REPORT NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_05000369/370/2009-301\_\_

# **FINAL SIMULATOR SCENARIOS**

**CONTENTS:** 

Final Simulator Scenarios

- 'As given' with changes made during administration annotated
- Each containing ES-D-1 "Scenario Outline"
- Each containing ES-D-2 "Required Operator Actions"

**Location of Electronic Files:** 

Submitted By:

Riches Verified By

Scenario Event Description

NRC Scenario 1

Facility:	Мс	Guire	Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: N09-1
Examine	s:		Operators: (SRO)
			(RO)
·			(BOP)
Initial Co	nditions:	ago to complete was completed level two days a this power level has indicated instabilities, on to commence Enclosure 1 of expected to rais Dilute during po of OP/1/A/6150	75% power (MOL), following an unplanned load reduction four days e corrective maintenance on the 1A CF Pump. The maintenance and the pump restarted, and power level raised to the present power ago. The present plan is to observe operation of the 1A CF Pump at , and then raise power to 100% within the next 24 hours. Dispatch that there have been intermittent voltage swings, and other the electrical grid, and that this is being investigated. It is expected a power increase to 100% power starting at Step 3.21.10 of OP/1/A/6100/003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation." It is se power on the upcoming shift at 2 MWe/Minute. Use of Alternate ower ascension in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, "Alternate Dilute," 0/009, "Boron Concentration Control," has been approved. The ved Oxygen Concentration is 800 ppb.
Turnover	:	Radiation Monito	quipment is Out-Of-Service: 1EMF27, SM Line D/Inner Doghouse or, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-8, E- ATER HI LEVEL," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last stigating).
Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*	Event Description
1	NA	R-BOP	Power Increase
		N-RO	
		N-SRO	
2		I-RO	Feed Flow Channel fails low
	CF018	I-SRO	
3	ILE001	I-BOP	NC Master Pressure Controller fails high/PORV Leakage
	NC012B	I(TS)-SRO	
4	EP003C	C-RO	Zone 1B Lockout causing Runback/Stuck Rod/Rods Fail to move
	IRE009	C(TS)-SRO	in AUTO
	IRE010		
5	SG001B	C-BOP	Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)
		C(TS)-SRO	
6	SG001B	M-RO	SGTR (B)
		M-BOP	
		M-SRO	
7	хмт СА012	NA	Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high
* (	N)ormal,	(R)eactivity,	(I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

#### McGuire 2009 NRC Scenario #1

The Plant is at 75% power (MOL), following an unplanned load reduction four days ago to complete corrective maintenance on the 1A CF Pump. The maintenance was completed and the pump restarted, and power level raised to the present power level two days ago. The present plan is to observe operation of the 1A CF Pump at this power level, and then raise power to 100% within the next 24 hours. Dispatch has indicated that there have been intermittent voltage swings, and other instabilities, on the electrical grid, and that this is being investigated. It is expected to commence a power increase to 100% power starting at Step 3.21.10 of Enclosure 1 of OP/1/A/6100/003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation." It is expected to raise power on the upcoming shift at 2 MWe/Minute. Use of Alternate Dilute during power ascension in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, "Alternate Dilute," of OP/1/A/6150/009, "Boron Concentration Control," has been approved. The RMWST Dissolved Oxygen Concentration is 800 ppb.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1EMF27, SM Line D/Inner Doghouse Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (IAE is investigating) and MCB Annunciator 1AD-8, E-2, "GROUNDWATER HI LEVEL," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power in accordance with Step 3.21.10 of Enclosure 4.1, "Power Increase," of OP/1/A/6100/003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operations." The RO will control the Turbine Generator in accordance with Enclosure 4.1, "Turbine-Generator Load Change," of OP/1/A6300/001A, "Turbine-Generator Load Change," and the BOP will conduct an NC System Boron dilution in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, "Alternate Dilute," of OP/1/A/6150/009, "Boron Concentration Control."

During the power increase, the controlling Feed Flow Transmitter (FCF-5060) on the D Steam Generator will fail low, causing a Steam Generator D Feed Flow Mismatch alarm. The operator will respond by implementing AP/1/A/5500/06, "S/G Feedwater Malfunction," recognize the failure and select an operating Feed Flow channel.

After this, the Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller output will fail high. This will cause the PORV 1NC34A and both spray valves to open, and NC Pressure will start to drop. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/11, "Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies." The operator will ultimately close the Block Valve for Pressurizer PORV 1NC34A when it is determined that the valve now leaks by its closed seat. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure From Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits," and 3.4.11, "Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVS)." Ultimately, IAE will correct the problem with the Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller, and it will be placed back in automatic control.

Subsequently, a Zone 1B Lockout causes PCB 11 and 12 to open, as well as the 1B Main Generator Breaker to open and the turbine to automatically runback to 56%. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/03, "Load Rejection." During the runback the operator will notice that the rods do not move in manual, and the operator will need to drive rods in manually. Additionally, the operator will notice that Control Rod M12 will remain stuck in its original position.

During the plant stabilization, a slow developing Steam Generator Tube Leak will occur on the 1B Steam Generator. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/10, "NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps," and sequentially reduce and isolate Letdown and start a second

## Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1

NV Pump. Ultimately, the leak will degrade to a 260 gpm SGTR. the operator will trip the reactor and actuate Safety Injection, and then enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage."

The operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture," and isolate the flow into and out of the 1B Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the NC System. The attempt to isolate Auxiliary Feedwater flow into the B Steam generator will be complicated by the failure of the Auxiliary Feed Flow transmitter (FCA-5100) to the B Steam Generator.

The scenario will terminate at Step 23.c of E-3, after the crew has closed 1NI-9A and 1NI-10B.

### Critical Tasks:

### E-3A

# Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs.

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of  $\Delta P$  between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. Upon a loss of  $\Delta P$ , the crew must transition to a contingency procedure that constitutes an incorrect performance that "necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy." If the crew fails to isolate steam from the SG, or feed flow into the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to decrease to the same pressures as the intact SGs, requiring a transition to a contingency procedure, and delaying the stopping of RCS leakage into the SG.

#### E-3B

# Establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because RCS temperature is either too high to maintain minimum required subcooling, or too low causing an Orange path on Subcriticality or Integrity.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure which constitutes an incorrect performance that "necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy." If the RCS temperature is too high when RCS depressurization is started, a loss of subcooling will occur when the RCS depressurization is started. On the other hand, if RCS temperature is allowed to continue to decrease after the initial cooldown, the operator may be required to transition to the Subcriticality or Integrity response FRP, and delay the RCS depressurization.

#### E-3C

# Depressurize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before ruptured SG level reaches 100% Wide Range Level.

Safety Significance: Failure to stop the reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates the mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a "significant reduction of Safety Margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. If RCS depressurization does NOT occur, the inventory in the secondary side of the ruptured SG will occur leading to water release through the SG PORV or Safety Valve, which could cause and unisolable fault in the ruptured SG.

# Scenario Event Description

NRC Scenario 1

## SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS

Bench Mark	ACTIVITY	DESCRIPTION
Sim. Setup	Rod Step On	
	Reset to Temp I/C 152.	Insert MALF-EMF227 = 6; EMF-27 Failure
		Event 6, Insert XMT-CA012, Set = 600, Ramp = 600 seconds (Connected to P4)
	RUN	
	Update Status Board,	NOTE: RMWST DO = <1000 ppb.
	Setup OAC	
	<b>Setup</b> ICCM, Turbine Displays, & Trend Recorders.	
	<b>Check</b> Rod Step Counters agree with rod positions	
	<b>Check</b> Make-up Control Switch in "ARMED."	
	<b>Ensure</b> DRPI Screen is Re-zeroed.	
	<b>Ensure</b> CF Pump LoveJoy reset.	
	Place orange Work Request Sticker on 1AD- 6/E-11 Panel board.	
An Annan an A	Freeze.	
	Update Fresh Tech. Spec. Log.	
	Fill out the NLO's Available section of Shift Turnover Info.	

# Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1

B	ench Mark	ACTIVITY	DESCRIPTION
P P	rior to Crew Briefing	RUN	
			Crew Briefing
1.	Assign Crew	Positions based on evaluatio	n requirements
2.	Review the SI	hift Turnover Information with	the crew.
4. 5.	Check Box or Check Box or Step 3.21.3 in Step 3.21.4 in Check Box or Step 3.21.6.1 Step 3.21.6.2 Step 3.21.6.3 Check Box or Step 3.21.8 N Step 3.21.9 N Provide OP/1 Concentration Provide a Rea	n step 3.21.1 checked. n step 3.21.2 checked. nitialed and Todd St.Claire en nitialed. n step 3.21.5 checked. initialed and Don Gabriel en NA and initialed. NA and initialed. NA and initialed. IA and initialed. IA and initialed. IA and initialed. IA and initialed. IA control," with Enclosure 4.4 activity Plan W/Pwr ascensio	
	Т-0	Begin Familiarization Period	
	t direction of examiner		Power Increase
	t direction of	(XMT) CF018	Feed Flow Channel fails low.
	examiner	Set = 0,	
		30 Second Ramp	
		Trigger #1	
	t direction of	(MALF) ILE001	NC Master Pressure Controller fails high/PORV Leakage
	examiner	Set = 1700, 30 second Ramp	II E001 will be deleted during the service of the
		(MALF) NC012B	ILE001 will be deleted during the course of the recovery.
		Set = 1	LOA-NC33A=Racked Out, 600 second Delay; on
		(OVR) NC088B = ON	Trigger #15 (PORV Isolation Valve Breaker)
1 1		1	

# Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1

Bench Mark	ACTIVITY	DESCRIPTION
At direction of examiner	(MALF) EP003C (MALF) IRE010M12 (MALF) IRE009 = 0 Trigger #5	Zone 1B Lockout causing Runback/Stuck Rod/Rods fail to move in AUTO LOA IPP003 = Override, Trigger #7; IPB Fan
At direction of examiner	(MALF) SG001B Set = 260 Ramp = 360 seconds Trigger #9	Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B) LOA-SA003 = 0, Trigger #13; TDCA Pump
Continued from Event 6	(XMT) CA012 Set = 600 Ramp = 600 seconds Trigger #11	Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high Set up to Trigger on Reactor Trip (Trigger #11)
	Terminate the scenar	io upon direction of Lead Examiner

Appendix D	)	· · ···· <u>·</u> ···	Ope	rator Actic	n			For	mΕ	S-D-2
Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	_1	Event #		••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••	Page	8	of	52
Event Descrip	otion:	Power Increa	ase							
Time	Position			Applica	nt's Actio	ons or Beha	vior			

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power in accordance with Step 3.21.10 of Enclosure 4.1, "Power Increase," of OP/1/A/6100/003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operations." The RO will control the Turbine Generator in accordance with Enclosure 4.1, "Turbine-Generator Load Change," of OP/1/A6300/001A, "Turbine-Generator Load Change," of OP/1/A6300/001A, "Turbine-Generator Load Change," of OP/1/A/6150/009, "Boron dilution in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, "Alternate Dilute," of OP/1/A/6150/009, "Boron Concentration Control."

**Booth Operator Instructions: NA** 

Indications Available: NA

Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
OP/1/#		
SRO	(Step 3.21.10) Continue power increase to 95% RTP."	<b>NOTE:</b> The power increase will be at 2 MWe/minute.
1		
BOP	(Step 3.6) Ensure Boric Acid Flow Counter reset to zero.	
BOP	(Step 3.7) Set Total Make Up Flow Counter to value determined in Step 3.5. (R.M.)	
BOP	(Step 3.8) WHEN Total Make Up Flow Counter cover closed, check counter at desired value. (R.M.)	
BOP	(Step 3.9) Select "ALTERNATE DILUTE" on "NC Sys M/U Controller".	
	OP/1/A SRO BOP BOP BOP	OP/1/A/6100/003, CONTROLLING PROCEDURE FO         ENCLOSURE 4.1, POWER INCRE         SRO       (Step 3.21.10) Continue power increase to         95% RTP."         OP/1/A/6150/009, BORON CONCENTRATION         ENCLOSURE 4.4, ALTERNATE DI         BOP       (Step 3.6) Ensure Boric Acid Flow Counter         reset to zero.         BOP       (Step 3.7) Set Total Make Up Flow Counter         royalue determined in Step 3.5. (R.M.)         BOP       (Step 3.8) WHEN Total Make Up Flow         Counter cover closed, check counter at         desired value. (R.M.)       BOP         BOP       (Step 3.9) Select "ALTERNATE DILUTE" on

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Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	_1	Event #	1	Page	9	of	52
Event Descrip	otion:	Power Increa	se						
Time	Position			Applica	nt's Actions	or Behavior	<u></u>		

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	BOP	(Step 3.10) If desired to makeup only through 1NV-175A (BA Blender to VCT Outlet), select CLOSED on 1NV-171A (BA Blender to VCT Inlet).	
	BOP	(Step 3.11) IF desired to adjust reactor makeup water flow using the "BA Blend Discharge Cntrl" potentiometer, adjust "BA Blend Discharge Cntrl" potentiometer setpoint to achieve desired flowrate.	
	BOP	(Step 3.12) If desired to manually adjust reactor makeup water flow, perform the following:	
		• Place "BA Blend Disch Cntrl" in manual.	
		Adjust "BA Blend Disch Cntrl" output to control reactor makeup water flowrate.	
	BOP	(Step 3.13) IF required to lower VCT level	<b>NOTE:</b> It is NOT required to lower VCT level.
	BOP	(Step 3.14) IF plant parameters require termination of dilution, place "NC System Makeup" to "STOP". (R.M.)	
	BOP	(Step 3.15) Momentarily select "START" on "NC System Make Up". (R.M.)	
	BOP	(Step 3.16) Check "NC System Make Up" red light lit.	
	BOP	(Step 3.17) Check 1NV-175A (BA Blender To VCT Outlet) open.	
	BOP	(Step 3.18) Check 1NV-252A (Rx M/U Water To Blender control) open or throttled as required.	

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Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	_1	Event #	1		Page	10	of	52
Event Descrip	tion:	Power Increa	ase							
Time	Position			Applica	nt's Action	is or Beha	avior	1):		P

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	BOP	(Step 3.19) IF 1NV-171A (BA Blender To VCT Inlet) in "AUTO", check 1NV-171A (BA Blender To VCT Inlet) open.	
	BOP	(Step 3.20) Check Rx M/U Water Pump starts.	
	BOP	(Step 3.21) Monitor Total Make Up Flow Counter. (R.M.)	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	BOP	(Step 3.22) Do NOT continue until one of the following occurs:	
		Amount of reactor makeup water recorded per Step 3.5 added	
		OR	
		Reactor makeup water addition manually terminated	
	BOP	(Step 3.23) Ensure dilution terminated as follows: (R.M.)	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · ·		• IF in "AUTO", ensure the following off:	
		1A Rx M/U Water Pump	
		1B Rx M/U Water Pump	
		Ensure the following closed:	
		<ul> <li>1NV-175A (BA Blender To VCT Outlet)</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>1NV-252A (RX M/U Water To Blender Control)</li> </ul>	
		1NV-171A (BA Blender To VCT Inlet)	
	BOP	(Step 3.24) Ensure 1NV-171A (BA Blender to VCT Inlet) in "AUTO".	

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Op Test No.: N09-1	Scenario # _1 Event #	_1 Page	<u>11</u> of <u>52</u>
Event Description:	Power Increase	-	
Time Position	Applica	nt's Actions or Behavior	······

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	BOP	(Step 3.25) Ensure "BA Blend Disch Ctrl" in "AUTO". (R.M.)	
	BOP	(Step 3.26) Ensure "BA Blend Disch Cntrl" potentiometer set at 5.6 (90 gpm). (R.M.)	
	BOP	(Step 3.27) Ensure 1NV-137A (NC Filters Otlt 3-Way Control) in "AUTO".	
	BOP	(Step 3.28) IF desired to flush blender,,	<b>NOTE:</b> It is NOT desired to flush the blender.
	BOP	(Step 3.29) Select "AUTO" for "NC Sys M/U Controller".	
	BOP	(Step 3.30) Momentarily select "START" on "NC System Make Up".	
	BOP	(Step 3.31) Check "NC System Make Up" red light lit.	
	BOP	(Step 3.32) Ensure the following reset to zero:	
		Total Make Up Flow Counter	
		Boric Acid Flow Counter	
	BOP	(Step 3.33) Record in Auto Log that final blender content is Rx Makeup Water.	
	OP	/1/A/6300/001A, TURBINE-GENERATOR STAI ENCLOSURE 4.1, TURBINE-GENERATOR L	
	RO	(Step 3.5) Changing Turbine Load	

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Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	_1	Event #	1	Page	<u>12</u> of	52
Event Descrip	tion:	Power Increa	se					
Time	Position			Applica	int's Action	s or Behavior		

Time Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	<ul> <li>IF Turbine in "OPERATOR AUTO", perform the following:</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>Ensure desired change within "Calculated Capability Curve".</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>IF turbine load will increase or decrease more than 10 MWs, notify Dispatcher of expected load change.</li> </ul>	ſ
	Depress "LOAD RATE".	
	Enter desired load rate in     "VARIABLE DISPLAY".	<b>NOTE:</b> the RO will select 2 MWe/Min loading rate.
	Depress "ENTER".	
	Depress "REFERENCE".	
	Enter desired load in "VARIABLE DISPLAY".	
	Depress "ENTER".	
	Depress "GO" Check load changes at selected rate.	
After 15-25 I	Mwe increase, <u>OR</u> at the discretion of the Lead	Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix [	)		Оре	erator Actio	n		Form E	S-D-2
Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	1	_ Event #	2	Page	13 of	52
Event Descri	ption:	Feed Flow C	hannel	fails low				
Time	Position			Applica	nt's Actions	or Behavior		

During the power increase, the controlling Feed Flow Transmitter (FCF-5060) on the D Steam Generator will fail low, causing a Steam Generator D Feed Flow Mismatch alarm. The operator will respond by implementing AP/1/A/5500/06, "S/G Feedwater Malfunction," recognize the failure and select an operating Feed Flow channel.

Booth Operator Instructions:	Operate Trigger #1 (XMT-CF018 (0% - 30 second
	ramp))

### Indications Available:

- Annunciator 1AD-4/A4, "S/G D Flow Mismatch Lo Stm Flow."
- Annunciator 1AD-4/B4, "S/G D Level Deviation."
- Annunciator 1AD-4/C4, "S/G D Flow Mismatch Lo CF Flow."
- D CF flow decreases.
- D NR Level decreases.

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
		AP/1/A/5500/06, S/G FEEDWATER MALF	UNCTION
			<b>NOTE:</b> Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of AP6, prior to the SRO addressing the AP.
	RO	(Step 1) IF CF control valve OR bypass valve has failed, THEN perform the following:	Immediate Action
		Place affected valve in manual.	
		Restore S/G level to program.	
	RO	(Step 2) IF CF pump speed control has	Immediate Action
		failed	<b>NOTE:</b> The CF pump speed control has NOT failed.
	RO	(Step 3) On each S/G, check the following channels – INDICATING the SAME:	<b>NOTE:</b> Channel I Feed Flow has failed low on D SG.
		Feed flow	

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Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	1	Event #	2	Page	14	of	52
Event Descrip	otion:	Feed Flow C	hannel	ails low					
Time	Position			Applica	int's Actions	or Behavior			

Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
RO	(Step 3 RNO) Select an operable channel on the affected S/G(s).	<b>NOTE:</b> operator will select Channel II on Steam Flow, Feed Flow and NR level.
RO	(Step 4) Check unit status as follows:	
	Reactor trip breakers – CLOSED	
	Pzr pressure – GREATER THAN P-11 (1955 PSIG).	
RO	(Step 5) IF AT ANY TIME S/G NR level approaches 17% OR 83%, THEN perform the following:	<b>NOTE:</b> This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.
	Trip reactor.	
	GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).	
SRO	(Step 6) Announce occurrence on page.	<b>NOTE:</b> SRO may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.
		lf so, <b>Floor Instructor</b> acknowledge as U2 RO.
RO	(Step 7) Check reactor power – GREATER THAN 3%.	
но	(Step 8) Check CM/CF – PRESENTLY FEEDING S/Gs.	
RO	(Step 9) Check S/G levels – STABLE OR TRENDING TO PROGRAM LEVEL.	<b>NOTE:</b> By this time NR level should be at or trending to programmed level.
	RO RO RO SRO SRO	RO       (Step 3 RNO) Select an operable channel on the affected S/G(s).         RO       (Step 4) Check unit status as follows:         •       Reactor trip breakers – CLOSED         •       Pzr pressure – GREATER THAN P-11 (1955 PSIG).         RO       (Step 5) IF AT ANY TIME S/G NR level approaches 17% OR 83%, THEN perform the following:         •       Trip reactor.         •       GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).         SRO       (Step 6) Announce occurrence on page.         RO       (Step 7) Check reactor power – GREATER THAN 3%.         RO       (Step 8) Check CM/CF – PRESENTLY FEEDING S/Gs.         RO       (Step 9) Check S/G levels – STABLE OR

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Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	1	_ Event #	2	Page	15	of	52
Event Description:		Feed Flow C	hannel	fails low					
Time	Position			Applica	ant's Actions	s or Behavior			300.0e

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	RO	(Step 10) Check NC temperatures as follows:	
		IF any NC pump on, THEN check NC T-Avg – STABLE OR TRENDING TO DESIRED TEMPERATURE.	<b>NOTE:</b> NC Tavg should be stable.
	RO	(Step 11) Check all S/G CF control valves – IN AUTO.	<b>NOTE:</b> 1D CF Control Valve will be in MANUAL.
		IN AUTO.	
		(Step 11 RNO) WHEN the following conditions met, THEN place affected CF control valve in automatic:	
		Automatic control – DESIRED	
		Affected S/G level(s) – AT PROGRAM LEVEL	<b>NOTE:</b> operator will place 1D CF Control Valve back in AUTO.
		Selected control channels – INDICATE CORRECTLY ON CHART RECORDER:	
		Feed flow	
		Steam flow	
		S/G level	
	RO	(Step 12) Check all S/G CF control bypass valves – IN MANUAL AND FULL OPEN.	
	RO	(Step 13) Check both CF pumps – IN AUTO.	
	RO	(Step 14) Check all CA pumps – OFF.	
			<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO may check TS, however, there are NO associated TS with this failure.

