



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION IV  
612 EAST LAMAR BLVD, SUITE 400  
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4125

August 6, 2009

Michael Perito  
Vice President, Operations  
Entergy Operations, Inc.  
River Bend Station  
5485 U.S. Highway 61N  
St. Francisville, LA 70775

Subject: RIVER BEND STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT  
05000458/2009003

Dear Mr. Perito:

On June 30, 2009, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your River Bend Station. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on July 8, 2009, with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

This report documents one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green). This finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and because it is entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest the violation or the significance of the noncited violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 612 E. Lamar Blvd, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas, 76011-4125; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the River Bend Station facility. In addition, if you disagree with the characterization of any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV, and the NRC Resident Inspector at River Bend Station. The information you provide will be considered in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0305.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, and its enclosure, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC's document system (ADAMS).

ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

***/RA/ DLProulx for***

Geoffrey B. Miller, Chief  
Project Branch C  
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket: 50-458  
License: NPF-47

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NRC Inspection Report 05000458/2009003  
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

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**U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

**REGION IV**

Docket: 05000458

License: NPF-47

Report: 05000458/2009003

Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility: River Bend Station

Location: 5485 U.S. Highway 61N  
St. Francisville, LA

Dates: April 1 through June 30, 2009

Inspectors: G. Larkin, Senior Resident Inspector  
C. Norton, Resident Inspector  
P. Elkmann, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector  
W. Sifre, Senior Reactor Inspector  
G. George, Reactor Inspector  
I. Anchondo, Reactor Inspector

Approved By: Geoffrey B. Miller, Chief, Project Branch C  
Division of Reactor Projects

## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000458/2009003; 04/01/2009 – 06/30/2009; River Bend Station, Integrated Resident and Regional Report; Drill Evaluation

The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced baseline inspections by region based inspectors. One Green noncited violation was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process." Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.

### A. NRC-Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

- Green. The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) for failure to identify and critique a nonrisk significant planning standard weakness demonstrated during a site emergency preparedness drill. Specifically, the licensee demonstrated a weakness in controlling radiological exposures for emergency workers during an emergency, without key emergency response organization decision maker consideration or input, when simulated emergency workers were left in containment during changing radiological conditions. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2009-02458.

This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the emergency response organization performance attribute of the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone which ensures the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Sheet 1, "Failure to Comply," of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, "Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process," and determined it to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a failure to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), the finding was associated with an emergency preparedness planning standard, the associated planning standard was not risk significant as defined by Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, and the finding was not a functional failure of the planning standard function. The inspectors determined that the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution because the licensee did not identify issues completely, accurately, and in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance [P.1(a)](Section 1EP6).

### B. Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

## REPORT DETAILS

### Summary of Plant Status

River Bend Station began the inspection period at 100 percent core thermal power. The plant remained at 100 percent power except for: May 2, 2009, when reactor power was reduced to 88 percent to repair a steam leak on Valve MSS-MOV111, steam supply to the moisture separator reheater; May 29, 2009, when reactor power was reduced to 66 percent power for a rod sequence exchange; June 13, 2009, when reactor power was reduced to 83 percent power for a control rod sequence exchange; and June 27, 2009, when reactor power was reduced to 67 percent for another control rod sequence exchange.

### 1. REACTOR SAFETY

#### Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness

#### 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)

##### Summer Readiness for Offsite and Alternate-ac Power

##### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of the licensee's preparations for summer weather for selected systems, including conditions that could lead to loss-of-offsite power and conditions that could result from high temperatures. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures affecting these areas and the communications protocols between the transmission system operator and the plant to verify that the appropriate information was being exchanged when issues arose that could affect the offsite power system. Examples of aspects considered in the inspectors' review included:

- Coordination between the transmission system operator and the plant during off-normal or emergency events
- Explanations for the events
- Estimates of when the offsite power system would be returned to a normal state
- Notifications from the transmission system operator to the plant when the offsite power system was returned to normal

During the inspection, the inspectors focused on plant-specific design features and the licensee's procedures used to mitigate or respond to adverse weather conditions. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the Updated Safety Analysis Report and performance requirements for systems selected for inspection, and verified that operator actions were appropriate as specified by plant-specific procedures. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. The inspectors also reviewed corrective action program items to verify that the licensee was identifying adverse weather issues at an appropriate threshold and entering them into their corrective action program in accordance with station corrective action procedures. The inspectors' reviews focused specifically on the following plant systems:

- Fancy Point 500 kV and 230 kV substation
- River Bend transformer yard
- Circulating water system
- Normal service water system
- Service water cooling system

These activities constitute completion of one readiness for summer weather affect on offsite and alternate ac power sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

**1R04 Equipment Alignments (71111.04)**

Partial Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant systems:

