Executive Director for Operations
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Date: 26 June 2009

Subject: 10CFR2.206 Petition for Enforcement Action Against
NRC Non-power Reactor Licensee Idaho State University (R-110)

Executive Director for Operations,

This 10CFR2.206 Enforcement Petition is submitted to correct decades of regulatory, criminal, and ethical violations associated with the operation of the non-power nuclear reactor licensed to Idaho State University in Pocatello, Idaho. Persons unaware have been contaminated and received undocumented doses, and will need to be informed and provided options if symptoms surface in the future. Also, the public credibility of nuclear regulation derives from the NRC's proper resolution of these health, safety, and security problems, no matter how tardy. These allegations are connected with my observations of administration, management, and operation during my tenure as Reactor Supervisor of this reactor from December 19, 1991 until March 12, 1993, and my activities as a whistleblower in the year following my resignation as Reactor Supervisor. The reason it has taken 16 years to file this petition is because of the threats that have been issued to me by the licensee as well as my busy schedule. The existing system for whistleblower protection is quite obviously flawed; otherwise such a serious problem as this would never have taken this course.

I am highly qualified to identify such violations having a PhD in Mechanical Engineering, an MS in Nuclear Engineering, and a BS in Chemical Engineering, all related to the design, operation, management, and administration of non-power nuclear reactors. I have three Senior Reactor Operators Licenses for three different facilities; (1) License R-126 100 Kw LEU TRIGA reactor, (2) License R-83 1.0 Mw HEU TRIGA reactor with pulsing to 2 Gw, and (3) the simple Idaho State University License R-110 5.0 w AGN reactor (Dec 19, 1991 until March 12, 1993). In fact, I have been the Director of Operations at all three facilities for a total of 14 years, the last 7 years running from facility to facility correcting problems caused by various degrees of technical, administrative, or management incompetence. In 1993 I reported at least 30 violations to the NRC and I have since found that the violations cited in 1993 were only partially remediated, even if under the false pretext of misrepresenting my prior work to resolve the problems as their own original work, and that the greater majority of regulatory and criminal violations I witnessed were not addressed in the 93-1 Notice of Violation or auxiliary investigation/inspection report.

The acts of the licensee related to the reactor extend far beyond the licensed activities. The documented and witnessed history of outrageous acts by the licensee clearly demonstrates that Idaho State University should never have been allowed to operate critical and subcritical assemblies. As will be described in this petition, Idaho State University has promoted a legacy of irresponsible conduct with respect to nuclear reactor operations that repulses me as an honorable alumnus of the US Air Force Academy unfalteringly loyal to the people of the US and as a nuclear professional committed to the Engineers Code of Ethics.

The following petition will proceed in the following format:

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS: Giving proper context to the order of a comprehensive list of observations

93-1 NOTICE OF VIOLATION: Summary of the seriousness of issues resolved and unresolved in 1993

CONCEALED VIOLATIONS: A partial list of violations and deviations deliberately concealed by the NRC

CRIMINAL ACTS: A summary list of criminal acts committed by the licensee directly related to reactor operations

RECOMMENDED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: Factors that should influence the consequences

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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

The reactor was licensed in 1971 to operate at steady state 5 watts. 5 watts does not generate enough fission products and by-product nuclear materials to be a regional threat, but it does generate enough to be a facility threat and a personal contamination threat. And since one of the great tricks of reactor operations is the control of the stored energy potential, it should be noted that 600 grams of U-235 that is contained in the critical assembly alone contains the stored energy potential of a 651 kiloton atomic bomb. From public statements issued from licensee administration, which will be recited later in this petition, the licensee administration considers the seriousness of compliance as a joke worth publishing. To the contrary, Idaho State University and its employees are not exempt from the laws of the United States, and all responsible should be held accountable for their violations from this point forward.

The Reactor Supervisor prior to my arrival was . When I interviewed I found that he was marginally competent in nuclear science with no clue about the negative temperature coefficient mechanism, only a vague understanding of delayed neutron precursors, and no comprehension of fission product poisoning response. Upon interviewing Senior Operators both ex-Navy Nukes, I found they had the same opinion of competence. In other words, could find the console key and manage to switch the range switches at the correct moment, but he was generally seen as just another "Prep School Diva" populating the faculty at Idaho State University.

While training on the reactor in Fall 1991 the first indication that there were serious problems in this facility was that the original strip chart recorders with safety trip mechanisms had been replaced with modern versions, there was no description in either the facility drawings or the SAR, and there was no 10CFR50.59 modification safety review in existence. Gross incompetence at first glance! Then at the TRTR Conference in Massachusetts in October 1991, I was an unwilling observer to seeing the current Reactor Supervisor on a trip out to Cape Cod. Employment at Idaho State University was a drunken Hillbilly-Hoedown nightmare from the very first day.

When I assumed the responsibilities of Reactor Supervisor on December 19, 1991, I began observing an institutional pathology of gross negligence. First I noticed during my first operation as Reactor Supervisor on December 19, 1991, that by-product nuclear material transfers were not documented. Upon returning from holiday in January 1992, I reported this to the Reactor Administrator and was told that no changes were to be made because would throw a "diva tantrum."

I did think it was prudent to remove tasteless photos and jokes posted in the facility bulletin board of the sort that were much worse than the verbal joke that resulted in a reactor operator at the University of Utah (R-126) being temporarily suspended from operations by the NRC in 1978, as well as the T-shirt that a senior operator wore that resulted in the NRC temporarily shutting down the University of Utah facility in 1988 while I was at Texas A&M. [Note: The severe consequences of these relatively innocuous acts should be a benchmark when deciding the consequences of the seriously outrageous Idaho State University acts.] That allowed drawings and photos of scantily clad females hanging in a public university engineering laboratory was a shock to my ethics and morals and would certainly have made a sensational news story in Idaho. The jokes posted on the bulletin board about the lack of competence in the NRC did nothing to promote respect for the regulatory body. I could clearly see that the NRC was condoning Idaho State University behavior that was considered completely unacceptable at other facilities.

I also noted that the operation checklist required a written reading of the radiation field dose at the console. At full power the reading was always 4 mr/hr. To the pseudo-expert that would appear not noteworthy. However, even a neophyte operator would recognize several problems pointing to a regulatory violation. First, the reading is a result of core radiation streaming from an access hole pointed directly at the console. Second, the detector was positioned off-center of the stream in order to reduce the reading to just below the 5 mr/hr limit that leads to a requirement for a "high radiation area" declaration defined in 10CFR20. Third, the detector was only a gamma detector. Core radiation is mixed radiation of gamma, x-ray, and particles of alphas, betas, and neutrons. Fourth, a personnel access went directly through the beam between the reactor and the console where the detector was positioned. Fifth, the neutron source placed in the core access was routinely handled without protective clothing and simply placed on the open floor. Sixth, the beam would strike any visitor of average height routinely positioned behind the console operator somewhere between the middle of the throat and eyes, depending on how straight the visitor was standing.

