

Modeling Nuclear Power Plant Operator Knowledge and Procedural Adherence in the ADS-IDAC Simulation Model

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Presentation Outline

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- Introduction
 - General Overview of ADS-IDAC
 - The IDA Cognitive Model
- Diagnostic Engine
- Plant Functional Decomposition
- Applications
 - Information Gathering
 - Knowledge-Based Actions
 - Procedure Step Skipping

Introduction

- ADS-IDAC Simulation Approach

ADS-IDAC - **A**ccident **D**ynamics **S**imulator with the **I**nformation **D**ecision and **A**ction in a **C**rew Context operator model

- Discrete Dynamic Event Tree (DDET) Simulation Method
- Model-based HRA approach
 - Integrates a thermal hydraulic nuclear plant model with a control room crew human performance model
 - Provides rich situational context for evaluating factors that may influence decision-making performance (e.g., identifying error forcing contexts)

Introduction

- IDA Cognitive Model

- ❑ IDA cognitive model provides framework for information processing, decision-making, and actions
- ❑ Operator mental state influences each cognitive process
- ❑ Error defined as a failure to meet a plant/system need





Fig. 2. Operator cognitive flow model.

Introduction

- Discrete Dynamic Event Tree

- ADS-IDAC generates a discrete dynamic event tree (DDET) based on the application of simple branching rules
- Both the branching rules and the timing of branch events influence the scenario trajectory
- The DDET structure links dynamic system behavior with hardware reliability models and operator actions to provide a more complete risk assessment



Branching rules reflect variations in plant hardware and crew responses to plant events

Diagnostic Engine

- Inference Method Used to Identify Possible Event Diagnoses
 - Diagnosis will influence follow-up actions such as goal and strategy selection, identification of appropriate procedures, or additional troubleshooting
- Two Event Types Are Considered
 - Initiating Events (e.g., LOCA, SGTR) - Classified based on their relative frequency and consequences
 - Imbalance Events. Used to Identify Mass or Energy Imbalances in Major Plant Systems
- Fuzzy Logic Technique Used to Calculate the Likelihood of Possible Events Based on the Operator's Confidence Level in Perceived Plant Symptoms

Diagnostic Engine

- Event-Symptom Relationship Matrix

| Initiating Event | Event Category | Associated Parameters | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|----------------|-----------------------|---------------|------------------|-----------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|----------------|-------------|
| | | Cont. Pressure | Reactor Power | T _{avg} | PZR Water Level | RCS Pressure | RCS Flowrate | MF Flowrate | MS Flowrate | SG Water Level | SG Pressure |
| Changing Steam Demand | Normal | | T | S | T | T | | T | P | | |
| Controller Failure - PZR Water Level | Normal | | | | P | T | | | | | |
| Controller Failure - RCS Pressure | Normal | | | | | P | | | | | |
| Controller Failure - RCS Temperature | Normal | | T | P | S | T | | | | | |
| Controller Failure - SG Water Level | Normal | | | | | | | P | | S | |
| Normal Steady-State Operation | Normal | | | P | | P | | | | | |
| Leak - MF System | AOO | | | | | | | S | | P | |
| Leak - MS System | AOO | | | | | | | T | P | | |
| Leak - RCS | AOO | | | | P | S | | | | | |
| Load Rejection | AOO | | T | S | T | T | | S | P | | S |
| Loss of Feedwater Flow | AOO | | | T | | | | P | | P | |
| Loss of RCS Flow | AOO | | | | | | P | | | | |
| MS Isolation Valve Closure | AOO | | T | S | T | T | | S | P | | S |
| RCS Overfill | AOO | | | | P | S | | | | | |
| Reactor Trip | AOO | | P | P | S | T | | T | T | | |
| ATWS - Loss of Load | Accident | | T | S | T | T | | | P | | S |
| Loss of Coolant Accident | Accident | P | | | P | P | | | | | |
| MF System Line Break | Accident | P | | S | | | | P | | P | |
| MS System Line Break | Accident | P | T | S | T | T | | T | P | | P |
| Steam Generator Tube Rupture | Accident | | | | P | S | | T | | P | |
| Energy Imbalance - PZR | Imbalance | | | | | P | | | | | |
| Energy Imbalance - RCS | Imbalance | | | P | | | | | | | |
| Energy Imbalance - SG | Imbalance | | | | | | | | | | P |
| Mass Imbalance - RCS | Imbalance | | | | P | | | | | | |
| Mass Imbalance - SG | Imbalance | | | | | | | | | P | |

P: Primary effects; S: Secondary effects; T: Tertiary effects.

