

#### UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

July 24, 2009

Mr. David J. Bannister Vice President and CNO Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station 444 South 16th St. Mall Omaha, NE 68102-2247

SUBJECT: FORT CALHOUN STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE: REVISE TRANSFORMER ALLOWED OUTAGE TIME IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 2.7(2) (TAC NO. MD9388)

Dear Mr. Bannister:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 261 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-40 for the Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1. The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications (TSs) in response to your application dated July 31, 2008, as supplemented by letter dated May 8, 2009.

The amendment modifies the allowed outage time for both unit auxiliary transformers while deleting diesel generator (DG) operability verifications as delineated in TS 2.7(2)a., and deleting DG operability verifications and special report requirements for house transformer inoperability as delineated in TSs 2.7(2)b., 2.7(2)c., and 5.9.3j. These proposed changes are consistent with NUREG-1432, "Standard Technical Specifications, Combustion Engineering Plants."

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

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Alan B. Wang, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-285

Enclosures:

- 1. Amendment No. 261 to DPR-40
- 2. Safety Evaluation

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#### UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

# OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT

# DOCKET NO. 50-285

## FORT CALHOUN STATION, UNIT NO. 1

## AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 261 Renewed License No. DPR-40

- 1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
  - A. The application for amendment by the Omaha Public Power District (the licensee), dated July 31, 2008, as supplemented by letter dated May 8, 2009, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
  - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
  - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
  - D. The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
  - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

- 2. Accordingly, Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-40 is amended by changes as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 3.B. of Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-40 is hereby amended to read as follows:
  - B. <u>Technical Specifications</u>

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 261, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 120 days from the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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Michael T. Markley, Chief Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-40 and Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: July 24, 2009

## ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 261

## RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-40

#### DOCKET NO. 50-285

Replace the following pages of the Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-40, Appendix A, Technical Specifications, and Appendix B, Additional Conditions, with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.

License Page				
REMOVE	INSERT			
-4-	-4-			
<u>Appendix A, Technical S</u>	Specifications			
REMOVE	INSERT			
2.7 – Page 2 5.0 – Page 7	2.7 – Page 2 5.0 – Page 7			

#### D. Fire Protection Program

Omaha Public Power District shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report for the facility and as approved in the NRC safety evaluation reports (SERs) dated February 14 and August 23, 1978; November 17, 1980; April 8 and August 12, 1982; July 3 and November 5, 1985; July 1, 1986; December 20, 1988; November 14,1990; March 17, 1993; and January 14, 1994, subject to the following provision:

Omaha Public Power District may make changes to the approved Fire Protection Program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

### E. Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

The Omaha Public Power District Updated Final Safety Analysis Report supplement, submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 54.21 (d), describes certain future activities to be completed prior to the period of extended operation. The Omaha Public Power District shall complete these activities no later than August 9, 2013, and shall notify the NRC In writing when implementation of these activities is complete and can be verified by NRC inspection.

The Updated Final Safety Analysis Report supplement, as revised, shall be included in the next scheduled update to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report required by 10 CFR 50.71 (e)(4) following issuance of this renewed license. Until that update is complete, the Omaha Public Power District may make changes to the programs and activities described in the supplement without prior Commission approval, provided that the Omaha Public Power District evaluates each such change pursuant to the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 50.59 and otherwise complies with the requirements in that section.

#### F. Appendix B

The Additional Conditions contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 261, are hereby incorporated into this license. Omaha Public Power District shall operate the facility in accordance with the Appendix B Additional Conditions.

> Renewed Operating License No. DPR-40 Amendment No. 261

# **TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS**

#### 2.0 **LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION**

### 2.7 <u>Electrical Systems</u> (Continued)

#### (2) <u>Modification of Minimum Requirements</u>

The minimum requirements may be modified to the extent that one of the following conditions will be allowed after the reactor coolant has been heated above 300°F. However, the reactor shall not be made critical unless all minimum requirements are met. If any of the provisions of these exceptions are violated, the reactor shall be placed in a hot shutdown condition within the following 12 hours. If the violation is not corrected within an additional 12 hours, the reactor shall be placed in a cold shutdown condition within an additional 24 hours.