Seventh, the beam exited the controlled access area through a thin pain of glass into an open student study area. To reach this level of incompetence the designer and operator of this facility could only be described as completely incapable of passing any reactor operator requalification exam, even the most rudimentary training quiz.

When it came time for submission of the Annual Operating Report for 1991, the form of which I had personally written and submitted annually at the University of Utah for years, I noticed that the format was incorrect and the information incomplete. Fortunately, I was not asked to sign the document because I would have refused. I did state my objection to the Reactor Administrator, who promptly ignored my expert advice.

Then I was required to conduct the annual inventory of Special Nuclear Materials. Three fuel plates were missing from the subcritical assembly. After consulting with operators I was told the plates were secretly (undocumented) moved out of the controlled access area to an unapproved location in an adjacent building. I found the plates in the 4-MeV accelerator lab of where he was preparing to use them for neutron spallation experiments. I asked which "backyard quantum mechanic" allowed this to happen and he responded that it was, of course, This is completely unacceptable gross incompetence.

In Spring 1992 when the snow began to melt and the spring rains arrived, told me that because the leak in the reactor room ceiling had caused the corrosion on the metal structure of the control console containing the safety shutdown electronic systems and the reactivity control electronics, we should place a plastic cover over this equipment. I questioned whether the reactor had been operated with compromised safety and control systems and demanded that the issue be dropped. No 10CFR50.59 safety review was ever conducted.

In preparation for submitting Reactor Instrumentation and Reactor Sharing Grant proposals to the DOE in Spring 1992, I had a little chat with , the DOE's University Programs Director. He informed me that in 1990 threw him and his staff had been physically thrown out of the Idaho State University College of Engineering for explaining grant opportunities and apparently alluding to the dynamic nuclear engineering program at the University of Utah from where I had previous contact with concerning these opportunities. had placed a prohibition on further DOE grant money to the Idaho State University College of Engineering. He said he would make an exception my case because of my outstanding professionalism. This is yet another clear example with external witness of the mental instability of

At my first meeting with the Reactor Safety Committee I requested a systematic overhaul of the facility documentation, as it was so completely out of compliance that I could not supervise the facility with a clear conscience. However, since the Committee members were deficient in reactor operations, and quite obviously took their administrative assignment lightly, they had no motivation to conduct themselves competently.

At Spring 1992 graduation ceremonies I observed what is indeed symbolic of whatever ails this institution. Sitting in Holt Arena, where NCAA football and 50-100 public events are held each year, the 20'x30' American flag has been desecrated by having the blue field inverted so that the 50 stars are represented by 50 inverted pentagrams. As an honorable alumnus of the United States Air Force Academy my sense of loyalty to the United States was highly offended. I'm certain that the administration will claim it is a mistake, but how could that blatant error be a mistake? Certainly some war veteran was complained about it since it was placed in the early 1970's, and the administration has deliberately chosen not to correct the problem. It is not a crime to desecrate the American flag, but it most certainly is a political statement. Idaho State University is publicly stating to this day that the administration shows contempt for the laws of the United States without being so overt as to hang the entire flag inverted.

Then I observed in Summer 1992 that the University Administration had started construction adjacent to the reactor building. Ordinarily this would not have been a problem, except that facility tunnels connected all of the buildings in the area. According to operator the tunnels connect to the reactor building in a location at the rear of the controlled access area where the subcritical assembly is located and concealed by a flimsy, non-reinforced false wall. When the tunnels were opened to the surface during construction, no 24-hour guard was placed at the opening, leaving the controlled access area and SNM within exposed 24 hours each day over a period of 4-5 months through a flimsy sheetrock wall.

Summer 1992 I proposed a drill of emergency services response as is routine at all non-power reactors. The reactor operators told me a drill had never been conducted before, but were willing to conduct a drill. I contacted the list of

emergency service providers and found that in fire, police, and medical emergency services the providers had no radioactive contamination training or contract to require services under these conditions. I proposed the drill to the Reactor Administrator and was denied permission. Of course, it wouldn't make sense to have a drill with people who were not trained in a radiation emergency and didn't want that to become obvious. And there was no contractual obligation for emergency services personnel to attend radiation emergency training for the reactor facility. These conditions flagged serious problems with the Emergency Plan.

By Fall 1992 had returned from his sabbatical and proceeded to operate the reactor without my approval required by procedure. also proceeded to unlawfully distribute controlled by-product nuclear materials in undocumented (as stated in 93-1 Notice of Violation), clandestine transactions, to unknown individuals of ethnic origin (such transactions were not witnessed by me personally, but I did witness such individuals walking by the simulator lab door where I would often work, on their way to the reactor room for pickup). These individuals were not licensed by the NRC (since Idaho is not an Agreement State) or certified by the ISU Broad License to possess these materials (detailed in 93-1 Notice of Violation). These individuals did not carry containers certified under 49CFR as I could see as they passed my door. The containers in which the nuclear materials were removed from the reactor room were never properly labeled for transport on public roads, as I could see as they left the area. The nuclear materials were transported by automobile that was usually parked between the engineering building and the physics building. The few times I did see them drive away, I saw them drive south from the engineering building.

In Fall 1992 senior engineering student studying in the Nuclear Option had his wife in the Portneuf Medical Center birthing their child. Four students proceeded from the nuclear lab class to my office to invite me to visit the neo-natal unit to see newborn. They told me they had just finished a lab exercise involving the radiation detection of various irradiated samples. I hesitated to accept the invitation because I had just determined that the reactor had been operated without my permission and that there were no requirements for protective clothing or contamination surveys. These students were quite obviously loaded with radioactive contamination and heading for the neo-natal unit. Later, I reviewed the documents and confirmed that as usual no optional personnel contamination surveys had been conducted. The students proceeded to the hospital where they contaminated the unit without the knowledge of the hospital authorities. I felt terrible that Idaho State University had placed me in a position where I could not stop this horrible situation of criminal child endangerment. The University should bear full responsibility for this act and any accessories should be fully exposed and permanently relieved of current responsibilities. There is no other descriptive word for this than despicable.

