



Overview of the NSCA Survey Process

Tab C1

Overview

The survey questions are based on the INPO Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture. Generally, the email distribution of the NSCA survey will take place 3-4 weeks prior to the assessment and it will run for two weeks. At the end of two weeks, it will be closed and the information will be processed for use by the team and incorporated into the assessment. During the two weeks of data collection, the NSCA process manager (or fleet safety culture manager) will keep in close touch with the host peer to discuss the progress of the survey. If the percentage of completion is not progressing as expected, it is possible to resend the survey request multiple times to those who do not respond to the first email. Other communications from plant management should be considered also. The data is analyzed and provided to the assessment team. Information from the survey is used to determine areas of focus and if there are any departments or groups which should receive additional interviews. A flow chart of the survey process is provided in attachment 1.

Preparation for electronic survey

A survey plan should be developed to determine the objectives of the survey. For example, if the survey is supporting an independent or third party assessment, additional questions may need to be added to the baseline survey. A communication plan should be utilized to inform personnel of the survey and the importance of completing the electronic survey. The communication needs to inform personnel that their candid comments are confidential. The survey data is captured by a secure external data management company. The system has been designed to ensure personal confidentiality to employees providing the information asked by the questions. It is essential that the employees understand this concept since they may already be reacting to what they may see as "finger-printing" through the survey requiring identification of their level in the organization as well as the department in which they work. Tab B2 contains attachments that can be utilized to assist in developing the communications. Changes can be made to the messages that will go out with the survey; this can be worked out with the NSCA process manager or team leader, early in the process. The survey email should have an introductory message, the survey entry page should contain the guidance on how to perform the survey, and finally a survey exit message should thank personnel for completing the survey.

The required nuclear safety culture survey should be distributed to all plant personnel. The mailing list will need to be provided by the host peer. As an alternative, the site may conduct its own survey; however, this is not recommended. If a different survey is conducted, the results must be provided to the NSCA team a month prior to the assessment and be organized around the NSCA principles and attributes (strictly in accordance with the INPO Principles and Attributes of a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture) so that it is useful to the team.

The IT department will need to be involved with the survey process. Due to SPAM blockers and other technologies that are utilized to prevent malicious electronic media from invading the electronic infrastructures, some test surveys will need to be sent. This will allow the survey to go out to the target population without running into glitches that may prevent the survey from reaching plant personnel.

The NSCA process manager's (NSCA PM) role and responsibility

The NSCA PM (or fleet nuclear safety culture manager) will monitor participation levels during the "run-time" for the data collection. Based on the return rate, the participants who have not filled out the survey may be reminded, or the survey can be sent again to work towards maximum participation levels.

When the expiration date arrives, the NSCA PM (or fleet manager) will close the survey. This stops further participation. The data is then collected and analyzed for the team's use. The administrator of the survey (internal or external) will assemble data in several ways. Consideration should be given to differences in response by different departments. Another is a rank ordered progression the "Top Ten (most positive)" and "Bottom Ten (most negative)" questions from the survey. This will be the most useful "point of entry" to the assessment team that will be coming on site to finish the Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment. Specific information on the calculations of the "Top Ten" and "Bottom Ten" are covered in detail in TAB C3 of the Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment Manual.

The NSC PM (or fleet manager) is responsible for the coordination, administration, distribution and outcome documents used in association with the pre-assessment survey. (The following functions may alternatively be covered by the psychologist for independent or third party assessments).

The NSCA Process Manager is responsible to contact the Team leader prior to the assessment to discuss what the survey data may suggest. The Team leader may wish to consider additional components going into the design of the interview list based on the Organization Chart from the plant.

The NSCA Process Manager (or fleet manager) is responsible to review survey information at the Sunday night meeting. This is to be done in coordination with the team leader.

The NSCA Process Manager will represent the survey outputs (specifically focusing on the "top Ten" and "Bottom Ten" questions) on Wednesday or Thursday as the data is being put into summary form. This is done as a check to review where the assessment started and what the team has formulated as their understanding of the Top and Bottom ten questions.

The NSCA Process Manager will ensure that the team leader has appropriate graphics from the

survey so that the final report will be able to show the whole story of from the survey through the interviews/observations to the final presentation of the INPO Principles and Attributes of Strong Nuclear Safety Culture.

Data use

The data that is produced by the survey will be one of the key determiners of whom and what groups will be interviewed during the on-site phase of the assessment. In **Tab B1** the following duty of the Team Leader is specified; “Ensures that the survey results (top ten/bottom ten questions), are combined with any areas of special interest by plant management and the general coverage of the entire plant work group population in the selection of which groups and individuals will be interviewed by the team.”