Appendix D
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Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #		Event #	2	 Page	<u>16</u>	of	52
Event Description:		Feed Flow C	hannel	fails low					
Time	Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior								

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
			<b>NOTE:</b> SRO may call WCC/IAE to address the failure.
			If so, <b>Booth Instructor</b> acknowledge as WCC.
			<b>NOTE:</b> SRO will likely conduct a Focus Brief.
			<b>NOTE:</b> This failure renders the Thermal Power Best Estimate inaccurate. The crew will need to use NIS and/or NC System $\Delta T$ to determine Reactor Power.
			<b>NOTE:</b> after the Focus Brief, it is likely that the crew will resume the power increase.
		At the discretion of the Lead Examiner mov	e to Event #3.

Appendix D	)	Operator Action					Form ES-D-2		
				- <u>1</u>			•• •• • • • • • • • • •		
Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	1	Event #	3	Page	<u>17</u> c	of <u>52</u>	
Event Descrip	otion:	NC Master P	ressure	Controller 1	ails high/F	ORV Leakage			
Time	Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior								

After this, the Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller output will fail high. This will cause the PORV 1NC34A and both spray valves to open, and NC Pressure will start to drop. The operator will respond in accordance with AP/1/A/5500/11, "Pressurizer Pressure Anomalies." The operator will ultimately close the Block Valve for Pressurizer PORV 1NC34A when it is determined that the valve now leaks by its closed seat. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure From Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits," and 3.4.11, "Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVS)." Ultimately, IAE will correct the problem with the Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller, and it will be placed back in automatic control.

# Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #3 (MALF-ILE001 (1700, 30 second ramp); MALF-NC012B (1%), OVR-NC088B (ON))

### Indications Available:

- 1AD-6/A-5, "Pzr Hi Press Dev Control."
- 1AD-6/A-6, "Pzr Lo Press PORV NC34 Blocked."
- 1AD-6/B-6, "Pzr Lo Press PORV NC32 & 36 Blocked."
- 1AD-6/A-9, "Pzr Safety Discharge Hi Temp."
- 1AD-6/B-9, "Pzr PORV Discharge Hi Temp."
- 1AD-6/C-12, "PORV NC-34 Actuated."
- 1AD-6/F-5, "1NC1, 2 or 3 Flo Detected."
- NC Pressure drops to 2216 psig (TS value).
- Dual position indication on 1NC-34A.

		NOTE: If the power increase
		has been restarted, the CRSRO will go to HOLD on the Turbine.
AP/1/A/55	00/11, PRESSURIZER PRESSU	IRE ANOMALIES
		Immediate Action NOTE: Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of AP11, prior to the SRO addressing the AP.
		- Immediate Action
	DP (Step 1) C GONE DO	GONE DOWN.

Op Test No.:	N09-1 S	cenario #	Event #	3	Page	18	of	_52
Event Descrip	otion: N	C Master Press	sure Controller f	ails high/P	ORV Leakage			
Time	Position		Applica	nt's Actions	or Behavior			

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	BOP	(Step 3) Check Pzr PORVs – CLOSED.	Immediate Action
			<b>NOTE:</b> Pzr PORV 1NC-34A has opened and NOT fully closed.
			•
	BOP	(Step 3 RNO) Perform the following:	Immediate Action
		Close PORVs.	<b>NOTE:</b> 1NC-34A will continue to display dual position indication.
		<ul> <li>IF PORV will not close, THEN close PORV isolation valve.</li> </ul>	<b>NOTE:</b> The operator will close the 1NC-34A PORV isolation valve (1NC-33A).
		(Stap 4) Charly Bar aprovidely as CLOSED	Immediate Action
	BOP	(Step 4) Check Pzr spray valves – CLOSED.	<b>NOTE:</b> depending on event timing, the Pzr Spray may or may NOT be closed. If they are move to Step 5.
	BOP	(Step 4 RNO) Perform the following:	Immediate Action
		Close Pzr spray valve(s).	
		IF AT ANY TIME a reactor trip occurs AND spray valve still open, THEN stop 1A and 1B NC pumps.	<b>NOTE:</b> This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.
	BOP	(Step 5) Check Pzr PORVs – CLOSED.	
		(Step 5 RNO) Perform the following:	
		IF associated PORV isolation valve will not close AND pressure going down rapidly, THEN	<b>NOTE:</b> The PORV Isolation valve will close.
		Close associated PORV inlet drain valve as follows:	
		IF 1NC-34A (Pzr PORV) failed, THEN close 1NC-270 (Pzr PORV Drn Isol For 1NC-34A)	

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Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	_1	Event #	3	Page	<u>19</u>	of .	52	
Event Descrip	otion:	NC Master P	ressure	e Controller 1	ails high/P	ORV Leakage				
Time	Position			Applica	nt's Actions	or Behavior	i i			-

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	BOP	(Step 6) Check Pzr spray valves – CLOSED.	
	SRO	(Step 7) GO TO Step 9.	
	SRO	(Step 9) Announce occurrence on page.	<b>NOTE:</b> SRO may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement. If so, <b>Floor instructor</b> acknowledge as U2 RO.
	BOP	(Step 10) Check 1NV-21A (NV Spray To PZR Isol) – CLOSED.	
	BOP	(Step 11) Check the following Pzr heaters – ON:	
		• 1A	
		• 1B	
		• 1D	
	BOP	(Step 11 RNO) IF NC pressure below desired pressure, THEN:	
		Place Pzr heater mode select switches in manual.	
		Turn on heaters as necessary to control pressure.	
	BOP	(Step 12) Check 1C Pzr heaters – ON.	
	BOP	(Step 12 RNO) IF NC pressure below desired pressure, THEN:	
		Place "PZR PRESS MASTER" in manual.	
		Control pressure.	

Appendix D
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Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	1	Event #	3	Page	20	of	52
Event Description	on:	NC Master P	ressure	Controller	ails high/PO	RV Leakage			
Time	Position		······································	Applica	nt's Actions o	r Behavior			·····

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
		<ul> <li>WHEN Pzr pressure returns to normal AND automatic Pzr pressure control desired, THEN place "PZR PRESS MASTER" in auto.</li> </ul>	<b>NOTE:</b> This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware; and will be used when the failure is corrected by IAE.
	BOD		
	BOP	(Step 13) Check Pzr pressure – GOING UP TO DESIRED PRESSURE.	
	BOP		
	BOF	(Step 14) Check "1NC-27 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE" switch – SELECTED TO "NORMAL".	
	SRO	(Step 14 RNO) Notify station management to ensure switch restored to "NORMAL" once spray valve is repaired.	<b>NOTE:</b> SRO may call WCC/IAE to address the switch position.
			If so, <b>Booth Instructor</b> acknowledge as WCC.
	BOP	(Step 15) Check "1NC-29 PRESSURIZER SPRAY EMERGENCY CLOSE" switch - SELECTED TO "NORMAL".	
	SRO	(Step 15 RNO) Notify station management to ensure switch restored to "NORMAL" once spray valve is repaired.	NOTE: SRO may call WCC/IAE to address the switch position.
			If so, <b>Booth Instructor</b> acknowledge as WCC.
	SRO	(Step 16) GO TO Step 24.	
	BOP	(Step 24) Ensure Pzr Press Rec Select is on operable channel.	<b>NOTE:</b> SRO will likely conduct a Focus Brief.

Append	ix D	Operator Action	Form ES-D-2
Op Test M		N09-1 Scenario # <u>1</u> Event # <u>3</u> NC Master Pressure Controller fails high/F	Page <u>21</u> of <u>52</u> PORV Leakage
Time	P	osition Applicant's Actions	s or Behavior
		· · · ·	Booth Instructor: Delete ILE001 Within 5 minutes, as WCC report that IAE discovers a blown fuse in the Pzr Master Controller circuitry, which has been replaced, and that IAE recommends that the Pzr Master Pressure Controller be placed back in AUTO. As Station Management, report that Pzr Spray Valve Switches can be returned to NORMAL when system response is satisfactory.
	SRO	Return to Continuous Action of Step 12 RNO.	
	BOP	(Step 12 RNO) IF NC pressure below desired pressure, THEN:	
		<ul> <li>Place "PZR PRESS MASTER" in manual.</li> </ul>	
		Control pressure.	
		WHEN Pzr pressure returns to normal     AND automatic Pzr pressure control	NOTE: The BOP will:
		desired, THEN place "PZR PRESS MASTER" in auto.	Manually adjust Spray Valve Controllers to 0 demand
			Place the Spray Valve Controllers to AUTO
			Place the Master Pressure Controller to about 50% output.
			Place the Master Pressure Controller to AUTO.
			Place the Emergency Close Switch for the Spray Valves to NORMAL.
			Control Pzr Heaters as needed.

Appendix D

Op Test I	No.: _	N09-1 Scenario	# <u>1</u> Eve	nt # <u>3</u>	Page 22 of 52
Event De	scription:	NC Mast	er Pressure Contr	oller fails high/l	PORV Leakage
Time	P	osition	A	pplicant's Action	s or Behavior
				-41-52	<b>NOTE:</b> SRO will likely conduct a Focus Brief.
TEC	CHNICAI		ON 3.4.1, RCS P FROM NUCLE		MPERATURE, AND FLOW DNB) LIMITS
	SRO	3.4.1 RCS Pre Departure fror Limits.	NOTE: NC System Pressure drops to ≈2150 psig on the failure, and TS 3.4.1 was entered and exited during the transient.		
			0 m 1 m		
	SRO	pressurizer pr temperature, a	S DNB paramete essure, RCS ave and RCS total flov is specified in Tab		
	SRO	APPLICABILI	TY: MODE 1.		
	SRO	ACTIONS			
				<u>.</u>	
	SRO	CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME	
		A. Pressurizer pressure or RCS average temperature DNB parameters not within limits.	A.1 Restore DNB parameter(s) to within limit.	2 hours	
TECHN	IICAL SF	PECIFICATION	3.4.11, PRESSU (POR		OPERATED RELIEF VALVES
	SRO	3.4.11 Pressu Valves (POR)	rizer Power Oper /s)	ated Relief	

Appendix D	
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Op Test No.:	N09-1 Scenario	# <u>1</u> Eve	ent # <u>3</u>	Page 23 of 52
Event Descriptio	n: NC Mast	er Pressure Cont	roller fails high/l	PORV Leakage
Time	Position	/	Applicant's Action	s or Behavior
SRO		ach PORV and a all be OPERABL		
SRO	APPLICABILI			
SRO	ACTIONS			
	CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME	<b>NOTE:</b> The operator determines that LCO 3.4.11 is
	B. One or two PORVs inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled.	<ul> <li>B.1 Close associated block valves</li> <li>AND</li> <li>B.2 Remove power from associated block valves</li> <li>AND</li> <li>B.3 Restore one PORV to OPERABLE status if two PORVs are inoperable.</li> </ul>	1 hour 1 hour 72 hours	NOT met, and that condition B must be applied.
				<b>NOTE:</b> SRO may call WCC to address the Pzr PORV Isolation Valve Breaker position.
				If so, <b>Booth Instructor</b> acknowledge as WCC.
				Operate Trigger #15:
				LOA-NC33A = Racked Out, 600 second Delay.
				As <b>NLO</b> , report action when complete.
	At the discret	tion of the Lead	Examiner mov	/e to Event #4.

Appendix D	O Operator Action						Form ES-D-2			
Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	_1	Event #	4	<u></u>	Page	24	_ of	52
Event Descrip	Event Description: Zone 1B Lockout causing Runback/Stuck Rod/Rods Fail to move in AUTO							UTO		
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior				ior						

Subsequently, a Zone 1B Lockout causes PCB 11 and 12 to open, as well as the 1B Main Generator Breaker to open and the turbine to automatically runback to 56%. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/03, "Load Rejection." During the runback the operator will notice that the rods do not move in manual, and the operator will need to drive rods in manually. Additionally, the operator will notice that Control Rod M12 will remain stuck in its original position.

### Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #5 (MALF-EP003C, MALF-IRE010M12 and IRE009 (0))

### Indications Available:

- MWe decreases.
- Control Rods do NOT move inward in automatic as expected.
- DRPI for control rod M12 indicates that the rod is stuck.

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
		AP/1/A/5500/03, LOAD REJECTIO	NC N
	RO	(Step 1) Ensure control rods in auto.	Immediate Action
			<b>NOTE:</b> While the RO will see that the Control Rods are in AUTO, it will also be observed that Rods are NOT moving, and that they are required to move. The RO will inform the SRO of the situation, and the SRO will direct that the RO control the rods in MANUAL to maintain Tavg-Tref.
	RO	(Step 2) Check Turbine Generator response as follows:	
		Check Generator – TIED TO GRID.	
		Check Generator output – GOING     DOWN AS REQUIRED.	

Appendix D	)
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Op Test	No.:	N09-1 S	cenario #	_1	Event #	_4	Pa	ge <u>25</u>	of _	52
Event De	escription:	Zo	one 1B Lock	out caus	ing Runba	ick/Stuck	Rod/Rods Fa	ail to move	in AL	ло
Time	P	osition		<del>Wa.</del> 2	Applicar	nt's Actions	or Behavior			
L	N		ı					ñ <u>'s a a a</u>	<u></u>	
Time	Pos.	E	Expected A	ctions	/Behavio	)r	C	omment	S	
-	RO	(Step 3) follows:	) Check cont	trol rod r	response	as				
		1	eck control b QUIRED.	anks – I	MOVING	N AS	NOTE: The NOT be me			
	RO		RNO) IF no perform the f			auto;				
		• Plac	ce Control R	lods in n	nanual.					
	Inser     progr				avg equal	to				
			o rods will move, THEN			<b>NOTE:</b> The Control Rods will move in MANUAL.			will	
	RO	1	eck all rods - SOCIATED		IED WITH		NOTE: At Rod M12 is			ol
							NOTE: The recognize WILL conti insertion.	the Stuck	Rod, I	but
							EXAMINE point TS 3. Misalignme entered, he plant trans SRO will n TS is show should be termination	.1.4 for Ro ent has be owever, w ient in pro ot check <sup>-</sup> vn on <b>Pag</b> checked a	od een ith the gress ΓS. Τι <b>e 50</b> ,	e , the his and
		misaligr	b RNO) IF 2 ned greater i the followir	than 24			NOTE: Th Action. Th both board	ne SRO wi	ll mak	ke
		• Trip	Reactor.							
			TO EP/1/A		-0 (Reacto	or Trip or				

(Step 4) Check CM system response as follows:

BOP

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Op ⊺est I	No.:	N09-1 Scenario # <u>1</u> Event # <u>4</u>	Page <u>26</u> of <u>52</u>
Event De	scription:	Zone 1B Lockout causing Runback/Stuck	Rod/Rods Fail to move in AUTO
Time	P	osition Applicant's Actions	or Behavior
Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
		<ul> <li>Standby Hotwell and Condensate Booster pumps – RUNNING.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>1CM-420 (Unit 1 Generator Load Rejection Bypass control) – OPEN.</li> </ul>	
	RO	(Step 5) IF 50% runback, THEN ensure turbine impulse pressure going down to less than 410 PSIG.	NOTE: The runback will terminate ≈56%.
	SRO	(Step 6) Announce: "UNIT 1 LOAD REJECTION, NON-ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL STAY OUT OF UNIT 1 TURBINE BLDG".	<b>NOTE:</b> SRO may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement. If so, <b>Floor Instructor</b> acknowledge as U2 RO.
	RO	(Step 7) Check P/R meters – LESS THAN 20%.	
	SRO / RO	(Step 7 RNO) Perform the following:	
		<ul> <li>Designate an operator to continuously monitor reactor power.</li> </ul>	
		• IF AT ANY TIME reactor power is less than 20%, THEN perform Step 8 to stabilize reactor power.	<b>NOTE:</b> This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will designate the RO to observe this action.
	SRO	• GO TO Step 9.	
· · · · ·	RO	(Step 9) Check condenser dump valves – MODULATING OPEN.	
	BOP	(Step 10) Check "IPB AIR FLOW TROUBLE" alarm (1AD-11, J-5) – DARK.	
	RO	(Step 10 RNO) within 15 minutes of lockout initiation, restore 1PB cooling as follows:	

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Op Test No.:	N09-1 Scenario # <u>1</u> Event # <u>4</u>	Page <u>27</u> of <u>52</u>
Event Description:	Zone 1B Lockout causing Runback/Stuck	Rod/Rods Fail to move in AUTO
Time F	Position Applicant's Action	s or Behavior
Time Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	IF "MAIN GENERATOR" less than     10,000 amps, THEN	<b>NOTE:</b> The Main Generator is NOT < 10,000 amps.
SRO	<ul> <li>Dispatch operator to check the following areas for signs of fire and notify Control Room of results within 5 minutes:</li> </ul>	<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO will dispatch an NLO.
	1A Main Step Up Transformer	
	1B Main Step Up Transformer	
	Unit 1 IPB Fan Enclosure area.	
SRO	Record approximate time lockout occurred.	
SRO	Do not continue until operator has been	Booth Instructor:
	given sufficient time (approximately 5 minutes) to complete fire inspection.	Within 3 minutes, as NLO report that there does NOT appear to be a fire around the transformers or IPB Fan area.
SRO	<ul> <li>IF operator confirms no fire has occurred, THEN dispatch operator to perform the following at the Unit 1 "IPB ALARM PANEL":</li> </ul>	<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO will dispatch an NLO.
	• Depress "LOCKOUT OVERRIDE" on the fan in "MAN".	
	IF IPB fan in "MAN cannot be	Booth Instructor:
	started, THEN depress "LOCKOUT OVERRIDE" on the fan in "AUTO".	Operate Trigger #7 (LOA- IPP003 (Override).
		Within 3 minutes, as NLO report that the 1A IPB Fan is running in Manual.
	IF neither IPB fan can be started,	NOTE: The 1A IPB Fan is running.
BOP	(Step 11) Check Pzr pressure control	
	response as follows:	
	Ensure Pzr heaters are in auto.	
	Ensure Pzr spray control valves are in auto.	
	Check Pzr PORVs – CLOSED.	

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Op Test	No.: _	N09-1 Scenario # _1 Event # _4	Page <u>28</u> of <u>52</u>
Event De	escription:	Zone 1B Lockout causing Runback/Stuck	Rod/Rods Fail to move in AUTO
Time	P	osition Applicant's Actions	s or Behavior
Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	BOP	(Step 11.c RNO) WHEN Pzr pressure is less than 2315 PSIG, THEN perform the following:	
		Ensure Pzr PORVs are closed.	<b>NOTE:</b> 1NC-34A has previously failed to fully close.
		<ul> <li>IF any PORV cannot be closed, THEN close its isolation and inlet drain valve as follows:</li> </ul>	
		IF 1NC-34A (PZR PORV failed, THEN close the following:	<b>NOTE:</b> These valves have been previously closed.
		1NC-33A (PZR PORV Isol).	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
		1NC-270 (PZR PORV Drn Isol For 1NC- 34A).	
	BOP	<ul> <li>(Step 11d) Check Pzr spray control valves – CLOSED.</li> </ul>	
	RO	(Step 12) Check load rejection – DUE TO LOSS OF CF PUMP.	
	SRO	(Step 12 RNO) GO To Step 15.	
	RO	(Step 15) Check turbine impulse pressure – LESS THAN 260 PSIG.	
	RO	(Step 15 RNO) Perform the following:	
		<ul> <li>IF AT ANY TIME turbine impulse pressure drops to less than 260 PSIG, THEN GO TO Step 16.</li> </ul>	<b>NOTE:</b> This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.

GO TO Step 19.

(Step 19) Check Main Generator as follows:

SRO

RO /

BOP

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Ap	pendix	D

Event De	scription:	Zone 1B Lockout causing Runback/Stu	uck hod/hods rail to move in AUTO
Time	F	osition Applicant's Act	tions or Behavior
Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
		Check Generator Breakers – EITHER GENERATOR BREAKER CLOSED.	
		Check Generator – TIED TO GRID.	
		<ul> <li>Check generator power factor – 0.9 TC 1.0 LAGGING.</li> </ul>	
	SRO	GO TO Step 20.	
	SRO	(Step 20) REFER TO RP/0/A/5700/000 (Classification of Emergency).	<b>NOTE:</b> SRO may ask OSM address.
			acknowledge as OSM.
	RO	(Step 21) WHEN transient is over, THEN perform the following:	
		<ul> <li>Check reactor power – GREATER THA 40%.</li> </ul>	AN
		Check S/G "CF FLOW" – LESS THAN 15%.	
	RO	(Step 21.b RNO) Perform the following:	
		<ul> <li>IF AT ANY TIME CF flow will be maintained less than 15%, THEN RETURN TO Step 21.c to swap CF flor to S/G CF Bypass control valves.</li> </ul>	NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.
	SRO	GO TO Step 21.g.	
	RO	<ul> <li>(Step 21.g) Check either CF pump – RUNNING IN AUTO.</li> </ul>	
	BOP	Slowly throttle closed 1CM-420 (Unit 1 Generator Load Rejection Bypass Control) while monitoring Condensate Booster pump suction pressure.	
	BOP	<ul> <li>WHEN 1CM-420 is closed, THEN check load rejection signal reset (OAC turn o code "CM").</li> </ul>	

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Op Test	No.:	<u>N09-1</u> Scenario # <u>1</u> Event # <u>4</u>	Page <u>30</u> of <u>52</u>
Event De	escription:	Zone 1B Lockout causing Runback/Stuck	Rod/Rods Fail to move in AUTO
Time	F	Position Applicant's Action	s or Behavior
Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	BOP	Reposition manual loader for 1CM-420 to 100% open.	
	SRO	• IF thermal power is greater than 15% THEN within 4 hours of reaching stable conditions, ensure each power range channel is within 2% of heat balance.	
	RO	• Check T-avg – GREATER THAN 561°F.	
	RO	Check "CONTROL ROD BANK LO LO LIMIT" alarm (1AD-2, B-9) – DARK.	
	RO / BOP	<ul> <li>(Step 21.n) Check "CONTROL ROD BANK LO LIMIT" alarm (1AD-2, A-9) – DARK.</li> </ul>	
	RO	(Step 22) Check load rejection – DUE TO LOSS OF CF PUMP.	
	SRO	(Step 22 RNO) Go To Step 24.	
	BOP	(Step 24) Shutdown unnecessary running plant equipment as follows:	· · · ·
		Condensate Booster pumps and place in auto.	
		Hotwell pumps and place in auto.	
		IF desired to secure,HDPs.	<b>NOTE:</b> It is NOT desired to secure the HDPs.
	SRO	(Step 25) IF power change greater than 15% in one hour, THEN notify Primary Chemistry to perform required Tech Spec sampling.	<b>NOTE:</b> SRO may contact Chemistry. If so, <b>Booth Instructor</b> : acknowledge as Chemistry.
		At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move	to Events #5-7.

