.1.2 If Test Quantities fall within the ALERT RANGE, the following corrective actions will be taken:
    - A. The frequency of testing specified shall be doubled until the cause of the deviation is determined and the condition corrected. The pump is still considered operable.
    - B. The instruments involved may be recalibrated and the test rerun.
    - C. Attachment II of GTP-301, Inservice Testing of Pumps Third Ten Year Interval, will be completed and attached to the Re-test STTS.
    - D. Write a CER.



	NAC SRO AZ	STP-205.004 REVISION 6
8.1.3	If deviations exceed the REQUIRED actions:	ACTION RANGE, take the following
	A. The pump shall be declared ino Technical Specifications 4.0.5, 3 3.5.3, 3.9.7.1, and 3.9.7.2 as ap	3.4.1.3, 3.4.1.4.1, 3.4.1.4.2, 3.5.2,
	B. The pump will not be returned to been corrected and a satisfacto conducted.	
	C. The instruments involved may b	be recalibrated and the test rerun.
		rvice Testing of Pumps Third Ten and attached to the Re-test STTS.
	E. Write a CER.	
8.2 Power	Operated Valve Acceptance Criteria	
8.2.1	The valve is considered operable in a Specification 4.0.5 when both of the	
	A. The MEASURED STROKE TIM MAXIMUM LIMITING STROKE	
	B. The MEASURED STROKE TIM MINIMUM LIMITING STROKE	E is greater than or equal to the TIME.
8.2.2	A valve shall be immediately retested accordance with GTP-302 Attachmen For Power Operated Valves, <u>or</u> decla Technical Specifications 4.0.5, 3.4.1. 3.9.7.1, and 3.9.7.2 as applicable, wh exist:	nt I, Evaluation/Corrective Action ared inoperable in accordance with 3, 3.4.1.4.1, 3.4.1.4.2, 3.5.2, 3.5.3,
		E is greater than the MAXIMUM ess than or equal to the MAXIMUM
	B. The MEASURED STROKE TIM LIMITING STROKE TIME and g MINIMUM ALLOWED STROKE	reater than or equal to the
8.2.3	A valve shall be declared inoperable Specifications 4.0.5, 3.4.1.3, 3.4.1.4. and 3.9.7.2 as applicable when any c	1, 3.4.1.4.2, 3.5.2, 3.5.3, 3.9.7.1,
	A. The MEASURED STROKE TIM ALLOWED STROKE TIME.	E is greater than the MAXIMUM

NRC SRO AZ

# <u>NOTE 6.3</u>

Valve position indication verification shall be verified in both the open and closed positions regardless of the safety functions performed by the valve.

- 6.3 Perform local verification of valve position indication of designated valves as follows:
  - 6.3.1 Station a qualified valve operator at the valve.
  - 6.3.2 When the valve is stroked, verify Main Control Board position indication reflects accurate local valve position.
  - * 6.3.3 Place a checkmark in the RPI/LOCAL column on Attachment IIIA or IIIB as applicable.

# 7.0 DATA REQUIREMENTS

7.1 All required data will be entered on all Attachments.

## *8.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

- 8.1 Pump Acceptance Criteria
  - 8.1.1 If Test Quantities fall in the ACCEPTABLE RANGE, the pump is considered operable in accordance with Technical Specification 4.0.5, 4.5.2.f and 4.5.3.1.
  - 8.1.2 If Test Quantities fall within the ALERT RANGE, the following corrective actions will be taken:
    - A. The frequency of testing specified shall be doubled until the cause of the deviation is determined and the condition corrected. The pump is still considered operable.
    - B. The instruments involved may be recalibrated and the test rerun.
    - C. Attachment II of GTP-301, Inservice Testing of Pumps Third Ten Year Interval, will be completed and attached to the Re-test STTS.
    - D. Write a CER.






VC Summer N	uclear Station		WORK OR	DER STE	P	WO Step:		0813375-0
Type: STTSR3 Statu			us: <b>Ready t</b>	is: Ready to Approve				Page 1 o
Equipment Info	rmation				<u></u>	······································		
EQ ID:XPP0031	A	EQ Name	RESIDUAL HEA	T REMOVAL P	UMP A			
Safety Class: C2		Mech: sR	Ele	ect: NA	Se	ismic: S1	En	viron:*
Location: AB-374-J-	08 AB374-17	Room: AB37	74-17		Sy	stem: RH	Tra	in: A
EQ Description: PU OI	JMP & RETROFIT RIGINAL SPEC: 67				& COUPL	ING) ORIGIN	NAL PO 54	46-1893,
Detailed Work	nformation							
Procedure: STP	0205.004-XPP003	1A		Planned b	 ру:			
Instructions: RHF	A PUMP & VALV	E OPERAB	ILITY TEST	. <u>L</u>				
Impact Section	······································							
	EOOS		This activity	impacts EO	OS risk.			
- 1977- 2 ¹⁷ C 5	Pre-Job B	brief	This activity	requires a F	Pre-Job Bri	ef.		
 	Reactivity Man	agement	This activity	impacts Rea	activity Ma	nagement		
	S/RWP -0001							
ر به د ب بر به د ب	Technical Spec	Specifications This activity impacts Technical Specifications.						
Maintenance R	ule Section							
	tenance Rule	MRT - WO	ORK NORMAL	WORK HO	URS			· · · ·
Lockout-Tagou	t Section							
LOTO Required: N		jout ID:		Tagout I	Name:			
Scheduling Sec	tion							
Priority: 3-Scheo			476404714			Freq: EVER	RY 84 DAY	′S
Schedule Start Da			176AOAZM ate: 12/15/2	2008		End Date:	01/05/200	9
Classification: Rep					2 PM's			·····
Outage Required:								
Trades Section								
Trade	Name		Crew		Min	Norkers		Duration
	UNIT		ОТ			2		3.00
								-
TEST Completion Sec	tion						UNLS.	
TEST Completion Sec Completed By: ,	Ra	ð		Date: 0	10300	Actual H		3.00
TEST Completion Sec	Ra	e 			10300			3,00
TEST Completion Sec Completed By: ,	Ra	<b>8</b>			1030			3,00

	WO Step: 0813375-001	
Page 1 of 2	12/1/2008 11:18	

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VC Summer Nucle	ear Station	WORK	ORDER STEP	WO Step:	0813375-00
Type: STTSR3		Status: Read	ly to Approve		Page 2 of
Approval Route Sli	0	Comme	ent	Reference	Date
DAVID STONE					11/03/08
Test Participant Se	ection				
Badge ID		In	volvement		Date
ļ					
Test Deficiency Ser	ction		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	۵٬۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ - ۲۰۰۰ -	
Test Deficiency Descri	otion:				
Action Taken:	<del></del>				
Responsible Superviso	r/Date:		Shift Supervisor/I	Date:	<u></u>
Test Failure:	Yes/No		Test Spec Failure	e: Yes/No	
R&R #:		CR #:		W.O. #:	
Post Test Reviews					
Test Performer	Gru _	Rele	2	1010.	309
S/S	S/U				<u></u>
Responsible Sup	S/U				
	S/U			/	
	S/U				
	S/U			//	
Completed By:			History Date:	Time:	

SKC AZ KEV







HEY

STP-205.004 ATTACHMENT IA PAGE 1 OF 1 REVISION 6 STTS#_09/3375-00/ CHANGE D

# TRAIN A FIELD STANDARD INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL

XPP0031A, RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP A

INSTALLATION LOCATION	REQUIRED RANGE	REFERENCE OR EXPECTED READING	FS NUMBER	CAL DUE DATE	AS FOUND	REQUIRED POSITION	POSITIONERS INITIALS	VERIFIERS INITIALS
IPT00600A-TC-RH Pd AB-374-J-08	0 - 300 PSIG (1)	190	5231	011809	closed CAPPed	CLOSED/ CAPPED	R	To
IPI00601A-TC-RH Pi AB-374-J-08	0 - 100 PSIG (1)	58	5234	021909	Closed CApped	CLOSED/ CAPPED	R	2
IPT00600B-TC-RH Pd (RHR PUMP B) AB-374-K-08	0 - 300 PSIG (1)	190	5387	031209	closed CAPPed	CLOSED/ CAPPED	R	Ro

NOTE 1: If gage ranges are not available, a gage whose full scale range is not greater than 3 times the reference reading may be substituted.

#### TEST EQUIPMENT

FS NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	CAL DUE DATE
5079	VIBRATION MONITOR	022209
4940	VIBRATION PROBE	031409

#### ACCEPTABLE INSTRUMENT ACCURACY

QUANTITY	PERCENT
PRESSURE	± 0.5
FLOW RATE	± 2
SPEED	± 2
VIBRATION	± 5
DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE	± 0.5





5RO AZ KEN STP-205.004 ATTACHMENT IIA PAGE 1 OF 3 REVISION 6 STTS#<u>08/13 375</u> - 00/ CHANGE D

# TRAIN A COMPONENT LINEUP (MCB)

	COMPONENT NUMBER	COMPONENT DESCRIPTION	AS FOUND	TEST POSITION	POSITIONERS INITIALS	REQUIRED POSITION	POSITIONERS INITIALS	VERIFIERS INITIALS
	MVG-8701A	RCS LP A TO PUMP A	closed off	N/A		CLOSED/ OFF	R	Re
	MVG-8702A	RCS LP A TO PUMP A	closed Off	N/A		CLOSED/ OFF	K	Z
	MVG-8812A	RHR SUMP A TO RHR PP A	closed	CLOSED	R	CLOSED	R	20
	MVG-8809A	RWST TO RHR PP A	OPEN	N/A		OPEN	R	2
	MVB-9503A	CC TO RHR HX A	open	N/A		OPEN	R	20
C01 ≯ C02 <b>→</b>	MVG-8888A	RHR LP A TO COLD LEGS	open	N/A		OPEN	K	R
C02 →	MVG-8887A	RHR LP A TO HOT LEGS	OPEN	N/A		OPEN	R	30
	HCV-603A	A OUTLET	OPEN	N/A		OPEN	R	20
	FCV-605A	A BYP	closed	<b>N/A</b>		CLOSED	R	æ
	MVG-8706A	RHR LP A TO CHG PP	closed	CLOSED	R	CLOSED	R	B
C02 >	MVG-8887B	RHR LP B TO HOT LEGS	OPEN	N/A		OPEN	R	1
C02 ≯	MVG-8889	RHR LP A & B TO HOT LEGS	Closed	CLOSED	R	CLOSED	R	k
	MVG-602A	PUMP A MINI FLOW	ALTO	OPEN	$\boldsymbol{\mathcal{K}}$	AUTO/ OPEN	K	2
	SWITCH	TRAIN A PWR LCKOUT	off	OFF	$\boldsymbol{\mathcal{L}}$	OFF	R	B
	SWITCH	RX COOL SYS MU MODE SELECT	Acto	N/A		AUTO	R	12

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KEY

STP-205.004 ATTACHMENT IIA PAGE 2 OF 3 REVISION 6 STTS#<u>08/3375</u>-00/ CHANGE D



COMPONENT NUMBER	COMPONENT DESCRIPTION	AS FOUND	TEST POSITION	POSITIONERS INITIALS	REQUIRED POSITION	POSITIONERS INITIALS	VERIFIERS INITIALS
MVB-9503B	CC TO RHR HX B	closed	N/A		CLOSED	R	B
FCV-605B	В ВҮР	Clused	N/A		CLOSED	R	R
SWITCH	XPP-0031A PUMP A	After STOP	N/A		AFTER STOP	R	Ro
SWITCH	XPP-0031B PUMP B	After STOP	N/A		AFTER STOP	R	Ro

Step 5.9.1 The required Initial Conditions for this test have been satisfied.

Step 5.9.2 The Precautions listed in Section 2.0 have been reviewed with the necessary personnel involved in the performance of this test.

1010309 Initials Date

1010309 Initials Date





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STP-205.004 ATTACHMENT IIA PAGE 3 OF 3 REVISION 6 STTS#<u>08/3 375</u>-00/ CHANGE D

COMPONENT NUMBER	COMPONENT DESCRIPTION	AS FOUND	TEST POSITION	POSITIONERS INITIALS	REQUIRED POSITION	POSITIONERS INITIALS	VERIFIERS INITIALS
XMC1DA2Y 18AD AB-412-L-08	RHR PP A MINIFLOW FCV0602A XVT0602A-RH	closed	OPEN	R	CLOSED	R	20
XVT08725A-RH AB-374-J-08	RH PUMP A DISCHARGE SAMPLE ISOL VALVE	closed	N/A		CLOSED (LVP)	28882	B
XVA18700-RH AB-374-J-08	RH PUMP A DISCHARGE SAMPLE VALVE	Closed	N/A		CLOSED	R	Po
XVT08725B-RH AB-374-K-08	RH PUMP B DISCHARGE SAMPLE ISOL VALVE	closed	N/A		CLOSED (LVP)	28882	Ro
XVA18701-RH AB-374-K-08	RH PUMP B DISCHARGE SAMPLE VALVE	closed	N/A		CLOSED	R	Ro

TRAIN A COMPONENT LINEUP

Justification for Discrepancies:_

Shift Supervisor Date

010309







SRE AZ KEY

STP-205.004 ATTACHMENT IIIA PAGE 1 OF 1 REVISION 6 STTS#_08/3375-00/

# TRAIN A VALVE DATA SHEET

COMPONENT	TEST DIRECTION	REFERENCE STROKE TIME ( SEC )	MINIMUM ALLOWED STROKE TIME ( SEC )	MINIMUM LIMITING STROKE TIME ( SEC )	MEASURED STROKE TIME ( SEC )	MAXIMUM LIMITING STROKE TIME ( SEC )	MAXIMUM ALLOWED STROKE TIME ( SEC )	ACCEP ⁻ SEC 8.0		RPI / LOCAL (1)
								YES	NO	
XVG08706A-RH	OPEN	8.6	N/A	6.5	9.0	10.7	15.0	$\checkmark$		NA
FCV00602A-RH	OPEN	5.2	N/A	3.9	(8.5)	6.5	10.0	V	)	NA
	CLOSED	5.2	N/A	3.9	5.4	6.5	10.0	$\overline{\mathcal{V}}$		NA
XVG08809A-SI	CLOSED	13.7	N/A	11.7	13.8	15.7	20.0	$\vee$	/	NA

NOTE 1: Perform RPI Verification going into each Refuel Outage.

COMPONENT	TRAVEL VERIFICATION	DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE (DOWNSTREAM - UPSTREAM = dP)			ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA			
	(CLOSED)	DOWNSTREAM UPSTREAM dP		ACCEPTABLE	TABLE SECT 8.0 MET			
					dP	YES	NO	
XVC08716A-RH	PRESSURE	178.36	44.38	133.98	<u>≥</u> 90			

IPT00600A Cal. Due Date 03 04 09

IPT00600B Cal. Due Date 05 23 09

SRO AZ KFY

STP-205.004 ATTACHMENT IVA PAGE 1 OF 1 **REVISION 6** STTS#0813375-001

# TRAIN A VALVE DATA SHEET FOR XVC08958A-SI CLOSURE

RHR PP A static inlet pressure - Elevation Correction = DOWNSTREAM PRESSURE for XVC08958A-SI

<u>66.94</u> psig - 10 psig = <u>56.94</u> psig DOWNSTREAM PRESSURE for XVC08958A-SI

VCT LEVEL CHANGE

	TIME	VCT LEVEL%	PLANT INSTR	UMENTATION	
			ID NUMBER	CAL DUE	
START	0150	47	ILT00115	042509	
STOP	0200	47		042001	
				Ô	

VCT LEVEL Delta% = VCT START LEVEL - VCT STOP LEVEL = _____ Delta%



COMPONENT NUMBER	DOWNSTREAM PRESSURE (PSIG)	UPSTREAM PRESSURE (PSIG) (1)	DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE (PSID)	ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA		
				ACCEPTABLE	SECT 8	.0 MET
					YES	NO
XVC08958A-SI	56.94	28.5	28.44	dP <u>&gt; 7</u> Delta % <u>&lt;</u> 3%	V	

NOTE 1:Pressure is calculated with the RWST level at 100% which is the most limiting condition.







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STP-205.004 ATTACHMENT VA PAGE 1 OF 1 REVISION 6 STTS#<u>08/3375</u>-00/

# XPP0031A, Residual Heat Removal Pump Group A Test Data Sheet

		D	ATA		RANGES OF IST QUAN	ITITIES		INSTALLE		
	TEST QUANTITY	MEASURED	REFERENCE	ACCEPTABLE	ALERT RANGE	REQUIREI RAN		ID NUMBER	CAL DUE DATE	
						LOW	HIGH			
	Q - FLOW (GPM)	1020	1010-1030					IF100602A	051009	Chg A
	Pd - PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE (PSIG)	175	175.0							
n a stand an de Ara	Pi - PUMP INLET PRESSURE (PSIG)	48	42.0							
the period and the second s	dP - DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE (PSID)	(129)	133.0	128.0 - ≤ 146.3		<128	>146.3			
	VIBRATION (IN/SEC)		1997) 1997 - Maria Mariana 1997 - Maria Maria Maria Maria Maria Maria Maria 1997 - Maria Maria Maria Maria Maria Maria Maria M							1
i	XPP0031A 1V (MOV) (0 degrees)	.095	0.090	≤ 0.216	> 0.216 to ≤ 0.518		> 0.518			Chg C
	XPP0031A 2H (MOH) (90 degrees)	.379	0.108	≤ 0.259	> 0.259 to ≤ 0.622		> 0.622			0
	XPP0031A 3A (MOA)	.066	0.046	≤ 0.110	> 0.110 to ≤ 0.264		> 0.264			
	XPP0031A 7V (PIV)	.042	0.038	≤ 0.091	> 0.091 to ≤ 0.218		> 0.218			
	XPP0031A 8H (PIH)	.048	0.045	≤ 0.108	> 0.108 to ≤ 0.259		> 0.259			
	XPP0031A 9A (PIA)	.037	0.055	≤ 0.132	> 0.132 to ≤ 0.316		> 0.316		:	

All Section 8.0 Acceptance Criteria for this test has been satisfactorily met.

10/0309 Date

Test Performer

# <u>NOTE 6.3</u>

Valve position indication verification shall be verified in both the open and closed positions regardless of the safety functions performed by the valve.

- 6.3 Perform local verification of valve position indication of designated valves as follows:
  - 6.3.1 Station a qualified valve operator at the valve.
  - 6.3.2 When the valve is stroked, verify Main Control Board position indication reflects accurate local valve position.
  - * 6.3.3 Place a checkmark in the RPI/LOCAL column on Attachment IIIA or IIIB as applicable.

# 7.0 DATA REQUIREMENTS

7.1 All required data will be entered on all Attachments.

# *8.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

- 8.1 Pump Acceptance Criteria
  - 8.1.1 If Test Quantities fall in the ACCEPTABLE RANGE, the pump is considered operable in accordance with Technical Specification 4.0.5, 4.5.2.f and 4.5.3.1.
  - 8.1.2 If Test Quantities fall within the ALERT RANGE, the following corrective actions will be taken:
    - A. The frequency of testing specified shall be doubled until the cause of the deviation is determined and the condition corrected. The pump is still considered operable.
    - B. The instruments involved may be recalibrated and the test rerun.
    - C. Attachment II of GTP-301, Inservice Testing of Pumps Third Ten Year Interval, will be completed and attached to the Re-test STTS.
    - D. Write a CER.



#### STP-205.004 REVISION 6

- 8.1.3 If deviations exceed the REQUIRED ACTION RANGE, take the following actions:
  - A. The pump shall be declared inoperable and action taken per Technical Specifications 4.0.5, 3.4.1.3, 3.4.1.4.1, 3.4.1.4.2, 3.5.2, 3.5.3, 3.9.7.1, and 3.9.7.2 as applicable.
  - B. The pump will not be returned to service until the condition has been corrected and a satisfactory Inservice Test has been conducted.
  - C. The instruments involved may be recalibrated and the test rerun.
  - D. Attachment II of GTP-301, Inservice Testing of Pumps Third Ten Year Interval, will be completed and attached to the Re-test STTS.
  - E. Write a CER.
- 8.2 Power Operated Valve Acceptance Criteria
  - 8.2.1 The valve is considered operable in accordance with Technical Specification 4.0.5 when both of the following conditions are satisfied:
    - A. The MEASURED STROKE TIME is less than or equal to the MAXIMUM LIMITING STROKE TIME.
    - B. The MEASURED STROKE TIME is greater than or equal to the MINIMUM LIMITING STROKE TIME.
  - 8.2.2 A valve shall be immediately retested one time and documented in accordance with GTP-302 Attachment I, Evaluation/Corrective Action For Power Operated Valves, or declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specifications 4.0.5, 3.4.1.3, 3.4.1.4.1, 3.4.1.4.2, 3.5.2, 3.5.3, 3.9.7.1, and 3.9.7.2 as applicable, when either of the following conditions exist:
    - A. The MEASURED STROKE TIME is greater than the MAXIMUM LIMITING STROKE TIME and less than or equal to the MAXIMUM ALLOWED STROKE TIME.
    - B. The MEASURED STROKE TIME is less than the MINIMUM LIMITING STROKE TIME and greater than or equal to the MINIMUM ALLOWED STROKE TIME.
  - 8.2.3 A valve shall be declared inoperable and action taken per Technical Specifications 4.0.5, 3.4.1.3, 3.4.1.4.1, 3.4.1.4.2, 3.5.2, 3.5.3, 3.9.7.1, and 3.9.7.2 as applicable when any of the following conditions exist:
    - A. The MEASURED STROKE TIME is greater than the MAXIMUM ALLOWED STROKE TIME.

- B. The MEASURED STROKE TIME is less than the MINIMUM ALLOWED STROKE TIME.
- C. Valve stem or disc for power operated valves fails to exhibit the required change in position.
- D. The valve fails to meet the acceptance criteria of Step 8.2.1 after retesting in accordance with Step 8.2.2.
- 8.2.4 For local verification of valve position indication (RPI/LOCAL), Main Control Board position indication matches local valve position.
- 8.3 Check Valve Acceptance Criteria
  - 8.3.1 XVC08958A(B)-SI shall be considered operable in the closed direction in accordance with Technical Specification 4.0.5 by exhibiting a minimum differential pressure of seven (7) psid or a VCT level decrease of less than or equal to three percent (3%) over a ten minute interval.
    - A. If either the pressure differential requirement or VCT level requirement is not met, a Test Deficiency should be written and the cause should be investigated and corrected on a priority basis. The check valve is still considered operable.
    - B. If both criteria, pressure differential and VCT level, cannot be met, the valve shall be declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 4.0.5, 3.4.1.4.1, and 3.4.1.4.2 as applicable.
  - 8.3.2 XVC08716A(B)-RH shall be considered operable in the closed position in accordance with Technical Specification 4.0.5 by exhibiting a differential pressure of greater than or equal to 90 psid.
    - A. If the required differential pressure is not obtained, the valve shall be declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specifications 4.0.5, 3.4.1.3, 3.4.1.4.1, 3.4.1.4.2, 3.5.2, 3.5.3, 3.9.7.1 and 3.9.7.2 as required.
    - B. An evaluation shall be performed to determine the effects of the deficiency.

VC Summer N	uclear station		WORK ORE			WO Step:		0813375-0
Type: STTSR3		Stat	us: Ready to	o Approv	9			Page 1 c
Equipment Info								
EQ ID:XPP0031			RESIDUAL HEAT					
Safety Class: c2		Mech: sR	Ele	ct: NA		eismic: S1		nviron:*
Location: AB-374-J-		Room: AB3				stem: RH	L_	rain: A
EQ Description: PU OF	JMP & RETROFIT RIGINAL SPEC: 67				& COUPL	ING) ORIGII	NAL PO	546-1893,
Detailed Work I	nformation							
Procedure: STP	0205.004-XPP003	1A		Planned b	y:			
Instructions: RHR	A PUMP & VALV	EOPERAE	BILITY TEST					
Impact Section								
H.D.CM	EOOS		This activity in	mpacts EO	OS risk.			
	Pre-Job B	rief	This activity r	equires a P	re-Job Bri	ef.		
$\begin{array}{c} 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 2 \\ 2 \\ 2 \\ 2 \\ 2 \\ 2 \\ 2 \\$	Reactivity Mana	This activity impacts Reactivity Management						
Sever	S/RWP		-0001		·			
TC	Technical Spec	fications	This activity in	mpacts Tec	hnical Spe	ecifications.		
Maintenance R	ule Section						······	
MRT Main	tenance Rule	MRT - WO	ORK NORMAL	WORK HO	URS			
Lockout-Tagou	t Section							
LOTO Required: N		out ID:		Tagout N	lame:			
Scheduling Sec	tion							
Priority: 3- Sched	lule at next availab veek within 12 wee					Freq: EVEF	Y 84 D	AYS
Schedule Start Da		Due [	176AOAZM Date: 12/15/20	າດຄ		End Date:	01/05/20	09
Classification: Rep		L			2 PM's			
Outage Required:								
Trades Section								
	Name	l	Crew		Min	Workers		Duration
TEST			OT			2		3.00
Completion Sec				ID-44		A		
Completed By: ,	Ka	2		Date: O	1030	Actual H	ours:	3.00
Completion Remar	KS:							

	WO Step: 0813375-001		
Page 1 of 2	12/1/2008 11:18		

VC Summer Nucle	ar Station	WORK OR	DER STEP	WO Step:	0813375-00
Type: STTSR3		Status: Ready t	o Approve		Page 2 of 2
Approval Route Slip	)	Comment		Reference	Date
DAVID STONE					11/03/08
Test Participant Se	ction				
Badge ID		Involv	ement		Date
	, <u>, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , </u>	-,			
Test Deficiency Sec	ction				
Test Deficiency Descrip	otion:				
Action Taken:					
Responsible Supervisor	r/Date:		Shift Supervisor/Da	nte:	
Test Failure:	Yes/No		Test Spec Failure:	Yes/No	
R&R #:		CR #:		W.O. #:	
Post Test Reviews					
Test Performer	Gru _	Refe		1010	309
S/S	S/U	والمحافظ المحافظ المحافظ والمحافر والمحرور والمحرور والمحافظ والمحافظ والمحافظ والمحافظ والمحافظ والمحافظ والمح		1	
Responsible Sup	S/U				
	S/U				
	S/U			/	1999-1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1997 - 1
	S/U			/	
Completed By:			History Date:	Time:	

	WO Step: 0813375-001	
Page 2 of 2	12/1/2008 11:18	「翻翻翻翻翻



STP-205.004 ATTACHMENT IA PAGE 1 OF 1 REVISION 6 STTS#<u>09/3</u>375-00/ CHANGE D

# TRAIN A FIELD STANDARD INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL

XPP0031A, RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP A

INSTALLATION LOCATION	REQUIRED RANGE	REFERENCE OR EXPECTED READING	FS NUMBER	CAL DUE DATE	AS FOUND	REQUIRED POSITION	POSITIONERS INITIALS	VERIFIERS INITIALS
IPT00600A-TC-RH Pd AB-374-J-08	0 - 300 PSIG (1)	190	5231	011809	closed CAPPed	CLOSED/ CAPPED	R	To
IPI00601A-TC-RH Pi AB-374-J-08	0 - 100 PSIG (1)	58	5234	021909	closed CApped	CLOSED/ CAPPED	R	2
IPT00600B-TC-RH Pd (RHR PUMP B) AB-374-K-08	0 - 300 PSIG (1)	190	5387	031209	closed CAPPed	CLOSED/ CAPPED	R	R


NOTE 1: If gage ranges are not available, a gage whose full scale range is not greater than 3 times the reference reading may be substituted.

#### TEST EQUIPMENT

	ويستعدين ويتعار والمترافعة المستافية الأستان والمتنا المستاب والمتابع والمتعار والمتعار والمتعاد والمتعاد	والمتقرب والمتكافية المستحد المكافية والمتقار المكافية والمتقار المتقار والمتقار والمتقار والمتعاد المتحد والمت
FS NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	CAL DUE DATE
5079	VIBRATION MONITOR	022209
4940	VIBRATION PROBE	031409

#### ACCEPTABLE INSTRUMENT ACCURACY

QUANTITY	PERCENT
PRESSURE	± 0.5
FLOW RATE	± 2
SPEED	± 2
VIBRATION	± 5
DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE	± 0.5



# TRAIN A COMPONENT LINEUP (MCB)

	COMPONENT NUMBER	COMPONENT DESCRIPTION	AS FOUND	TEST POSITION	POSITIONERS INITIALS	REQUIRED	POSITIONERS	VERIFIERS
Ī	MVG-8701A	RCS LP A TO PUMP A	closed off	N/A		CLOSED/ OFF	R	To
	MVG-8702A	RCS LP A TO PUMP A	closed	N/A		CLOSED/ OFF	R	R
	MVG-8812A	RHR SUMP A TO RHR PP A	closed	CLOSED	R	CLOSED	R	20
	MVG-8809A	RWST TO RHR PP A	open	N/A		OPEN	R	2
	MVB-9503A	CC TO RHR HX A	open	N/A		OPEN	R	20
01 ≯ 02 ≯	MVG-8888A	RHR LP A TO COLD LEGS	open	N/A		OPEN	K	R
D2 >	MVG-8887A	RHR LP A TO HOT LEGS	OPEN	N/A		OPEN	R	20
	HCV-603A	A OUTLET	OPEN	N/A		OPEN	R	20
ſ	FCV-605A	A BYP	closed	N/A	Level J	CLOSED	R	æ
Ī	MVG-8706A	RHR LP A TO CHG PP	closed	CLOSED	R	CLOSED	R	To
)2 ≯	MVG-8887B	RHR LP B TO HOT LEGS	OPEN	N/A		OPEN	R	R
02 ≯	MVG-8889	RHR LP A & B TO HOT LEGS	closed	CLOSED	R	CLOSED	R	r
	MVG-602A	PUMP A MINI FLOW	AUTO	OPEN	R	AUTO/ OPEN	R	2
Ī	SWITCH	TRAIN A PWR LCKOUT	off	OFF	R	OFF	R	8
	SWITCH	RX COOL SYS MU MODE SELECT	Auto	N/A		AUTO	R	12

STP-205.004 ATTACHMENT IIA PAGE 2 OF 3 REVISION 6 STTS#<u>08/3375</u>-00/ CHANGE D

# TRAIN A COMPONENT LINEUP (MCB)

COMPONENT NUMBER	COMPONENT DESCRIPTION	AS FOUND	TEST POSITION	POSITIONERS INITIALS	REQUIRED POSITION	POSITIONERS INITIALS	VERIFIERS INITIALS
MVB-9503B	CC TO RHR HX B	closed	N/A		CLOSED	R	R
FCV-605B	B BYP	Clused	N/A		CLOSED	R	R
SWITCH	XPP-0031A PUMP A	After STOP	N/A		AFTER STOP	R	Ro
SWITCH	XPP-0031B PUMP B	AFTER STOP	N/A	2.4	AFTER STOP	R	20

Step 5.9.1 The required Initial Conditions for this test have been satisfied.

Step 5.9.2 The Precautions listed in Section 2.0 have been reviewed with the necessary personnel involved in the performance of this test.

010309 Date Initials

1010309 Initials Date

STP-205.004 ATTACHMENT IIA PAGE 3 OF 3 REVISION 6 STTS#<u>08/3 375</u>-00/ CHANGE D

#### POSITIONERS REQUIRED POSITIONERS VERIFIERS COMPONENT AS FOUND TEST COMPONENT DESCRIPTION POSITION INITIALS NUMBER POSITION INITIALS INITIALS RHR PP A MINIFLOW FCV0602A XMC1DA2Y 18AD OPEN Z CLOSED closed AB-412-L-08 XVT0602A-RH XVT08725A-RH RH PUMP A DISCHARGE SAMPLE N/A CLOSED closed To AB-374-J-08 ISOL VALVE 28882 (LVP) 20 RH PUMP A DISCHARGE SAMPLE N/A XVA18700-RH R Closed CLOSED AB-374-J-08 VALVE XVT08725B-RH **RH PUMP B DISCHARGE SAMPLE** N/A CLOSED closed 28882 AB-374-K-08 ISOL VALVE (LVP) 40 RH PUMP B DISCHARGE SAMPLE XVA18701-RH N/A R closed CLOSED AB-374-K-08 VALVE

010309

TRAIN A COMPONENT LINEUP

Justification for Discrepancies:

Shift Supervisor Date



#### STP-205.004 ATTACHMENT IIIA PAGE 1 OF 1 REVISION 6 STTS#<u>08/3375</u>-00/

# TRAIN A VALVE DATA SHEET

COMPONENT	TEST DIRECTION	REFERENCE STROKE TIME ( SEC )	MINIMUM ALLOWED STROKE TIME ( SEC )	MINIMUM LIMITING STROKE TIME ( SEC )	MEASURED STROKE TIME ( SEC )	MAXIMUM LIMITING STROKE TIME ( SEC )	MAXIMUM ALLOWED STROKE TIME ( SEC )	ACCEP SEC 8.0		RPI / LOCAL (1)
								YES	NO	
XVG08706A-RH	OPEN	8.6	N/A	6.5	9.0	10.7	15.0	$\checkmark$		MA
FCV00602A-RH	OPEN	5.2	N/A	3.9	8.5	6.5	10.0	$\checkmark$		NA
	CLOSED	5.2	N/A	3.9	5.4	6.5	10.0	arbornom arbornom		NA
XVG08809A-SI	CLOSED	13.7	N/A	11.7	13.8	15.7	20.0	V	,	NA

NOTE 1: Perform RPI Verification going into each Refuel Outage.

COMPONENT	TRAVEL VERIFICATION		DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE (DOWNSTREAM - UPSTREAM = dP)		ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA			
	(CLOSED)	DOWNSTREAM UPSTREAM		dP	ACCEPTABLE	SECT 8.0 MET		
				dP	YES	NO		
XVC08716A-RH	PRESSURE	178.36	8.36 44.38 133.4		<u>≥</u> 90			

IPT00600A Cal. Due Date <u>03 04 09</u>

IPT00600B Cal. Due Date ______ 0 5 23 09____

STP-205.004 ATTACHMENT IVA PAGE 1 OF 1 REVISION 6 STTS#<u>08/3375</u>-00/

## TRAIN A VALVE DATA SHEET FOR XVC08958A-SI CLOSURE

RHR PP A static inlet pressure - Elevation Correction = DOWNSTREAM PRESSURE for XVC08958A-SI

<u>66.94</u> psig - 10 psig = <u>56.94</u> psig DOWNSTREAM PRESSURE for XVC08958A-SI

VCT LEVEL CHANGE

	TIME	VCT LEVEL%	PLANT INSTRUMENTATIO							
			ID NUMBER CAL DU							
START	0150	47	ILT00115 04250							
STOP	0200	47		04,204						
VCT LEVEL Delta% = VCT START LEVEL - VCT STOP LEVEL =Ô Delta%										

COMPONENT NUMBER	DOWNSTREAM PRESSURE (PSIG)	UPSTREAM PRESSURE (PSIG) (1)	DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE (PSID)	ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA		RIA
				ACCEPTABLE SECT 8.0 MET		.0 MET
					YES	NO
XVC08958A-SI	56.94	28.5	28,44	dP <u>&gt;</u> .7 Delta % <u>&lt;</u> .3%	V	

NOTE 1: Pressure is calculated with the RWST level at 100% which is the most limiting condition.