On the Sunday night preceding the start of the Interview and Observation component of the Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment, the team will meet for an extended period and review the survey data and have a discussion around the “Top Ten” and “Bottom Ten” lists.

During the (Wednesday or Thursday) team meeting the person responsible for presenting the survey data will conduct a brief meeting with the entire team to review the initial findings of the survey with the data formulated through the interview and observation process. It is important to be able to explain both agreement and major differences between the two components of the program (i.e., the survey and the interview/ observation phases).

Assessment Team Leader and NSCA Process Manager's Checklist

Plant/Location: _____

Dates of Assessment: START _____ FINISH _____

Host Peer: _____ Phone: _____ email: _____

Survey Collection Dates: START _____ FINISH _____

Assessment Team Leader (ATL): _____

Home location: _____ Phone: _____ email: _____

Team Executive Sponsor: _____

Home location: _____ Phone: _____ email: _____

Team Process Manager: _____

Home location: _____ Phone: _____ email: _____

Internal Team Members:

Name: _____ Phone: _____ email: _____

Resume / Background _____

Name: _____ Phone: _____ email: _____

Resume / Background _____

Name: _____ Phone: _____ email: _____

Resume / Background _____

Name: _____ Phone: _____ email: _____

Resume / Background _____

Name: _____ Phone: _____ email: _____

Resume / Background _____

Name: _____ Phone: _____ email: _____

Resume / Background _____

Name: _____ Phone: _____ email: _____

Resume / Background _____

External Team Members:

Name: _____ Phone: _____ email: _____
From: _____ Resume / Background _____

Name: _____ Phone: _____ email: _____
From: _____ Resume / Background _____

Name: _____ Phone: _____ email: _____
From: _____ Resume / Background _____

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From: _____ Resume / Background _____

Name: _____ Phone: _____ email: _____
From: _____ Resume / Background _____

Access to survey responses and Confidentiality:

Team Leader – access to all information, and will appropriately distribute to team prior to the assessment.

Process Manager – will work with all data to put it in useful format for team as well as oversee collection of data during the assessment.

Executive Sponsor and Team Members – will see information distributed by TL.

Site Vice President / CNO will own the Assessment Team Report (Once Assessment Report is completed all working papers are to be destroyed and computers (electronic media) files are to be deleted.)

Discuss, with site senior management, any additional question that they may want to add to the survey.

(Discuss that there are 71 questions in the survey with ability to add comments for each question. The available response ratings are Negative -, Positive + and Neutral o, only and the question will have a comment field.)

Additional questions:

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____


Determine Survey Participants (Target Population for electronic survey):

- Regular full-time employees / Part-time.
 - Supplemental employees.
 - Specific Corporate employees.
 - Specific employees who have moved to other corporate assignments:
 - Others:
- Compile an Email list, from above, and supply it to the NSCA Process Manager. A third party vendor will use the list to send out the emails. The vendor will not use the email list for any other reason.
- Construct initial communication email to be signed by Site Vice President (Senior Plant Management) to be used in introducing the survey and its' importance.
- Utilize other venues to communicate the survey and assessment.
- All-Hands meeting
 - Site newspaper
 - Tailboards
 - Video
- Construct a message for the beginning of the survey.
- Construct a message for the end of the survey, prior to the survey being submitted.
- Determine the IT contact for the electronic survey process.
- Name: _____ Phone: _____ Email: _____
- Discuss with IT personnel how to get the surveys through the firewall when it is sent out in a mass distribution emailing.
- Perform test surveys to validate the survey can get through firewalls and SPAM blockers.
- NSCA Process Manager will provide survey progress to host peer, approximately every three days.
- If participation is not progressing as desired, the site needs to consider other communications efforts to increase the participation.

Timetable:

- Date that Site VP will send out initial message:
- Date of the initial release of survey to participant employees: _____
- Date of check and resubmission to employees not submitting: _____
- Date when Survey will be stopped / closed: _____
- Date Survey reports will be distributed to Team Leader: _____

Survey Plan Sheet 3 (Flow-Chart)





Map of Survey Questions to INPO Principles and Attributes for Strong Nuclear Safety Culture
Tab C2