Appendix D			Op	perator Action	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			Form	ES-D-2
Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	_1	Event #	5,6&7	Page	31	of	52
Event Descri	ption:	Steam Gene SG fails high		ube Leak (B)	/SGTR (B)/ Aux	Feed Flow	Tran	smitte	r to B
Time	Position			Applica	nt's Actions or E	Behavior			

During the plant stabilization, a slow developing Steam Generator Tube Leak will occur on the 1B Steam Generator. The operator will enter AP/1/A/5500/10, "NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps," and sequentially reduce and isolate Letdown and start a second NV Pump. Ultimately, the leak will degrade to a 260 gpm SGTR. the operator will trip the reactor and actuate Safety Injection, and then enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection." The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage." The operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture," and isolate the flow into and out of the 1B Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the NC System. The attempt to isolate Auxiliary Feedwater flow into the B Steam generator will be complicated by the failure of the Auxiliary Feed Flow transmitter (FCA-5100) to the B Steam Generator. The scenario will terminate at Step 23.c of E-3, after the crew has closed 1NI-9A and 1NI-10B.

# Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #9 (MALF- SG001B (260 over 360 seconds))

(XMT-CA012 (600 on 600 second ramp)) Trigger #11 Conditional on Rx Trip

### Indications Available:

- 1RAD1/C-1, "1EMF 71 S/G A Leakage Hi Rad."
- 1RAD1/D-1, "1EMF 72 S/G B Leakage Hi Rad."
- 1RAD1/D-2, "1EMF 73 S/G C Leakage Hi Rad."
- 1RAD1/D-3, "1EMF 74 S/G D Leakage Hi Rad."
- 1RAD1/B-1, "1EMF 33 Cond Air Eject Exh Hi Rad."
- 1RAD3/E-5, "1EMF 24, 25, 26, 27 S/G A, B, C, D Steamline Hi Rad."
- Pzr Level drops.
- Charging flow increases in automatic.

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
AP/1,	/A/5500/	10, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CA CASE I, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE	
	RO / BOP	(Step 1) Check Pzr level – STABLE OR GOING UP.	
	BOP	(Step 1 RNO) Perform the following as required to maintain level:	

9-1 Scenario #	1 Eve	nt # 5,6&7	-			
		int# <u>5,687</u>	Page	<sup>32</sup> of	52	
	Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)/ Aux Feed Flow Tra SG fails high			Transmitte	Insmitter to B	
ition	A	Applicant's Actions or	Behavior			
it i	SG fails hig	SG fails high	SG fails high	SG fails high	~	

mme	F03.	Expected Actions/Denavior	comments
		<ul> <li>Maintain charging flow less than 200 GPM at all times in subsequent steps.</li> </ul>	
		Ensure 1NV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control) opening.	
	BOP	<ul> <li>Open 1NV-241 (U1 Seal Water Inj Flow Control) while maintaining NC pump seal flow greater than 6 GPM.</li> </ul>	
		Reduce or isolate letdown.	<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO will likely direct that Letdown be reduced to 45 gpm.
			After Letdown has been reduced to 45 gpm, and Pzr Level is still lowering, the SRO will likely direct that Letdown be isolated.
		Start additional NV pump.	<b>NOTE:</b> When it is determined that the Pzr level is still lowering with Letdown Isolated, the SRO will direct that a 2 <sup>nd</sup> Charging Pump be started.
		<ul> <li>IF CLAs are isolated, AND Pzr level is going down,</li> </ul>	<b>NOTE:</b> The CLAs are NOT isolated.
	SRO	<ul> <li>IF Pzr level cannot be maintained greater than 4%, OR Pzr level going down with maximum charging flow, THEN perform the following:</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>1F 1B OR 1C S/G identified as ruptured, THEN immediately have another operator initiate actions to isolate TD CA pump steam supply</li> </ul>	<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO will dispatch an NLO. <b>Booth Instructor</b> :
		from ruptured S/G PER Enclosure 3 (TD CA Pump Steam Supply	Operate Trigger #13 (LOA- SA003 (0)).
		Isolation).	Within 3 minutes, as NLO report that steam has been isolated to the TD CA Pump from the B SG.
	RO/ BOP	Trip reactor.	

Appendi	x D			Ope	erator Action	1				Form	<u>ES-D-2</u>
								· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
Op Test	No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	1	Event #	5,6&7	,	Page	33	_ of	52
Event De	escription:		Steam Gener SG fails high		be Leak (B)	/SGTR (B)/	Aux Fe	ed Flow	Trans	smitte	r to B
Time	P	osition			Applica	ant's Action	s or Beha	avior			
Time	Pos.		Expected	Action	s/Behavi	or		Con	nmer	nts	
		•	WHEN rea setpoint re initiated.								
	SRO	•	GO TO EF Trip or Sat			eactor	NOTE to E-0.	: The S	RO w	ill trar	nsition
							point T Leakay howev transie will no shown	INER N S 3.4.1 ge has rer, with ent in pr t check on Pag be che ation.	3 for been the p ogres TS. <b>ge 49</b>	RCS entero lant s, the This T , and	ed, e SRO TS is
	,	EP/1/	A/5000/E-0,	REACT	OR TRIP (	OR SAFET	Y INJE	CTION			
	SRO	(Step	) 1) Monitor F	oldout p	bage.		Immed	: Crew diate Ac SRO ac	tions	of E-0	), prior
	RO		2) Check Re	484.44.00						····	
			Il rod bottom								
			leactor trip ar	nd bypa	ss breaker	'S —					
		• 1/	'R amps – G(	DING D	OWN.						
	RO	(Step	2 RNO) Per	form the	e following		RNO a Rod M	:: The F action b 112 is N n (i.e. R _IT).	ecau: IOT o	se Co n the	ntrol
		• 1	rip reactor.								
: : 		• !	f reactor will r	not trip.				: The Feactor is			rt that

Appendix D	A	aq	enc	lix	D
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Time

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**Operator Action** 

 Op Test No.:
 N09-1
 Scenario #
 1
 Event #
 5, 6 & 7
 Page
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 of
 52

 Event Description:
 Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)/ Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B
 SG fails high

Position

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	RO	(Step 3) Check Turbine Trip:	
		All throttle valves – CLOSED.	
	BOP	(Step 4) Check 1ETA and 1ETB – ENERGIZED.	
	BOP	(Step 5) IF either CF pump is in Manual Direct Valve Position (MDVP) mode, THEN trip affected pump(s).	
	RO/ BOP	(Step 6) Check if S/I is actuated:	<b>NOTE:</b> If SI has NOT automatically actuated, it should be manually actuated here.
		<ul> <li>"SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATED" status light (1SI-18) – LIT.</li> </ul>	
		Both LOCA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI-14) – LIT.	
	SRO	(Step 7) Announce "Unit 1 Safety Injection".	<b>NOTE:</b> SRO may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement. If so, <b>Floor Instructor</b> acknowledge as U2 RO.
	BOP	(Step 8) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):	
		• Groups 1, 2, 5 – DARK.	
		• Group 3 – LIT.	
		OAC – IN SERVICE.	
		<ul> <li>Group 4, Rows A through F – LIT AS REQUIRED.</li> </ul>	
	SRO	GO TO Step 9.	

Appe	ndix D
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Op Test No.:

Operator Action

of 52

N09-1 Scenario #

Event Description: Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)/ Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high

1 Event #

Time Position

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

<u>5,6&7</u> Page 35

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	RO / BOP	(Step 9) Check proper CA pump status:	
		• MD CA pumps – ON.	
		<ul> <li>N/R level in at least 3 S/Gs – GREATER THAN 17%.</li> </ul>	
	BOP	(Step 10) Check all KC pumps – ON.	
	BOP	(Step 11) Check both RN pumps – ON.	
	SRO	(Step 12) Notify Unit 2 to start 2A RN pump.	Floor Instructor: As U2 RO report "2A RN Pump is running."
	RO	(Step 13) Check all S/G pressures – GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.	
	BOP	(Step 14) Check Containment Pressure – HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG.	<b>NOTE:</b> Containment Pressure is normal.
	BOP	(Step 15) Check S/I flow:	
		Check "NV PMPS TO COLD LEG     FLOW" gauge – INDICATING FLOW.	
		Check NC pressure – LESS THAN 1600     PSIG.	
	BOP	(Step 15b RNO) Perform the following:	
		<ul> <li>Ensure ND pump miniflow valve on running pump(s) open:</li> </ul>	
		1ND-68A (1A ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol)	
		1ND-67B (1B ND Pump & Hx Mini Flow Isol).	

Appendix	кD	Operator Action	Form ES-D-2
Op Test Event De	No.:	N09-1 Scenario # <u>1</u> Event # <u>5, 6 &amp; 7</u> Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)/ SG fails high	
Time	P	osition Applicant's Actions	s or Behavior
Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	SRO	<ul> <li>IF valve(s) open on all running ND pumps, THEN GO TO Step 16.</li> </ul>	
		(Step 16) Notify OSM or other SRO to perform EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions Following an S/I) within 10 minutes.	<b>NOTE:</b> SRO may ask OSM to address. If so, <b>Floor Instructor</b> acknowledge as OSM.
	RO	(Step 17) Check CA flow:	
		<ul> <li>Total CA flow – GREATER THAN 450 GPM.</li> </ul>	
	BOP	Check VI header pressure – GREATER THAN 60 PSIG.	
	RO	• WHEN N/R level in any S/G greater than 11% (32% ACC), THEN control CA flow to maintain N/R levels between 11% (32% ACC) and 50%.	
	RO	(Step 18) Check NC temperatures:	
		<ul> <li>IF all NC pumps off, THEN check NC T-Colds – STABLE OR TRENDING TO 557°F.</li> </ul>	
	BOP	(Step 19) Check Pzr PORV and spray valves:	
	BOP	All Pzr PORVs – CLOSED.	<b>NOTE:</b> 1NC-34A has previously failed to fully close.
	BOP	(Step 19a RNO) if Pzr pressure less than 2315 PSIG, THEN perform the following:	
		Close Pzr PORV9s).	
		IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed, THEN perform the following:	
		Close its isolation valve.	
		Close the following valve.	

Appendix	( D	Operator Action	Form ES-D-2
Op Test I Event De	No.: escription:	N09-1 Scenario # <u>1</u> Event # <u>5, 6 &amp; 7</u> Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)/ SG fails high	Page <u>37</u> of <u>52</u> Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B
Time	P	osition Applicant's Actions	s or Behavior
Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
		<ul> <li>IF 1NC-34A (PZR PORV) failed, THEN close 1NC-270 (PZR PORV Drn Isol For 1NC-34A).</li> </ul>	<b>NOTE:</b> These valves have been previously closed.
		IF PORV isolation valve cannot be closed,	<b>NOTE:</b> The PORV Isolation valve is closed.
		<ul> <li>IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed or isolated,</li> </ul>	<b>NOTE:</b> The PORVs are either closed or isolated.
		<ul> <li>(Step 19b) Normal Pzr spray valves – CLOSED.</li> </ul>	
	BOP	(Step 19b RNO) IF Pzr pressure is less than 2100 PSIG,	<b>NOTE:</b> Pzr Pressure is > 2100 psig.
	RO	(Step 20) Check NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs – GREATER THAN 0°F.	
	RO/ BOP	(Step 21) Check if main steamlines intact:	
		All S/G pressures – STABLE OR GOING     UP	
		All S/Gs – PRESSURIZED.	
	BOP	(Step 22) Check if S/G tubes intact:	<b>NOTE:</b> All S/G EMFs are NOT Normal, and the 1B SG Level is increasing in an uncontrolled manner.
		The following secondary EMFs – NORMAL:	
		<ul> <li>1EMF-33 (Condenser Air Ejector Exhaust)</li> </ul>	
		• 1EMF-34(L) (S/G Sample (Lo Range))	
		• 1EMF-24 (S/G A)	
		• 1EMF-25 (S/G B)	
		• 1EMF-26 (S/G C)	

Appendix	( D	Operator Action	Form ES-D-2
<u> </u>			
Op Test I	No.:	N09-1 Scenario # <u>1</u> Event # <u>5, 6 &amp; 7</u>	7 Page 38 of 52
Event De	scription:	Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B) SG fails high	/ Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B
Time	P	osition Applicant's Action	s or Behavior
	_		
Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
		• 1EMF-27 (S/G D).	
		S/G levels – STABLE OR GOING UP IN A CONTROLLED MANNER.	
	SRO	(Step 22 RNO) IF S/G levels going up in an uncontrolled manner OR any EMF abnormal, THEN perform the following:	
	******	<ul> <li>Implement EP/1/A/5000/F-0 (Critical Safety Function Status Trees).</li> </ul>	
		GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-3 (Steam Generator Tube Rupture).	<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO will transition to E-3.
		EP/1/A/5000/E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUE	BE RUPTURE
	SRO	(Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.	
			· · · ·
_	BOP	(Step 2) Identify ruptured S/G(s):	
		Any S/G N/R level – GOING UP IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER	<b>NOTE:</b> The 1B SG Level is increasing in an uncontrolled manner.
		OR	
		Chemistry or RP has determined ruptured S/G by sampling	<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO may contact Chemistry for sampling.
			Booth Instructor: Acknowledge as appropriate.
		OR	
		<ul> <li>Any of the following EMFs – ABOVE NORMAL:</li> </ul>	<b>NOTE:</b> The S/G related EMFs are NOT normal, with 1EMF-25 reading the highest.
		• 1EMF-24 (S/G A)	
		• 1EMF-25 (S/G B)	
		• 1EMF-26 (S/G C)	

Appendix D	

Time

**Operator** Action

Op Test No.: N09-1 Scenario # 1 Event #

<u>5,6&7</u> Page <u>39</u> of <u>52</u>

Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)/ Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B

Event Description: SG fails high

Position

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Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
		• 1EMF-27 (S/G D)	<b>NOTE:</b> 1EMF-27 is OOS. The CRSRO may call Chemistry and direct that the 1D SG be sampled to ensure that a SGTR/SGTL does NOT exist in the 1G SG.
			If so, <b>Booth Instructor</b> acknowledge as Chemistry.
	RO	(Step 3) Check at least one S/G – AVAILABLE FOR NC SYSTEM COOLDOWN.	
	RO	(Step 4) Isolate steam flow from ruptured S/G(s) as follows:	
		<ul> <li>Check ruptured S/G(s) SM PORV – CLOSED.</li> </ul>	
		IF TD CA pump is the only source of feedwater,	<b>NOTE:</b> the TD CA Pump is NOT the only source of feedwater.
		• Check S/Gs 1B and 1C – INTACT.	<b>NOTE:</b> the 1B SG is NOT intact.
	BOP	(Step 4c RNO) Isolate TD CA pump steam supply from ruptured S/G as follows:	<b>Examiner NOTE:</b> This action may have already taken place. If so, continue with Step 4d.
		Ensure operators dispatched in next step immediately notify Control Room Supervisor when valves are closed.	
		Immediately dispatch 2 operators to concurrently verify (CV), unlock and close valves on ruptured S/G(s):	NOTE: If NOT already done, the SRO will direct two NLOs to CLOSE 1SA-2 and 78.
			Booth Instructor: Set LOA- SA003 = 0, (1SA-2/78)
			Within 3 minutes, as NLO report that steam has been isolated to the TD CA Pump from the B SG.

Appendix	: D	Operator Action	Form ES-D-2
Op Test I	No.:	<u>N09-1</u> Scenario # <u>1</u> Event # <u>5, 6 &amp; 7</u>	Page of
Event De	scription:	Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)/ SG fails high	Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B
Time	P	osition Applicant's Actions	s or Behavior
Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
		• For 1B S/G:	
		<ul> <li>1SA-2 (1B S/G SM Supply to Unit 1 TD CA Pump Turb Maint Isol) (Unit 1 interior doghouse, 767+12, FF-53)</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>1SA-78 (1B S/G SM Supply to Unit 1 TD CA Pump Turb Loop Seal Isol) (Unit 1 interior doghouse, 767+10, FF-53.</li> </ul>	
	SRO	<ul> <li>IF AT ANY TIME local closure of SA valves takes over 8 minutes, THEN isolate TD CA pump steam supply PER Enclosure 2 (Tripping TD CA Pump Stop Valve or Alternate Steam Isolation).</li> </ul>	<b>NOTE:</b> This is a Continuous Action. If NOT already done, the SRO will make both board operators aware.
	RO	<ul> <li>(Step 4d) Check blowdown isolation valves on ruptured S/G(s) – CLOSED:</li> </ul>	
		• For 1B S/G:	
		<ul> <li>1BB-2B (1B S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control)</li> </ul>	
		1BB-6A (B S/G BB Cont Inside Isol).	
		• Close steam drain on ruptured S/G(s).	
		• 1SM-89 (B SM Line Drain Isol)	
		• Close the following on ruptured S/G(s):	
		MSIV	
		MSIV bypass valve.	
	RO	(Step 5) Control ruptured S/G(s) level as follows:	
		Check ruptured S/G(s) N/R level –     GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC).	
		• Isolate feed flow to ruptured S/G(s):	
		<ul> <li>Close 1CA-54AC (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1B S/G Isol).</li> </ul>	

	x D	Operator Action	Form ES-D-2
	<u> </u>	N09-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5.6.&	7 Dana (1 of 50
Op Test			
Event De	escription:	Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B) SG fails high	Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B
Time	P	Position Applicant's Action	s or Behavior
Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
		<ul> <li>Close 1CA-58A (1A CA Pump Disch To 1B S/G Isol).</li> </ul>	<b>NOTE:</b> Because CA flow has failed on 1B SG, the CRSRO may direct an NLO to check the position of the valve locally.
			If so, <b>Booth Instructor</b> report back <b>as NLO</b> , that <b>the valves</b> <b>are closed</b> .
	AL TAS		
transit	ion to E	feedwater flow into and steam flow from CA-3.1 occurs. ce: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a	
SG and that con which co or feed the intac	the intactistitutes a omplicate flow into t	It SGs. Upon a loss of $\Delta P$ , the crew must transit an incorrect performance that "necessitates the operation of the event mitigation strategy." If the crew fails the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to de equiring a transition to a contingency procedure	tion to a contingency procedure crew taking compensating action s to isolate steam from the SG, crease to the same pressures as
SG and that con which co or feed the intac	the intac institutes a omplicate flow into t ct SGs, re akage into	It SGs. Upon a loss of $\Delta P$ , the crew must transit an incorrect performance that "necessitates the operation strategy." If the crew fails the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to de equiring a transition to a contingency procedure to the SG.	tion to a contingency procedure crew taking compensating action s to isolate steam from the SG, crease to the same pressures as
SG and that con which co or feed the intac	the intact nstitutes a omplicate flow into t ct SGs, re	It SGs. Upon a loss of $\Delta P$ , the crew must transit an incorrect performance that "necessitates the operation of the event mitigation strategy." If the crew fails the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to de equiring a transition to a contingency procedure	tion to a contingency procedure crew taking compensating action s to isolate steam from the SG, crease to the same pressures as
SG and that con which co or feed the intac	the intac institutes a omplicate flow into t ct SGs, re akage into	t SGs. Upon a loss of $\Delta P$ , the crew must transit an incorrect performance that "necessitates the or es the event mitigation strategy." If the crew fails the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to de equiring a transition to a contingency procedure to the SG. (Step 6) Check ruptured S/G(s)pressure –	tion to a contingency procedure crew taking compensating action s to isolate steam from the SG, crease to the same pressures as
SG and that con which co or feed the intac	the intac stitutes a omplicate flow into t ct SGs, re akage into RO	t SGs. Upon a loss of ∆P, the crew must transit in incorrect performance that "necessitates the design incorrect performance that "necessitates the design in the event mitigation strategy." If the crew fails the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to de equiring a transition to a contingency procedure to the SG. (Step 6) Check ruptured S/G(s)pressure – GREATER THAN 280 PSIG.	tion to a contingency procedure crew taking compensating action s to isolate steam from the SG, crease to the same pressures as
SG and that con which co or feed the intac	the intac astitutes a omplicate flow into t ct SGs, re akage into RO BOP	t SGs. Upon a loss of ∆P, the crew must transit in incorrect performance that "necessitates the operation of the event mitigation strategy." If the crew fails the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to de equiring a transition to a contingency procedure to the SG. (Step 6) Check ruptured S/G(s)pressure – GREATER THAN 280 PSIG. (Step 7) Check any NC pump – RUNNING. (Step 8) Check Pzr pressure – GREATER	tion to a contingency procedure crew taking compensating action s to isolate steam from the SG, crease to the same pressures as
SG and that con which co or feed the intac	the intac stitutes a omplicate flow into t ct SGs, re akage into RO BOP BOP	t SGs. Upon a loss of ∆P, the crew must transit in incorrect performance that "necessitates the operation of the event mitigation strategy." If the crew fails the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to de equiring a transition to a contingency procedure to the SG. (Step 6) Check ruptured S/G(s)pressure – GREATER THAN 280 PSIG. (Step 7) Check any NC pump – RUNNING. (Step 8) Check Pzr pressure – GREATER THAN 1955 PSIG (Step 9) Initiate NC System cooldown as	tion to a contingency procedure crew taking compensating action s to isolate steam from the SG, crease to the same pressures as
SG and that con which co or feed the intac	the intac stitutes a omplicate flow into t ct SGs, re akage into RO BOP BOP	<ul> <li>t SGs. Upon a loss of AP, the crew must transit in incorrect performance that "necessitates the operation of the event mitigation strategy." If the crew fails the SG the ruptured SG pressure will tend to de equiring a transition to a contingency procedure of the SG.</li> <li>(Step 6) Check ruptured S/G(s)pressure – GREATER THAN 280 PSIG.</li> <li>(Step 7) Check any NC pump – RUNNING.</li> <li>(Step 8) Check Pzr pressure – GREATER THAN 1955 PSIG</li> <li>(Step 9) Initiate NC System cooldown as follows:</li> <li>Determine required core exit temperature based on lowest ruptured</li> </ul>	NOTE: SRO determines to

Appendix	k D	Operator Action	Form ES-D-2
Op Test Event De	No.: escription:	N09-1 Scenario # <u>1</u> Event # <u>5, 6 &amp;</u> Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)	
		SG fails high	
Time	P	osition Applicant's Action	s or Behavior
Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior     MSIV bypass valve	Comments
		<ul> <li>Check ruptured S/G(s) SM PORV – CLOSED.</li> </ul>	
		• Check S/Gs 1B and 1C – INTACT.	
	RO	(Step 9.d RNO) IF 1B OR 1C S/G is ruptured, THEN do not continue until steam is isolated to TDCA pump from ruptured S/G per one of the following:	NOTE: If NOT already done, the SRO will direct two NLOs to CLOSE 1SA-2 and 78. Booth Instructor: Set LOA- SA003 = 0, (1SA-2/78) Within 3 minutes, as NLO
			report that steam has been isolated to the TD CA Pump from the B SG.
		• Local isolation of SA line (per Step 4.c)	
		OR	
		Tripping TD CA pump stop valve (per Step 4.c)	
	RO	Check condenser available:	
		<ul> <li>"C-9 COND AVAILABLE FOR STEAM DUMP" status light (1SI-18) – LIT</li> </ul>	
		MSIV on intact S/G(s) – OPEN	
		Check S/Gs 1B and 1C – INTACT.	
	RO	(Step 9.f) Perform the following to place steam dumps in steam pressure mode:	
		<ul> <li>Place "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" in manual.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Adjust "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" output to equal "STEAM DUMP DEMAND" signal.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Place "STEAM DUMP SELECT" in steam pressure mode.</li> </ul>	

Appendix D	)			Оре	erator Action					Form I	ES-D-2
Op Test No	D.:	N09-1 Scen	ario #	1	Event #	5,6&7	7	Page	43	_ of	52
Event Desc	cription:		n Genera ails high	ator Tu	be Leak (B)	/SGTR (B)	/ Aux Fee	ed Flow	<b>Tran</b> s	smitte	r to B
Time	P	osition		•	Applica	nt's Action	s or Beha	vior			
Time	Pos.	Exp	ected /	Action	ıs/Behavi	or		Cor	nmer	nts	
		(1SI-18		EN pla	TAVG" stat ce steam c						
		conder	nser at m iting to a	naximu	act S/G(s) t m rate whi Main Stear	е					
		Check     _ BLO		essure	Steamline	Isolation					····
		(Step 9.i R	NO) Per	form th	ne following						
	BOP	Depres		<sup>o</sup> zr to le	ess than 19			<u>.</u>			
		• Ma	aximum a	availab	le Pzr spra	у.					
		OR	·								
			normal F IEN use		ay is not av DRV.	vailable,					
			continu 955 PSI		Pzr pressu	re is less					
					Low Press ock switch						
		Close     PORV		y valve	e(s) and Pz	r					
		Mainta     PSIG.	uin NC pi	ressure	e less than	1955					
	RO				e exit T/Cs· EMPERAT						

(Step 9.j RNO) Perform the following:

WHEN Core exit T/Cs are less than required temperature, THEN perform the

Stop NC System cooldown.

