

#	EAL	QUESTION / ISSUE / CONCERN
1	N/A	<p>In the response to RAI #3, it was stated “The failure mechanism for loss of indication for both a digital or non-digital indication and monitoring system is loss of DC power which is addressed by CU7, Unplanned Loss of Required DC power for 15 minutes or longer.”</p> <p>Provide the failure mode analysis for the digital I&C system to be installed at the AP1000 and ESBWR plants, as well as their applicable Technical Specifications, to support your statement that the failure mechanism is bounded by CU7.</p> <p>Provide the failure mode analysis and applicable Technical Specifications to support your statement that a loss of the non-digital indication and monitoring systems is bounded by CU7.</p> <p>Develop EALs that are equivalent to proposed SA4 and SS6 for cold, refuel, or defueled operating modes.</p>
2	N/A	<p>In the response to RAI #9, the 1st paragraph of Section 5.3 was revised instead of deleting it as requested by the staff.</p> <p>The basis for the staff’s RAI is that new reactor applications, that will use NEI 07-01 in the development of the emergency action levels, must adhere to the presentation method as proposed in NEI 07-01 if these new reactor applicants are choosing to commit to NEI 07-01 versus providing a complete detailed set of emergency action levels with their new reactor applications. For new reactor applicants choosing to commit to NEI 07-01 versus providing a complete and detailed set of EALs in their new reactor application, the staff’s expectation is that this guidance will be applied exactly as presented in NEI 07-01 with applicable site-specific information developed as directed by the applicable Developer Note.</p> <p>Explain how maintaining this paragraph as proposed in your response to RAI #9 will provide sufficient specificity to allow the staff to reach a reasonable assurance finding for new reactor applications committing to NEI 07-01.</p>

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3	N/A	<p>In the response to RAI #10, you stated in part, "Not including definitions will help ensure consistency between the Security Plan and Emergency Plans should subsequent definition changes be made to these terms."</p> <p>The basis for the staff's position is that incorporation of common terminology throughout the nuclear industry is advantageous and is expected, particularly for the definition of terms used for non-design related issues such as Security. Regardless of their specific use in NEI 07-01, it is expected that definitions be consistent in all endorsed EAL guidance documents unless excluded by applicable design considerations.</p> <p>The staff considers the following definitions important for implementation in NEI 07-01, in addition to the definitions already proposed: (affecting) safe shutdown, bomb, civil disturbance, extortion, sabotage, and strike action.</p>
4	AU2	<p>In the response to RAI #13, question 2, you stated that threshold #1.b (AP1000) was modified so that a Developer Note is no longer required.</p> <p>However, the proposed AU2 AP1000 threshold 1.b still has a site-specific tag. Explain or correct the inconsistency, and provide more detail in the Developer Note if the site specific tag is maintained.</p> <p>In addition, explain how a Refueling Bridge 'Portable' Monitor will be acceptable as an EAL threshold for AU2. Is it required in all operating modes? Provide the documentation that details this requirement.</p>
5	AA2	<p>In the response to RAI #15, question 3, you stated that a Developer Note for threshold #2 (AP1000) was provided. However, the Developer Note that is still there is unacceptable as it does not clearly describe how this site specific information will be developed. Provide more detail in the Developer Note if the site specific tag is maintained</p> <p>In addition, explain how a Refueling Bridge 'Portable' Monitor will be acceptable as an EAL threshold for AU2. Is it required in all operating modes? Provide the documentation that details this requirement.</p>
6	CS1	<p>In the response to RAI #24, question 1, the threshold value was changed to an actual value rather than "offscale low." This is an acceptable approach; however, the logic between the two instruments was also changed from an "OR" to an "AND."</p> <p>Explain why this logic was changed with no justification provided to the staff, provide justification in support of this change, or correct the discrepancy.</p> <p>Note that the equivalent threshold in the Fission Barrier Matrix is an "OR" logic.</p>

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7	CG1	<p>In the response to RAI #25, question 1, the threshold value was changed to an actual value rather than "offscale low." This is an acceptable approach; however, the logic between the two instruments was also changed from an "OR" to an "AND."</p> <p>Explain why this logic was changed with no justification provided to the staff, provide justification in support of this change, or correct the discrepancy.</p> <p>Note that the equivalent threshold in the Fission Barrier Matrix is an "OR" logic.</p>
8	SS6	<p>In the response to RAI 39, question 2, it was stated that the developer information was incorporated into the Basis. However, this was not actually done. The actions from your RAI response need to be completed.</p>
9	CU3 CU7 CA3 SU1 SA1 SS1 SS3	<p>In response to RAIs 40, 42-45, it was stated that if there was power on the DC buss there is power on the UPS buss.</p> <p>Explain why the EAL thresholds are not limited to the UPS busses or develop an EAL that captures a loss of the inverters.</p> <p>In addition, explain why CU3 and SU1 are not worded the same and why the cold equivalent to SS3, CU7, is two classifications lower.</p>