I requested to produce a medical certification pursuant 10CFR55 and identical to the Operator Requalification Program I wrote for the University of Utah to reopen that facility in 1988 after it was closed during my time at Texas A&M. refuse my request. I conducted the Fall 1992 round of Reactor Operator Training for new operators. The week the NRC contracted operator license examiner from then INEL arrived to conduct the exam I had prepared, he was observed by College of Engineering support staff in an out-of-control inebriated state in a bar in Idaho Falls, during which he was observed verbally communicating about the in-process operator examination. This information worked its way back to me in the following days, after which I immediately reported to the NRC this unprofessional compromise of the examination by its contractor. Nothing was done to restore the integrity to the examination round. I was beginning to see that this mode of operation by the NRC was used to justify the gross negligence I observed at the licensee facility.

To prepare for the Fall 1992 meeting of the Reactor Safety Committee I started looking for copies of 10CFR, ANSI/ANS 15, and the Engineers Code of Ethics so that I could start educating the pseudo-experts about the fundamental concepts of nuclear reactor operations. After all, I had served on the Working Group for ANSI/ANS 15.20 with all of the NRC regulated non-power reactor industry leaders and there is no excuse for not following these guides. To my complete surprise there were no copies of the Engineers Code of Ethics or any subpart of ANSI/ANS 15 on campus. I was working in a vacuum of common sense at Idaho State University.

When 1993 arrived I knew I was in for another round of fraudulent Annual Operating Report to cover up operator illegal distributions that were continuing without my permission. I also knew the personnel doses would be under-reported. I did account for all of the SNM, which was a relief to me. However, with my first full year (nominally 12-15 months as defined in regulatory guides) was drawing to an end, and so was my toleration of the gross negligence, technical incompetence, and fraud. Beyond the nominal one-year period I would have to begin sharing a prorated portion of the blame for the prior incompetence native in the institution, and I certainly was not

going to have my reputation destroyed because the institution gave me the responsibility for serious problems, but not the authority to correct the problems.

On February 15, 1993 I participated in a conference call with the NRC Project Manager, and the Chief of NRC Region IV Non-power Reactor Regulation, The NRC recorded this conference. We discussed the long history of incompetence and violations at Idaho State University that preceded my arrival. I stated my evaluation of the facility as in opposition to every compliance modification that I recommended. I indicated my concern for generic unlawful activities that were being conducted. Both NRC representatives expressed the desire for me to bring the Idaho State University facility into compliance and recommended tactics that I had already tried, but offered no assistance.

On about March 1, 1993 operator launched an unprovoked ambush by standing in the doorway of my office and making a complete fool of himself shouting and carrying on about my "doorcard" not reflecting my willingness to participate in the unlawful activities in the reactor facility, while I was assisting one of my students. My student and I were both so surprised at such an unprovoked and irrelevant attack. I said my published assignments were between me and the Reactor Administrator and none of his insubordinate business. He was, in the words of this student, a raving idiot. I discussed the situation with the senior reactor operator and we agreed that was out of control and was not going to bring the facility under control. I order my operators to close the facility to reactor operations and informed the NRC that the facility was closed. I inspected the Controlled Access Area, and before I could return to my office, the reported from the pseudo-independent newspaper, the Idaho State Journal, appeared at my office asking questions about the facility closure. Obviously, the NRC contacted the University administration, and the administration contacted the Journal. Clearly, this was a set-up, so I said very little to the reporter.

Without a review by the Reactor Safety Committee, the University President, , reopened the facility the next day, no doubt at the insistence of the Reactor Administrator. This was extremely foolish since the facility no longer had operating Physical Security and Emergency Plans requiring the Reactor Supervisor. The criminal and regulatory violations were going to continue at any cost. The knee-jerk reactions of the institution once again increased facility liability.

I would never accept responsibility for the deliberately malicious actions and gross technical incompetence of , so I resigned the responsibilities of Reactor Supervisor on March 12, 1993. The fraudulent Annual Operating Report for 1992 would be issued. The unlawful distributions of controlled substances would continue. The contamination of operators, students, and visitors would continue. All of the institutional lunacy would continue. The time was correct to design an exit strategy, and having a few ideas I contacted foreign language professor in March 1993 about the Fulbright Program. I obtained the application materials and then went to the Pocatello offices of Senators in April 1993 to explain the situation and gain their support. The office managers for each understood that I was preparing to expose the criminal activities in the NRC licensed reactor facility and said I would have their full support in whatever I needed.

This March 1, 1993 incident led to taking disciplinary actions against me for not wanting to incriminate myself with their crimes. I filed a Whistleblower complaint with the US Dept of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Portland Regional Office in May 1993. I promptly left for nuclear consulting work in North Wales at the Wylfa Power Station in Anglesey, and then on to University of Edinburgh, and finally over to University of Bergen in Norway. Upon my return in July, 1993 DOL investigator of the Wage and Hour Division Boise Field Office contacted me. I provided documentary evidence of whistleblower retribution and my student as a witness. In August 1993 I agreed to drop the complaint against Idaho State University if any disciplinary action were removed from my file and retained in file. The DOL and Idaho State University promptly altered the conditions by dropping the complaint with the condition that the disciplinary action was removed from personnel file. I did not agree to this, but the DOL UNLAWFULLY proceeded to drop the complaint without my agreement to the new conditions and failed to investigate as required by law. I submitted my Fulbright materials with the appropriate letters of support from the Idaho Senators.

I was contacted by NRC Region IV in late July, 1993 and informed that an inspector and a criminal investigator, , would arrive in Pocatello the first week of August. A court recorder was sent from Salt Lake City. I arranged to have the entire group meet at my private home, since my office at the University was not secure

as I noted from blatantly suspicious behavior of the janitor. On August 4, 1993 I gave a 4-hour deposition to officers of the federal court outlining regulatory and criminal violations at Idaho State University. This information was used to formulate the violations of the 93-1 Notice of Violation. The licensee had been presented a preliminary list of violations in the Exit Interview a day or 2 later. I was provided notes from the Exit containing a list of remediation steps had presented to remediate the violations. The solutions were, to say the least, completely inadequate. But what else could be expected from extremely limited experience and academic training in such a backwater institution. I would learn in a very short while that the principle remediation effort would take the form of whistleblower retribution against me, a federally licensed senior operator who had just reported serious criminal activities conducted with the reactor; retribution being the best indicator of consciousness of guilt and the admission of knowledge that these are crimes of a very serious nature. This is the point where the chronology of events is injected with a level of insanity that leaves the reader astonished and confused, but the source of such insanity can be positively identified.

By the time academic courses started in mid-August, extreme paranoia had seized was also obsessed to the point of unhealthy distraction that I was going to sabotage accreditation of the College. Another professor, now of University of Vermont, Mechanical Engineering Dept, and I watched from a distance in late August as the building janitor, a visually repulsive student known for underage drinking and smoking, ransacked my office after office hours. obviously was not playing with a full deck.