Parameter states based on trends (increasing, decreasing, steady)

Relationship matrix compact method for capturing operator knowledge

Plant Functional Decomposition


- The ADS-IDAC operator knowledge base links components to functions and functions to diagnostic events
 - All plant components are categorized by the high-level plant functions they support
 - Plant functions are based on controlling mass, energy, and momentum at a system level (e.g., reactor coolant, pressurizer, steam generator, etc.)
 - The diagnosis module used to identify deficiencies in maintaining plant functions

Plant Functional Decomposition

- Model allows operator to identify the relevance of each component to the current plant state
 - For example, a high pressure injection pump has high salience when a deficiency in pressurizer mass control is perceived
- The plant functional decomposition supports key features in the IDA cognitive model:
 - Information Processing – Control Panel Scanning
 - Decision-Making – Knowledge Based Response
 - Action – Procedure Step Skipping

Applications

- Information Processing



Applications

- Knowledge-Based Actions

- Applies the functional decomposition framework and the diagnosis module to support a “reasoning” based approach to problem solving
 - Focuses on restoration of safety functions
 - Each function is associated with specific components (e.g., AFW throttle valves linked to mass balance in SGs)
 - When the operator diagnoses a functional problem, specific actions can be activated
 - This mode of plant interaction is completely independent of the procedure following approach

Applications

- Knowledge-Based Actions

Example Knowledge-Based Actions for a Steam Generator Tube Rupture



A relatively small number of rules can drive complex plant interactions

| Imbalance Diagnosis | Actions | Prerequisites |
|--|---|--|
| Low mass in the reactor coolant system | Isolate chemical and volume control system letdown Actuate emergency core cooling systems | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Low pressurizer water level •Low pressurizer water level |
| High mass in the reactor coolant system | Stop emergency core cooling injection flow | •Adequate sub-cooling margin and pressurizer water level |
| Low energy in the pressurizer | Reduce setpoint of SG atmospheric steam dump valves | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Goal to cooldown reactor coolant system activated •Sub-cooling margin less than 10F |
| High mass in a steam generator | Isolate steam generator (e.g., shut main steam, main feedwater, and auxiliary feedwater isolation valves) Open pressurizer spray valve Close pressurizer spray valve | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Mental belief that reactor is shut down and a steam generator tube rupture has occurred. •Mental belief that reactor is shut down and a steam generator tube rupture has occurred. •RCS pressure <i>greater</i> than ruptured SG pressure •Mental belief that reactor is shut down and a steam generator tube rupture has occurred. •RCS pressure <i>less</i> than ruptured SG pressure |

Applications

- Knowledge-Based Actions

- Knowledge-based and procedure-based operator response follow different trajectories to achieve similar end states
 - May be useful for potential errors of commission or “jumping” sections within a procedure



Applications

- Procedure Step Skipping

Skip probability based on static and dynamic factors

Static Factors

| | |
|------------------------------|--|
| Type of Step | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Verification Steps • Prerequisite Steps • Decision Steps • Objective-Related Action Steps • Monitoring Steps |
| Type of Procedure | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EOP/FRG • Normal/Abnormal • Alarm Response • Memorized |
| Complexity of Actions | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Location of actions • Step structure • Familiarity with action |


Dynamic Factors

| | |
|--------------------------------|--|
| Time Constraint Loading | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Based on time until a critical parameter exceeds a specific threshold • Represents plant dynamics |
| Action Relevance | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Measures the relevance of the step action to the operator's situational assessment • If the action is closely associated with an identified plant need, the relevance is high |

Applications

- Procedure Step Skipping

- Likelihood of skipping a procedure step dynamically determined
- Reflects PIFs, information perception, operator knowledge, and procedure characteristics



Conclusions

- Recent improvements to the ADS-IDAC code have dramatically improved the realism of plant and operator models.
 - ADS-IDAC is capable of capturing a wide range of crew behaviors within a structured environment
 - The ADS-IDAC knowledge base framework can represent the complex operator mental models of plant behavior that guide crew actions.

Taken together, these factors reinforce the man-machine feedback loop and improve the ability of ADS-IDAC to model crew-to-crew variabilities and dependencies