1. Everyone is personally responsible for nuclear safety.

No	NSCA Question on Survey	INPO Principles & Attributes	INPO Attribute #
1	At PlantX, safety is discussed at every meeting where plant work activities are planned or reviewed.	Responsibility and authority for nuclear safety are well defined and clearly understood. Reporting relationships, positional authority, staffing, and financial resources support nuclear safety responsibilities. Corporate policies emphasize the overriding importance of nuclear safety.	P1a
2	At PlantX, I clearly understand that I am personally responsible for nuclear safety practices that contribute to the overall plant nuclear safety culture.	Responsibility and authority for nuclear safety are well defined and clearly understood. Reporting relationships, positional authority, staffing, and financial resources support nuclear safety responsibilities. Corporate policies emphasize the overriding importance of nuclear safety.	P2b
3	At PlantX, authority and responsibility for nuclear safety is clearly defined	The line of authority and responsibility for nuclear safety is defined from the board of directors to the individual contributor. Each of these positions has clearly defined roles, responsibilities, and authorities, designated in writing and understood by the incumbent.	1A
4	At PlantX, support groups understand their roles in contributing to nuclear safety.	Support groups, such as human resources, labor relations, and business and financial planning, also understand their roles in contributing to nuclear safety.	1B
5	At PlantX, the employees are viewed as the most valuable asset of the nuclear organization.	People and their professional capabilities, values, and experiences are regarded as the nuclear organization's most valuable asset. Staffing levels are consistent with the demands related to maintaining safety and reliability.	1C
6	At PlantX, Senior Corporate Officers reinforce the focus on nuclear safety through site visits.	Board members and corporate officers periodically take steps to reinforce nuclear safety, including visiting sites to assess management effectiveness first-hand.	1D
7	At PlantX, the line organization is the primary source of information and only source of direction.	The line organization, starting with the chief executive officer, is the primary source of information and the only source of direction. Other parties, such as oversight organizations and committees, review boards, and outside advisors, who provide management information essential to effective self-evaluation, are not allowed to dilute or undermine line authority and accountability.	1E

No	NSCA Question on Survey	INPO Principles & Attributes	INPO Attribute #
8	At PlantX, the employees understand and adhere to nuclear safety standards.	All personnel understand the importance of adherence to nuclear safety standards. All levels of the organization exercise healthy accountability for shortfalls in meeting standards.	1F
9	At PlantX, the line of responsibility for nuclear safety is clear and not confused by corporate or fleet-related priorities.	Relationships among utilities, operating companies, and owners are not allowed to obscure or diminish the line of responsibility for nuclear safety.	1G
10	At PlantX, rewards and recognition are tied to strong nuclear safety.	The system of rewards and sanctions is aligned with strong nuclear safety policies and reinforces the desired behaviors and outcomes	1H

2. Leaders demonstrate commitment to safety

No.	NSCA Question on Survey	INPO Principles & Attributes	INPO Attribute #
11	At PlantX, I am able to look around at my various levels of management and see by their example how I am to behave to support nuclear safety culture.	Executive and senior managers are the leading advocates of nuclear safety and demonstrate their commitment both in word and action. The nuclear safety message is communicated frequently and consistently, occasionally as a stand-alone theme. Leaders throughout the nuclear organization set an example for safety.	P2a
12	At PlantX, my supervision has personally recognized me for supporting nuclear safety.	Executive and senior managers are the leading advocates of nuclear safety and demonstrate their commitment both in word and action. The nuclear safety message is communicated frequently and consistently, occasionally as a stand-alone theme. Leaders throughout the nuclear organization set an example for safety.	P2b
13	At PlantX, managers and supervisors are visible in the plant while they coach, mentor and reinforce standards.	Managers and supervisors practice visible leadership in the field by placing “eyes on the problem,” coaching, mentoring, and reinforcing standards. Deviations from station expectations are corrected promptly.	2A

No.	NSCA Question on Survey	INPO Principles & Attributes	INPO Attribute #
14	At PlantX, employees have input into resolving issues.	Management considers the employee perspective in understanding and analyzing issues.	2B
15	At PlantX, managers and supervisors provide appropriate oversight during safety-significant tests or evolutions.	Managers and supervisors provide appropriate oversight during safety-significant tests or evolutions.	2C
16	At PlantX, management is personally involved in reinforcing expected worker behavior during training.	Managers and supervisors are personally involved in high-quality training that consistently reinforces expected worker behaviors.	2D
17	At PlantX, production goals do not take priority over nuclear safety.	Leaders recognize that production goals, if not properly communicated, can send mixed signals on the importance of nuclear safety. They are sensitive to detect and avoid these misunderstandings.	2E
18	At PlantX, the background for operational decisions is promptly communicated to workers.	The bases, expected outcomes, potential problems, planned contingencies, and abort criteria for important operational decisions are communicated promptly to workers.	2F
19	At PlantX informal leaders from the work group (non-supervisors) model safe behavior to meet high standards.	Informal opinion leaders in the organization are encouraged to model safe behavior and influence peers to meet high standards.	2G
20	At PlantX, management employees are selected and evaluated for their contribution to a strong nuclear safety culture.	Selection and evaluation of managers and supervisors consider their abilities to contribute to a strong nuclear safety culture.	2H