On September 3, 1993, my mother and brother drove in for Labor Day Weekend. I made these arrangements in private phone conversations. Yet they were stalked for nearly 60 miles from the Utah/Idaho State line to my driveway, in alternating speeds ranging between 45 mph and 65 mph in an attempt to throw off the stalker. They noted the make, model, and color of vehicle, but didn't get the license plate. I later located that vehicle associated with the licensee at the home of

About this time I was also receiving repeated anonymous phone calls placed to my home in the evenings, in violation of Idaho State Criminal Code. Because the first call was so completely weird I started recording on the second call. After the third call I phone Qwest Communications Security Division in Tacoma, WA and spoke with who promised me that my complaint would be permanently recorded in corporate archives.

On the fourth anonymous phone call about September 10, 1993, I told the perpetrator that I knew they worked for ISU administration and I had registered a complaint with Qwest. I explicitly told the person on the phone that I didn't want them calling. I told them "NO!" in no uncertain terms many times and finally I just terminated the phone call, no wanting to play their sick little games.

The perpetrator showed up to my office the next day and identified himself as an FBI agent, , without producing any identification [red flag #1]. He told me that I had been caught with the phone calls harassing another employee, explaining that this employee had found a generic, no-name paper on the hallway floor outside my office with my home phone number [red flag #2]. I questioned him on the origin of the note and he promised that the month-old note that had been sitting in the janitors office for a few days and passed around the maintenance staff a month earlier would be sent to Idaho State Crime Lab where one of my engineering students worked. Being a chemical engineer, I knew finger oils disperse rapidly on porous materials [red flag #3]. thought that I was as ignorant and inexperienced as he. His scenario was illogical because he called me without any solicitation, his premise was illogical because the note he was trying to pawn as mine was found trashed on the floor [red flag #4], his evidence was obviously fabricated with absolutely no provenance [red flag #5]. I informed him that repeated anonymous phone called were criminal under Idaho Code and asked if he had a warrant to commit these crimes. He replied "no" [red flag #6]. I explained that he was very good at negatives, so what part of "NO" didn't he understand when I told his little perverted minion "NO" on the phone?

After moving quickly out of my office I called the local office of the FBI. I spoke with a field agent who told me that not only was NOT an FBI agent, but that they had similar complaints against him before, and that he had been convicted of domestic violence, could not carry a weapon, and therefore, could not be a law enforcement officer at any level of government. I called the Idaho State Police Certification Office and they confirmed that not only was not certified in Idaho, but neither was the Public Safety Director on campus, who had allowed to conduct the illegal activities from institutional phones. I started to query private citizens around Pocatello for information about and discovered the older folks around Pocatello call

"I ." The younger folks around Pocatello call the "Village Idiot." And on campus the students call him the " ."

Following the advice of I went to Pocatello City Police to report the crimes. I spoke with (Assist Police Chief) who treated me like a perpetrator. Although I was the victim of the crimes, I offered my fingerprints to prove that little distraction was entirely his fabrication. never did offer his fingerprints because he originated the note and knew his prints would be all over it. never produced any results because the results turned up negative, now leaving him as an accessory to the crimes of I called the City Attorney's Office to report and received the concerned public safety mantra from an attorney named , "You can't make me file charges," to which I responded that I never claimed I could. Everywhere else in the United States would be charged with obstruction of justice. It was easy to see that a nuclear facility of any sort should never be cited under the jurisdiction of a small town for the protection of whistleblowers. The State of Utah has already legislated against this sort of conflict of interest [e.g. Private Fuel Storage and Tooele County].

The saga continued to become more insane. claimed that instead of me filing a complaint with Qwest, I actually drove to Salt Lake, broke into the secure Bell One Plaza office building, and mailed myself the standard Qwest instructions on how to deal with repeated criminal phone calls. He claimed that I was fired from Texas A&M University and University of Utah, something that was news to claimed I was on campus when some juvenile accusation happened, when in fact a sales receipt for tire repair proves that I was off campus. claimed that I was teaching 4 classes when in fact I was teaching 5 classes. s psychology requires him to ignore any evidence, specifically physical evidence, which is inconsistent with his fantasies. is so obsessed with "conspiracy theories" that it dominates his life and interferes with his perception of reality. The conclusion of all of this is that has no conscience (sociopath) about fabricating these stories and his methods are systematic (pathological). Combine this psych-profile with a conviction for a violent crime and he is dangerous to society. This is not the type of environment suited for a critical assembly of SNM producing by-product nuclear materials.

In October 1993, I conducted a thorough examination of College of Engineering accounts at University Accounting. I discovered that my DOE accounts had been used for purposes NOT described in my contracts with DOE, in violation of the contract conditions and federal law. I also discovered that there were no accounts for nuclear reactor services. The illegal distributions were being produced without documented charge. never mentioned a billing situation. I believe that archives of personal financial accounts will prove that no personal gains, via illegal skimming, was not the motivation for illegal distribution. The only other motivation for providing "free" by-product nuclear materials to persons of ethnic origin in clandestine transactions and then concealing the fact through fraudulent reports was political disagreement with the government of the United States.

The second week of November 1993 I received notice from the Council for the Internal Exchange of Scholars (CIES) that I was honored as a Fulbright Senior Scholar for 1994-95 and would be receiving confirmation of a grant for language training pursuant to my proposal, that would be effective January, 1994. I immediately gave notice to that I would be leaving the institution no later than early January 1994 to be honored by the United States Senate. He totally lost control and I had to simply walk away from this lunatic behavior.

About November-December, 1993, the DOL issued a "no finding" in the investigation of another Whistleblower complaint specifically against and his group of thugs masquerading as FBI agents without ID. The DOL never talked with me or any of the witnesses and never collected any physical evidence that I had accumulated. The DOL once again unlawfully failed to investigate my second complaint. As a result, the DOL supported the criminal activities of illegal distribution of controlled by-product nuclear materials to persons unknown and likely in support of terrorist activities, fraud, repeated threatening anonymous phone calls, criminal stalking, libel, slander, 30+ safety violations, uncontracted use of federal funds, nepotism under a federal contract in the reactor facility in 1991), etc.

In December 1993, Professors neither one of the degreed or licensed nuclear engineers published their professional assessment of the operation of the nuclear reactor. Nothing new about that since there was no professional ethics to be found in the College of Engineering. The licensee claimed they terminated me for unrelated circumstances that were unsubstantiated. Because employment at Idaho State University

is actually a detriment to any professional, then it can be concluded that the licensee was not revoking anything of any value, and as a unlawful distributor of controlled substances submitting fraudulent reports to conceal where the materials were being used, there was nothing detrimental a criminal organization could say to hurt my reputation.

