



July 10, 2009

Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
11545 Rockville Pike
Rockville, MD 20852

Subject: **Re-submittal of 71.95 Report initially submitted March 26, 2009**

Attachment(s): 1) Original Submittal of 71.95 Report

Dear Mr. Thompson,

In March of 2009, a 71.95 report was submitted to the NRC regarding Certificate of Compliance USA/9319/B(U)F-96, Revision 1. As part of a records review, AREVA NP Inc. searched the ADAMS database to verify that the report had been received. The report was not found within ADAMS, therefore the NRC was contacted directly for conformation. Subsequent communications indicated that the NRC did not have the report on file.

The original report is being resubmitted based on the above information. Should you have any questions regarding this letter, please contact me at (434) 832-5205.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Samuel E. Miller', written in a cursive style.

Samuel E. Miller, Manager
Environmental, Health, Safety and Licensing

AREVA NP INC.
An AREVA and Siemens company

3315 Old Forest Road, P.O. Box 10935, Lynchburg, VA 24506-0935
Tel.: (434) 832-3000 - Fax: (434) 832-3840

FORM: 22700VA.1 (4/1/2005)

NMS501

Attachment 1

Original 71.95 Report,
March 26, 2009

AREVA NP INC.
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3315 Old Forest Road, P.O. Box 10935, Lynchburg, VA 24506-0935
Tel.: (434) 832-3000 - Fax: (434) 832-3840

FORM: 22709VA-1 (4/1/2008)



**CERTIFIED MAIL
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED**

RDM-09-013

March 26, 2009

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Director, Spent Fuel Project Office,
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards,
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject: **10 CFR 71.95 Report of Non-Compliance with Certificate of Compliance
USA/9319/B(U)F-96, Revision 1, for the Model No. MAP-12/MAP-13 Package**

To Whom It May Concern:

On January 22, 2009, AREVA NP Inc., an AREVA and Siemens Company, discovered that a single MAP-12 shipping container containing two LTA fuel assemblies, transported from our facility located in Lynchburg, Virginia to the Braidwood Nuclear Station located in Braidwood, Illinois violated the requirements of NRC Certificate of Compliance (CoC) USA/9319/B(U)F-96, Revision 1, Section 5 (a) (3), in that not all of the requirements of licensing drawing 9045393 were met. Specifically, the requirement for installation of a shorter length ball lock pin may not have been limited to the impact limiters, as two (2) may have been installed on the package rail resulting in their dislodgement during transit to the Braidwood site.

Installation of the shorter ball lock pin on the package rail may not allow the pin to fully engage resulting in the potentially to become dislodged during transit. The license drawing allows two different ball lock pin lengths to be used in the MAP package. However, AREVA migrated to the longer length ball lock pin, which properly engages at all locations, to eliminate the potential for the installation of a shorter ball lock pin on the rail whereby it might potentially become dislodged during transit. Attachment A to this letter provides additional information related to this shipment.

Per 10 CFR 71.95 (a) (1), AREVA does not consider the conditions of the subject shipment, listed in this notice, to have caused a significant reduction in the effectiveness of the package. There was no impact to the safety basis of the package or increased risk to the public. This report is being made in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 71.95 (a) (3); Instances in which the conditions of approval in the Certificate of Compliance were not observed in making a shipment. Further justification is provided in Attachment A.


If you or your staff have any questions, require additional information, or wish to discuss the matter further, please contact me at 434-832-5172. Please reference the unique document identification number in any correspondence concerning this letter.

AREVA NP INC.
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3315 Old Forest Road, P.O. Box 10935, Lynchburg, VA 24506-0935
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FORM: 22709VA-1 (4/1/2006)

Sincerely,



Richard D. Montgomery, Advisory Engineer
Nuclear Criticality Safety & Shipping Containers

Cc:

E. W. Brach, Director
Spent Fuel Project Office
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Attachment A
Additional Information

AREVA NP INC.
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10 CFR 71.95 Sections (1) and (2)

(1) A brief abstract describing the major occurrences during the event, including all component or system failures that contributed to the event and significant corrective action taken or planned to prevent recurrence.

On January 22, 2009, AREVA NP Inc., an AREVA and Siemens Company, discovered that a single MAP-12 shipping container containing two LTA fuel assemblies, transported from our facility located in Lynchburg, Virginia to the Braidwood Nuclear Station located in Braidwood, Illinois violated the requirements of NRC Certificate of Compliance (CoC) USA/9319/B(U)F-96, Revision 1, Section 5 (a) (3), in that not all of the requirements of licensing drawing 9045393 were met. Specifically, the requirement for installation of a shorter length ball lock pin may not have been limited to the impact limiters, as two (2) may have been installed on the package rail resulting in their dislodgement during transit to the Braidwood site. Installation of the shorter ball lock pin on the package rail may not allow the pin to fully engage resulting in the potentially to become dislodged during transit. The license drawing allows two different ball lock pin lengths to be used in the MAP package. However, AREVA migrated to the longer length ball lock pin, which properly engages at all locations, to eliminate the potential for the installation of a shorter ball lock pin on the rail whereby it might potentially become dislodged during transit.