STP-205.004 ATTACHMENT VA PAGE 1 OF 1 REVISION 6 STTS#_08/3375~-00/

# XPP0031A, Residual Heat Removal Pump Group A Test Data Sheet

	DATA			RANGES OF IST QUA		INSTALLED PLANT INSTRUMENT		
TEST QUANTITY	MEASURED REFE	REFERENCE	ACCEPTABLE	ALERT RANGE	REQUIRED ACTION RANGE		ID NUMBER	CAL DUE DATE
						LOW	HIGH	
Q - FLOW (GPM)	1020	1010-1030				1	IF100602A	051009
Pd - PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE (PSIG)	175	175.0	1 SEAL		-			
Pi - PUMP INLET PRESSURE (PSIG)	48	42.0						
dP - DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE (PSID)	129	133.0	128.0 - ≤ 146.3		<128	>146.3		
VIBRATION (IN/SEC)								
XPP0031A 1V (MOV) (0 degrees)	.095	0.090	≤ 0.216	> 0.216 to ≤ 0.518		> 0.518		
XPP0031A 2H (MOH) (90 degrees)	.379	0.108	≤ 0.259	> 0.259 to ≤ 0.622		> 0.622		
XPP0031A 3A (MOA)	.066	0.046	≤ 0.110	> 0.110 to ≤ 0.264		> 0.264		
XPP0031A 7V (PIV)	.042	0.038	≤ 0.091	> 0.091 to ≤ 0.218		> 0.218	1	9
XPP0031A 8H (PIH)	.048	0.045	≤ 0.108	> 0.108 to ≤ 0.259		> 0.259	a cont	
XPP0031A 9A (PIA)	.037	0.055	≤ 0.132	> 0.132 to ≤ 0.316		> 0.316		

All Section 8.0 Acceptance Criteria for this test has been satisfactorily met.

10/0309 Date **Test Performer** 



# *JPM NO:* 09 RO/SRO A3

DETERMINE STAY TIME FOR A JOB AT RHR HEAT EXCHANGER 'A'

APPROVAL: APPROVAL DATE:

REV NO: 0

CANDIDATE:

EXAMINER:

THIS JPM IS NOT APPROVED



Tuesday, December 02, 2008

#### TASK:

#### 343-029-03-03 Assess exposure limits of personnel for assigned duties

#### TASK STANDARD:

Based upon a 25 mrem accumulated dose alarm on the Electronic Dosimeter from RWP 08-00013, and a 240 mrem per hour dose rate as determined from Survey Map Q802 for AB 12-06 RHR HEAT EXCHANGER A, applicant will be allowed to work for a Maximum of 6.25 minutes before receiving an accumulated dose alarm on his ED. Acceptable Stay Time Calculation can range from 6 to 6.25 minutes.

PREFERRED EVALUATION LOCATION

#### **PREFERRED EVALUATION METHOD**

CLASS	ROOM		PERFORM					
REFERENCES	S: HPP-0403		RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS FOR NUCLEAR WORK / REVISION 10					
	HPP-0151		USE OF THE RADIATION WORK PERMIT AND STAN RADIATION WORK PERMIT, REVISION 8					
HPP-153			ADMINISTRATIVE	EXPOS	URE LIMITS	5		
TOOLS:	SURVEY MAPS RWPs							
EVALUATION	TIME	10	TIME CRITICAL	NO	10CFR55:	55.45(a)10		
TIME START:		TIME FINISH:	•••	PERFOR	MANCE TIME:			
PERFORMAN	CE RATING:	SAT:	UNSAT:					
EXAMINER:						1		
				SIGNA	TURE	DATE		



## **INSTRUCTIONS TO OPERATOR**

## READ TO OPERATOR:

WHEN I TELL YOU TO BEGIN, YOU ARE TO PERFORM THE ACTIONS AS DIRECTED IN THE INITIATING CUES. I WILL DESCRIBE THE GENERAL CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THIS TASK IS TO BE PERFORMED AND PROVIDE THE NECESSARY TOOLS WITH WHICH TO PERFORM THIS TASK. BEFORE STARTING, I WILL EXPLAIN THE INITIAL CONDITIONS, WHICH STEPS TO SIMULATE OR DISCUSS, AND PROVIDE INITIATING CUES. WHEN YOU COMPLETE THE TASK SUCCESSFULLY, THE OBJECTIVE FOR THIS JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE WILL BE SATISFIED.

SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: NONE

- *INITIAL CONDITION:* The plant is in Mode 1. A-1 Maintenance Week
- INITIATING CUES: You have been directed to Danger Tag XVT08718A-RH HIGH ROOT TO IFT0605A & IFS0602A, AND XVT08719A-RH LOW ROOT TO IFT0605A & IFS0602A in RHR HX room 'A'. Using the Surveys, Radiation Work Permits (RWPs), and assuming all exposure is accumulated at the highest On Contact Radiation Exposure rate for the work to be performed, determine the maximum allowable stay time for the work to be performed prior to you Electronic Dosimeter alarming. Show all calculations.

HAND JPM BRIEFING SHEET TO OPERATOR AT THIS TIME!



Tuesday, December 02, 2008

## JPM BRIEFING SHEET

## **OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS:**

SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: NONE

- *INITIAL CONDITION:* The plant is in Mode 1. A-1 Maintenance Week
- INITIATING CUES: You have been directed to Danger Tag XVT08718A-RH HIGH ROOT TO IFT0605A & IFS0602A, AND XVT08719A-RH LOW ROOT TO IFT0605A & IFS0602A in RHR HX room 'A'. Using the Surveys, Radiation Work Permits (RWPs), and assuming all exposure is accumulated at the highest On Contact Radiation Exposure rate for the work to be performed, determine the maximum allowable stay time for the work to be performed prior to you Electronic Dosimeter alarming. Show all calculations.



# HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU FEEL THAT YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.



Tuesday, December 02, 2008

**STEPS** 

	luator	Note: be performed in any order.		
The ever		o "margin for error" built into the calculation value	s because all numbers will come out	
CR SE	EQ		STEP STANDARD:	
Yes Y	es	Reviews Survey Maps to determine the dose rate in the area where the work will be performed.	Reviews survey maps and selects AB 12-06 RHR HEAT EXCHANGER 'A', survey # Q802 and determines from survey map that the "On Contact" dose rate between valves XVT08718A and XVT08719A is 240 mrem per hour.	
СОММ	ENTS	S:	SAT	
			UNSAT	
		<i>STEP</i> : 2		
CUE Com	S: ment			, ,
		be determined by reviewing the applicable RWP's determined by noting the S/RWP # on the associ		] 
CR SE	EQ		STEP STANDARD:	
Yes Ye	es	Applicant reviews all RWPs and selects	Selects RWP 08-00013 ROUTINE	

res RWP for task to be performed. HEALTH PHYSICS AND MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES TO INCLUDE VALVE LINEUPS IN HI DOSE AREAS IE. LHRA AND HRA.

#### SAT

UNSAT



**COMMENTS:** 





## *STEP*: 3

CUES:

CR SEQ		STEP STANDARD:
Yes Yes	Determines Electronic Dosimeter Limits	From RWP 08-00013:
		Dose Rate alarm 300 mr/hr
		Dose Limit 25 mr
COMMEN	TS:	SAT
		UNSAT
	STEP: 4	
CUES:		
CR SEQ		STEP STANDARD:
Yes Yes	Determines ON CONTACT DOSE RATE:	From Survey map of RHR HX room 'A' determins that the Highest ON CONTACT reading is 240 mr/hr between the valves to be tagged.
COMMENT	<i>TS</i> :	SAT
		UNSAT





## *STEP*: 5

CUES:

Evaluator Note:	,
After the applicant reports the maximum	stay time: Evaluation on this JPM is complete.
CR SEQ	STEP STANDARD:
Yes Yes Calculate maximum stay time.	Total Permitted Dose ÷ Total Dose Rate: Total Permitted Dose 25 mrem from RWP 08-013 Total Dose Rate 240 mrem / Hr = 240 mrem/hr ÷ 60 minutes = 4mrem/min 25 mrem ÷ 4mrem / min = 6.25 minutes A range of from 6 to 6.25 mins is acceptable if the candidate rounds down
COMMENTS:	to the nearest whole minute.

UNSAT

Examiner ends JPM at this point.



Tuesday, December 02, 2008

## JPM SETUP SHEET

JPM NO: 09 RO/SRO A3

DESCRIPTION: DETERMINE STAY TIME FOR A JOB AT RHR HEAT EXCHANGER 'A'

IC SET:

**INSTRUCTIONS:** 

COMMENTS:





RO / SRO A3 KEY Stay Time Calculation:

Total Permitted Dose ÷ Total Dose Rate:

Total Permitted Dose 25 mrem from RWP 08-013

Total Dose Rate 240 mrem / Hr = 240 mrem/hr ÷ 60 minutes = 4mrem/min

25 mrem ÷ 4mrem / min = 6.25 minutes

A range of from 6 to 6.25 minutes is acceptable if the candidate rounds down to the nearest whole minute.

RWP/SEGMENT NO. 08-00015/003

OUTAGE NO JOB CODE NO. 15-00

WORK DESCRIPTION: ROUTINE HEALTH PHYSICS & MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES TO INCLUDE VALVE LINEUPS IN LOCKED HIGH RADIATION AREAS

SYSTEM COMPONENT ID NA LOCATION CODE NA NRC TASK CATEGORY 2

DESCRIPTION NOT APPLICABLE DESCRIPTION Various locations DESCRIPTION ROUTINE MAINTENANCE

WORK GROUP SUPERVISOR TODD ELLISON PHONE 4976 ALL WORK GROUPS AUTHORIZED WITH HEALTH PHYSICS APPROVAL ORIGINATOR RUSSELL C. OWENS DATE 17-AUG-2007 LAST UPDATED BY WILLIAM A. SMITH DATE 18-SEP-2008

	DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY		DOSE RATE mREM/HR	EST MAN- HRS	EST MAN- REM
	ORM SURVEILLANCE/MINOR MAIN HRA'S (TO INCLUDE VALVE LINE		2.50	25	0.063
	TH PHYSICS SUPPORT	.0237	2.00 TOTALS	10 35	0.020 0.083
ACTIVITY NO	PROTECTIVE REQUIREMENTS	ACTIVITY NO	PROTECTIVE	REQUIREM	ENTS
1, 2, , 1, 2, ,	CONTINUOUS COVERAGE ELECTRONIC DOSIMETER (ED)	1, 2, , 1, 2, ,	FULL PC'S LABCOAT, BOOT	TIES, AND	GLOVE
Contraction of the second		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS ATTACHED? Y N

ED SETTINGS ARE 25 MR / 1000 MR/HR

RESPIRATORY PROTECTION NOT REQUIRED BECAUSE THE PROBABILITY / POTENTIAL OF UPTAKES OF AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVITY WILL BE LOW / LOW

DRESS REQUIREMNENTS (IE. FULL PC'S VS LABCOAT, BOOTIES AND GLOVE) PER THE DUTY HP SHIFT LEADER

NO PC'S REQUIRED IN NON CONTAMINATED AREAS

EVALUATE THE NEED FOR CHANGING THE ED SETTINGS BASED UPON THE GIVEN TASK/JOB

RADIOLOGICAL CONDITIONS EXPECTED ACTUAL DOSE RATES: HIGHEST CONTACT GENERAL AREA CONTAMINATION LEVELS SPECIAL CONDITIONS

(REFER TO MOST RECENT SURVEYS)

PAGE OF

RWP/SEGMENT NO. 08-00	015/003 OUTA	GE NO	JOB	CODE N	0. 15-0
	AUTHORIZATION TO B	EGIN WORK			
HEALTH PHYSICS SUPER DESIGNATE	VISOR/ PRINTED NAME	I SIGNATURE	DATE/TI	IME	
THIS SEGMENT OF THE AND SURVEYS ARE COMP HEALTH PHYSICS SUPER			ACHMEN		
DESIGNATE	PRINTED NAME	SIGNATURE			

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RWP/SEGMENT NO. 08-00013/003

OUTAGE NO

JOB CODE NO. 15-00

WORK DESCRIPTION: ROUTINE HEALTH PHYSICS AND MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES TO INCLUDE VALVE LINEUPS IN HIGH RADIATION AREAS

SYSTEM COMPONENT ID NA LOCATION CODE NA NRC TASK CATEGORY 2

DESCRIPTION NOT APPLICABLE DESCRIPTION Various locations DESCRIPTION ROUTINE MAINTENANCE

WORK GROUP SUPERVISORJOHN HUNSICKERPHONE 4515ALL WORK GROUPS AUTHORIZED WITH HEALTH PHYSICS APPROVALDATE 17-AUG-2007ORIGINATOR RUSSELL C. OWENSDATE 17-AUG-2007LAST UPDATED BY WILLIAM A. SMITHDATE 18-MAR-2008

	DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY		DOSE RATE mREM/HR	EST MAN- HRS	EST MAN- REM
2 HEAL	ORM SURVEILLANCE/MINOR MAIN RA'S (TO INCLUDE VALVE LINE TH PHYSICS SUPPORT		0.98 0.59 TOTALS	350 46 396	0.342 0.027 0.369
ACTIVITY NO	PROTECTIVE REQUIREMENTS	ACTIVITY NO	PROTECTIVE	REQUIREM	ENTS
1, 2, , 1, 2, ,	INTERMITTENT COVERAGE ELECTRONIC DOSIMETER (ED)	1, 2, , 1, 2, ,	FULL PC'S LABCOAT, BOOT	IES, AND	GLOVE
OF UPTAKES ( DRESS REQUIN HP SHIFT LEA	PROTECTION NOT REQUIRED BE OF AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVITY W REMENTS (IE. FULL PC'S VS L ADER JIRED IN NON CONTAMINATED A	ILL BE LOW / ABCOAT, BOOTI	LOW		
	EXPECTED		S ENERAL AREA		
CONTAMINATION SPECIAL CONT					

(REFER TO MOST RECENT SURVEYS)

PAGE OF

WP/SEGMENT NO. 08-0	0013/003	OUTAGE NO	JOB CODE NO. 15-
<u>1</u>	AUTHORIZATION	TO BEGIN WORK	
HEALTH PHYSICS SUPE DESIGNATE	RVISOR/ PRINTED NAM	1E SIGNATU	DATE/TIME
THIS SEGMENT OF THE AND SURVEYS ARE COM			ATTACHMENTS
HEALTH PHYSICS SUPE			DATE/TIME
DESIGNATE	PRINTED NAM	E SIGNATUR	RE

PAGE ____ OF ____

0/300 63 10

RWP/SEGMENT NO. 08-00010/002

OUTAGE NO

JOB CODE NO. 15-00

WORK DESCRIPTION: SCHEDULED SYSTEM WALKDOWNS BY ENG, QC, MECH, ELECT. I&C, AND

HP

SYSTEM COMPONENT ID NA LOCATION CODE NA NRC TASK CATEGORY 1

DESCRIPTION NOT APPLICABLE DESCRIPTION Various locations DESCRIPTION REACTOR OPERATIONS & SURVEILLANCE

WORK GROUP SUPERVISOR LARRY BENNET PHONE 4500 ALL WORK GROUPS AUTHORIZED WITH HEALTH PHYSICS APPROVAL ORIGINATOR RUSSELL C. OWENS DATE LAST UPDATED BY WILLIAM A. SMITH DATE

DATE 17-AUG-2007 DATE 28-JAN-2008

	DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY	DOSE RATE mREM/HR	EST MAN- HRS	EST MAN- REM	
	ORM WALKDOWNS TH PHYSICS SUPPORT	1.35 0.67 TOTALS	35 10 45	0.047 0.007 0.054	
ACTIVITY NO	PROTECTIVE REQUIREMENTS	ACTIVITY NO	PROTECTIVE	REQUIREM	ENTS
$\begin{array}{c} 1, 2, \\ 1, 2, \\ 1, 2, \\ 1, 2, \end{array}$	CONTINUOUS COVERAGE FULL PC'S LABCOAT,BOOTIES, AND GLOVE	1, 2, , 1, 2, , , , ,	INTERMITTENT ELECTRONIC DO		
POTENTIAL OF JOB COVERAGE DRESS REQUIE HP SHIFT LEF	JIRED IN NON CONTAMINATED AN	IOACTIVITY WI ITTENT) PER T ABCOAT, BOOTI REAS	ILL BE LOW/LOW	HIFT LEAD	
	RADIOLOGICA EXPECTED	AL CONDITIONS	3		
DOSE RATES: H CONTAMINATIC SPECIAL CONE	HIGHEST CONTACT		ENERAL AREA	1.00	
	(REFER TO MOST	RECENT SURVE	EYS)		
	PAGE	_ OF	÷		

WP/SEGMENT NO. 08-00	010/002 OUTA	GE NO	JOB CODE NO. 15-0
	AUTHORIZATION TO B	EGIN WORK	
HEALTH PHYSICS SUPER DESIGNATE	VISOR/ PRINTED NAME	I SIGNATURE	DATE/TIME
AND SURVEYS ARE COMP			
HEALTH PHYSICS SUPER DESIGNATE	PRINTED NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE/TIME

PAGE _____ OF _____

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WP/SEGMENT NO. 08-00011/002 OUTAGE NO

JOB CODE NO. 15-00

WORK DESCRIPTION: RHR VENTING, VALVE LINE-UP, AND SURVEILLANCE

SYSTEM COMPONENT ID NA LOCATION CODE NA NRC TASK CATEGORY 2

DESCRIPTION NOT APPLICABLE DESCRIPTION Various locations DESCRIPTION ROUTINE MAINTENANCE


WORK GROUP SUPERVISOR SHIFT SUPERVISOR PHONE 0226 ALL WORK GROUPS AUTHORIZED WITH HEALTH PHYSICS APPROVAL ORIGINATOR RUSSELL C. OWENS LAST UPDATED BY WILLIAM A. SMITH

DATE 17-AUG-2007 DATE 28-JAN-2008

	DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY		DOSE RATE mREM/HR	EST MAN- HRS	EST MAN- REM
1 ALL A	ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATED WITH	RHR	1.83	100	0.183
2 HP SU			2 02	50	0.101
	JFFORI			150	0.284
ACTIVITY NO	PROTECTIVE REQUIREMENTS	ACTIVITY NO	PROTECTIVE	REQUIREM	ENTS
1, 2, , 1, 2, , 1, 2, ,	CONTINUOUS COVERAGE FULL PC'S LABCOAT,BOOTIES, AND GLOVE	1, 2, , 1, 2, , , , ,	INTERMITTENT ELECTRONIC DO		
	TRUCTIONS: ADDIT	IONAL INSTRU	CTIONS ATTACH	ED? Y_	N
HP SHIFT LEF	JIRED IN NON CONTAMINATED AN	REAS		PER TH	E DUTY
		AL CONDITIONS	S		
DOSE RATES: CONTAMINATION SPECIAL CONT		GI	ENERAL AREA		
	(REFER TO MOST	RECENT SURVI	EYS)		
	PAGE	OF	-		

RWP/SEGMENT NO. 08-0	0011/002 007	TAGE NO	JOB COD	E NO. 1	5-00
	AUTHORIZATION TO	BEGIN WORK			
HEALTH PHYSICS SUPE DESIGNATE	RVISOR/	SIGNATURE	DATE/TIME		-
AND SURVEYS ARE COM	the second se		TACHMENTS DATE/TIME		
HEALTH PHYSICS SUPE DESIGNATE	PRINTED NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE/TIME		-

PAGE _____ OF _____




-	CONTAMIN	ATION	IN DP	M/100	CM~;	WUNTER: KYN 19 SER. # 4500	INST. ITPE: NO. 20 SER. # 316
1	iĸ	9		/17	1	COUNTER: SER. #	INST. TYPE: TelepoleSER. # 015
2	IK	10		/ 18		COMMENTS: BKG = 100 CPM	SURVEYED BY: ? SAUNDERS
,	JK	11	V/	19	PI	Sweep + wipes = BKG	TIME:09:15 DATE: 8-10-08
4	«1k	12	/	20	/A		REVIEWED BY: Skuisi Kent
5	41k	13	1	21			TIME: 23) DATE: R
é	/	14	/	22			
7	r/a	115/		23	/	HS = Hot spot	
3	/	116		24		OH = over head	R. Daunders

* DENOTES CONTACT READINGS, ALL OTHERS IN mR/hr UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.

803 Survey #: 🚫 S/RWP#: 100 % Ry Power:

Poince they

AB 374-16/17 A & B RHR PUMPS




	Co	ntami	nation	n in DPM/1	00cm	n2		Counter: Rm14 Ser.# 3475 C	Inst. Type: Ro. 20 Ser.# 4747
1	4	IK	9	41K	17		1	Counter: MSJ Ser.# 963	Inst. Type: - Ser.# -
2	6	1	10	11<	18		1	Rm14 Ser# 4450	Surveyed By: D. Scott
3			11	1200	19	N	7	Bkg = to CPM	R. SAUNders & SAUNDERS
4	1.1	T	12	T	20		/	BK = 100 com (2)	Time: 11: 30 & Date 8. 22-08
5	15	T	13	1200	21	17	A		Reviewed By: Cost, Marel
6			14	41K	22	17		Sweep + wipes = BKG	107.5
7	L	1	15	1200	23	V			Time: 1510 Date: 0.21-60
8	-	K	16	NA	24			Dose Received =	


Relard AB NEY

#### AB 12-27 LETDOWN REHEAT HEAT EXCHANGER


Survey #:	6006
S/RWP#: O	8-01
% Rx Power:	100



	Contami	nation	in DPM/1	00cn	n2	Counter: KM 14 Ser.# 4500	Inst. Type: RO2 Ser.# 3137	
1	6200	9		17		Counter: PLC Ser.# 1	Inst. Type: N/A Ser.# N/A	
2		10		18			Surveyed By: LisaHall Huis Hall	
3		11		19	$\nabla$	Bkg = (OO) CPM		
4	V	12		20		H3 = Hot Sont	Time: 0945 Date: 8808	
5	6200	13	1	21		OH - OUFRHEAD	Reviewed By: SHERUIN Seins	
6		14	"	22		SWEEPSILVIPES = BKG		
7	N.	15		23			Time: 0 250 Date: 8-8-08	
8		16	/	24		Dose Received = $\mathbf{r}$	my1 8-8-08	
	* Denotes Contact Readings - All Readings are in MR/HR unless otherwise noted.							




* Denotes Contact Readings - All Readings are in MR/HR unless otherwise noted.




* DENOTES CONTACT READINCS, ALL OTHERS IN mil/ir UNLESS OTHERWIEE NOTED (Beta/Camma)

. 1



*DENOTES CONTACT READINGS, ALL OTHERS IN mR/hr UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED (Beta/Gamma)



1

	1	CC	TAHIHAT	ION	IN DPM/100 CH2			COUNTER: RMILER 145	INST. TYPE: RAZO SERI 3161
1	· · · · · · ·	8	1	15	22	29	/	COUNTER: SER	INST. TYPEI SERN
2		8		16	23	30		COMMENTSI BIKG - 150	SURVEYED BY: J. Soundas
3	P	10		17	20	31		SWEEDSAWIDES	TIME: 1645 DATE: 8-20 88
4		11		Π	25	₼ 32		= BKG	REVIEWED BY: SRISI Bene A
5	/	12		19	26	F 33			TIME: /230 DATE: 8- 23-09
6	/	13		20	27	34	÷		a faunders
7	1	14		21	28	35			0 4 10 10

*DENOTES CONTACT READINGS, ALL OTHERS IN mR/hr UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED (Beta/Gamma)

RWP/SEGMENT NO. 08-00010/002 OUTAGE NO

JOB CODE NO. 15-00

WORK DESCRIPTION: SCHEDULED SYSTEM WALKDOWNS BY ENG, QC, MECH, ELECT. I&C, AND HP

SYSTEM COMPONENT ID NA LOCATION CODE NA NRC TASK CATEGORY 1

DESCRIPTION NOT APPLICABLE DESCRIPTION Various locations DESCRIPTION REACTOR OPERATIONS & SURVEILLANCE

DOOD

1

nam

T

WORK GROUP SUPERVISOR LARRY BENNET PHONE 4500 ALL WORK GROUPS AUTHORIZED WITH HEALTH PHYSICS APPROVAL ORIGINATOR RUSSELL C. OWENS DATE 17-AUG-2007 DATE 28-JAN-2008 LAST UPDATED BY WILLIAM A. SMITH

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY		RATE mREM/HR	MAN- HRS	EST MAN- REM
1 PERFORM WALKDOWNS 2 HEALTH PHYSICS SUPPORT	_	1.35 0.67 TOTALS		0.047 0.007 0.054
ACTIVITY NO PROTECTIVE REQUIREMENTS	ACTIVITY NO	PROTECTIVE	REQUIREM	ENTS
1, 2, , 1, 2, , 1, 2, , LABCOAT, BOOTIES, AND GLOVE	1, 2, , 1, 2, , , , ,	INTERMITTENT ELECTRONIC D		
ED SETTINGS ARE 10 MR / 300 MR/HR RESPIRATORY PROTECTION NOT REQUIRED B POTENTIAL OF AN UPTAKE OF AIRBORNE RAD JOB COVERAGE (IE. CONTINUOUS VS INTERM	IOACTIVITY WI ITTENT) PER 1	THE DUTY HP SI	HIFT LEAI	DER
DRESS REQUIREMENTS (IE. FULL PC'S VS L HP SHIFT LEADER NO PC'S REQUIRED IN NON CONTAMINATED A 2.			) PER IN	E DUTY

PAGE OF

RWP/SEGMENT NO. 08-	00010/002	OUTAGE NO	JOB CODE NO. 15-00
· · ·	AUTHORIZAT	ION TO BEGIN WORK	
HEALTH PHYSICS SUP DESIGNATE	PERVISOR/ PRINTED	NAME SIGN.	DATE/TIME
THIS SEGMENT OF TH AND SURVEYS ARE CO HEALTH PHYSICS SUB	MPLETE AND ATTAC		TED ATTACHMENTS DATE/TIME
DESIGNATE	PRINTED	NAME SIGN.	ATURE

PAGE OF

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RWP/SEGMENT NO. 08-00011/002

OUTAGE NO

JOB CODE NO. 15-00

-

WORK DESCRIPTION: RHR VENTING, VALVE LINE-UP, AND SURVEILLANCE

SYSTEM COMPONENT ID NA LOCATION CODE NA NRC TASK CATEGORY 2

1

DESCRIPTION NOT APPLICABLE DESCRIPTION Various locations DESCRIPTION ROUTINE MAINTENANCE

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WORK GROUP SUPERVISORSHIFT SUPERVISORPHONE 0226ALL WORK GROUPS AUTHORIZED WITH HEALTH PHYSICS APPROVALORIGINATOR RUSSELL C. OWENSDATE 17-AUG-2007LAST UPDATED BY WILLIAM A. SMITHDATE 28-JAN-2008

	DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY		DOSE RATE mREM/HR	EST MAN- HRS	EST MAN- REM
	ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATED WITH H	RHR	1.83	100	0.183
VENTI 2 HP SU			2.02	50	0.101
2 11 50	FFORT		TOTALS	150	
ACTIVITY NO	PROTECTIVE REQUIREMENTS	ACTIVITY NO	PROTECTIVE	REQUIREM	ENTS
1, 2, ,	CONTINUOUS COVERAGE FULL PC'S LABCOAT,BOOTIES, AND GLOVE	1, 2, , 1, 2, , , , ,	INTERMITTENT ELECTRONIC DO		
UPTAKES OF A JOB COVERAGE DRESS REQUIR HP SHIFT LEA	VIRED IN NON CONTAMINATED AF	BE LOW / LOW (TTENT) PER T ABCOAT, BOOTI REAS	N THE DUTY HP SH TES AND GLOVE)	HIFT LEAD	DER
1	EXPECTED	AL CONDITIONS ACTUAL			
DÔSE RATES:H CÔNTAMINATIC SPECIAL COND	IIGHEST CONTACT		ENERAL AREA		
4	(REFER TO MOST	RECENT SURVE	YS)		
r -	PAGE	OF			
1. C					

RWP/SEGMENT NO. 08-00	011/002 OUTA	GE NO	JOB CODE NO. 15
	AUTHORIZATION TO B	EGIN WORK	
HEALTH PHYSICS SUPER DESIGNATE	VISOR/ PRINTED NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE/TIME
THIS SEGMENT OF THE AND SURVEYS ARE COMP HEALTH PHYSICS SUPER			FACHMENTS
DESIGNATE	PRINTED NAME	SIGNATURE	

PAGE OF

RWP/SEGMENT NO. 08-00013/003

OUTAGE NO

JOB CODE NO. 15-00

WORK DESCRIPTION: ROUTINE HEALTH PHYSICS AND MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES TO INCLUDE VALVE LINEUPS IN HIGH RADIATION AREAS

SYSTEM COMPONENT ID NA LOCATION CODE NA NRC TASK CATEGORY 2

DESCRIPTION NOT APPLICABLE DESCRIPTION Various locations DESCRIPTION ROUTINE MAINTENANCE

WORK GROUP SUPERVISOR JOHN HUNSICKERPHONE 4515ALL WORK GROUPS AUTHORIZED WITH HEALTH PHYSICS APPROVALDATE 17-AUG-2007ORIGINATOR RUSSELL C. OWENSDATE 17-AUG-2007LAST UPDATED BY WILLIAM A. SMITHDATE 18-MAR-2008

	L PC'S COAT, BOOT	396 REQUIREM TIES, AND	GLOVE
ACTIVITY NO       PROTECTIVE REQUIREMENTS       ACTIVITY NO       PR         (1, 2, ,       INTERMITTENT COVERAGE       1, 2, ,       FUL         1, 2, ,       ELECTRONIC DOSIMETER (ED)       1, 2, ,       FUL         SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:       ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTION	TOTALS	396 REQUIREM TIES, AND	0.369 ENTS GLOVE
Image: Special instructions:     Image: Special instruction     Image: Special instructins<	L PC'S COAT, BOOT	TIES, AND	GLOVE
1, 2, ,     ELECTRONIC DOSIMETER (ED)     1, 2, ,     LAB       SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:     ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTION	COAT, BOOT		
	NS ATTACH	ED? Y _	_ N
ED SETTINGS ARE 25 MR / 300 MR/HR RESPIRATORY PROTECTION NOT REQUIRED BECAUSE THE PROBAB OF UPTAKES OF AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVITY WILL BE LOW / LOW DRESS REQUIREMENTS (IE. FULL PC'S VS LABCOAT, BOOTIES HP SHIFT LEADER NO PC'S REQUIRED IN NON CONTAMINATED AREAS	•		
RADIOLOGICAL CONDITIONS EXPECTED ACTUAL DOSE RATES:HIGHEST CONTACT GENERA	AL AREA		
CONTAMINATION LEVELS SPECIAL CONDITIONS (REFER TO MOST RECENT SURVEYS)			

PAGE OF

1 =

RWP/SEGMENT NO. 08-0	0013/003 OUTA	AGE NO	JOB CODE	NO. 15-00
8	AUTHORIZATION TO E	BEGIN WORK		
HEALTH PHYSICS SUPE DESIGNATE	RVISOR/ PRINTED NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE/TIME	
AND SURVEYS ARE COM	RWP IS COMPLETE AND AL PLETE AND ATTACHED:			
HEALTH PHYSICS SUPE DESIGNATE	RVISOR/ PRINTED NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE/TIME _	

PAGE OF

RWP/SEGMENT NO. 08-00015/003

OUTAGE NO JOB CODE NO. 15-00

DOCE DOT DOT

WORK DESCRIPTION: ROUTINE HEALTH PHYSICS & MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES TO INCLUDE VALVE LINEUPS IN LOCKED HIGH RADIATION AREAS

SYSTEM COMPONENT ID NA LOCATION CODE NA NRC TASK CATEGORY 2

T

DESCRIPTION NOT APPLICABLE DESCRIPTION Various locations DESCRIPTION ROUTINE MAINTENANCE

WORK GROUP SUPERVISOR TODD ELLISON PHONE 4976 ALL WORK GROUPS AUTHORIZED WITH HEALTH PHYSICS APPROVAL DATE 17-AUG-2007 ORIGINATOR RUSSELL C. OWENS LAST UPDATED BY WILLIAM A. SMITH DATE 18-SEP-2008

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY		RATE mREM/HR	MAN- HRS	MAN- REM
1 PERFORM SURVEILLANCE/MINOR MAINTE		2.50	25	0.063
IN LHRA'S (TO INCLUDE VALVE LINEUR 2 HEALTH PHYSICS SUPPORT	?S)	2.00	10	0.020
		TOTALS		0.083
ACTIVITY NO PROTECTIVE REQUIREMENTS	ACTIVITY NO	PROTECTIVE	REQUIREM	ENTS
1, 2, , 1, 2, , CONTINUOUS COVERAGE ELECTRONIC DOSIMETER (ED)	1, 2, , 1, 2, ,	FULL PC'S LABCOAT,BOOT	IES, AND	GLOVE
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: ADDITIC	NAL INSTRUC	TIONS ATTACH	ED? Y	N
RESPIRATORY PROTECTION NOT REQUIRED BECA OF UPTAKES OF AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVITY WIL DRESS REQUIREMNENTS (IE. FULL PC'S VS LA HP SHIFT LEADER NO PC'S REQUIRED IN NON CONTAMINATED ARE EVALUATE THE NEED FOR CHANGING THE ED SE	L BE LOW / ABCOAT, BOOT CAS CTTINGS BASE	LOW TIES AND GLOVI ED UPON THE G	E) PER TI	HE DUTY
RADIOLOGICAL		3		
EXPECTED DOSE RATES:HIGHEST CONTACT CONTAMINATION LEVELS SPECIAL CONDITIONS	GE	ENERAL AREA		
(REFER TO MOST R	ECENT SURVE	YS)		


PAGE OF

V	AUTHORIZATION TO B	EGIN WORK		
HEALTH PHYSICS SUPE			DATE/TIME	
DESIGNATE	PRINTED NAME	SIGNATURE		
	RWP IS COMPLETE AND AL	L ASSOCIATED AT	TACHMENTS	
ND SURVEYS ARE COM EALTH PHYSICS SUPE	PLETE AND ATTACHED: RVISOR/	I	DATE/TIME	
DESIGNATE	PRINTED NAME	SIGNATURE		

PAGE _____ OF _____


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
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*DENOTES CONTACT READINGS, ALL OTHERS IN mR/hr UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED (Beta/Gamma)



		C	ONTANINATIO	N IN DPH	4/100	CH2		COUNTER: FMILLER 4145	INST. TYPE: RAZO SERI 3161	
1		8	1 1!		22		29	/	COUNTER: SER!	INST. TYPE: SERI
2		8	16		23		30		COMMENTS: BILG- 150	SURVEYED BY: J. Soundars
3	P	10	11		24		31		SHICEDSALVIDES	TIME: 1645 DATE: 8-20 88
4		11	-		25		32		= BKG	REVIEWED BY: SKISI Bene
5	/	12	19		26	PP	233			TINE: /230 DATE: 8-23-09
6	/	13	20		27	1	34			a faunders
1	1	14	21		28		35			0


*DENOTES CONTACT READINGS, ALL OTHERS IN mR/hr UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED (Beta/Gamina)



COUNTRR: N/ & BRD. AN/ A INST. TYPEI N/ ABER. 11 N/ A COMMENTEI BIG 0 = 150 SURVEYED DYI J. SZUNGUS & SOUNDU
SURVEYED BYIT SURVEYED BYIT SURVEYED BYIT
COMPRESE RIC - ISC SUMPLES BUILD STUDIE COSTS SOLUCION
SWEEPS = BKG TIMBI 1700DATEL 8-20-08
REVIEWED BY I SLUSS RANG
TIME: / 73/DATE: 8-20-58


* DENOTES CONTACT READINCS, ALL OTHERS IN mR/hr UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED (Deta/Gamma)

- E




#### AB 12-27 LETDOWN REHEAT HEAT EXCHANGER

Survey #:	006
S/RWP#: 08	-0
% Rx Power:	00



	Contamir	nation i	n DPM/10	10cn	12	Counter: KM 19 Ser.# 4500	Inst. Type: RO2 Ser.# 3137
1	1200	9		17	1	Counter: Pic Ser.# \	Inst. Type: N/A Sec.# N/A
2	1	10		18			Surveyed By: LiseHall Huis Hall
3		11		19		Bkg = 100 CPM	
4	V	12		20		H3 = Hot Spot	Time: 0945 Date: 818108
5	6200	13	~	21		OH & OUERHEAD	Reviewed By: SHERNIN Sum
6		14		22		SWEEPSILLIPES = BKG	
7	N.	15	$\mathbb{Z}$	23			Time: Ø 250 Date: 8-8-08
8		16		24		Dose Received = $\mathbf{D}$	my 4-8-08
	* Denotes Contact Readings — All Readings are in MR/HR unless otherwise noted.						