- Division 1 control building heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
- Division 2 penetration valve leakage control
- Division 3 emergency diesel generator

The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors attempted to identify any discrepancies that could affect the function of the system, and, therefore, potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, Updated Safety Analysis Report, technical specification requirements, administrative technical specifications, outstanding work orders, condition reports, and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have rendered the systems incapable of performing their intended functions. The inspectors also walked down accessible portions of the systems to verify system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective action program with the appropriate significance characterization. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of three partial system walkdown samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04-05.



b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

**1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)**

Quarterly Fire Inspection Tours

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns that were focused on availability, accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following risk-significant plant areas:

- April 17, 2009, reactor building 70-foot level, 114-foot level, 141-foot level, 162-foot level, and 186-foot level
- April 20, 2009, fuel building 70-foot level, 95-foot level, 113-foot level, and 148-foot level
- April 28, 2009, tunnels B, E, F, and G
- May 6, 2009, turbine building 67-foot level, 95-foot level, and tunnel C
- May 6, 2009, auxiliary building 95-foot level, 114-foot level, and 141-foot level
- May 7, 2009, reactor building 70-foot level, 114-foot level, 141-foot level, 162-foot level, and 186-foot level
- June 4, 2009, fire pump house

The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if licensee personnel had implemented a fire protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant; effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability; maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition; and had implemented adequate compensatory measures for out-of-service, degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems, or features in accordance with the licensee's fire plan. The inspectors selected fire areas based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk as documented in the plant's Individual Plant Examination of External Events with later additional insights, their potential to affect equipment that could initiate or mitigate a plant transient, or their impact on the plant's ability to respond to a security event. Using the documents listed in the attachment, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The inspectors also verified that minor issues identified during the inspection were entered into the licensee's corrective action program.

These activities constitute completion of seven quarterly fire-protection inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

**1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)**

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the Updated Safety Analysis Report, the flooding analysis, and plant procedures to assess susceptibilities involving internal flooding; reviewed the corrective action program to determine if licensee personnel identified and corrected flooding problems; inspected underground bunkers/manholes to verify the adequacy of sump pumps, level alarm circuits, cable splices subject to submergence, and drainage for bunkers/manholes; and verified that operator actions for coping with flooding can reasonably achieve the desired outcomes. The inspectors also walked down the area listed below to verify the adequacy of equipment seals located below the flood line, floor and wall penetration seals, watertight door seals, common drain lines and sumps, sump pumps, level alarms, control circuits, and temporary or removable flood barriers. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

- May 11, 2009, control building and diesel generator building, 98-foot elevation

These activities constitute completion of one flood protection measures inspection sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

**1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)**

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following risk-significant systems:

- Service air system
- Control building heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system
- Control rod drive system
- Instrument air system

The inspectors reviewed events such as where ineffective equipment maintenance has resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems and independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition problems in terms of the following:

- Implementing appropriate work practices
- Identifying and addressing common cause failures

- Scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b)
- Characterizing system reliability issues for performance
- Charging unavailability for performance
- Trending key parameters for condition monitoring
- Ensuring proper classification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2)
- Verifying appropriate performance criteria for structures, systems, and components classified as having an adequate demonstration of performance through preventive maintenance, as described in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2), or as requiring the establishment of appropriate and adequate goals and corrective actions for systems classified as not having adequate performance, as described in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1)

The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability, and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance effectiveness issues were entered into the corrective action program with the appropriate significance characterization. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of four quarterly maintenance effectiveness samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

**1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)**

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee personnel's evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and safety-related equipment listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to removing equipment for work:

- Division 1 control building chilled water chiller emergent maintenance, March 31, 2009
- Division 1 control building chilled water and emergency diesel generator planned maintenance, June 3, 2009
- Main transformer number 2 emergent maintenance, June 22–25, 2009

The inspectors selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified

that licensee personnel performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the assessments were accurate and complete. When licensee personnel performed emergent work, the inspectors verified that the licensee personnel promptly assessed and managed plant risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's probabilistic risk analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the technical specification requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of three maintenance risk assessments and emergent work control inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

**1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)**

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following issues:

- CR-RBS-2009-1584, control building 98-foot elevation clogged drain hub, reviewed on April 4, 2009
- CR-RBS-2009-1894, qualification of submerged electrical cable, reviewed on April 22, 2009

The inspectors selected these potential operability issues based on the risk significance of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that technical specification operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the technical specifications and Updated Safety Analysis Report to the licensee's evaluations, to determine whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. The inspectors determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the evaluations. Additionally, the inspectors also reviewed a sampling of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies associated with operability evaluations. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of two operability evaluations inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15-04.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

**1R17 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17)**

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the effectiveness of the licensee's implementation of evaluations performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59, "Changes, Tests, and Experiments," and changes, tests, experiments, or methodology changes that the licensee determined did not require 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations. The inspection procedure requires the review of 6 to 12 licensee evaluations required by 10 CFR 50.59, 12 to 25 changes, tests, or experiments that were screened out by the licensee and 5 to 15 permanent plant modifications.

