

## ArevaEPRDCPEm Resource

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**From:** Tesfaye, Getachew  
**Sent:** Wednesday, September 02, 2009 6:42 PM  
**To:** 'usepr@areva.com'  
**Cc:** Ashley, Clinton; Jackson, Christopher; Snodderly, Michael; Carneal, Jason; Colaccino, Joseph; ArevaEPRDCPEm Resource  
**Subject:** U.S. EPR Design Certification Application RAI No. 281 (3601), FSAR Ch. 6  
**Attachments:** RAI\_281\_SPCV\_3601.doc

Attached please find the subject requests for additional information (RAI). A draft of the RAI was provided to you on August 25, 2009, and on August 31, 2009, you informed us that the RAI is clear and no further clarification is needed. As a result, no change is made to the draft RAI. The schedule we have established for review of your application assumes technically correct and complete responses within 30 days of receipt of RAIs. For any RAIs that cannot be answered within 30 days, it is expected that a date for receipt of this information will be provided to the staff within the 30 day period so that the staff can assess how this information will impact the published schedule.

Thanks,  
Getachew Tesfaye  
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**Hearing Identifier:** AREVA\_EPR\_DC\_RAIs  
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**From:** Tesfaye, Getachew

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Request for Additional Information No. 281(3601), Revision 0

9/02/2009

U. S. EPR Standard Design Certification

AREVA NP Inc.

Docket No. 52-020

SRP Section: 06.02.02 - Containment Heat Removal Systems

Application Section: FSAR Chapter 6.3 and Tech Specs

QUESTIONS for Containment and Ventilation Branch 1 (AP1000/EPR Projects) (SPCV)

06.02.02-35

This is a follow-up to RAI 212 (eRAI 2452) question 06.02.02.02-23. RG 1.206 requires the applicant to describe, in the FSAR, how a system design complies with relevant rules and regulations. The AREVA response to question 06.02.02.02-23 summarized changes to the passive flooding line design as follows: "With the passive flooding device normally closed and the power removed from the motorized isolation valves, no single failure can result in the loss of the safety function to maintain the water level of the IRWST at an appropriate level for emergency core cooling system pump NPSH. " This description of how the IRWST complies with single failure protection, which is a design bases requirement, is not discussed in Chapter 6 where ECCS related design information resides. Explain why this IRWST safety function and its connection to the passive flooding line is not described in Chapter 6 and how absence of this information from Chapter 6 meets regulations?

06.02.02-36

AREVA response to RAI 212 (eRAI 2452) question 06.02.02-23 (eQuestion 10110) referred to BTP 8-4. BTP 8-4 states the plant technical specifications should include a list of all electrically operated valves, and the required positions of these valves, to which the requirement for removal of electric power is applied in order to satisfy the single failure criterion. In response to question 06.02.02-23 AREVA made design changes in which isolation valves are disconnected from the power system to maintain a condition in which a single failure can not result in the loss of a safety function. Explain why no corresponding change to the plants technical specifications was provided?