-1-1-

	CONTAMIN.	ATION	IN DPM.	/100	CM ² :	COUNTER: Rm 14 SER. # 4500	INST. TYPE: Ro- 20 SER. # 3161	
l	IK	9	1	17	1	COUNTER: SER. #	INST. TYPE: TelepoleSER. # 015	
2	IK	10	/	18	1	COMMENTS: BKg = 100 CPM	SURVEYED BY: ? SAUNDERS	
3	JK	11	pl	19	4/	Sweep + wipes = BKG	TIME:09:15 DATE: 8-10-08	
4	«Ik	12	/A	20	/A		REVIEWED BY: SLUISI Kent	
5	«1k	13	1	21	1		TIME: 23) DATE: 8	
6	/	14	1	22	1			
7	"/A	15	/	23	/	HS = Hot spot		
3	/	116	1	24		OH = over head	R. Daunders	

* DENOTES CONTACT READINGS, ALL OTHERS IN mR/hr UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.

Survey #: 🚫	-807
S/RWP#: /	08.0
% Rx Power:	100

#### AB 374-16/17 A & B RHR PUMPS



1	Contam	ination	n in DPM/1	00cm	12		Counter: Rm14 Ser.# 3475 C	D Inst. Type: RO-20 Ser.# 4747
1	4 IK	9	*1K	17		i	Counter: MSJ Ser.# 963	Inst. Type: Ser.#
2	1	10	11	18		1	Rm14 Ser# 4450	Surveyed By: D. Scott )
3	1.1.1	11	4200	19	N	1	Bkg = to CPM (D)	R. SAUNDERS) & SAUNDERS
4		12	T	20		1	BK9 = 100 Cpm (2)	Time: 11:30 & Date: 8-22.08
5		13	2200	21	1	A		Reviewed By: CUS, Marel
6		14	4 IK	22	1	1.1	Sweep + wipes = BKG	mpr s
7	Y	15	4200	23	/			Time: 1510 Date: 0.21-50
8	-IK	16	NA	24			Dose Received =	

* Denotes Contact Readings ~ All Readings are in MR/HR unless otherwise noted.



# V.C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

### *JPM NO:* 09 SRO A4

Classify an Emegency Event and complete the Emergency Notification Form Within the Required Time

APPROVAL: APPROVAL DATE:

REV NO: 0

CANDIDATE:

EXAMINER:

### SRO ONLY

THIS JPM IS NOT APPROVED

## TIME CRITICAL JPM



Thursday, November 20, 2008

TASK:

344-019-03-02	CLASSIFY EMERGENCY EVENTS REQUIRING EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTATION
TASK STANDARD:	

Correct EAL Determination and minimum required information on the Initial Notification Form; all completed within the time critical requirements.

PREFERRED I	EVALUATION I	OCATION	V PREFI	ERRED	EVALUATI	ON METHOD	
CLASS	SROOM			S	MULATE		
REFERENCE	S: EPP-002		COMMUNICATIO		NOTIFICATIO	)N	
	EPP-001		ACTIVATION AND	D IMPLE	MENTATION	OF THE EMER	(
TOOLS:	PLAN		ID IMPLEMENTATION		ERGENCY		
EVALUATION	TIME	30	TIME CRITICAL	YES	10CFR55:	55.45(a)11	
TIME START:		TIME FINIS	SH:	PERFOR	MANCE TIME:		
PERFORMAN	CE RATING:	SAT:	UNSAT:				
EXAMINER:		1.07 a ⁻¹ state etc					
				SIGN	ATURE	DATE	



**READ TO OPERATOR:** 

WHEN I TELL YOU TO BEGIN, YOU ARE TO PERFORM THE ACTIONS AS DIRECTED IN THE INITIATING CUES. I WILL DESCRIBE THE GENERAL CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THIS TASK IS TO BE PERFORMED AND PROVIDE THE NECESSARY TOOLS WITH WHICH TO PERFORM THIS TASK. BEFORE STARTING, I WILL EXPLAIN THE INITIAL CONDITIONS, WHICH STEPS TO SIMULATE OR DISCUSS, AND PROVIDE INITIATING CUES. WHEN YOU COMPLETE THE TASK SUCCESSFULLY, THE OBJECTIVE FOR THIS JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE WILL BE SATISFIED.

#### SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: None

INITIAL CONDITION: ° 100% Power

- ° EDG 'B' is tagged out
- ° An Inadvertent Turbine trip occurs.
- [°] The Reactor does not trip automatically or manually from the MCB hand switches.
- ° Reactor Trip Breakers cannot be manually opened.
- ° Safety Injection is actuated.
- ° A subsequent Loss of ALL Offsite Power occurs.
- ° DG 'A' output breaker fails to close.
- ° The EOF at the Nuclear Learning Center is available.
- [°] Current wind direction is from 270 degrees.
- ° Current wind speed is 3 mph.
- * Current precipitation is none.
- ° Current stability class is Delta
- INITIATING CUES: You are the Duty Shift Supervisor. Perform the duties of the Interim Emergendy Director

## THIS IS A TIME CRITICAL JPM!





#### HAND JPM BRIEFING SHEET TO OPERATOR AT THIS TIME!



Thursday, November 20, 2008

Page 4 of 12

## JPM BRIEFING SHEET

**OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS:** 

SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: None

INITIAL	CONDITION:	٥	100% Power
---------	------------	---	------------

- ° EDG 'B' is tagged out
- ° An Inadvertent Turbine trip occurs.
- [°] The Reactor does not trip automatically or manually from the MCB hand switches.
- ° Reactor Trip Breakers cannot be manually opened.
- ° Safety Injection is actuated.
- [°] A subsequent Loss of ALL Offsite Power occurs.
- ° DG 'A' output breaker fails to close.
- ° The EOF at the Nuclear Learning Center is available.
- ° Current wind direction is from 270 degrees.
- ° Current wind speed is 3 mph.
- * Current precipitation is none.
- ° Current stability class is Delta

INITIATING CUES: You are the Duty Shift Supervisor. Perform the duties of the Interim Emergendy Director

# HAND THIS PAPER BACK TO YOUR EVALUATOR WHEN YOU FEEL THAT YOU HAVE SATISFACTORILY COMPLETED THE ASSIGNED TASK.



Thursday, November 20, 2008

#### **STEPS**

1 STEP:

CUES:

CR SEQ

No Yes Locate the appropriate "EAL Topic" and "Initiating Condition" and turn to the referenced page in Attachment II of EPP-001

**COMMENTS:** 

#### STEP STANDARD:

Applicant determins that Section E-ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE (Failure of Reactor to Trip) applies

SAT _____

UNSAT

#### STEP: 2

CUES:

- CR SEQ
- Yes Yes The Interim Emergency Director (IED)/Emergency Director (ED) shall:

Determine the EAL by comparing the verified plant parameters or conditions to the detection method for each initiating condition. This evaluation period should not exceed 15 minutes from the occurrence of the event.

Time Critical Start Time:

Time Critical Stop Time:

#### STEP STANDARD:

Applicant makes declaration of **GENERAL EMERGENCY Initiating** Condition (431) 1. AND 2.c:

Transient requiring operation of shutdown systems with failure to trip which results in core damage or additional failure of core cooling and makeup systems which could lead to core melt.

1. Reactor remains critical after attempted trip.

AND

2.c Flow indicators on safety injection systems and RHR systems show zero flow with safety injection initiated.

Initiating Condition (431)

Time Critical portion is from accepting the task until the event is declared is 15 minutes

SAT _____

UNSAT







**COMMENTS:** 

CUES:

CR SEQ Yes Yes

### STEP STANDARD:

Declare the appropriate EAL classification. Applicant implements EPP-001.4 Perform additional actions in accordance (GENERAL EMERGENCY): with the Emergency Operating Procedures

**COMMENTS:** 

SAT _____

UNSAT

STEP:	4
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Procedures (EPP).

CUES:

- CR SEQ
- No Yes Determine the location to which nonessential personnel will be evacuated. (Refer to Attachment 4)

(EOP) and the appropriate Emergency Plan

**COMMENTS:** 

STEP STANDARD:

Applicant makes determination to evacuate non-essential personnel and Fairfield Pumped Storage Facility to their personal residence.

SAT _____

UNSAT





CUES:

Simulate all actions until going to EPP-002, COMMUNICATION AND NOTIFICATION.

### CR SEQ

No Yes Announce the emergency condition and site evacuation to all plant personnel over the plan paging system.

#### STEP STANDARD:

Applicant should make the following announcement.

Announces emergency condition over plant page:

Attention in the Plant. Attention in the Plant.

The station is in an GENERAL EMERGENCY Condition. The initiating event is (some general statement as to Initiating Condition 431). All Emergency Response Personnel report to your duty stations. All non-essential personnel evacuate the site. Proceed to Your Private Residence. All essential personnel in the Radiation Control Area assemble at the RCA Checkpoint. All personnel shall refrain from eating, drinking, smoking, or chewing until further notice.

Sounds Radiation Emergency Alarm

Repeats the previous announcement

Determines EOF will be utilized.

Proceeds to EPP-002

SAT .

UNSAT



**COMMENTS:** 

### CUES:

Acknowt	edge direction to activate the pager system.	
CR SEQ		STEP STANDARD:
Yes Yes	Upon initial declaration of an emergency classification, the Interim Emergency Director (IED) shall:	Applicant directs shift communicator to activate the pager system. ( $\dot{\nu}$ )
	For an Alert or higher emergency classification, inform the Shift Communicator to activate the Pager System Statewide and Local group calls for the utility's Emergency Response Organization (ERO), designating whether the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) or Backup EOF is to be used.	
COMMENT	<i>rs:</i>	SAT





UNSAT

CUES:

#### CR SEQ

Yes Yes Applicant completes lines 1 through 13 on Attachment I, Page 1, Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Notification Form, with all the available information. Direct the Shift Communicator to make the initial notification to the State and local governments. STEP STANDARD:

**Completes Attachment 1** 

**Critical Elements:** 

Step 1 DRILL OR ACTUAL EVENT Step 4 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION: GENERAL EMERGENCY Step 4 BASED ON EAL #: 431 Step 4 EAL DESCRIPTION: TRANSIENT REQUIRING OPERATION OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS WITH FAILURE TO TRIP WHICH RESULTS IN CORE DAMAGE OR ADDITIONAL FAILURE OF CORE COOLING AND MAKEUP SYSTEM WHICH COULD LEAD TO CORE MELT Step 5 PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS: Step 5 EVACUATE: A-0; B-1; C-1 Step 5 SHELTER: A-1; D-1; E-1; F-1; A-2; B-2; C-2; D-2; E-2; F-2 Step 6 EMERGENCY RELEASE: NONE Step 9 METEOROLOGICAL DATA: Step 9 WIND DIRECTION FROM: 270 degrees Step 9 WIND SPEED: 3 mph Step 9 PRECIPITATION: None Step 9 STABILITY CLASS: {D} Step 10: DECLARATION; DECLARATION TIME, TODAY'S DATE

SAT _____

UNSAT



**COMMENTS:** 

### CUES:

Evaluato This is th	r Note: Mark the time that Attachment 1 is hand ne Critical STOP TIME.	ed to the Shift Communicator
Evaluato	or CUE: Acknowledges the request to make the i	nitial notifications.
CR SEQ		STEP STANDARD:
Yes Yes	Hands EPP-002, Attachment 1 to Shift Communicator and directs him/her to make Initial Notifications.	Hands Attachment 1 to Shift Communicator in less than 15 minutes after the Event Declaration Time in JPM Step 2.
	Time Critical Start Time: Time of Declaration in Step 2	
	Time Onitiael Step Times	

Time Critical Stop Time:_____. Time Attachment 1 given to Shift Communicator

#### **COMMENTS:**

SAT

UNSAT

Examiner ends JPM at this point.





## JPM SETUP SHEET

JPM NO: 09 SRO A4

*DESCRIPTION:* Classify an Emegency Event and complete the Emergency Notification Form Within the Required Time

IC SET:

**INSTRUCTIONS:** 

**COMMENTS:** 





	1000			FOR M	PHING USE CN	Cyr
	NRC 2	2009 SR				EPP-002 ATTACHMENT I
			K	EY		PAGE 1 of 11 REVISION 34
			ANT EM	ERGENCY N	IOTIFICATION F	MESSAGE #
2. NITIAL	B FOLLOW-UF		TION: TIME	DATE	// AUTHENTICA	
3. SITE: <u>V. C. S</u>	Land .	NothioA		UATL	Confirmation Phone # (	
4. EMERGENC						
	TION:				<i>7</i> -	<b>_</b>
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					uld lend to con	
5. PROTECTIVI		ENDATIONS:		ONE		
EVACUA	те <u>А-0, В-</u>	1, C-1				
				(-2, D-2, E		
	R THE USE OF KI (POT	ASSIUM IODIDE) IN ACC	ORDANCE WITH S	TATE PLANS AND POLICY	<i>.</i>	
		None	<b>B</b> is Oc		C Has Occurred	
6. EMERGENC		None				
7. RELEASE SI	GNIFICANCE:	📕 Not appli	limits	n normal operating	Above normal operating	D Under evaluati
8. EVENT PROC		A Improving		-	Degrading	
9. METEOROLO			ection* from <u>2</u>	<u>degrees</u>	Wind Speed* 3 mpt	
Notifications)	ailable for Initial	•	ion* <u>NONE</u>	_	Stability Class* 🗛 🖪 🖸	
10. DECLAR/	ATION B TERM	<b>JINATION</b>	Time			
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12. UNIT STATU (Unaffected Notification 13. REMARKS: 	JS: d Unit(s) Status Not F is) <u>No Addita</u> <u>FOLLO</u> E CHARACTERIZATIO AGNITUDE: Noble RM: Airborne ELiquid ION PARAMETERS: Projection perfor	Image: Second state in the second s	Image: Constraint of the second se	Time         % Power       Shutdown a         % Power       Stop Time         % Mours       Es	at Time <u>0930</u> Date at Time <u>Date</u> at Time <u>Date</u> at Time <u>Date</u> <i>BLAW H</i> <i>B for Initial Notifications</i> <i>B A IS SELECTED</i> UNITS: Ci Ci Ci/se <u>Date</u> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i></i>	// // cc [Ω] μCi/sec 
12. UNIT STATU (Unaffected Notification 13. REMARKS: 	JS: d Unit(s) Status Not F is) <u>No Addita</u> <u>FOLLO</u> E CHARACTERIZATIO AGNITUDE: Noble RM: Airborne ELiquid ION PARAMETERS: Projection perfor	Image: Start Time	Image: Constraint of the second se	Time         % Power       Shutdown a         Mixed       G Ground	at Time <u>0930</u> Date at Time <u>Date</u> at Time <u>Date</u> at Time <u>Date</u> <i>BLAW H</i> <i>B for Initial Notifications</i> <i>B A IS SELECTED</i> UNITS: Ci Ci Ci/se <u>Date</u> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i>Date</i> <i></i>	
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SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

## **NUCLEAR OPERATIONS**

COPY NO._____

### EMERGENCY PLAN PROCEDURE

EPP-001

### ACTIVATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EMERGENCY PLAN

### **REVISION 29**

SAFETY RELATED

CHANGE LETTER	TYPE CHANGE	APPROVAL DATE	CANCELLATION DATE	CHANGE LETTER	TYPE CHANGE	APPROVAL DATE	CANCELLATION DATE
A	P	2/13/08					
В	Р	5/23/08					

#### RECORD OF CHANGES

## INFORMATION USE

Procedure may Be Performed From Memory. User Retains Accountability For Proper Performance.



SAP-0139 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 1 OF 2 REVISION 26

## DOCUMENT REVIEW FORM

Page 1 of 1

			Documen	t Ident	ification			
Origin	ators Name:	Leonard Bouknight			Ext:	54089	Mail Code:	507
Date:	05/05/08	Document No.: EP	P-001		Revision I	lo.: 29	Change Le	tter: B
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Failure by the "Additional Reviewers" to provide comments within 5 working days following the comment due date

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## DOCUMENT REVIEW FORM

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Page 1 of

			Documen	t Iden	tification			
Originator	rs Name:	Leonard Bouknight		5	Ext:	54089	Mail Code:	507
Date: (	01/03/08	Document No.: EP	P-001		Revision N	o.: 29	Change Let	tter: A
Title: Acti	vation an	d Implementation of En	nergency Pla	n		D		NNS
Tempo	nt: (check orary App	cone) 🛛 Normal Rev proval			litorial Correction			
Descriptio	n: Attach	iment II- Restored Dies	el Building ar		mediate Building	to Detecti	on Method	
		Change: Restore Deter rocedure affected by this cl		to ma	pproved EAL.			
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* Failure by the "Additional Reviewers" to provide comments within 5 working days following the comment due date may be considered as "No Comment".

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## DOCUMENT REVIEW FORM

Page 1 of 1

Originators N Date: 8/24 Title: ACTIVA							
		nson		Ext:	54464	Mail Code:	507
Title: ACTIVA	1/07 Document			Revision	No.: 29	Change Let	ter:
	TION AND IMPLE	MENTATION	OF EMERGENC	SY PLAN	$\boxtimes$		NNS
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Description: F	Revision of Attach	nent II based of	n the review dor	ne IAW RIS 200	07-01		
Reason/Basi:	for Change: RI	S 2007-01					
s the SCOPE of	the procedure affect	ed by this change	NO X YES				
Cemporary Ap	proval		1		Fina	al approval i (30 da)	
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			nt Reviewers	(Enclosure C)			
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All Commen	ts Resolved		X Yes	Or wy	ginator/Date	pele?	
Commitmen	s Addressed per	SAP-0630	X NA	Yes, P/C/	Sector Sector Sector	MLSA	
50.59 Applic	ability/Review Cor	npleted (SAP-0	107) NA	Yes, Atta	ched		Initial/Da
Pre-impleme	ntation Training C	ompleted	D NA	Yes ck	2		
Training reg	uired after implem	entation	NA NA	Yes, Mtg.	9.4.07		
-	wcompleted		A NA				
PSRC Revie	w Completed		K NA	Yes, Mtg.	INU.		Initial

* Failure by the "Additional Reviewers" to provide comments within 5 working days following the comment due date may be considered as "No Comment".

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

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## 1.0 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

- 1.1 To define the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) that will activate and implement the Emergency Plan and to provide a means of classifying the emergency.
- 1.2 Changes and revisions to this procedure must ensure compliance with the requirements of 10CFR50.54.q, 10CFR50 Appendix B, and SAP-630. A 10CFR50.59 review is not required.

## 2.0 <u>REFERENCES</u>

- 2.1 Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station FSAR, Appendix 13A, "South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Radiation Emergency Plan".
- 2.2 NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants.
- 2.3 10CFR50, Appendix E.
- 2.4 10CFR50.54 (x) and (y), Applicability of License Conditions and Technical Specifications in an Emergency.
- C03 -->

## 3.0 **DEFINITIONS**

- 3.1 NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.
- 3.2 ALERT Events are in process, or have occurred, which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of hostile action. Any releases are expected to be small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.



- 3.3 SITE AREA EMERGENCY Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or hostile actions that result in intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guidelines exposure levels beyond the site boundary.
- 3.4 GENERAL EMERGENCY Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or hostile actions that result in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.
- 3.5 HOSTILE ACTION An act toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidates the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. Hostile Action should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the plant. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address such activities, (e.g., violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled area.
- 3.6 HOSTILE FORCE One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming or causing destruction.
- 3.7 OWNER CONTROL AREA The area between the Vehicle Barrier System and the Protected Area Barrier.

## 4.0 CONDITIONS AND PREREQUISITES

4.1 The Emergency Plan shall be implemented whenever an "Initiating Condition" (as identified in Attachment II) has occurred.

## <u>NOTE 4.2</u>

The implementation of any specific Emergency Plan Procedure (except this procedure) does not necessarily implement the Emergency Plan, but may do so at the discretion of the IED/ED. For example: a small chlorine leak would implement the toxic release procedure but not necessitate implementation of the Emergency Plan, whereas a large release with the potential of affecting the level of safety of the plant would implement the toxic release procedure and the Emergency Plan due to the declaration of a NUE.

4.2 The "Initiating Condition" and "Detection Method" shall be used to determine the applicable Emergency Action Level (EAL). All Detection Methods must be met prior to declaring an EAL

Chg. B

4.3 The 3 digit number in parenthesis associated with EALs on Attachment II is only used for quick reference by VCS personnel.

## <u>NOTE 4.4</u>

When the plant is in a security related event, deviation from the guidance in the Emergency Plan Procedures is allowed when the safety of plant personnel and/or plant equipment must be considered. EPP-027 must be implemented for Security-related events.

- 4.4 The Duty Shift Supervisor must concur with any actions that depart from a license condition or technical specification in an emergency when such actions are immediately needed to protect the public health and safety (Reference 2.4).
- 4.5 Attachment I provides a cross reference for the EAL Classification and should only be used as a guide to locate the "EAL Topic" and the "Initiating Condition" in Attachment II, Emergency Action Levels.

## 5.0 PROCEDURE

5.1 Upon recognition of an abnormal plant or site condition, the observer shall notify the Duty Shift Supervisor of the potential emergency plan condition.


## NOTE 5.2

When the TSC is activated, the ED is responsible for determining the appropriate EAL and emergency classification.

5.2 The Interim Emergency Director (IED)/Emergency Director (ED) shall:



Using Attachment I for guidance, locate the appropriate "EAL Topic" and "Initiating Condition" and turn to the referenced page in Attachment II.





Declare the appropriate EAL classification. Perform additional actions in accordance with the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) and the appropriate Emergency Plan Procedures (EPP).

Notification of Unusual Event	-	EPP-001.1
Alert	-	EPP-001.2
Site Area Emergency		EPP-001.3
General Emergency	-	EPP-001.4
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- D. When the plant is in a security related event, deviation from the guidance in the Emergency Plan Procedures is allowed when the safety of plant personnel and/or plant equipment must be considered. EPP-027 must be implemented for Security-related events.
- 5.3 Undeclared or Misclassified Events
- C01→ A. When it is discovered that an event or condition had existed which met the criteria for Emergency Plan activation but no emergency had been declared and the basis for the EAL classification no longer exists, the IED/ED shall ensure that an ENS notification to the NRC and ESSX notification to the State and local governments is made within one hour of the discovery of the undeclared or misclassified event. No "after-the-fact" emergency declaration is necessary.

## 6.0 <u>RECORDS</u>

6.1 There are no records generated by this procedure.

## 7.0 REVISION SUMMARY

- 7.1 Complete revision Attachment II to incorporate changes made IAW RIS 2007-01.
- 7.2 Revision 29 Change A includes the following:
  - 7.2.1 Revised Attachment II to reflect the EAL Detection Method change to EAL #392A in Revision 55 of the Radiation Emergency Plan.



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## EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CROSS REFERENCE GUIDE

NOTE: This Attachment is not to be used for EAL Classification. Refer to Attachment II.

## EAL TOPIC

PAGE

Α.	. Reactor Coolant System Leakage or LOCA 1. RCS Leakage	1
	2. LOCA	
	3. Failure of Pressurizer or Steam Generator Safety or Relief Valve to	
	Reseat	.2
	4. Loss of Fission Product Barriers	.3
В.	. Steam Generator Tube Leak or Rupture	.4
~	Secondary System	
U.	<ul> <li>Secondary System</li> <li>Main Steam Line Break or Secondary System Depressurization</li> </ul>	5
	<ol> <li>Stuck Open Steam Generator Safety or Relief Valve</li></ol>	
	3. Loss of Heat Sink	
	4. Turbine or Generator Failure	
D.	. Nuclear Fuel	
	1. Fuel Damage	.8
	2. Fuel Handling Accident	
_		4.0
E.	. Engineered Safety Feature (Failure of Reactor to Trip)	.10
E	Loss of Station Power	
1.	1. Station AC Power	11
	2. Station DC Power	
G.	. Radiological Effluents	.13,14
		4.5
Н.	. Fire	.15
۱.	Security	16
	Occurry	. 10
J.	Natural Phenomenon	
- •	1. Earthquake	.17
	2. Tornado or Wind	
	3. Hurricane	.18



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## EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CROSS REFERENCE GUIDE

## NOTE: This Attachment is not to be used for EAL Classification. Refer to Attachment II.

## EAL TOPIC

PAGE

K.	Manmade Phenomenon	
	1. Aircraft Crash	.19
	2. Train Derailment	.19
	3. Missile Impacts or Explosion	.20
	4. Toxic or Flammable Gas	.21
L.	Loss of RHR at Half Pipe Operations	.22
		~~
M.	Loss of Plant Annunciators	.23
N	Control Room Evacuation	23
		.20
О.	Emergency Director Discretion	.24
Ρ.	Other	
	1. Loss of Communications	
	2. Loss of Functions for Cold Shutdown	.25
	3. Loss of Functions for Hot Shutdown	.25





#### EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE OR LOCA (1 of 3)

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE OR LOCA (1 of 3)						
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY			
INITIATING CONDITION (101) RCS LEAKAGE	INITIATING CONDITION (201) REACTOR COOLANT LEAKAGE RATE EXCEEDS 50 GALLONS PER MINUTE Detection Method:	INITIATING CONDITION (301) KNOWN LOCA GREATER THAN CHARGING PUMP CAPACITY	INITIATING CONDITION (401) SMALL AND LARGE LOCA'S WITH FAILURE OF ECCS TO PERFORM LEADING TO SEVERE CORE DEGRADATION OR MELT. ULTIMATE FAILURE OF REACTOR BUILDING POSSIBLE FOR MELTDOWN SEQUENCES			
Detection Method:	Detection Method.	Detection Method:	Detection Method:			
ANY of the following exceeded (1 OR 2 OR 3): 	Evaluation of the following to determine leakage rate: Note: This excludes SG Tube Leakage. (See Specific Table for SG Tube Leakage) 1. Excessive Makeup to the Volume Control Tank. 2. IPCS CHG _{NET} 3. STP-114.002, Operational Leak Test.	<ol> <li><u>ALL</u> of the following:         <ol> <li>Pressurizer low pressure reactor trip.</li> <li>Pressurizer low pressure safety injection signal.</li> <li>High Reactor Building pressure.</li> <li>High Reactor Building Sump level.</li> <li>Abnormal radiation levels as indicated on RM-A2 (if unisolated) OR RM-G5, OR RM-G7 OR RM-G18.</li> <li>Reactor Building Cooling Units Drain Flow High.</li> </ol> </li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Safety Injection signal with reactor trip.</li> <li>AND</li> <li>EITHER of the following:         <ul> <li>Status lamps indicate safety injection system and RHR pumps not running.</li> <li>OR</li> <li>Flow indicators for safety injection systems read zero.</li> </ul> </li> <li>AND</li> <li>RMG-5, AND RMG-7, AND RMG-18 High Alarms.</li> <li>AND</li> <li>RM-A2 High Range Alarm (if unisolated).</li> </ol>			





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#### EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE OR LOCA (2 OF 3)

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
INITIATING CONDITION (102) FAILURE OF A PRESSURIZER OR STEAM GENERATOR SAFETY OR RELIEF VALVE TO RESEAT (EXCEEDING NORMAL WEEPAGE)			INITIATING CONDITION (402) SMALL LOCA AND INITIALLY SUCCESSFUL ECCS. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF REACTOR BUILDING HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEMS OVER SEVERAL HOURS COULD LEAD TO CORE MELT AND POSSIBLE FAILURE OF THE REACTOR BUILDING
Detection Method:			Detection Method:
Pressurizer or Steam Generator Safety or Relief Valve opens and then fails to reseat as indicated by:			<ol> <li>a. Pressurizer low pressure reactor trip.</li> <li>AND</li> </ol>
EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3:			<ul> <li>b. Pressurizer low pressure safety injection signal.</li> </ul>
1. Valid open indication on ANY of the			AND
following: EITHER (a <u>OR</u> b <u>OR</u> c)			<ol> <li>a. RHR flow indicators show zero flow after shift to RHR is attempted.</li> </ol>
a) Unisolable Pressurizer Relief Valve			AND
OR			<ul> <li>RHR flow indicators continue to show zero flow for greater than 2 hours.</li> </ul>
b) Pressurizer Safety Valve			AND
OR			c. RCS temperature rising.
c) Valid Acoustical Monitor Indication			AND
<u>OR</u>			<ol> <li>Reactor Building spray and Reactor Building air handling system fail to function.</li> </ol>
<ol> <li>Valid open indication on <u>EITHER</u> of the following:</li> </ol>	i		
a.) Unisolable Steam Generator Relief Valve.			
OR			
b.) Stuck open Steam Generator Safety Valve.			
<u>OR</u>	-		
<ol> <li>Excess feedwater flow to and steam flow from the affected Steam Generator.</li> </ol>			



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#### EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE OR LOCA (3 OF 3)

ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
		INITIATING CONDITION (403) LOSS OF TWO OF THREE FISSION PRODUC BARRIERS WITH POTENTIAL LOSS OF THE THIRD BARRIER (E.G., LOSS OF FUEL INTEGRITY AND PRIMARY COOLANT BOUNDARY AND HIGH POTENTIAL FOR RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE FROM CONTAINMENT)
		Detection Method:
		1. a. Primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity ≥ 300 µCi/ml. OR         b. RM-L1 High Range Alarm (if unisolated) AND         c. LOCA in progress. AND         d. Reactor Building pressure > 30 psig for least 2 minutes.         OR         2. a. Primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity ≥ 300 µCi/ml. OR         b. RM-L1 High Range Alarm (if unisolated AND         c. Breach of containment integrity. AND         d. <u>EITHER</u> of the following:         1) RCS leakage greater than Technic Specification allowable.         2) RCS pressure >2335 psig.         OR         3. a. LOCA as identified in Site Area Emergency(301) AND         b. Breach of containment integrity. AND         c. EITHER of the following:         1) Dose Equivalent 1-131 activity > 1 µCi/ml in primary coolant.



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## EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

STEAM GENERATOR TUBE LEAK OR RUPTURE				
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY	
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT INITIATING CONDITION (103) EXCEEDING TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAK RATE LIMIT Detection Method: Primary to Secondary Leak Rate Exceeds Technical Specification 3.4.6.2 Limits: Greater than 150 gallons per day from any one	ALERT INITIATING CONDITION (203) RAPID FAILURE OF SEVERAL STEAM GENERATOR TUBES (e.g., SEVERAL HUNDRED GALLONS PER MINUTE PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY LEAK RATE) Detection Method: 1. <u>ALL</u> of the following: a. Pressurizer low pressure alarm. b. Reactor trip.	SITE AREA EMERGENCY INITIATING CONDITION (302) RAPID FAILURE OF SEVERAL STEAM GENERATOR TUBES (SEVERAL HUNDRED GPM PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY LEAK RATE) WITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER Detection Method: 1. a. Pressurizer low pressure alarm and reactor trip. OR	GENERAL EMERGENCY	
Greater than 150 gallons per day from any one Steam Generator.	<ul> <li>b. Reactor trip.</li> <li>c. Pressurizer low level alarm.</li> <li>d. RM-A9 high alarm (if unisolated).</li> <li>e. Steam generator water level rapidly increasing in one or more steam generator(s), falling in the others.</li> <li>f. RM-L3, OR RM-L7, OR RM-L10 high alarms (if unisolated).</li> <li>g. Possible lifting of steam generator PORV's and/or safety valves.</li> </ul> <b>ALERT INITIATING CONDITION (202) RAPID GROSS FAILURE OF ONE STEAM GENERATOR TUBE WITH LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER Detection Method:</b> <ol> <li>ALL of the following:</li> <li>Pressurizer low pressure alarm.</li> <li>Reactor trip.</li> <li>Pressurizer low level alarm.</li> <li>RM-A9 high alarm (if unisolated).</li> <li>Pressurizer low pressure safety injection signal.</li> <li>Undervoltage alarms on 1DA and 1DB.</li> <li>RM-L3, OR RM-L7, OR RM-L10 high alarms (if unisolated).</li> </ol>	<ul> <li>b. Pressurizer level rapidly decreasing.</li> <li>AND</li> <li>2. ALL of the following: <ul> <li>a. Pressurizer low-level alarm.</li> <li>b. RM-A9 High Alarm (if unisolated).</li> <li>c. Undervoltage alarms on 1DA and 1DB.</li> <li>d. Steam Generator water level rapidly increasing in one or more steam generators, falling in the others.</li> <li>e. RM-L3 OR RM-L7 OR RM-L10 high alarm (if unisolated).</li> <li>f. Possible lifting of steam generator PORV's and/or safety valves.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>		



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#### EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT       ALERT       SITE AREA EMERGENCY       GENERAL EMERGENCY         INITIATING CONDITION (104) RAPID SECONDARY SYSTEM DEPRESSURIZATION       INITIATING CONDITION (204) MAJOR STEAM LINE BREAK (e.g., GREATER THAN 6 INCHES EQUIVALENT DIAMETER) WITH A SIGNIFICANT (E.G., GREATER THAN 10 GPM) PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY LEAK RATE       INITIATING CONDITION (303) MAJOR STEAM LINE BREAK (WITH GREATER THAN 50 GALLONS PER MINUTE PRIMARY- TO-SECONDARY LEAK RATE         Detection Method:       Detection Method:       Detection Method:         1. Increased steam flow.       1. ALL of the following: a. Rapidly decreasing reactor coolant Tavg, b. Rapidly decreasing pressurizer pressure b. Rapidly decreasing pressurizer pressure.       Detection Alternation AND	<u></u>
RAPID SECONDARY SYSTEM DEPRESSURIZATION       MAJOR STEAM LINE BREAK (e.g., GREATER THAN 6 INCHES EQUIVALENT DIAMETER) WITH A SIGNIFICANT (E.G., GREATER THAN 10 GPM) PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY LEAK RATE       MAJOR STEAM LINE BREAK WITH GREATER THAN 50 GALLONS PER MINUTE PRIMARY- TO-SECONDARY LEAKAGE AND INDICATION OF FUEL DAMAGE         Detection Method:       Detection Method:       Detection Method:         1. Increased steam flow.       1. ALL of the following:       Detection the following:         AND       a. Rapidly decreasing reactor coolant Tayg.       1. All of the following:	
1. Increased steam flow.       1. ALL of the following:       1. Rapidly decreasing reactor coolant         AND       a. Rapidly decreasing reactor coolant Tavg.       1. Rapidly decreasing reactor coolant Tavg.	
<ul> <li>2. Reduced RCS temperature and pressure.</li> <li>AND</li> <li>3. Observation of break or steam dump, relief or safety-valve inadvertently opened.</li> <li>2. a. <u>ALL</u> of the following: <ol> <li>AND</li> </ol> </li> <li>2. a. <u>ALL</u> of the following: <ol> <li>Steam line differential pressure safety injection signal.</li> <li>Yigh Reactor Building pressure alarm.</li> <li>RM-A2 high alarm for rupture in Reactor Building (if unisolated).</li> <li>B. High Reactor Building (if unisolated).</li> <li>AND</li> <li>C. R. Primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity 2300 µCl/ml.</li> </ol> </li> <li>AND</li> <li>B. High Reactor Building (if unisolated).</li> <li>AND</li> <li>C. R. Primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity 2300 µCl/ml.</li> <li>AND</li> <li>B. High Reactor Building (if unisolated).</li> <li>AND</li> <li>C. R. Primary coolant dose equivalent I-131 activity 2300 µCl/ml.</li> </ul>	



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#### EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS LOSS OF HEAT SINK

SEE INITIATING CONDITION 301 (REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOCA) (REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOCA) FEEDWATER AND CONDENSATE SYSTEMS (PRINCIPAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM) FOLLOWED BY FAILURE OF EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM FOR EXTENDED PERIOD. CORE MELTING POSSIBLE IN SEVERAL HOURS. ULTIMATE FAILURE OF REACTOR BUILDING POSSIBLE IF CORE MELTS Detection Method: 1. a. Reactor trip. AND b. Decreasing wide-range steam		LOSS OF H	IEAT SINK	
(REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LOCA)       TRANSIENT INITIATED BY LOSS OF         (PRINCIPAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM)       FOILOWED BY FAILURE OF REERGENCY         FEDWATER ANY FOR EXTENDED       PERIOD. CORE MELTING POSSIBLE IF CORE         MELTS       Detection Method:         1. a. Reactor trip.       AND         b. Decreasing wide-range steam generators.         AND         2. a. Emergency feedwater flow indicators indicate zero flow 2 min. after required.         OR         b. Status lamps indicate emergency feedwater pumps not running 2 min. after required.         OR         b. Status lamps indicate mergency feedwater pumps not running 2 min. after required.	NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
1. a. Reactor trip.         AND         b. Decreasing wide-range steam generator levels toward off-scale low on all steam generators.         AND         2. a. Emergency feedwater flow indicators indicate zero flow 2 min. after required.         OR         b. Status lamps indicate emergency feedwater pumps not running 2 min. after required.         AND         3. Emergency feedwater cannot be restored				TRANSIENT INITIATED BY LOSS OF FEEDWATER AND CONDENSATE SYSTEMS (PRINCIPAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM) FOLLOWED BY FAILURE OF EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM FOR EXTENDED PERIOD. CORE MELTING POSSIBLE IN SEVERAL HOURS. ULTIMATE FAILURE OF REACTOR BUILDING POSSIBLE IF CORE
AND b. Decreasing wide-range steam generator levels toward off-scale low on all steam generators. AND 2. a. Emergency feedwater flow indicators indicate zero flow 2 min. after required. OR b. Status lamps indicate emergency feedwater pumps not running 2 min. after required. AND 3. Emergency feedwater cannot be restored				Detection Method:
<ul> <li>b. Decreasing wide-range steam generator levels toward off-scale low on all steam generators.</li> <li>AND</li> <li>2. a. Emergency feedwater flow indicators indicate zero flow 2 min. after required.</li> <li>OR</li> <li>b. Status lamps indicate emergency feedwater pumps not running 2 min. after required.</li> <li>AND</li> <li>3. Emergency feedwater cannot be restored</li> </ul>				1. a. Reactor trip.
generator levels toward off-scale low on all steam generators. AND 2. a. Emergency feedwater flow indicators indicate zero flow 2 min. after required. OR b. Status lamps indicate emergency feedwater pumps not running 2 min. after required. AND 3. Emergency feedwater cannot be restored				AND
<ul> <li>a. Emergency feedwater flow indicators indicate zero flow 2 min. after required.</li> <li>OR</li> <li>b. Status lamps indicate emergency feedwater pumps not running 2 min. after required.</li> <li>AND</li> <li>3. Emergency feedwater cannot be restored</li> </ul>				generator levels toward off-scale low on
indicate zero flow 2 min. after required. OR b. Status lamps indicate emergency feedwater pumps not running 2 min. after required. AND 3. Emergency feedwater cannot be restored				AND
<ul> <li>b. Status lamps indicate emergency feedwater pumps not running 2 min. after required.</li> <li>AND</li> <li>3. Emergency feedwater cannot be restored</li> </ul>				
feedwater pumps not running 2 min. after required. AND 3. Emergency feedwater cannot be restored				OR
3. Emergency feedwater cannot be restored				feedwater pumps not running 2 min.
3. Emergency feedwater cannot be restored within 30 min.				AND
				3. Emergency feedwater cannot be restored within 30 min.