There were no component or system failures during the event.

An inspection of package MP-043 indicated that approximately 10-12 shorter length ball lock pins might have been installed on the package. Of these, two (2) may have been installed on the package closure rail on opposite sides of the package towards the central section of the package. In some instances, the shorter ball lock pin may not properly engage when installed on the rail. Two (2) shorter length ball lock pins were further observed at rails locations however these appeared to fully engage within the rail.

AREVA had previously migrated to the longer ball lock pin for all closure locations on the exterior of the package to eliminate the potential for a shorter ball lock pin to be installed on the rail whereby it might become dislodged during transit. These changes were implemented with the fabrication of package MP-021 at NuWeld. In addition, AREVA replaced all of the shorter ball lock pins on packages MP-001 through MP-020 prior to their first use package.

To prevent a recurrence of this error, AREVA suspended all MAP shipments and conducted inspections of all received MAP-12 packages to determine if the packages had the shorter ball lock pins. The inspection of as received packages from NuWeld concluded that no shorter ball lock pins had been installed. These inspections were documented using a miscellaneous inspection form.

AREVA personnel further conducted inspections at NuWeld to confirm the lack of shorter ball lock pins in their inventory. These inspections concluded that there were no shorter ball lock pins in the NuWeld inventory. However, during personnel interviews, an operator seemed to recall that some shorter ball lock pins may have been installed on a previous package but could provide no further details. Inspection of the NuWeld site was completed by 01/30/2009.

AREVA personnel further conducted inspections of their spare parts inventory at the Lynchburg, Virginia facility, finding no shorter length ball lock pins. However, to prevent the potential reintroduction of a shorter ball lock pin, the receptacle used to collect the smaller ball lock pins from

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packages MP-001 through MP-020 was removed from the area and discarded. AREVA will continue to inspect new MAP-12 packages as received from NuWeld to confirm the lack of shorter length ball lock pins. With the above actions, AREVA has achieved full compliance as of 01/30/2009.

(2) A clear, specific, narrative description of the event that occurred so that knowledgeable readers conversant with the requirements of part 71, but not familiar with the design of the packaging, can understand the complete event. The narrative description must include the following specific information as appropriate for the particular event.

(i) Status of components or systems that were inoperable at the start of the event and that contributed to the event;

There was no inoperable component or system at the start of the event or that contributed to the event. The single MAP package contained two fuel assemblies. All safety requirements were met in preparation of the packaging for shipment with the exception that two (2) noted ball lock pins were missing on receipt of package MP-043 at the Braidwood site.

(ii) Dates and approximate times of occurrences;

A single shipment of four (4) MAP-12 packages, each containing two fuel assemblies, was loaded as a single conveyance and subsequently shipped on January 14, 2009. The shipment arrived at the Braidwood site on January 15, 2009.

(iii) The cause of each component or system failure or personnel error, if known;

There were no component or system failures. An issue evaluation identified inappropriate actions involving the potential use and installation of a shorter length ball lock pin at a package rail location for package MP-043. Testing conducted on 01/22/09 indicated that a shorter length ball lock pin would not properly engage at the noted locations. Testing further confirmed that the longer length ball lock pin would properly engage at both noted locations. Therefore, it was concluded that a shorter length ball lock pin might have been installed at each noted location.

(iv) The failure mode, mechanism, and effect of each failed component, if known;

There were no failed components.

(v) A list of systems or secondary functions that were also affected for failures of components with multiple functions;

There were no other systems or secondary functions that were affected by the two (2) missing ball lock pins.

(vi) The method of discovery of each component or system failure or procedural error;

There were no component or system failures. The missing ball lock pins were discovered on package MP-043 by AREVA during fuel receipt support at the Braidwood site.

(vii) For each human performance-related root cause, a discussion of the cause(s) and circumstances;

The MAP design allowed the use of a shorter length ball lock pin for engagement at the package impact limiters. AREVA recognized the potential for a shorter length ball lock pin to not properly

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engage when installed on the package rail. AREVA migrated to the longer length ball lock pin to eliminate this potential concern. In doing this, AREVA replaced the shorter length ball lock pins on packages MP-001 through MP-020 while NuWeld instituted the single longer length ball lock pin starting with the fabrication of package MP-021. However, AREVA failed to conduct an inspection of the vendor's inventory to confirm that all shorter length ball lock pins had been discarded. As such, some shorter length ball lock pins may have been inadvertently used on package MP-043. AREVA conducted an on-site inventory inspection of NuWeld on 01/30/2009 confirming the lack of the shorter length ball lock pins.

(viii) The manufacturer and model number (or other identification) of each component that failed during the event; and

There were no component failures during the event.

(ix) For events occurring during use of a packaging, the quantities and chemical and physical form(s) of the package contents.

The shipment involved four (4) MAP-12 packages each containing two (2) fuel assemblies. Each fuel assembly consists of uranium dioxide pellets clad in zirconium alloy tubing and arranged in a lattice with installation in a cage or structure. The material is solid normal form. The enrichments were all less than 5.0 wt% ²³⁵U. Only the single MAP-12 package MP-043 was noted to have missing ball lock closure pins.