In April 1994, CIES phoned me to tell me that the licensee was attempting to interfere with my federal contract as a Fulbright Scholar to teach Belarusian students about the licensee providing illegal services to terrorist organizations. This, of course, is a violation of federal law prohibiting threats to federal contractors. Later that summer, Professor reported that CIES contacted him to confirm that Idaho State University Administration was indeed as lunatic as their behavior suggested in phone calls. has a balanced understanding of the ISU administration and assured them that I was steady and ISU administration was unstable.

In June 1994 died in during a medical exam, students say of his own karma. I was home for a brief visit and the nuclear engineering students gathered at my home for a party they wanted to celebrate the death of a crook. I left for Belarus on September 1, 1994. Sometime during this federal contract the Fulbright Program public relations news release was distributed. The Idaho State University administration phoned of the University of Utah reactor facility and threatened my family, my property, and me if I persisted in telling the truth about the criminal activities at Idaho State University, in violation of federal law protecting federal contractors. The licensee also sent a letter to of the National Whistleblower Center with a copy of a letter with my signature forged at the bottom claiming that the NWC was representing me. The envelope in which the licensee claimed the letter arrived was stamped with a US postage stamp that was UNCANCELLED. It is impossible to mail a letter like that from Belarus. It is impossible to mail a letter from inside the US without the stamp being cancelled. So obviously, this is mail fraud and there is no honesty to be found at Idaho State University. A copy of the letter is found in the archives of the National Whistleblower Center in Washington DC area. In 1995 appropriately retired to his "Ted Kaczynski Cabin" in the mountains near the Montana border where his continual drunken Hillbilly-Hoedown would never be interrupted.

The week between February 8 and 15, 2002 someone from the licensee destroyed my mailbox, in violation of federal law, as a result of an article of mine that was published in the Salt Lake Tribune about the ease of illegally distributing controlled substances to support terrorist activities where I cited the Idaho State University example. ISU College of Engineering Dean , who had been working in Missouri in 1992-1994 and therefore knew absolutely nothing about the facts, wrote a response filled with lies, distortions, and inaccuracies. Nothing unexpected about that since there were no ethics to be found anywhere within the licensee organization. From the moment I returned to the US in 1995, I found that a lunatic from inside the Idaho State University administration would stalk my web site virtually monthly (around the 26th of each month) until they became aware in 2002 that the Salt Lake District Attorney's Office had received regular reports of their activities since 1996. This had also been reported to the SL Office of the FBI.

The level of extreme paranoia as witnessed and documented is explained by only one circumstance that supports my observations while I was at Idaho State University: Idaho State University was illegally distributing controlled substances to a terrorist organization and submitting fraudulent Annual Operating Reports to conceal the fact. No other explanation warrants the level of extreme paranoia demonstrated by the licensee, Idaho State University, and the cast of unsavory characters hanging around the reactor room door every time operated the reactor without my permission. Idaho State University Administration has such an extensive history of documented fraud as described in this Petition, that the response to these allegations is quite simple and straight forward: produce the by-product nuclear material transfer documentation and supporting financial records for all of the years preceding August 4, 1993, or else accept the allegations in full.

93-1 NOTICE OF VIOLATION

To be perfectly clear, and in contradiction to public statements from Idaho State University, the proposed 93-1 Notice contained 9 citations consisting of 8 violations and one deviation. These citations were taken from the August 4, 1993 deposition that I gave to the NRC Region IV criminal investigator, in an undisclosed location and recorded by a court recorder from Murray, Utah contracting to the NRC.

The final 93-1 Notice dropped one citation because it was improperly stated. It referenced an unmarked high radiation area above the reactor that was actually marked. The real problem was the lack of protective clothing

requirement and the inevitable contamination from procedural handling of a startup channel detector from directly over the core. The NRC didn't consult me about dropping this citation. Apparently Region IV Reactor Regulation didn't like me catching them covering up this horrible hypocrisy of more than 20 years.

The remaining citations were 7 violations and one deviation. By definition violations are administrative problems directly due to a serious level of incompetence of the Reactor Administrator, . The only deviation, which normally would be an operations problem, was the responsibility of the Reactor Safety Committee [the governing administrative body] to audits within the required interval. Phone records prove that operations [reactor operator] phoned the RSC Chairman several times to prompt them, but with no success.

The violations included the failure to implement such rudimentary procedures as the Operator Training and Requalification Program such as the ones I had previously written at the University of Utah and Texas A&M and offered to this licensee. These resulted in violations of operator to certify for operations. I pleaded with and the RSC, but of course. the extreme ignorance and arrogance of the pseudo-experts prevailed. I, as the Reactor Supervisor, did not certify to operate the reactor, but he proceeded to operate the reactor without my approval in complete insubordination. He could not pass a written exam prepared by me. He could not pass a physical exam from a licensed physician. His mental state was such that a licensed practitioner should have evaluated his reactor room behavior. He suffered a heart attack during one operation, during which by luck happened to be in the area. The citation failed to properly resolve the violation. was unqualified and should never have been allowed to operate the reactor from the moment the NRC was notified. The NRC, once again playing loose and fast with the regulations with whatever double standard suits them, did not terminate Operator license.

Idaho State University was also cited for failing to document the transactions of controlled by-product nuclear materials made by upon my report. The licensee should have been required to stop operations to account for all by-product nuclear materials produced in the reactor. The accounting should have included the isotopes, the quantities, and the final disposition. If the materials were transferred out of the facility, the receiving license and the certified receiver should be identified. If the material were to be transferred via public road, then certified container identification and surface contamination surveys should have been recorded. The remainder of the required information is lost to time. The NRC, completely blowing off protocol, ignored this routine remediation protocol. As a result, the licensee remains in violation to this day because the licensee still cannot satisfy 10CFR20 required tracking of the by-product nuclear materials produced in the reactor.

VIOLATIONS COMPLETELY CONCEALED BY THE NRC

The NRC had a history of concealing violations before I reported the violations. The following will list violations that the NRC continued to conceal after the 93-1 Notice of Violation and my deposition of August 4, 1993.

(1) Failure to conduct 10CFR50.59 safety review of the automated reactivity manipulation implemented prior to Aug 1991 and not covered in the SAR. The equipment used for this modification included a system of hardware that fails in an uncontrolled positive reactivity addition to the core. One would have to be a total moron to ignore this situation and allow reactor operations.

(2) Failure to conduct 10CFR50.59 safety review of the modification of the Controlled Access Area by the addition of an undocumented roof access for the siphon breaker experiment implemented prior to Aug 1991 and not covered in the SAR. Random students accessed the roof of the reactor room daily to retrieve objects thrown there. That is how the roof seal was broken and will continually be broken, and proof the roof area does not have a natural barrier to access the unmonitored doors to the reactor room.