The inspectors reviewed 13 evaluations required by 10 CFR 50.59; 26 changes, tests, and experiments that were screened out by licensee personnel; and 14 permanent plant modifications. Document numbers of the evaluations, changes, and modifications reviewed are listed in the attachment.

The inspectors verified that when changes, tests, or experiments were made, that evaluations were performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and that licensee personnel had appropriately concluded that the change, test, or experiment can be accomplished without obtaining a license amendment. The inspectors also verified that safety issues related to the changes, tests, or experiments were resolved. The inspectors reviewed changes, tests, and experiments that licensee personnel determined did not require evaluations and verified that the licensee personnel's conclusions were correct and consistent with 10 CFR 50.59. The inspectors also verified that procedures, design, and licensing basis documentation used to support the changes were accurate after the changes had been made.

In the inspection of modifications, the inspectors verified that supporting design and license basis documentation had been updated accordingly and was still consistent with the new design. The inspectors verified that procedures, training plans, and other design basis features had been adequately accounted for and updated. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of 53 samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.17-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

## **1R19 Postmaintenance Testing (71111.19)**

### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following postmaintenance activities to verify that procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and functional capability:

- WO 00151164, CRD Suction Filter Replacement, reviewed on April 14, 2009
- WO 00189009, Tasks 1 - 7, Remove/Repair/Replace HVC-ACU2B, reviewed on May 11, 2009
- WO 00149509, Tasks 6 and 17, EGS-EG1B #8 Cylinder Exhaust Pipe Crack, reviewed on June 11, 2009

The inspectors selected these activities based upon the structure, system, or component's ability to affect risk. The inspectors evaluated these activities for the following:

- The effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate for the maintenance performed
- Acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness; test instrumentation was appropriate

The inspectors evaluated the activities against the technical specifications, the Updated Safety Analysis Report, 10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various NRC generic communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the equipment met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed corrective action documents associated with postmaintenance tests to determine whether the licensee was identifying problems and entering them in the corrective action program and that the problems were being corrected commensurate with their importance to safety. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of three postmaintenance testing inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19-05.

### b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

## **1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)**

### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the Updated Safety Analysis Report, procedure requirements, and technical specifications to ensure that the four surveillance activities listed below demonstrated that the systems, structures, and/or components tested were capable of performing their intended safety functions. The inspectors either witnessed or reviewed

test data to verify that the significant surveillance test attributes were adequate to address the following:

- Preconditioning
- Evaluation of testing impact on the plant
- Acceptance criteria
- Test equipment
- Procedures
- Jumper/lifted lead controls
- Test data
- Testing frequency and method demonstrated technical specification operability
- Test equipment removal
- Restoration of plant systems
- Fulfillment of ASME Code requirements
- Updating of performance indicator data
- Engineering evaluations, root causes, and bases for returning tested systems, structures, and components not meeting the test acceptance criteria were correct
- Reference setting data
- Annunciators and alarms setpoints

The inspectors also verified that licensee personnel identified and implemented any needed corrective actions associated with the surveillance testing.

- STP-207-4550, RCS Leakage Detection Sys – DW and Pedestal Floor Drain Sump Monitoring Channel Functional Test, performed on March 15, 2009
- STP-309-0203, Division III Diesel Generator Operability Test, performed on May 27, 2009
- STP-309-0612, Division II Diesel Generator 24 Hour Run, reviewed on May 27, 2009
- STP-201-6310, Standby Liquid Control Quarterly Pump and Valve In Service Operability Test, performed on May 28, 2009

Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of four surveillance testing inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

**1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes (71114.04)**

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed an in-office review of the River Bend Station Emergency Plan, Revision 34, and emergency plan implementing Procedure EIP 2-001, "Classification of Emergencies," Revision 17. These revisions changed a requirement for one on-shift instrument and control technician to a requirement for two on-shift maintenance technicians filled by any combination of electrical and instrument and control technicians, added details regarding responsibilities assigned to the Emergency Preparedness Manager, and made minor editorial and typographic corrections.

These revisions were compared to their previous revisions, to the criteria of NUREG-0654, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, to NEI Report 99-01, "Emergency Action Level Methodology," Revision 4, and to the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) to determine if the revisions adequately implemented the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q). These reviews were not documented in a safety evaluation report and did not constitute approval of licensee-generated changes; therefore, these revisions are subject to future inspection.