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#### EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS TURBINE OR GENERATOR FAILURE

TURBINE OR GENERATOR FAILURE					
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY		
INITIATING CONDITION (105)	INITIATING CONDITION (292)				
OTHER HAZARDS BEING EXPERIENCED OR	OTHER HAZARDS BEING EXPERIENCED OR				
PROJECTED WHICH HAVE THE POTENTIAL	PROJECTED WHICH HAVE A SIGNIFICANT				
FOR ENDANGERING THE FACILITY	POTENTIAL FOR AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY				
TURBINE-GENERATOR ROTATING	TURBINE TRIP AND OBSERVATION OF				
COMPONENT FAILURE CAUSING RAPID	PENETRATION OF CASING				
PLANT SHUTDOWN					
Detection Method:	Detection Method:				
4 Turking this and share ation of turking					
<ol> <li>Turbine trip and observation of turbine malfunction or failure.</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Turbine generator failure causing casing penetration.</li> </ol>				
manufation of failure.	penetration.				
			<u>+</u>		





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#### EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS






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## EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

FUEL HANDLING						
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY			
	INITIATING CONDITION (222) FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT WITH RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVITY TO REACTOR OR FUEL HANDLING BUILDING	INITIATING CONDITION (322) MAJOR DAMAGE TO MORE THAN ONE SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLY IN REACTOR BUILDING OR FUEL HANDLING BUILDING LEADING TO CLAD RUPTURE (e.g., LARGE OBJECT DAMAGES FUEL OR WATER LOSS BELOW FUEL LEVEL)				
	Detection Method:	Detection Method:				
	<ol> <li>Observation of damage to spent fuel assembly.</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Observations of major damage to more than one spent fuel assembly.</li> </ol>				
	AND	OR				
	2. <u>EITHER</u> of the following:	2. a. Spent fuel pool water below fuel level.				
	a. RM-A2 high alarm and/or RMG-17A, 17B high alarm after accident in Reactor					
	Building. <b>OR</b> b. RM-A6 high alarm OR RMG-8 high	<ul> <li>b. <u>EITHER</u> of the following:</li> <li>1) RM-A2 and/or RMG-17A, 17B high</li> </ul>				
		alarm for accident in Reactor Building.				
	alarm; after accident in Fuel Handling Building.	OR 2) RM-A6 and/or RMG-8 high alarm for accident in Fuel Handling Building.				





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EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE (FAILURE OF REACTOR TO TRIP)

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
	INITIATING CONDITION (231) FAILURE OF THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM TO INITIATE AND COMPLETE A TRIP WHICH BRINGS THE REACTOR SUBCRITICAL	INITIATING CONDITION (331) TRANSIENT REQUIRING OPERATION OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS WITH FAILURE TO TRIP (CONTINUED GENERATION, NO FUEL DAMAGE EVIDENT)	INITIATING CONDITION (431) TRANSIENT REQUIRING OPERATION OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS WITH FAILURE TO TRIP WHICH RESULTS IN CORE DAMAGE OR ADDITIONAL FAILURE OF CORE COOLING AND MAKEUP SYSTEMS WHICH COULD LEAD TO CORE MELT
	Detection Method:	Detection Method:	Detection Method:
	<u>ALL</u> of the following (1 <u>AND</u> 2):	ALL of the following (1 and 2):	1. Reactor remains critical after attempted trip.
	<ol> <li>An automatic reactor trip fails when required,        </li></ol>	<ol> <li>An automatic Reactor trip fails when required. AND</li> <li>Reactor remains critical after attempted manual trip from MCB handswitches.</li> </ol>	



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LOSS OF STATION AC POWER				
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY	
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT INITIATING CONDITION (107) TOTAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER OR LOSS OF ONSITE AC POWER CAPABILITY Detection Method: ANY of the following (1 or 2): 1. a. Undervoltage alarms on 1DA and 1DB buses. OR 2. a. Loss of 115KV ESF Potential lights. AND b. Loss of 230KV ESF Potential lights.			GENERAL EMERGENCY INITIATING CONDITION (441) FAILURE OF OFFSITE AND ONSITE POWER ALONG WITH TOTAL LOSS OF EMERGENCY FEEDWATER MAKEUP CAPABILITY FOR SEVERAL HOURS. COULD LEAD TO EVENTUAL CORE MELT AND POSSIBLE FAILURE OF THE REACTOR BUILDING. Detection Method: 1. Undervoltage alarms on 1DA and 1DB buses for greater than 2 hours. AND 2. Steam driven Emergency Feedwater pump fails to start.	





# EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS LOSS OF STATION DC POWER

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS LOSS OF STATION DC POWER				
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY	
	INITIATING CONDITION (242) LOSS OF ALL ONSITE DC POWER FOR A PERIOD GREATER THAN 5 MINUTES	INITIATING CONDITION (342) LOSS OF ALL VITAL ONSITE DC POWER FOR MORE THAN 15 MINUTES		
	Detection Method:	Detection Method:		
	<u>ALL</u> of the following (1 <u>AND</u> 2 <u>AND</u> 3): Lost for a period of from <b>5 to 15 minutes</b>	ALL of the following (1 <u>AND</u> 2 <u>AND</u> 3): Lost for a period <b>greater than 15 minutes</b>		
	1. DC bus undervoltage alarms on all ESF buses,	<ol> <li>DC bus undervoltage alarms on all ESF buses,</li> </ol>		
		<u>AND</u>		
	2. 480V ESF Channel A <u>QR</u> B Loss of DC Alarm.	<ol> <li>480V ESF Channel A <u>OR</u> B Loss of DC Alarm,</li> </ol>		
	3. DG A <u>OR</u> B Loss of DC Alarm.	<u>AND</u>		
		3. DG A <u>OR</u> B Loss of DC Alarm.		



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RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS (1 OF 2)				
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY	
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT INITIATING CONDITION (108) GASEOUS EFFLUENT INSTANTANEOUS RELEASE RATE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS EXCEEDED FOR 1 HOUR (APPENDIX B TABLE II, COLUMN 1 10CFR20) Detection Method: 1. <u>ANY</u> of the following gaseous effluent monitors in valid alarm mode for more than 1 hr.: a. RM-A3 b. RM-A4 c. RM-A9 d. RM-A10 e. RM-A13 (due to radioactivity releases to the environment).	RADIOLOGICAL EF	<ul> <li>FLUENTS (1 OF 2)</li> <li>SITE AREA EMERGENCY</li> <li>INITIATING CONDITION (361) RADIATION MONITORS DETECT LEVELS CORRESPONDING TO GREATHER THAN 50 MREM/HR WHOLE BODY FOR 0.5 HR. OR GREATER THAN 500 MREM/HR WHOLE BODY FOR 2 MIN. (OR FIVE TIMES THESE LEVELS TO THE THYROID) AT THE EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY FOR ADVERSE METEOROLOGY (PASQUILL F STABILITY, 1 M/SEC WIND VELOCITY).</li> <li>1. <u>ANY</u> of the following valid Atmospheric Radiation Monitor readings:</li> <li>a. RM-A3, RM-A4, RM-A9, RM-A10, RM- A13 readings and analysis shows equivalent I-131 release rate greater than:</li> <li>1) 1.14 Ci/hr for 0.5 hr. OR</li> <li>2) 11.4 Ci/hr for 2 minutes.</li> <li>b. RM-A3, RM-A4, RM-A9, RM-A10, RM- A13 readings and analysis shows equivalent Xe-133 release rate greater than:</li> <li>1) 489 Ci/hr for 0.5 hr.</li> </ul>	GENERAL EMERGENCY INITIATING CONDITION (461) EFFLUENT MONITORS DETECT LEVELS CORRESPONDING TO 1 REM TEDE (WHOLE BODY) OR 5 REM CDE (THYROID) AT THE EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY UNDER ACTUAL METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS. Detection Method: ALL of the following (1 AND 2): 1. Radiation Monitor levels exceed those specified for Site Area Emergency, AND 2. Calculation on Dose Assessment Forms indicates levels exceeding 1 Rem TEDE (whole body) or 5 Rem CDE (thyroid) at the exclusion area boundary using radiation monitor readings and effluent stream flow rates (measured or assumed) for actual meteorological conditions; or using field measurements.	
		2) 4890 Ci/hr for 2 min.		



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#### EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS (2 OF 2)

RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENTS (2 OF 2)				
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY	
INITIATING CONDITION (109) LIQUID EFFLUENT CONCENTRATIONS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS LIMITS EXCEEDED FOR 15 MINUTES (APPENDIX B TABLE II COLUMN 1 10CFR20)	INITIATING CONDITION (262) RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT RELEASE RATE EXCEEDING 10 TIMES TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION INSTANTANEOUS LIMITS	INITIATING CONDITION (362) DOSE RATES LISTED BELOW ARE PROJECTED BASED ON GAMMA RADIATION MONITOR (RMG) READINGS AND/OR OTHER PLANT PARAMETERS OR ARE MEASURED AT THE EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY		
Detection Method:	Detection Method:	Detection Method:		
<ol> <li><u>ANY</u> of the following valid liquid effluent monitor readings for longer than 15 min. which are greater than:         <ol> <li>RM-L5 or RM-L9 high alarm setpoint established in discharge permit and isolation valve fails to close.</li> </ol> </li> </ol>	ANY of the following valid radiation monitor readings for longer than 15 minutes (1 <u>OR</u> 2 <u>OR</u> 3 <u>OR</u> 4 <u>OR</u> 5): 1. RM-A3 (Gas) is off scale high.	EITHER 1 OR 2 OR 3: 1. Reactor Building leak rate results in calculated dose rate at exclusion area boundary greater than EITHER (a OR b): a. 50 mrem/hr whole body for 0.5 hour.		
OR b. RM-L3, RM-L7 or RM-L10 while steam generator blowdown is directed to the nuclear blowdown system and isolation valves fail to close (due to radioactivity releases to the environment).	<ul> <li><u>OR</u></li> <li>2. RM-A3 (lodine) is off scale high.</li> <li><u>OR</u></li> <li>3. RM-A4 (Gas) exceeds 40 times high alarm setpoint.</li> <li><u>OR</u></li> <li>4. RM-A4 (lodine) exceeds 10 times high alarm setpoint.</li> <li><u>OR</u></li> <li>5. RM-L5, RM-L7, or RM-L9 exceeds 10 times high alarm setpoint and isolation valve(s) fail to close.</li> </ul>	OR         b. 500 mrem/hr whole body for 2 minutes.		





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FIRE					
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY		
INITIATING CONDITION (110) FIRE WITHIN THE PROTECTED AREA OR THE SWITCHYARD LASTING MORE THAN 15 MINUTES	INITIATING CONDITION (271) FIRE POTENTIALLY AFFECTING SAFETY SYSTEMS.	INITIATING CONDITION (371) FIRE AFFECTING SAFETY TRAINS OR FUNCTIONS			
Detection Method:	Detection Method:	Detection Method:			
Observation of Fire lasting more than 15 minutes within: EITHER 1 <u>OR</u> 2:	<ol> <li>Observation of a fire that has the potential for rendering a safety system inoperable per the Technical Specifications.</li> </ol>	Observation of a fire that renders both trains of a safety system or function inoperable per the Technical Specifications.			
1. Protected Area <u>OR</u>	2. Implementation of FEP 1.0				
2. Switchyard					



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SECURITY					
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY		
<ul> <li>INITIATING CONDITION (111)</li> <li>SECURITY THREAT OR ATTEMPTED ENTRY OR ATTEMPTED SABOTAGE</li> <li>OR</li></ul>	<ul> <li>INITIATING CONDITION (281)</li> <li>ONGOING SECURITY COMPROMISE</li> <li>OR</li> <li>A VALIDATED NOTIFICATION FROM NRC OF AN AIRLINER ATTACK THREAT LESS THAN 30 MINUTES AWAY.</li> <li>OR</li> <li>A NOTIFICATION FROM THE SITE SECURITY FORCE OF AN ARMED ATTACK, EXPLOSIVE ATTACK, AIRLINER IMPACT OR OTHER HOSTILE ACTION WITHIN THE OWNER CONTROLLED AREA.</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>INITIATING CONDITION (381)</li> <li>SECURITY THREAT INVOLVING IMMINENT LOSS OF PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE PLANT</li> <li>OR</li> <li>A NOTIFICATION FROM THE SITE SECURITY FORCE OF AN ARMED ATTACK, EXPLOSIVE ATTACK, AIRLINER IMPACT OR OTHER HOSTILE ACTION IS OCCURRING OR HAS OCCURRED WITHIN THE PROTECTED AREA</li> </ul>	INITIATING CONDITION (481) A HOSTILE FORCE HAS TAKEN CONTROL OF PLANT EQUIPMENT SUCH THAT PLANT PERSONNEL ARE UNABLE TO OPERATE EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN SAFETY FUNCTIONS		
Detection Method: Report to the Control Room by Security, observer or NRC.	Detection Method: Report to the Control Room by Security, observer or NRC.	<u>Detection Method:</u> Report to the Control Room by Security or observer.	Detection Method: Report to the Control Room by Security or observer.		
See EPP-027 for additional guidance.	See EPP-027 for additional guidance.	See EPP-027 for additional guidance.	See EPP-027 for additional guidance.		





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EARTHQUAKE				
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY	
INITIATING CONDITION (112A) NATURAL EVENTS NEAR SITE Earthquake.	INITIATING CONDITION (291A) EARTHQUAKE GREATER THAN THE 2/3 OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE LEVEL	INITIATING CONDITION (391A) EARTHQUAKE GREATER THAN OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE LEVEL BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WITH PLANT NOT IN COLD SHUTDOWN		
Detection Method:	Detection Method:	Detection Method:		
1. Seismic Recording System Start indication.	BOTH 1 AND 2	BOTH 1 AND 2		
	<ol> <li>Seismic Event Annunciator 2/3 OBE exceeded (one or more yellow lights lit),</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Observation of the event (felt or heard) lasting &gt;2 seconds,</li> </ol>		
	AND	AND		
	2. Confirmation of a seismic event through observation (felt or heard) in the Control	2. <u>EITHER</u> a <u>OR</u> b:		
	Room.	<ul> <li>a. RB Foundation Seismic Switch OBE exceeded.</li> </ul>		
		OR		
		<ul> <li>b. Seismic Event Annunciator OBE exceeded (one or more red lights lit).</li> </ul>		
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#### EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS TORNADO OR WIND

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
INITIATING CONDITION (112B)	INITIATING CONDITION (291B)	INITIATING CONDITION (391B)	
TORNADO ONSITE	TORNADO STRIKING FACILITY	SUSTAINED WINDS IN EXCESS OF	
		100 MILES PER HOUR ONSITE BEING	
		EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WITH PLANT	
		NOT IN COLD SHUTDOWN	
	\ \		
Detection Method	Detection Method:	Detection Method:	
1. Observation of event within the Exclusion	Observation of a Tornado within	Sustained winds in excess of 100 mph onsite:	
Area.			
	EITHER a or b:	As measured by <u>EITHER</u> a <u>or</u> b:	
	a) Protected Area	a) Onsite meteorological instrumentation	
	a) Frotected Area	a) Onsite meteorological institutientation	
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	OR	OR	
	b) Switchyard.	<ul> <li>b) The National Weather Service.</li> </ul>	
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#### HURRICANE

	HURR		
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
INITIATING CONDITION (112C) HURRICANE ONSITE	INITIATING CONDITION (291C) SUSTAINED HURRICANE WINDS GREATER THAN 75 MILES PER HOUR NEAR SITE	INITIATING CONDITION (391C) SUSTAINED WINDS IN EXCESS OF 100 MILES PER HOUR ONSITE BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WITH PLANT NOT IN COLD SHUTDOWN	
Detection Method: 1. Observation of event within the Exclusion Area.	Detection Method:         Sustained winds in excess of 75 mph onsite due to a hurricane:         As measured by EIITHER a or b:         a. Onsite meteorological instrumentation,	<u>Detection Method:</u> Sustained winds in excess of <u>100 mph</u> onsite: As measured by <u>EITHER</u> a <u>or</u> b: a) Onsite meteorological instrumentation <b>OR</b> b) The National Weather Service.	









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	AIRCRAF		
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
INITIATING CONDITION (113A) ONSITE AIRCRAFT CRASH BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR ENDANGERING THE FACILITY	INITIATING CONDITION (292A) AIRCRAFT CRASH ON FACILITY BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAVE A SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL FOR AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY	INITIATING CONDITION (392A) AIRCRAFT CRASH INTO VITAL STRUCTURES BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WITH PLANT NOT IN COLD SHUTDOWN	
		Detection Method:	
Detection Method:	Detection Method:	Aircraft crash causing damage <u>or</u> fire in <u>ANY</u> of the following areas:	
Observation of Aircraft Crash within the Exclusion Area.	Observation of a Aircraft Crash within:		
	EITHER a or b:	a. Reactor Building. b. Control Building. c. Auxiliary Building.	
	a. Protected Area	d. Fuel Handling Building. e. Turbine Building.	
	<u>OR</u>	f. Intake Structures. g. DG Building	
	b. Switchyard.	h. Intermediate Building	

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY	
INITIATING CONDITION (113B) ONSITE TRAIN DERAILMENT BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR ENDANGERING THE FACILITY				
Detection Method: 1. Observation of Train Derailment within the				
Exclusion Area.				





EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 20 OF 25 REVISION 29

#### EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS MISSLE IMPACTS OR EXPLOSION

MISSLE IMPACTS OR EXPLOSION							
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY				
	INITIATING CONDITION (292B) MISSILE IMPACTS ON FACILITY WITH RESULTANT MAJOR DAMAGE BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAVE A SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL FOR AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY	INITIATING CONDITION (392B) OTHER HAZARDS BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WITH PLANT NOT IN COLD SHUTDOWN MISSILE OR EXPLOSION IMPACT RENDERING SEVERE DAMAGE TO FACILITY SHUTDOWN					
	Detection Method:	Detection Method: 1. Loss of functions needed for hot shutdown (see Initiating Condition 394 for Site Area					
	Observation of missile impacts on Plant structures or components with major damage.	Emergency).					
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT INITIATING CONDITION (113C) ONSITE EXPLOSION (EXCLUDING PLANNED ACTIVITIES) BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR ENDANGERING THE FACILITY ONSITE EXPLOSION (EXCLUDING PLANNED ACTIVITIES).	ALERT INITIATING CONDITION (292C) KNOWN EXPLOSION AT FACILITY RESULTING IN MAJOR DAMAGE TO PLANT STRUCTURES OR EQUIPMENT BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAVE A SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL FOR AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY						
Detection Method: 1. Observation of explosion or warning from	Detection Method:						
offsite.	Observation of Major Damage by Explosion.						



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	TOXIC OR FLA	AMMABLE GAS				
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY			
INITIATING CONDITION (113D) NEAR OR ONSITE TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GAS RELEASE OF A MAGNITUDE THAT THREATENS PERSONNEL BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR ENDANGERING THE FACILITY NEAR OR ONSITE TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GAS RELEASE OF A MAGNITUDE THAT THREATENS PERSONNEL.	INITIATING CONDITION (292D) ENTRY INTO FACILITY ENVIRONS OF TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE GASES IN CONCENTRATION WHICH EXCEEDS THE LIMITS OF FLAMMABILITY OR TOXICITY BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WHICH HAVE A SIGNIFICANT POTENTIAL FOR AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY	INITIATING CONDITION (392C) OTHER HAZARDS BEING EXPERIENCED OR PROJECTED WITH PLANT NOT IN COLD SHUTDOWN				
Detection Method:	Detection Method:					
1. Observation of release or warning from offsite.	Detection method: Observation or credible warning of an unplanned release of toxic or flammable gas within: <u>EITHER</u> a <u>OR</u> b: a. Protected Area, OR b. Switchyard.	Detection Method: 1. Entry of toxic or flammable gases into: a. Control Room b. Cable spreading rooms c. Reactor Building d. Switchgear room e. Safe shutdown panels f. Emergency diesel generator rooms As detected by portable instrumentation <u>and</u> renders a train of a safety related system inoperable.				



EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 22 OF 25 REVISION 29

#### EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

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NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
	INITIATING CONDITION (297) LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL FLOW FOR MORE THAN 20 MINUTES DURING HALF-PIPE OPERATIONS WITH VESSEL HEAD INSTALLED	INITIATING CONDITION (397) LOSS OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL FLOW FOR MORE THAN 40 MINUTES DURING HALF-PIPE OPERATIONS WITH VESSEL HEAD INSTALLED <u>AND</u> HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTION/CHARGING UNAVAILABLE.	
	Detection Method:	Detection Method:	
	ALL of the following (1 <u>THROUGH</u> 4) For a period of <b>20 to 40 minutes</b> :	ALL of the following (1 <u>THROUGH</u> 5) For a period greater than 40 minutes:	
	<ol> <li>Both RHR Loop A FLO LO <u>AND</u> RHR Loop B FLO LO annunciators in alarm,</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Both RHR Loop A FLO LO <u>AND</u> RHR Loop B FLO LO annunciators in alarm,</li> </ol>	
	AND	AND	
	2. <u>NEITHER</u> RHR Pump is running,	2. <u>NEITHER</u> RHR pump is running, <u>AND</u>	
	<ol> <li>Core exit thermocouple temperatures increasing or at saturation temperature for the current RCS pressure</li> <li>AND</li> <li>Reactor Vessel Head is in place and RCS loops are drained to 434'-7.43" or less.</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Core exit thermocouple temperatures increasing or at saturation temperature for the current RCS pressure</li> <li>AND</li> <li>Reactor Vessel Head is in place and RCS loops are drained to 434'-7.43" or less.</li> <li>AND</li> </ol>	
		5. <u>NEITHER</u> train of Charging/SI is available.	
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# EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
	INITIATING CONDITION (296) MOST OR ALL ANNUNCIATOR ALARMS LOST	INITIATING CONDITION (396) MOST OR ALL ANNUNCIATORS LOST <u>AND</u> PLANT TRANSIENT INITIATED OR IN PROGRESS	
	Detection Method:	Detection Method:	
	Greater than 75% of the MCB annunciators inoperable.	ALL of the following (1 AND 2):	
		<ol> <li>Greater than 75% of the MCB Annunciators inoperable,</li> </ol>	
		AND	
		<ol> <li>Reactor Trip or Safety Injection actuation initiated or in progress.</li> </ol>	

#### CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
	INITIATING CONDITIONS (295) EVACUATION OF CONTROL ROOM ANTICIPATED OR REQUIRED WITH CONTROL OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS ESTABLISHED FROM LOCAL STATIONS	INITIATING CONDITION (395) EVACUATION OF CONTROL ROOM AND CONTROL OF SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS NOT ESTABLISHED FROM LOCAL STATIONS IN 15 MINUTES.	
	Detection Method:	Detection Method:	
	Same as Initiating Condition.	Same as Initiating Condition.	





EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 24 OF 25 **REVISION 29** 

# EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS EMERGENCY DIRECTOR DISCRETION

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	EMERGENCY DIRE	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
INITIATING CONDITION (193)	INITIATING CONDITION (293)	INITIATING CONDITION (393)	INITIATING CONDITION (493)
OTHER PLANT CONDITION [133] OTHER PLANT CONDITIONS EXIST REQUIRING OTHER THAN NORMAL PLANT SHUTDOWN AND REQUIRING INCREASED AWARENESS ON THE PART OF STATE OFFICIALS	OTHER PLANT CONDITION (233) OTHER PLANT CONDITIONS EXIST THAT WARRANT ACTIVATION OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER AND EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY	OTHER PLANT CONDITION (333) OTHER PLANT CONDITIONS EXIST THAT WARRANT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND RADIATION MONITORING TEAMS AND A PRECAUTIONARY PUBLIC WARNING	INTIATING CONDITION (433) OTHER PLANT CONDITIONS EXIST THAT WARRANT ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND RECOMMENDED PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE PUBLIC
Detection Method:	Detection Method:	Detection Method:	Detection Method:
As determined by IED/ED.	As determined by IED/ED.	As determined by IED/ED.	As determined by IED/ED.



EPP-001 ATTACHMENT II PAGE 25 OF 25 REVISION 29

NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT	ALERT	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	GENERAL EMERGENCY
NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT INITIATING CONDITION (115) UNPLANNED LOSS OF ALL ONSITE OR OFFSITE COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY. Detection Method: Unplanned loss of EITHER 1 QR 2: 1. ALL of the following onsite communications capability affecting the ability to perform routine operations. a. Internal telephone system, b. Gai-Tronics system and c. Radio System OR 2. All offsite communications capability. (When extraordinary means must be used to make communications.) a. Internal telephone system, b. Bell Lines, c. Fiberoptic Links and d. Radio System NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT INITIATING CONDITION (114) INABILITY TO REACH REQUIRED SHUTDOWN WITHIN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS Detection Method: Same as Initiating Condition		SITE AREA EMERGENCY         INITIATING CONDITION (394)         LOSS OF FUNCTIONS NEEDED FOR PLANT         HOT SHUTDOWN         Detection Method:         1. a. Inability to establish charging pump injection.         AND         b. Inability to establish emergency feedwater flow.         OR         2. a. Inability to establish service water flow.         AND       b. Inability to establish service water flow.         AND       b. Inability to establish component cooling water flow.	GENERAL EMERGENCY

### EPP-106 REVISION 0

- 3.1.2 <u>Timely</u>: Classifications which are made consistently within the goal of 15 minutes once plant parameters reach an Emergency Action Level (EAL). Offsite notifications are initiated (verbal contact) within 15 minutes of event classification and/or PAR development. PARs are developed within 15 minutes of data availability.
- 3.1.3 <u>Accurate:</u> Classification and PAR appropriate to the event as specified by the approved plan and implementing procedure. Initial notification form completed appropriately for the event to include the following:
  - Class of emergency
  - Description of emergency

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- Wind direction and speed
- Whether offsite protective measures are necessary
- Potentially affected population and areas
- Whether a release is taking place
- Date and time of declaration of emergency
- Whether the event is a drill or actual event
- 3.1.4 <u>Communicator</u>: The person who fills out the Emergency Notification Form and is responsible for the accuracy and timeliness of notifications. The communicator is not expected to be just a phone talker who is not responsible for the accuracy or timeliness.
- 3.1.5 <u>Siren Tests</u>: Number of sirens multiplied by the number of times they are tested.
- 3.1.6 <u>Successful Siren Tests</u>: The sum of sirens that performed their function when tested.
- 3.1.7 <u>Drill:</u> Proficiency enhancing evolution (exercise, functional drill, table top drill, mini drill, etc.) that reasonably simulate, the interactions between appropriate centers or individuals that would be expected to occur during emergencies.
  - 4.0 CONDITIONS AND PREREQUISITES
- 4.1 The data that is measured on the last calendar day of the quarter is reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
- 4.2 Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP) monitors timely and accurate performance in drills, exercises, and actual events that presents opportunities for classification of emergencies, notification of offsite authorities, and development of Protective Action Recommendations (PARs). It is the ratio, in percent, of timely and accurate performance of those actions to total opportunities.



## SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

VIRGIL C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATION

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

### **NUCLEAR OPERATIONS**

COPY NO._____

#### EMERGENCY PLAN PROCEDURE

EPP-001.4

#### GENERAL EMERGENCY

## **REVISION** 7

### SAFETY RELATED

Original signed by Robert E. Williamson for M.P. Findlay DISCIPLINE SUPERVISOR 7/1/05 DATE

Original signed by Shaun Zarandi, DA

### RECORD OF CHANGES

CHANGE LETTER	TYPE CHANGE	APPROVAL DATE	CANCELLATION DATE	CHANGE LETTER	TYPE CHANGE	APPROVAL DATE	CANCELLATION DATE
A	Р	1/18/06		E	Р	5/23/08	
В	Ρ	4/25/06		F	Р	7/1/08	
С	Р	7/2/07					
D	Р	2/13/08					

#### **INFORMATION USE**

Procedure May Be Performed From Memory. User Retains Accountability For Proper Performance.



7/5/05 DATE

# DOCUMENT REVIEW FORM

Page 1 of 2

		Document	Identi	fication			
Originators Nan	ne: Leonard Bouknight			Ext:	54089	Mail Code	: 507
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* Failure by the "Additional Reviewers" to provide comments within 5 working days following the comment due date

## DOCUMENT REVIEW FORM

Page 2 of _2___

**Procedure Change:** Revised Attachment I deleting the Step for the Shift Supervisor to Complete the NRC Notification Form, this form is being eliminated and the State and local ENF will be used to notify the NRC, also added guidance for the SS to ensure completion of the ENF. Added announcing the emergency over the "NLC Spkr" radio channel to notify site personnel.

**<u>Reason for Change:</u>** INPO AFI OP.1-2 Shortfalls exist with shift supervisor (SS) oversight during a few transient and normal plant operations. Problems include the SS being distracted from oversight responsibilities during a simulated reactor trip and safety injection.

10CFR 50.54(g) Evaluation: See evaluation completed on the attached SAP-127 Attachment II.

<u>Procedure Change:</u> Revised Attachment III providing guidance for the Shift Communicator to activate ERDS.

**<u>Reason for Change:</u>** ERDs is required to be activated with one hour of the declaration of an Alert or greater emergency. This will ensure the ERDs is activated as required and provide information to the NRC quicker.

10CFR 50.54(g) Evaluation: See evaluation completed on the attached SAP-127 Attachment II.



^{*} Failure by the "Additional Reviewers" to provide comments within 5 working days following the comment due date may be considered as "No Comment".

# DOCUMENT REVIEW FORM

Page 1 of 1

			Document	Ident	ification			
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itle: General Emerg	gency			] NN
	one) Normal Rev/Chg	Restricted Ch	g (expires:	)
escription: Change	d definition of a General Eme	rgency. Added guidan	ce on OEC responsibility.	
	ange: Performed this change t alter the scope of this proce		C Bulletin 2005-02 and CER 05-2	2864
emporary Approval	2222	2	Final approval requi	
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# DOCUMENT REVIEW FORM

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		d Attachment I, Attachment ope of this procedure.	II, Attachment	III and remove	d reference to EIS. This revis	sion
Reaso	on/ Basis for Ch	ange: RIS 2004-13 Supple	ment 1 and oth	ner changes to	enhance the procedure.	
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	ATTACHMENTS	
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	ATTACHMENT II - Protective Action Recommendations	

- ATTACHMENT III General Emergency Shift Communicator Actions Flow Chart
- ATTACHMENT IV Evacuation of Non-Essential Personnel Decision Tree
- ATTACHMENT V EOF -vs.- Backup EOF Decision Flow Chart



## 1.0 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

- 1.1 This procedure describes the actions to be taken in the event that a General Emergency condition has been declared at the V. C. Summer Nuclear Station.
- 1.2 Changes and revisions to this procedure must ensure compliance with the requirements of SAP-630, 10CFR50.54.q and 10CFR50 Appendix B. A 10CFR50.59 review is not required.

### 2.0 <u>REFERENCES</u>

- 2.1 V. C. Summer Nuclear Station, Radiation Emergency Plan, FSAR, Section 13A.
- 2.2 NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants.
- 2.3 10CFR50, Applicability of License Conditions and Technical Specifications in an Emergency.
- 2.4 EPP-001, Activation and Implementation of Emergency Plan.
- 2.5 NUREG-0396, Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants, December 1978.
- 2.6 IN 83-28, Criteria for Protective Action Recommendations for General Emergencies.
- 2.7 RIS 04-13 Supplement 1, Consideration of Sheltering in Licensee's Range of Protective Action Recommendations.
- 2.8 WCAP-14696-A Revision 1, Westinghouse Owners Group Core Damage Assessment Guidance.



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### EPP-001.4 REVISION 7

## 3.0 **DEFINITIONS**

- C01→ 3.1 General Emergency Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or hostile actions that result in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.
  - 3.2 Early Warning Siren System (EWSS) The primary means for alerting the public within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone around the nuclear plant.
  - 3.3 Severe Core Damage Fuel over-temperature condition where fuel pellets have reached a temperature where there is a rapid movement of fission products from the fuel pellet matrix to the reactor coolant system.