(3) Release of controlled by-product nuclear materials in containers not certified [10CFR49] for transport of such materials on public roads and not labeled with the required labeling.

(4) Failure to survey personnel contaminated after handling by-product nuclear materials and record results, resulting in contamination routinely tracked through the city of Pocatello, contamination of the US Postal system, and in 1992 that ended up in the Neo-natal Unit of the Medical Center unknowingly carried by students (whose newborn was in the hospital), and two others who had just completed handling

radioactive materials under the direction of and without protective clothing and without follow-up contamination surveys to screen out contamination. This flagrant safety violation possibly caused latent radiation related injuries to the infants therein (child endangerment concealed by the USNRC and its licensee Idaho State University). The victims were never informed.

(5) Failure to implement ALARA procedures [10CFR20] for requiring protective clothing for the handling of by-product nuclear materials to prevent release of contamination to unrestricted areas.

(6) Failure to implement ALARA procedures [10CFR20] for requiring prohibition of consuming food and drink in the radioactive material handling areas.

(7) Failure to competently survey [existing surveys excluded neutron and beta radiation], mark, and secure a high radiation area beginning at the core access and continuing through the visitors observation area and operator control station, and extending to the inadequate controlled access area boundary consisting of a $3/16^{th}$ inch glass window. This violated 10CFR20 requirements for controlling a high radiation area as well as dose requirements for an uncontrolled access area.

(8) Failure of operator to notify the Reactor Supervisor of all reactor operations, particularly those operations for the clandestine distribution of controlled materials. Deviation of approved procedural requirements.

(9) Fraudulent submission of the SAR [18USC1001] containing diagrams not indicating the unreinforced and concealed access to the controlled access area containing the subcritical assembly. This area was open to public access 24/7 during building construction in summer 1992.

(10) Loss of control of Special Nuclear Materials prior to Aug 1991 that I had to recover in 1992 upon my first conduct of a material inventory. I recovered the materials in an unsecured and unapproved area in laboratory in the Physics Building. is honest enough to state that the incompetent licensed Senior Reactor Operator permitted the materials to be released illegally.

(11) Failure to review the Physical Security plan in biennial cycles, resulting in failure to monitor the roof accesses at random times within each 8-hour period of the day as required by the Physical Security Plan.

(12) Submission of fraudulent Annual Operating Reports [18USC1001] by the Reactor Administrator concealing unlawful distributions of controlled by-product materials and all facility modifications. There will be multiple counts of these numerous criminal violations. The fraudulent reports are still on file with the NRC with no amendments. This makes it virtually impossible for victims to sue the licensee since all documentation conceals the loss of control of these materials. Apparently the NRC is protecting the licensee from litigating incompetence.

(13) Failure to follow 10CFR20 requirements to conservatively place badge personnel radiation monitoring badges at waist level and not on collars where the mixed radiation beam is aimed, thereby producing under measured doses that are recorded for a person's lifetime. This means that mine and all other personnel in the facility have falsely low measured lifetime doses that have not been corrected.

(14) Failure to conduct 10CFR50.59 safety review of the routinely rain water soaked reactivity control and reactor safety systems by a leak in the roof caused by routine unauthorized public access to the reactor room roof. Repair orders will be noted for summer 1993 just before the facility inspection the week of Aug 4, 1993. The repairs were made to cover-up the existence of the leaks that had existed for at least 2 years prior when the siphon breaker experiment was installed.

(15) Failure to require the reactor operator conducting the startup procedures to wear protective clothing to routinely remove the activated startup channel detector from the reactor core, thereby causing routine personnel contamination that was routinely hot surveyed. The NRC attempted to cite this violation in the 93-1 Notice of Violation, but was so incredibly clumsy (citing dose concerns instead of contamination concerns) that this item was dropped from the Notice. This would have contaminated the control console and log books, and violates 10CFR20 ALARA requirements.

(16) Failure to properly calibrate the power channels, thereby giving false measurements and exceeding the licensed power levels. The calibration procedure on record has no quality assurance and cannot prove accuracy and precision to within on order of magnitude, 10x over or under licensed power limit. Violation of the technical specification limit on power is virtually guaranteed.

(17) Routine unprotected handling of an unshielded neutron source (reactor start-up source) by licensed operators, and uncontrolled access by untrained and unlicensed facility visitors to this neutron source, violating 10CFR20 ALARA requirements.

(18) The USNRC failed to notify the Deputy US Attorney for the District of Idaho of the illegal distribution of controlled substances to unlicensed and unknown individuals in clandestine transactions hidden from the knowledge of the Reactor Supervisor. No effort was ever made to characterize these materials, identify the release dates, identify the single licensed reactor operator systematically involved in these transactions, and amend the Annual Operating Reports so that individuals suffering from latent personal injury can sue the licensee.

(19) Failure to review the Emergency Plan in biennial cycles resulting in the facility not having a signed agreement with all referenced emergency services (e.g., fire protection, certified law enforcement, emergency medical services) who were required to be trained to respond to a radiation related emergency, conducted routine radiation related emergency drills, and who had a legal obligation to respond to same. Interestingly enough, emergency response personnel had never been in the facility and had no idea what they would face. That would be typical of a back-woods hick operation.

(20) I reported the compromise of the 1992 Reactor Operator Exams by the incompetent NRC examiner when he was observed drunk in an Idaho Falls bar shooting of his mouth about the in-process examination. Nothing was done to restore the integrity of the examination. Of course, this initiated the motivation for the NRC to withdraw support from me as Director of Reactor Operations in trying to bring the facility into compliance with the legal requirements of the license. Between the NRC and the University administration, it was like being constantly surrounded by drunken idiots.

CRIMINAL ACTS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE REACTOR FACILITY

(1) Unlawful distribution of controlled by-product nuclear materials by Reactor Operator in clandestine, undocumented transactions.

(2) Submission of fraudulent [18USC1001] Annual Operating Reports by Reactor Administrator to conceal the unlawful distributions

(3) Submission of fraudulent [18USC1001] SAR specification concealing the false wall behind the subcritical assembly.

(4) Repeated threatening phone calls placed to my home at night by and without law enforcement authority and without court warrant in violation of Idaho State Criminal Code. This is a well-worn pathology at backwater institutions.

(5) Publishing libelous statements by because I reported regulatory and criminal violations in the operation of the nuclear reactor and successful whistleblower findings and to intimidate me to prevent my reporting additional regulatory and criminal violations.

(6) Sending fraudulent materials through the mail to the National Whistleblower Center to prevent a civil action against the licensee.

(7) Attempted interference with a federal contractor.

(8) Unlawful use of federal DOE Reactor Sharing and Reactor Instrumentation funds for purposes not described in the contracting documents.

(9) Child endangerment.

