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**Timothy P. Cleary**  
Site Vice President  
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

June 16, 2009

10 CFR 50.73

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Gentlemen:

**TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) UNITS 1  
AND 2 - DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE  
DPR-77 AND DPR-79 - LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 50-327/2008-002-01**

The enclosed LER is being revised to indicate that the condition has subsequently been determined to be a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (v) (D). The event concerned an unplanned failure of the "B" train main control room air handling unit in conjunction with planned maintenance to replace the batteries for the 1A-A emergency diesel generator. The revisions are annotated by a vertical bar to the right of the text.

The event report was originally submitted on November 25, 2008. The condition was reported, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (i) (B), as any operation or condition which was prohibited by Technical Specification.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads 'Timothy P. Cleary'.

Timothy P. Cleary  
Site Vice President

Enclosure  
cc: See page 2

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

INPO Records Center  
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations  
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NRC FORM 366 (9-2007)		U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION			APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104		EXPIRES 08/31/2010				
<b>LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)</b> (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)					Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.						
1. FACILITY NAME Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1					2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000327		3. PAGE 1 of 6				
4. TITLE: Loss of a Main Control Room Air Handling Unit In Conjunction With an Emergency Power Source Out of Service											
5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER	
09	26	2008	2008	002	01	06	16	2009	Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2	05000328	
9. OPERATING MODE  1			11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)							DOCKET NUMBER	
10. POWER LEVEL  100			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2201(d)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)	
			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(4)	
			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)(5)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	
			<input type="checkbox"/> 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A					
12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER											
NAME Rusty Proffitt, Licensing Engineer								TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 423-843-6651			
13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT											
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX		
X	EK	MO	L205	Y							
14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED						15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE			MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)						<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO					
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)											
<p>The enclosed LER is being revised to indicate that the reported condition has subsequently been determined to be a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function. On September 24, 2008, at 1705 Eastern daylight time (EDT), Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.8.1.1, was entered for scheduled maintenance of the 1A-A emergency diesel generator (EDG) 125-volt battery bank. At the time of entering the LCO, both Units 1 and 2 were operating in Mode 1. The scheduled battery bank maintenance was expected to take approximately 64 hours. On September 25, 2008, at 2255, LCO 3.7.15, was entered because of a motor failure on the associated "B" train main control room air handling unit. Also TS LCO 3.0.5 was entered, which required action to be initiated within 2 hours to place both units in Hot Standby in the following 6 hours. Enforcement discretion was requested and granted on September 26, 2008, to extend the expiration time of LCO 3.0.5 an additional 36 hours. Compensatory measures were initiated to administratively control and protect vital plant equipment during this period of time for completing maintenance to replace the batteries for the 1A-A EDG and the unplanned maintenance to replace the motor in the "B" train main control room air handling unit. Subsequently, SQN returned the EDG battery bank to service and exited LCO 3.8.1.1 and LCO 3.0.5 on September 26, 2008 at 1400 EDT. The risk associated with swapping the main control room air handling units while the 1A-A EDG was inoperable was not adequately assessed. Actions were expedited to repair the "B" train main control room air handling unit motor and return the 1A-A EDG operable.</p>											

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Unit 1	05000327	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION	2 OF 6
		2008 --	002 --	01	

17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)

I. PLANT CONDITION(S)

Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operating at 100 percent power.

II. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

A. Event:

On September 24, 2008, at 1705 Eastern daylight time (EDT), Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.8.1.1, "A/C Sources," was entered for scheduled maintenance of the 1A-A emergency diesel generator (EDG) [EIS Code EK] 125-volt battery bank. The scheduled battery bank maintenance was expected to take approximately 64 hours. On September 25, 2008, at 2255, LCO 3.7.15, "Control Room Air-Conditioning System," was entered because of a motor failure on the associated "B" train main control room air handling unit [EIS Code VI]. Under this condition TS LCO 3.0.5 was entered, which required action to be initiated within 2 hours to place both units in Hot Standby in the following 6 hours.

Enforcement discretion was requested and granted on September 26, 2008, to extend the expiration time of LCO 3.0.5 an additional 36 hours. Compensatory measures were initiated to administratively control and protect vital plant equipment during this period of time for completing maintenance to replace the batteries for the 1A-A EDG and the unplanned maintenance to replace the motor in the "B" train main control room air handling unit. Subsequently, SQN returned the EDG battery bank to service and exited LCO 3.8.1.1 and LCO 3.0.5 on September 26, 2008 at 1400 EDT.

B. Inoperable Structures, Components, or Systems that Contributed to the Event:

None.

C. Dates and Approximate Times of Major Occurrences:

September 24, 2008 at 1705 EDT      EDG 1A-A was declared inoperable in preparation for EDG 125-volt battery bank maintenance.