- a. Both unit auxiliary power transformers T1A-1 and T1A-2 (4.16 kV) may be inoperable for up to 72 hours.
- b. Either house service transformer T1A-3 or T1A-4 (4.16kV) may be inoperable for up to 7 days. The NRC Operations Center shall be notified by telephone within 4 hours after transformer inoperability.
- c. Both house service transformers T1A-3 and T1A-4 (4.16kV) may be inoperable for up to 72 hours. The loss of the 161kV incoming line renders both transformers inoperable. The NRC Operations Center shall be notified by telephone within 4 hours after inoperability of both transformers.

## **TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS**

#### 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

- 5.9 <u>Reporting Requirements</u> (Continued)
- 5.9.2 Not Used
- 5.9.3 Special Reports

Special reports shall be submitted to the appropriate NRC Regional Office within the time period specified for each report. These reports shall be submitted covering the activities identified below pursuant to the requirements of the applicable reference specification where appropriate:

- a. In-service inspection report, reference 3.3.
- b. Tendon surveillance, reference 5.21.
- c. DELETED
- d. DELETED
- e. DELETED
- f. DELETED
- g. Materials radiation surveillance specimens reports, reference 3.3.
- h. DELETED
- i. Post-accident monitoring instrumentation, reference 2.21.
- j. DELETED

5.0 - Page 7

Amendment No. <del>9,24,35,38,46,75,86,89,99,</del> <u>110,113,119,133,147,152,157,</u> <u>160,164,185,202,216,219, 228,231, 237</u> 261



UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

# SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

## RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 261 TO RENEWED FACILITY

## **OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-40**

## OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT

## FORT CALHOUN STATION, UNIT NO. 1

## DOCKET NO. 50-285

## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated July 31, 2008 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML082140104), as supplemented by letter dated May 8, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML091320036), Omaha Public Power District (the licensee) requested a license amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR-40 for Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1 (FCS). Based on a telephone conference between the licensee and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff on April 9, 2009, the licensee supplemented its amendment request by letter dated May 8, 2009. The proposed change would revise the allowed outage time (AOT) for both unit auxiliary transformers (the auxiliary power transformers (APT) and the house service transformers (HST)) while deleting diesel generator (DG) operability verifications as delineated in Technical Specification (TS) 2.7(2)a. and deleting DG operability verifications and special report requirements for HST inoperability as delineated in TSs 2.7(2)b., 2.7(2)c., and 5.9.3. The supplemental letter dated May 8, 2009, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the staff's original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the *Federal Register* on February 10, 2009 (74 FR 6666).

The proposed amendment would revise TSs 2.7(2)a., 2.7(2)b., and 2.7(2)c., to allow both APTs, T1A-1 and T1A-2, to be inoperable for a period of 72 hours, and would impose a limit of 72 hours for plant operation in the event that both HSTs, T1A-3 and T1A-4, become inoperable. Currently, there is no limit to the amount of time that the HSTs may be inoperable, provided a special report is submitted to the NRC. This special report provision is being deleted since there will be a time limit placed on the inoperability of the transformers. The proposed change would also remove the existing requirement to verify operability of the emergency diesel generators (EDGs) when offsite power sources are degraded or inoperable. The proposed TS changes, in general, are consistent with NUREG-1432, "Standard Technical Specifications, Combustion Engineering Plants."

Since the special reporting requirements are being removed from TS 2.7(2)b. and TS 2.7(2)c., the associated TS 5.9.3j requirement for submitting a special report to the NRC per TS 2.7(2) is also being deleted. An editorial change is being made to TS 5.9.3i to add a period at the end of the text for consistency.

These changes are proposed to address recent NRC concerns that the current wording in TSs 2.7(2)b. and 2.7(2)c. contains no limit on the AOT for an inoperable or degraded offsite power supply.

In addition, an administrative change is proposed to TS 2.7(2)a. to add "T1A" to the equipment notation for the second auxiliary power transformer, T1A-2, for consistency. An administrative change to TS 2.7(2)c. is also being proposed to clarify the existing language regarding the telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center being made within 4 hours after inoperability "of both transformers" versus "transformer" inoperability.