RECOMMENDED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

The licensee has had decades to comply with the conditions of licensure and yet has made only sub-minimal effort to comply. The licensee has conducted criminal activities to conceal violations and clearly demonstrated a consciousness of guilt. This licensee has committed criminal acts against the NRC licensed senior reactor operator in flagrant retribution. The licensee has issued public statements clearly subordinating public health, safety, and national security to their own fraudulent appearance. The licensee has demonstrated contempt for the laws of the United States. It is time for the administration of this licensee to finally be brought to the professional table for the first time in their careers to account and be fully responsible for their behavior.

(1) The reactor operating license should be suspended immediately. ALL continuing violations including the unresolved items from the 93-1 Notice of Violation as well as the additional 20 concealed violations must be reconciled with the regulatory requirements immediately.

(a) Reactor room roof must be replaced entirely to eliminate roof access to the reactor room,
(b) Reactor room roof access must be prevented through architectural modification of the outside of the building,
(c) CAA boundary in the subcritical assembly room must be entirely reinforced concrete,
(d) A normal, straight forward emergency escape door should be constructed, replacing the "child's tree house fantasy door" constructed through the ceiling (time for these people to grow up),
(e) A safety system locked beam-stop must be placed on the neutron source access to prevent full power operation when the beam is not stopped,
(f) Emergency services must be formally contracted, and personnel annually trained in this specific facility,
(g) The unreviewed safety question of Ar-41 production in a sealed reactor room must prove that Ar-41 exposure is significantly less of a health risk than gaseous fission product release when the core container is opened for maintenance,
(h) Undocumented releases of airborne nuclear materials (no CAM, no HEPA filter) must be calculated and all Annual Operating Reports amended to reflect these releases,
(i) Initiate a policy of no consumption in the material handling areas,
(j) Protective clothing must be worn in material handling areas,
(k) Hand and foot monitor should be acquired and used on all personnel leaving the facility,
(l) A CAM should be acquired and installed along with a HEPA filter and proper ventilation in the reactor room,
(m) The neutron source should be locked down and shielded,
(n) Any operator removing the startup channel from the core should be required to wear protective clothing, to be removed and disposed of immediately after handling.

(2) The licensee should be fined for all damages related to the violations and cover-up of violations.

(3) The licensee should be required to carry a 50-year $50,000,000 bond to cover latent radiation injuries instead of covering these injuries with unreliable State budget allocations for contingency funds.

(4) EVERY potential exposure and contamination victim should be identified through facility records, located, and informed of the potential risk to them and their families. The Medical Center should also be informed so that they may do the same. They should be informed of the entire range of expected symptoms. They should be informed of their right to seek compensation from the licensee. The licensee made certain that whole body counts could not be conducted, and that is truly unfortunate for the victims.

(5) The inability for the licensee to account with documentation for controlled by-product nuclear materials that were:

(a) Released in clandestine, undocumented shipments before August 4, 1993,
(b) To unidentified persons of ethnic origin,
(c) Who were not licensed to hold the materials,

(d) And were not certified to handle the materials,
(e) Without proper 49CFR DoT certified containers,
(f) Without proper labeling for transport on public roads, and
(g) Concealed via fraudulent Annual Operating Reports as defined in 18USC1001 that were never amended even after citation in 93-1,

should warrant immediate permanent revocation of the operating license. The administrative, technical, and operational incompetence of these acts alone is appalling. If for nothing else, the materials can never be accounted, thereby placing the facility in permanent violation of 10CFR20 requirements for tracking. The licensee violated the contract conditions for operating this critical assembly, and did so willingly. The licensee committed crimes to conceal the violations, and did so willingly.

(6) The hiring of a convicted violent criminal, , to impersonate an FBI agent to conceal criminal and regulatory violations required consciousness of guilt by the University Administration. This is the same organization structure that administers the Broad Form License. Given that the Dean of the College of Engineering, published a comment in the Salt Lake Tribune, February 15, 2002 denying that the University had any problem with illegal distribution, while a mere 6 months prior the Broad Form License was cited for illegal distribution, it is clear to see that fraud is institutional and can be expected in the administration of the Broad Form License. Therefore, with this history of fraud and criminal intent it is recommended that the Broad Form License be permanently revoked.

(7) The licensee must publicly acknowledge that lost control of SNM, and that during inventory accounting the Reactor Supervisor discovered their clandestine activity, recovered the SNM, and reported it as a responsible licensed professional. Afterwards, the licensee took actions to conceal the fact.

(8) The licensee must publicly acknowledge the criminal record of and admit he served as an accessory to concealing unlawful distribution of controlled substances, fraud (both Annual Operating Reports and National Whistleblower Center), loss of control of SNM, child endangerment, uncontracted use of federal funds, repeated threatening anonymous phone calls that were reported to Qwest by the whistleblower victim, impersonating an FBI agent, criminal stalking, libel, and slander. must be placed on the Terrorist Watchlist for his part in the concealment of unlawful distribution of controlled substances to persons unknown.

These recommended enforcement actions for the violations to be confirmed should be compared to the enforcement actions at the University of Utah reactor mentioned earlier. You will see that these enforcement recommendations are VERY mild in relation to the seriousness of the violations. At Idaho State University, we are not referring to "levity in the control room" resulting in the six month suspension of a licensed reactor operator. We are not talking about a licensed operator wearing a shirt with a provocative statement resulting in the temporary shutdown of a facility for "loss of management control" until I could return from Texas A&M Nuclear Science Center and set the facility back on track. At Idaho State University we are dealing with operator insubordination, illegal distribution of controlled substances, fraud, loss of control of SNM, child endangerment, obstruction of justice, gross incompetence, criminal negligence, and quackery beyond all belief; a very fine legacy for a facility licensed and tolerated by the NRC.

No reactor operator should be exposed to such gross incompetence, criminal negligence, and flagrant crimes as I experienced at Idaho State University. There is no excuse for what I witnessed at this licensee. The NRC is as much to blame for allowing this behavior as the licensee is for conducting these despicable acts. I can say as an expert, that in a hypothetical world where the US Service Academies could waive age and IQ requirements and allow these responsible parties at both Idaho State University and the NRC to matriculate, these crooks most certainly could NOT last a month with their lack of morals and ethics. They are truly disgusting and despicable people who place their own appallingly arrogant appearance before national security and public health and safety. Now is the time for the NRC to finally draw the line to establish some credibility so that nuclear endeavors can move forward without the burden of deceit that so many non-invested crooks carry into the nuclear arena.