SRO

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following:

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Op Test	INO.:	N09-1 Scenario # <u>1</u> Event # <u>5,6&amp;7</u>	7 Page 44 of
Event De	escription:	Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)/ SG fails high	' Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to
Time	F	osition Applicant's Actions	s or Behavior
Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
THIC	103.	Maintain core exit T/Cs less than	Comments
		required temperature.	
	SRO	GO TO Step 10.	
	RO	(Step 10) Control intact S/G levels:	
		Check N/R level in any intact S/G – GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC).	
-		Throttle feed flow to maintain all intact	,,
		S/G N/R levels between 22% (32% ACC)	
		and 50%.	
	BOP	(Step 11) Check Pzr PORVs and isolation	
	DUF	valves:	
		Power to all Pzr PORV isolation valves – AVAILABLE.	
		• All Pzr PORVs – CLOSED.	<b>NOTE:</b> 1NC-34A has previously failed to fully clo
	BOP	(Step 11b RNO) IF Pzr pressure less than 2315 PSIG, THEN perform the following:	
		Close Pzr PORV(s).	
		IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed, THEN close its isolation valve.	<b>NOTE:</b> This valve has bee previously closed.
		IF PORV isolation valve cannot be closed	<b>NOTE:</b> The PORV Isolatio valve is closed.
		<ul> <li>IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed or isolated,</li> </ul>	<b>NOTE:</b> All PORVs are eith closed or isolated.
		IF any Pzr PORV cannot be closed, THEN close the following valve:	
		IF 1NC-34A (PZR PORV) failed, THEN close 1NC-270 (PZR	<b>NOTE:</b> This valve has bee previously closed.
	BOP	(Step 11c) At least one Pzr PORV	

Appendix D
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1 Event #

of <u>52</u>

Op Test No.: <u>N09-1</u> Scenario #

Event Description: Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)/ Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B SG fails high

Time Position

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

<u>5,6&7</u> Page 45

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	BOP	(Step 12) Reset the following:	
		• S/I	
		Sequencers	
		Phase A Isolation	
:		Phase B Isolation	
	BOP	(Step 13) Establish VI to containment:	······································
		Open the following:	
		<ul> <li>1VI-129B (VI Supply to A Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol))</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>1VI-160B (VI Supply to B Cont Ess VI Hdr Outside Isol))</li> </ul>	
		1VI-150B (Lwr Cont Non Ess Cont Outside Isol).	
-		Check VI header pressure – GREATER THAN 85 PSIG.	
- - - - - - - -	RO	(Step 14) Check if NC System cooldown should be stopped as follows:	
		Check Core exit T/Cs – LESS THAN     REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.	
	RO	(Step 14a RNO) Perform the following:	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
		• IF AT ANY TIME while in this step ruptured S/G pressure changes by over 100 PSIG, AND ruptured S/G pressure is greater than 400 PSIG, THEN select a new target temperature from table in Step 9.a.	<b>NOTE:</b> This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.
		Do not continue until core exit T/Cs are less than target temperature.	
	RO	(Step 14b) Stop NC System cooldown.	
		Maintain Core exit T/Cs – LESS THAN     REQURIED TEMPERATURE.	

Appendix D				Ор	erator Actio	<u>ן</u>				Form	ES-D-
Op Test No.:		N09-1 S	cenario #	1	Event #	5,6&	7	Page	46	_ of	52
Event Descri	ption:		team Gener G fails high		ıbe Leak (B	/SGTR (E	B)/ Aux I	Feed Flow	v Tran	smitte	r to B
Time	P	osition			Applica	ant's Actio	ns or Be	havior			<del> </del>
Time P	'os.		Expected	Actio	ns/Behav	or		Cor	nmer	nts	
			5) Check ri E OR GOII		l S/G(s) pre	essure –					
I	RO				cooling bas ER THAN 2			<u> </u>			
CRITICAL	TAS	К:									

occur because RCS temperature is either too high to maintain minimum required subcooling, or too low causing an Orange path on Subcriticality or Integrity.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure which constitutes an incorrect performance that "necessitates the crew taking compensating action which complicates the event mitigation strategy." If the RCS temperature is too high when RCS depressurization is started, a loss of subcooling will occur when the RCS depressurization is started. On the other hand, if RCS temperature is allowed to continue to decrease after the initial cooldown, the operator may be required to transition to the Subcriticality or Integrity response FRP, and delay the RCS depressurization.

 RO	(Step 17) Depressurize NC System as follows:	
 	Check ruptured S/G(s) NR level – LESS THAN 73% (63% ACC).	
 BOP	Check normal Pzr spray flow –     AVAILABLE.	
	<ul> <li>Initiate NC depressurization using maximum available spray.</li> </ul>	
	<ul> <li>IF AT ANY TIME during this step, spray valves are not effective at reducing NC pressure, OR ruptured S/G(s) NR level is approaching 83% (73% ACC), THEN GO TO Step 18.</li> </ul>	<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO may decide that Pzr Spray is ineffective at reducing pressure, and proceed to Step 18. If so, proceed forward to Step 18 on <b>Page 47</b> .
 RO / BOP	Do not continue until any of the following conditions satisfied:	

Appendix	(D			Op	perator Action	1			Forr	n E
Op ⊺est	No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	1	Event #	5,6&7	P	age 4	17 O	f
Event De	escription:		Steam Gene SG fails high		ube Leak (B)	/SGTR (B)/	Aux Feed I	low T	ransmit	ter t
Time	F	Position			Applica	int's Actions	s or Behavio	r		
Time	Pos.		Expected	Actio	ns/Behavi	or		Comr	nents	
		•	NC subco T/Cs – LE		ased on cor AN 0°F	e exit				
		•	Pzr level - (58% ACC		ATER THAN	176%		_		
		•	Both of the	e follow	/ing:					
	RO / BOP		RUPT		– LESS TH S/G(s)	AN				
				vel – G 29% A	REATER T CC).	HAN				
······································	BOP	• (	Close Pzr spr	ay valv	es.					
	BOP		o 17.g) Check sol) – CLOSE		21A (NV Spi	ray to				
	BOP		o 17.h) Obser GO TO Step :		ution prior to	Step 20				
	BOP		o 18) Depress V as follows:		NC System	using Pzr	NOTE: The performed determined is NOT efformed NC System System Statement St	d if the es that fective	e SRO t the Pz e at red	r Sp
	BOP		Check at leas AVAILABLE.	t one F	2r PORV -					
	BOP	• (	Open one Pzi		1.					
	BOP	• 1	Do not contin conditions sat	ue unti tisfied:	l any of the	following				
		•	NC subco T/Cs - LE		ased on col AN 0°F	re exit				
		OR								
			Pzr level (58% ACC		ATER THAN	176%				
		OR				····				
		•	<ul> <li>Both of th</li> </ul>	e follov	wing:					

Op Test	No.: _	N09-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5, 6 & 7 Pag	ge <u>48</u> of _
Event De	escription:	Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)/ Aux Feed Flo SG fails high	ow Transmitter
Event Description: Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)/ Aux Feed Flow Tran			
Time	Pos	Expected Actions/Behavior	omments
11110	1.00.		onniento
		RUPTURED S/G(s)	
	BOP	Close Pzr PORV.	
	BOP	Close Pzr spray valves.	
	BOP	(Step 19) Check NC pressure - GOING UP.	
(E-3C) level re	<b>Depres</b> eaches	surize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before 100% Wide Range Level. ce: Failure to stop the reactor coolant leakage into a rupture	d SG by
(E-3C) level re Safety S depress event. introduc seconds	Depress eaches Significan surizing th It also con ced by the ary side co	surize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before 100% Wide Range Level. tee: Failure to stop the reactor coolant leakage into a rupture the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates institutes a "significant reduction of Safety Margin beyond that be scenario. If RCS depressurization does NOT occur, the inv of the ruptured SG will occur leading to water release through	d SG by the mitigation t irreparably entory in the
(E-3C) level re Safety S depress event. introduc seconds	Depress eaches Significan surizing th It also con ced by the ary side co	surize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before 100% Wide Range Level. tee: Failure to stop the reactor coolant leakage into a rupture the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates institutes a "significant reduction of Safety Margin beyond that be scenario. If RCS depressurization does NOT occur, the inv of the ruptured SG will occur leading to water release through	d SG by the mitigation t irreparably entory in the
(E-3C) level re Safety S depress event. introduc seconds	Depress eaches - Significan surizing th It also con ced by the ary side c Valve, wh	surize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before 100% Wide Range Level. tee: Failure to stop the reactor coolant leakage into a rupture the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates institutes a "significant reduction of Safety Margin beyond that a scenario. If RCS depressurization does NOT occur, the inv of the ruptured SG will occur leading to water release through the could cause and unisolable fault in the ruptured SG.	d SG by the mitigation t irreparably entory in the
(E-3C) level re Safety S depress event. introduc seconds	Depress eaches - Significan surizing th It also con ced by the ary side c Valve, wh	surize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before 100% Wide Range Level. Ace: Failure to stop the reactor coolant leakage into a rupture the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates institutes a "significant reduction of Safety Margin beyond that a scenario. If RCS depressurization does NOT occur, the involu- of the ruptured SG will occur leading to water release through the could cause and unisolable fault in the ruptured SG. (Step 20) Check S/I termination criteria:	d SG by the mitigation t irreparably entory in the
(E-3C) level re Safety S depress event. introduc seconda	Depress eaches - Significan surizing th It also con ced by the ary side c Valve, wh	surize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before 100% Wide Range Level. Ace: Failure to stop the reactor coolant leakage into a rupture the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates institutes a "significant reduction of Safety Margin beyond that a scenario. If RCS depressurization does NOT occur, the inv of the ruptured SG will occur leading to water release through ich could cause and unisolable fault in the ruptured SG. (Step 20) Check S/I termination criteria: NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs – GREATER THAN 0°F.	d SG by the mitigation t irreparably entory in the
(E-3C) level re Safety S depress event. introduc seconda	Depress eaches - Significan surizing th It also con ced by the ary side c Valve, wh	surize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before 100% Wide Range Level. ce: Failure to stop the reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured he RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates institutes a "significant reduction of Safety Margin beyond that e scenario. If RCS depressurization does NOT occur, the invi- of the ruptured SG will occur leading to water release through ich could cause and unisolable fault in the ruptured SG. (Step 20) Check S/I termination criteria: • NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs – GREATER THAN 0°F. • Secondary heat sink: • N/R level in at least one intact S/G –	d SG by the mitigation t irreparably entory in the
(E-3C) level re Safety S depress event. introduc second	Depress eaches - Significan surizing th It also con ced by the ary side c Valve, wh	surize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before 100% Wide Range Level. ce: Failure to stop the reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured be RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates institutes a "significant reduction of Safety Margin beyond that be scenario. If RCS depressurization does NOT occur, the involu- of the ruptured SG will occur leading to water release through ich could cause and unisolable fault in the ruptured SG. (Step 20) Check S/I termination criteria: NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs – GREATER THAN 0°F. Secondary heat sink: N/R level in at least one intact S/G – GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC)	d SG by the mitigation t irreparably entory in the
(E-3C) level re Safety S depress event. introduc seconda	Depress eaches - Significan surizing th It also con ced by the ary side c Valve, wh	surize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before 100% Wide Range Level. ce: Failure to stop the reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates institutes a "significant reduction of Safety Margin beyond that a scenario. If RCS depressurization does NOT occur, the involu- of the ruptured SG will occur leading to water release through ich could cause and unisolable fault in the ruptured SG. (Step 20) Check S/I termination criteria: NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs – GREATER THAN 0°F. Secondary heat sink: N/R level in at least one intact S/G – GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC) Or Total feed flow available to S/G(s) –	d SG by the mitigation t irreparably entory in the
(E-3C) level re Safety S depress event. introduc second	Depress eaches - Significan surizing th It also con ced by the ary side c Valve, wh	surize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before 100% Wide Range Level. ce: Failure to stop the reactor coolant leakage into a rupture the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates institutes a "significant reduction of Safety Margin beyond that a scenario. If RCS depressurization does NOT occur, the inv of the ruptured SG will occur leading to water release through ich could cause and unisolable fault in the ruptured SG. (Step 20) Check S/I termination criteria: • NC subcooling based on core exit T/Cs – GREATER THAN 0°F. • Secondary heat sink: • N/R level in at least one intact S/G – GREATER THAN 11% (32% ACC) Or • Total feed flow available to S/G(s) – GREATER THAN 450 GPM.	d SG by the mitigation o t irreparably entory in the

Appendix D

Operator Action

Op Test I	No.:	N09-1 Scenario # <u>1</u> Event # <u>5, 6 &amp; 7</u>	Page <sup>49</sup> of <u>52</u>									
Event De	scription:	Steam Generator Tube Leak (B)/SGTR (B)/ SG fails high	Aux Feed Flow Transmitter to B									
Time	Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior											
<b>T</b> :	<b>D</b>		0									
Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments									
	BOP	(Step 21) Stop S/I pumps as follows:										
		NI pumps.										
		All but one NV pump.										
	BOP	(Step 22) Isolate NV S/I flowpath:										
		<ul> <li>Check NV pump – SUCTION ALIGNED TO FWST.</li> </ul>	,,,,,									
		Check NV pumps minimflow valves –     OPEN:										
		1NV-150B (NV Pumps Recirculation)										
	BOP	<ul> <li>1NV-151A (NV Pumps Recirculation).</li> </ul>										
		Close the following valves:										
		<ul> <li>1NI-9A (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV)</li> </ul>										
		1NI-10B (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV).										
	At	the discretion of the Lead Examiner term	ninate the exam.									
			<b>EXAMINER NOTE:</b> Following Exam termination, Examiner should follow-up with TS Requirements during the Steam Generator Tube Leak.									
	TECHN	ICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.13, RCS OPER	ATIONAL LEAKAGE									
	SRO	3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE										
	SRO	LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:										
		No pressure boundary LEAKAGE;										

• 1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE;

Op Test I	No.: _	N09-1 Scenario	# <u>1</u> Eve	ent # <u>5,6&amp;7</u>	Page 50 of 5
Event De	scription:	Steam Ge SG fails I		eak (B)/SGTR (B)	/ Aux Feed Flow Transmitter t
Time	Р	osition	,	Applicant's Action	s or Behavior
Time	Pos.	Expect	ed Actions/B	ehavior	Comments
			entified LEAKAG		
		389 gallons     secondary	s per day total p LEAKAGE thro s (SGs); and	rimary to	
			s per day primar through any on (SG).		
	SRO	APPLICABILIT	Y: MODES 1, 2	, 3, AND 4.	
	SRO	ACTIONS			
					<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO will determine that LCO 3.4.13 NOT met, and that Condition is applicable, during the course of the transient.
		CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME	
		A. RCS Operational LEAKAGE not within limits for reasons other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE or primary to secondary LEAKAGE.	A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE within limits.	4 hours	-
	TECHN	ICAL SPECIFI	CATION 3.1.4	, ROD GROUF	P ALIGNMENT LIMITS
	SRO	3.1.4 Rod Gro	oup Alianment L	imits	

Appendix	D		Operator	Action		Forr	m ES-D-2	
Op Test N	-	N09-1 Scenario		ent # <u>5,6&amp;7</u>			of <u>52</u>	
Event Des	scription:	Steam Ge SG fails I	enerator Tube Le nigh	ak (B)/SGTR (B)/	Aux Feed Flow	v Transmit	tter to B	
Time	P	osition	4	Applicant's Actions	s or Behavior			
Time	Pos.	Expect	ed Actions/Be	havior	Со	nments		
	`SRO	shall be OPER indicated rod p	Il shutdown and ABLE, with all i ositions within 1 p counter demar	ndividual 2 steps of				
	SRO	APPLICABILIT	Y: MODES 1 ar	ıd 2.				
	SRO	ACTIONS						
				<b>NOTE:</b> The S determine the NOT met, an is applicable, course of the	at LCO 3. d that Cor during th	ndition B e		
		CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME				
		B. One rod not within alignment limits.	B.1 Restore rod to within alignment limits. OR	1 hour				
			OR B.2.1.1 Verify SDM is within the limit specified in the COLR. OR B.2.1.2	1 hour				
			Initiate boration to restore SDM to within limit.	1 hour			:	
			B.2.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER to ≤ 75% RTP. AND B.2.3	2 hours				
			Verify SDM is within the limit specified in the COLR. <u>AND</u> B.2.4 Perform SR 3.2.1.1.	Once per 12 hours				
1			AND B.2.5 Perform SR 3.2.2.1. AND B.2.6 Re-evaluate	72 hours				
			safety analyses and confirm results remain valid for duration of operation under these conditions.	72 hours 5 days				
			1					
		1						l

 Power Level:
 75%
 NCS [B]
 1136 ppm
 Pzr [B]:
 1149 ppm
 Xe:
 Per OAC

 Power History:
 The Plant is at 75% power (MOL),
 Core Burnup:
 250 EFPDs

for two days.

**CONTROLLING PROCEDURE:** OP/1/A/6100/03 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation (See Reactivity Plan and Power Ascension Guidelines)

#### OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME TO SHIFT:

- The Plant is at 75% power (MOL), following an unplanned load reduction four days ago to complete corrective maintenance on the 1A CF Pump.
- The maintenance was completed and the pump restarted, and power level raised to the present power level two days ago.
- The present plan is to observe operation of the 1A CF Pump at this power level, and then raise power to 100% within the next 24 hours.
- Dispatch has indicated that there have been intermittent voltage swings, and other instabilities, on the electrical grid, and that this is being investigated.
- It is expected to commence a power increase to 100% power starting at Step 3.21.10 of Enclosure 1 of OP/1/A/6100/003, "Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation."
- Use of Alternate Dilute during power ascension in accordance with Enclosure 4.4, "Alternate Dilute," of OP/1/A/6150/009, "Boron Concentration Control," has been approved.
- The RMWST Dissolved Oxygen Concentration is 800 ppb.
- The crew has been directed to raise power at 2 MWe/Minute.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

- 1EMF27, SM Line D/Inner Doghouse Radiation Monitor, failed last shift (IAE is investigating).
- MCB Annunciator 1AD-8, E-2, "GROUNDWATER HI LEVEL," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Work Control SRO	Jim					
Plant SRO	Joe					
NLO's AVAILABLE						
<u>Unit 1</u>					<u>Unit 2</u>	
Aux Bldg.	John				Aux Bldg.	Chris
Turb Bidg.	Bob				Turb Bldg.	Mike
5 <sup>th</sup> Rounds	. Carol					
Extra(s)	Bill	Ed	Wayne	Tanya		

## Scenario Event Description

NRC Scenario 3

Facility:	McG	luire	Scena	ario No.:	3	Op Test No.:	N09-1		
Examiner	rs:			Operato	rs:		(SRO)		
		7. d 1					(RO)		
		·					(BOP)		
Initial Cor	nditions:	requested that the Control Valve) fro is standing by in t has indicated tha	e operator swa om Normal to Ali the Turbine Buil tt Turbine Load	o CF Control ernate for req ding Basemen does not nee	Va uire it to ed 1	alve Control Circuit ed corrective maint o support this activit to be reduced to p	ork Control Center has for 1CF-32 (A S/G CF enance. An NLO (Bob) ty. System Engineering erform this. When the ve maintenance on the		
Turnover	:	SG NR Level Cha	annel 4 failed las SETS TROUB	st shift (IAE is	inv	estigating). MCB	pected back in 6 hours). Annunciator 1AD-2, F-9, times over the last hour		
Event No.	Malf. No.	Event Type*	* Event Description						
1	NA	N-RO N-SRO	Swap CF Cor	ntrol Valve Cir	cu	it			
2	ILE001	I-BOP I(TS)-SRO	Pressurizer Level Transmitter fails high						
3	NV028A NV023A	C-BOP C(TS)-SRO	NV Demin Re and fails oper		ent	t failure/Letdown Li	ne Relief valve lifts		
4	NA	N-BOP N-SRO	Establish Exc	ess Letdown					
5	<sup>xmt</sup> SM003	I-RO I(TS)-SRO	Turbine Impu	lse Pressure	Tra	ansmitter failure			
6	IFE006A	C-RO C-SRO	FCV Controlle	er failure					
7	CF032	M-RO M-BOP M-SRO	SG NR Level	Channel 2 fa	ils	high/FWIS			
8	IPE001A/B IPE002A/B DEH003A	NA	Failure of Aut	omatic/Manu	al I	Rx Trip/ Automatic	Turbine Trip		
9	CA005	NA	TD CA Pump	trip			····		
10	CA004A	NA	1A CA Pump	CA Pump fails to start					
* (	N)ormal,	(R)eactivity,	(I)nstrument,	(C)ompo	ne	nt, (M)ajor			

### McGuire 2009 NRC Scenario #3

The Plant is at 100% power (EOL), steady-state operation. The Work Control Center has requested that the operator swap CF Control Valve Control Circuit for 1CF-32 (A S/G CF Control Valve) from Normal to Alternate for required corrective maintenance. An NLO (Bob) is standing by in the Turbine Building Basement to support this activity. System Engineering has indicated that Turbine Load does not need to be reduced to perform this. When the swapover is complete Maintenance personnel will perform corrective maintenance on the system.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: 1B CA Pump is OOS (Expected back in 6 hours). SG NR Level Channel 4 failed last shift (IAE is investigating). MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, F-9, "ROD DRIVE M/G SETS TROUBLE," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will shift from Normal to the Alternate CF Control Valve Control Circuit for 1CF-32, (A S/G CF Control Valve) in accordance with section 3.6 of Enclosure 4.22, "Swapping CF Control Valve Control Circuit," of OP/1/A/6250/001, "Condensate and Feedwater System." When the procedure is complete 1CF-32 will be in Automatic Control on the Alternate Control Circuit.