## 2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

In Section 50.36 of Title 10 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR), "Technical specifications," the NRC established its regulatory requirements related to the content of TS. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.36(c), TSs are required to include items in the following five specific categories related to station operation: (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings, (2) limiting conditions for operation (LCOs), (3) surveillance requirements, (4) design features, and (5) administrative controls. The rule does not specify the particular requirements to be included in a plant's TS. As stated in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(i), the "[I]imiting conditions for operation are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility." Section 50.36 of 10 CFR requires a licensee's TSs to establish LCOs, which include completion times for equipment that is required for safe operation of the facility.

In a memorandum dated September 18, 1992, the Commission approved the NRC staff's proposal in SECY-92-223, "Resolution of Deviations Identified During the Systematic Evaluation Program," not to apply 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to plants with construction permits prior to May 21, 1971 (ADAMS Legacy Library Accession No. 9210060362). FCS was licensed for construction prior to May 21, 1971, and at that time committed to the draft General Design Criteria (GDC). The draft GDC, which are similar to Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," in 10 CFR Part 50, are contained in Appendix G, "Response to 70 Criteria," of the FCS Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR).

In its letter dated July 31, 2008, the licensee appropriately identified the following draft GDC as specified in Appendix G to the FCS USAR:

FCS Criterion 24 - Emergency Power for Protection Systems states:

In the event of loss of all offsite power, sufficient alternate sources of power shall be provided to permit the required functioning of the protection systems. In its letter dated May 8, 2009, the licensee states that FCS Criterion 24 is met as follows:

Emergency power is available from two completely independent Diesel generator [DG] sets and from the two completely independent 125v [Volts] dc [direct current] systems for essential dc loads.

The independent diesel generator supply systems are located in the plant and are connected to separate buses. Both generator sets are independently automatic starting upon loss of auxiliary power and will be ready to accept load within 10 seconds of loss of normal supply power. Starting power is self-contained within each unit. Each unit has sufficient capacity to start sequentially the loads that must be supplied for the engineered safeguards equipment for the hypothetical accident concurrent with loss of outside power. This capacity is adequate to provide a safe and orderly plant shutdown and maintain the plant in a safe condition.

Each of the two 125v dc batteries is capable of supplying essential station dc load for 8 hours and may be charged by the generator power supply.

Facilities are included to permit periodic starting and running the Diesel generator sets without interrupting plant operation. Diesel units are synchronized to the bus and loaded periodically to ensure readiness for emergency services.

#### FCS Criterion 39 - Emergency Power for Engineered Safety Features states:

Alternate power systems shall be provided and designed with adequate independency, redundancy, capacity and testability to permit the functioning required of the engineered safety features. As a minimum, the onsite power system and the offsite power system shall each, independently, provide this capacity assuming a failure of a single active component in each power system.

In its letter dated May 8, 2009, the licensee states that FCS Criterion 39 is met as follows:

Offsite power to the plant is available via the 161 kV line from Blair, and after the unit is tripped, via backfeed from the 345 kV system through the main and unit auxiliary transformers.

When the unit is tripped and the 161 kV supply is not available, the motoroperated disconnect switch in the generator main leads is opened and the supply to the unit auxiliary transformers is re-established. Switch operation is accomplished by a motor operator supplied from the station battery.

Onsite power is provided by two diesel generator sets. Each independent diesel generator set is adequate for supplying the minimum engineered safeguards equipment for the hypothetical accident concurrent with loss of outside power.

Station batteries provide onsite power for instrument and control systems. These batteries will be subject to rigorous inspection and maintenance. The charger voltage will periodically be manually lowered to test batteries capability to assume load at the appropriate bus voltage.

The diesel generator facilities permit periodic starting and running during normal plant operations.