These activities constitute completion of two samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.04-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

**1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)**

Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine licensee emergency drill on April 21, 2009, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the simulated control room, technical support center, operations support center, and emergency off-site facility to determine whether the event classification, notifications, and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures. The inspectors also attended the licensee drill critique to compare any inspector-observed weaknesses with those identified by the licensee staff in order to evaluate the critique and to verify whether the licensee staff was properly



identifying weaknesses and entering them into the corrective action program. As part of the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the drill package and other documents listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of one sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06-05.

b. Findings

Introduction. The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) involving failure to identify and critique a nonrisk-significant planning standard weakness demonstrated during a site emergency preparedness drill. Specifically, the licensee demonstrated a weakness in controlling radiological exposures for emergency workers during an emergency, without key emergency response organization decision maker consideration or input, when simulated workers were left in containment during changing radiological conditions.

Description. On April 21, 2009, Entergy conducted Site Drill Scenario RDRL-EP-902 at River Bend Station to demonstrate emergency response organization performance in the simulator control room, technical support center, operations support center, and the emergency operations facility. The scenario started with the reactor at 100 percent power while simulated maintenance workers inside containment gathered data on the train A residual heat removal injection valve. As the scenario progressed, the main steam isolation valves closed due to high temperature in the steam tunnel. The simulated workers remained inside the containment for over an hour, during which time the reactor control rods failed to insert following the automatic reactor scram, the reactor safety relief valves lifted and dumped steam to the suppression pool, reactor vessel water level decreased, fuel elements failed, and the simulator control room crew performed an emergency depressurization. These simulated conditions could have caused the emergency workers in containment to exceed administrative and regulatory radiation dose limits and exposed them to dangerous steam and high temperatures. Although the simulated workers were performing a prioritized task at the request of the control room staff and the workers' location was posted on a status board in the operations support center, key decision makers of the emergency response organization in the technical support center were unaware that simulated workers were inside containment during degrading plant conditions. The emergency response team did not consider means to control the simulated workers' radiological exposure in accordance with station emergency procedures and did not address the simulated workers' radiological exposure during a technical support center brief conducted 45 minutes after the failure of the control rods to insert following a scram. The failure to adequately address radiological exposure controls for simulated workers in accordance with Entergy procedures was not identified and presented as a weakness requiring corrective action during the formal drill critique.

Analysis. The emergency response organization's failure to implement procedures and control radiological exposures for emergency workers during an emergency drill is a weakness because the failure to control the radiological exposures of emergency workers could prevent the effective implementation of the licensee's emergency plan during an actual emergency. Failure to identify and address this emergency response organization performance weakness via a formal critique process was a performance deficiency that was within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct. This finding is

more than minor because it is associated with the emergency response organization performance attribute of the emergency preparedness cornerstone which ensures the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Sheet 1, "Failure to Comply," of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, "Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process," and determined it to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a failure to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), the finding was associated with an emergency preparedness planning standard, the associated planning standard was not risk significant as defined by Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, and the finding was not a functional failure of the planning standard function. The inspectors determined that the finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution because the licensee did not identify issues completely, accurately, and in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance [P.1(a)].

Enforcement. Title 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) requires that periodic drills be conducted to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, periodic drills be conducted to develop and maintain key skills, and deficiencies identified as a result of exercises or drills be corrected. Contrary to the above, during a site drill scenario, conducted on April 21, 2009, the licensee failed to identify a deficiency related to Planning Standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11) which requires that means for controlling radiological exposures, in an emergency, are established for emergency workers. Because the finding is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2009-2458, this violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000458/2009003-01, "Failure to Identify and Formally Critique an Emergency Plan Weakness."

#### **4. OTHER ACTIVITIES**

##### **40A1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)**

###### **.1 Data Submission Issue**

###### **a. Inspection Scope**

The inspectors performed a review of the data submitted by the licensee for the first quarter 2009 performance indicators for any obvious inconsistencies prior to its public release in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0608, "Performance Indicator Program."

This review was performed as part of the inspectors' normal plant status activities and, as such, did not constitute a separate inspection sample.

###### **b. Findings**

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Safety System Functional Failures (MS05)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Safety System Functional Failures performance indicator for the period from the second quarter of 2008 through the first quarter of 2009. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, performance indicator definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 5, and NUREG-1022, "Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73" definitions and guidance were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, operability assessments, maintenance rule records, maintenance work orders, issue reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of April 2008 through March 2009 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.