September 25, 2008 at 2250 EDT      A swap of main control room air conditioning system, from train "A" to "B" was attempted, at which time the "B" train main control room air handling unit tripped when attempting to start. Train "A" continued to operate.

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1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET	6. LER NUMBER			3. PAGE
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17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)

September 25, 2008 at 2255 EDT Main control room air conditioning system "B" train was declared inoperable when an investigation revealed smoke and a burnt smell from the B-B main control room air handling unit motor. TS LCO 3.0.5 was entered which required both units to be in Hot Standby at 0655 on September 9, 2008.

September 26, 2008 at ~0400 EDT NRC granted TVA's verbal request for enforcement discretion to extend the expiration time of LCO 3.0.5 an additional 36 hours.

September 26, 2008 at 0507 EDT The EDG 1A-A battery bank was aligned to the 125-volt dc distribution board and charger. The 1A-A EDG was considered functionally available but inoperable per TS.

September 26, 2008 at 1400 EDT EDG 1A-A was declared operable after its battery passed its TS required surveillance test. TS LCO 3.0.5 was exited.

D. Other Systems or Secondary Functions Affected:

No other systems or secondary functions were affected by this event.

E. Method of Discovery:

"B" train main control room air handling unit tripped while attempting to start. Control room air conditioning system "B" train was declared inoperable when an investigation revealed smoke and a burnt smell from the B-B main control room air handling unit motor.

F. Operator Actions:

Main control room air conditioning system "B" train was declared inoperable because of the "B" train main control room air handling unit motor failure. TS LCO 3.0.5 was entered on both units. Compensatory measures were initiated to administratively control and protect vital plant equipment during this period of time to complete maintenance to replace the batteries for the 1A-A EDG and the unplanned maintenance to replace the motor in the "B" train main control room air handling unit. Subsequently, SQN returned the EDG 1A-A battery bank and the "B" train main control room air handling unit to service.

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17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)

G. Safety System Responses:

No safety system response was required.

III. CAUSE OF THE EVENT

A. Immediate Cause:

"B" train main control room air handling unit motor failed during the time 1A-A EDG was inoperable for battery bank replacement.

B. Root Cause:

The risk associated with swapping the main control room air handling units while the 1A-A EDG was inoperable was not adequately assessed.

C. Contributing Factor:

None.

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

Main control room air conditioning system train "A" was inoperable solely because of its emergency power source being unavailable (EDG 1A-A). The redundant main control room air conditioning system train "B" became inoperable which required both units to enter LCO 3.0.5 which required 2 hours to return the EDG to service or place both units in Hot Standby in 6 hours. Train "A" main control room air conditioning system continued to perform its intended function of maintaining control room temperature.

If a loss of off-site power occurs, the EDG battery provides control power during the blackout period and field flash current for excitation during a EDG start. Prior to expiration of the time limit of LCO 3.0.5, the EDG battery was made available and was sufficiently charged to assure that the battery would perform its function in support of EDG 1A-A.

In the unlikely event the "A" train main control room air handling unit was lost, TVA calculations demonstrate that more than 18 hours exist before the main control room would become an uninhabitable environment. In addition, shutdown of both units can be accomplished from the backup control room. The backup control room is located outside the main control room and is supplied by a different air-conditioning system that was available during the 36-hour extension time.

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17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)

There was no net increase in radiological risk to the public by avoiding the unnecessary transient imposed by compliance with LCO 3.0.5 and safety continued to be assured by the "A" train main control room air conditioning system, which was performing its intended function of maintaining control room temperature.

V. ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

Based on the above "Analysis of The Event," this event did not adversely affect the health and safety of plant personnel or the general public.

VI. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

A. Immediate Corrective Actions:

Compensatory measures were put in place to ensure no activities would take place that could affect the supporting systems and equipment for the "A" train main control room air conditioning system. Actions were expedited to repair the "B" train main control room air handling unit motor and return to operable the 1A-A EDG.

B. Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence:

Operations clarified guidance for operating out of train equipment and developed required approval for manipulating 'protected' equipment.

Establish a process for review and control of site work activities for potential nuclear safety or generation risk that provides a mechanism to reassess nuclear safety or generation risk upon change to the original scope or planning of the activity.

Establish visual aids for work packages and procedures that identify the type and level of risk associated with the work.

VII. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A. Failed Components:

Main Control Room Air Handling Unit motor.

B. Previous LERs on Similar Events:

A review of previous reportable events did not identify any previous similar events.

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17. NARRATIVE (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)

C. Additional Information:

None.

D. Safety System Functional Failure:

This event did constitute in a safety system functional failure in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v).

E. Unplanned Scram with Complications:

This condition did not result in an unplanned scram with complications.

VIII. COMMITMENTS

None.