## 3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

### 3.1 System Description

In its application dated July 31, 2008, the licensee states that FCS is designed with two semiindependent offsite power circuits, used to supply power to station loads, both safety-related and non-safety-related. The offsite sources consist of power from the 345 kilovolt (kV) substation and the 161 kV substation, both of which are located in a common switchyard adjacent to the plant. Either of the offsite sources are capable of supplying power to the plant's four 4160 volt (V) busses. The 161 kV source normally provides power to the two 4 kV safetyrelated busses (each of which can also be powered from an independent EDG) and the 345 kV source normally provides power to the two 4 kV non-safety-related busses.

During normal operation, the 345 kV transmission system is connected to APTs T1A-1 and T1A-2 through a 22 kV bus which is also connected to the output of the main generator and the main generator step-up transformer. This configuration allows a portion of the main generator output to be fed to APTs to supply power to some plant loads. However, this arrangement results in a loss of power from the 345/22 kV system to the plant busses when the plant is shut down until such time that the operators are able to open the main generator disconnect switch and subsequently re-establish the 345 kV supply via the main generator step-up transformer and the APTs. The 161 kV source, on the other hand, is continuously available to provide plant power, through HSTs, T1A-3 and TIA-4, before, during, and after a plant trip.

In summary, FCS has two offsite circuits, each capable of supplying all four 4 kV busses. The APT circuit consists of a generator step-up transformer connected to the 345 kV transmission system, feeding the APTs which feed the 4kV busses. The HST circuit consists of the two HSTs which are connected to the 161kV transmission system and feed the 4 kV busses.

#### 3.2 <u>Proposed TS Changes</u>

#### APT Offsite Circuit TS

TS 2.7(2)a. currently allows both APTs to be inoperable for 24 hours provided the EDGs are verified operable. The proposed amendment would extend the AOT to 72 hours and eliminate the need to confirm EDG operability.

#### HST Offsite Circuit TSs

TS 2.7(2)b. currently allows either HST to be inoperable for 7 days provided the associated EDG is verified operable. In addition, continued operation beyond 7 days is allowed as long as

a special report is submitted to the NRC in 48 hours outlining restoration and precaution plans. The proposed amendment would eliminate the EDG operability verification and the special report along with eliminating the option of extending inoperability beyond 7 days (no change to AOT duration).

TS 2.7(2)c. currently allows both HSTs to be inoperable for 72 hours provided both EDGs are verified operable. In addition, continued operation beyond 72 hours is allowed as long as a special report is submitted to the NRC in 48 hours outlining restoration and precaution plans. The proposed amendment would eliminate the EDG operability verifications and the special report along with eliminating the option of extending inoperability beyond 72 hours.

In its May 8, 2009, letter, the licensee proposes to amend the TS as follows:

- TS 2.7(2)a. Change the allowed outage time for auxiliary power transformers TIA-1 and TIA-2 from 24 to 72 hours to be consistent with NUREG 1432, *Standard Technical Specifications* [STS] *for Combustion Engineering Plants*. In addition, add "TIA" to the equipment component name for the auxiliary power transformer "TIA-2" to be consistent with the equipment terminology in TS 2.7(2). This administrative change is being made for consistency.
- TS 2.7(2)b. Remove the requirement to submit a special report to the NRC for restoration plans to allow continued operation beyond the allowed outage time. Remove the requirement to verify diesel generator operability when entering this action statement since diesel generator operability is addressed elsewhere in TS 2.7.
- TS 2.7(2)c. Remove the requirement to submit a special report to the NRC for restoration plans to allow continued operation beyond the allowed outage time. Remove the requirement to verify diesel generator operability when entering this action statement since diesel generator operability is addressed elsewhere in TS 2.7. Administratively change existing verbiage to clarify that the NRC Operations Center shall be notified by telephone within 4 hours after inoperability "of both transformers" instead of "transformer" inoperability.
- TS 5.9.3i. Add a period at the end of the sentence to be consistent with TS 5.9.3. This is an administrative change only.
- TS 5.9.3j. Replace the verbiage, "Electrical systems, reference 2.7(2)." with the word "DELETED" to be consistent with TS 5.9.3. The special reporting requirements for 2.7(2), which are currently delineated in TS 2.7(2)b. and c., will no longer be required pending NRC approval of this LAR. This is an administrative change.
- TS Basis for TS 2.0.1 is being modified to delete the verbiage "provided the operability of both Diesel Generators is immediately verified;" and correct the typographical error by replacing the acronym "LCO's" with

"LCOs" as this is a plural acronym and is not a possessive form. This TS Basis Change (TSBC) is included for information and will be processed in accordance with TS 5.20.