## 4.0 CONDITIONS AND PREREQUISITES

- 4.1 The Duty Shift Supervisor shall concur with any actions that depart from a license condition or technical specification in an emergency when such actions are immediately needed to protect the public health and safety.
- 4.2 Attachment II should be used by the Interim Emergency Director/Emergency Director/Offsite Emergency Coordinator (IED/ED or OEC) as an aid in determining which Protective Actions should be recommended to government officials when a General Emergency is declared.

## 5.0 PROCEDURE

A General Emergency has been declared in accordance with EPP-001.

- Initial Actions (Initial Actions Summary, see Attachment I).
  - 5.2.1 The Interim Emergency Director (IED) or the Emergency Director (ED) shall accomplish, or cause to be accomplished, the following:

Determine the location to which non-essential personnel will be evacuated. (Refer to Attachment IV for guidance).

Chg. А

# <u>NOTE 5.2.1.B</u>

The plant page announcement should be modified by the IED/ED as is appropriate for current conditions.

B. Announce the emergency condition and site evacuation to all plant personnel over the plant paging system.

Attention in the Plant. Attention in the Plant:

The station is in a General Emergency Condition. The initiating event is ______ All Emergency Response Personnel report to your duty stations. All non-essential personnel evacuate the site. Proceed to (choose one):

> Your Private Residence. or The Southern Offsite Holding Area. or The Northern Offsite Holding Area.

All Essential personnel in the Radiation Control Area assemble at the RCA Checkpoint. All personnel shall refrain from eating, drinking, smoking or chewing until further notice.

Chg. A

- C. Sound the Radiation Emergency Alarm.
- D. Repeat the announcement.

# NOTE 5.2.1.E

Guidance for the Shift Communicator may be found on Attachment III and is performed concurrently with IED initial actions.

E. Direct the Shift Communicator to complete the initial notifications in accordance with EPP-002. Designate to the Shift Communicator whether the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) or Backup EOF will be utilized. (Refer to Attachment V for guidance.)



## NOTE 5.2.1.F

The information in Attachment II intended as guidance and may not include all situations. The IED/ED/OEC should use best judgment when recommending Protective Actions to offsite officials.

- F. Refer to Attachment II for Protective Action Recommendations for offsite areas.
- G. Activate the EWSS in accordance with EPP-021.
- H. Notify Security of call-in.
- I. Ensure on-shift personnel have responded to their emergency response stations as follows:
  - 1. When the Operations Support Center (OSC) is not activated, assign a Maintenance person to record names and badge numbers of all essential shift workers, including Operations personnel.
  - 2. Provide names of all essential shift workers to the Technical Support Center (TSC)/Security.

## NOTE 5.2.1.J

Consideration should be given to access routes taken.

- J. Request Offsite Emergency Services (Fire, Medical, Law Enforcement, etc.) if required, in accordance with EPP-002.
- K. Repeat Steps 5.2.1.B, C, and D.
- L. Ensure the Emergency Log Book or the TSC AutoLog is established and maintained. Attachment I should be used as the log of those items listed on Attachment I. Any other pertinent items should be noted in the Emergency Log Book or the TSC AutoLog.
- M. Update the OEC as conditions warrant.
- N. Ensure TSC/OSC/EOF/Backup EOF is being activated in accordance with EPP-023 and EPP-051.

- O. If non-essential personnel have been evacuated to an Offsite Holding Area, ensure HP personnel are assigned to report to that Offsite Holding Area.
- P. If actions depart from license conditions and Technical Specifications, refer to Step 4.1. Document in the Emergency Log Book or the TSC AutoLog and notify Plant Management. Notify the NRC Operations Center as soon as possible.
- 5.2.2 Initial Actions for All Other Personnel
  - A. Emergency Response Personnel report to their designated stations.
  - B. Non-essential personnel evacuate the site, proceed to their private residence or offsite holding area as designated by the IED/ED, and await further instructions.
  - C. Personnel in the Radiation Control Area (RCA) report to the RCA Control Point on the 412' level of the Control Building, unless otherwise directed.
  - D. Perform accountability of Protected Area personnel in accordance with EPP-012.

## NOTE 5.2.2.E

Essential shift workers who are involved with maintenance on essential equipment must notify the Control Room (CR) to determine if the work should proceed.

- E. When the OSC is not activated, essential shift workers report to the Control Room.
- 5.3 Follow-up Actions
  - 5.3.1 IED
    - A. Ensure updated follow-up notifications are made in accordance with EPP-002 hourly and when conditions change that could affect offsite areas and/or emergency response activities.
    - B. Update the ED of the status of the emergency and current plant conditions, as necessary.
    - C. Ensure plant page announcements are made periodically to update personnel on emergency conditions, as appropriate.





### EPP-001.4 REVISION 7

- D. Continue assessments and corrective actions to mitigate the emergency condition and place the plant into a safe and controlled condition.
- E. Make assignments to the staff to mitigate the emergency conditions in accordance with established procedures, or as required for conditions.
- F. Dispatch essential shift workers to the OSC when the OSC is activated.
- G. Continually assess the status of the General Emergency condition for possible recommendation to the ED to enter the recovery phase.
- 5.3.2 ED
  - A. Assume the duties of the IED as soon as possible when onsite and thoroughly cognizant of the situation.
  - B. Ensure updated follow-up notifications are made in accordance with EPP-002, hourly and when conditions change that could affect offsite areas and/or emergency response activities. These notifications will be accomplished by the EOF when the EOF is activated.
  - C. Ensure plant page announcements are made periodically to update personnel on emergency conditions, as appropriate.
  - D. Update the OEC of the status of the emergency and current plant conditions, as necessary.
  - E. Verify the TSC/OSC are manned and activated in accordance with EPP-023.
  - F. Continually assess the status of the General Emergency condition.
- 5.3.3 OEC
  - A. Maintain awareness of the plant status and potential offsite consequences of the emergency.
  - B. Ensure updated follow-up notifications are made in accordance with EPP-002, hourly and when conditions change that could affect offsite areas and/or emergency response activities. This includes development and approval of dose projections and Protective Action Recommendations.

Chg A

- C. Verify the EOF is manned and activated in accordance with EPP-051.
- D. Keep the ED informed of offsite radiological conditions.
- 5.4 Final Actions
  - 5.4.1 The ED will determine when plant conditions warrant entry into the recovery phase. The NRC and Department of Health and Environment Control (DHEC) must agree with this decision.
  - 5.4.2 The ED/OEC shall ensure that offsite authorities are:
    - A. Notified verbally by normal emergency communications in accordance with EPP-002.
    - B. Provided a written summary within 8 hours of the closeout of the emergency. This is the responsibility of Nuclear Licensing.
  - 5.4.3 Initiate EPP-017 as required.

### 6.0 RECORDS

6.1 Forward all written material or copies of written material generated as a result of an emergency to the Emergency Services Unit (ESU). The ESU will ensure appropriate written material included in the applicable Condition Evaluation Report.

7.0 REVISION SUMMARY

- 7.1 Incorporated Changes A through D.
- 7.2 Deleted the references in Section 2.0 that did not pertain to the development or revision of this procedure in accordance with SAP-139.
- 7.3 Added references 2.5 through 2.8 that included basis for development of plant-based Protective Action Recommendations.
- 7.4 Added Step 3.1.3 Added the definition for Severe Core Damage.
- 7.5 Step 5.2.1.L., P. and Attachment I Replaced the word EIS with AutoLog. AutoLog is the current method for logging plant activities.
- 7.6 Revised Attachment I to include the plant announcement from the body of the procedure. This is an enhancement to this attachment.



Chg C

### EPP-001.4 REVISION 7

- 7.7 Attachment I, Line 17 Added the words "Ensure the Communicator has" to indicate that the Communicator is the individual who activated the sirens, not the IED/ED/OEC.
- 7.8 Revised Attachment II to provide more detailed guidance for the determination of Protective Actions that will be recommended to State and local officials.
- 7.9 Revised Attachment III to indicate that Fairfield County is the controlling county for siren activation, not Newberry County.
- 7.10 Change A revisions include:
  - 7.10.1 Step 3.1.1 Revised the definition of a General Emergency as required by NRC Bulletin 2005-02 and CER 05-2864.
  - 7.10.2 Step 5.2.1 B and Attachment I Added statement in the announcement for personnel to refrain from eating, drinking, smoking or chewing until further notice.
  - 7.10.3 Step 5.3.3 B Added statement concerning approval of dose projections and Protective Action Recommendations.
- 7.11 Change B revisions include:
  - 7.11.1 Attachment II Enlarged a text box that was hiding some text.
- 7.12 Change F revisions include:
  - 7.12.1 Revised Attachment I deleting the Step for the Shift Supervisor to Complete the NRC Notification Form, this form is being eliminated and the State and local ENF will be used to notify the NRC, also added guidance for the SS to ensure completion of the ENF.
  - 7.12.2 Revised Attachment III providing guidance for the Shift Communicator to activate ERDS.

Chg. F






EPP-001.4 ATTACHMENT I PAGE 1 OF 1 **REVISION 7** Change F

#### GENERAL EMERGENCY INITIAL ACTIONS SUMMARY

		INITIAL ACTIONS	TIME	
	1.	Assess Conditions and Classify Emergency	XXXX	
	2.	Announce to Plant Personnel		
		Attention in the Plant. Attention in the Plant:		
	The station All Emerge	is in a General Emergency Condition. The initiating event is <u>Detection Methods</u> from IC (431) ncy Response Personnel report to your duty stations. All non-essential personnel evacuate the site. Proceed to (choose one):		
		Your Private Residence.		
		The Southern Offsite Holding Area.		
		Of The Martheau Official Indiana Anna		
		The Northern Offsite Holding Area.		
Cha I	All Essentia	al personnel in the Radiation Control Area assemble at the RCA Checkpoint. All personnel shall refrain from eating, drinking, smoking		
A		until further notice.	XXXX	
	3. Sound Radiation Emergency Alarm			
	4.	Repeat Announcement to Plant Personnel		
	5.	Determine the EOF location (EPP-001.4 Att V)		
	6.	Ensure Shift Communicator activates beepers Notify Security of call-in		
	7.	Ensure completion of Emergency Notification Form (EPP-002 Att. I) Found in EP Tool Box.	······································	
	8.	Refer to EPP-001.4 Att. II for determining Protective Action Recommendations and Enter on the Emergency Notification Form		
	9.	Ensure Communicator performs "Recommendation for Actuation of the EWSS" (EPP-021 Att. I) Found in EP Tool Box		
	10.	Ensure Fairfield Pumped Storage has been Notified to Evacuate to the same Location as the Plant Non-Essentials		
	*11.	Ensure Essential Shift Workers have reported to CR Area		
	*12.	Assign Person (Maintenance) To Record Names and Badge Numbers of All Essential Personnel (including Operations personnel) - Provide to TSC/Security		
	13.	Repeat Announcement to Plant Personnel and make announcement over the "NLC Spkr" radio channel.		
	14.	Sound Radiation Emergency Alarm		
	15.	Repeat Announcement to Plant Personnel and make announcement over the "NLC Spkr" radio channel.		
	16.	Ensure Communicator has Activated EWSS In Coordination with EAS Activation (EPP-021)		
	17.	Request Offsite Emergency Services if Required (ESSX *42) - Notify Security		
	18.	Commence record-keeping in the ED log book or in the TSC AutoLog		
	*Off-No	rmal Hours Only.		

*Off-Normal Hours Only.

### PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS






С

Chg.

## PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS





### PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS

## DEFINITIONS

Ι.

- A. Severe Core Damage is indicated by **ANY** of the following:
  - Containment Rad. Monitor > 10,000 R/Hr. without RB Spray operating.
     OR
    - Containment Rad. Monitor >4,000 R/Hr. with RB Spray operating.
  - 2. Core Exit Thermocouple > 2000°F.
  - 3. Core uncovered > 30 minutes.
  - 4. Containment  $H_2 > 1\%$
  - 5. Emergency Director Judgment.
- B. Large fission product inventory in the containment is indicated by **ANY** of the following:
  - 1. A Loss of Coolant Accident > Charging Pump capacity.
  - 2. Containment  $H_2 > 1$  %.
  - 3. An unplanned, unexplained rapid primary system depressurization with corresponding containment pressure increase.
  - 4. Emergency Director Judgment.
- C. Imminent projected containment failure or release underway is indicated by <u>ANY</u> of the following:
  - 1. Containment pressure > 57 psig.
  - 2. Rapid uncontrolled decrease in containment pressure following an initial increase due to RCS failure.
  - 3. Failure of containment isolation system resulting in a direct path from the containment to the environment.
  - 4. Containment  $H_2$  concentration > 4%.
  - 5. Unisolable faulted/ruptured S/G.
  - 6. Emergency Director Judgment.
- Known Impediments events or conditions recognized to exist prior to or during the event. It is not intended that VCS personnel attempt to obtain information on travel conditions beyond what is already established.
  - 1. External natural emergencies (e.g. Tornado, hurricane, ice storm)
  - 2. Road damage that could prevent flow of traffic (e.g. bridge damage, road construction)





EPP-001.4 ATTACHMENT II REVISION 7 PAGE 4 OF 5

# PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS

## II. 2-MILE RADIUS, 5 MILES DOWNWIND EVACUATION / SHELTERING

Wind Direction (From)	Compass Bearing	Evacuate EPZ Zones	Shelter EPZ Zones
348.76° - 11.25°	N	A-0, C-1, D-1, E-1	A-1, B-1, F-1, A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2, E-2, F-2
11.26° - 33.75°	NNE	A-0, C-1, D-1, E-1	A-1, B-1, F-1, A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2, E-2, F-2
33.76° - 56.25°	NE	A-0, E-1	A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1, F-1, A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2, E-2, F-2
56.26° - 78.75°	ENE	A-0, E-1, F-1	A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1, A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2, E-2, F-2
78.76° -101.25°	E	A-0, E-1, F-1	A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1, A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2, E-2, F-2
101.26° - 123.75°	ESE	A-0, A-1, F-1	B-1, C-1, D-1, E-1, A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2, E-2, F-2
123.76° - 146.25°	SE	A-0, A-1, F-1	B-1, C-1, D-1, E-1, A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2, E-2, F-2
146.26° - 168.75°	SSE	A-0, A-1, F-1	B-1, C-1, D-1, E-1, A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2, E-2, F-2
168.76° - 191.25°	S	A-0, A-1, B-1	C-1, D-1, E-1, F-1, A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2, E-2, F-2
191.26° - 213.75°	SSW	A-0, A-1, B-1	C-1, D-1, E-1, F-1, A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2, E-2, F-2
213.76° - 236.25°	SW	A-0, A-1, B-1, C-1	D-1, E-1, F-1, A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2, E-2, F-2
236.26° - 258.75°	WSW	A-0, A-1, B-1, C-1	D-1, E-1, F-1, A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2, E-2, F-2
258.76° - 281.25°	W	A-0, B-1, C-1	A-1, D-1, E-1, F-1, A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2, E-2, F-2
281.26° - 303.75°	WNW	A-0, C-1	A-1, B-1, D-1, E-1, F-1, A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2, E-2, F-2
303.76° - 326.25°	NW	A-0, C-1	A-1, B-1, D-1, E-1, F-1, A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2, E-2, F-2
326.26° - 348.75°	NNW	A-0, C-1, D-1	A-1, B-1, E-1, F-1, A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2, E-2, F-2





EPP-001.4 ATTACHMENT II REVISION 7 PAGE 5 OF 5

## PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS

## III. 5-MILE RADIUS, 10 MILES DOWNWIND EVACUATION / SHELTERING


Wind Direction (From)	Compass Bearing	Evacuate EPZ Zones	Shelter EPZ Zones
348.76° - 11.25°	N	A-0, A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1, E-1, F-1, D-2	A-2, B-2, C-2, E-2, F-2
11.26° - 33.75°	NNE	A-0, A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1, E-1, F-1, D-2, E-2	A-2, B-2, C-2, F-2
33.76° - 56.25°	NE	A-0, A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1, E-1, F-1, D-2, E-2	A-2, B-2, C-2, F-2
56.26° - 78.75°	ENE	A-0, A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1, E-1, F-1, E-2, F-2	A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2
78.76° -101.25°	E	A-0, A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1, E-1, F-1, E-2, F-2	A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2
101.26° - 123.75°	ESE	A-0, A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1, E-1, F-1, F-2	A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2 E-2
123.76° - 146.25°	SE	A-0, A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1, E-1, F-1, A-2, F-2	B-2, C-2, D-2, E-2
146.26° - 168.75°	SSE	A-0, A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1, E-1, F-1, A-2, F-2	B-2, C-2, D-2, E-2
168.76° - 191.25°	S	A-0, A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1, E-1, F-1, A-2	B-2, C-2, D-2, E-2, F-2
191.26° - 213.75°	SSW	A-0, A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1, E-1, F-1, A-2, B-2	C-2, D-2, E-2, F-2
213.76° - 236.25°	SW	A-0, A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1, E-1, F-1, A-2, B-2	C-2, D-2, E-2, F-2
236.26° - 258.75°	WSW	A-0, A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1, E-1, F-1, B-2, C-2	A-2, D-2, E-2, F-2
258.76° - 281.25°	W	A-0, A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1, E-1, F-1, B-2, C-2	A-2, D-2, E-2, F-2
281.26° - 303.75°	WNW	A-0, A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1, E-1, F-1, C-2	A-2, B-2, D-2, E-2, F-2
303.76° - 326.25°	NW	A-0, A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1, E-1, F-1, C-2	A-2, B-2, D-2, E-2, F-2
326.26° - 348.75°	NNW	A-0, A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1, E-1, F-1, D-2	A-2, B-2, C-2, E-2, F-2






EPP-001.4 ATTACHMENT III PAGE 1 OF 1 REVISION 7

#### GENERAL EMERGENCY SHIFT COMMUNICATOR ACTIONS FLOW CHART




EPP-001.4 ATTACHMENT IV PAGE 1 OF 1 REVISION 7

## EVACUATION OF NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL DECISION TREE



EPP-001.4 ATTACHMENT V PAGE 1 OF 1 REVISION 7

#### EOF -vs.- BACKUP EOF DECISION FLOW CHART





1



Facility: VC SUMMER	- FINAL	Date of Examination:	2009 NRC					
Examination Level (circle o	one): <b>RO</b> / S	RO Operating Test Number:						
Administrative Topic (see Note)	Type Code*	Describe activity to be performed						
Conduct of Operations (A1-a)	P, M	RO/SRO Common Calculate the Maximum Allowable H in accordance with EOP-18.2, RESI IN REACTOR VESSEL, Attachmen G2.1.25 (3.9/4.2): Ability to interpret referen graphs, curves, tables, et	PONSE TO VOIDS t 2 ice materials, such as					
Conduct of Operations (A1-b)	М	Perform a Shutdown Margin Verifica plant conditions in accordance with REACTOR SHUTDOWN FROM ST STANDBY (MODE 2 TO MODE 3), G2.1.23 (4.3/4.4): Ability to perform specific plant procedures during a operation.	GOP-005, ARTUP TO HOT Step 3.7.b. system and integrated					
Equipment Control (A2)	Ν	Perform the surveillance test procedure and complet the associated documentation for the Pressurizer PORV motor operated block valves. G2.2.12 (3.7/4.1): Knowledge of surveillance procedures.						
Radiation Control (A3)	М	RO/SRO Common Determine the dose limit and apply limits to calculate stay time for perfor involving whole body exposure. G2.3.7 (3.5/3.6): Ability to comply with radia requirements during norma conditions	ormance of a task					
Emergency Plan		Category not selected	for RO					
		for SROs. RO applicants require or ninistrative topics, when 5 are require						







	*Type Codes & Criteria:	(C)ontrol room
		(D)irect from bank ( $\leq$ 3 for ROs; $\leq$ for SROs & RO retakes)
i		(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)
		(P)revious 2 exams ( $\leq$ 1; randomly selected)
		(S)imulator

#### JPM SUMMARY STATEMENTS

**CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS (A1-1):** Given a set of conditions, calculate the Maximum Allowable Head Venting Time in accordance with EOP-18.2, RESPONSE TO VOIDS IN REACTOR VESSEL, Attachment 2. Modify 2005 NRC JPM A1-2 by changing the Reactor Building initial conditions. RO/SRO Common JPM.

**CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS (A1-2):** Perform a Shutdown Margin Verification for intended plant conditions in accordance with GOP-005, REACTOR SHUTDOWN FROM STARTUP TO HOT STANDBY (MODE 2 TO MODE 3), Step 3.7.b. The applicant will be directed from GOP-005 to perform STP-134.001, SHUTDOWN MARGIN VERIFICATION, to determine the required boron concentration for the intended conditions (Mode 5). Modify a Bank JPM by changing core burnup, existing boron concentration, and adding an "untrippable" rod. In addition, STP-134.001 has undergone significant revisions since the Bank JPM being modified was last revised.

**EQUIPMENT CONTROL (A2):** Perform the surveillance test procedure and complete the associated documentation for the Pressurizer PORV motor operated block valves. The applicant will perform STP-127.001, PRESSURIZER BLOCK VALVE OPERABILITY TEST, on the simulator; stroke testing the three PZR PORV Block Valves with a malfunction placing one valve outside of the specified acceptance criteria. New JPM.

**RADIATION CONTROL (A3):** Determine the stay time for performance of a task involving whole body exposure to ensure compliance with RWP requirements. Identified as a modified JPM because there are dose rate/dose calculation JPM's in the facility bank (JPA-007). RO/SRO Common JPM.



Facility: VC SUMMER	- FINAL	Date of Examination: 2009 NRC
Examination Level (circle c	one): RO / 🤶	Operating Test Number:
Administrative Topic (see Note)	Type Code*	Describe activity to be performed
Conduct of Operations (A1-a)	Р, М	<b>RO/SRO Common</b> Calculate the Maximum Allowable Head Venting Time in accordance with EOP-18.2, RESPONSE TO VOIDS IN REACTOR VESSEL, Attachment 2 G2.1.25 (3.9/4.2): Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.
Conduct of Operations (A1-b)	N	Evaluate the impact of a change in the plant electrical lineup (close ALT Feed BRKR to ESF Bus 1DA or 1DB) on the TS LCO and complete SAP-205, Attachment 1 – REMOVAL AND RESTORATION CHECKSHEET G2.1.18 (3.6/3.8): Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise
Equipment Control (A2)	М	Evaluate the completed surveillance test procedure for a safety related system G2.2.12 (3.7/4.1): Knowledge of surveillance procedures.
Radiation Control (A3)	М	<b>RO/SRO Common</b> Determine the dose limit and apply the RWP dose limits to calculate stay time for performance of a task involving whole body exposure.
		G2.3.7 (3.5/3.6): Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions
Emergency Plan (A4)	М	Given a set of conditions, determine the EAL and complete the Emergency Notification Form within the required time G2.4.41 (2.9/4.6): Knowledge of the emergency action level
NOTE: All items (5 tota	I) are require	thresholds and classifications.
*Type Codes & Criteria:	(N)ew or (N	om n bank (≤ 3 for ROs; ≤ for SROs & RO retakes) 1)odified from bank (> 1) 2 exams (≤ 1; randomly selected)






## JPM SUMMARY STATEMENTS

**CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS (A1-a):** Given a set of conditions, calculate the Maximum Allowable Head Venting Time in accordance with EOP-18.2, RESPONSE TO VOIDS IN REACTOR VESSEL, Attachment 2. Modify 2005 NRC JPM A1-2 by changing the Reactor Building initial conditions. RO/SRO Common JPM.

**CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS (A1-b):** Evaluate the impact of a change in the plant electrical lineup (close alternate feed breaker to ESF Bus 1DA or 1DB in Mode 1) on the Technical Specification LCO and complete SAP-205, STATUS CONTROL AND REMOVAL AND RESTORATION, Attachment 1 – REMOVAL AND RESTORATION CHECKSHEET. The applicant will be required to determine the Technical Specification Action Statements that must be entered and then complete the status tracking document. New JPM.

**EQUIPMENT CONTROL (A2):** Evaluate the completed surveillance test procedure for a safety related system. The applicant will be directed to review (for approval) a completed STP-205.004, RHR PUMP AND VALVE OPERABILITY TEST, containing three significant errors. Modify a Bank JPM by changing all errors.

**RADIATION CONTROL (A3):** Determine the stay time for performance of a task involving whole body exposure to ensure compliance with RWP requirements. Identified as a modified JPM because there are dose rate/dose calculation JPM's in the facility bank (JPA-007). RO/SRO Common JPM.





# Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline

Form ES-301-2

Fac	ility: VC Summer - FINAL	Date of Examination:	2009		
Exa	m Level (circle one): RO / SRO(I) / <b>SRO(U)</b> C	Operating Test No.:	NRC		
Con	ntrol Room Systems [@] (8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I)				
Sys	tem / JPM Title	Type Code*	Safety Function		
a.	APE 001 [JPS-036B] Respond to Continuous Rod Withdrawal (AOP-403.3)	D, S	1		
b.	System 006 [JPSF-058A]				
υ.	Raise ECCS Accumulator Level (W/ High Pressure Alarm) (SOP-112)	) M, A, S	2		
C.	System 008 [JPS-068B]	······································			
	Shift CCW Trains (W/O Transferring In-Service Charging Pumps) (SOP-118)	M, S	8		
d.	APE 025 [JPSF-065] Establish Hot Leg Injection During Loss of RHR at Mid Conditions (AOP-115.5)	I-Loop D, A, S, L	4P		
e.	System 045 [JPSF-022B] Respond to Turbine Trip Failure (W/ Manual SI Required) (EOP-1.0)	M, A, S	4S		
f.	System 026 [JPSF-019B] Manually Initiate Reactor Building Spray (EOP-1.0)	<i>M, A,</i> S	5		
g.	System 010 [JPSF-150A] Depressurize the RCS to Refill the Pressurizer (EOP-2.	1) P, D, A, S	3		
h.	System 015 [JPS-157] Perform an Intermediate Range NI Analog Channel Operational Test (STP-102.003) RO Only	N, S	7		
In-P	Plant Systems [@] (3 for RO; 3 for SRO-I; 3 or 2 for SRO-U)				
i.	System 001 [JPPF-096A] Locally Trip the Reactor (EOP-13.0)	M, A, E	1		
j.	System 061 [JPP-068] Reset Turbine Driven Emergency Feed Pump (SOP-21	1) D, R	4S		
k.	System 062 [JPP-207] Transfer a Vital 120VAC Power Supply - Return of Alte Source (SOP-310)	rnate N	6		



@ All control room (and in-plant) systems mupped plant systems and functions may overlap to the system of the s		
* Type Codes	Criteria for:	RO / SRO-I / SRO-U
<ul> <li>(A)Iternate path</li> <li>(C)ontrol room</li> <li>(D)irect from bank</li> <li>(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant</li> <li>(L)ow-Power</li> <li>(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A)</li> <li>(P)revious 2 exams</li> <li>(R)CA</li> <li>(S)imulator</li> </ul>	$4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3$ $\leq 9 / \leq 8 / \leq 4$ $\geq 1 / \geq 1 / \geq 1$ $\geq 1 / \geq 1 / \geq 1$ $\geq 2 / \geq 2 / \geq 1$ $\leq 3 / \leq 3 / \leq 2 \text{ (random)}$ $\geq 1 / \geq 1 / \geq 1$	[6] / [6] / 3 [4] / [4] / 3 [1] / [1] / 1 [1] / [1] / 1 [7] / [6] / 2 ly selected) [1] / [1] / 1 [1] / [1] / 1





## VC SUMMER 2009 NRC EXAM JPM SUMMARY

- Respond to continuous rod withdrawal in accordance with AOP-403.3, CONTINUOUS CONTROL ROD MOTION. Applicant will use Manual control rod motion to restore Tavg to Tref. Bank JPM JPS-036B.
- b. Raise the level in an ECCS Accumulator in accordance with SOP-112, SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM. The applicant will restore ECCS Accumulator level to within the technical specification band using the system operating procedure. When the accumulator level is raised, the high pressure alarm will come in and the applicant will have to vent the accumulator to the RB to lower pressure. Modify Bank JPM JPSF-058 (now 058A).
- c. Swap Active CCW loop form Train A to Train B in accordance with SOP-118. Modify Bank JPM JPS-068 (now 068B).
- d. Establish hot leg injection during loss of RHR at mid-loop conditions in accordance with AOP-115.5, LOSS OF RHR WITH THE RCS NOT INTACT (MODES 5 & 6). The alternate path is that the applicant will respond to degrading plant conditions by aligning RHR injection and establishing flow to the RCS hot legs. Bank JPM JPSF-065.
- e. Respond to a turbine trip failure in accordance with EOP-1.0, REACTOR TRIP/SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION. The alternate path is that the applicant will be required to trip the turbine using diverse means from the MCB and/or locally. After completing the immediate operator actions for the turbine trip, the applicant will respond to degrading plant conditions that require manual initiation of SI. Modify Bank JPM JPSF-022A (now 022B) by adding a simulator malfunction that leads to a requirement for MANUAL SI actuation.
- f. Manually initiate reactor building spray in accordance with EOP-1.0, REACTOR TRIP/SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION, Step 8. The applicant will implement alternate path actions to actuate RB Spray using Train B switches or by manually aligning spray pump suction and header isolation valves. Failure of MVG-3003A, RB Spray Isolation Valve, to open automatically will require the applicant to manually open the valve to establish Train A Reactor Building Spray flow. Modify Bank JPM JPSF-019 (now 019B) by adding the MVG-3003A failure.
- g. Depressurize the RCS to refill the Pressurizer using a PORV in accordance with EOP-2.1, POST-LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION, Step 8. The alternate path is that the applicant must use a PZR PORV to depressurize because the spray valve for the running RCP fails to open. After depressurizing, the PZR PORV will fail to close requiring the respective isolation valve to be closed. Randomly selected from 2007 NRC Exam. Bank JPM JPSF-150A.
- h. Perform an Intermediate Range Analog Channel Operational Test for N35 in accordance with STP-102.003. New JPM.
- Locally trip the reactor in accordance with EOP-13.0, RESPONSE TO ABNORMAL NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION, ATTACHMENT 1 – TRIPPING THE REACTOR LOCALLY. The alternate path requires the applicant to open the Rod Drive MG Set breakers after attempts to manually open the reactor trip breakers fail. Modify Bank JPM JPPF-096 (now 096A).



- j. Reset turbine driven emergency feed pump in accordance with SOP-211, EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM. Bank JPM JPP-068.
- k. Transfer a vital 120VAC power supply in accordance with SOP-310, 120 VAC INSTRUMENT AND CONTROL SYSTEM. The applicant will complete the steps to restore the alternate source of power to Inverter XIT-5901 in accordance with procedure section IV.AD. New JPM.



NUREG-1021, Revision 9

Facility: VC FIN	Summer - AL	Date of Examination:	7/6/09	Operating Test Numb	er: N	NRC	
		1. GENERAL CRITERIA	Δ			Initials	
					а	b*	c#
	ing requirement	ns with the previously approv ts (e.g. 10 CFR 55.45, opera			R	b	m
	o day-to-day rep examination.	petition between this and othe	er operating tes	sts to be administered	Ru	to	m
c. The operation D.1.a).	ing test shall no	ot duplicate items from the ap	oplicants' audit	test(s) (see Section	Rh	35	M
	th the written expension that the written expension of the second s	amination and between diffe	erent parts of th	e operating test is	RC	To	M
		ng test will differentiate betwe ne designated license level.	een competent	and less-than-	Rh	F	m
		2. WALK-THROUGH CRITE	ERIA		-	-	~
<ul> <li>initial ca</li> <li>initial ca</li> <li>initiating</li> <li>referen</li> <li>reasona</li> <li>designa</li> <li>operatia</li> <li>operatia</li> <li>detai</li> <li>syste</li> <li>state</li> <li>criter</li> <li>ident</li> <li>restri</li> <li>b. Ensure tha through ou the accept</li> </ul>	onditions g cues ces and tools, ir able and validat tion if deemed onally important ed expected ac m response and ments describin a for successfu fication of critic ctions on the se t any changes f tines (Forms E ance criteria (e.	lowing, as applicable: including associated procedur ed time limits (average time a to be time-critical by the facil specific performance criteria tions with exact criteria and d other examiner cues ig important observations to l completion of the task al steps and their associated equence of steps, if applicable from the previously approved S-301-1 and 2) have not cau g., item distribution, bank use a those forms and Form ES-2	allowed for con ity licensee a that include: nomenclature be made by the performance s e systems and a sed the test to e, repetition fro	e applicant standards administrative walk- deviate from any of	RE Re	To Po	M M
		3. SIMULATOR CRITERI		<u>т</u>	-	-	_
The associated s Form ES-301-4 a		ing tests (scenario sets) have	e been reviewe	d in accordance with	Rh	Za-	m
		Printed Na	ame / Signature	e		Date	
a. Author		Richard F. Ellis	1 Ra	le	6/2	9/0	9
b. Facility Re	/iewer (*)	William R. Quick /	TIT Illing	Refut	6/	4/06	<i>(</i>
-	Examiner (#)	RorAld F. Diell	al al	1 1	6/2 5	169	
d. NRC Supe	rvisor	Makouter. Widne	14	In an of the	06/25	709	
NOTE: * T	ne facility signat	ture is not applicable for NRC	C-developed te	sts.			
		C reviewer initial items in Col	-		requirec	1.	



ES-301

# Simulator Scenario Quality Checklist

Form ES-301-4

Facility:	VC Summer - FINAL	Date of Exam:	7/6/09	Scena	rio Numbers	1,2,3	Ope	erating	Test No	:	NRC	
		QUALIT	ATIVE ATT	RIBUTE	s					b	nitials	
									a		b.	c#
1.	The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the operators into expected events.											D
2.	The scenarios consist	mostly of related	events.						RE		te	8
3.	<ul> <li>the malfunction(s</li> <li>the symptoms/cu</li> </ul>	n consists of cenario when it is s) that are entered ues that will be vis erator actions (by	to initiate t ible to the c	the event crew							Re	V
		ation point (if appl							Ra			
4.	No more than one non a credible preceding in	n-mechanistic failu	ure (e.g., pip	pe break) ent.	is incorporat	ted into the	scenar	io with	-		B	0
5.	The events are valid w	with regard to phys	sics and the	ermodyna	mics.			100	R	-	8	S
	Sequencing and timing evaluation results com					ion team to	obtain	comple	1.00		Ro	0
	If time compression te have sufficient time to								n. R	cr	Ro	1
8.	The simulator modelin	ig is not altered.							de	-	R	0
	The scenarios have be deficiencies or deviation fidelity is maintained w	ons from the refer	enced plant	t have be							B	Q
	Every operator will be scenarios have been a					odified sce	nario.	All othe		2	R	9
	All individual operator form along with the sin			ated, as v	erified using	Form ES-34	01-6 (si	ubmit ti		1.	B	Ŵ
	Each applicant will be specified on Form ES-						d event	S	R	- 1	Re	0
13.	The level of difficulty is	appropriate to su	upport licen	ising deci	sions for eac	h crew pos	tion.		R	-	Po	-10
-	Target Quantita	tive Attributes (F	Per Scenar	io; See S	ection D.5.0	i) A	ctual A	tribute	s -		-	-
						1	2	3	-		-	-
1.	Total malfunctions (5-8	3)				1	0 10	11	Ru	2	Re	9
2.	Malfunctions after EOF	Pentry (1-2)			_	4	4	5	RE	- 1'	Ro	-D
3.	Abnormal events (2-4)	í				2	4	2	RL	-	Ro	0
4.	Major transients (1-2)					1	2	1	10		Ro	Ø
5.	EOPs entered/requirin	g substantive acti	ions (1-2)			4	2	3	Ke		Pa	0
5.	EOP contingencies rec	quiring substantiv	e actions (0	0-2)		1	0	0	AL		Po	1
7.	Critical tasks (2-3)					3	3	3	PL	1	B	-10

## **Transient and Event Checklist**

Form ES-301-5

Facility:	VC Sum	mer - F	INAL	]	: 7/6/2009 C				Оре	erating	lo.:	NRC					
A P	EV								Sce	narios							
P L I	E N T		1			2			3			4		T O T		M I N	
C A N T	T Y P		CREW DSITIO			CREW DSITIC			CREW DSITIC			CREW DSITIC		A L		I M U M(*)	
	E	S R O	A T C	B O P	S R O	A T C	B O P	S R O	A T C	B O P	S R O	A T C	B O P		R	I	i
RO 🛛	RX NOR	1												0 1	1	1	
SRO-I 🛛	I/C	245 6												4	4	4	2
SRO-U-1	MAJ	7												1	2	2	
	TS RX	36			 									2 0	0	2 1	
RO 🗆	NOR	1												1	1	1	
SRO-I 🛛	I/C	245 6												4	4	4	
SRO-U-2	MAJ	7												1	2	2	1
	TS	36						and the second second		-				2	0	2	
RO 🗆	RX NOR													0	1 1	1	
SRO-I 🛛	I/C				123 45									5	4	4	
SRO-U-3	MAJ				68									2	2	2	1
	TS			×	24			<b></b>	X					2	0	2	
RO 🗆	RX NOR													0 0	1	1	<b>(</b>
SRO-I 🛛	I/C				123 45									5	4	4	2
SRO-U-4	MAJ				68									2	2	2	1
	TS				24								_	2	0	2	2
RO 🗆	RX NOR	1				1								1	1	1	C
SRO-I-1 🔳	I/C	245				24								5	4	4	2
SRO-U 🛛	MAJ	6 7				68								3	2	2	1
SNU-U LI	TS	36												2	0	2	2





А

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**Transient and Event Checklist** 

Scenarios

Form ES-301-5

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Transient and Event Checklist

Instru	ictions:
1.	Circle the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must service in both the "at-the-controls (ATC)" and "balance-of-plant (BOP)" positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an Instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
2.	Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or <i>controlled</i> abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
3.	Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicant's license level in the right-hand columns.