These activities constitute completion of one safety system functional failures sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Mitigating Systems Performance Index - Emergency ac Power System (MS06)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Mitigating Systems Performance Index - Emergency ac Power System performance indicator for the period from the second quarter 2008 through the first quarter of 2009. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, performance indicator definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 5, was used. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, mitigating systems performance index derivation reports, issue reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of April 2008 through March 2009 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors reviewed the mitigating systems performance index component risk coefficient to determine if it had changed by more than 25 percent in value since the previous inspection, and if so, that the change was in accordance with applicable NEI guidance. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.

These activities constitute completion of one mitigating systems performance index emergency ac power system sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Mitigating Systems Performance Index - High Pressure Injection Systems (MS07)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Mitigating Systems Performance Index - High Pressure Injection Systems performance indicator for the period from the second quarter of 2008 through the first quarter of 2009. To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those periods, performance indicator definitions and guidance contained in NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 5, was used. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, issue reports, mitigating systems performance index derivation reports, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports for the period of April 2008 through March 2009 to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors reviewed the mitigating systems performance index component risk coefficient to determine if it had changed by more than 25 percent in value since the previous inspection, and if so, that the change was in accordance with applicable NEI guidance. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's issue report database to determine if any problems had been identified with the performance indicator data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.

These activities constitute completion of one mitigating systems performance index high pressure injection system sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

**40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)**

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Physical Protection

.1 Routine Review of Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

As part of the various baseline inspection procedures discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that they were being entered into the licensee's corrective action program at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed. The inspectors reviewed attributes that included: the complete and accurate identification of the problem; the timely correction, commensurate with the safety significance; the evaluation and disposition of performance issues, generic implications, common causes, contributing factors, root causes, extent of condition

reviews, and previous occurrences reviews; and the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness of corrective actions. Minor issues entered into the licensee's corrective action program because of the inspectors' observations are included in the attached list of documents reviewed.

These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure, they were considered an integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter and documented in Section 1 of this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Daily Corrective Action Program Reviews

a. Inspection Scope

In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program. The inspectors accomplished this through review of the station's daily corrective action documents.

The inspectors performed these daily reviews as part of their daily plant status monitoring activities and, as such, did not constitute any separate inspection samples.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Semi-Annual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of the licensee's corrective action program and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the corrective action program to identify long term trends with balance of plant equipment reliability and availability concerns that could challenge overall plant safety and stability. The inspectors focused their review on repetitive equipment issues, but also considered the results of daily corrective action item screening discussed in Section 4OA2.2, above, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The inspectors nominally considered the 6-month period of October 2008 through March 2009, although some examples expanded beyond those dates where the scope of the trend warranted.

The inspectors also included issues documented outside the normal corrective action program in major equipment problem lists, repetitive and/or rework maintenance lists, departmental problem/challenges lists, system health reports, quality assurance audit/surveillance reports, self-assessment reports, and maintenance rule assessments. The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensee's corrective action program trending reports. Corrective actions associated with

a sample of the issues identified in the licensee's trending reports were reviewed for adequacy.

These activities constitute completion of one single semi-annual trend inspection sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Selected Issue Follow-up Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

During a review of items entered in the licensee's corrective action program, the inspectors recognized a corrective action item documenting foreign material control inside the reactor building. The inspectors looked for proper implementation of Procedure EN-MA-118, "Foreign Material Exclusion," Revision 4. Specifically, the inspectors questioned the method in which the reactor building was posted as a foreign material exclusion zone or an exclusion area; whether a loss of control applied to scaffold items, wood, and plastic bags on the refuel floor; the fail-safe design of stored material in the foreign material exclusion zone 1; and whether temporary modifications packages for temporary pumps, power cords, and small motor control centers were appropriately prepared.

These activities constitute completion of one in-depth problem identification and resolution sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152-05.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

**40A5 Other Activities**

Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities

a. Inspection Scope

During the inspection period, the inspectors performed observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with River Bend security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security. These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours.

These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an integral part of the inspectors' normal plant status review and inspection activities.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

## **40A6 Meetings**

### Exit Meeting Summary

The branch chief met with the licensee on April 23, 2009, to convey the results of the End-of-Cycle Review of plant performance. The licensee acknowledged the results of the review.

On May 5, 2009, the inspectors presented the evaluations of changes, tests, or experiments and permanent plant modifications inspection results to Mr. M. Perito, Site Vice President, and other members of his staff. The inspectors reviewed some proprietary information and verified that none would be included in this report.

On May 7, 2009, the inspector conducted a telephonic exit meeting to present the results of the in-office inspection of changes to the licensee's emergency plan and emergency action levels to Mr. J. Leavines, Manager, Emergency Planning. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented.