3. Trust permeates the organization

No	NSCA Question on Survey	INPO Principles & Attributes	INPO Attribute #
21	At PlantX, my supervisor periodically observes me working and gives me useful feedback about how to improve my performance.	A high level of trust is established in the organization, fostered, in part, through timely and accurate communication. There is a free flow of information in which issues are raised and addressed. Employees are informed of steps taken in response to their concerns.	P3a

No	NSCA Question on Survey	INPO Principles & Attributes	INPO Attribute #
22	At PlantX, our managers spend enough time in the work areas talking with people to know what really goes on around here.	A high level of trust is established in the organization, fostered, in part, through timely and accurate communication. There is a free flow of information in which issues are raised and addressed. Employees are informed of steps taken in response to their concerns.	P3b
23	At PlantX, my manager or supervisor responds to my questions or concerns in an open and honest manner.	A high level of trust is established in the organization, fostered, in part, through timely and accurate communication. There is a free flow of information in which issues are raised and addressed. Employees are informed of steps taken in response to their concerns.	P3c
24	At PlantX, employees are treated with dignity and respect.	People are treated with dignity and respect.	3A
25	At PlantX, concerns over nuclear safety can be expressed without fear of retribution.	Personnel can raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of retribution and have confidence their concerns will be addressed.	3B
26	At PlantX, continuous improvement is important and innovative ideas are encouraged.	Employees are expected and encouraged to offer innovative ideas to help solve problems.	3C
27	At PlantX, differing opinions are welcomed and respected.	Differing opinions are welcomed and respected. When needed, fair and objective methods are used to resolve conflict and unsettled differing professional opinions.	3D
28	At PlantX, supervisors provide a crucial role in supporting safety culture through being responsive to employee questions.	Supervisors are skilled in responding to employee questions in an open, honest manner. They are recognized as an important part of the management team, crucial to translating safety culture into practical terms.	3E
29	At PlantX, the effects of upcoming changes are managed to build organizational trust.	The effects of impending changes (such as those caused by sale or acquisition, bargaining unit contract renegotiations, and economic restructuring) are anticipated and managed such that trust in the organization is maintained.	3F

No	NSCA Question on Survey	INPO Principles & Attributes	INPO Attribute #
30	At PlantX, Management incentive programs focus on long-term plant performance and nuclear safety.	Senior management incentive programs reflect a bias toward long-term plant performance and safety.	3G
31	At PlantX, full disclosure is provided to oversight, audit and regulatory organizations.	Complete, accurate, and forthright information is provided to oversight, audit, and regulatory organizations.	3H
32	At PlantX, trust and a safety culture are enhanced through management communications.	Managers regularly communicate to the workforce important decisions and their bases, as a way of building trust and reinforcing a healthy safety culture. Worker understanding is periodically checked.	3I

5. Decision-making reflects safety first

No	NSCA Question on Survey	INPO Principles & Attributes	INPO Attribute #
33	At PlantX, we follow the procedures and make conservative decisions even if there is a lot of time pressure to get the job done.	Personnel are systematic and rigorous in making decisions that support safe, reliable plant operation. Operators are vested with the authority and understand the expectation, when faced with unexpected or uncertain conditions, to place the plant in a safe condition. Senior leaders support and reinforce conservative decisions.	P4a
34	At PlantX, my supervisor discusses safety with me before I start work on the job.	Personnel are systematic and rigorous in making decisions that support safe, reliable plant operation. Operators are vested with the authority and understand the expectation, when faced with unexpected or uncertain conditions, to place the plant in a safe condition. Senior leaders support and reinforce conservative decisions.	P4b
35	At PlantX, a knowledgeable workforce is maintained to support operational and technical decisions.	The organization maintains a knowledgeable workforce to support a broad spectrum of operational and technical decisions. Outside expertise is employed when necessary.	4A

No.	NSCA Question on Survey	INPO Principles & Attributes	INPO Attribute #
36	At PlantX, all levels respect the roles of others in decision-making.	Managers, supervisors, and staff clearly understand and respect each other's roles in decision-making.	4B
37	At PlantX, employees apply a rigorous approach to problem solving.	Plant personnel apply a rigorous approach to problem-solving. Conservative actions are taken when understanding is incomplete.	4C
38	At PlantX, single-point accountability is maintained for important safety decisions.	Single-point accountability is maintained for important safety decisions, allowing for ongoing assessment and feedback as circumstances unfold.	4D
39	At PlantX, dialogue and debate are encouraged when evaluating safety issues.	Candid dialogue and debate are encouraged when safety issues are being evaluated. Robust discussion and healthy conflict are recognized as a natural result of diversity of expertise and experience.	4E
40	At PlantX, decision-making reflects a conservative approach to nuclear safety.	Decision-making practices reflect the ability to distinguish between "allowable" choices and prudent choices.	4F
41	At PlantX, when new facts call into question prior operational decisions a thorough review is made to improve future decisions.	When previous operational decisions are called into question by new facts, the decisions and associated underlying assumptions are reviewed to improve the quality of future decisions.	4G