Facility: VC Summer FINAL		of ninatio	on:		7/6/09 Operating Test No.:						NRC	-
		APPLICANTS										
		SI	RO			A	ГС			B	OP	
Competencies		SCEN	ARIO			SCEN	IARIO			SCEN	IARIO	
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Interpret/Diagnose Events and Conditions	2-9	1-9	2-11		3467 89	2478	247 10 11		2589	1356 9	5678 9	
Comply With and Use Procedures (1)	1-9	1-9	1-11		1346 789	1247 8	1247 10 11		1257 89	1356 89	1567 89	
Operate Control Boards (2)	s NA	NA	NA		1467 89	1246 78	1247 11		1257 8	1356 89	1567 89	
Communicate and Interact	ALL	ALL	ALL		1346 789	1246 78	1247 10 11		1257 89	1356 89	1356 789	
Demonstrate Superviso Ability (3)	ry ALL	ALL	ALL		NA	NA	NA		NA	NA	NA	
Comply With and Use Tech. Specs. (3)	36	24	34		NA	NA	NA		NA	NA	NA	

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Circle the applicants' license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant.



	9 PWR Examination Outline									_		Fo	rm E	S-401				
Facility: C()	mmER	Date	ofE	xam		-	-	-	NF. 1	15	5	-		-	-	-	-	104000
Tier	Group	RO K/A Category Points													SR	0-Onl	y Poir	nts
	croup	к 1	к 2	к 3	K 4	K 5	к 6	A 1	A 2	A 3	A 4	G *	Total	4	2		3*	Total
1.	1	3 3 3 3 3 3	3			3	18		3	1	3	6						
Emergency & Abnormal Plant	2	2	1	2		N/A		1	1	N	/A	2	9		2	1	2	4
Evolutions	Tier Totals	5	4	5	-			4	4			5	27		5		5	10
	1	2	2	2	3	3	2	2	3	3	3	3	28		2	:	3	5
2. Plant	2	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	10		2		1	3
Systems	Tier Totals	3	2	3	4	4	3	3	4	4	4	4	38		4		4	В
	nowledge an	d Ab	ilitie	s		1		2	-	3	4	:	10	1	2	3	4	7
	Categories					3		2	:	3	2	2	1.1.1	2	1	2	2	
1. 2.	Ensure that at and SRO-only in each K/A or The point tota The final point	outlin atego I for a	nes ( ry sh each	i.e., o nall no grou	exce ot be ip an	pt for less d tier	one than in t	cate two	gory ). opos	in T ed o	ler 3 o	of the	e SRO-on	ly outli that sp	ine, the	e *Tier d in the	Totals	*
2. 3. 4. 5.	and SRO-only in each K/A ca The point tota The final point based on NRC Systems/evolu- not apply at the not included of the elimination Select topics in the group b Absent a plan selected. Use	outlin atego i for i t tota c revi utions ne fac on the fac on the fac on the fac on the fac on the fac on the fac on the fac of i for i ( for i ) revi ( for i ) revi ) revi ( for i ) revi ( for i ) ( for i ) ( ) )	nes ( vry sh each I for o sions s with cility a outh napp as m a sele cific RO a for T	i.e., o mall ne grou each s. Th shou ine s shou ine s shou ine s prior prior prior shou si in s i i i i socting prior si i i shou i i shou i i shou i i shou shou shou shou shou shou shou shou	except of be grou e fini- ach g ld be hould ach g a se g a se a se g a se a se a se a se a se a se a se a se	pt for less d tier up an al RO groupp d dele d be a K/A sl ams a decome only t ating 1 2 fro	one than in that d ties a are sted a adde taten adde taten ad top hose s for com th shal	cate i two) ne prin r may m mu ideni ideni id. R nents volut tic for the F ne shi i be s	gory ). opos y dev ust to tified ustified ustified ustified si ions r any s hav so hav	in T eed o iate tal 7 i on t eed; c to ES as po syst ing a nd Si i syst ted 1	ler 3 i utline by ± 1 5 poi the as opera 3-401 ossib tem o an imp RO-or	of the s must l from nts a ssoci tiona , Attu- le; si r evo porta nly po- and l	e SRO-on at match t in that spe ind the SF ated outli illy import achment i achment i anple eve blution. ance ratin ortions, re K/A categ	that specified to-online; sy tant, s 2, for g ery sys ig (IR) especi pories.	ine, the pecifies in the y exam stems ite-spe guidan stem of of 2.5 tively.	e 'Tier d in the table o must or evo scific s ce reg r evolu or high	Totals table total 2 lutions ystem arding tion	5 points. 5 that do 5 that are







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ES-401, REV 9			T1G	1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE	FORM ES-401		
KA	NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:		IR	K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G	TOPIC:		
		RO	SRO				
008AA1.06	Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3	3.6	3.6		Control of PZR level		
				Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)			
011EK3.15	Large Break LOCA / 3	4.3	4.4		Criteria for shifting to recirculation mode		
				Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)			
015AK2.07	RCP Malfunctions / 4	2.9	2.9		RCP seals		
				Knowledge of the interrelations between (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION) and the following:(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8)			
022AA2.02	Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2	3.2	3.7		Charging pump problems		
				Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)			
025AK1.01	Loss of RHR System / 4	3.9	4.3		Loss of RHRS during all modes of operation		
				Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.8 to 41.10 / 45.3)			
026AG2.1.20	Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8	4.6	4.6		Ability to execute procedure steps.		
				This is a Generic, no stern statement is associated.			







ES-401, RE	EV 9		T10	31 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE	FORM ES-401
KA	NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:		IR	K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G	TOPIC:
		RO	SRC	)	
027AK2.03	Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3	2.6	2.8		Controllers and positioners
	Manunction / 3			Knowledge of the interrelations between (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION) and the following:(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8)	
029EK1.02	ATWS / 1	2.6	2.8		Definition of reactivity
				Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.8 to 41.10 / 45.3)	
038EK1.01	Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3	3.1	3.4	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.8 to 41.10 / 45.3)	Use of steam tables
040AG2.2.25	Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat	3.2	4.2		Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for
	Transfer / 4			This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.
054AK3.03	Loss of Main Feedwater / 4	3.8	4.1		Manual control of AFW flow control valves
				Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)	
055EA1.01	Station Blackout / 6	3.7	3.9		In-core thermocouple temperatures
				Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)	







ES-401, REV 9			T1G	1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE	FORM ES-401	
KA	NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:		IR	K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G	TOPIC:	
		RO	SRO			
056AA2.02	Loss of Off-site Power / 6	3.5	3.6		ESF load sequencer status lights	
				Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)		
057AG2.4.8	Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6	3.8	4.5		Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are	
				This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	used in conjunction with EOPs.	
065AK3.08	Loss of Instrument Air / 8	3.7	3.9		Actions contained in EOP for loss of instrument air	
				Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)		
077AK2.02	Generator Voltage and Electric Grid	3.1	3.3		Breakers, relays	
	Disturbances / 6			Knowledge of the interrelations between (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION) and the following:(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8)		
WE04EA1.1	LOCA Outside Containment / 3	4.0	4.0		Components and functions of control and safety systems,	
				Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)	including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes and automatic and manual features.	
WE05EA2.1	Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of	3.4	4.4		Facility conditions and selection of appropriate	
	Secondary Heat Sink / 4			Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)	procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.	







ES-401, RE	EV 9		T1G	2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE	FORM ES-401		
KA	NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:		IR	K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G	TOPIC:		
		RO	SRO				
001AK1.16	Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1	3	3.4		Definition and application of power defect		
				Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.8 to 41.10 / 45.3)			
024AK2.01	Emergency Boration / 1	2.7	2.7		Valves		
				Knowledge of the interrelations between (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION) and the following:(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8)			
033AG2.4.11	Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7	4.0	4.2		Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.		
				This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.			
051AA1.04	Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4	2.5	2.5		Rod position		
				Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)			
061AK3.02	ARM System Alarms / 7	3.4	3.6		Guidance contained in alarm response for ARM system		
				Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to (ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)			
068AA2.02	Control Room Evac. / 8	3.7	4.2		Local boric acid flow		
				Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)			





ES-401, REV 9			T10	2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE	FORM ES-401-2	
КА	NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:		IR	K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G	TOPIC:	
		RO	SRC	)		
074EK3.03	Inad. Core Cooling / 4	3.4	3.8	Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)	Placing the plant in hot standby status	
WE01EK1.2	Rediagnosis / 3	3.4	4	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.8 to 41.10 / 45.3)	Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection / Rediagnosis).	
we03EG2.4.21	1 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. / 4	4.0	4.6	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions	







ES-401, REV 9			T20	1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE	FORM ES-401	
KA	NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:		IR	K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G	TOPIC:	
		RO	SRC	,		
003G2.1.7	Reactor Coolant Pump	4.4	4.7	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior and instrument interpretation.	
004A3.15	Chemical and Volume Control	3.5	3.6	Ability to monitor automatic operations of the (SYSTEM) including:(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)	PZR pressure and temperature	
004K2.05	Chemical and Volume Control	2.7	2.9		MOVs	
				Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following:(CFR: 41.7)		
005K5.02	Residual Heat Removal	3.4	3.5	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (SYSTEM):(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)	Need for adequate subcooling	
006A1.09						
00041.09	Emergency Core Cooling	2.8	3.2	Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the (SYSTEM) controls including:(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)	Pump amperage, including start, normal and locked	
007A2.03	Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank	3.6	3.9		Overpressurization of the PZR	
				Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SYSTEM) and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)		

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ES-401, REV 9			T2G	1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE	FORM ES-401-2	
KA	NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:		IR	K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G	TOPIC:	
		RO	SRO			
008A1.03	Component Cooling Water	2.7	2.9		CCW pressure	
				Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the (SYSTEM) controls including:(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)		
010A2.01	Pressurizer Pressure Control	3.3	3.6		Heater failures	
				Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SYSTEM) and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)		
012K4.01	Reactor Protection	3.7	4.0		Trip logic when one channel OOC or in test	
				Knowledge of (SYSTEM) design feature(s) and or interlock(s) which provide for the following:(CFR: 41.7)		
012K6.10	Reactor Protection	3.3	3.5		Permissive circuits	
				Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the (SYSTEM):(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)		
013K6.01	Engineered Safety Features Actuation	2.7	3.1		Sensors and detectors	
				Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the (SYSTEM):(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)		
022A4.05	Containment Cooling	3.8	3.8	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)	Containment readings of temperature, pressure and humidity system	



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ES-401, REV 9			T2G	1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE	FORM ES-401-2
KA	NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:		IR	K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G	TOPIC:
		RO	SRO		
022K1.02	Containment Cooling	3.7	3.5	Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between (SYSTEM) and the following:(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)	SEC/remote monitoring systems
026A4.05	Containment Spray	3.5	3.5	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)	Containment spray reset switches
039A2.04	Main and Reheat Steam	3.4	3.7	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SYSTEM) and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)	Malfunctioning steam dump
039K5.05	Main and Reheat Steam	2.7	3.1	Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (SYSTEM):(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)	Bases for RCS cooldown limits
059K4.13	Main Feedwater	2.9	2.9	Knowledge of (SYSTEM) design feature(s) and or interlock(s) which provide for the following:(CFR: 41.7)	Feedwater fill for S/G upon loss of RCPs
061K3.01	Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater	4.4	4.6	Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SYSTEM) will have on the following:(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)	RCS







ES-401, REV 9			T2G	1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE	FORM ES-401-		
KA	NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:		IR	K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G	TOPIC:		
		RO	SRO				
061K5.01	Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater	3.6	3.9		Relationship between AFW flow and RCS heat transfer		
				Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (SYSTEM):(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)			
062G2.4.46	AC Electrical Distribution	4.2	4.2		Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the		
				This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	plant conditions.		
062G2.4.9	AC Electrical Distribution	3.8	4.2	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Knowledge of low power / shutdown implications in accident (e.g. LOCA or loss of RHR) mitigation strategies.		
063A4.01	DC Electrical Distribution	2.8	3.1	Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)	Major breakers and control power fuses		
064A3.05	Emergency Diesel Generator	2.8	2.9		Operation of the governor control of frequency and		
				Ability to monitor automatic operations of the (SYSTEM) including:(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)	voltage control in parallel operation		
064K4.10	Emergency Diesel Generator	3.5	4.0		Automatic load sequencer: blackout		
				Knowledge of (SYSTEM) design feature(s) and or interlock(s) which provide for the following:(CFR: 41.7)			
073K3.01	Process Radiation Monitoring	3.6	4.2		Radioactive effluent releases		
				Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SYSTEM) will have on the following:(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)			







ES-401, REV 9 **FORM ES-401-2 T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE** KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC: RO SRO 076K1.16 Service Water ESF 3.6 3.8 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between (SYSTEM) and the following:(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) 078K2.01 2.7 2.9 Instrument Air Instrument air compressor Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following:(CFR: 41.7) 103A3.01 Containment Containment isolation 3.9 4.2 Ability to monitor automatic operations of the (SYSTEM) including:(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)







ES-401, REV 9			T2G	2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE	FORM ES-401-	
KA	NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:		IR	K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G	TOPIC:	
		RO	SRO			
001A2.07	Control Rod Drive	4.1	4.4		Effect of reactor trip on primary and secondary parameters and systems	
				Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SYSTEM) and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)		
002A4.02	Reactor Coolant	4.3	4.5		Indications necessary to verify natural circulation from	
				Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)	appropriate level, flow and temperature indications and valve positions upon loss of forced circulation	
011K6.05	Pressurizer Level Control	3.1	3.7		Function of PZR level gauges as postaccident monitors	
				Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the (SYSTEM):(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)		
016K5.01	Non-nuclear Instrumentation	2.7	2.8		Separation of control and protection circuits	
				Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (SYSTEM):(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)		
027G2.4.31	Containment Iodine Removal	4.2	4.1		Knowledge of annunciators alarms, indications or	
				This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	response procedures	
028K3.01	Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge	3.3	4.0		Hydrogen concentration in containment	
·	Control			Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SYSTEM) will have on the following:(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)		







ES-401, REV 9			T26	2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE	FORM ES-401-2	
KA	NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:		IR	K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G	TOPIC:	
		RO	SRC	)		
035A1.01	Steam Generator	3.6	3.8		S/G wide and narrow range level during startup,	
				Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the (SYSTEM) controls including:(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)	shutdown and normal operations	
072K1.05	Area Radiation Monitoring	2.8	2.9		MRSS	
				Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between (SYSTEM) and the following:(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)		
075K4.01	Circulating Water	2.5	2.8		Heat sink	
				Knowledge of (SYSTEM) design feature(s) and or interlock(s) which provide for the following:(CFR: 41.7)		
086A3.01	Fire Protection	2.9	3.3	Ability to monitor automatic operations of the (SYSTEM) including:(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)	Starting mechanisms of fire water pumps	







ES-401, REV 9		<b>T3 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE</b>			FORM ES-401-2
КА	NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:	IR		K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G	TOPIC:
		RO	SRO		
G2.1.17	Conduct of operations	3.9	4.0	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Ability to make accurate, clear and concise verbal reports.
G2.1.18	Conduct of operations	3.6	3.8	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Ability to make accurate, clear and concise logs, records, status boards and reports.
G2.1.43	Conduct of operations	4.1	4.3	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Ability to use procedures to determine the effects on reactivity of plant changes
G2.2.14	Equipment Control	3.9	4.3	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Knowledge of the process for controlling equipment configuration or status
G2.2.37	Equipment Control	3.6	4.6	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment
G2.3.11	Radiation Control	3.8	4.3	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Ability to control radiation releases.
G2.3.5	Radiation Control	2.9	2.9	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Ability to use radiation monitoring systems







ES-401, REV 9			T;	B PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE	FORM ES-401-2
KA	NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:		IR	K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G	TOPIC:
		RO	SRC	)	
G2.3.7	Radiation Control	3.5	3.6	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions
G2.4.30	Emergency Procedures/Plans	2.7	4.1	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Knowledge of events related to system operations/status that must be reported to internal orginizations or outside agencies.
G2.4.32	Emergency Procedures/Plans	3.6	4.0	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Knowledge of operator response to loss of all annunciators.







ES-401, RE	EV 9	S	RO T	1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE	FORM ES-40		
KA	NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:	_	IR	K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G	TOPIC:		
		RO	SRC	)			
008AG2.4.6	Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3	3.7	4.7	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Knowledge symptom based EOP mitigation strategies.		
015AA2.10	RCP Malfunctions / 4	3.7	3.7		When to secure RCPs on loss of cooling or seal injection		
				Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)			
026AG2.2.44	Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8	4.2	4.4	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions		
054AA2.04	Loss of Main Feedwater / 4	4.2	4.3		Proper operation of AFW pumps and regulating valves		
				Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)			
062AG2.2.36	Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4	3.1	4.2	This is a Generic, no stern statement is associated.	Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions of operations		
WE04EA2.1	LOCA Outside Containment / 3	3.4	4.3	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to (EMERGENCY PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)	Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations		







ES-401, RE	V 9 ·	S	RO T	1G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE	FORM ES-401		
КА	NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:	RO	IR SRC	K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G	TOPIC:		
001 <b>AA</b> 2.03	Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1	4.5	4.8	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)	Proper actions to be taken if automatic safety functions have not taken place		
003AA2.03	Dropped Control Rod / 1	3.6	3.8	Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to ABNORMAL PLANT EVOLUTION):(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)	Dropped rod, using in-core/ex-core instrumentation in- core or loop temperature measurements		
037AG2.4.8	Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3	3.8	4.5	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs.		
we08EG2.2.25	6 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4	3.2	4.2	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.		







ES-401, RI	EV 9	S	RO T	2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE	FORM ES-401		
KA	NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:	:	IR	K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G	TOPIC:		
		RO	SRC	)			
013G2.2.42	Engineered Safety Features Actuation	3.9	4.6	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry- level conditions for Technical Specifications		
062G2.4.6	AC Electrical Distribution	3.7	4.7	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Knowledge symptom based EOP mitigation strategies.		
064A2.13	Emergency Diesel Generator	2.6	2.8	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SYSTEM) and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)	Consequences of opening auxiliary feeder bus (ED/G sub supply)		
073G2.4.8	Process Radiation Monitoring	3.8	4.5	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs.		
078A2.01	Instrument Air	2.4	2.9	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SYSTEM) and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)	Air dryer and filter malfunctions		







ES-401, RI	EV 9	SRO	T2G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE	FORM ES-401		
KA	NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:	IR	K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G	TOPIC:		
		RO SR	0			
001G2.4.34	Control Rod Drive	4.2 4.1	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Knowledge of RO tasks performed outside the main control room during an emergency and the resultant operational effects		
034A2.03	Fuel Handling Equipment	3.3 4.0	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SYSTEM) and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)	Mispositioned fuel element		
068A2.04	Liquid Radwaste	3.3 3.3	Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SYSTEM) and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operation:(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)	Failure of automatic isolation		







ES-401, F	REV 9		SRO	T3 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE	FORM ES-401		
KA	NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION:		IR	K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G	TOPIC:		
		RO	SRO				
G2.1.27	Conduct of operations	3.9	4	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Knowledge of system purpose and or function.		
G2.1.34	Conduct of operations	2.7	3.5	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Knowledge of primary and secondary chemistry limits		
G2.2.38	Equipment Control	3.6	4.5	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license.		
G2.3.13	Radiation Control	3.4	3.8	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties		
G2.3.14	Radiation Control	3.4	3.8	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities		
G2.4.20	Emergency Procedures/Plans	3.8	4.3	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Knowledge of operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions and notes.		
G2.4.41	Emergency Procedures/Plans	2.9	4.6	This is a Generic, no stem statement is associated.	Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications.		

Tier/Group	Randomly Selected K/A	Reason for Rejection
2/2	002 A4.04	Reject. Filling RHR (LPI) pumps during refueling is testing minutia. Filling of the pumps happens transparently when filling the system. It's not really a different evolution.
		Resolution: Replaced with 002 A4.02.
2/1	003 G2.4.41	Reject because ROs are NOT responsible for determining EAL classifications. Also reject because there are no EAL classifications related to RCPs.
		Resolution: Replaced with 003 G2.1.7.
2/1	004 A3.01	Due to a computer sampling error, this K/A was replaced with 004 K2.05, which is what we wrote a question to. Chief Examiner accepted.
2/1	005 K5.02	May be difficult to write to because there are no operationally- relevant links for RHE to subcooling.
		Resolution: Attempt to write the question.
SRO 1/1	008 AG2.2.38	Will be hard to match this K/A. There is no firm link between the facility license and a PZR Vapor Space Accident.
		Resolution: Replaced with 008 AG2.4.6.
1/1	011 EK1.01	Reject because reflux boiling is N/A for a LBLOCA. Only applies to a SBLOCA.
		Resolution: Replaced with 011 EK3.15.
2/1	012 Кб.07	Reject because VCSNS does not have a "core protection calculator." This is a CE design.
		Resolution: Replaced with 012 K4.01.
1/1	015 AK2.07	This K/A was duplicated on the final outline, but was not on the original outline, nor was it on the original ES-401-4.
		Resolution: Replaced with 040 G2.2.25
2/1	022 K1.04	Cannot write a question that will be a 100% match to the K/A. VCSNS does not use Chilled Water for Containment Cooling. We could write a question to Industrial Cooling or SW.
		Resolution: Originally replaced with 022 K6.08, which had an RO Importance Value of 1.9. 022 K6.08 was replaced with 022 A4.05.

SRO 1/1	026 AG2.4.34	Reject because at VCSNS we do not have any RO tasks outside of the CR for a Loss of CCW.
		Resolution: Was supposed to be replaced with 026 AG2.2.44; however, final outline still contained 026 AG2.4.34. We wrote to 026 AG2.2.44, which Chief Examiner accepted.
1/1	027 AK3.02	We don't "shift flow chart transmitters" and have no alternate PZR PCS transmitters at VCSNS.
		Resolution: Was supposed to be replaced with 027 AA2.03, but was actually replaced with 027AK2.03. We wrote a question to 027 AK2.03, which the Chief Examiner accepted.
2/2	027 G2.4.1	Will be hard to match this K/A. VCSNS does not have any EOP Entry Conditions (or Symptoms) or IOAs related to Containment Iodine Removal.
		Resolution: Replaced with 027 G2.4.31
2/2	028 K3.01	Recombiners are no longer in service.
		Resolution: Replaced with 029 K3.01
1/1	029 EK1.02	In order to provide a 100% match to the K/A, we run the risk of a GFES style question that may be LOD=1.
		Resolution: Attempt a question. Notify Chief if LOD=1.
1/2	033 AG2.2.21	Will be difficult to write an RO question to "surveillance" in the AOP for Loss of IR. Normally, "surveillance space" is for SRO Only. The AOP does not prompt operators to perform any STPs, nor GTP-702 tracking. At best, we might be able to get to the RO level with a Op Test done after the failed channel was repaired.
		Resolution: Replaced with 033 AG2.4.11.
SRO 2/2	034 G2.4.6	Reject because at VCSNS we have NO actions for operating FH Equipment in our EOPs. Is it appropriate to write question to an AOP?
		Resolution: Replaced with 034 A2.03.
1/1	038 EK1.04	Reject because reflux boiling during a SGTR is not operationally relevant. It is not considered in the EOP-4.0 (E-3) series, and is
		not a cooling mechanism that impacts on operator actions. Resolution: Replaced with 038 EK1.01.
2/1	039 K5.08	Due to a computer sampling error, this K/A was replaced with 039 A2.04, which is what we wrote a question to. Chief Examiner accepted.

1/1	040AG2.2.2	Appears to have been replaced with a duplicate 015 AK2.07 on the final outline as part of the oversampling issue document under WE12 EK2.2. The duplicate 015 AK2.07 was replaced with 040 G2.2.25.
1/1	040 G2.2.25	K/A is SRO Only.
2/1	061 K5.05	Resolution: Replaced with 058 G2.1.7 Due to a computer sampling error, the low-level K/A statements for APEs and EPEs were incorrectly mixed with the high level statements of the system. Given that, we wrote a question that more closely matched 061 K5.01, which the Chief Examiner accepted.
2/1	064 K4.04	Due to a computer sampling error, this K/A was replaced with 063 A3.05, which is what we wrote a question to. Chief Examiner accepted.
3	G2.1.18	Reject because this Generic is also selected on this exam (RO). It may be difficult to write an appropriate SRO Only question.
3	G2.2.11	Resolution: Replaced with G2.1.34Will be hard to write an RO question to this K/A. At VCSNS, ROs are not involved in the <i>process</i> for temporary mods. They may operate a temporary mod, but only Scheduling SROs or the Procedure Writing group would be involved in the process. At the RO level, we run the risk of a LOD = 1.
		Resolution: Replaced with G2.2.14
1/2	WE03 G.2.41	(Believe this is supposed to be 2.4.41 vs. 2.4 on the outline). Reject because ROs are NOT responsible for determining EAL classifications for a LOCA. May be able to write a high-level question on either 1) order of severity of the 4 classifications OR 2) 15 minutes to declare after the event. With either case, will run the risk of LOD = 1.
		Resolution: Replaced with WE03 G2.4.21.
1/1	WE12 EK2.2	On the RO exam, the generator selected APE 040 and then selected EPE E12. We were informed in 2007 that the topics are considered 1 line item, and therefore, if either of those items is selected, the other should remain unavailable until all other available topics are selected at least 1 time. (This was supported by Headquarters) In this case, topics 007, 009, 025, and E11 were not selected for tier 1 Group 1, but 040 and E12 were each selected. This may be considered excessive overlap or inadequate sampling.
		Resolution: Replaced with 025 AK1.01

ES-401

## Written Examination Quality Checklist

Form ES-401-6

<ul> <li>a. NRC K/As are referenced for all questions. b. Facility learning objectives are referenced as available.</li> <li>3. SRO questions are appropriate in accordance with Section D.2.d of ES-401</li> <li>4. The sampling process was random and systematic (If more than 4 RO or 2 SRO questions were repeated from the last 2 NRC licensing exams, consult the NRR OL program office).</li> <li>5. Question duplication from the license screening/audit exam was controlled as indicated below (check the item that applies) and appears appropriate: the audit exam was systematically and randomly developed; or the audit exam was sompleted before the license exam was started; or the examinations were developed independently; or the licensee certifies that there is no duplication; or other (explain)</li> <li>6. Bank use meets limits (no more than 75 percent from the bank, at least 10 percent new, and the rest new or modified); enter the actual RO / SRO-only question distribution(s) at right.</li> <li>7. Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RO exam are written at the comprehension/ analysis level; the SRO exam may exceed 60 percent if the randomly selected K/As support the higher cognitive levels; enter the actual RO / SRO question distribution(s) at right.</li> <li>7. Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RO exam are written at the comprehension/ analysis level; the SRO exam may exceed 60 percent if the randomly selected K/As support the higher cognitive levels; enter the actual RO / SRO question distribution(s) at right.</li> <li>8. Memory</li> <li>6. C/A</li> <li>6. Bank use meets limits (no more than 75 percent fithe randomly selected K/As support the higher cognitive levels; enter the actual RO / SRO question distribution(s) at right.</li> <li>7. Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RO exam are written at the comprehension/ analysis level; the SRO exam may exceed 60 percent if the randomly selected K/As support the higher cognitive levels; enter the actual RO / SRO question distribu</li></ul>	   
1.       Questions and answers are technically accurate and applicable to the facility.       PEE       PEE         2.       a.       NRC K/As are referenced for all questions.       PEE       PEE         3.       SRO questions are appropriate in accordance with Section D.2.d of ES-401       PEE       PEE         4.       The sampling process was random and systematic (If more than 4 RO or 2 SRO questions were repeated from the last 2 NRC licensing exams, consult the NRR OL program office).       PEE       PEE         5.       Question duplication from the license screening/audit exam was controlled as indicated below (check the item that applies) and appears appropriate:       PEE       PEE	m m
b.Facility learning objectives are referenced as available. $I142$ 3.SRO questions are appropriate in accordance with Section D.2.d of ES-401 $I221$ 4.The sampling process was random and systematic (If more than 4 RO or 2 SRO questions were repeated from the last 2 NRC licensing exams, consult the NRR OL program office). $I642$ 5.Question duplication from the license screening/audit exam was controlled as indicated below (check the item that applies) and appears appropriate: the audit exam was systematically and randomly developed; or the audit exam was completed before the license exam was started; or the examinations were developed independently; or d the licensee certifies that there is no duplication; or other (explain) $I644$ 6.Bank use meets limits (no more than 75 percent from the bank, at least 10 percent new, and the rest new or modified); enter the actual RO / SRO-only question distribution(s) at right.BankModified MemoryNew $I2 + if$ 7.Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RO exam are written at the comprehension/ analysis level; the SRO exam may exceed 60 percent if the randomly selected K/As support the higher cognitive levels; enter the actual RO / SRO question distribution(s) at right.Memory $C/A$ $I644$ 8.References/handouts provided do not give away answers $I643$ $I7$ $I2.74/$ $I644$ $I644$	m
<ul> <li>4. The sampling process was random and systematic (If more than 4 RO or 2 SRO questions were repeated from the last 2 NRC licensing exams, consult the NRR OL program office).</li> <li>5. Question duplication from the license screening/audit exam was controlled as indicated below (check the item that applies) and appears appropriate: the audit exam was systematically and randomly developed; or the audit exam was completed before the license exam was started; or the audit exam was completed before the license exam was started; or the audit exam was completed before the license exam was started; or the licensee certifies that there is no duplication; or other (explain)</li> <li>6. Bank use meets limits (no more than 75 percent from the bank, at least 10 percent new, and the rest new or modified); enter the actual RO / SRO-only question distribution(s) at right.</li> <li>7. Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RO exam may exceed 60 percent if the randomly selected K/As support the higher cognitive levels; enter the actual RO / SRO question distribution(s) at right.</li> <li>8. References/handouts provided do not give away answers</li> </ul>	
<ul> <li>The sampling process was random and systematic (in the train + NC of 2 of C questions) + E + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +</li></ul>	m
as indicated below (check the item that applies) and appears appropriate: the audit exam was systematically and randomly developed; or the audit exam was completed before the license exam was started; or the examinations were developed independently; or Y the licensee certifies that there is no duplication; or other (explain) $k \neq w$ $k \neq k$ 6.Bank use meets limits (no more than 75 percent from the bank, at least 10 percent new, and the rest new or modified); enter the actual RO / SRO-only question distribution(s) at right.BankModifiedNew $k \neq w$ $k \neq w$ $k \neq w$ 7.Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RO exam are written at the comprehension/ analysis level; the SRO exam may exceed 60 percent if the randomly selected K/As support the higher cognitive levels; enter the actual RO / SRO question distribution(s) at right.Memory $C/A$ $k \neq w$ $k \neq w$ $k \neq w$ 8.References/handouts provided do not give away answers $k \neq w$ $k \neq w$	
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<ul> <li>exam are written at the comprehension/ analysis level; the SRO exam may exceed 60 percent if the randomly selected K/As support the higher cognitive levels; enter the actual RO / SRO question distribution(s) at right.</li> <li>8. References/handouts provided do not give away answers</li> </ul>	m
<ul> <li>the SRO exam may exceed 60 percent if the randomly selected K/As support the higher cognitive levels; enter the actual RO / SRO question distribution(s) at right.</li> <li>8. References/handouts provided do not give away answers</li> </ul>	
8. References/handouts provided do not give away answers	m
	m
deviations are justified.	m
10. Question psychometric quality and format meet the guidelines in ES Appendix B.	m
11. The exam contains the required number of one-point, multiple choice items;	m
	Date 2/09 2/09 2/09 2/19

ES-401, Page 29 of 33

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## Summer 2008-301

- I				——————————————————————————————————————		=								6.			
Q#/	1. LOK	2. LOD	3	. Psycr	nome	tric Fla	ws	4. Job Content Flaws					5. Other		7.		
		(1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link									
	structions efer to Section D of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts.]																
1.																	
<ol> <li>Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as enter (F)undamental of (F)undamental of</li></ol>																	
3.	The stem lackś sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information). The stem or distracters contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc). The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements. One or more distracters is not credible. One or more distracters is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem).																
4. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified: The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid K/A but, as written, is not operational in content). The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory). The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons). The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.																	
5.	5. <u>Check questions that are sampled</u> for conformance with the approved K/A and those that are designated SRO-only (K/A and license level mismatches are unacceptable).																
6	Ba	sed or	n the re	viewer	's jud	lgment	, is the q	uestion a	is written	(U)naco	ceptable (r	equiring	g repair	or repla	cement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory?		
7.	At a	a minir	num, e	xplain	any "	U" ratir	ngs (e.g.,	how the	Appendi	x B psy	chometric	attribute	es are r	ot being	met).		
	RO/SRO Combined Question																
NDV CAF WOO DV =	Not pl = No d = Cheo TF = V discri	iscri ck at Vhich mina	minato facility one o tory va	of the alue	follo	Ū		respoi	nses in	blue. i	Do this f	or eac	h ques	tion			

	1-	2.	3	Psych	nome	tric Fla	ws	1	. Job Can	tent Fla	IWS	5.0	Other	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)		Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist,	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
1	С	2	x			×						Ŷ	N	E*	001A2.07 Psychometrics: If distracter A was correct, B would be correct (subsets). If C was correct, D would be correct (subsets). Rewrite stem: "WOOTF describes the required response and the <i>minimum</i> amount of boric acid to be added?" Due to the psychometric flaws, distracters A and C are not plausible. Therefore this Q is U 12/30/08 FACILITY COMMENT: Please type all facility responses in blue. Facility Response: Question revised as suggested Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09: 001 - OK as revised
2	с	2	×			×						Y	Ν	U	001AK1.16 Since the increase in fuel temperature directly inserts negative reactivity through the Doppler effect, one might thing that the power defect has decreased especially if the forget that the total power defect is the product of the overall power coefficient X the change in Rx power. Since they know that Tave has changed (from the initial conditions), "remained the same" is not plausible. Replace "remained the same" with "decreased" in both A and B distracters. This Q is U because of 2 NP distracters. Peer review stated all distracters are non-plausible 12/30/08 Facility Response: Question changed as suggested. Restructured WOOTF based on feedback from 2nd validation. Duplicate Question. We propose using version 002. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09:

-	1.	2.	3	Psyc	home	tric Fla	ws	4	1. Job Cor	ntent Fla	aws	5.0	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	(1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
														1	002 - 3 rd bullet: Change from "after the failure" to "after rods in MAN'
3	c	4										Y	N		002A4.02 No comment (good Q) 12/30/08 Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: 001 - Add power history to make choices A & B more credible.
4	С	2										Y	N	S	003G2.17 No comment 12/30/08 Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: 001 - Choice A; Replace "seal brg temp" with "Seal DF 350 psid" (Avoid DJ w/ SRO question) Choice C: reduce down to "HI/LO annunciato due to high level"
5	C.	2				×						Y	Ζ	U	004A3.15 With energizing only one set of BU heaters, it is NOT plausible for relief valves to be the first thing that happens. Replace distracters A and B. This Q is U because of two NP distracters. 12/30/08 Facility Response: Revised the two NP distractors, re-sequenced distractors from shortest to longest. Revised Feedback section accordingly. Duplicate Question. We propose using version 002. Duplicate Question – This means that, rather than revise the original question; we duplicated, then revised. When we get the second question where we want it, we will delete the first.