On July 8, 2009, the resident inspectors presented the integrated baseline inspection results to Mr. M. Perito, Site Vice President, and other members of his staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

## **SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION**

### **KEY POINTS OF CONTACT**

#### **Licensee Personnel**

T. Bolke, Licensing Specialist  
G. Bush, Manager, Plant Maintenance  
M. Chase, Manager, Training and Development  
J. Clark, Assistant Operations Manager - Shift  
F. Corley, Electrical Design Engineering Supervisor  
B. Cox, Manager, Operations  
M. Feltner, Manager, Outage  
C. Forpahl, Manager, Engineering Programs & Components  
D. Heath, Radiation Protection Supervisor  
R. Heath, Superintendent, Chemistry  
G. Hendl, Senior Engineer, Engineering  
B. Houston, Manager, Radiation Protection  
K. Huffstatler, Senior Licensing Specialist  
A. James, Manager, Plant Security  
L. Kitchen, Manager, Planning and Scheduling  
R. Kowaleski, Manager, Corrective Actions & Assessments  
J. Leavines, Manager, Emergency Preparedness  
D. Lorring, Manager, Licensing  
W. Mashburn, Manager, Design Engineering  
R. McAdams, Manager, System Engineering  
J. McElwain, Manager, Human Resources  
E. Olson, General Manager, Plant Operations  
M. Perito, Vice President, Operations  
R. Persons, Superintendent, Training  
J. Roberts, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance  
J. Schlesinger, Supervisor, Engineering  
J. Schroeder, Assistant Operations Manager – Training  
D. Wiles, Director, Engineering  
L. Woods, Manager (Acting), Quality Assurance

#### **NRC Personnel**

D. Proulx, Senior Project Engineer

### **LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED**

#### **Opened and Closed**

05000458/2009003-01	NCV	Failure to Identify and Formally Critique an Emergency Plan Weakness (Section 1EP6)
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## LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

### Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection

#### PROCEDURES

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REVISION</u>
AOP-0064	Degraded Grid	0
ENS-DC-199	Off-Site Power Supply Design Requirements	2
ENS-DC-201	Transmission Grid Monitoring	2
OSP-0063	Grid Monitor	2

### Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment

#### PROCEDURES

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REVISION/DATE</u>
6221.418-000-001A	High Pressure Core Spray System Power Supply Unit, Amendments 1, 2, and 3	1A
IEEE STD 308	IEEE Standard Criteria for Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations	1978
STP-208-6302	DIV II MSIV Leakage Control Quarterly Valve Operability Test	6
STP-309-0203	Division 3 Diesel Generator Operability Test	304

### Section 1R05: Fire Protection

#### MISCELLANEOUS

Pre-Fire Plan/Strategy Book  
USAR Section 9A.2, Fire Hazards Analysis

#### PROCEDURES

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REVISION</u>
FPP-0100	Fire Protection System Impairment	10
FPP-0101	Fire Suppression System Inspection	10

SOP-0037	Fire Protection Water System Operating Procedure (System 251)	27
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**Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures**

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-2009-01584	CR-RBS-2009-01644	CR-RBS-2009-01840
CR-RBS-2009-01611	CR-RBS-2009-01645	

MISCELLANEOUS

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REVISION/DATE</u>
Calculation PN-317 ADD 0B	Max Flood Elevations for Moderate Energy Line Cracks in CATI Structures	July 17, 2001
G13.18.12.3.15	Internal Flooding Screen Analysis	0
PID 23-11A	Engineering P & I Diagram, System 609, Drains – Floor and Equipment	7
PID 23-12A	Engineering P & I Diagram, System 609, Drains – Floor and Equipment	8
PID 23-12B	Engineering P & I Diagram, System 609, Drains – Floor and Equipment	6
USAR Appendix 3C	Failure Mode Analysis for Pipe Breaks and Cracks	August 1987
PN-17	Max Flood Elevation for Category 1 Structures	July 17, 2001

PROCEDURES

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REVISION</u>
SOP-0104	Floor and Equipment Drains System	32

**Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness**

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-2008-00680	CR-RBS-2008-03636	CR-RBS-2009-00112
CR-RBS-2008-01901	CR-RBS-2008-03751	CR-RBS-2009-00238
CR-RBS-2008-02273	CR-RBS-2008-03753	CR-RBS-2009-00454
CR-RBS-2008-02590	CR-RBS-2008-03827	CR-RBS-2009-00454
CR-RBS-2008-02637	CR-RBS-2008-04014	CR-RBS-2009-00525
CR-RBS-2008-02727	CR-RBS-2008-04277	CR-RBS-2009-00990

CR-RBS-2008-02753	CR-RBS-2008-04437	CR-RBS-2009-01283
CR-RBS-2008-02890	CR-RBS-2008-04598	CR-RBS-2009-01291
CR-RBS-2008-03074	CR-RBS-2008-05017	CR-RBS-2009-01363
CR-RBS-2008-03115	CR-RBS-2008-06586	CR-RBS-2009-02251
CR-RBS-2008-03495	CR-RBS-2008-06693	
CR-RBS-2008-03591	CR-RBS-2008-06827	

**Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Controls**

PROCEDURES

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REVISION</u>
ADM-0096	Risk Management Program and Implementation Risk Assessment	303
AOP-0029	Severe Weather Operation	24
AOP-0064	Degraded Grid	0
EN-MA-125	Troubleshooting and Control of Maintenance Activities	4
EN-OP-103	Reactivity Management Program	3
EN-WM-101	On-Line Work Management Process	5
ENS-DC-199	Off-Site Power Supply Design Requirements	2
OSP-0037	Shutdown Operations Protection Plan	18
OSP-0048	Switchyard, Transformer Yard, and Sensitive Equipment Controls	6

**Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations**

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-2009-01584	CR-RBS-2009-01840	CR-HQN-2009-00296
CR-RBS-2009-01611	CR-RBS-2009-01894	CR-RBS-2008-02539
CR-RBS-2009-01644	CR-RBS-2009-01626	
CR-RBS-2009-01645	LO-NOE-2002-00078	

MISCELLANEOUS

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REVISION/DATE</u>
Generic Letter 2007-01	Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transient	0

PID 23-11A	Engineering P & I Diagram, System 609, Drains – Floor and Equipment	7
PID 23-12A	Engineering P & I Diagram, System 609, Drains – Floor and Equipment	8
PID 23-12B	Engineering P & I Diagram, System 609, Drains – Floor and Equipment	6
Regulatory Guide 1.211	Qualification of Safety-Related Cables and Field Splices for Nuclear Power Plants	0
USAR Appendix 3C	Failure Mode Analysis for Pipe Breaks and Cracks	August 1987

PROCEDURES

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REVISION</u>
EN-LI-102	Corrective Action Process	13
EN-OP-104	Operability Determinations	3
EN-OP-115	Conduct of Operations	7
SOP-0104	Floor and Equipment Drains System	32

**Section 1R17: Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications**

10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATIONS

EC-108	EC-07-0252	EC-08-5924	EN-2008-010
EC-03918	EC-08-1933	EN-2007-002	EN-2009-001
EC-09167	EC-08-4309	EN-2008-007	ER-RB-2005-0450-000
EC-5563			

10 CFR 50.59 SCREENS

PAD AOP-0064	PAD STP-050-0700	LBDCR 10.04-233
PAD EC-08-4309	PAD STP-051-4254	LBDCR 10.04-234
PAD EC-4861	LBDCR 05.03-043	LBDCR 15.03-003
PAD EC-6570	LBDCR 09.02-371	LBDCR 09.02-382
PAD EC-09723	LBDCR 09.02-373	LBDCR 09.04-183
PAD EC-10690	LBDCR 09.03-295	LBDCR 09.04-180
PAD ENS-DC-199	LBDCR 09.03-300	LBDCR 09.02-358
PAD ENS-DC-201	LBDCR 09.05-177	LBDCR 08.03-104
PAD EOP/SAP	LBDCR 10.04-224	

CALCULATIONS

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REVISION/DATE</u>
ES-218	Drywell Bypass Leakage Test Limits	2
G13.18.10.2*235	Design of Permanent Lead Shielding for WCS-006-005-1 Between Elevation 95 ft. and Elevation 116 ft.	December 27, 2007
G13.18.10.2*241	Evaluation of a HELB Event with Permanent Lead Shielding at the WCS Piping Risers Against the Drywell Wall from El. 9 ft. to El. 116 ft.	December 27, 2007
G13.18.10.2*242	Design of Permanent Lead Shielding for RCS Piping Below EL. 95 ft. in the Drywell	December 27, 2007
G13.18.10.2*244	Evaluation of a HELB Event with Permanent Lead Shielding at the RCS Loops A & B Suction and Discharge and RHR Shutdown Mode Piping Below Elevation 95 ft	December 27, 2007
G13.18.10.2*245	Design of Permanent Lead Shielding of RCS Piping Above El. 95 ft. in the Drywell	December 27, 2007
G13.18.10.2*247	Evaluation of Spring Can Pipe Supports With Permanent Lead Shielding Rods	June 30, 2008
G13.18.10.2*252	Evaluation of HELB Events with Permanent Lead Shielding at the RCS Piping in the Drywell Above Elevation 95 ft.	June 30, 2008