5. Nuclear technology is recognized as special and unique

No	NSCA Question on Survey	INPO Principles & Attributes	INPO Attribute #
42	At PlantX, the special characteristics of nuclear technology drive work planning which is performed per established schedules, processes and procedures.	The special characteristics of nuclear technology are taken into account in all decisions and actions. Reactivity control, continuity of core cooling, and integrity of fission product barriers are valued as essential, distinguishing attributes of the nuclear station work environment.	P5a

No	NSCA Question on Survey	INPO Principles & Attributes	INPO Attribute #
43	At PlantX, there is a very high respect for critical safety functions such as core cooling and reactor safety.	Features designed to maintain critical safety functions, such as core cooling, are recognized as particularly important.	5B
44	At PlantX, any activities affecting core reactivity are handled with the utmost care.	Activities that could affect core reactivity are conducted with particular care and caution.	5A
45	At PlantX, design and operating margins are carefully guarded and are changed only with great care.	Design and operating margins are carefully guarded and are changed only with great thought and care. Special attention is placed on maintaining fission product barriers and defense-in-depth.	5C
46	At PlantX, safety related equipment is meticulously maintained well within design requirements.	Equipment is meticulously maintained well within design requirements.	5D
47	At PlantX, insights from probabilistic risk analyses are considered in daily plant activities.	Insights from probabilistic risk analyses are considered in daily plant activities and plant change processes.	5E
48	At PlantX, comprehensive, high-quality processes and procedures govern plant activities.	Plant activities are governed by comprehensive, high-quality processes and procedures.	5F
49	At PlantX, employee knowledge of fundamentals establishes a solid foundation for sound decisions.	Employee mastery of reactor and power plant fundamentals, as appropriate to the job position, establishes a solid foundation for sound decisions and behaviors.	5G
71	At PlantX the work management practices used by all employees support a strong nuclear safety culture.	This question was added to the Principles and Attributes produced by INPO. It was the opinion of the oversight team of the Alliance Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment process that this area had not been included by INPO in the present version of the Fundamentals of Strong Nuclear Safety Culture.	5H

6. A questioning attitude is cultivated

No	NSCA Question on Survey	INPO Principles & Attributes	INPO Attribute #
50	At Plant X we are taught to be vigilant to changing conditions and to be comfortable in challenging our own ideas and those of others as we do our work.	Individuals demonstrate a questioning attitude by challenging assumptions, investigating anomalies, and considering potential adverse consequences of planned actions. This attitude is shaped by an understanding that accidents often result from a series of decisions and actions that reflect flaws in the shared assumptions, values, and beliefs of the organization. All employees are watchful for conditions or activities that can have an undesirable effect on plant safety.	P6a
51	At PlantX, contingencies are developed to deal with the possibility of mistakes and worst-case scenarios.	While individuals expect successful outcomes of daily activities, they recognize the possibility of mistakes and worst-case scenarios. Contingencies are developed to deal with these possibilities.	6A
52	At PlantX, operational anomalies are promptly investigated and resolved.	Anomalies are recognized, thoroughly investigated, promptly mitigated, and periodically analyzed in the aggregate.	6B
53	At PlantX, personnel do not proceed in the face of uncertainty.	Personnel do not proceed in the face of uncertainty.	6C
54	At PlantX, employees identify conditions having a potential to degrade operating or design margins.	Workers identify conditions or behaviors that have the potential to degrade operating or design margins. Such circumstances are promptly identified and resolved.	6D
55	At PlantX, conservative decision-making is applied to mitigate unpredicted failures.	Employees understand that complex technologies can fail in unpredicted ways. They are aware that latent problems can exist, and they make conservative decisions considering this potential.	6E
56	At PlantX, opposing views are encouraged and considered.	Group-think is avoided through diversity of thought and intellectual curiosity. Opposing views are encouraged and considered.	6F