The NRC should make Idaho State University an example of the "licensee death penalty" when a licensed facility is used to commit crimes. It is better to send an industry warning at this level than to allow problems to propagate to

larger facilities. Of course, failure to draw the line on absolutely unacceptable licensee activities will only raise more questions for the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. That this petition had to be written is proof that the system has failed to regulate this license and that a significant potential exists at any NRC licensed facility for threat to public health and safety as well as national security. If this licensee goes unpunished, then the NRC cannot be trusted to regulate nuclear facilities. There is no wonder that the States of Utah and Nevada have strenuously expressed their distrust of the NRC and its licensees in the last 25 years. The question now is how will the system change to prevent NRC licensees with a political axe to grind from providing terrorist support activities in the future?

Regards,

Kevan C. Crawford

Kevan Crawford, PhD

enc: USIS News Release (1)
Support letters from Senators Craig and Kempthorne (2)
Senior Reactor Operators Licenses (3)

cc: State of Idaho
Office of Attorney General
700 W. State Street
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

State of Nevada
Office of the Attorney General
100 North Carson Street
Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717
(775) 684-1100
madams@ag.nv.gov

State of Utah
Office of the Attorney General
Utah State Capitol Complex
350 North State Street Suite 230
SLC UT 84114-2320
(801) 538-9600
dchancellor@utah.gov

Idaho State Board of Education
Len B. Jordan Building, Room 307
650 West State Street,
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID, 83720-0037
board@osbe.idaho.gov

FBI, Pocatello Field Office
Pocatello.SLC@ic.fbi.gov
saltlakecity@ic.fbi.gov

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of the Inspector General
Hotline Program
Mail Stop O5-E13
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852

US Rep. Edward Markey
Committee on Energy and Commerce
2125 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
will.huntington@mail.house.gov

US Rep. Jim Matheson
Committee on Energy and Commerce
2434 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
neeta.bidwai@mail.house.gov

US Senator Orrin Hatch
Committee on the Judiciary
104 Hart Office Building
Washington, DC 20510
Jared_Brown@hatch.senate.gov

United States Information Agency

Washington, D.C. 20547

USIA

NEWS RELEASE

Kevan Crawford, formerly a professor and Reactor Supervisor at Idaho State University has been awarded a Fulbright grant to Belarus, a former Republic of the Soviet Union, the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board and the United States Information Agency (USIA) announced recently.

Candidates are selected for their professional integrity and extensive experience in their academic disciplines. Dr. Crawford has 17 years experience in the management and administration of nuclear reactors and has served as Reactor Manager at Texas A&M University and Reactor Supervisor at the University of Utah.

Dr. Crawford recently reported numerous negligent and willful violations of federal regulations at Idaho State University which endangered the health and safety of students and the violation of numerous state and federal laws in unlawful acts of whistleblower retribution. Dr. Crawford will be lecturing on Negligent and Willful Non-compliance, Whistleblower Law and the incidents at Idaho State University to scholars from Belarus, the Russian Federation, and the Ukraine.

He is one of approximately 2,000 U.S. grantees who will travel abroad for the 1994-95 academic year under the Fulbright Program. Established in 1946 under the Congressional legislation introduced by former Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, the program is designed "to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries."

Under the Fulbright Program, some 5,000 grants are awarded each year to American students, teachers and scholars to study, teach and conduct research around the world, and to foreign nationals to engage in similar activities in the United States. More than 195,000 "Fulbrighters," over 70,000 from the United States and 125,000 from abroad, have participated in the program since it began.

The program is administered by the United States Information Agency under policy guidelines established by the presidentially appointed J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board and in cooperation with several private organizations. Scholarships are awarded through open competition, with final selections made by the Foreign Scholarship Board. Thirty seven foreign governments share in the funding of these exchanges.

# # #

The United States Information Agency is an independent foreign affairs agency within the executive branch of the federal government that explains and supports U.S. foreign policy and national security interests abroad and through a wide range of information programs. The agency promotes mutual understanding between the United States and other countries through a series of educational and cultural exchange activities.

For further information about the Fulbright Program, contact:

U.S. Information Agency
Office of Public Liaison
301-4th Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20547
Telephone: (202) 619-4355

DIRK KEMPTHORNE
IDAHO

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-4902

November 18, 1994

Dr. Kevan C. Crawford

Dear Kevan:

I would like to congratulate you on being selected by the United States Information Agency for the Fulbright Scholar Program.

To be recognized and rewarded for such worthwhile endeavors is truly an honor. It is an honor to represent such accomplished Idahoans as yourself.

I wish you continued success and an enjoyable year in Belarus.

Sincerely,

Dirk

DIRK KEMPTHORNE
United States Senator

DK\mkd

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LARRY E. CRAIG
IDAHO
HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING
(202) 224-2752

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1203

AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ETHICS

November 22, 1994

Dr. Kevan Crawford

Dear Kevan:

I have been informed that you have been selected to receive a Fulbright award for the 1994-1995 academic year. I congratulate you on this achievement and commend you for the personal commitment and professional excellence which qualified you to win this prestigious honor.

I'm sure your experience abroad will enrich your life and enhance the lives of those with whom you share your abilities.

Sincerely,

LARRY E. CRAIG
U.S. Senator

LEC/tmo

The United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Nuclear Plant
Senior Reactor Operator
License Certification

granted to

Kevan C. Crawford

effective on the tenth day of March, Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Four, for having met the provisions of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's regulations and having demonstrated the knowledge, skills and ability to carry out the responsibilities of the position of Senior Reactor Operator at the

University of Utah TRIGA Nuclear Reactor Facility Docket No. 50-407

In accordance with the terms and conditions of
Senior Operator License Number 4233
Operator Docket Number 55-6733

Chairman

Director,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Regional Administrator,
Region IV

The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Nuclear Plant Senior Reactor Operator License Certification

granted to

Kevan C. Crawford

effective on the ninth day of August, Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Eight, for having met the provisions of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's regulations and having demonstrated the knowledge, skills and ability to carry out the responsibilities of the position of Senior Reactor Operator at the

Texas A&M University TRIGA Reactor
Facility Docket No. 50-128

In accordance with the terms and conditions of
Senior Operator License Number 43399
Operator Docket Number 55-6733

Lando W. Zech Jr.

Chairman

Thomas E. Murley

Director,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Robert D. Martin

Regional Administrator,
Region IV

The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Nuclear Plant Senior Reactor Operator License Certification

granted to

Kevan Charles Crawford

effective on the Seventh day of November, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-One, for having met the provisions of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's regulations and having demonstrated the knowledge, skills and ability to carry out the responsibilities of the position of Senior Reactor Operator at the

Idaho State University Nuclear Reactor Facility
Facility Docket No. 50-284

In accordance with the terms and conditions of
Senior Operator License Number 70033
Operator Docket Number 55-6733

Chairman

Director,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Director,
Division of Licensee Performance & Quality Evaluation