	1.	2.	3.	Psyc	home	tric Fla	ws	4	. Job Cor	tent Fla	ws	5.0	other	6	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)		Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
6		L. L.							1						Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: 002 - OK as-is 004K2.05
0	Μ	2	×			×						Y	N	E	LCV-115D is the VCT outlet NOT the RWST to charging pumps. Facility re-verify this Q. This Q is a E (due to no correct answers) until verified. 12/30/08 Facility Response: LCV-115D is RWST-Charging pumps, not VCT outlet. Changed nomenclature to be consistent with EOPs. Table AB3.2 is in error - feedback will be submitted to correct after the exams. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: 001 - Ok as-is
7	с	2	x									Y	N	E S	005K5.02 2 nd bullet states that Mode 4 was "just" entered. Remove Tavg < 350°F from the WOOTF statement. The applicant should be able to figure this out. 12/30/08 Facility Response: This can easily be deleted in Atlanta if necessary. We would prefer to leave it in since it is the complete name of LCO 3.5.3. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: 001 - Ok as-is. Change question to SAT.
8	м	2	x				x					Y	N	E	006A1.09 Distracter C is not plausible because the applicant does no know what the initial gpm was. The term "throttle" could

Q#/	1. LOK	2.	3	Psyc	nome	tric Fla	ws	4	. Job Cor	ntent Fla	aws	5.0	ther	6,	7.
GU#1	(C/A)	(1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
9	С	3										Y	N	SE	<ul> <li>mean increase or decrease. Change throttle to increase flow or decrease flow. State a starting flow in the stem to qualify distracter C. 12/30/08</li> <li><i>Facility Response:</i></li> <li>Added the following bullet to given information:</li> <li><i>RHR Pump 'A' is in service with 3750 gpm flow indicated on FI-602A.</i></li> <li>Also revised last two bullets to give more precise RHF pump conditions - based on validation feedback.</li> <li>Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09:</li> <li>001 - Choice C; Swap 603 &amp; 605 to prevent C from being a subset.</li> <li>007A2.03</li> <li>No comment 12/30/08</li> <li>Facility Response:</li> <li>Based on feedback from validation, 1) added "Due to the transient" in the 3rd bullet and 2) moved the word "rapidly" in the 2nd bullet.</li> <li>Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09:</li> <li>001 - Change WOOTF to "initially."</li> <li>Revise all 4 choices to require only the 1st procedure entered.</li> </ul>
10	с	2										Y	N	s	008A1.03 No comment 12/30/08

-	1.	2	.3	Psyc	nome	tric Fla	ws	4	Job Con	tent Fla	iws	5.0	Ither	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)		Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
														E	Facility Response: Feedback from validation has shown us that this question is not operationally oriented and tests trivia. It is not necessary to know that CCW discharge pressure will be felt through the CCBP. This knowledge is not applied in any of our procedures. Duplicate Question. We propose using version 002. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: 002 - Choice A: for consistency, change "pumps' to 'CCBPs" Subbullets 1 & 2: for consistency, change "operating" to 'running."
11	C	2				x						Ŷ	N	U	008AA1.06 Given bullets 2 and 6 that talk about rad monitor indication: increasing and pressurizer PORV and safety tailpipe temps increasing, renders distracters A and B NP (main steam line leak). Replace distracters A and B or do a better job justifying plausibility This Q is U because there are two NP t. 12/30/08 Facility Response: Revised Choices A & B to "leaking PZR PORV" vs "MSLB." Added last bullet for PRT pressure to allow discrimination between PORV and steam space break. Revised stem and WOOTF based on feedback from validation. Validation feedback was that it was difficult to tell what point in time was being asked. With this in mind, we added "prior to a subsequent Rx Trip/SI" to the end of the WOOTF. Also had questions about what Tavg was doing, so we provided Tavg indication. Duplicate Question. We propose using version 002.

Q#/	1. LOK	LOD	3	. Psycl	nome	tric Fla	WS	4	. Job Cor	tent Fla	ws	5.C	ther	6.	7.
QHI.		(1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: 002 - WOOTF: Add "automatic" before Rx Trip/SI. Remove underline from "charging.'
12	С	2				×						N	N	U	010A2.01 Distracters C and D are NP because of the amber trouble light is on for Gp 2 only. C and D will be ruled out immediately. Replace distracters C and D. KA requires "correct, control, or mitigate" This Q is U because there are two NP distracters and KA not met. 12/30/08 Facility Response: Modified the stem and choices to improve credibility (by distinguishing between control and backup group indications) and by providing actions to terminate the downward trend in PZR pressure. Duplicate Question. We propose using version 002. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: 002 - All 4 choices: underline "decrease and increase
13	М	2										Y	N	S E	011EK3.15 No comment 12/30/08 Facility Response: Feedback from validation indicated that this question is not operationally relevant in that it is not important to know which event may dictate the need for Hot Leg Recirc. It is more operationally relevant to know what part of the core is of concern, which more closely addresses why HLR is implemented. None of the actions in the EOPs require the operators to distinguish between and cold leg and a hot leg break.

~	1. LOK	Z.	3	Psych	ome	tric Fla	WS	4	. Job Cor	ntent Fla	ws	5.0	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	(C/A)	1.00	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
14	c	2				x						Y	N	U	Also, this is true only for a certain regime of cold leg breaks, in which subcooling is lost, not for all breaks. It was felt that this distinction makes it more of an SRO, than RO, knowledge. The actual decision to implement HLR will be made by the TSC, using guidance in PSEG-08, TSC Duties. Knowledge of the criteria in PSEG-08 for making this decision also appears to be more of an SRO, than RO, issue. Duplicate Question. We propose using version 002. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: 002 - Choices B & D: replace "downcomer" with "cold leg nozzles." WOOTF: remove "boiling in the core" – teaching. 011K6.05 Distracter analysis was not completed. Requiring two level transmitters to be operable defeats
															single failure criteria which is common knowledge. Therefore distracters A and C are not plausible. This Q is U because two distracters are NP Why is "462" plausible? May reconsider after CAF. 12/30/08 Facility Response: Replaced question. Duplicate Question. We propose using version 002. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: 002 - OK as-is
15	С	2		x								Y	N	E	012K4.01 Check to make sure this Q is not double jeopardy with 011K6.05. Otherwise this Q is OK. 12/30/08

	1.	2	3	Psych	name	tric Fla	ws		. Job Cor	ntent Fla	aws	5.0	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)		Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
16	c	2					x					Y	N	E	<ul> <li>Facility Response:</li> <li>This question is not DJ w/ 011 K6.05 because it tests a separate T.S. and different operability requirements.</li> <li>Capitalized "remaining" in stem because at least two validators overlooked it.</li> <li>Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09:</li> <li>001 - Last bullet: Add "associated b/s have been tripped"</li> <li>Change initial power level to 25%.</li> <li>WOOTF: Remove "when/if"</li> <li>Change answer to B</li> <li>012K6.10</li> <li>Change C and D beginning to read "under current conditions). Delete "provided both of the two" from both distracters. This is teaching.</li> <li>12/30/08</li> <li>Facility Response:</li> <li>Revised as suggested. Resequenced choices from shortest to longest. Resequenced Distractor Analysis accordingly.</li> <li>Duplicate Question. We propose using version 002.</li> <li>Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09;</li> <li>002 - WOOTF: Change "impact" to "result"</li> <li>Add bullet: "All remaining PZR pressure transmitters</li> </ul>

	1.	2.	3	Psyc	home	etric Fla	aws	-	1. Job Cor	tent Fla	IWS	5. O	ther	6.	7.
0#/	LOK (C/A)	(1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
17	C	2	×									Y	N	E	Indicate 1950 psig and slowly decreasing Choices A: Change "auto opening of PZR PORVs is reset" to "PZR PORV 445B logic changes state." Choice C: change "auto opening of PZR PORvs is unaffected" to "PZR PORV 445B will auto open." 013K6.01 Stem: There is no statement to complete as stated in the WWOTF statements. Delete the first WWOTF statements 12/30/08 Facility Response: Revised as suggested. Feedback from validation tells us that it is trivial to require ROs to know that HI-3 is bypassed versus tripped. Would like to provide T.S. 3.3.2 & T.S. Table 3.3-3 as references. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: 001 - Ok with REF PROVIDED, limit to pages 3-17, 3-18 3-23, 3-24. Make 1 st part of WOOTF to the last bullet Make choices into a table format with "HIGH-1" and HIGH-3 as headers.
18	С	3										Y	N	S	015AK2.07 No comment 12/31/08 Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09:

	1.	2.	3	. Psycl	home	tric Fla	IWS	4	4. Job Cor	tent Fla	ws	5. C	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus		T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
19	C*	3										Y	N	E	016K5.01 * This is a C question due to the involvement of using the flow chart. This is NOT a memory Q. Change M to C 12/31/08 Facility Response: Revised as suggested. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: 001 - 2 nd bullet: delete 2 nd part of bullet. WOOTF: add "a set of signals." Remove "could be."
20	Μ	2				×						Y	N	E	<ul> <li>022A4.05</li> <li>In distracters C and D, by telling the applicant that you average the 3 Temp elements, you are teaching.</li> <li>A and B are questionable because of the complexity of attachment III of OAP-106.1.</li> <li>All of the 1st parts are OK</li> <li>Suggestion for 2nd part.:</li> <li>A. The sum of all the temperature elements divided by the averages calculated at each elevation.</li> <li>B. The sum of all the temperature elements divided by the averages calculated at each elevation.</li> <li>C. The average of the averages calculated at each elevation.</li> <li>D. The average of the averages calculated at each elevation</li> <li>D. The average of the averages calculated at each elevation</li> <li>You do NOT need to say the average of the 3 temperature elements at each elevation because it is implied in the second part</li> <li>12/31/08</li> <li>Facility Response:</li> <li>Version 001 - Deleted "nine" from Choices A &amp; B. Changed the 2nd part of Choices C &amp; D to read as suggested above.</li> </ul>

~~~	1,	2.	3	Psych	ome	tric Fla	WS	4	. Job Con	tent Fla	aws	5. C	ther	6.	7,
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															Feedback from validation indicated that we are testing ROs on T.S. surveillance requirements, which should be reserved for SROs. Additionally, as written, this is one of 2 questions on the RO exam which specifically requires knowledge of manual log-taking (see G2.1.18). With Auto-Log, all of the calculations are done transparent to the operator. Since operators rarely take manual logs, we feel that two manual log questions over emphasize this topic. With these issues in mind, we revised second part of all choices to make it more of a conceptual approach versus a specific distinction in how the surveillance is met. Duplicate Question. We propose using version 003. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: Version 003 OK as-is
21	C	2										N	N	UE	022AA2.02 The 2 nd part of the KA is not met (based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control) This Q is U because the KA is not completely satisfied. 12/31/08 Facility Response: The actual wording to K/A 022 AA2.02 is: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: Charging Pump Problems. This question was written to this K/A. The description of the K/A in the Notes section of this questions was copied from the original outline that you gave to us. The original outline contained errors in the stem statements of the K/A in that the <u>stem statements</u> for all APEs and EPEs were from the system, not the APE or EPE. Corrected the K/A wording in the Notes section. Do not believe any other changes are required.

