Enclosure 3 September 2009 Meeting NRC Handout Meeting Summary of the 09/10/09 Public Meeting to Discuss Industry's Proposed Safety Culture Process Dated September 29, 2009

Fostering a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture

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Challenges with the Existing Situation

- Different NRC/INPO terminology creates confusion
- Industry has the responsibility, but has not taken the lead
- Inspection findings are a very limited set of data
- Industry is not taking full advantage of all the possible indications of safety culture weaknesses
- There is no industry-wide guidance for conducting safety culture assessments – self, independent, or third party



Objective: Achieve A Strong Nuclear Safety Culture Across Industry

- A common language of nuclear safety culture
- Industry responsible and leading; NRC providing appropriate and transparent oversight
- Use all available assessment tools to assess, identify and correct weaknesses
- A common methodology for conducting assessments, including third party



Alignment is Proceeding in Three Areas

- INPO and NRC have begun discussions on creating a common language
- A common industry approach using all available tools to assess and address issues, and with effective NRC oversight, has been submitted to NRC
- A common industry approach for conducting self, independent and third party assessments has been submitted to NRC




NEI 09-07 Fostering a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture

- Uses multiple inputs to the CAP and other key inputs including external assessments
- Licensee monitoring, oversight and communication
 - Trends and analyzes input data
 - Ensures effective corrective action
 - Communicated to key stakeholders
- Monitoring review panel and site leadership team conduct periodic reviews
- Provides systematic approach



Site Nuclear Safety Culture Process



NRC Role is to Independently Assess Licensee Actions


- Enhanced PI&R inspections
 - Effectiveness of licensee program in identifying weaknesses
 - Corrective action effectiveness
- Observation/assessment of licensee process
- Continue identifying crosscutting aspects in inspection findings
- Maintain SCWE and traditional enforcement
- Document oversight in inspection reports and assessment letters



Key Steps Going Forward

- Establish a pilot program to test industry approach against success criteria
- NRC observe pilots in parallel with current oversight approach
- Jointly assess success of the pilot program and apply lessons learned to governing documents
- Conduct industry workshops and implement nationwide

NUCLEAR SAFETY CULTURE PROCESS IMPLEMENTATION PLAN



Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment



Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment

- NRC and industry dissatisfied with 95003 safety culture assessment experience at Palo Verde
- NEI agreed to develop industry guideline
- Established task force to develop guideline that could be used for self, independent and third party assessments
- All sites required to perform biennial self assessments
 - Required by INPO SOER 02-4
 - Some use contractors for surveys and/or assessments
 - No industry-wide consistency
 - USA has a methodology it has used successfully for five years
- Industry is modifying the USA approach to create a Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment Process Manual




USA NSCA Process

- Structured on INPO's Principles and Attributes for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture; results are provided in that context
- Pre-assessment automated survey and document review
- Assessment of leadership and worker attitudes, opinions, and perceptions through structured interviews and behavioral observations
- Full week evaluation with Friday exit
- Can be scaled up for "independent" or "third party" assessment



What the Process Looks Like



Typical Coverage Pattern

- Start with individual contributors, then supervision
- Data tracking ensures coverage of all INPO attributes and all organizations
- Generally includes:
 - 40 to 60 interviews of individuals or small groups
 - Attend 10-15 meetings and make 10-12 Field
 Observations
- Provides varying levels of coverage for 250-300 employees on site
- Typically over 1000 data points go into profile

Assessment Results

- Exit meeting followed by written report
- Can include other areas of Site VP interest
- Both descriptive and graphic results
- Strengths, weaknesses, recommendations
- Follow-up from previous assessment
- Entered in the CAP and/or improvement plan
- Wide communication of results



NSCA Process Manual has Been Upgraded

- Modified to reflect three levels of assessment (self, independent and third party)
- Upgrade survey to distinguish between departments and levels in the organization
- Conducted validation study of process
- Reviewed against revised 95003
- Continuous improvement built into process



In conclusion

- Efforts continue to develop common language
- Industry has completed two guidelines and has provided them for NRC comment:
 - NEI 09-07 Fostering a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture
 - Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment Process Manual
- NRC is invited to observe pilot plants this year
- Industry is interested in refining the approach, including NRC's oversight role, for Commission consideration and implementation in 2011



Pilot Program



Pilot Plants

- Hope Creek
- North Anna
- Braidwood
- South Texas Project



Preparation

- Site Procedures using NEI 09-07
- Training
- Communications



NRC Involvement

- Continue baseline inspection program
- Observe Nuclear Safety Culture
 Assessment
- Observe Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring
 Panel
- Observe Site Leadership Team meeting



Pilot Activities

- NSCA survey and onsite
- Use of previous surveys/assessments
- Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Meetings
- Site Leadership Team Meetings
- Action Plans/Corrective Actions
- Nuclear Safety Review Board



Post Pilot Activities

- Lessons Learned, plus, deltas
- Success Criteria met?
- Process Modifications