7. Organizational learning is embraced

No	NSCA Question on Survey	INPO Principles & Attributes	INPO Attribute #
57	At PlantX, enough information from a wide variety of sources is shared between work groups to ensure that work is done safely.	Operating experience is highly valued, and the capacity to learn from experience is well developed. Training, self-assessments, corrective actions, and benchmarking are used to stimulate learning and improve performance.	P7a
58	At PlantX, when a serious event happens or a poor decision has been made, managers and supervisors ensure that we learn from it.	Operating experience is highly valued, and the capacity to learn from experience is well developed. Training, self-assessments, corrective actions, and benchmarking are used to stimulate learning and improve performance.	P7b
59	At PlantX, employees are well informed of lessons learned from significant industry and station events.	Individuals are well informed of the underlying lessons learned from significant industry and station events, and they are committed to not repeating these mistakes.	7C
60	At PlantX, root cause analyses are applied effectively.	Expertise in root cause analysis is applied effectively to identify and correct the fundamental causes of events.	7D
61	At PlantX, there are processes established to identify and resolve existing organizational weaknesses.	Processes are established to identify and resolve latent organizational weaknesses that can aggravate relatively minor events if not corrected.	7E
62	At PlantX, employees are confident that nuclear safety issues will be addressed in a timely fashion.	Employees have confidence that issues with nuclear safety implications are prioritized, tracked, and resolved in a timely manner.	7F
63	At PlantX active cultivation of continuous learning is expected – no complacency.	The organization avoids complacency and cultivates a continuous learning environment. The attitude that “it can happen here” is encouraged.	7A
64	At PlantX, Training upholds management standards and expectations along with nuclear safety values.	Training upholds management standards and expectations. Beyond teaching knowledge and skills, trainers are adept at instilling nuclear safety values and beliefs.	7B

8. Nuclear safety undergoes constant examination

No	NSCA Question on Survey	INPO Principles & Attributes	INPO Attribute #
65	At PlantX, senior management is periodically briefed by oversight on Station Safety Performance	Senior executives and board members are periodically briefed on results of oversight group activities to gain insights into station safety performance.	8E
66	At PlantX, there is an effective balance between self-assessments and independent oversight.	A mix of self-assessment and independent oversight reflects an integrated and balanced approach. This balance is periodically reviewed and adjusted as needed.	8A
67	At PlantX, periodic safety culture assessments are used as a basis for improvement.	Periodic safety culture assessments are conducted and used as a basis for improvement.	8B
68	At PlantX, a broad set of performance indicators is utilized with a focus on early detection of problems.	The pitfalls of focusing on a narrow set of performance indicators are recognized. The organization is alert to detect and respond to indicators that may signal declining performance.	8C
69	At PlantX, insights and fresh perspectives provided by operational support or oversight groups are valued.	The insights and fresh perspectives provided by quality assurance, assessment, employee concerns, and independent oversight personnel are valued.	8D
70	At PlantX, nuclear safety culture has improved in the last two years.	Oversight is used to strengthen safety and improve performance. Nuclear safety is kept under constant scrutiny through a variety of monitoring techniques, some of which provide an independent “fresh look.”	P8a



Behavioral Observation Guide

Tab D1

Assessment Team: _____

Date: _____

Position of Interviewee: _____

Collection Sheet Control Number	
Observer Name	
Date	
Activity Observed	

Instructions: Watching how meetings or pre-job briefs are conducted by the leader and how participants react and provide input can provide indicators of nuclear safety culture. Attempt to record observed behaviors on the "Behavioral Observation" sheet as the meeting progresses, but ensure you complete it as soon as possible after the meeting is over. Prior to the meeting the assessors should have a chance to review the meeting handouts and related documents. They should discuss general or specific expectations for the type of meeting, expected outcomes, key participants and their roles.

The observers should decide in advance a few Principles or Attributes they will be specifically be looking at. During the meetings circumstances may change and notes on other few Principles or Attributes may be taken as the situation permits. Not all of the Principles or Attributes are easy to observe in meetings or likely to be observed during a meeting and there is not need to "force fit."

Scoring:

- Score “+, Ø or –“ for each Principles or Attributes when sufficient information is provided.
- If a question has more than 1 part, you may score multiple “+,Ø or –“s.
- If more than one instance of a Principles or Attributes is observed you may score multiple “+,Ø or –“s.
- If the answer to a question under one Principle or attribute is applicable to another Principle or Attribute you may score both with a “+,Ø or –“.

Also, record any obvious work groups or individuals that were not present or represented at this meeting or brief and needed to be there.

Rating	P/A	Principle 1 Everyone is personally responsible for nuclear safety.
	P1a	Are the Lines of authority/duties for nuclear safety clearly defined? Document example(s).
	P1b	Is it clear that employees are familiar with plant policies of <u>nuclear</u> Safety? Document example(s).
	1A	Does line management have clear authority over <u>nuclear</u> safety practices? Document example(s).
	1B	Are Maintenance and Engineering focused to support plant operations? Document example(s).
	1B	How do Maintenance and Engineering support the plant design and licensing bases? Document Example(s).
	1C	Does Management make sure that staffing and other resources are sufficient to safely get the necessary work done? Document example(s).