~~~	1	2.	3	. Psyc	home	etric Fla	aws		4. Job Cor	ntent Fla	aws	5. C	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus		T/F	Cred Dist	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															Feedback from 2nd validation has identified several psychometric issues. Examinees felt that the question was implying that actual VCT level was 100%; therefore, with VCT at 100%, gas binding could not occur. Also, if VCT level just failed, how could the NROATC immediately note the given charging pump paramaters? Additionally, the given parameters may not be entirely consistent with gas binding. At least in the early phases of gas binding, the charging pump parameters should be fluctuating. Question was revised to attempt to alleviate these concerns. Duplicate Question. We propose using version 002. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: 002 - WOOTF: Add (charging pump lineup." Choice A; Change to "The divert valve failed to shift to the RHUT" Choice B: Change to "suction shifted to RWST" Change top statement to: "sequence of events" Remove last bullet – not needed. Next to last bullet: Remove "At direction of NROATC" Need to change grading of question from UNSAT to E.
22	м	2										?	N	E	022K1.02 The KA is to write a Q relating containment cooling and remote monitoring systems. I do not see a connection to this KA from the way this Q is written. CAF: Justify 12/31/08 Facility Response:

~~~	1.	2.	3	Psyc	home	tric Fla	IWS	4	1 Job Cor	ntent Fla	iws	5. C	ther	6.	7,
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus		T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															Rewrote question to address a cause-effect relationship. Duplicate Question. We propose using version 003. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: Version 003 as-is This question was evaluated as E due to the ambiguity of "SEC" in the K/A.
23	М	2										Y	N	S E	024AK2.01 No comment 12/31/08 Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: 001 - Simplified stem by deleting unnecessary given info and factoring "if BA filter will not pass flow" into the WOOTF:
24	С	2	x				×					Y	N	E	025AK1.01 In distracters C and D, there is an action that RHR Pump is started. There are no actions in choices A or B. Why? The stem ask what is the most immediate action. If the action was to start the RHR B pump in C and D then the action has already been completed. Therefore, the Q is misleading. The distracter analysis is not clear on this issue Suggestion: Can the "RHR Pump B Started" be removed from C and D? CAF 12/31/08 Facility Response: If "RHR Pump B is removed from Choice C, it would also be correct, since the T.S action would then be to immediately stop any reduction in boron and restore the required loop to service. Since the RHR pump is started, the LCO is satisfied and no action is required

-	1.	2.	3	Psyc	hame	tric Fla	ws		1. Job Cor	ntent Fla	ws	5.0	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															'RHR Pump B is started" was included in the correct answer to balance with Choice C. It will make no difference to the correct answer. In either event, immediate action is required (see Actions a & b in T.S. 3.4.1.4.1). We can change in Atlanta if necessary. Also note that we revised Choice C's SG levels to mee the limitations of TSR 1032 for T.S. 3.4.1.4.1.b. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: 001 - WOOTF: Changed to better solicit answers.
25	М	1*										Y	N	E	026A4.05 The requirement to depress both RB spray pushbuttons is common knowledge. CAF: Please explain why this Q has DV. *The distracter analysis did not do a good job justifying DV This Q is E pending facility explanation. 12/31/08 Facility Response: Rewrote Question Duplicate Question. We propose version 002.

-	1.	2.	3	Psych	nome	tric Fla	ws	4	. Job Cor	tent Fla	aws	5.0	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
26	C	2	x				x					Y	2	E	Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: 002 - Reduce given info to: • Due to LOCA, RB press peaked at 18 and is now 2.5 • During EOPs, went to 14.0, and is now in EOP-1.2 Remove last bullet (TSC recommends) – not needed. WOOTF: Minor rewording.
															Common knowledge dictates that CCW is needed for RCPs. Distracter A is NP. Replace A and remove "if any" from stem. 12/31/08 Facility Response: While we agree that it may be considered common knowledge that CCW is needed for the <u>RCPs</u> , this question is asking about operation of <u>charging</u> pumps. Replaced Distractors A & B (for balance), and replaced Distractor C with Distractor B (more credible). Revised the stem by removing local temps and trends, otherwise, with the given temps, we would be requiring them to know the limits of an AOP Attachment from memory. Feedback from 2nd validation indicated that Choice C may also be viewed as correct (since the WOOTF did not specify "preferred order" or "sequence" or "NEXT/FIRST action). We did not go with "NEXT/FIRST" because it seemed inconsistent with the wording of new Choices A & B. With this in mind, we added the last statement "(Assume actions are taken as prescribed in AOP-118.1)." Duplicate Question. We propose using 002. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09:

	1.	2.	3	Psych	nome	tric Fla	aws		4. Job Cor	ntent Fla	aws	5. C	Other	6,	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															002 - 3 rd bullet; Add "no temperature limits are exceeded" Choice B: Change '90' to '20" minutes. Delete last 3 bullets (B Cg pp P-T-L, Letdown status, and downpower in progress. – not needed. WOOTF: add "preferred." Delete "(Assume actions taken)" because IAW AOP in WOOTF is sufficient.
27	C	2	x				×					Y	Ν		027AK2.03 Distracter D is NP as written. "0% open" is unnatural. If the was the correct answer, it would read closed. For A,B, and C add the word OPEN. For D make it read "CLOSED." 12/31/08 Facility Response: Revised as suggested. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: 001 - ALL 4 choices; Move "approx" and "open" to WOOTF.

	1.	2	3	Psych	home	tric Fla	IWS		1. Job Con	tent Fla	aws	5.0	Other	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
28	с	3					1					Y	N	S E	Make 2 nd half of all choices: 80, 30, 80, 30. " 027G2.4.31 No comments (Good Question) 12/31/08 Facility Response:
															Feedback from validation indicated that normal practice for this alarm is to have one of the Auxiliary Building AOs to valve in the local gauge glass and provide the Control Room with a local indication. When low level alarm comes in, they use the gauge glass to determine if they are still within T.S limits since the gauge glass is the method used in STP- 112.009 to verify the volume is above within the limits of T.S. 3.6.2.2. Added bullet #3 to reflect that practice. This still requires the examinee to use Figure VI-27. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: 001 - All 4 choices: Delete 2 decimal places. WOOTF: Add T.S 3.6.2.2.
29	C*	3										Y	N	E	 * This is a C question due to the involvement of using figure 15.4-73. This is NOT a memory Q. Change M to C * This is NOT a memory Q. Change M to C * 12/31/08 Facility Response: Feedback from validation indicated that, as written, this question was not operationally oriented in that it tested knowledge of a specific point on a curve in the FSAR. This curve is not in the Station Curve Book and would not be used by operators after a LBLOCA. It postulated an extremely low probability event - both recombiners failed or OOS. Additionally, the TSC would be primarily responsible for monitoring H2 concentration after a LBLOCA. The recombiners have

~	1.	2	3	Psych	ome	tric Fla	WS	4	. Job Con	itent Fla	ws	5. C	ther	6	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)		Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															been removed from T.S., which further reduces relevance to an operator. Would like a new K/A. Atlanta Review (RFA approved) 06/03/09: Annotate on 401-4 that Recombiners are no longer in service. K/A replaced. Replace with 029 K3.01. Added initial ARP corrective actions to stem of 029 K3.01. Modified all choices to improve psychometrics and eliminate subsets. (Approved by RFA on 6/18/09)
30	M	2				×						Y	z	E	029EK1.02 A slight contradiction: The EOP subcriticality flow chart states that the SUR has to be zero or negative. Zero would make choice C a correct answer too. CAF there are potentially two correct answers. Please re- evaluate this potential contradiction. This Question is E* until this issue is resolved. 12/31/08 Facility Response: Feedback from validation has indicated that we are testing SRO knowledge. ROs should not be required t know transition criteria <u>out</u> of EOP-13.0. Revised question to test Entry Conditions (which <u>is</u> RO knowledge) vs transition criteria (which is more often SRO knowledge). Duplicate Question. We propose using version 003. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09:

-	1.	2.	3	Psych	nome	tric Fla	ws	4	L Job Cor	tent Fla	ws	5 C	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
21									1.0						002 - WOOTF: Change to "LOWEST" Make choices +0.2, 0.0, -0.2, -0.33. WOOTF: Change "(assume other parametersexist) t "NO CSF Red paths conditions exist.' 033G2.4.11
31	C	2					x					Ŷ	N	E	The distracter analysis states that 12-15% is plausible because this is the next incremental power ascension and would be the correct action if the failure had occurred just above 10%. The reference material provided did not support this statement. CAF: Provide reference to support distracters B and D. 12/31/08. Facility Response: See GOP-4A, Page 13 of 36. Reference will be provided in Atlanta. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: 001 - WOOTF: Add "maximum allowable power level as limited by T.S. 3.3.1" Delete 3 rd bullet – annunciator SR DET – not needed. Change 2 nd half of B & D to "maintain <15% & split up for readability. Choices A & C: split up for readability.
32	С	3										Y	N	S	035A1.01 No comments 12/31/08 <i>Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09:</i> 001 - OK as-is

	1.	2.	3	Psych	nome	tric Fla	ws	4	I Job Con	tent Fla	aws	5.0	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	(1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
33	C	2	×									Y	Ν	E	038EK1.01 Delete the "and" from the 2 nd bullet Good Q 12/31/08 Facility Response: Feedback from validation indicates that this question is an SRO Only question since distractors B & D test a transition to an ECA (Yellow Path) which is not ECA 0.0. Also, all 4 choices involve procedure selection, which is a 10CFR55.43 item. Duplicate Question. We propose using version 002. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: Revise 002 as follows: Delete last 2 bullets (crew is preparing to C/D; CRS directs RO to calculate target temp w/ allowance for 50F subcooling) and factor into WOOTF. WOOTF: Change to "T/Cs is the target temp, w/ allowance for 50F subcooling.'
34	с	2				x						Y	N	E.	039A2.04 Distracters B and D are not plausible because of the last bullet (C9 status light dim). Suggestion: Render the condensers unavailable by some other means rather than directly with the status light. Maybe give them Cond Vac. This Q is E* because of two NP distracters. 12/31/08

	1.	2.	3.	Psych	ome	tric Fla	ws	4	. Job Con	itent Fla	ws	5. C	ther	6,	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	(1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
25															Facility Response: As suggested, changed "The PERMISV C9 status light is DIM." to "Condenser pressure is 6.0" Hg abs. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: 001 - Ok w/ changes 039K5.05
35	С	3										Ŷ	N	S	No comments 12/31/08 Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: 001 - WOOTF: Add T.S. 3.4.9.
36	М	2										Y	N		040G2.2.25 No comments 01/01/09 Facility Response: We cannot write an RO-level question for this K/A. According to the Region II "SRO Only" document, RO: are only required to know the bases for T.S. Safety Limits. Because a steamline rupture has no impact on either of the T.S. Safety Limits, we could not write an RO question for this K/A. Request a new K/A. Atlanta Review 06/03/09: Replace w/ 058 G2.1.7

-	1.	2.	3	Psyc	nome	tric Fla	iws	4	. Job Cor	itent Fla	iws-	5.0	Other	б.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)		Stem Focus		T/F	Cred Dist	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															Annotate on ES-401-4: as follows: Original K/A was SRO Only. Changed initial power level to improve plausibility of "NOT trip" in choices C & D. Reworded WOOTF and choices for readability and clarity. Added "automatically trip" and "automatically start" to preclude consideration of manual start/trip. (Approved by RFA on 6/18/09)
37	М	2				×						Y	N	U	051AA1.04 Distracter C is NP because the Q has nothing to do with a dropped rod. Distracter D is NP because it is common knowledge that 2/3 channels are required to trip. Consider tripping an OPDT channel in the stem, then D will be plausible. This Q is U because two distracters are NP. 01/01/09 Facility Response: Changed Choices C & D as suggested and resequenced choices from shortest to longest. Also revised Distractor Analysis accordingly. Duplicate question. We propose using version 002. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: 002 - Give name & number of AOP.
38	с	3	-									Y	N	s	054AK3.03 No comments 01/01/09

-	1.	2.	3	. Psycl	home	tric Fla	ws	4	4. Job Cor	ntent Fla	IWS	5.0	Other	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
														E	Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: 001 - Delete 1 st bullet "S/U being conducted IAW" – 2 nd bullet provides enough information.
39	C	2	x									Y	N	E	055EA1.01 Consider deleting everything above the WOOTF statement. Based on the reference provided, none of the bullets seem to impact the selection of the correct answer. 01/01/09 Facility Response: Revised as suggested. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09: 001 - Choice D; Add "and rising" WOOTF: Add title of EOP-6.0. Choice C: To strengthen, add "WR"
40	с	2	x				x					N	N	U E	056AA2.02 The 2 nd part of the KA is not met (based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control) This Q is U because the KA is not completely satisfied. Also on Train "A" where is step 6,7,8 status 01/01/09

~	1.	2	3	Psych	nome	tric Fla	ws	4	, Job Con	tent Fla	aws	5,0	ther	6,	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															 Facility Response: The actual wording to K/A 056 AA2.02 is: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power: ESF load sequencer status lights. This question was written to this K/A. The description of the K/A in the Notes section of this question was copied from the original outline that you gave to us. The original outline contained errors in the descriptions of the K/A in that the <u>descriptions</u> for all APEs and EPEs were from the system, not the APE or EPE. Corrected the K/A wording in the Notes section. Do not believe any other changes are required. Given information for Train 'A' ESFLS is intended to make Choice B more credible. Added a sentence in the Distractor Analysis for Choice B to help clarify this attempt. Added information for Steps 6-8 on Train 'A'. We believe this question should be an Enhancement. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09 001 - WOOTF; Add", if any" Delete "that"
41	С	2					x					Y	N	E	057G2.4.8 Distracter D is NP. One would not say "The operator woul use an AOP to respond to and then refer to an AOF to respond to The way this would be written would be "The operator would use an AOP for both and" Replace distracter D.

	1.	2	3	Psych	nome	tric Fla	c Flaws	100	4. Job Cor	itent Fla	WS	5. C	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	(1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist		Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
42	c	2					×					N	Ν	U	01/02/09 Facility Response: Feedback from validation indicates that we have postulated an extremely low probability event in the given conditions. Changed initial conditions in the given information because having N44 in test at this time is a more operationally likely situation. Also mad minor changes to WOOTF. Duplicate Question. We propose using version 003. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/03/09 Version 003 OK Choices C & D: remove "ONLY" – unnecessary if we ask "initially" in WOOTF. 059K4.13 It is common knowledge that FRV will NOT be in auto with the MT off line. Distracters B and D are NP. Re-write to 059K4.05: Control of speed of MFW pump turbine (2.5/2.8) 01/02/09 Facility Response: Under the conditions stipulated in the stem, the FRVs will be in AUTO. The SOP for shutting down an RCP requires the FRV to be transferred to MANUAL. For this reason, we believe that Distractors B & D are plausible. We believe question should be SAT. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09

a.	1.	2.	3	Psycl	home	tric Fla	IWS	4	. Job Cor	tent Fla	ws	5.0	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	(1-5)	Stem Focus		T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
42															001 - Choices A & B: Change to HI-HI vs HI. Change from UNSAT to E. Stem: Change to MFP 'B' [vs A] because MFP 'A' oil pumps are supplied by 1A1X. 061AK3.02
43	Μ	2										N	Ν		The KA requires the Q to be written to a loss or malfunction of the ARM system alarms and the effect it would have on the ARM system. The Q was written to describe why the ARP directs the operator to refer to FOP-17.2. The Q is U because the KA was not met. 01/02/09 Facility Response: The actual wording to K/A 061 AK3.02 is: Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System Alarms: Guidance contained in alarm response for ARM system. This question was written to this K/A. The description of the K/A in the Notes section of this question was copied from the original outline that you gave to us. The original outline contained errors in that the <u>stem</u> <u>statements</u> for all APEs and EPEs K/As were from the system, not the APE or EPE. Corrected the K/A wording in the Notes section. Do not believe any other changes are required. We believe the question should be SAT. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09 001 - WOOTF: Add "for RM-G7 after "ARP."

	1.	2	3	. Psyc	home	tric Fla	IWS	4	. Job Cor	ntent Fla	aws	5.0	other	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)		Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q≃ K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															Delete 1 st 3 bullets – not needed Change from UNSAT to E.
44	C	2	×				×					Y	N	E	061K3.01 Change the 3 rd bullet to just above where C-9 will be lost. Since circ pumps off, loss of vac is eminent and applicant should recognize this. Currently, distracter A is NP, 01/02/09 Facility Response: Changed value in 3 rd bullet to 5.1. Feedback from validation has indicated that the examinees have had significant difficulties understanding at what point in the event we are trying to evaluate. Restructured given information on SG levels, resequenced the bullets, and changed the WOOTF to ask for a specific time period. Current version is still 001. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09 001 - Choice C: Change to "PZR spray 100% full open setpoint: vs "the setpoint and cycles"
45	М	2										Y	N	S E	061K5.05 No comments 01/02/09 Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09 001 - WOOTF: Add "IAW EOP-1.0)

~	1.	2	3	. Psych	nome	tric Fla	ws	4	. Job Con	tent Fla	W5	5,0	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus		T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															Choice B: Change from "as necessary to stabilize at no load" to "no less than 380 gpm to stop C/D" Change from SAT to E
46	С	3										Y	N	S	062G2.4.46 No comments 01/02/09 <i>Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09</i> <i>001 - OK as-is</i>
47	Μ	2										Y	Ν	S	062G2:4.9 No comments 01/02/09 Facility Response: Based on feedback received in recent validations/reviews, modified question to make it more appropriate for ROs and to avoid conflict with SSP-004 As written, Choice D may also be considered correct. Duplicate Question. We propose using version 002. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09 002 - Choice A: Change from "ONE offsite" to "ONE offsite and 1 DG." Choice B: Since we have "MIN" in WOOTF, delete "ONLY"

10.111	1 min	2.	3	Psych	nome	tric Fla	WS		4. Job Cor	tent Fla	iws	5.0	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stern Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Jab- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
48	Μ	2										N	Ν	U	063A4.01 I cannot think of a breaker that could NOT be opened manually at the breaker. Distracter B is NP. Replace this distracter The KA does NOT appear to be met. The KA requires the knowledge of ability to manually operate breakers from the CR. This Q deals with a breaker that can only be operated locally. This Q is U because KA is not met. 01/02/09 Facility Response: Since the K/A relates to the ability to manually operate from the MCB, it appears that if we require the examinee to recognize that he/she <u>cannot</u> manually operate from the MCB, then the K/A is matched, even i it is sort of a "reverse method." Revised Choice B. Duplicate Question. We propose using version 003. Version 004 may be an acceptable alternative. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09 Choice A: Add "using the pushbutton" Choice B: Add "OR using the p/b at the breaker" Choice D: add "using the open contactor & screwdriver." Chief Examiner accepts use of this question because MCB breakers cannot be operated from the MCB without DC power. Change from UNSAT to E.

	1,	2.	3	Psych	nome	tric Fla	ws	4	. Job Cor	ntent Fla	ws	5.0	ther	6	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)		Stem Focus		T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
49	м	2										Y	N	\$	064A3.05 No comments 01/02/09 Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09 001 - OK as-is
50	c	2					X					Y	N	E	 064K4.10 Distracter B. Since this is an issue if sustained more than 3 seconds, define sustained with a time. Furthermore, the way this is written, if B was correct, A would be also. Currently, distracter B is NP. 01/02/09 Facility Response: Revised Choice B by adding "for 10 (TEN) seconds." Also, needed to change Choice A from 2 to 3 seconds because the ESFLS will not actuate for an additional 2.0 seconds after the UV is sensed (0.25 + 2.0 = 2.25 seconds. See page 50 of 98 of GS-2. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09 001 - Choice B: change from "6780' to "6680' to make it more credible. Choice D: Change from a "single phase" to "two phases." WOOTF: Add "w/ respect to 1DA" and delete "1DA" from Choice D.
51															065AK3.08 I do not think enough information is in the stem. Was the

~~	1.	2.	3	Psych	home	tric Fla	IWS	4	Job Con	tent Fla	iws	5.0	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	(1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
	M	2					x					Ŷ	N		a Rx trip? CAF to resolve/verify 01/02/09 Facility Response: It doesn't appear to matter if we tell them a Reactor Trip has occurred or not. They would still implement AOP-220.1 concurrently with EOP-1.0 (see CAUTION in front of procedure). Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09 001 - 3 rd bullet: delete "response" (to avoid implicating ARPs) WOOTF: Change "done" to "required." Choices C & D: To improve credibility, change wording to "Alternate steaming one SG at a time" Original wording results in a steamline DP – too easily rejected.
52	с	3										Y	N	S	068AA2.02 No comments 01/02/09

-	1.	2	3	Psyc	nome	tric Fla	WS	4	. Job Cor	tent Fla	ews	5.0	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
53	м	2					x					Y	N	E	Facility Response: Based on feedback from validation, revised choices B & D to use more realistic values of emergency boration flow. Duplicate Question. We propose using version 003. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09 Version 003 OK. WOOTF: Add IAW GOP-8. 072K1.05 Consider starting the WOOTF statement with "In
															Consider starting the WOOTF statement with "In accordance with GS-9, WOOTF of the" This will bullet proof the correct answer. 01/02/09 Facility Response: Would like to avoid referencing training materials in th stem of the question. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09 001 - 2 nd bullet: Add "sudden" WOOTF: Change 2 nd half from "over the course of the event" to "after the Rx Trip/SI."
54	М	2					x					Y	N	E	073K3.01 CAF: If the RM-L5 INTERLOCK Switch is placed in OFF, will the discharge terminate? If not, replace distracter A with "The RM-L5 INTERLOCK Switch is placed in OFF" Distracter A is not plausible because there are few system

~ ***	1.	2.	3	Psyc	nome	tric Fla	IWS	4	Job Cor	itent Fla	WS	5. C	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)		Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
55															Ithat isolate on low flow, if any that can recall. 01/02/09 Facility Response: Replaced Choice A as suggested. Had to reword WOOTF because the new choice A is not one of the ARP Probable Causes. Resequenced choices and Distractor Analysis from shortest to longest. Duplicate Question. We propose using 002. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09 002 - WOOTF: Delete "automatically" Add "MINIMUM Choices B & C: "Add Loss of power AND" to increase DV.
55	Μ	1*										Y	Ν	U	Choice A is too obvious. Regardless of what the other three choices were, choice A would be correct. Change A to degraded loop flow condition statement that would have the same effect as a non-operating RCS loop. *This Q is U because of low DV 01/02/09 Facility Response: Revised Choice A as suggested. Resequenced Choices from shortest to longest. Also resequenced distractor analysis. The current version is 002. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09

~ "	1.	2.	3.	Psych	nome	tric Fla	ws	4	4. Job Cor	tent Fla	ws	5. C	other	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)		Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
56	м	2										Y	N	S	002 - WOOTF: Delete "because DNBR cannot be guaranteed to be maintained within limits" – teaching. Also add "per the associated T.S." To better balance choices, change choice D from "a plant transient" to "an instrument failure" 075K4.01 No comments
														E	01/02/09 Facility Response: Due to feedback from validation, we are inappropriately testing detailed knowledge of an SOP Off-Normal section. Additionally, it is possible that power may not be reduced if the circ water conditions (low temps - winter) allowed. This situation would involve significant management input and would not necessarily be as clear-cut as the question originally implied. When we evaluated this K/A, we recognized that the same K/A was selected for the Audit Exam. We thought we could write a different question, but this was more difficult than we thought. The end result was a submitted question that did not really match the K/A, in that it did NOT test knowledge of interlocks or design features - it tested an operational limitation. Rewrote to test an interlock. Duplicate Question. We propose using version 004. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09 004 - WOOTF: Add "the following annunciators, when lit, indication a condition" Choice A: Change "Lube water pump is 15 gpm." to "CW JOCKEY PP TRIP"

	1.	2.	3	. Psyc	nome	tric Fla	ws	4	. Job Cor	ntent Fla	aws	5.0	ther	6,	7.
2#/	LOK (C/A)		Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
									Î						Choice B: Change "valve at mid-position" to "CNDSR A VACUUM LO"
57	C	3				×						N	N	U	 076K1.16 Distracters A and B are not plausible because these components nor any other would trip unless the BO sequencer / loss of power occurred. However, add to the step that EDG load test is running in parallel with the vital bus, a grid disturbance occurs and offsite power is lost causing a reactor trip. All other conditions are the same. This will give plausibility to A and B. It's common knowledge that components load shed to prevent overloading the DG upon re-energizing the bus(s). This Q is U because two distracters are NP. 01/02/09 Facility Response: Revised close to what was suggested. Feedback from validation indicated that Ops would not test D/G 'B' with a leak in SW Loop 'A. Duplicate Questions (2). We propose using version 002. (Also have version 003 - BANK) Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09 Version 002: WOOTF: Change "later" to "following the loss of" Choices: Change wording to make tense consistent.
58	Μ	2					x					Y	N	E	077AK2.02 Why not say that "the Main generator Breaker and Generator Field Breaker will remain CLOSED" for A and C instead of saying "A bumpless transfer to Core 2 will occu This will be in keeping with B and D. 01/02/09 Facility Response: Revised as suggested.

~	1.	2.	3	Psyc	home	tric Fla	ws	4	4. Job Cor	tent Fla	aws	5. C	Other	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
59	M	2											N	8	Duplicate Question. We propose using version 002. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09 002 - WOOTF: Delete "load" since it is already in the choices. WOOTF: remove "voltage regulator" because choices no longer involve the regulator – just the breakers.
	м	2										Y	N	E	No comments 01/02/09 Facility Response: Due to feedback from validation, deleted 3rd bullet (Rx Trip & SI) because it wasn't needed and 1st part of WOOTF (when est. RB I.A.) because it also wasn't needed and caused some confusion. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09 001 - OK as-is
60	М	2					×					Y	N	E	086A3.01 To be consistent with the stem, on distracters C and D: Change the word "used" to "pressurized." 01/02/09 Facility Response: Revised as suggested. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09 001 - WOOTF: Add "FIRST"

	1.	2.	3	Psych	nome	tric Fla	iws	4	Job Cor	tent Fla	aws	5.0	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
61	С	3					x					Y	N	E	 103A3.01 Please explain why distracter A is plausible. The distracte analysis explanation is unacceptable. A phase has occurred. Distracter A is not plausible. 01/02/09 Facility Response: We believe that Distractor A is plausible for several reasons: 1) 1 validator picked Choice A 2) some of the MCB status lights in this area should be dim after an S and 3) the 2nd part of Choice A is correct. Rewrote Distractor Analysis to better establish plausibility. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09 001 - Choices B-D: Change "LIT" to "BRIGHT"
62	C	3					x					Y	N	E	E01EK1.2 Psychometrics: Change distracter D to reflect a CRS decision to be in line with A,B, and C. 01/02/09 Facility Response: Revised Choice D by replacing "crew" with "CRS" Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09 001 - WOOTF: Change "should" to "meets <u>ALL</u> entry conditions." Change A: from "EOP-16.0" to "just entered EOP-15.0 w/ Rx Trip and NO SI" Choice D: Change 1 st CRS" to "crew" and replace "it doesn't appear to be helping" with and the CRS is NO sure that this is the correct procedure" Also, change "without an SI" to "NO SI."

Q#/	1.	2	3	Psyc	home	inc Fla	IWS		1. Job Cor	itent Fla	aws	5. C	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	(1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
63	С	3										Y	N	S E	E03G2.4.21 No comments 01/03/09 <i>Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09</i> <i>001 - Choices B & D: Change '1200" to "10⁴"</i>
64	С	3										Y	N	SE	E04EA1.1 No comments 01/03/09 <i>Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09</i> <i>001 - Add 5th bullet: "SI has not been reset"</i> <i>WOOTF: Add "MINIMUM"</i> <i>Choice C: 1st part – Change "MVG-8888A" to "Train A"</i> <i>– proper nomenclature.</i> <i>Change SAT to E</i>
65	C	3				×						N	N	U	E05EA2.1 Add IAW AOP 15.0 between "action" and "that." This will solidify meeting the 2 nd part of the KA Since bleed and feed are required, A and B are wrong. However, since the word "attempt" is used in both distracters, no action is implied (no success path). Therefore, A and B are NP. Delete the word "attempt" from A and B. Peer comment: C is not plausible either because it is too obvious that the PORVs need to be open – not cycling. This Q is U because two distracters (a and B) are NP 01/03/09 Facility Response: Revised stem and Choices A & B as suggested. Deleted "and close" from Choice C. Additionally,

116.00	100	2,	3.	Psych	nome	tric Fla	WS	4	Job Cor	itent Fla	WS	5. O	ther	б.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
66	C.	3				Dist	x					Y	Ν	1.000	feedback from validation indicated that we could simplify the given information in bullets 3, 4, & 5. Since we tell them in bullet 1 that the plant is in "MODE 3, following a trip," they should <u>know</u> the status of Condensate, MFBPs, and MFWPs (the given bullets are the <u>normal</u> status). Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09 WOOTF: Move title to 2 nd bullet. Remove "WIDE RANGE" from high level bullet. G2.1.17 Distracter B (bee) is not plausible. The use of the phonetic alphabet is common knowledge. Replace distracter B. 01/03/09 Facility Response: In Distractor B, replaced "Place "C (see)" Charging Pump in PULL-TO-LOCK on Train "B (bee)"" with "RCS Tavg is trending towards 557°F" Revised Distractor Analysis accordingly. Duplicate Question. We propose using version 002. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09 WOOTF: add "spoken" and "MINIMUM."

	1.	2.	3	. Psyc	home	tric Fla	ws	4	L Job Cor	itent Fla	aws	5. O	ther	в.	7,
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus		T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
67															ALL Choices: put spoken words in quotations. Choice B: delete "trending towards." G2.1.18
67	Μ	2					x					Y	Ζ		 Psychometric symmetry and distracter A is NP due to its simplicity. Make distracter B look like D but with 75%. Make distracter A look like D but with 60% 01/03/09 Facility Response: Revised Choice B to make it look like D and Choice A to make it look like C. Removed "minimum" aspect from stem. Revised the Distractor Analysis accordingly. Duplicate Question. We propose using version 002. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09 Choices A & C insert "as" before values Choices A & C: delete 'since it is the "in-spec" reading because it is not needed and because it is NP that you would red circle an in-spec reading. WOOTF: Add "<u>MINIMUM</u>"
68	Ċ	3										Y	N	S E	G2.1.43 No comments 01/03/09 Facility Response: Feedback from validation has indicated that we have not provided enough information to ensure that B is the correct answer. The given prediction from the

	1.	2.	3	Psych	home	tric Fla	IWS	4	4. Job Cor	ntent Fla	aws	5. C	ther	6,	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)		Stem Focus	Cues	Ţ/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															ICRR is a normal occurrence during Startups. Reactor Engineering and Ops work together to make a judgement call on whether it is appropriate to make another rod pull. According to Reactor Engineering, they may incrementally reduce the length of the rod pull as they get closer to criticality. As they get closer they will asses if they believe the next increment will achieve criticality. If it appears that they will, and criticality will occur < RIL, then they would apply the GOP-A criteria that is outlined in Choice B. Some validators (and a Reactor Engineer) believed that since there was still 65 steps between RIL and the given Bank C position, that D may be the "best answer." When we added new information in the stem to address these issues, further feedback indicated that we overcomplicated the question. With this in mind, we reduced the scope of the question and made it more straight-forward. Duplicate Question. We propose using version 002. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09 Choice A: At beginning, insert "Suspend positive reactivity additions." Recalculate the ECC. Dliute to criticality" Choice D: Move "continue S/U" to the end.
69	М	2										Y	N	S E	G2.2.14 No comments 01/03/09 <i>Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09</i> <i>WOOTF: Break into two statements:</i> <i>Statement 1: Make it read: " IAW SAP-205"</i>

~	1.	2.	3	. Psych	nome	tric Fla	ws	4	Job Cor	tent Fla	ws	5.0	ther	б.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	(1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															Statement 2: Make it read: "IAW OAP-106.3"
70	Μ	2					x					Y	Z		G2.2.37 The procedure uses the term "racked in" vs. "racked up." If the breakers are closed, it is assumed to be racked in. Distracter B is a subset of A. Make A "racked in and closed." Make be "racked in ONLY." In choices A and B, move the word "only" up front before the word "train." 01/03/09 Facility Response: Revised as suggested. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09
71	м	2										Y	z	S	Choices A & B: Change "ONLY Train 'B' is INOP" to "Initial entry into the LCO for Train 'B' is required at the time when" G2.3.11 No comments 01/03/09 Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09

-	1.	2.	3	Psyc	nome	tric Fla	ews	4	4. Job Cor	ntent Fla	WS	5, C	ther	6,	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
								1-22	Í		1				OK as-is
72	Μ	1				x						N	Ν	U	 G2.3.5 Stem: Change to read "is adjustedthe setpoint is directed to be found?" Change A and C 2nd part to read "SOP-108, ATTACHMENT VA" Reason for change is that ALL LWRPs have setpoint info on them. Currently, B and D are NP. This Q is U because of two NP distracters. 01/03/09 Facility Response: Feedback from validation indicated they were very confused with what "directed to be found" meant. Rewrote WOOTF to "where is release setpoint found" and revised second half of choices A & C. Revised Distractor Analysis accordingly. Validators were also confused about what "Prior to the release," which meant that the setpoint would be 2X background. With this in mind, changed 1st part or WOOTF from "Prior to release" to "in preparation for a WMT release." Duplicate Question. We propose using version 002. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09 Version 002 – OK as-is.
73	М	2					x					Y	N	E	G2.3.7 Distracter C is NP due to common sense and standard HF work practices. Replace C. 01/03/09 Facility Response:

	1.	2	3	Psycl	nome	tric Fla	ws		Job Cor	tent Fla	IWS	5.0	Other	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	(1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															Revised Distractor C to make it similar to D and revised D to balance with C. Now, C/D are complimentary like A/B. Revised Distractor Analysis accordingly. Duplicate Question, We propose using version 002. Atlanta Review 06/04/09 Tabled discussion – will work on new question at VCSNS. New Question: Converted WOOTF to fill-in-blank format. Revised choices to A – "ONLY" and B-D- "complete 2 nd part of WOOTF (by adding the word "and")" (RFA approved 6/18/09)
74	C	3	x				x					Y	N	E	G2.4.30 C and D are wrong because the distracter analysis states that a power change is less than 15% in one hour. How do you know that given the information in the stem? CAF: Please explain. 01/03/09 Facility Response: Because AOP-210.3 requires a power reduction to 91%, which is only 9% from 100% power. In the Distractor Analysis for Choices C & D, added "(per AOP-210.3)" to clarify. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/04/09 WOOTF: Insert "as listed in AOP-210.3, Feedwater Pump Malfunction"

~	1.	2.	3.	Psych	ome	tric Fla	iws	- 4	L. Job Cor	ntent Fla	aws	5.0	ther	б.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)		Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
75	C	1	x			×						N	N	U	 G2.4.32 The attached references do NOT support either the correct answer or the distracters. CAF: you will have to redefine, e-evaluate or walk me through this one. This Q is U until the facility proves otherwise. Peer Review: No plausible distracters 01/03/09 Facility Response: This appears to have been a copying error. Our hard copy contains all of the references for both the answer and distractors. They will be provided at the review in Atlanta unless you ask for them earlier. Duplicate Question. Current version is 002. We propose version 003. Validation is raising questions about operational relevance of exact steps in the AOP. On a practical bases, the exact sequence of steps taken is a combination of our choices; much more involved thar dictated by the procedure. Have written another question that is more operationally relevant.
											SRC	0	NL	Y	
76	С	2				×			1			N	Y	U	001AA2.03 Distracters C and D are NOT plausible. First, they are not trip setpoints. The basis for C and D are the basis for trip setpoints. Consider the plausibility of using OPDT for C and D. The KA requires an action. No actions are listed The Q is U because of two NP distracters. 12/29/08 Facility Response:

~	1.	2.	3	Psych	ome	tric Fla	ws	4	Job Con	tent Fla	IWS.	5.0	ther	6	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist	Partial	Jab- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															Regarding K/A match, these were our comments in the Notes section: "Not an exact match to the K/A because any action taken as a result of a failure of an automatic action would be an Immediate Operator Action; therefore, would not be an SRO Only question. Question was written to the impact that a Continuous Rod Withdrawa has on the automatic calculation of a protection setpoints and the bases for that calculation." In regards to Choices C & D, we recognized that that they were not setpoints. We attempted to address this with the "limit/set point" wording in the WOOTF. If we changed the 1 st part of C & D to OPDT, Choice C would also be correct. Having said that, we replaced the 2 nd half of all 4 choices to include an action, versus a bases, and revised the WOOTF. Duplicate Question. We propose using version 002. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09: Removed redundant "Tavg increasing" from WOOTF. Reworded 1 st half of choices C & D to " The TS 3.2.5 DNB Paramater for Tavg will be exceeded" Reworded last bullet to "Tavg is 580F and <u>continues to</u> rise." 001G2.4.34
77	М	2	x			×						Y	N	U	The procedure does NOT specifically state "who" will do which action. It only states to notify the BOP when the RTBs are opened. All choices are potentially correct. Furthermore, the presumed correct answer states to "report" to the BOP. The procedure states to "notify" the BOP. If in fact choice C is the only correct answer (from

	1.	2.	3	Psych	home	tric Fla	ws	4	1. Job Con	tent Fla	IWS	5.0	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stern Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															the who does what perspective), choice C is still wrong because the procedure states to "notify" not "report to." This would leave NO correct answers. This Q is U because of multiple correct answers. Additionally, Q is NOT SRO knowledge. Recommend replacing this Q 12/29/08 Facility Response: Replaced Question. Duplicate Question. We propose using version 003. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09: 2 nd bullet: change 'implemented" to "entered" 5 th bullet: insert 'long" WOOTF: add "from the CREP." Choice B. Inserted "GREATER THAN." Choice D: reword to "Either N32A or N33 indicates 1000cps or less."
78	Μ	2	x									Y	Y	E	003AA2.03 Confirm IAW "what" procedure? 12/29/08 Facility Response: Not sure what we need to do here. Will discuss in Atlanta. Note: Actual K/A statement is as follows: "Ability to determine and interpret the following as the

	1.	2	3	Psych	nome	etric Fla	ws	4	. Job Con	itent Fla	ws	5, C	ther	6,	7
0#/	LOK (C/A)		Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															 apply to the Dropped Control Rod: Dropped rod, using in-core/ex-core instrumentation in-core or loop temperature measurements." This question was written to this K/A. The description of the K/A in the Notes section of this question was copied from the original outline that you gave to us. The original outline contained errors in that the stem statements for all APEs and EPEs K/As were from the system, not the APE or EPE. Corrected the K/A wording in the Notes section. Feedback from validation has indicated that we are overemphasizing T.S. bases statements, in the 2nd half of questions, on the SRO exam. If we were to emphasize anything, we should emphasize operator actions. Additionally, many of the validators felt this knowledge was trivial, having no relevance to day-to-day operations. With this in mind, we changed the second half of each choice in this question to actions in T.S., versus bases. It is still SRO Only since the action tested are greater than 1 hour (2 and 12). Duplicate Question. We propose using version 002. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09: WOOTF: underline "must" and add "IAW T.S. 3.2.4"
79	C	2	x									Y	Y	E	008G2.4.6 2 nd Bullet: Delete "causing a small break LOCA" Teaching 4 th Bullet: Instead of stating that "all RCPs have been tripped," state all actions of procedure have been completed (which would include the tripping of the RCPs) 5 th and 6 th Bullets: Delete, not necessary In the WOOTF statement, state (following, IAW procedure identifies) 12/29/08 Facility Response:

	1.	2	3	Psych	nome	tric Fla	ws	4	. Job Con	tent Fla	iws	5.0	ther	б,	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															2nd Bullet: changed as suggested. Deleted "All RCPs tripped" and revised statement about procedures entered to include EOP-2.1 specifically. Deleted bullets 5 & 6. Changed WOOTF statement. Based on feedback from validation, we have not provided enough information in the stem to accurately place them in EOP-2.1. Additionally, with a stuck open safety valve, RCS subcooling will not be maintained above 30°F (see ES-1.2 Background (HES12BG.doc) page 37) until an RCS cooldown is initiated. Feedback also indicated that, even with indicated PZR level at 100%, a marginal amount of spray control may be possible, unless the PZR was water-solid (Choice 'B' may also be considered correct). With this feedback in mind, we revised the stem to accurately place them in EOP-2.1; and placed them in a water- solid condition. Also changed choices to test knowledge of Note - Step 9. This is SRO knowledge because it involves a decision on which RCP should be started. RO's would not be required to make this decision. Since the previous version of this question involved understanding of the bases for the EOP step, it could be considered RO knowledge (see K/A 2.4.18, Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs 3.3/4.0). Duplicate Question. We propose using version 003. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09: Break up Choices C & D to look like A & B. Restructured all 4 choices to better balance and increase plausibility.
80	С	2	x									Y	Y	E	013G2.2.42 3 rd Bullet: Delete (teaching). 12/29/08 <i>Facility Response:</i>

-	1.	2.	3	. Psyc	home	tric Fla	ws		4. Job Con	itent Fla	iws	5. C	Other	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus		T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
81	c	2	x			Dist	×					Y	Y	E	Deleted 3r Bullet as suggested. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09: Add " <u>ALL</u> of" to WOOTF: Check for overlap. 015AA2.10 Stem: Place a coma after the word "recovery" Stem: Add the word "specific" before the word "procedures(s) and delete the word "only" from C and D since EOP-1.0 is not referenced in A or B. 5 th Bullet: What valve??? Increase the bearing Temps for A and B RCPs so C (196) doesn't stick out like a sore thumb. 193 and 194 seem appropriate suggested valuse. 12/29/08 Facility Response: Stem: Added comma after "recovery." Added "specific" before "procedure(s)." Deleted "ONLY" from Choices C & D. Deleted 5 th bullet.
82	с	2	x									Y	Y	E	Revised RCP temps as suggested. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09: Move "IAW SOP-101" from choices to WOOTF. Change 1 st parts of B & D from "ALL RCPs" to "Only RCPs B &C. To make this credible, change motor brg temp for A to 189F. 026G2.2.44 Typo in Stem answer choices: LCV-7098 should be LCV-

~	1.	2.	3	Psych	nome	tric Fla	IWS	4	1. Job Cor	ntent Fla	aws	5.0	Other	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															7090. If this is true, this typo should have been caught during validation. 12/29/08 Facility Response: Changed 7098 to 7090 in stem and choices. Agree that this should have been caught before now. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09: Choices A-D: Change "will be" to "are" <u>and</u> add "ALL to C & D. WOOTF: Add "IAW this XCP-601, 1-1"
83	С	3	x				x					Y	Ŷ		 034A2.03 The answer when the blank is filled in makes no sense (,the fuel assembly is mispositioned based on being in th wrong place). Obviously, if it is in the wrong place it is mispositioned. Suggestion: Given these conditions, the refueling team should A. Unlatch the assembly AND perform a new statistical reliability check of N-31. B. Unlatch the assembly AND suspend core alterations. C. Perform a new statistical reliability check of N-31. D. Suspend core alterations ONLY.

	1.	2.	3	Psyc	home	tric Fla	ws	4	4. Job Cor	itent Fla	IWS	5.0	ther	б,	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus		T/F	Cred Dist	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															If the "material transfer form" is provided, the 4" bullet (at location J-2) is NOT needed. Let the applicant use the reference to figure that out. 12/29/08 Facility Response: Revised stem & choices as suggested above. Still need to tell them which hole the assembly is actually going in to. Then they need the form to make the determination that it is in the wrong location so they can, in turn, determine that Core Alts must be suspended. The response of the SR instruments is normal for placing an assembly in a 3X3 array. Duplicate Question. We propose using version 002. Atlanta Review 06/02/09: 3 rd bullet: Add "SR NI" WOOTF: Change "should" to "must". Also add "IAW REP-107.103" Table for further discussion 06/18/09 Review: NEW QUESTION - Version 006 Added REP to 1 st question. Reduced scope and clarified 2 nd question. (RFA approved 06/18/09) 037G2.4.8
84	С	3				х	_		_			Y	Y	U	Regardless whether the applicant "refers" or "returns to,"

	1.	2	3	Psyc	home	tric Fla	IWS	4	I. Job Cor	itent Fla	IWS	5. C	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus		T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															stated in OAP-103.4, the way distracter A is written (perform applicable steps of AOP-112.2), is a subset of choice C. The difference between A and C is purely semantics. Start them at a different step in distracter A. This Q us U because there are potentially two correct answers. 12/29/08 Facility Response: Restructured all 4 choices. This simplified the choices and eliminated subsets. Wording is now more consistent with OAP-103.4 definitions (REFER TO & GO TO). Revised Distractor Analysis accordingly. Revised last bullet to place them at Step 4 of EOP-1.1. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09: Add "(Step 3)" to last bullet. Choice B: To increase plausibility, add "Step 4" 054AA2.04
85	C	3	×			×						Y	Y	U	According to TS 3.7.1.2, the SDEFW pump is NOT inoperable because it has an operable steam supply system. Therefore, you do NOT have three inoperable EFW pumps. None of the references provided stated that the SDEFW pump is inop if the flow control valve fails open. Peer Review: A and C are NOT plausible. No SG levels are provided in the Q stem, which I presume would be the indication used to enter "response to SG high level" Takin action to restore an emergency feed pump would never be incorrect. This Q is U because D is potentially a correct answer and 1 NP distracters. 12/29/08 Facility Response: Rewrote question.

mar	1.	2.	3	. Psyc	home	tric Fla	iws		4. Job Cor	ntent Fla	W5	5. C	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	(1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
86	C	3				×						Y	Y	E.	Duplicate Question. We propose using version 002. Atlanta Review 06/02/09: Last bullet: Add "NR" to SG levels. Change to "ALL" SGs. Delete 6 th bullet: "The crew is throttling" Table for further discussion 06/18/09 Review: Moved "MDEFP starts, then trips" to bullet #5. Modified WOOTF and 2 nd part of all choices to improveredibility and clarity. (RFA approved 06/18/09) 062262.2.36 Stem: Delete the word BOTH since each choice has two activities. Choices: change AND to and. Discracters C and D: "Perform the monthly Surveillance or the B Diesel Generators" is NOT plausible because it is nothing special. However, an extra or special surveillance would be if a statement in the stem indicated that it might be warranted. Modify distracters C and D. Suggestion: (Perform an additional monthly surveillance) and add a bullet in the stem to hook the applicant in thinking one is required when in fact it isn't. Peer Review: Test against the requirements not "should." Replace with "shall" The O is E* because of potentially two NP distracters
															Peer Review: Test against the requirements not "sho

(C/A) (1-5) Stem Focus Cues T/F Cred Partial Dist. Job- Link Minutia #// units Back- ward C SR0 Only UE/S Explanation Image: State of the state of	-	1.	2	3	Psyc	home	etric Fl	aws	4	1 Job Con	itent Fla	IWS	5.0	Other	6.	7.
87 C 3 X Y Y E Duplicate Question. We propose using version 003. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09: Check Table 3.3.2 for overlap or makes it a direct lookup. 87 C 3 X Y Y E Distracters A and B: Change 2 ^{mb} part to read "Use SG PoRVs to stabilize SG Pressure in accordance with EO- 6." Since going to step 30 is stated in the caution statement, it renders the answer potentially NDV. Distracters C and D: Change 2 ^{mb} part to read: "Establist I.A. to the RB in accordance with EOP-6." This Q was rated as an E because no reference was provided. If the reference was provided, it would have been a U. 12/29/08 <i>Facility Response:</i> Seems like we have written other questions that tess incovledge of Sequence of Steps in the EOP-6.0. We would like to keep the question as it is written. I to stage and the outperson of steps in the EOP-6.0.	Q#/				Cues	T/F	1.40			Minutia		and the second se			U/E/S	Explanation
	87	c	3				Dist						Y	Y	E	 Duplicate Question. We propose using version 003. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09: Check Table 3.3.2 for overlap or makes it a direct lookup. To better balance (3)Bs and (1)A, change Choice A from "B to C" to "C to B' 062G2.4.6 Distracters A and B: Change 2nd part to read "Use SG PORVs to stabilize SG Pressure in accordance with EOP-6." Since going to step 30 is stated in the caution statement, it renders the answer potentially NDV. Distracters C and D: Change 2nd part to read: "Establish I.A. to the RB in accordance with EOP-6." This Q was rated as an E because no reference was provided. If the reference was provided, it would have been a U. 12/29/08 Facility Response: Seems like we have written other questions that tests knowledge of Cautions in a near verbatim fashion and they were <u>not</u> considered NDV. Without the references to step numbers and their relative locations in the EOP, the revised choices would require too detailed knowledge of sequence of steps in the EOP-6.0. We would like to keep the question as it is written. No changes made to question. Need to discuss further
Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09:																in Atlanta.

	1.	2.	3	Psych	nome	tric Fla	ws		1. Job Cor	tent Fla	aws	5. C	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															EOP-6.0" Change end to "when the bus is restored." Choices C & D: 2 nd part is weak. Change to "EOP-1.0, Step 1"
88	c	3	x				x					Y*	Y	E	064A2.13 In the WOOTF statement: Delete the word "within" * In order to fully meet the 2 nd part of the KA: Distracters A and C: Change A and C 2 nd part to read: Transfer Service Water System Loads to train B in accordance with ARP-001, Panel XCP-604. Distracters B and D, 2 nd part change to read "Start SWP C and open PVG-3105A In accordance with SOP-117" (to provide) is teaching. 12/29/08 Facility Response: Revised WOOTF. Revised 2 nd part of all 4 choices as suggested. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09; Change "1F/min" to "1.0F/min" 4 Th bullet: To add credibility to B & D, add "but not running"
89	с	3	x				x					Y	Y	E	068A2.04 Stem: State the procedure (as required by procedure

	1.	2.	3	Psych	home	tric Fla	IWS	4	. Job Con	tent Fla	aws	5. C	ther	6.	7
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															12/29/08 Facility Response: Revised 001 as suggested. Agree that it should have been caught during validation. Feedback from validation has indicated that we are testing trivial knowledge regarding <u>doses</u> at the Site Boundary. Changed questions to ask for <u>location</u> of limiting dose, versus the actual dose. Still SRO Only since it tests knowledge of a T.S. bases that is not a Safety Limit. Duplicate Question: We propose using version 002. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09: 002 OK as-is.
90	C	3	x			x						Y	N	U	073G2.4.8 This Q does NOT meet SRO criteria. Only an action is taken based on an alarm. No in-depth knowledge of procedures or use of TS is involved. Suggestion: Change the stem to require a TS action. Peer Review: Test against the requirements not "should." Replace with "shall." Distracters: B can be ruled out because it is greater than 1 hour action without a reference provided, D is NP because because a uci/ml values needs to be added to the stem. This Q is U because it is NOT SRO only and 2 NP distractors 12/30/08 Facility Response: Rewrote to include ARP actions and T.S. action > 1 hour.

Q#/	1. LOK	2. LOD	3	Psyc	home	tric Fla	aws	4	, Job Cor	ntent Fla	IWS	5. C	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	(C/A)	(1-5)	Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ unīts	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															Duplicate Question. We propose using version 002. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09: 002 OK as-is.
91	с	3										Y	Y	SE	078A2.01 No comment 12/30/08 Facility Response: Feedback from validation has indicated that a crew may trip the Reactor at 50#, even if they haven't started working through the AOP. With this in mind, we modified given information to put them at the very beginning of the AOP, with a Reactor Trip not yet implemented. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09: WOOTF: "action(s)" vs "action." Change "if Rx has not yet been tripped" to "prior to the Rx trip."
92	C	3					x					Y	Y	E	E04 EA2.1 On distracter D, add a transition stem from EOP-2.4 since EOP-2.1 is a transition step out of EOP-2.4. Otherwise, distracter D is NOT plausible. 12/30/08 Facility Response: Revised Choice D as suggested. Feedback from validation has resulted in a few changes from the original version. 1) validators felt tha 1300 psig was relatively low for a LOCA outside containment, so we raised pressure to 1700 psig. 2) we

~	1.	2.	3	Psyc	home	tric Fla	ws		1. Job Cor	ntent Fla	WS	5. C	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)		Stem Focus		T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
															were asked to provide specific indications of RB conditions, so we provided those indications evaluated in Step 14 of EOP-1.0. 3) we were asked to provide specific alarms for the Auxiliary Building, so we provided 2 specific AB alarms. 4) Since there are more than just the diagnostic steps 12-14 in EOP-1.0, we were asked to give which set of diagnostics in bullet 2. Current version is 002. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09: Add "and STABLE" behind RB pressure Choice A: replace 2 nd part – "EOP-2.0" to "EOP-2.4" Choice D: delete "EOP-2.1"
93	C	3										Y	Y	S E	E08 G2.2.25 No comment 12/30/08 Facility Response: Current version is 003. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09: Choices A & C. To better balance with B & D, add ""in the Rx vessel wall"
94	Μ	2				×						Y	Y	U	G2.1.27 Distracters A and C are not plausible because they do NOT meet single failure criteria which is common knowledge. This Q is U because two distracters are NP. 12/30/08 Facility Response: Revised Choices A & C to avoid single failure criteria. We propose using version 003. Current version is 002. We have also provided version 004 as an option.

	1.	2.	3	Psyc	home	etric Fla	ws		1. Job Cor	tent Fla	aws	5.0	ther	6.	7.
0#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus		T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
														1 and	Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09: Move most of the verbage from choices to stem and make it fill in the blank.
95	Μ	2										Y	Y	S E	G2.1.34 No comment 12/30/08 Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09: WOOTF; Split into two question: 2 nd part should say "IAW T.S. 3.4.7" Choices C & D: change to "350F" vs. "250F" Credibility based on MODE 4 at 350F – part of GOP-2.
96	Μ	2										Y	Y	SE	G2:2.38 No comment 12/30/08 Facility Response: Based on validation and recent changes to OAP-100.6 deleted all given information and revised WOOTF. Operators are now directed to reduce power to less than 2900 MWt (instantaneous), not reduce power such that an 8-hour average is <2900 MWt. Would also like to provide NL-122 as a Reference - SROs should not be held accountable for 24 hour notices from memory. Duplicate Question. We propose using version 002. Version 003 is also available as an option. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09: Allow REF PROVIDED. (1hr – 72hr) Only pages 1-20 o Enclosure A of NL-122.
-								-				-	-	-	G2.3.13

n 111	1.	2.	3	. Psyc	nome	tric Fla	WS	4	4. Job Con	itent Fla	aws	5.0	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)		Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
97	C	3				x						Y	Y	U	Based on the distracter analysis, if the 2 nd part of distracter C is correct following work within containment, the 2 nd part of distracter A is also correct? This Q is U because of the potential of two correct answers Suggestion: Make B to include the 2 nd part of A and B. Make the 2 nd part of A "reactor building closeout inspection ONLY" Similar for C and D. Peer Review: Test what the operator is "required" to do not "will" do. 12/30/08 Facility Response: In the WOOTF, changed "will" to "must." The second part of Choices A and C are incorrect. The reason for the R&R is to ensure STP-215.001B is performed, not STP-109.001 (since it may not be performed for 7 days after closeout). Even if they decided to use the Personnel Airlock, they would not generate the R&R for the RB Closeout. The distractor analysis for Choice C explains why STP-109.001 is plausible, not that it is correct. As such, there is only" correct answer. Confusion may have been due to the 2 different explanations, in Choices A & C, of why they were incorrect. Revised the "incorrect because" statements of A & C to make them consistent. Added "normally" to the WOOTF because feedback from validation indicated that they <u>may</u> use the Personnel Airlock, depending on the location and nature of the work in the RB. If they <u>did</u> use the Personnel Airlock, Choice D would be correct. We believe the question should be SAT. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09: WOOTF: add "IAW OAP-108.1"

-	1.	2.	3	. Psyc	home	tric Fla	ws	4	. Job Cor	tent Fla	iws	5.0	ther	6.	7.
Q#/	LOK (C/A)	LOD (1-5)	Stem Focus		T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation
98	C	3	x									Y	Y	E	G2.3.14 Reference TS 3.11.2.6 in the stem otherwise choice B is potentially a correct answer based on table 15.3-5 in the provided reference. 12/30/08 Facility Response: Revised as suggested. Feedback from validation has indicated that we are testing trivial knowledge in this particular dose limit from T.S. bases. We propose testing a more operationally-oriented T.S. bases - related to why CR ventilation is reduced to a single train within 30 minutes of an accident. It still matches the K/A and i. still SRO Only in that it tests a T.S. bases that is not a Safety Limit. Duplicate Questions. We propose using version 005. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09: Version 005 Choices B & D: change "30" to "1.0." WOOTF: Add "maximum of"
99	С	3	x									Y	Y	E	G2.4.20 The status of CCW pump B is not addressed in the stem. Does it need to be in order to rule out distracter B? CAF This Q is an E until this issue is resolved. 12/30/08

Q#/	1. LOK (C/A)		3. Psychometric Flaws					4. Job Content Flaws				5. Other		6.	7.	
			Stem Focus	Cues	T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only	U/E/S	Explanation	
100	c	2				×						Ŷ	Y	E	 Facility Response: Providing status of CCW pump B is not necessary. The applicant should know that loop 'B' is in standby since bullet 2 tells them that 'A' is the Active Loop. Deleted "Loop 'A'" in WOOTF. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09: Move 1st bullet (LOCA) to 3rd bullet to better sequence. Add : CCW is in it's normal lineup except that CCW Pump 'C.'" Choice D; Change "flow" to "loads" G2.4.41 Psychometrics: If distracter A was correct, C would be correct also because A is a subset of C. If B was correct, D would be also. Suggestion: Add the word only on A and B. NP distracters in A and C due to the times: It's common knowledge that an SAE requires 15 min to notify. Therefore change 10 to 15 minutes in A and C. A will still be wrong because of NP distracters in A and B. NP distracters of NP distracters in A and B. NP distracters of NP distracters in A and B. The Q is E* because of NP distracters in A and B and because of multiple correct answers due to psychometrics 12/30/08 Facility Response: This question required complete revision based on new EALs. Original version was 002. We propose using 	

Q#/	1. LOK (C/A)		3. Psychometric Flaws					4. Job Content Flaws				5. Other		6.	7.	
					T/F	Cred Dist.	Partial	Job- Link	Minutia	#/ units	Back- ward	Q= K/A	SRO Only		Explanation	
															version 003. Atlanta Review (RFA approved): 06/02/09: Place TWENTY minutes in stem. Delete times from all choices. Make choices A-B "only"	

Question Status						
S (7)	Question is Sat with NO Comments					
E (70)	Editorial Changes Needed					
E* (5)	Technically the Q is U but a word or two will fix					
U (18)	Question is Unsat					



ES-403, Rev. 9

Written Examination Grading Quality Checklist

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Fa	cility: V.C. Summer	Date of Exam: July 10, 2009	Exam L	.evel: R	O/SRO						
			Initials								
	lt	а	b	с							
1.	Clean answer sheets	N/A	rfa								
2.	Answer key changes documented	N/A	rfa								
3.	• •	ecked for addition errors < > 25% of examinations)	pgc	N/A	rfa						
4.	Grading for all border as applicable, ±4% c	N/A	rfa								
5.	All other failing exam are justified	N/A	rfa								
6.	Performance on miss deficiencies and word questions missed by	N/A	rfa								
	Printed Name/Signature										
a.	Grader	Phillip G. Capehart/		8/0	:109 109						
b.	Facility Reviewer(*)	N/A									
c.	c. NRC Chief Examiner (*) Ronald F. Aiello/										
d.	d. NRC Supervisor (*) Malcolm T. Widmann/										
(*)	 (*) The facility reviewer's signature is not applicable for examinations graded by the NRC; two independent NRC reviews are required. 										