#### 3.3 NRC Staff Evaluation

The objective of TS Section 2.7 is to define those conditions of electrical power availability necessary to provide for safe reactor operation and the continuing availability of engineered safety features. The NRC staff reviewed the proposed changes for compliance with 10 CFR 50.36 and consistency with NUREG-1432, Revision 3, "Standard Technical Specifications Combustion Engineering Plants." In general, licensees cannot justify technical specification changes solely on the basis of adopting the model Standard Technical Specifications. To ensure this, the NRC staff makes a determination that proposed changes maintain adequate safety.

## 3.3.1 Revised TS 2.7(2)a.

The licensee is proposing to change the AOT for APTs TIA-1 and TIA-2 from 24 to 72 hours to be consistent with NUREG-1432, "Standard Technical Specifications [STS], Combustion Engineering Plants." The NRC staff concludes this change is acceptable since it would then be consistent with the AOT for the other offsite circuit (HST circuit). Eliminating the requirement to verify EDG operability is considered acceptable since the EDGs have their own TS surveillances which ensure their operability. In addition, performing EDG surveillance would require the EDG to be made inoperable during the test coincident with the offsite circuit inoperability. The NRC staff concludes these changes are consistent with the STS (NUREG-1432) and are, therefore, acceptable.

#### 3.3.2 Revised TS 2.7(2)b.

The licensee proposes to eliminate the special report requirement during the single HST circuit inoperability. The NRC finds this acceptable since inoperability will now be limited to the 7-day AOT and cannot be extended indefinitely. The NRC staff also concludes changing the HST TS to eliminate the operability verification of the associated EDG acceptable since the EDGs have their own TS surveillances which ensure their operability. In addition, performing EDG surveillance to ensure operability would require the EDG to be made inoperable during the test coincident with the single HST inoperability. These changes are consistent with the STS (NUREG-1432), therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the above changes are acceptable.

#### 3.3.3 Revised TS 2.7(2)c.

The licensee proposes to eliminate the special report requirement during HST circuit inoperability. The NRC staff finds this change acceptable since inoperability will now be limited to the 72-hour AOT and cannot be extended indefinitely. The proposed change to eliminate indefinite extended operation is more restrictive than the current TS. The NRC staff also concludes changing the HST TS that will eliminate the EDG operability verifications acceptable since the EDGs have their own TS surveillances that ensure their operability. In addition, performing EDG surveillance to ensure operability would require the EDG to be made inoperable during the test coincident with the HST offsite circuit inoperability. These changes

are consistent with the STS (NUREG-1432) and, therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the above changes are acceptable.

In addition, TS 2.7(2)c. currently states, in part, that:

The NRC Operations Center shall be notified by telephone within 4 hours after transformer inoperability.

The new TS 2.7(2)c. will state, in part, that:

The NRC Operations Center shall be notified by telephone within 4 hours after inoperability of both transformers.

Based on the above, the staff concludes that the proposed changes to the FCS TS 2.7(2) and TS 5.9.3 meet 10 CFR 50.36 requirements to ensure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained and that the TS limiting conditions for operation will be met.

### 4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Nebraska State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.

#### 5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding published in the *Federal Register* on February 10, 2009 (74 FR 6666). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

### 6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Principal Contributor: K. Miller

Date: July 24, 2009

Mr. David J. Bannister Vice President and CNO Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station 444 South 16th St. Mall Omaha, NE 68102-2247

### SUBJECT: FORT CALHOUN STATION, UNIT NO. 1 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE: REVISE TRANSFORMER ALLOWED OUTAGE TIME IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 2.7(2) (TAC NO. MD9388)

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A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly *Federal Register* notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Alan B. Wang, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-285 Enclosures: 1. Amendment No. 261 to DPR-40 2. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv

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