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-2007-01720	CR-RBS-2008-04686	CR-RBS-2009-00023	CR-RBS-2009-01356
CR-RBS-2007-03527	CR-RBS-2008-05261	CR-RBS-2009-00291	CR-RBS-2009-01565
CR-RBS-2007-03605	CR-RBS-2008-05308	CR-RBS-2009-00561	CR-RBS-2009-01766
CR-RBS-2007-03641	CR-RBS-2008-06416	CR-RBS-2009-00737	

DRAWINGS

PID-06-01A	PID-09-10F	PID-09-11A	PID-25-01G
PID-27-06A	PID-36-01A		

PERMANENT PLANT MODIFICATIONS

EC 0000000054	EC 0000000460	EC 0000005924	EC 50000070752
EC 0000000108	EC00000000615	EC 0000006570	EC 50000070762
EC 0000000109	EC 0000002086	EC 00000009752	EC 80000004309
EC 0000000110	EC 0000004861		

PROCEDURES

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REVISION/DATE</u>
AOP-0064	Degraded Grid	0
EN-DC-115	Engineering Change Development	6
EN-DC-116	Engineering Change Installation	2
EN-DC-117	Post Modification Testing and Special Instructions	2
EN-DC-118	Engineering Change Closure	3
EN-LI-100	Process Applicability Determination	7
EN-LI-101	10 CFR 50.59 Review Program	4
ENS-DC-199	Off Site Supply Design Requirements	3
ENS-DC-201	ENS Transmission Grid Monitoring	3
MCP-4300	Ventilation System Flow Measurement	6B
PEP-0036	Testing and Balancing of Ventilation Systems	3B
STP-256-6301	Div. 1 Standby Service Water Quarterly Valve Operability Test	October 21, 2008
STP-050-0700	RCS Pressure/Temperature Limits Verification	January 9, 2008
STP-051-4254	HPCS Drywell Pressure-High Channel Calibration and Logic System Functional Test	March 9, 2009
STP-057-3603	Drywell Bypass Leakage Rate Test	December 18, 2008

**Section 1R19: Postmaintenance Testing**

CONDITION REPORT

CR-RBS-1996-0836	CR-RBS-1996-1037	CR-RBS-2008-02176
CR-RBS-1996-0999	CR-RBS-2008-02166	CR-RBS-2009-01992

MISCELLANEOUS

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REVISION</u>
4216.200-113-003F	1HVC-ACU2A&2B Seismic Calculations	G
EC No. 06929	CRD Suction Filter Change	0

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REVISION</u>
ER_RB-1999-0780	Evaluate and Document the As-Built configuration of Fan Blade Setting Performed on Fans Identified in RBS CR 99-0107	0

PROCEDURES

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REVISION</u>
EN-AD-102	Procedure Use and Adherence	4
EN-AD-103	Document Control and Records Management Programs	10
EN-WM-105	Planning	5
EN-WM-102	Work Implementation and Closeout	2
OSP-0040	LCO Tracking and Safety Function Determination Program	15

**Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing**

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-1996-00634  
 CR-RBS-2008-02983  
 CR-RBS-2009-00352  
 CR-RBS-2009-00416

MISCELLANEOUS

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REVISION</u>
TDI Test Results 74039-722	IEEE 387 Factory Test Results	0
VTD-C634-0112	Transamerica Delaval Instruction Manual for Model DSR-48 Diesel Engine/Generator	1
VTTD-E220-0100	Elliott Type G High-Pressure Turbochargers Instructions for Installation, Operation, and Maintenance [TC-70-A]	1

PROCEDURES

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REVISION</u>
EN-OP-104	Operability Determinations	3
EN-OP-109	Drywell Leakage	1
PEP-0026	Diesel Generator Operating Logs	12
STP-201-6310	SLC Quarterly Pump and Valve Operability Test	303
STP-309-0203	Division III Diesel Generator Operability Test	304

WORK ORDERS

WO 00149509

**Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation**

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-2009-01673

PROCEDURES

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REVISION</u>
EIP-2-012	Radiation Exposure Controls	19
RBNP-024	Radiation Protection Plan	10B
RSP-0229	Radiation Protection Response to Changing Plant Conditions	08

SCENARIOS

Site Drill Scenario RDRL-EP-00902, Revision 00, April 16, 2009



**Section 40A1: Performance Indicator Verification**

PROCEDURES

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REVISION</u>
EN-LI-102	Corrective Action Process	13
EN-LI-114	Performance Indicator Process	4

**Section 40A2: Identification and Resolution of Problems**

CONDITION REPORTS

CR-RBS-2008-06107	CR-RBS-2009-01671	CR-RBS-2009-01913
CR-RBS-2009-00402	CR-RBS-2009-01712	CR-RBS-2009-01927
CR-RBS-2009-01475	CR-RBS-2009-01855	CR-RBS-2009-01954

PROCEDURES

<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REVISION</u>
EN-MA-118	Foreign Material Exclusion	4