Immediately afterwards, the controlling Pzr Level Transmitter (LNC-5160) will rapidly fail high causing charging flow to lower. The operator will respond in accordance with 1AD-6/C-7, "Pzr Hi Level DEV Control," determine that a failed instrument has occurred and swap to an operable channel. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, "RTS Instrumentation," 3.3.3, "PAM Instrumentation," 3.3.4, "Remote Shutdown System."

Following this, the retention element on the in-service NV System Demineralizer will fail causing an immediately plugging of Letdown Filter A, and causing Letdown Line Relief Valve to lift, and then fail open. There are two possible success paths for the operating crew. The operator may elect to isolate Letdown, and then implement AP/1/A/5500/12, "Loss of Letdown, Charging or Seal Injection," due to the loss of Letdown flow. On the other hand, the operator may respond in accordance with 1AD-7, I-4, "LETDN RELIEF HI TEMP," and then implement AP/1/A/5500/10, "NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps," Case II, "NC System leakage." In either situation the operator will isolate normal letdown and establish excess letdown. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.4.13, "RCS Operational Leakage."

After excess Letdown is established, Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel 1 will fail low causing Tref to go low, and Control Rods to move inward in auto to maintain Tavg-Tref deviation. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/14, "Rod Control Malfunction." The control rods will be left in manual control for the remainder of the scenario. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, "RTS Instrumentation." The operator will also address SLC 16.7.1, "ATWS/AMSAC."

Subsequently, the controller for 1CF-32 (A S/G CF Control Valve) will fail in Automatic control causing the valve to go closed. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/06, "S/G Feedwater Malfunctions," and take manual control of the control valve. The controller will be left in manual control for the remainder of the scenario.

Shortly afterwards, the D SG NR Level Channel 2 will fail high causing an FWIS. Simultaneously, the Reactor will fail to trip automatically and manually; and the Turbine will fail to trip automatically. The operator will be expected to enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, "Reactor Trip or

## Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3

Safety Injection," and attempt to manually trip the Reactor. When the Reactor does not trip, the operator will be expected to transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS." During the performance of FR-S.1, the operator will successfully trip the Reactor and the Turbine.

Upon event initiation, the TD CA Pump will overspeed. Additionally, the 1A CA Pump will trip on overcurrent causing a Red Path to exist on Heat Sink. Following completion of FR-S.1, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink." Upon entry into FR-H.1, the Steam Generator levels will approach the point at which NCS Bleed and Feed must be established.

The scenario is expected to terminate at Step 29 of FR-H.1, after the crew has established NCS Bleed and Feed cooling.

## Critical Tasks:

## FR-S.1 C

## Manually drive rods inward before completing the immediate actions of FR-S.1 (Step 2).

Safety Significance: failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would move the reactor towards a subcritical condition to prevent a subsequent return to criticality. A failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect reactivity control.

## FR-S.1 A

### Trip the Turbine prior to Wide Range Steam Generator levels dropping to < 24%

Safety Significance: Turbine trip is important in maintaining Steam generator inventory and primary-tosecondary heat transfer. If the Turbine is NOT tripped the Steam Generator U-Tubes uncover sooner and faster. Thus, primary-to-secondary heat transfer starts to deteriorate earlier in the transient and deteriorates more rapidly. The result is that once tube uncovery begins, NC System temperature and pressure increase more rapidly and reach higher values.

### FR-H.1 B

# Establish RCS Bleed and Feed before all four Steam Generator Wide Range Levels reach 0%, and the NCS temperature and/or pressure increases.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish RCS Bleed and Feed before automatic opening of the PORVs (due to plant heatup) reduces the probability of success to establish a heat sink for the core. This constitutes a "Significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario." Establishing feedwater flow into the Steam Generators offers the most effective recovery action to restore the heat sink. If all attempts to initiate feedwater flow fail, the crew must establish bleed and feed to cool the core. This is accomplished by manually initiating SI, and then manually opening the PORVs. The lower NCS pressure allows a greater ECCS flow to recover NCS inventory and force flow through the core. If this action is to be successful, it must be started before SG dryout. SG dryout would cause NC temperature to increase, increasing NC Pressure and forcing open the PORVs automatically. If NCS pressure is at the PORV setpoint due to NCS heatup, the operator action of opening the PORVs manually may not be successful in lowering NCS pressure and increasing ECCS flow. Ultimately, the core could uncover.

## SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS

Bench Mark	ACTIVITY	DESCRIPTION
Sim. Setup	Rod Step On	
	Reset to Temporary IC- 153	<ul> <li>100% Steady-State EOL</li> <li>LOA CA-010=Racked Out, 1B CA Pump is OOS</li> <li>XMT-CF031 = 100, LCF-5580, SG D #4 NR Level OOS</li> <li>MALF IPE001A/B, Failure of Automatic Rx Trip</li> <li>MALF IPE002A/B, Failure of Manual Rx Trip</li> <li>MALF DEH003A, Failure of Automatic Turbine Trip</li> <li>MALF CA004A=2, Failure of 1A CA Pump to start (Both Auto and Manual)</li> </ul>
	RUN	
	Update Status Board, Setup OAC Setup ICCM, Turbine Displays, & Trend Recorders. Check Rod Step Counters agree with rod positions Check Make-up Control Switch in "ARMED." Ensure DRPI Screen is Re-zeroed. Ensure CF Pump LoveJoy reset.	
	Freeze.	
	Update Fresh Tech.	1B CA Pump OOS

# Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3

Bench Mark	ACTIVITY	DESCRIPTION
	Spec. Log.	LCF-5580, SG D #4 NR Level OOS
	Fill out the NLO's Available section of Shift Turnover Info.	
Prior to Crew Briefing	RUN	
	<u> </u>	Crew Briefing
1. Assign Crew	Positions based on evaluation	on requirements.
2. Provide crew	with OP/1/A/6250/001, Encl	osure 4.22, completed through Steps 3.1 – 3.3.
3. Review the S	hift Turnover Information wit	h the crew.
4. Direct the cre	w to Review the Control Boa	ards taking note of present conditions, alarms.
T-0	Begin Familiarization Period	
At direction of examiner	NA	Swap CF Control Valve Circuit
At direction of examiner	(XMT) ILE001	Pzr Level Transmitter fails high
cxaminer	Set = 100	
	Ramp = 30 seconds	
	Trigger #1	
At direction of examiner	(MALF) NV028A Set = 100 Trigger #3	NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and fails open
	(MALF) NV023A Set = OPEN Trigger #5	When Letdown Hi Pressure Annunciator alarms, Operate Trigger #5.
Continued from Event 3	NA	Establish Excess Letdown

## Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3

Bench Mark	ACTIVITY	DESCRIPTION
At direction of examiner	(XMT) SM003 Set = 0	Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter Failure
	Ramp = 30 seconds	
	Trigger #7	
At direction of	(MALF) IFE006A	FCV Controller failure
examiner	Set = 0	
	Ramp = 60 seconds	
	Trigger #9	
At direction of examiner	(XMT) CF032	SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS
examiner	Set = 100	(LCF-5600, SG D #2 NR Level)
	Trigger #11	
Continued	(MALF) IPE001A/B	Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/ Automatic Turbine Trip
from Event 7	(MALF) IPE002A/B	
	(T=0)	
	(MALF) DEH003A	
	(T=0)	
Continued from Event 7	(MALF) CA005	TD CA Pump trip
	Trigger #13 (w/P4)	
		Trigger #13 = Conditional on reactor trip (P4).
Continued	(MALF) CA004A	1A CA Pump fails to start
from Event 7	Set = BOTH	(Pump will fail to start in Auto or Manual)
	(T=0)	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
	· · · ·	
	Terminate the scena	rio upon direction of Lead Examiner

Appendix D	CD Operator Action					Form ES-D-2			
				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·					
Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	3	_ Event #	1	Page	8	of	59
Event Descrip	otion:	Swap CF Co	ntrol Va	lve Circuit				-	
Time	Position			Applica	nt's Actions	or Behavior	<b>.</b>		

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will shift from Normal to the Alternate CF Control Valve Control Circuit for 1CF-32, (A S/G CF Control Valve) in accordance with section 3.6 of Enclosure 4.22, "Swapping CF Control Valve Control Circuit," of OP/1/A/6250/001, "Condensate and Feedwater System." When the procedure is complete 1CF-32 will be in Automatic Control on the Alternate Control Circuit.

## **Booth Operator Instructions: NA**

## Indications Available: NA

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
		DP/1/A/6250/001, CONDENSATE AND FEEDW DSURE 4.22, SWAPPING CF CONTROL VALVI	
	RO	(Step 3.4) Perform the following sections, as applicable:	
		Section 3.5, Swap CF Control /valve Control Circuit For 1CF-32AB (1A S/G CF Control)	
	RO/ NLO	(Step 3.5) Swap CF Control Valve Control Circuit For 1CF-32AB (1A S/G CF Control)	
		• (Step 3.5.1) IF swapping from Normal to Alternate Control Circuit, check Alternate Control Power available for 1CFSV0234 on TB 691 (Unit 1 Turbine Building Basement).	NOTE: The RO will contact NLO. Booth Instructor: Report that Alternate Control power is available for 1CVSV0234 on TB691.
	RO	• (Step 3.5.2) Place 1CF-32A (1A S/G CF Control) in "MAN." (R.M.)	
			<b>NOTE:</b> The RO may direct the NLO to perform Steps 3.5.3 through 3.5.5.
			If so, <b>Booth Instructor:</b> make the following reports all at once.

Append	lix D	Operator Action	Form ES-D-2
Op Test I	No.: _	N09-1 Scenario # <u>3</u> Event # <u>1</u>	Page <u>9</u> of <u>59</u>
Event De	scription:	Swap CF Control Valve Circuit	
Time	P	osition Applicant's Action	s or Behavior
Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	RO / NLO	<ul> <li>(Step 3.5.3) Check the following green lights on the HART Interface Module (HIM) alternate controller (1CFEM0008) for 1CF-32AB (1A S/G CF Control) lit:</li> </ul>	NOTE: The RO will contact NLO. Booth Instructor: Report that the Input, Ready, Trip1, and Trip 2 green lights are lit on the HART Interface Module
			alternate controller for 1CF- 32AB.
		Input	
		Ready	
		Trip 1	
		Trip 2	
	RO/ NLO	<ul> <li>(Step 3.5.4) Check the following green lights on the HART Interface Module (HIM) normal controller (1CFEM0004) for 1CF-32AB (1A S/G CF Control) lit:</li> </ul>	NOTE: The RO will contact NLO. Booth Instructor: Report that the Input, Ready, Trip1, and Trip 2 green lights are lit on the HART Interface Module normal controller for 1CF- 32AB.
		Input	
		Ready	
		Trip 1	
		Trip 2	
		<ul> <li>(Step 3.5.5) Check digital readout on 1CFEM0008 and 1CFEM0004 indicate within 10%.</li> </ul>	NOTE: The RO will contact NLO. Booth Instructor: Report that the digital readout on 1CFEM00008 and 1CMEM0004 are within 10%.
	RO	(Step 3.5.6) Place 1CF-32AB     "SELECTOR SWITCH" to desired control     circuit:	
		• "ALT"	
		OR	
		• "NORM"	

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 Op Test No.:
 N09-1
 Scenario #
 3
 Event #
 1
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 Event Description:
 Swap CF Control Valve Circuit
 Swa

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	RO	<ul> <li>(Step 3.5.7) Maintain 1A S/G level programmed level.</li> </ul>	
	RO	<ul> <li>(Step 3.5.8) WHEN desired, place 1CF- 32AB (1A S/G CF Control) in "AUTO" as follows: (R.M.)</li> </ul>	
		Ensure the following:	
		<ul> <li>Selected control channels for 1A S/G indicating correctly on chart recorder for the following:</li> </ul>	
		Feed Flow	
		Stm Flow	
		S/G Level	
		<ul> <li>1A S/G level at programmed level.</li> </ul>	
		Place 1CF-32AB (1A S/G CF Control) in "AUTO".	<b>NOTE:</b> The RO may contact NLO to observe system operation as normal.
			If so, <b>Booth Instructor:</b> as <b>NLO</b> , report that <b>System operation is Normal</b> .
		At the discretion of the Lead Examiner mov	e to Event #2.

Appendix E	)	Operator Action				Form ES-D-2		
Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	3	Event #	2	Page	<u>11</u> of	59
Event Descrip	otion:	Pzr Level Tr	ransmit	ter fails hig	h			
Time	Position	1		Applica	nt's Actions	or Behavior		

Immediately afterwards, the controlling Pzr Level Transmitter (LNC-5160) will rapidly fail high causing charging flow to lower. The operator will respond in accordance with 1AD-6/C-7, "Pzr Hi Level DEV Control," determine that a failed instrument has occurred and swap to an operable channel. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, "RTS Instrumentation," 3.3.3, "PAM Instrumentation," 3.3.4, "Remote Shutdown System."

Booth Operator Instructions:	Operate Trigger#1 (XMT-ILE001 (100 over 30
	seconds))

## Indications Available:

- Annunciator 1AD-6/C-7, "Pzr Hi Level Dev Control."
- Annunciator 1AD-7/A-7, "Pzr Hi level Alert."
- Charging flow decreases.
- Channel #3 Pzr level indicates 100%.
- Actual Pzr Level decreases.

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
			<b>NOTE</b> : The SRO may address AP12, however, this AP will NOT mitigate the failure. The crew will eventually recognize that the ARP mitigates the failure and address it.
	OP/1/A	V6100/010G, ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE C-7, PZR HI LEVEL DEV CONTR	
	BOP	(IA Step 1) Check backup heaters are on and charging flow is decreasing.	
	BOP	(IA Step 2) IF instrument malfunction, manually control charging flow at the appropriate man/auto station:	
		Pzr Level Master Cntrl	
		1NV-238 (Charging Line Flow Control)	<b>NOTE:</b> The BOP will place 1NV-238 in MANUAL to control Charging flow.

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Op Test No.: <u>N09-1</u> Scenario #

3 Event #

Event Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter fails high

Time Position

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

2 Page

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
		PD Pump Speed	
	BOP	(IA Step 3) IF instrument malfunction, place "Pzr Level Cntrl Select" to unaffected channels.	<b>NOTE:</b> The BOP will select position 3-2 on Pzr Level Control.
	SRO	(SA Step 1) IF required to control Letdown/Charging, go to OP/1/A/6200/001 A (Chemical and Volume Control System Letdown) or OP/1/A/6200/001 B (Chemical and Volume Control System Charging).	<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO may isolate Letdown. If so, AP12 will be entered to re-establish Letdown.
	SRO	(SA Step 2) Refer to Tech Specs for minimum instrumentation requirements.	<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO will likely conduct a Focus Brief.
			<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO may call WCC/IAE to address failure.
			If so, <b>Booth Instructor</b> acknowledge as WCC.
	   	FECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, RTS INST	RUMENTATION
	SRO	Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation	
	SRO	LCO 3.3.1 The RTS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.	
ļ		APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.	
	SRO	ACTIONS	
	SHU		

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age <u>13</u> of <u>59</u>
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Time	Pos.		ed Actions/Be	indensionales, esta ale	<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO will recognize that Table 3.3-1 shows that function 9 is applicable in Mode 1 above P- 7, and determine that Action M is applicable.
		CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME	
		M. One channel inoperable.	NOTE One channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing.		
			M.1 Place channel in trip.	6 hours	
			OR M.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-7.	12 hours	
	т	ECHNICAL SP	ECIFICATION 3	.3.3. PAM INST	RUMENTATION
T	······		······································	- 	
	SRO	Post Accident Instrumentatio	Monitoring (PAN n	1)	
	SRO		PAM instrumer ble 3.3.3-1 shall		- -
		APPLICABILI	TY: Modes 1, 2 a	ind 3.	
				and the second	
	SRO	ACTIONS			
- - -					

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Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	3	Event #	2		Page	14	of	_59
Event Description:		Pzr Level Tr	ansmitt	er fails hig	h					
Time			Applica	nt's Actions	s or Beha	vior				

Time	Pos.	Expect	ed Actions/Be	ahavior	
				r	<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO will recognize that Table 3.3.3-1 shows that function 11 is applicable and determine that Action B is applicable.
		CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME	
		B. One or more Functions with one required channel inoperable.	B.1 Restore required channel to OPERABLE status.	30 days	
	TEC		FICATION 3.3		UTDOWN SYSTEM
	SRO	Remote Shutd	own System		
	SRO		Remote Shutdo able 3.3.4-1 sha		
		APPLICABILIT	Y: Modes 1, 2 a		
	SRO	ACTIONS			
					<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO will recognize that Table 3.3.4-1 shows that function 4 is applicable and determine that Action A is applicable.
-		CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME	
		A. One or more required Functions inoperable.	A.1 Restore required Function to OPERABLE status.	30 days	
		At the discretio	n of the Lead E	xaminer move	e to Events #3-4.

Appendix D			Ope	Operator Action				Form ES-D-2	
Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	3	Event #	3&4	Page	15 of	59	
Event Descrip	tion:	NV Demin R fails open/ E			ilure/Letdown tdown	Line Relief va	alve lifts a	nd	
Time	Position		Applicant's Actions or Behavior						

Following this, the retention element on the in-service NV System Demineralizer will fail causing an immediately plugging of Letdown Filter A, and causing Letdown Line Relief Valve to lift, and then fail open. There are two possible success paths for the operating crew. The operator may elect to isolate Letdown, and then implement AP/1/A/5500/12, "Loss of Letdown, Charging or Seal Injection," due to the loss of Letdown flow. On the other hand, the operator may respond in accordance with 1AD-7, I-4, "LETDN RELIEF HI TEMP," and then implement AP/1/A/5500/10, "NC System Leakage Within the Capacity of Both NV Pumps," Case II, "NC System leakage." In either situation the operator will isolate normal letdown and establish excess letdown.

## Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #3 (MALF-NV028A (100))

When Letdown High Pressure Annunciator alarms, Operate Trigger #5 (MALF-NV23A (Open))

## Indications Available:

• 1AD-7/H-1, LETDN HI OUTLET HI PRESS

- 1AD-7/I-4, LETDN RELIEF HI TEMP
- OAC Alarms.

Time Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
		NOTE: The crew actually has two success paths. They could isolate the leak by isolating Letdown, and go to AP12. This success path is scripted first. On the other hand, they could address the ARP and then go
		to <b>AP10</b> . If so, Examiner following script starting on <b>Page 22</b> .
		<b>NOTE:</b> The operator may recognize from the onset of the event that Letdown must be isolated to stop the leak, take action to do so, and enter AP12. If so, Examiner start here.
AP/1/	A/5500/12, LOSS OF LETDOWN, CHARGING (	OR SEAL INJECTION

Dp Test I Event De	No.: scription:	N09-1 Scenario # <u>3</u> Event # <u>3 &amp; 4</u> NV Demin Retention Element failure/Let	
		fails open/ Establish Excess Letdown	
Time	P	osition Applicant's Acti	ons or Behavior
Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	SRO	(Step 1) IF a loss of charging through the Regenerative HX has occurred, THEN	<b>NOTE:</b> A loss of Charging has NOT occurred.
	BOP	(Step 2) Check Pzr level – LESS THAN 96%	
	BOP	(Step 3) IF AT ANY TIME "REGEN HX LETDN HI TEMP" alarms (1AD-7, I-2), THEI close the following valves:	NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.
		1NV-1A (NC L/D Isol To Regen Hx)	<b>NOTE:</b> These valves are most likely already closed.
		• 1NV-2A (NC L/D Isol To Regen Hx).	
	RO	(Step 4) Stop any power or temperature changes in progress.	-
	SRO	(Step 5) Announce occurrence on paging system.	<b>NOTE:</b> SRO may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement. If so, <b>Floor Instructor</b>
			acknowledge as U2 RO.
	SRO	(Step 6) IF this AP entered due to loss of letdown only, THEN GO TO Step 36.	<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO will need to answer YES to this condition if this procedure is to be of any use to the crew.
	BOP	(Step 36) Ensure the following are closed:	
		1NV-458A (75 GPM L/D Orifice Outlet Cont Isol)	
		1NV-457A (45 GPM L/D Orifice Outlet Cont Isol)	
		1NV-35A (Variable L/D Orifice Outlet Cont Isol).	

