June 5, 2009 (2:43pm)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS STAFF

In the matter of
Entergy Corporation
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
License Renewal Application

Docket # 50-293

June 4, 2009

POST HEARING DEVELOPMENTS: LEAKS OF CONTAMINATED WATER FROM BURIED PIPING AT OYSTER CREEK & INDIAN POINT AS THEY PERTAIN TO PILGRIM WATCH'S PETITION FOR REVIEW OF LBP-06-848 AND INTERLOCUTORY DECISIONS

To the Honorable Chairman Jaczko and Members of the Commission:

Post hearing developments at Oyster Creek and Indian Point directly pertain to Pilgrim Watch's Petition for Review of LBP-06-848, Contention 1 now before the Commissioners. These developments include the recent leaks of radioactive contaminated water from buried pipes at both Oyster Creek and Indian Point; and the Honorable Edward J. Markey's letter to the Commissioners expressing his "grave concerns regarding the current inspections regime for buried pipes" and that he finds them "profoundly inadequate to ensure the public health and safety."

These developments were not brought forward by Pilgrim Watch at the Hearing for the simple reason that they had not yet occurred.

1. Oyster Creek: Leaks Of Radioactive Liquid Nine Days After License Renewal

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Company's renewed license was issued April 8, 2009. Nine days later (April 17) workers found an elevated level of radioactive tritium (102,000 picocuries from one sample, 5 times higher than the EPA limit for drinking water per liter) from two buried pipes associated with the condensate storage tank. One pipe had a 5/8 of an inch hole in an 8-

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inch carbon steel pipe; the other had a 1-inch hole in it. These leaks demonstrate The Inadequacy of NRC's staff safety inspections during the license renewal process and inadequacy of the aging management program for buried components.

According to press reports, NRC's Neil Sheehan reported in an email that Exelon said that they examined one of the two pipes with holes before its operating license was renewed; however it appears the pipe was inspected in a different spot than where the hole was found.² This highlights a fundamental weakness of the Aging Management Program (AMP) that Pilgrim Watch brought forward in Pilgrim's license renewal adjudication.

Exelon stated that underground piping systems carrying radioactive water will be moved above ground or placed in vaults. In other words Exelon admits, after the fact, that there is a problem. Will Pilgrim's buried piping carrying radioactive water be similarly placed above ground or in vaults; or does NRC condone New Jersey citizens being safer than Massachusetts citizens?

The inescapable conclusion from these leaks is as follows.

- (A) The pipes leaked nine days into the twenty year license extension. The Oyster Creek Aging Management Program for Buried Pipes was obviously insufficient.
- (B) The NRC Staff Safety Review did not identify deficiencies in the buried piping AMP; there is no basis to assume that Pilgrim's SER was any better.
- (C) Although the applicant must "demonstrate that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation;" the definition of those intended functions is too limited. The Applicant, NRC Staff and the ASLB maintained in Pilgrim's License Renewal that the intended function of buried components does not include containment of radioactive liquids to prevent leaks, such as at Oyster Creek of unmonitored radioactivity into the environment.

¹ Brick Township Bulletin, Holes in two pipes thought to be source of tritium leaks, Patricia Miller, May 7, 2009

² Cherry Hill Courier Post, Only one leaking Oyster Creek pipe inspected, Todd Bates, May 2, 2009

Does the Commission support this astounding assertion? Can the Commissioners seriously tell the public that the unmonitored leakage of radioactive liquids from components is so unimportant that it does not care whether there is reasonable assurance that the AMP will prevent them?

2. Indian Point: Leaks of Radioactive Liquid; License Application Currently Under Review

On April 30, 2009 the Honorable Edward Markey, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment and the Honorable John J. Hall, Member of Congress, wrote to the Commission about the leak at Indian Point.³ On February 16, 2009, again after the close of the Pilgrim Hearing, Entergy determined that a buried section of the Unit 2 condensate storage tank (CST) return line leaked water at a rate of approximately 18 gallons per minute. Entergy determined that a 1.5 inch diameter corrosion hole was the source of the leak. All told, 100,000 gallons had leaked.

James Sheets, a spokesman for Entergy, said that the pipe that broke was made of carbon steel covered with a protective coating and external corrosion caused the rupture.⁴

Lessons learned from Indian Point

A. Carbon steel, like all metals, corrodes. Protective coating corrodes, is defective or becomes damaged. External corrosion caused the rupture at Indian Point. Chemistry control that targets interior surfaces provides no guarantee that pipes shall maintain their integrity. All of these issues were raised by Pilgrim Watch. Indian point shows their importance.

B. The corroded pipe at Indian Point adds to the long and growing list of pipe leaks around the county. Leaks of water with radioactivity have been discovered in underground piping, for

³ Their letter is attached; the Commission has yet to respond.

⁴ New York Times, Indian Pt. Broken Pipe Spurs Safety Worries, Annie Correal, February 28, 2009

example, at Byron, Braidwood, Dresden, Palo Verde, Indian Point, and Oyster Creek. Tritium

was discovered in monitoring wells at Pilgrim.

C. Representative Markey said in his letter to then-Chairman Klein that the leak raised serious

questions about Entergy's and the regulatory commission's oversight. "This leak may

demonstrate a systemic failure of the licensee and the commission to inspect critical buried pipes

in a manner sufficient to guarantee the public health and safety." He noted that physically

inspecting buried piping systems poses unique challenges due to limited accessibility. However,

he noted that many industries have successfully developed technologies and programs to deal

with this problem. Congressman Markey concluded his letter by asking "Has the Commission

ever considered requiring licensees to develop technologies and methods to inspect difficult to

access buried pipes? If so, why are such requirements not in place?"

Pilgrim Watch's testimony at the Pilgrim hearing specifically answered Congressman Markey's

question. There are technologies and programs available to supplement the AMP to make it

sufficient – backfit cathodic protection, require a robust inspection protocol, install a sufficient

number of monitoring wells, and perform a baseline inspection prior to license renewal so that

there is a benchmark of conditions to measure the rate of corrosion going forward.

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The post-hearing leaks of radioactive liquid at Oyster Creek and Indian Point support Pilgrim

Watch's position that leaving leakage of unmonitored quantities of radioactive liquids out of the

licensing procedure and subject only to some industry voluntary program, is an abdication of

NRC's responsibility to protect the public from unmonitored radioactive exposure and is

contrary to NRC's ALARA principle.

Thank-you for your consideration, I am sincerely,

Mary Lampert, pro se

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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In the Matter of

Docket # 50-293-LR

Entergy Corporation

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the following was served June 4, 2009, Post Hearing Developments: Leaks of Contaminated Water From Buried Piping at Oyster Creek & Indian Point As They Pertain To Pilgrim Watch's Petition For Review Of LBP-06-848 and Interlocutory Decisions

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