	1E	Do Oversight personnel provide improvement suggestions? Document example(s).
	1F	Do you see Management correcting performance shortfalls? Document example(s).
	1F	Do you see Management pushing hard for continuous improvement? Document example(s).
	1F	Are Low standards corrected by plant management? Document example(s).
	1G	Do you see a clear role for outside organizations in supporting nuclear safety culture? If so, what role/s?

Rating	P/A	Principle 2 Leaders demonstrate commitment to safety.
	P2a	How are Management employees proactive with safety practices?
	P2b	Does Management routinely reinforce the nuclear safety theme in meetings? Document example(s).

	2A	Did you see Management identify undesirable behaviors in the workforce? Document example(s). If so, what did they do about the undesirable behaviors? Document example(s).
	2A	Did you see Management identify deficient processes? Document example(s). If so, what did they do about the deficient processes? Document example(s).
	2A	Do Management practices at the plant encourage communication? Document example(s).
	2A	Does Management value teamwork at the plant? Document example(s).
	2A	Does Management monitor performance and compare it against the stated expectations? Document example(s).
	2A	Does Management reinforce the problem reporting process? Document example(s).

		Does Management take the lead in critically reviewing technical data to ensure nuclear safety issues are identified? Document example(s).
	2C	Is the nuclear safety issues then actively addressed until resolved? Document example(s).
	2C	Are you confident that appropriate levels of Management are actively involved in the day-to day activities of the plant? Document example(s).
	2D	Are managers and supervisors actively involved in the plant training programs? Document example(s).
	2E	Is it clear that economic pressures do not distract from the focus on nuclear performance? Document example(s).
	2E	Is the organizational focus on safety and reliability along with that of production? Document example(s). Is equipment not operated with significant deficiencies? Document example(s).
	2E	How are time pressures minimized or eliminated at the plant? Document example(s).

	2F	<p>Did you see managers ensuring implementation plans include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • basis for decision, • expected outcomes, • contingencies, and • abort criteria? <p>Document example(s).</p>
	2G	<p>Are workers told of important decisions/strategies? Document example(s).</p>
	2H	<p>Do managers reinforce expected personnel behaviors by the employees? Document example(s).</p>

Rating	P/A	Principle 3 Trust permeates the organization.
	P3b	<p>Are issues are openly discussed at the plant? Document example(s).</p>
	P3c	<p>Does management regularly provide employee feedback on issues? Document example(s).</p>
	3A	<p>Do managers try to avoid a punitive approach to errors? Document example(s).</p>

	3B	Do leaders encourage independent thinking? Document example(s).
	3C	Do managers ask for feedback on implementation plans? Document example(s).
	3C	Does management provide an environment where workers are expected to take part in pursuing solutions to plant problems? Document example(s).
	3D	Were differing opinions openly discussed? Document example(s).
	3E	Does management maintain an atmosphere of open communication to discuss problems? Document example(s).
	3F	Did managers ensure implementation plans include the appropriate level of detail? Document example(s).
	3I	Were communications accurate/thorough? Document example(s).
	3I	Did managers ensure implementation plans included adequate communications to all personnel? Document example(s).

	3l	Did management speak about improving station performance? Document example(s).
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Rating	P/A	Principle 4 Decision-making reflects safety first.
	P4a	Did you see conservative operational decisions being made? Document example(s).
	P4b	Did Operators demonstrate that they have the authority to demand high levels of equipment performance? Document example(s).
	4A	Did management demonstrate getting outside knowledge or expertise for issues at hand? Document example(s).
	4C	Was there a tendency to analyze problems away instead of eliminating them? Document example(s).
	4C	Did management show a low tolerance for deficiencies and/or unreliable equipment? Document example(s).
	4C	Were operability evaluations discussed and challenged? Document example(s).

	4C	If you saw or heard about any investigations - were they structured and comprehensive? Document example(s).
	4D	Was Single point accountability established safety related activities? Document example(s).
	4E	Did plant employees exhibit healthy challenging behaviors with each other? Document example(s).
	4F	Did managers reinforce nuclear plant safety as the overriding priority? Document example(s).
	4G	Did managers encourage reassessment of plans as new information or changing conditions are identified? Document example(s).

Rating	P/A	Principle 5 Nuclear technology is recognized as special and unique.
	P5a	<p>Did Operational decisions take into consideration:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • reactivity control, • fuel integrity, • RCS integrity, • DH removal capability, • containment integrity, • vital supporting auxiliary systems, • inventory control, and • Power availability? <p>Document example(s).</p>

	5A	When considering changes were consequences and safety impacts thoughtfully considered? Document example(s).
	5B	Were issues associated with critical equipment appropriately prioritized/addressed? Document example(s).
	5C	Were nuclear safety margins are managed strongly? Document example(s).
	5C	Did Management give a high level of attention to maintaining plant design intent? Document example(s).
	5C	Did Management give a high level of attention to maintaining plant configuration control? Document example(s).
	5E	Did you see evidence that defense-in-depth is practiced? Document example(s).
	5E	Did you see evidence of risks being carefully evaluated? Document example(s).