Ap	pen	dix	D
		CILC.	-

Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	3	_ Event #	3 & 4	Page	17	of	59
Event Description:		NV Demin Re fails open/ E				Line Relief va	lve lif	its ar	nd
Time	Position			Applica	Int's Actions or	Behavior			

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
			and the second sec
	BOP	(Step 38) Ensure charging flow going down to maintain Pzr at program level.	<b>NOTE:</b> The BOP may take manual control of Charging flow via 1NV-238.
	BOP	(Step 39) Check "LETDN RELIEF HI TEMP" alarm (1AD-7, I-4) – HAS REMAINED DARK.	
	BOP	(Step 39 RNO) Evaluate if low failure of letdown pressure instrument caused loss of letdown.	
	BOP	(Step 40) Check 1NV-21A (NV Spray To PZR Isol) – CLOSED.	
	BOP	(Step 41) Operate Pzr heaters as follows:	
		Check all Pzr heater group supply breakers – CLOSED.	
		Check normal Pzr spray – AVAILABLE.	
		<ul> <li>Place the following Pzr heater groups in manual and "ON" to maximize spray flow:</li> </ul>	
		• A	
		• B	
		• D	
	BOP	(Step 42)Check the following valves – OPEN:	<b>NOTE:</b> These valves have been previously closed.
		• 1NV-1A (NC L/D Isol To Regen Hx).	
		• 1NV-2A (NC L/D Isol To Regen Hx).	
	SRO	(Step 43) GO TO Step 48.	

Append	dix D	Operator Action	Form ES-D-2
Op Test	No.:	Page <u>18</u> of <u>59</u>	
Event De	own Line Relief valve lifts and		
Time	s or Behavior		
Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	SRO	(Step 48) Establish normal letdown:	<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO will need to know that the procedure is directing an action that plant conditions will NOT allow, and go to the RNO.
	SRO	(Step 48 RNO) GO TO Step 49.	
	BOP	(Step 49) Establish excess letdown:	<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO may direct the BOP step by step, or handout this section of the procedure to the BOP.

Adjust charging to minimum while

Pzr level at program level.

to Step 50 and GO TO Step 50 to establish letdown using Rx Vessel Head

to Step 50 and GO TO Step 50 to establish letdown using Rx Vessel Head

NC pump seal injection flow greater

IF AT ANY TIME excess letdown cannot

be established, THEN observe Note prior

IF AT ANY TIME excess letdown cannot

be established, THEN observe Note prior

1KC-315B (Excess L/D Hx Ret Hdr

1KC-305B (Excess L/D Hx Sup Hdr

Ensure 1NV-27B (Excess L/D Hx Otlt

3-Way Cntrl) selected to "VCT" position.

Open 1NV-26B (Excess L/D Hx Outlet

**NOTE:** This is a Continuous

**NOTE:** This is a Continuous

Action.

Action.

maintaining the following:

than 6 GPM

BOP

SRO/

BOP

SRO/

BOP

BOP

BOP

BOP

BOP

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Vents.

Vents.

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Cntrl).

Wait 2 minutes.

Open the following:

Cont Otsd Isol).

Cont Otsd Isol).

Ap	pend	ix D

Op Test I	No.:	N09-1	Scenario # <u>3</u> Event # <u>3&amp;4</u>	Page <u>19</u> of <u>59</u>
Event De	scription:		NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdo fails open/ Establish Excess Letdown	wn Line Relief valve lifts and
Time	P	ositic	on Applicant's Actions	s or Behavior
Time	Pos.		Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	BOP	•	Close 1NV-26B (Excess L/D Hx Outlet Cntrl).	
	BOP	•	Check the following valves - OPEN:	
			<ul> <li>1NV-94AC (NC Pumps Seal Ret Cont Inside Isol)</li> </ul>	
			1NV-95B (NC Pumps Seal Ret Cont Outside Isol).	
	BOP	•	Open 1NV-24B (C NC Loop To Exs L/D Hx Isol).	
	BOP	•	Open 1NV-25B (C NC Loop To Exs L/D Hx Isol).	
-	BOP	•	Check the following:	
			Reactor – CRITICAL	
			• 1NV-27B – ALIGNED TO VCT	
	BOP	•	Closely monitor reactor response once excess letdown is in service.	
	BOP	•	Slowly open 1NV-26B while maintaining excess letdown HX temperature less than 200°F.	<b>NOTE:</b> BOP will fully open 1NV-26B over time, in order to control inventory.
	SRO/ BOP	•	GO TO Step 49.r.	
	BOP	•	Notify Primary Chemistry that excess letdown is in service.	<b>NOTE:</b> SRO/BOP may call Chemistry to address.
				If so, <b>Booth Instructor</b> acknowledge as Chemistry.
	BOP	•	Adjust charging flow as desired while maintaining:	
			<ul> <li>NC pump seal injection flow greater than 6 GPM.</li> </ul>	
			Pzr level at program level.	
	BOP	•	Operate Pzr heaters as desired.	
	BOP	•	WHEN time allows, THEN notify engineering to document the following	<b>NOTE:</b> SRO/BOP may call WCC to address.
			transients:	If so, <b>Booth Instructor</b> acknowledge as WCC.

	Ap	pendix	D
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Op Test	No.: _	N09-1	Scenario # Event # 3 & 4	Page <u>20</u> of <u>59</u>							
Event De	escription:		NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdo fails open/ Establish Excess Letdown	wn Line Relief valve lifts and							
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior											
	N		in a second s								
Time	Pos.		Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments							
			Letdown isolation.								
			Potential charging nozzle transient.								
			<ul> <li>IF NV Aux Spray was in service, THEN</li> </ul>	<b>NOTE:</b> NV Aux Spray has NOT been used.							
	BOP	•	Check 1NV-27B (Excess L/D Hx Otlt 3-Way Cntrl) – ALIGNED TO "VCT".								
	BOP	•	IF AT ANY TIME VCT level needs to be lowered AND NCDT is available to pump water outside containment, THEN perform the following:	<b>NOTE:</b> This is a Continuous Action.							
			• Place 1NV-27B to "NCDT".								
			<ul> <li>Adjust 1NV-26B (Excess L/D Hx Outlet Cntrl) as necessary to maintain NCDT pressure less than 8 PSIG.</li> </ul>								
			• WHEN VCT at desired level, THEN return 1NV-27B to "VCT".								
	SRO/ BOP	•	WHEN normal letdown available, THEN establish normal letdown PER Steps 42 through 48.	<b>NOTE:</b> This is a Continuous Action.							
	BOP	•	WHEN desired to isolate excess letdown, THEN perform the following:	<b>NOTE:</b> This is a Continuous Action.							
			Close 1NV-26B (Excess L/D Hx     Outlet Cntrl).								
			Close 1NV-24B (C NC Loop To Exs L/D Hx Isol).								
			Ciose 1NV-25B (C NC Loop To Exs L/D Hx losl).								
			Close 1KC-305B (Excess L/D Hx Sup Hdr Cont Otsd Isol).								
	BOP		Close 1KC-315B (Excess L/D Hx Ret Hdr Cont Otsd Isol).								

Appendix D			Operator Actic		Form ES-D-2		
Op Test No	o.: _	N09-1 Scenario #	3 Event #	3&4	Page	<u>21</u> of	59
Event Des	cription:		etention Element fa stablish Excess Let		wn Line Relief va	alve lifts a	nd
Time	P	osition	Applica	nt's Actions	or Behavior	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	<u></u>
Time	Pos.	Expected	Actions/Behavi	or	Com	ments	
	SRO/ BOP	RETURN TO      effect.	D procedure and step in		<b>NOTE:</b> SRO/BOP may call WCC to address.		
					lf so, <b>Booth In</b> acknowledge a		
					Examiner NOT forward to ever on Page 36.		
					Examiner NOT uses the ARP a to AP10 to resp Letdown Relief Start Here.	and then goond to th	goes ie
	OP/1//	V6100/010H, ANI I-4,	UNCIATOR RE LETDN RELIEF			AD-7	
	BOP	(Immediate Action and correct if nece		pressure			
	BOP	(Supplementary A and PRT.	ction Step 1) Moni	tor VCT			
	BOP	(SA Step 2) IF in f service AND it is c leaking,			NOTE: The pla Mode 4.	ant is NOT	Г in
	BOP	(SA Step 3) IF det perform the follow		aking,			
	BOP	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	4 (Letdown Pressu	ure			
			24 (Letdown Press quired to establish ure.				
	BOP		1NV-6 (Letdown I king, perform the				

Appendix	D		Operator Action					
Op Test No.	.:	<sup>N09-1</sup> Scenario #	_3	Event #	3&4	Page	<u>22</u> of <u>59</u>	
Event Descr	ription:	NV Demin fails open/				wn Line Relief v	alve lifts and	
Time	Po	osition	». »	Applica	nt's Actions	s or Behavior	·····	
Time F	Pos.	Expecte	d Action	s/Behavi	or	Com	ments	
		• Ensure than 340	ˈRegen Hx )°F.	L//D Tem	p" less			
		Control)	NV-124 (L as require sig letdowr	d to estab	lish 150			
		Ensure 1NV Control) pot desired pres	entiometer			NOTE: This ac done. The SR leave this cont	O will decide t	
		Place 1NV- Control) in "		wn Pressu	ire	NOTE: The SF leave this cont		
	SRO	(SA Step 4) Ref System Leakage Pumps).				NOTE: The SF to AP-10.	RO will transitio	
	SRO	(SA Step 5) Ref specifications.	er to Tech	Spec for I	eakage	NOTE: The Si LCO 3.4.13 ar are applicable	d SLC 16.9.7	
	SRO	(SA Step 6) IF ii SRO.	nstrument	failure, no	tify WCC	NOTE: SRO address the re leakage.		
						lf so, <b>Booth Ir</b> acknowledge		
AP/1/A	√5500	/10, NC SYSTE		AGE WIT PUMPS	HIN THE	CAPACITY C	F BOTH NV	
		CAS	SE II, NC	SYSTEM	LEAKA	GE		
	BOP	(Step 1) Check THE AUX BUIL		OWN TO I	BE IN	NOTE: The N known to be ir Building.		
	SRO	(Step 1 RNO) P				NOTE: A Con NOT in progre		
		IF containm	ent entry i	s in progre	ess	-		

Append	dix D		rator Actic	Action Form ES-D-				
Op ⊺est	No.:	N09-1 Scenario #	_3	Event #	3&4	Page	23 of 5	9
Event De	escription:	NV Demin Re fails open/ Es				own Line Relief va	alve lifts and	
Time	P	osition		Applica	nt's Actions	s or Behavior		
Time	Pos.	Expected	Action	s/Behavi	or	Com	ments	
		IF in Modes 1- GO TO Step 2		no-mode, T	HEN			
	BOP	(Step 2) Check Pz GOING UP.	r level -	- STABLE (	DR			
	BOP	(Step 3) IF AT AN procedure Pzr leve stable, THEN perfe	el canno	ot be mainta		<b>NOTE:</b> This is Action. The SI both board ope	RO will make	
	BOP	(Step 4) Check Pz TRENDING TO 22	r pressi 235 PSI	ure – STAE G.	LE OR			
	RO	(Step 5) Check ma	ain stea	m line intac	:t:			
		Reactor powe	r – AT 1		OWER			
		NC Loop T-Av	g – ST/	ABLE.			······································	
	SRO	(Step 6) Announce	e occurr	ence on pa	ige.	NOTE: SRO r to make Plant if so, Floor Ins	Announceme	
	-					acknowledge a		
	RO / BOP	(Step 7) Estimate following methods		e using an	y of the			
		Monitor OAC	NC grap	ohic				
		OR						
		Compare chair plus seal returned		w to letdow	n flow			
		OR						
		Monitor VCT I M1P1271).	evel tre	nd (OAC p	oint			

Append	lix D		Ope	Operator Action				S-D-2
Op Test I	No.:	N09-1 Scenario #	3	Event #	3 & 4	Page	<u>24</u> of	59
Event De	scription:	NV Demin Re fails open/ E				wn Line Relief v	alve lifts ar	nd
Time	P	osition		Applicar	nt's Actions	s or Behavior		
Time	Pos.	Expected	Actio	ns/Behavid	)r	Com	ments	
	SRO	(Step 8) REFER T (Classification of E			)	NOTE: SRO may ask OSM to address.		
						If so, Floor Ins acknowledge a		
	SRO	(Step 9) IF AT AN exceeds Tech Spe following:						
		in service PE	ure Outside Air Pressure Filter train ervice PER OP/0/A/6450/011				nay ask U s.	2
		(Control Area System), Encl Atmosphere F Abnormal Cor	osure 4 Pressuri	4.4 (Control I zation Durin	Room	If so, <b>Floor Ins</b> acknowledge a		Þ.
		Have another exceeds SLC and immediat	16.9.7	condition C	limits	NOTE: SRO r address.	-	SM to
		inoperable.				If so, <b>Floor Ins</b> acknowledge a		
	BOP	(Step 10) IF AT A below 16% ("VCT alarm (1AD-7, D-3 NV pump suction	ABNO 3) low s	RMAL LEVE etpoint), TH	EĽ"	NOTE: This is Action. The S both board ope	RO will ma	ake
	BOP	(Step 11) IF AT A pressure exceed THEN evaluate pl select switches in from cycling arou	Tech S acing a "HGIH	pec limit (0.3 II 4 VL AHU " to prevent	8 PSIG), mode	NOTE: This is Action. The S both board op	RO will ma	ake
	BOP	(Step 12) check s – LESS THAN 6 (		koff on all NG	C pumps			
		(Stop 12) Chask !			orrioro			
	BOP	(Step 13) Check I intact as follows:	ve pun	ip mennai D	amers			

Append	lix D	Operator Action	Form ES-D-2
	·····		
Op Test I	No.: _	N09-1 Scenario # <u>3</u> Event # <u>3 &amp; 4</u>	Page <u>25</u> of <u>59</u>
Event De	scription:	NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdo fails open/ Establish Excess Letdown	wn Line Relief valve lifts and
Time	P	osition Applicant's Actions	s or Behavior
Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
		<ul> <li>NC pump thermal barrier KC outlet flows and temperatures on OAC KC graphic – NORMAL (flow and temperature should be similar for all 4 NC pumps)</li> </ul>	
		KC surge tank level rates on OAC KC graphic – NORMAL.	
		KC Surge Tank level – NORMAL	
		1EMF-46A (Train A Component Cooling)     – NORMAL	
		1EMF-46B (Train B Component Cooling)     - NORMAL	
	SRO	(Step 14) GO TO Step 16.	
	BOP	(Step 16) Check leak – SUSPECTED ON LETDOWN LINE NEAR DEMINERALIZERS.	<b>NOTE:</b> The NCS leak is NOT suspected to be on the Letdown Line near the Demineralizers.
	SRO	(Step 16 RNO) GO TO Step 18.	
	BOP	(Step 18) Check leak – KNOWN TO BE ON NORMAL LETDOWN LINE.	<b>NOTE:</b> in order to use this flow path the BOP must recognize that the leak was on the letdown Line, and answer YES to this question.
	BOP	(Step 19) Isolate leak as follows:	
		Check leak – KNOWN TO BE DUE TO LETDOWN LINE RELIEF OPEN.	
		Check letdown pressure – BETWEEN     150 TO 350 PSIG.	
		Perform Supplementary actions PER Annunciator Response for "LETDN RELIEF HI TEMP" (1AD-7, I-4).	
		Check leak – ISOLATED.	

Append	dix D	Operator Action	Form ES-D-2								
Op Test Event De	No.:	N09-1 Scenario # <u>3</u> Event # <u>3 &amp; 4</u> NV Demin Retention Element failure/Leto fails open/ Establish Excess Letdown									
Time	P	osition Applicant's Actions or Behavior									
Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments								
	SRO	(Step 19.d RNO) Observe Note prior to Step 19.f and GO TO Step 19.f.									
	SRO	<ul> <li>(Step 19.f) Check letdown isolation – DESIRED.</li> </ul>									
	BOP	Close the following letdown isolation valves:									
		1NV-458A (75 GPM L/D Orifice Outlet Cont Isol).									
		1NV-457A (45 GPM L/D Orifice Outlet Cont Isol).									
		<ul> <li>1NV-35A (Variable L/D Orifice Outlet Cont Isol).</li> </ul>									
		Check leak – ISOLATED.	<b>NOTE:</b> the only way to know if the leak is isolated is to check that the PRT Level has stabilized.								
		Ensure charging flow going down to maintain Pzr at program level.									
		IF tube leak is suspected on Letdown     Hx,	<b>NOTE:</b> A tube leak on the Letdown HX is NOT suspected.								
		Check leak – ISOLATED.									
		<ul> <li>Place 1NV-137A (NC Filters Otlt 3-Way Cntrl) to "HUT" to ensure VCT is isolated from leak.</li> </ul>									
		Establish excess letdown PER EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 2 (Establishing Excess Letdown).	<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO will direct the BOP to establish Excess Letdown using Generic Enclosure 2.								
		EP/1/A/5000/G-1, GENERIC ENCL ENCLOSURE 2, ESTABLISHING EXCE									

Appendix D				Operator Action				Form ES-D-2		
Op Test No.: <u>N09-1</u> Scenario #			)# <u>3</u>	_ Event #	3&4	Page	27	of	59	
Event Desc	ription:			n Element fa h Excess Le		n Line Relief v	alve lif	ts ar	ıd	
Time	P	osition		Applica	int's Actions of	or Behavior		···		
Time	Pos.	Expec	ted Actio	ns/Behavi	or	Com	ment	S		
	BOP	(Step 1) Chec follows:	k KC Syste	nt as						
			ent pressur D BELOW						P	
		All KC put	mps – ON.			<u></u>				
	BOP	(Step 1.b RN0 THEN perform			mps off,					
		Close from operator t idle train:								
		A trair	ו:				<b></b>			
		E J.	ss Sup Isol	Frn A Rx Blo ) aux bldg, T e north end o	750+12,					
		E	ss Ret Ísol)	A Rx Bldg aux bldg, 7 of column	′33+8,					
	BOP	Bldg head	der per step	ated from R above, TH on operating	EN open					
		• 1KC- <sup>-</sup> Ret Is		Rx Bldg No	n Ess			=		
		1KC-2 Sup Is		3 Rx Bldg N	on Ess	- That is - an adding door a proper in parts				
			ntinue unti Bldg header	l KC aligned r.	l to					
ļ										
	BOP	• 1KC-	) Open the 305B (Exce Otsd Isol)	following: ess L/D Hx \$	Sup Hdr					
		• 1KC-		ess L/D Hx F	Ret Hdr					

Check containment pressure – HAS REMAINED BELOW 3 PSIG.

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Append	lix D	······································	Ope	rator Actic	'n			Forr	n E	S-D-2
Op Test	No.: _	N09-1 Scenario #	3	Event #	3&4		Page	28	of	59
Event De	scription:	NV Demin Reto fails open/ Est				wn Line	Relief va	alve lif	ts ar	d
Time	P	osition		Applica	nt's Actions	s or Beha	vior			
Time	Pos.	Expected A	ction	s/Behavi	or		Com	ment	S	4
	BOP	(Step 2) Place 1NV- 3-Way Cntrl) to "VC			Hx Otit					
	BOP	(Step 3) Open 1NV- Outlet Cntrl).	26B (	U1 Excess	L/D Hx					
	BOP	(Step 4) Wait 2 mini	utes.							
	BOP	(Step 5) Close 1NV Outlet Cntrl).	-26B (	U1 Excess	L/D Hx					
	BOP	(Step 6) Check the	followi	ng valves -	- OPEN:					
		<ul> <li>1NV-94AC (NC Inside Isol)</li> </ul>	Pump	os Seal Ret	Cont					
		1NV-95B (NC F Outside Isol).	umps	Seal Ret C	Cont					
	BOP	(Step 7) Check read	ctor —	SUBCRITIO	CAL.					
	BOP	(Step 7 RNO) IF rea perform the followin		ritical, THE	N					
		Closely monitor excess letdown			e once					
	BOP	(Step 8) Open 1NV L/D Hx Isol).	-24B (	C NC Loop	To Exs					
	BOP	(Step 9) Open 1NV L/D Hx Isol).	-25B (	C NC Loop	To Exs					
	BOP	(Step 10) Open 1N Outlet Cntrl) while r letdown Hx tempera	nainta	ining Exce	SS					

Form ES-D-2 Appendix D Operator Action Op Test No.: N09-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3&4 Page 29 of 59 NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdown Line Relief valve lifts and Event Description: fails open/ Establish Excess Letdown Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior **Expected Actions/Behavior** Time Pos. Comments BOP (Step 11) Notify Chemistry that excess **NOTE:** The BOP will call letdown is in service. Chemistry. **Booth Instructor** acknowledge as Chemistry. BOP (Step 12) WHEN time allows, THEN notify NOTE: The BOP may call engineering to document transients on WCC to document transients. letdown and charging. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. (Step 13) RETURN TO procedure and step BOP **NOTE:** The BOP reports that in effect. excess Letdown is established and SRO returns to AP10. AP/1/A/5500/10, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE WITHIN THE CAPACITY OF BOTH NV PUMPS CASE II, NC SYSTEM LEAKAGE SRO Power operation may continue as long ٠ as NC System activity and chemistry requirements are met. GO TO Step 29. • (Step 29) Ensure RP is notified of location NOTE: SRO will call RP. SRO and size of leak. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as RP. SRO (Step 30) Contact station management to NOTE: SRO may call evaluate need to shutdown. WCC/Management to address the need to shutdown. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

Append	ix D	Operator Action	Form ES-D-2
<b>F</b>			
Op Test N	No.: –	N09-1 Scenario # <u>3</u> Event # <u>3&amp;4</u>	Page <u>30</u> of <u>59</u>
Event De	scription:	NV Demin Retention Element failure/Letdo fails open/ Establish Excess Letdown	wn Line Relief valve lifts and
Time	P	osition Applicant's Actions	s or Behavior
Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	SRO	(Step 31) Check unit shutdown – REQUIRED.	
	SRO	(Step 31 RNO) GO TO Step 34.	
	SRO	(Step 34) WHEN leak less than Tec Spec limits, THEN perform the following:	
	BOP	Check VCT – INTACT.	
		<ul> <li>Check NV pump suction – ALIGNED TO VCT.</li> </ul>	
	SRO	IF Outside Air Pressure Filter Train in service, THEN contact station management to evaluate securing filter train PER OP/0/A/6450/011 (Control Area Ventilation/Chilled Water System), Enclosure 4.4 (Control Room Atmosphere Pressurization During Abnormal Conditions)	<b>NOTE:</b> SRO may call WCC/Management to address the OAFPT alignment. If so, <b>Booth Instructor</b> acknowledge as WCC.
		IF VL AHU mode select switches were placed to "HIGH" in Step 11,	<b>NOTE:</b> The VL AHU Mode Select Switches were NOT placed in HIGH.
	TECHN	ICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.13, RCS OPER	
	SRO	3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	SRO	LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to:	
		No pressure boundary LEAKAGE;	
		1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE;	
		10 gpm identified LEAKAGE;	
		<ul> <li>389 gallons per day total primary to secondary LEAKAGE through steam generators (SGs); and</li> </ul>	

Appendix I	D		Operato	r Action		Form ES-		
Op Test No.: Event Descri				ent # <u>3&amp;4</u> nent failure/Letdo ess Letdown	Page			
Time	Positior	ition Applicant's Actions or Behavior						
Time P	os.	Expect	ed Actions/B	ehavior	Cor	nments		
			through any or	ry to secondary ne steam				
S	RO APF	PLICABILIT	Y: MODES 1, 2	2, 3, AND 4.				
S	RO ACT	TIONS						
						at LCO 3.4.13 d that Conditic during the		
	cc	ONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME				
		RCS Operational LEAKAGE not within limits for reasons other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE or primary to secondary LEAKAGE.	A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE within limits.	4 hours				
	At t	he discret	on of the Lear	Examiner mov	e to Event #5			

Appendix D		Operator Action					Form ES-D-2		
		w <sup></sup> <del></del>						<u></u>	
Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	3	Event #	_5	Page	32	of	59
Event Descrip	otion:	Turbine Imp	ulse Pre	essure Trans	smitter failu	ıre			
Time	Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior								

After excess Letdown is established, Turbine Impulse Pressure Channel 1 will fail low causing Tref to go low, and Control Rods to move inward in auto to maintain Tavg-Tref deviation. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/14, "Rod Control Malfunction." The control rods will be left in manual control for the remainder of the scenario. The operator will address Technical Specification 3.3.1, "RTS Instrumentation." The operator will also address SLC 16.7.1, "ATWS/AMSAC."

Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #7 (XMT-SM003 (0 over 30 seconds))

#### Indications Available:

- Channel I Impulse Pressure indicates low.
- Control rods heard and observed to be moving in Auto.

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
		AP/1/A/5500/14, ROD CONTROL MALFU	JNCTION
	RO	(Step 1) IF more than one rod dropped, THEN perform the following:	Immediate Action NOTE: No Rods have dropped.
		Trip reactor.	
	-	GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).	
	RO	(Step 2) Place control rods in manual.	Immediate Action
	RO	(Step 3) Check rod movement – STOPPED.	Immediate Action
	RO	(Step 4) Check all rods – ALIGNED WITH ASSOCIATED BANK.	
	RO	(Step 5) Check "ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE" alarm (1AD-2, A-10) – DARK.	
	RO	(Step 6) Check the following reactor control instruments – NORMAL:	<b>NOTE:</b> The Channel 1 Turbine Impulse Pressure has failed.

Appendix		Operator Action	Form ES-I
Op Test Event De	No.:	N09-1 Scenario # <u>3</u> Event # <u>5</u> Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter fail	Page <u>33</u> of <u>59</u>
Time		Position Applicant's Action	
11110			S OF Denavior
Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
		"1A NC LOOP T-AVG"	
		"1B NC LOOP T-AVG"	
		"1C NC LOOP T-AVG"	
		"1D NC LOOP T-AVG"	
		"TURB IMP PRESS CH 1"	
	SRO	(Step 6 RNO) Perform the following:	
		IF "NC LOOP T-AVE" channel failed,	NOTE: Loop Tavg has NOT failed.
		GO TO Enclosure 3 (Response to Continuous Rod Movement).	<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO will go to Enclosure 3.
		AP/1/A/5500/14, ROD CONTROL MALFUNCLOSURE 3, RESPONSE TO CONTINUOUS	
	SRO	(Step 1) Announce occurrence on paging system.	<b>NOTE:</b> SRO may ask U2 R to make Plant Announceme
10-11-11-11-11-11-11-11-11-11-11-11-11-1			If so, <b>Floor Instructor</b> acknowledge as U2 RO.
	SRO	(Step 2) Evaluate the following prior to any control rod withdrawal:	
		Ensure no inadvertent mode change will occur.	
		• Ensure control rods are withdrawn in a deliberate manner, while closely monitoring the reactor's response.	
	RO	(Step 3) Check the following – NORMAL:	
		"TURB IMP PRESS CH 1"	
		T-Ref indication.	

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Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	3	Event #	5	P	age	34	of	59
Event Descrip	tion:	Turbine Imp	ulse Pre	ssure Tran	smitter failu	re				
Time			Applica	nt's Actions	or Behavio	or				

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
		• IF "TURB IMP PRESS CH 1" failed, THEN ensure P-7 and P-13 interlocks are in required state for existing unit conditions (Tech Spec 3.3.1.16).	
	SRO	Notify IAE to repair failed channel.	<b>NOTE:</b> SRO may call WCC/IAE to address.
			If so, <b>Booth Instructor</b> acknowledge as WCC/IAE.
		IF unit coastdown in progress,	<b>NOTE:</b> Coastdown is NOT in progress.
	RO	<ul> <li>Perform any of the following as necessary to maintain T-Colds 555°F to 557°F:</li> </ul>	
		Position control rods in manual.	
		OR	
		Borate/dilute NC System	
		OR	
		Adjust turbine load.	
	SRO	GO TO Step 6.	
	RO	(Step 6) WHEN problem is repaired, THEN perform the following:	<b>NOTE:</b> This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.
		• Ensure T-Avg at T-Ref ± 1°F.	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
		IF auto rod control desired, THEN place rods in auto.	
	SRO	(Step 7) Exit this procedure.	<b>NOTE:</b> SRO will likely conduct a Focus Brief.
	1	FECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, RTS INST	
	SRO	3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation	

Ap	pendix D	

3 Event #

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Op Test No.:

Event Description:

Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter failure

Time Position

N09-1 Scenario #

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

5

Time	Pos.	Expec	ted Actions/Be	havior	Comments
	SRO		RTS instrumen ble 3.3.1-1 shall		
	SRO	APPLCIABILIT	Y: According to	Table 3.3.1-1.	
	SRO	ACTIONS			
			1	1	
	SRO	CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME	NOTE: The SRO will determine that Functional
		A. One or more Functions with one or more required channels inoperable.	A.1 Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.3-1 for the channel(s).	Immediately	Units 16.b and 16.e on Table 3.3-1 are affected by this event, and that Conditions A and T are required.
		T. One or more channei(s) inoperable.	T.1 Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions.	1 hour	
			T.2 Be in MODE 2.	7 hours	
			I	1	
		SELECTED	LICENSEE CO	MMITMENT 16.	7.1, AMSAC
	SRO	16.7.1 ATWS/	AMSAC		
	SRO	COMMITMEN shall be OPEF	T: The ATWS/A RABLE.		
	SRO		TY: MODE 1 abo		
	SRO	ACTIONS	·		
				Sy Sum Josla	

Ap	pen	dix	Ð

 Op Test No.:
 N09-1
 Scenario #
 3
 Event #
 5
 Page
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 of
 59

 Event Description:
 Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitter failure

Time Position

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Time	Pos.	Expec	ted Actions/Be	Comments	
	SRO	CONDITION	REQUIRED ACTION	COMPLETION TIME	<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO will determine that Condition A is
		A. ATWS/AMSAC system inoperable.	A.1 Restore ATWS/AMSAC system to OPERABLE status. <u>OR</u> A.2 Prepare and submit a Special Report outlining the cause of the malfunction and plans for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.	7 days 37 days	required.
		T. One or more channel(s) inoperable.	<ul> <li>T.1 Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions.</li> <li>OR</li> <li>T.2 Be in MODE 2.</li> </ul>	1 hour 7 hours	
		At the discret	ion of the Lead	Examiner mov	e to Event #6.

Appendix D			Operator Action					Form ES-D-2		
Op Test No.:	<u>N09-1</u> Se	cenario #	3	Event #	_6	Page	37	of	59	
Event Descrip	otion: Fe	CV Controlle	r failur	e						
Time	Position		Applicant's Actions or Behavior				1			

Subsequently, the controller for 1CF-32 (A S/G CF Control Valve) will fail in Automatic control causing the valve to go closed. The operator will implement AP/1/A/5500/06, "S/G Feedwater Malfunctions," and take manual control of the control valve. The controller will be left in manual control for the remainder of the scenario.

# Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #9 (MALF- IFE006A (0 over 60 seconds))

#### Indications Available:

• 1AD-4/B-1, S/G A LEVEL DEVIATION

• 1AD-4/C-1, S/G A FLOW MISMATCH LO CF FLOW

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
		AP/1/A/5500/06, S/G FEEDWATER MAL	FUNCTION
	RO	(Step 1) IF CF control valve OR bypass valve has failed, THEN perform the following:	
		Place affected valve in manual.	
		Restore S/G level to program.	
	RO	(Step 2) IF CF pump speed control has failed,	<b>NOTE:</b> CF speed control has NOT failed.
	RO	(Step 3) On each S/G, check the following	
		channels - INDICATING THE SAME:	
		Feed flow	
		Steam flow	
		S/G level.	
	RO	(Step 4) Check unit status as follows:	
		Reactor trip breakers – CLOSED	
		Pzr pressure – GREATER THAN P-11 (1955 PSIG).	

	Ap	pendix	D
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3 Event #

FCV Controller failure

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Op Test No.: <u>N09-1</u> Scenario #

Event Description:

Time

Position

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

6

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	RO	(Step 5) IF AT ANY TIME S/G N/R level approaches 17% OR 83%, THEN perform the following:	<b>NOTE:</b> This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.
		Trip reactor.	
		GO TO EP/1/A/5000/E-0 (Reactor Trip or Safety Injection).	
	SRO	(Step 6) Announce occurrence on page.	<b>NOTE:</b> SRO may ask U2 RO to make Plant Announcement.
			If so, <b>Floor Instructor</b> acknowledge as U2 RO.
	RO	(Step 7) Check reactor power – GREATER THAN 3%.	
	RO	(Step 8) Check CM/CF – PRESENTLY FEEDING S/Gs.	
	RO	(Step 9) Check S/G levels – STABLE OR TRENDING TO PROGRAM LEVEL.	
	RO	(Step 10) Check NC temperatures as follows:	
		IF any NC pump on, THEN check NC T- Avg – STABLE OR TRENDING TO DESIRED TEMPERATURE.	
	RO	(Step 11) Check all S/G CF control valves –	·
		IN AUTO.	
			NOTE: Due to maintenance
	RO	(Step 11 RNO) WHEN the following conditions met, THEN place affected CF control valve in automatic:	<b>NOTE:</b> Due to maintenance being performed, the 1A CF Control Valve will need to remain in MANUAL.
		Automatic control – DESIRED	<b>NOTE:</b> AUTO control is NOT desired.

Appendix D	
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FCV Controller failure

\_ Page 39 \_\_\_\_ of \_\_59

Op Test No.: N09-1 Scenario #

Event Description: Time

Position

Applicant's Actions or Behavior

3 Event # 6

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
		Affected S/G level(s) – AT PROGRAM     LEVEL	
		Selected control channels – INDICATE CORRECTLY ON CHART RECORDER:	
		Feed flow	
		Steam flow	
		S/G level.	
			<b>NOTE:</b> SRO may dispatch an NLO to investigate valve.
			If so, <b>Floor Instructor</b> acknowledge as NLO.
			<b>NOTE:</b> SRO may call WCC/IAE to address failure.
			If so, <b>Booth Instructor</b> acknowledge as WCC.
	RO	(Step 12) Check all S/G CF control bypass valves – IN MANUAL AND FULL OPEN.	
	RO	(Step 13) Check both CF pumps – IN AUTO.	
······	RO	(Step 14) Check all CA pumps – OFF.	
	4	At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move	to Events #7-10.

Appendix D Operator Action							Form ES-D-2		
Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	_3	Event #	7, 8, 9 & 10	Page	40	of	59
Event Descrip	otion:				h/FWIS/ Failure o CA Pump trip/1A				
Time Position		Applicant's Actions or Behavior							

Shortly afterwards, the D SG NR Level Channel 2 will fail high causing an FWIS. Simultaneously, the Reactor will fail to trip automatically and manually; and the Turbine will fail to trip automatically. The operator will be expected to enter EP/1/A/5000/E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and attempt to manually trip the Reactor. When the Reactor does not trip, the operator will be expected to transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS." During the performance of FR-S.1, the operator will successfully trip the Reactor and the Turbine. Upon event initiation, the TD CA Pump will overspeed. Additionally, the 1A CA Pump will trip on overcurrent causing a Red Path to exist on Heat Sink. Following completion of FR-S.1, the operator will transition to EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink." Upon entry into FR-H.1, the Steam Generator levels will approach the point at which NCS Bleed and Feed must be established. The scenario is expected to terminate at Step 29 of FR-H.1, after the crew has established NCS Bleed and Feed cooling.

### Booth Operator Instructions: Operate Trigger #11 (XMT-CF032 (100))

## Trigger #13 (CA005) will operate on P4 (Reactor Trip)

### Indications Available:

- 1AD-1/A-4, S/G D HI-HI LVL TURB TRIP.
- 1FO-1/F-5, TURB TRIP CAUSES RX TRIP.
- Reactor Trip Breakers remain closed.
- Main Turbine does NOT trip.
- Normal feedwater to SG is isolated.
- OAC does NOT indicate Red Path on Heat Sink, although the Red Path exists.

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
			<b>NOTE:</b> Crew will carry out Immediate Actions of E-0, prior to the SRO addressing the EP.
	F	EP/1/A/5000/E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SA	
	SRO	(Step 1) Monitor Foldout page.	Immediate Action
	RO	(Step 2) Check Reactor Trip:	Immediate Action
		All rod bottom lights – LIT	

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×μ	pen	UIX	

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior								
Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments					
		Reactor trip and bypass breakers -     OPEN	-					
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	I/R amps – GOING DOWN.	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·					
	RO	(Step 2 RNO) Perform the following:	<b>NOTE:</b> The reactor trip will fail, and the crew will need to transition to FR-S.1.					
		Trip reactor.						
	FF	R-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POW	ER GENERATION/ATWS					
	RO	(Step 1) Check Reactor Trip:	Immediate Action					
		All rod bottom lights – LIT						
		Reactor trip and bypass breakers     OPEN	-					
		• I/R amps – GOING DOWN.						
	RO	(Step 1 RNO) Perform the following:	Immediate Action					
		Trip the reactor.						
		<ul> <li>IF reactor will not trip, THEN manu insert rods.</li> </ul>	ually <b>NOTE:</b> The RO will drive Rods in, in MANUAL until Reactor Trip Breakers have been opened.					
	<u> </u>							
Critical	Task:	(FR-S.1 C)						
Manua Step 2	-	e rods inward before completing the	ne immediate actions of FR-S.1					
esults i	n an unn n. Perfo	ice: failure to insert negative reactivity, u ecessary situation in which the reactor r rmance of the critical task would move th sequent return to criticality. A failure to i	emains critical or returns to a critical ne reactor towards a subcritical condition					

Appendix D	
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Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	3	Event #	7, 8, 9 & 10	Page	42	of	59
Event Description:					gh/FWIS/ Failure of CA Pump trip/1A				
Time	Position			Applica	ant's Actions or Beha	avior			

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	BOP	(Step 2) check Turbine Trip:	Immediate Action
		All throttle valves – CLOSED.	

# Critical Task: (FR-S.1 A)

# Trip the Turbine prior to Wide Range Steam Generator levels dropping to < 24%

Safety Significance: Turbine trip is important in maintaining Steam generator inventory and primary-to-secondary heat transfer. If the Turbine is NOT tripped the Steam Generator U-Tubes uncover sooner and faster. Thus, primary-to-secondary heat transfer starts to deteriorate earlier in the transient and deteriorates more rapidly. The result is that once tube uncovery begins, NC System temperature and pressure increase more rapidly and reach higher values.

Booth	Instruct	or: Delete MALF-IPE001 A/B 30 second dispatched to locally trip the react	
	SRO	(Step 3) Monitor Foldout page.	
	BOP	(Step 4) Check proper CA pump status:	<b>NOTE:</b> All CA Pumps will be OFF, and will NOT be able to be started.
		• MD CA pumps – ON.	
		Check N/R Level in at least3 S/Gs –     GREATER THAN 17%.	<b>NOTE:</b> SRO may call WCC to address the CA Pump failures.
			If so, <b>Booth Instructor</b> acknowledge as WCC.
	BOP	(Step 5) Initiate emergency boration of NC System:	
		• Ensure one NV pump – ON.	
		Align boration flowpath as follows:	
		Open 1NV-265B (Boric Acid To NV Pumps).	
		• Start both boric acid transfer pumps.	

Op Test	No.:	N09-1 Scenario # <u>3</u> Event # <u>7, 8, 9</u>	<u>&amp; 10</u> Page <u>43</u> of <u>59</u>
Event De	scription:	SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ F Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TD CA Pump	
Time	P	psition Applicant's Action	s or Behavior
Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
		Check emergency boration flow – GREATER THAN 30 GPM.	
	BOP	(Step 5b3 RNO) IF NV pump suction is aligned to VCT, THEN	NOTE: This step will only be applicable if an SI has occurred.
	BOP	<ul> <li>(Step 5c) Check if NV flowpath aligned to NC System:</li> </ul>	
	- - -	<ul> <li>1NV-244A (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol) – OPEN</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>1NV-245B (Charging Line Cont Outside Isol) – OPEN.</li> </ul>	
	BOP	(Step 5c RNO) Perform the following:	<b>NOTE:</b> This step will only be applicable if an SI has occurred.
		<ul> <li>IF NV pump suction is aligned to VCT, THEN align to FWST as follows:</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Open 1NV-221A (NV Pumps Suct From FWST).</li> </ul>	
		Open 1NV-222B (NV Pumps Suct From FWST).	
		Close 1NV-141A (VCT Outlet Isol).	
		Close 1NV-142B (VCT Outlet Isol).	
		Open the following:	
		1NI-9A (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV)	
		• 1NI-10B (NC Cold Leg Inj From NV).	
	SRO	GO TO Step 5e.	
	BOP	(Step 5d) Ensure charging flow is greater than emergency boration flow.	

Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	3	Event #	7, 8, 9 & 10	Page	44	of	59
Event Description:					h/FWIS/ Failure of CA Pump trip/1A				
Time	Position			Applica	nt's Actions or Beh	avior			

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	BOP	<ul> <li>(Step 5e) Check Pzr pressure – LESS THAN 2335 PSIG.</li> </ul>	
	BOP	(Step 6) Close the following VQ valves:	
		1VQ-1A (U1 Cont Air Release Inside Isol)	
		1VQ-6A (U1 Cont Air Addition Inside Isol)	
		1VQ-2B (U1 Cont Air Release Outside lsol)	
		1VQ-5B (U1 Cont Air Addition Outside lsol).	
	SRO	(Step 7) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure an S/I signal exists or occurs, THEN perform the following:	
		Have another Licensed Operator check     S/I equipment PER Enclosure 3     (Subsequent S/I Actions).	<b>NOTE:</b> If an SI has occurred the SRO will hand this off to the BOP, and continue through FR-S.1 with the RO.
		Continue with this procedure.	
			<b>Examiner NOTE:</b> Follow the actions associated with Enclosure 3 if BOP is assigned by SRO to perform. Others go to <b>Page 46</b> to continue with FR-S.1.
	FF	R-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GEN ENCLOSURE 3, SUBSEQUENT S/I AC	
1	BOP	(Step 1) Check 1ETA and 1ETB – ENERGIZED.	
	BOP	(Step 2) Check both LCOA Sequencer Actuated status lights (1SI-14) – LIT.	

Appendix	D	Operator Action	Form ES-D-2
Op Test I	No.: _	N09-1 Scenario # <u>3</u> Event # <u>7, 8, 9 8</u>	<u>10</u> Page <u>45</u> of <u>59</u>
Event De	scription:	SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ Fa Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TD CA Pump	
Time	P	osition Applicant's Actions	or Behavior
Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	BOP	(Step 3) Check ESF Monitor Light Panel on energized train(s):	an na ana manazimi na studio da studio da seconda da seconda da seconda da seconda da seconda da seconda da se
		• Groups 1, 2, 5, - DARK.	·
	BOP	Group 3 – LIT.	
		OAC – IN SERVICE.	
		Group 4, Rows A through F – LIT AS REQUIRED.	
	BOP	(Step 3d RNO) Perform the following;	
		Ensure both trains Phase A Isolation are initiated.	
		<ul> <li>Align or start S/I and Phase A components with individual windows in Group 4 as required.</li> </ul>	
		GO TO Step 3.f.	
	BOP	<ul> <li>(Step 3 continued) Check LOCA Sequencer Actuated status light (1SI-14) on energized train(s) – LIT.</li> </ul>	· · · ·
		Check the following windows on Monitor Light Panel Group 4 – LIT:	
		C-3 "CONT ISOL PHASE A TRN A     VLVS ALIGNED"	
		<ul> <li>C-6 "CONT ISOL PHASE A TRN B VLVS ALIGNED"</li> </ul>	
		F-4 "SAFETY INJECTION TRAIN A COMPONENTS ALIGNED"	
		F-5 "SAFETY INJECTION TRAIN B COMPONENTS ALIGNED".	
	BOP	(Step 4) Check proper CA pump status:	
		• MD CA pumps – ON.	
		N/R level in at least 3 S/Gs – GREATER THAN 17%.	

Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	3	Event #	7, 8, 9 & 10	Page	46	_ of	59
Event Descriptior				h/FWIS/ Failure of CA Pump trip/1A (					
Time	Position			Applica	nt's Actions or Beha	ivior			

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	BOP	(Step 4b RNO) Ensure TD CA pump on.	
	BOP	(Step 5) Check all KC pumps – ON.	
	BOP	(Step 6) Check both RN pumps – ON.	
	BOP	(Step 7) Notify Unit 2 to start 2A RN pump.	<b>Floor Instructor:</b> As U2 RO report "2A RN Pump is running."
	BOP	(Step 8) Check all S/G pressures – GREATER THAN 775 PSIG.	
	BOP	(Step 9) Check Containment Pressure – HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 3 PSIG.	
-	BOP	(Step 10) IF AT ANY TIME while in this procedure containment pressure goes above 3 PSIG, THEN perform Step 9.	
	BOP	(Step 11) Notify OSM or other SRO to perform EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures), Enclosure 22 (OSM Actions Following an S/I).	<b>NOTE:</b> The BOP may ask OSM to address. If so, <b>Floor Instructor</b> acknowledge as OSM.
	FF	R-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GEN	NERATION/ATWS
	RO	(Step 8) Check if the following trips have occurred:	
		<ul><li>Reactor trip.</li><li>Turbine trip.</li></ul>	

**Operator Action** 

Path will exist on Heat Sink, and the transition should be

made to FR-H.1.