	5F	<p>Did you see where Management formally defines:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • problem reporting criteria, • desired level of problem evaluation, and • Timeliness of corrective actions. <p>Document example(s).</p>
	5H	<p>Did you see where Management ensures that work is performed in accordance with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • established plans, • schedules and • Procedures? <p>Document example(s).</p>
	5H	<p>In your opinion was work is prioritized to support safe and reliable operations? Document example(s).</p>

Rating	P/A	Principle 6 A questioning attitude is cultivated.
	P6a	<p>Did Management encourage employees at all levels in the organization to identify a broad range of problems? Document example(s).</p>
	P6a	<p>Did the Station Management reinforce a questioning attitude? Document example(s).</p>

	6A	Were human performance improvements discussed and acted upon? Document example(s).
	6A	Was equipment protection provided when redundancy was challenged? Document example(s).
	6A	Were potential risks and contingencies recognized? Document example(s).
	6A	Were potential risks and contingencies thoroughly discussed. Document example(s).
	6B	Were long-term, repetitive problems discussed? Document example(s).
	6B	Were long-term, repetitive problems then acted upon? Document example(s).
	6B	How was the significance of events recognized and not under-played? Document example(s).
	6B	Once event significance was recognized how aggressive were the reactions? Document example(s).

	6B	How were Operator Work Arounds acted upon? Document example(s).
	6C	Did additional discussions occur with plant personnel when faced with uncertainties? Document example(s).
	6D	How was intolerance to degraded equipment exhibited? Document example(s).
	6E	How did the plant make sure that the question: "What could go wrong" is routinely addressed? Document example(s).
	6F	Did the plant staff constructively challenge each other? Document example(s).

Rating	P/A	Principle 7 Organizational learning is embraced.
	P7a	Did you see the frequent discussion of operating experience? Document example(s).
	7A	Did you experience Management setting goals encouraging continual improvement in performance? Document example(s).

	7B	How did the training reinforce management expectations? Document example(s).
	7C	Did Management give a high level of attention to the use of operating experience? Document example(s).
	7D	Was a structured root cause analysis process often used? Document example(s).
	7E	Were organizational causes of events explored thoroughly? Document example(s).
	7F	Was Management concerned about the age of outstanding corrective actions? Document example(s).
	7F	Were the Condition Reports categorized properly? Document example(s).
	7F	Were Condition Report dates for action commensurate with the importance? Document example(s).
	7F	Were problems evaluated commensurate with their significance? Document example(s).

	7F	<p>Were new problems reported in the corrective action program screened promptly for their effect on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • safety, • reliability, • operability, and • reportability. <p>Document example(s).</p>
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Rating	P/A	Principle 8 Nuclear safety undergoes constant examination.
	8C	How was trending discussed/used? Document example(s).
	8C	How were performance indications adequately monitored? Document example(s).
	8D	How were Quality Assurance and other Oversight groups involved in nuclear safety practices? Document example(s).
	8D	How intrusive were Quality Assurance and other Oversight groups in nuclear safety matters? Document example(s).



Field Note Collection Guide

Tab D2

Collection Sheet Control Number	
Observer Name	
Date	
Activity Observed	

Instructions: Field Notes are used in two circumstances; 1) During planned plan field activities or tours, or 2) casual opportunities during the assessment.

Prior to planned field observations or tours the assessors should have a chance to review the work to be done (Procedure or Maintenance Order) or the areas to be visited. They should discuss general or specific expectations for the type of activity to be observed or expectations for housekeeping, warning signs, radiological postings or requirements, etc. for the area(s) to be visited. The observers should decide in advance a few Principles or Attributes they will be specifically be looking at. During the note collection circumstances may change and notes on other few Principles or Attributes may be taken as the location or situation permits.

- Score “+, Ø or –” for each Principles or Attributes when sufficient information is provided.
- If a question has more than 1 part, you may score multiple “+,Ø or –”s.
- If more than one instance of a Principles or Attributes is observed you may score multiple “+,Ø or –”s.
- If the answer to a question under one Principle or Attribute is applicable to another Principle or Attributes you may score both with a “+,Ø or –”.

RATING +, -, Ø	Principle / Attribute	Observation Facts/Details
RATING	ATTRIBUTE	

RATING	ATTRIBUTE	
RATING	ATTRIBUTE	
RATING	ATTRIBUTE	