	·		
Op Test	No.: _	N09-1 Scenario # <u>3</u> Event # <u>7, 8, 9</u>	<u>&amp; 10</u> Page <u>47</u> of <u>59</u>
Event De	escription:	SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ F Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TD CA Pump	
Time	P	osition Applicant's Action	s or Behavior
<b>T</b> 1	<b>D</b>		0
Time	Pos. RO	Expected Actions/Behavior (Step 9) Check reactor subcritical:	Comments
		P/R channels – LESS THAN 5%.	
		W/R Neutron Flux – LESS THAN 5%	
		<ul> <li>I/R SUR – NEGATIVE.</li> </ul>	
	SRO	(Step 10) GO TO Step 17.	
	BOP	(Step 17) Ensure adequate shutdown margin:	
		Obtain current NC boron concentration from Primary Chemistry.	<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO will contact Chemistry.
			Booth Instructor: Acknowledge as Chemistry.
		WHEN current NC boron concentration is obtained, THEN perform shutdown	<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO will hand this off to another SRO.
		margin calculation PER OP/0/A/6100/006 (Reactivity Balance Calculation).	Floor Instructor: Acknowledge as another SRO.
		<ul> <li>WHEN following conditions satisfied, THEN NC System boration may be stopped:</li> </ul>	<b>NOTE:</b> This is a Continuous Action. The SRO will make both board operators aware.
		<ul> <li>Adequate shutdown margin is obtained.</li> </ul>	
		Uncontrolled cooldown has been stopped.	
	SRO	(Step 18) REFER TO RP/0/A/5700/000 (Classification of Emergency).	<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO may ask OSM to address.
			If so, <b>Floor Instructor</b> acknowledge as OSM.
	SRO	(Step 19) RETURN TO procedure and step	NOTE: The SRO will transition
		in effect.	back to E-0, however a <b>Red</b>

Ap	pendix D
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Op Test No.	N09-1	Scenario #	3	Event #	7, 8, 9 & 10	Page	48	of	59
Event Descr	iption:				h/FWIS/ Failure of CA Pump trip/1A				
Time	Position			Applica	int's Actions or Beh	avior			
Time F	Pos.	Expected	Action	o/Pohovio		Cor	nmen	to	

Inne	103.		Comments
	D/1/A/5(	000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SE	
	F/1/P/50	500/FR-11.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SEC	
	BOP	(Step 1) IF total feed flow is less than 450 GPM due to operator action,	<b>NOTE:</b> total feed flow is NOT < 450 gpm due to operator action.
	BOP / RO	(Step 2) Check if secondary heat sink is required:	
		NC pressure – GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED S/G PRESSURE.	
		Any NC T-Hot – GREATER THAN 350°F (347°F ACC).	
	SRO	(Step 3) Monitor Foldout Page.	<b>NOTE:</b> Foldout Criteria for Bleed and Feed may be met a this point. If so, move forward to Step 20 on <b>Page 56</b> .
	BOP	(Step 4) Check at least one of the following NV pumps – AVAILABLE:	
		1A NV pump	
		OR	
		1B NV pump.	
	RO	(Step 5) Check if NC System feed and bleed should be initiated:	
		<ul> <li>Check W/R level in at least 3 S/Gs – LESS THAN 25% (36% ACC).</li> </ul>	<b>NOTE:</b> Foldout Criteria for Bleed and Feed may be met a this point. If so, move forward to Step 20 on <b>Page 56.</b>
	RO / BOP	(Step 5 RNO) Perform the following:	
		Monitor feed and bleed initiation criteria.	

Appendix [	)
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Op Test No.: N09-1 3 49 Scenario # Event # 7, 8, 9 & 10 of 59 Page Event Description: SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TD CA Pump trip/1A CA Pump fails to start Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior **Expected Actions/Behavior** Time Pos. Comments **NOTE:** This is a Continuous WHEN criteria satisfied, THEN GO TO ٠ Action. The SRO will make Step 20. both board operators aware. SRO **Examiner NOTE:** If at any GO TO Step 6. ٠ time during the event the Bleed and Feed Criteria of this step is met, move to Page 56. RO / (Step 6) Ensure S/G BB and NM valves Examiner NOTE: The SRO BOP closed PER Enclosure 3 (S/G BB and may assign the RO or the BOP Sampling Valve Checklist). to perform this Enclosure. If so, RO/BOP Examiner follow actions of RO/BOP in Enclosure 3. Examiners not following operator assigned, moved forward to FR-H.1 actions on Page 50. EP/1/A/5000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK **ENCLOSURE 3, S/G BB AND SAMPLING VALVE CHECKLIST** 

RO / BOP	(Step 1) Check the following valves – CLOSED:	
	1BB-1B (1A S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) - CLOSED	
	1BB-2B (1B S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) - CLOSED	
	1BB-3B (1C S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) - CLOSED	
	1BB-4B (1D S/G Blowdown Cont Outside Isol Control) - CLOSED	
	1BB-5A (A S/G BB Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED	
	1BB-6A (B S/G BB Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED	

Op Test No.:	N09-1 Scenario # <u>3</u> Event # <u>7, 8, 9 &amp; 10</u> Page <sup>50</sup> of <u>59</u>
Event Description:	SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TD CA Pump trip/1A CA Pump fails to start
Time P	osition Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Time Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
	<ul> <li>1BB-7A (C S/G BB Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED</li> </ul>
	1BB-8A (D S/G BB Cont Inside Isol) –     CLOSED
	1NM-187A (1A S/G Upper Shell Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED
	1NM-190A (1A S/G Upper Shell Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED
	1NM-201A (1B S/G Upper Shell Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED
	1NM-207A (1C S/G Upper Shell Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED
	1NM-210A (1C S/G Blowdown Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED
	1NM-221A (1D S/G Blowdown Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED
	1NM-191B (1A S/G Blowdown Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED
	1NM-197B (1B S/G Upper Shell Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED
	1NM-200B (1B S/G Blowdown Sample Cont Inside Isol) - CLOSED
	1NM-211B (1C S/G Blowdown Sample Hdr Cont Outside Isol) - CLOSED
	1NM-217B (1D S/G Upper Shell Sample Cont Inside Isol) – CLOSED
	1NM-220B (1D S/G Blowdown Sample Cont Inside Isol) – CLOSED.
EP/1/A/5	000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK
RO / BOP	(Step 7) Attempt to establish CA flow to at least one S/G as follows:
	Check power to both MD CA pumps –     AVAILABLE.

Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	3	Event #	7, 8, 9 & 10	Page	51	of	59
Event Descrij	otion:				h/FWIS/ Failure of CA Pump trip/1A (				
Time	Position		<u></u>	Applica	nt's Actions or Beha	avior			

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
		(Step 7.a RNO) Perform the following:	
	RO / BOP	IF essential power is not available,	<b>NOTE:</b> Essential power is available.
	SRO	<ul> <li>IF the essential bus is energized, THEN dispatch operator to determine cause or breaker failure.</li> </ul>	<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO will dispatch an NLO.
			Booth Instructor:
			Within <b>3 minutes</b> , as <b>NLO</b> report that <b>the 1A CA Pump</b> <b>Breaker has a 51 relay</b> <b>tripped.</b>
			9
	RO / BOP	<ul> <li>(Step 7.b) Ensure control room CA valves aligned PER Enclosure 4 (CA Valve Alignment).</li> </ul>	<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO may assign the RO or the BOP to perform this Enclosure.
			If so, <b>RO/BOP Examiner</b> follow actions of RO/BOP in Enclosure 4.
			Examiners not following operator assigned, moved forward to <b>FR-H.1</b> actions on <b>Page 54</b> .
E	<b>P/1/A/</b> 50	000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SEC ENCLOSURE 4, CA VALVE ALIGN	
	BOP / RO	(Step 1) Check the following valves - OPEN:	
		1CA-66AC (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1A S/G Isol) – OPEN	
		1CA-62A (1A CA Pump Disch To 1A S/G Isol) – OPEN	
		1CA-54AC (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1B S/G Isol) – OPEN	

Appendix D
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Op Test No	o.: _	<sup>N09-1</sup> Scenario # <u>3</u> Event # <u>7, 8, 9 &amp;</u>	10 Page 52 of 59						
Event Desc	cription:	SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ Fa Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TD CA Pump t							
Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior									
Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments						
		<ul> <li>1CA-58A (1A CA Pump Disch To 1B S/G Isol) - OPEN</li> </ul>							
		<ul> <li>1CA-50B (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1C S/G Isol) – OPEN</li> </ul>							
		<ul> <li>1CA-46B (1B CA Pump Disch To 1C S/G Isol) - OPEN</li> </ul>							
		1CA-38B (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1D S/G Isol) – OPEN							
		<ul> <li>1CA-42B (1B CA Pump Disch To 1D S/G Isol) – OPEN.</li> </ul>							
E	BOP / RO	(Step 2) Check the following valves – OPEN:							
		<ul> <li>1CA-64AB (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1A S/G Control – OPEN</li> </ul>							
		<ul> <li>1CA-60A (1A CA Pump Disch To 1A S/G Control) – OPEN</li> </ul>							
		<ul> <li>1CA-52AB (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1B S/G Control) – OPEN</li> </ul>							
		1CA-56A (1A CA Pump Disch To 1B S/G Control) - OPEN							
		<ul> <li>1CA-48AB (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1C S/G Control) – OPEN</li> </ul>							
		1CA-44B (1B CA Pump Disch To 1C S/G Control) - OPEN							
		<ul> <li>1CA-36AB (U1 TD CA Pump Disch To 1D S/G Isol) – OPEN</li> </ul>							
		1CA-40B (1B CA Pump Disch To 1D S/G Control) – OPEN.							
	BOP / RO	(Step 3) Check CA Storage tank (water tower) level – GREATER THAN 1.5 FT.							
	BOP / RO	(Step 4) Check the following valves – CLOSED:							

Op Test No.:	N09-1 Scenario # <u>3</u> Event # <u>7, 8, 9 &amp; 10</u> Page <u>53</u> of <u>59</u>
Event Description:	SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWIS/ Failure of Automatic/Manual Rx Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TD CA Pump trip/1A CA Pump fails to start
Time P	osition Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Time Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior Comments
	1RN-69A (1A RN Assured Supply To U1 CA Isol) – CLOSED
	1CA-86A (U1 TD CA Pump Suction From 1A RN Isol) – CLOSED
	1CA-15A (1A CA Pump Suction From 1A RN Isol) - CLOSED
	1RN-162B (1B RN Assured Supply To U1 CA Isol) – CLOSED
	1CA-116B (U1 TD CA Pump Suction From 1B RN Isol) – CLOSED
	1CA-18B (1B CA Pump Suction From 1B RN Isol) – CLOSED.
BOP / RO	(Step 5) Check the following valves – OPEN:
	1CA-11A (1A CA Pump Suction Isol) –     OPEN
	1CA-7AC (U1 TD CA Pump Suction Isol)     - OPEN
	1CA-9B (1B CA Pump Suction Isol) –     OPEN.
BOP / RO	(Step 6) GO TO Step 8.
BOP / RO	(Step 8) Check 1CA-2 (U1 CA Pumps Suct From CA Storage Tank Isol) – OPEN.
BOP / RO	(Step 9) Check CA pump suction from UST and CA Condensate Storage Tank (service bldg roof tank) valves – CLOSED:
	1CS-18 (U1 UST To CA Pump Suct Hdr Isol) – CLOSED
	1CA-4 (U1 CA Pumps Suct From UST Isol) – CLOSED

Appendix D	Operator Action	Form ES-D-2
Op Test No.:	N09-1 Scenario # <u>3</u> Event # <u>7, 8</u>	3, 9 & 10 Page 54 of 59
Event Description:	SG NR Level Channel 2 fails high/FWI Trip/Automatic Turbine Trip/ TD CA Pu	
Time F	Position Applicant's Ac	tions or Behavior
Time Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	1CA-6 (U1 CA Pumps Suct From CA CST Isol) – CLOSED.	
EP/1/A/5	000/FR-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF	SECONDARY HEAT SINK
RO / BOP	• (Step 7.c) Start all available CA pumps	3.
	Check TD CA pump – RUNNING.	
	(Step 7.d RNO) Perform the following as necessary:	
	IF 1SA-48ABC (SM From S/G C To TE CA Pump Isol) is closed,	NOTE: 1SA-48ABC is NOT closed.
	IF 1SA-49AB (SM From S/G B to TD C Pump Isol) is closed, THEN	CA NOTE: 1SA-49AB is NOT closed.
	<ul> <li>IF "TD CA PUMP STOP VLV NOT OPEN" alarm (1AD-5, F-3) is lit, THEN dispatch operator to reset 1SA-3 (Unit TD CA Pump Turb Stop Valve) PER EP/1/A/5000/G-1 (Generic Enclosures Enclosure 24 (Resetting TD CA Stop Valve).</li> </ul>	<sup>1</sup> Booth Instructor:
	IF reason for loss of steam supply to T     CA pump not determined,	D NOTE: The reason for the loss of steam supply to the TD CA Pump turbine is known.
RO / BOP	<ul> <li>(Step 7.e) Check total flow to S/G(s) – GREATER THAN 450 GPM.</li> </ul>	
RO / BOP	(Step 7.e RNO) Perform the following:	
	IF any CA pump is started,	NOTE: All CA pumps are OFF.
	• IF any feed flow to at least one S/G is indicated,	<b>NOTE:</b> There is no feed flow to any SG.

Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	3	Event #	7, 8, 9 & 10	Page	55	of	59
Event Descrip	ition:				gh/FWIS/ Failure of CA Pump trip/1A C				
Time	Position			Applica	ant's Actions or Beha	vior			

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	SRO	IF no feed flow indicated, THEN perform the following:	
		<ul> <li>IF no CA pump can be started, THEN dispatch operator and maintenance to CA pumps to try to</li> </ul>	<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO will dispatch an NLO, and contact WCC/Maintenance.
		restorè one CA pump to service.	Floor Instructor: acknowledge as NLO.
			Booth Instructor: acknowledge as WCC.
		<ul> <li>Dispatch operator to ensure CA valves aligned PER Enclosure 5</li> </ul>	<b>NOTE:</b> The SRO will dispatch an NLO.
		(Local CA Valve Alignment).	Floor Instructor: acknowledge as NLO.
	SRO	GO TO Step 8.	
	RO	(Step 8) Check steam dumps:	
		Check condenser available:	
		<ul> <li>"C-9 COND AVAILABLE FOR STEAM DUMP" status light (1SI-18) – LIT</li> </ul>	
		Any MSIV – OPEN	
	RO	"STEAM DUMP SELECT" – IN T-AVG MODE.	
	RO	<ul> <li>Perform the following to place steam dumps in steam pressure mode:</li> </ul>	
		Ensure "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" setpoint at 1092 PSIG (pot setting of 8.4).	
		Place "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" in manual.	
		<ul> <li>Adjust "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" output to equal "STEAM DUMP DEMAND" signal.</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Place "STEAM DUMP SELECT" in steam pressure mode.</li> </ul>	

Op Test No.:	N09-1	Scenario #	_3	Event #	7, 8, 9 & 10	Page	56	of	59
Event Descri	otion:				h/FWIS/ Failure of CA Pump trip/1A				
Time	Position			Applica	int's Actions or Beha	ivior		÷	

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
		Place "STM PRESS CONTROLLER" in auto.	
	BOP	(Step 9) Stop all NC pumps.	
			<b>Examiner NOTE:</b> If at any time during the event the Bleed and Feed Criteria of this step is met, the crew will move forward to HERE.
	SRO	(Step 20) Perform Steps 21 through 25 quickly to establish NC heat removal by NC feed and bleed.	
:	BOP	(Step 21) Ensure all NC pumps – OFF	
	BOP	(Step 22) Initiate S/I.	
	BOP	(Step 23) Check "NV PMPS TO COLD LEG FLOW" – INDICATING FLOW.	
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	BOP	(Step 24) Establish NC System bleed path as follows:	
		Check all Pzr PORV isolation valves – OPEN.	
		Select "OPEN" on two Pzr PORVs that have an open Pzr PORV isolation valve.	
		• Align N <sub>2</sub> to Pzr PORVs by opening:	
		<ul> <li>1NI-430A (Emerg N2 From CLA To 1NC-34A)</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>1NI-431B (Emerg N2 From CLA To 1NC-32B &amp; 36B).</li> </ul>	
		<ul> <li>Check power to all Pzr PORV isolation valves – AVAILABLE.</li> </ul>	

Appendix D			Op	perator Action	1			Form I	ES-D-2
Op Test No.:	: <u>N09-1</u>	Scenario #	3	Event #	7, 8, 9 & 10	Page	57	of	59
Event Descri	ption:				gh/FWIS/ Failure o CA Pump trip/1A				
Time	Position			Applica	ant's Actions or Beh	avior			<u></u>
Time P	os.	Expected	Actio	ns/Behavio	r	Cor	nmer	nts	

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	BOP	(Step 25) Check two Pzr PORVs and associated isolation valves – OPEN.	

# Critical Task: (FR-H.1 A)

# Establish RCS Bleed and Feed before all four Steam Generator Wide Range Levels reach 0%, and the NCS temperature and/or pressure increases.

Safety Significance: Failure to establish RCS Bleed and Feed before automatic opening of the PORVs (due to plant heatup) reduces the probability of success to establish a heat sink for the core. This constitutes a "Significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario." Establishing feedwater flow into the Steam Generators offers the most effective recovery action to restore the heat sink. If all attempts to initiate feedwater flow fail, the crew must establish bleed and feed to cool the core. This is accomplished by manually initiating SI, and then manually opening the PORVs. The lower NCS pressure allows a greater ECCS flow to recover NCS inventory and force flow through the core. If this action is to be successful, it must be started before SG dryout. SG dryout would cause NC temperature to increase, increasing NC Pressure and forcing open the PORVs automatically. If NCS pressure is at the PORV setpoint due to NCS heatup, the operator action of opening the PORVs manually may not be successful in lowering NCS pressure and increasing ECCS flow. Ultimately, the core could uncover.

BOP       (Step 26) Isolate NV Recirc flowpath as follows:         • Close:         • 1NV-150B (NV Pumps Recirculation)         • 1NV-151A (NV Pumps Recirculation)         • 1NV-151A (NV Pumps Recirculation).         • Maintain NV recirc valves closed unless directed to open by subsequent steps.         BOP       (Step 2&) Ensure Pzr heaters remain off as follows:         • Place A,B, and D Pzr heaters in manual and off.			
<ul> <li>INV-150B (NV Pumps Recirculation)</li> <li>1NV-151A (NV Pumps Recirculation)</li> <li>1NV-151A (NV Pumps Recirculation).</li> <li>Maintain NV recirc valves closed unless directed to open by subsequent steps.</li> <li>BOP (Step 2&amp;) Ensure Pzr heaters remain off as follows:         <ul> <li>Place A,B, and D Pzr heaters in manual</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	 BOP		
<ul> <li>INV-151A (NV Pumps Recirculation).</li> <li>Maintain NV recirc valves closed unless directed to open by subsequent steps.</li> <li>BOP (Step 2&amp;) Ensure Pzr heaters remain off as follows:</li> <li>Place A,B, and D Pzr heaters in manual</li> </ul>		Close:	
Recirculation).         • Maintain NV recirc valves closed unless directed to open by subsequent steps.         BOP       (Step 2&) Ensure Pzr heaters remain off as follows:         • Place A,B, and D Pzr heaters in manual		1NV-150B (NV Pumps Recirculation)	
directed to open by subsequent steps.         BOP       (Step 2&) Ensure Pzr heaters remain off as follows:         • Place A,B, and D Pzr heaters in manual			
follows:			
	 BOP		
Open "C PZR HTR GRP SUP BKR".		Open "C PZR HTR GRP SUP BKR".	

Appendix D	erator Action				Form	ES-D-2		
Op Test No.: N09-1	Scenario #	3	Event #	7, 8, 9 & 10	Page	58	of	59
Event Description:				h/FWIS/ Failure of CA Pump trip/1A				

# Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Position

Time

Time	Pos.	Expected Actions/Behavior	Comments
	SRO	(Step 28) Have another licensed operator check S/I equipment PER Enclosure 9	<b>NOTE:</b> SRO may ask U2 BOP to address.
		(Subsequent S/I Actions) while continuing with this procedure.	If so, <b>Floor Instructor</b> acknowledge as U2 BOP.
	BOP	(Step 29) Maintain NC System heat removal by performing the following:	
		Maintain S/I flow	
		• Maintain 2 Pzr PORV flowpaths - OPEN.	
		At the discretion of the Lead Examiner termi	nate the exam.

#### **UNIT 1 STATUS:**

Power Level:	100%	NCS [B]	76 ppm	Pzr [B]:	79 ppm	Xe:	Per OAC
		-		_		_	
Power History:	At this po	wer for 28	8 days	Core E	Burnup: 485	EFPD	S

**CONTROLLING PROCEDURE:** OP/1/A/6100/03 Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation

#### OTHER INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSUME TO SHIFT:

- The Plant is at 100% power (EOL), steady-state operation.
- The Work Control Center has requested that the operator swap CF Control Valve Control Circuit for 1CF-32 (A S/G CF Control Valve) from Normal to Alternate for required corrective maintenance.
- An NLO (Bob) is standing by in the Turbine Building Basement to support this activity. System Engineering has indicated that Turbine Load does not need to be reduced to perform this.
- When the swapover is complete Maintenance personnel will perform corrective maintenance on the system.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:

- 1B CA Pump is OOS (Expected back in 6 hours).
- 1D SG NR Level Channel 4 failed last shift (IAE is investigating).
- MCB Annunciator 1AD-2, F-9, "ROD DRIVE M/G SETS TROUBLE," has alarmed spuriously several times over the last hour (IAE is investigating).

Work (	Control SR	Jim					
Plant S	SRO	Joe					
NLO's	AVAILABL	E					
	<u>Unit 1</u>	<u>Unit 2</u>					
	Aux Bldg.	Aux Bldg.	Chris				
	Turb Bldg	Turb Bldg.	Mike				
	5 <sup>th</sup> Round						
	Extra(s)	Bill	Ed	Wayne	Tanya		